JOSE DOLIENDO v. DOMINGO BIARNESA
GAUDENCIO & GENEROSA ORDOÑEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS and Monico Ordoñez
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
July 30, 1990 | Griño-Aquino, J.
DOCTRINE:  Possession,  to  constitute  the  foundation  of  a  prescriptive  right,  must be possession under a  and that the property in ques on was included in a public auc on due to subsis ng obliga ons
claim of title or it must be adverse.  that occurred when he was alive. Biarnesa bought such property and began occupying it for more
 
FACTS:  Pe oner Gaudencio and private respondent Monico are full blood brothers. There are
two (2) parcels of unregistered land which Monico inherited from his parents' estate: (1) the
"looban" which is a residen al lot where the ancestral house stands in which Monico lives, and (2)
the "tubigan," a riceland.
Private respondent sold the "tubigan" to Gaudencio for P150 and in payment of his prior
indebtedness to said pe oner of P500. It is evidenced by a duly notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale. Private respondent tes fied that he verbally mortgaged the "looban" to Pedro Encarnacion
as security for a loan of P300.
Upon private respondent's request, Gaudencio paid P400 to Encarnacion in se lement of the
private respondent's debt. Pe oner stepped into the shoes of the former creditor, Pedro
Encarnacion. Pe oner Gaudencio allowed his grandson, Pablito Bernardo, and his wife to build a
house on the property.
On July 8, 1983, the private respondent filed a complaint (1) to quiet his tle over both parcels of
land (the "tubigan" and "looban") against his older brother, herein pe oner Gaudencio, and (2) to
eject the Bernardo spouses from the "looban." (Dispute about the ownership of the “looban” land)
TC ruled in favor of private respondent as owner of looban. CA affirmed. Hence this pe on.
Pe oners alleged that he acquired said property by acquisi ve prescrip on
  
ISSUE: Whether the pe oner acquired the land “looban” by acquisi ve prescrip on
  
HELD: NO.  from Belarmino.
The Court of Appeals and the lower court correctly held that the receipts for realty taxes paid by
Encarnacion and the pe oner, Gaudencio Ordoñez, on the "looban" are not evidence of tle. At
best, they were indicia of possession. But as against the admi ed fact that private respondent
was in actual occupancy of the "looban" as he was the one living in the ancestral home, the tax
receipts of the pe oner Gaudencio may not prevail as proof of his alleged "adverse" possession
of the property that could ripen to ownership by acquisi ve prescrip on.
That Gaudencio's possession was neither adverse nor con nuous, is supported by the fact that he
admi edly had never informed private respondent, nor any of his brothers and other rela ves,
that he had purchased the "looban" from Pedro Encarnacion. Possession, to cons tute the
founda on of a prescrip ve right, must be possession under a claim of tle or it must be adverse.
Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds the property by mere tolerance of
the owner are clearly not in the concept of an owner, and such possessory acts, no ma er how
long con nued, do not start the period of prescrip on running. Private respondent won, since
pe oner did not have possession under a claim of tle and does not have adverse possession
since in the lower court, Monico was the one who was living and in possession of the disputed
land. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
pe on for review is denied, with costs against the pe oners.
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
December 27, 1906 | Carson, J.
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  Doliendo bought a property from Belarmino. Belarmino later on died
than 20 years. Doliendo filed a case before the RTC averring that he is the righ ul owner. RTC
granted the mo on in favor of Doliendo. However, the Supreme Court ra ocinated otherwise on
the basis that Doliendo failed to assert his claim regarding the property in ques on since he only
filed a claim a er 20 years.
DOCTRINE:    An  action  for  reacquisition  of  land  should  be  filed  within  10  years  or  else  such  action  will 
prescribe against the owner 
  
FACTS:  Doliendo bought a property from Ventura Belarmino on 11-30-1888. Belarmino later on
died and that a proceeding was held for the dissolu on of her proper es which thereby making
the property in ques on in this case to be included in a public auc on.
Biarnesa was able to buy this land and occupy it on 12-31-1892. It is to be noted that he took
possession of such land un l the filing of a complaint against the defendant. The RTC ruled in
favor of Doliendo on the basis that it was sufficiently proven that Doliendo really bought it from
Belarmino. Hence this pe on to the Supreme Court.
  
ISSUE:  Whether Doliendo is barred from reacquiring his property on the basis that prescrip on
already ran in favor of Biarnesa
HELD: YES. 
The judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed and now in favor of Biarnesa. The Supreme
Court held that Biarnesa should be the lawful owner on the land since he was already occupying
the said land ever since 1892. Hence, the prescrip on ran against Doliendo on the basis that he
wasn’t able to file anything regarding this ma er not un l 20 years a er the purchase of Doliendo
 
SOUTH CITY HOMES Inc. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and Court of Appeals
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
May 25, 1990 | Cruz, J.
RECIT-READY:  Pe oner owns two lots surrounding a strip of land. He claimed ownership on the
basis of prescrip on. SC ruled that his possession was far too short of the required prescrip ve
period for acquisi on of immovable property.
DOCTRINE:  The  prescriptive  period  required  for  acquisition  of  immovable  property  is  ten  years  if  the 
possession is in good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land is public. 
FACTS:  The subject of this dispute is a strip of land between two lots owned by the pe oner.
South City Homes, Inc now iden fied as Lot No. 5005. Lots 2381 and 2386-A (two lots bordering
the Lot 5005) were acquired by the pe oner in 1977 and 1981 respec vely.
Pe oner argues that Lot 5005 should be registered in its because it had acquired the property
by prescrip on through uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner, by itself and its
predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 1 
Respondent Republic argues that subject land cannot be subjected to prescrip on because On May 31, 1978 Private Respondents answered that the Pe oner’s COA was barred by
pe oner had not established the requisite possession of the lot, as to the manner and length, to prescrip on. Oct 10, 1979 Respondent Judge issued an Order, which the Pe oner prays to be
jus fy judicial confirma on of tle. set aside

Trial Court ruled in favor of pe oner and registra on of lot under pe oner’s name was ordered. ISSUE: Whether pe oner is barred by prescrip on from asser ng her right to the property
CA reversed.   
   HELD: NO 
ISSUE: Whether the pe oner had validly acquired the lot in ques on through prescrip on The ques oned Order has to be set aside as prayed by the pe oner. In the present case, it is
   ex nc ve prescrip on which is involved . From August 12, 1963, to May 7, 1978, less than thirty
HELD: NO.  (30) years had elapsed. The respondent judge apparently relying on paragraph 2 of the
The pe oner presented only two witnesses whose tes mony regarding its supposed possession above-quoted ar cle has ruled in effect that the ac on is barred because the defendants have
of Lot No. 5005 is essen ally hearsay and inherently inadequate. According to the tes mony, acquired the subject ma er of the ac on by acquisi ve prescrip on of ten (10) years.
there was an irriga on canal constructed on the strip of land in ques on.
This is manifest error for the defendants have not claimed acquisi ve prescrip on in their answer
A er the cadastral survey, the canal gradually disappeared by the filling up of dirt and silt, un l and even if they did, it cannot be given judicial sanc on on mere allega ons. The law requires one
such me that no one could no ce any more a canal, such that the same was taken possession of who asserts ownership by adverse possession to prove the presence of the essen al elements
by both the owners of Lot 2381 and 2386. which in ordinary acquisi ve prescrip on of real estate are good faith, a just tle and the lapse of
me fixed by law.
This tes mony falls short of establishing the manner and length of possession required by law to
vest prescrip ve tle in the pe oner to Lot No. 5005. For one thing, the claim of adverse This was not done by the defendants before the respondent judge dismissed the complaint
ownership to the strip of land was  not  exclusive  but  shared  by  predecessors-in-interest  of  the  against them. WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 10, 1979, of the respondent judge is
petitioner.  For another the length of possession claimed by the petitioner is not sufficient to vest  hereby set aside and he is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. OZ-704. Costs against the private
prescriptive  title  in  it.  Tacking of possession allowed only when there is a privity of contract or respondents.
rela onship between the previous and present possessors.  

In the absence of such privity, the possession of the new occupant should be counted only from  BASILIO GODINEZ, Tecla, Gregorio, Tranquilino, & Concepcion Godinez, and Pedro Jayme
the  time  it  actually  began  and  cannot  be  lengthened  by connecting it with the possession of the  v. COURT OF APPEALS and Mamerto & Lorenzo Igot
former  possessors. Pe oner’s possession  should  begin  from  1981  when  it  acquired  the  two  Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be part of the other two.  March 18, 1985 | Aquino, J.
  RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  Felix Bergado owned a lot, which was eventually inherited by his
Pe oner’s possession  of  the  land  for  less  than  3  years  was  far  too  short  of  the  prescriptive  seven children. Judge Pablo adjudicated 1/6 share to each one of them, instead of 1/7. Due to
period  required  for  acquisition  of  immovable  property,  which  is  ten  years  if the possession is in  this error, the land was never registered. The same lot was transferred to Patalinghug and Sps.
good  faith  and  thirty  years  if  in  bad  faith  or  if  the  land  is  public.  Pe on is denied. The Magsumbol. Sps. Magsumbol acquired 5/7 of the lot designated as Lot A. In the guardianship
respondents WON. proceeding for the children of Miguel Magsumbol, his son Domingo acquired Lot A. He eventually
  sold the same to respondents Igot. 38 years a er, Judge Mendoza corrected the clerical errors in
MARCIANA DE MORALES v. CFI MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL (Branch 2, Ozamis City), Judge Pablo's decision at the instance of the Bergado heirs, herein pe oners. The respondents
Felicidad Busarang, and Fortunato Gonzaga Igot then sued them. The TC, CA, and SC all favored the Igots. The said lot was acquired by Sps.
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on Magsumbol by prescrip on and said rights were transferred to the Igots upon its sale.
May 29, 1980 | Abad Santos, J.
DOCTRINE:  When  the  owner  fails  to  assert  his  claim  within  the  prescriptive  period, the possessor of the 
DOCTRINE: Art. 1141 Real actions over immovable prescribe after 30 years  same may acquire the property by acquisitive prescription. 
    
FACTS:  On September 26, 1957, Rosario Morales-Terez and San ago Terez, pe oner's FACTS:  Felix Bergado owned Lot 655.  It was inherited by his seven children. Cadastral Judge
predecessors-in-interest, filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, against Pablo ordered the registra on of Lot 655 and adjudicated 1/6 share instead of 1/7. Because of
Felicidad Busarang and Fortunato Gonzaga, private respondents herein, for the recovery of this error, no decree was issued and the heirs did not obtain any Torrens tle. The land remained
possession, ownership, unpaid rentals and damages of one-half of a piece of land and one-half of unregistered.
the house built thereon situated at the poblacion of Ozamis City.
2/7 of the lot were transferred to Patalinghug, while 5/7 share were transferred to Sps.
TC dismissed the complaint. Sps. Terez filed an M/R, where the Court a erward issued an Order Magsumbol. The lot was subdivided with the approval of the Director of Lands into Lot A (5/7)
modifying the dismissal. On May 7, 1978 Pe oner Marciana as plain ff and and Lot B (2/7). In the guardianship proceeding for the children of Miguel Magsubol, Judge
successor-in-interest of Rosario filed against the Private Respondents Busarang and Gonzaga. Mendoza adjudicated to Domingo Magsubol Lot A. Domingo sold to the brothers Mamerto and
Lorenzo Igot, herein respondents, Lot A. The Igots con nued Magsumbols' possession.

Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 2 

38 years a er Judge Pablo rendered his decision, Judge Mendoza corrected the clerical errors in
Judge Pablo's decision at the instance of the Bergado heirs. The land was registered under their
names. The Igot brothers sued the Bergado heirs for the reconveyance of Lot A. The TC and CA
favored the Igot brothers. It held that Magsumbols acquired Lot A by prescrip on. That right was
in turn transmi ed to the Igots. Hence this pe on.
  
ISSUE: Whether the Magsumbols validly acquired Lot A by prescrip on
  
HELD: YES.  CFI, on the ground that the plain ff does not exercise sovereign func on and, hence, causes of
Lot 655-A has been in the adverse, con nuous, uninterrupted and notorious possession of the
Magsumbols and the Igots in the concept of owner for more than half a century. SC affirmed the
decision of the CA.
 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
January 30, 1965 | Makalintal, J.
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  AFP, as an instrumentality of the Republic, opened an account with
PNB. PNB allowed a stranger to withdraw an amount from the AFP’s account. AFP filed an ac on
to compel PNB to refund them. PNB refused. Hence this case. PNB claimed that AFP’s ac on
already prescribed. SC ruled that prescrip on does not run against the State, which includes all its
instruments.
DOCTRINE: Prescription does not run against an instrumentality of the Republic or the State.  dismissal is erroneous on the ground that statute of limita ons does not run against the plain ff
FACTS:  Complaint alleges that the AFP opened a current account with PNB. That PNB, through
negligence, paid to an unnamed person the sum of P37k covered by two checks drawn against
AFP’s account but bearing fic ous names and forged the signatures of officers authorized to
make withdrawals.
One of the AFP officers no ced and called the a en on of PNB. Despite AFP’s repeated
demands, PNB refused to refund the value withdrawn, which prompted the AFP to file an ac on.
PNB moved to dismiss AFP’s ac on on the ground that the ac on had prescribed.
RTC: Sustained the mo on and dismissed the complaint on a different ground, which is based on
desnudar un santo para ves r a otro (to unrobe an image to cloth another). The Court ruled that
this is just a waste of me and unnecessary government expense.
  
ISSUE: Whether AFP’s ac on against PNB had already prescribed?
HELD: NO.  the statute of limita ons.
The statute of limita ons does not run against the state and it is neither alleged nor shown that
AFP, in making the deposit of its funds in ques on with PNB, did so other than as an
instrumentality of the Republic or the State, hence, the plea of prescrip on cannot be maintained
against it.
The order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings, with costs against PNB.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE YULO TOBIAS
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
April 23, 1963 | Concepcion, J.
RECIT-READY:  The case involved is an appeal from the CFI, dismissing the plain ff’s complaint on
the ground of prescrip on of ac on. The plain ff argued that the order of dismissal was
erroneous, because on the ground that statute of limita ons does not run against them because
the same is an instrumentality of Government. However, the SC ruled affirming the decision of
ac on are subject to the statute of limita on.
DOCTRINE:  A  government  owned  and  controlled  corporation  cannot  be  said  to  exercise  a  sovereign 
function, thus, causes of action are subject to the statute of limitations. 
  
FACTS:  The case involved is an appeal by the plain ff from an order of the CFI dismissing their
complaint on the ground of prescrip on of ac on. In March 22, 1960, plain ff, represented by
PNB (its agents), seeks to recover from defendant, the sum of P6,905.81, plus interest and a y’s
fees, under a promissory note of said defendant, dated and issued on May 13, 1946, for the order
of said plain ff.
Defendant filed a mo on to dismiss upon the ground that the ac on upon which the complaint is
based has prescribed long ago for more than 10 yrs having elapsed since May 13, 1946, when
said promissory note was issued and plain ffs’ ac on accrued. Plain ff argued that the order of
because the same is an instrumentality of Government.
  
ISSUE:  Whether the plain ff is correct on poin ng out that the statute of limita on does not run
against them because the same is an instrumentality of Government.
  
HELD: NO. 
The SC said that the plain ff does not exercise sovereign powers, and hence cannot invoke that
prescrip on does not run against them. It is true that plain ff is an instrumentality of such
Government, but as this Court has held in the case of Association Cooperativa de Credito Agricola de 
Miagao vs. Monteclaro (74 Phil., 281):
"Even the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, which is a government-owned and
controlled corpora on and which has been created to promote agriculture and industry
on a larger scale than agricultural credit coopera ve associa ons, cannot be said to
exercise a sovereign func on. It is, like all other corpora ons capitalized by the
Government, a business corpora on," and, as such, its causes of ac on are subject to
In the case at hand, the plain ff herein does not exercise sovereign powers — and, hence, cannot
invoke the exemp ons thereof — but is an agency for the performance of purely corporate,
proprietary or business func ons.
 
 
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 3 

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. Hon. MIDPAINTAO ADIL  foreclosure and public auc on), ac on should have been filed within 5 years but DBP filed on
and Sps. Patricio & Jovita Villafuerte-Confesor
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
May 11, 1989 | Gancayco, J.
SUMMARY:  Sila respondent nangutang kay pe oner. Nag execute siya ng PN saying na
babayaran niya yung utang in 10 years. Nag lapse na yung 10 years. Nag execute si respondent
ulit ng PN acknowledging the debt. Sabi ng SC, yung 2nd PN ay example ng tacit renuncia on ng
right ni respondent of prescrip on.
  
DOCTRINE:  Where  a  party  acknowledges  the  correctness  of  a  debt  and  promises  to  pay  it  after  it  has  created by law.
prescribed, he thereby waives the benefit or prescription. 
  
FACTS:  In 1940, respondent spouses obtained an agricultural loan from the DBP in the sum of
P2,000 as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves to pay
the account in 10 equal yearly amor za ons.
As the obliga on remained unpaid even a er the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year-period,
Confesor, executed a second promissory note on April 1, 1961 expressly  acknowledging  said  The Court agreed with this. It has been held that mortgagee in both real and cha el mortgages
loan  and  promising  to  pay  the  same on or before June 15, 1961. Spouses s ll have not paid the
obliga on.
 
DBP filed a complaint against respondent spouses for the payment of the loan. CFI ruled in favor
of DBP. CA reversed.
ISSUE: Whether the right to prescrip on has been tacitly renounced by respondent spouses.
HELD: YES. 
There is no doubt that prescrip on has set in as to the first promissory note of February 1940.
However, when respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 1961
whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous promissory note on or before
June 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, said respondent
thereby effec vely and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescrip on of the ac on
covering the first promissory note.
 
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
Sps. RUFO & SOLEDAD CASTELO-TOMELDAN etc.
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
November 17, 1980 | Abad Santos, J.
DOCTRINE: Obligation created by law has a prescriptive period of 10 years.  ALREADY PRESCRIBED? Sabi ng SC NO kasi the ac on to set aside a contract that is fic ous, or
  
FACTS:  On June 23, 1963: DBP approved and released a loan to the private respondents which
they promised to pay jointly and severally. It was secured by a real estate mortgage. On Sept. 15,
1967: Mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed since respondents failed to pay.
On March 14, 1977: There was s ll deficiency (unpaid balance) so DBP filed ac on for the
deficiency. All respondents were declared in default. On Nov. 27, 1978: Lower court dismissed on
the ground that the cause of ac on has prescribed since the cause of ac on of DBP is covered by
the 5-year prescrip ve period and Art. 1149 of the CC provides that: all other ac ons whose
periods are not fixed in the code or in other laws must be brought within 5 years from me the
cause of ac on accrues.
They also ruled that since deficiency payment accrued on Sept. 16, 1967 (day a er extrajudicial
March 14, 1977 (less than 10 years a er). Hence, this appeal
  
ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of ac on of DBP has already prescribed
  
HELD: NO. 
It is right that cause of ac on accrued on Sept. 16, 1967 and case filed on March 14, 1977 which
is less than 10 years a er. As DBP’s conten on that the their cause of ac on must be governed
by Art. 1144 of CC since the obliga on of the private respondents to pay the deficiency is one
Art. 1144: The following ac ons must be brought within 10 years from the me the
right of ac on accrues:
a. Upon a wri en contract;
b. Upon an obliga on created by law;
c. Upon a judgment
has by law the right to claim for the deficiency resul ng from the price obtained in sale of
property at public auc on and the outstanding obliga on at the me of the foreclosure
proceedings.
Therefore, DBP has the right to claim payment of the deficiency a er it had foreclosed the
property and that private respondents have the corresponding obliga on created by law to pay
such deficiency. Since obliga on was created by law, Art. 1144 must apply – 10 year prescrip ve
period. Respondent Judge ordered to con nue its trial.
 
ESTEBAN GARANCIANG and Ermana Buenaflor  
v. CATALINO GARANCIANG and Rufina Nocis
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
May 21, 1969 | Makalintal, J.
SUMMARY: Ito yung sila pet Esteban and resp Catalino, they were Father and child. Pet Esteban
Garanciang owned a parcel of land they alleged that thru misrepresenta on, fraud and deceit they
signed some documents daw purpor ng to be for applica on of pension and passport para
makapag aral sa US yung anak nila na si def Catalino. In defense sabi ni resp Catalino na the land
was given to him”in kindness”. Nag file ngayon ng reconveyance sila pet Esteban alleging that the
transfer was void. In conten on sabi nila resp Catalino na barred by prescripton na sila pet
Esteban. Hence, the issue of WON THE ACTION OF PET ESTEBAN FOR RECONVEYANCE IS
absolutely void or inexistent, does not prescribe. In the case the deceit was discovered in 1958
and the complaint was filed in 1963, even though there was a lapse of more than 4 years already,
ac ons against void contracts do not prescribe. So panalo sila pet Esteban.
DOCTRINE:  the  action  to  set  aside  a  contract  that  is  fictitious,  or  absolutely  void  or  inexistent, does not 
prescribe. 
FACTS:  Pe oners were the owners of several parcels of land and that on 3 occasions. through

misrepresenta on, fraud and deceit, they were requested to sign some papers for an 
applica on
for their pension and passport for their grandson to go to USA 
. That the said documents turned
out to be deed of sale of their lands. (without any 
considera on, as gesture of kindness). The
possession was transferred to the defendants.
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 4 
Respondent is the only son of the pe oner. Respondents were able to register the documents
and place it under their names. 
Pe oner discovered the “anomalous execu on” of the deed of
sale on 1958 thus filing 
an adverse claim with the civil register of deeds. In 1963, defendants
filed a MTD on the ground of prescrip on and lack of cause of ac on.
ISSUE: Whether the ac on is barred by prescrip on?
HELD: NO. 
The  action  to  set  aside  a  contract  that  is  fictitious,  or  absolutely  void or inexistent, does not prescribe. In
dismissing the complaint the trial court relied on Ar cle 1391 of the Civil Code, which provides
that an ac on for annulment (of a contract) on the ground of fraud prescribes in four years,
computed from the discovery of the fraud.
According to the complaint the fraud was discovered by the plain ffs on September 10, 1958, so
that when this ac on was filed on July 2, 1963, more than four years had passed. However, the
complaint alleges not only fraud in the execu on of the deeds of sale sought to be annulled, but
total absence of cause or considera on. This allega on, if true, would render the contracts not
merely voidable but absolutely void and inexistent.
Indeed the sales were, on the face of the complaint, worse than fic ous, since the plain ffs had
no inten on — not even a simulated one — of execu ng them. WHEREFORE, the order appealed
from is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs
against appellees in this instance.
Sps. NARCISO & DOLORES RONGAVILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS 
and Mercedes & Florencia Dela Cruz
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
August 17, 1998 | Quisumbing, J.
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  Rongavilla spouses and Dela Cruz sisters each owns 50% of the
property in ques on. The sisters acquired a loan from the spouses and that they were made to
sign a document evidencing their loan. A er quite some me, the spouses later on evicted the
sisters since the document that they signed was a deed of sale. The sisters filed a case before the
RTC, which the RTC and CA affirmed that the deed of sale is a void contract. The spouses
elevated the case to the SC averring the defense of prescrip on but the SC ruled otherwise since
there was no valid contract in the first place thereby not being subjected to prescrip on.
DOCTRINE: A void contract can’t be subjected to prescription 
  
FACTS:  The property in ques on in this case is co-owned between Mercedes and Florencia Dela
Cruz (1st party) who are sisters and the Rongavilla Spouses (2nd party). Both par es owns 50% of
the property in ques on. The Dela Cruz sisters obtained a loan from the Rongavilla spouses
amoun ng to P2, 000.00 for the repairs for the roo op of their house.
Later on, the Rongavilla spouses went to the Dela Cruz sisters (who is the aunt of Mrs. Rongavilla)
in order to fraudulently make them sign a document alleged to evidence a P2, 000.00 loan which
is wri en in English (The Dela Cruz sisters doesn’t know how to speak English).
A er 4 years, the Rongavilla spouses went to the house of the Dela Cruz sisters and asked them
to vacate the land in ques on on the basis that they are alleged to be the real owner of the land.
The Dela Cruz sisters went to the Register of Deeds and discovered that the Cer ficate of Title
was replaced with a new one which entails that such land was issued in favor of the Rongavilla
spouses and that it was also mortgaged in favor of Cavite Development Bank.
Such transfer of tle occurred because the document that they previously signed was a deed of
sale and not a nego able instrument which represented their indebtedness to the Rongavilla
spouses. The Dela Cruz sisters later on filed a case before the RTC to render such deed of sale
void on the basis that they were fraudulently acquired which the RTC affirmed despite the
defense of the Rongavilla that the ac on has already prescribed a er 4 years
The CA also affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this pe on to the Supreme Court
  
ISSUE: Whether the Rongavilla spouses can raise the defense of prescrip on
HELD: NO. 
The judgement of the CA is affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the Dela Cruz sisters were
really misled by the Rongavilla spouses into believing that the document they signed was a
document acknowledging a loan. Hence, the consent doesn’t exist in the first place. The cause of
the contract is also missing since the property mortgaged amounted to P40,000.00 which is in
stark contrast with the price wri en in the deed of sale which amounted to P2,000.00. Lastly, on
the issue of prescrip on, the Supreme Court ra ocinated that the document in ques on is
declared void thereby making the statute of limita ons inapplicable in this case since under the
eyes of the law, there is no contract in the first place.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM  
v. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Percival Lopez, Ayala Corpora on, and Ayala Land Inc.
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
October 7, 1998 | Mar nez, J.
RECIT-READY:  A lease for the 128 hectares land of MWSS was entered into by MWSS with the
CHGCCI for 25 years, provided that CHGCCI will exercise the right of first refusal should the
property bemade open for sale. When the lease expired, the CHGCCI purchased the property
andThere a er sold it to Ayala. 10 years later, MWSS filed an ac on against CHGCCI and Ayala in
RTC praying for the declara on of nullity of the MWSS-CHGCCI sales agreement. RTC dismissed
the pe on on grounds of prescrip on, laches, estoppel and non-joinder of indispensable par es.
CA affirmed.
 
DOCTRINE:  For  voidable  contracts,  the  four  year  prescriptive  period  under  Art.  1391  of  the  New  Civil 
Code  will  apply.  This  article  provides  that  the  prescriptive  period  shall  begin  in the cases of intimidation, 
violence  or  undue  influence,  from  the  time  the  defect  of  the  consent  ceases",  and  "in  case  of  mistake  or 
fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same time. 
  
FACTS: A lease for the 128 hectares land of MWSS was entered into by MWSS with the CHGCCI
for 25 years, provided that CHGCCI will exercise the right of first refusal should the property be
made open for sale. With its terms, subject to presiden al approval. 10 years later, MWSS filed an
ac on against CHGCCI and Ayala in RTC praying for the declara on of nullity of the
MWSS-CHGCCI sales agreement.
Le er of Instruc on (LOI) No. 440 was issued on July 29, 1976 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos direc ng pe oner MWSS to nego ate the cancella on of the MWSS-CHGCCI lease
agreement for the disposi on of the subject property. Oscar Ilustre, then General Manager of
pe oner MWSS, 1980, informed respondent CHGCCI, through its president of its preferen al
right to buy the subject property which was up for sale.
Upon being informed that pe oner MWSS and respondent CHGCCI had already agreed in
principle on the purchase of the subject property, President Marcos expressed his approval of the
sale dated 1982. The Board of Trustees of pe oner MWSS therea er passed Resolu on 36-83,
approving the sale of the subject property in favor of respondent SILHOUETTE.
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 5 
  
The MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement eventually pushed through. Per the Agreement dated Lastly, even assuming that the pe oners had indeed failed to raise the affirma ve defense of
May 11, 1983. Subsequently, respondent SILHOUETTE, under a deed of sale dated July 26,1984, prescrip on in a mo on to dismiss or in an appropriate pleading and an amendment would no
sold to respondent AYALA about sixty-seven (67) hectares of the subject property. Respondent longer be feasible, s ll prescrip on, if apparent on the face of the complaint, may be favorably
AYALA developed the land it purchased into a prime residen al area now known as the Ayala  considered.
Heights Subdivision.    
In the case at bar, the private  respondents  admit  in  their  complaint  that  the  contract  or  real 
Almost a decade later, pe oner MWSS on March 26, 1993 filed an ac on against all herein estate  mortgage  which  they  alleged  to  be  fraudulent  and which had been foreclosed, giving rise
named respondents before the RTC seeking for the declara on of nullity of the to this controversy with the pe oners, was executed on July 17, 1978, or more than eight long
MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement and all subsequent conveyances involving the subject years before the commencement of the suit in the court a quo, on September 15, 1986.
property, and for the recovery thereof with damages.
Pe oner MWSS further  contends  that  prescription  does  not  apply as its complaint prayed not 
Respondent AYALA filed its answer pleading the affirma ve defenses of (1) prescrip on, (2) for  the  nullification  of  voidable  contracts  but  for  the  declaration  of  nullity  of  void  ab  initio 
laches, (3) waiver/estoppel/ra fica on, (4) no cause of ac on, (5) non-joinder of indispensable contracts  which  are  imprescriptible.  This is incorrect, as the prayers in a complaint are not
par es, and (6) non-jurisdic on of the court for non-specifica on of amount of damages sought. determina ve of what legal principles will operate based on the factual allega ons of the
complaint. Therefore, the rules on prescrip on will operate. Even if pe oner MWSS asked for
RTC Dismissed the Pe on on grounds of laches, estoppel and non-joinder of indispensable the declara on of nullity of these contracts, the prayers will not be controlling as only the factual
par es. CA affirmed allega ons in the complaint determine relief.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not decision of the RTC to dismiss the case on the grounds of prescrip on is It  is the material allegations of fact in the complaint, not the legal conclusion made therein or the 
valid? prayer  that  determines  the  relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled.  WHEREFORE, in view of the
   foregoing, the consolidated pe ons are hereby DENIED.
HELD: YES. 
Pe oner MWSS claims as erroneous both the lower courts’ uniform finding that the ac on has
prescribed, arguing that its complaint is one to declare the MWSS-SILHOUETTE sale, and all MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MAKATI TUSCANY CONDO CORP
subsequent conveyances of the subject property, void  which  is  imprescriptible. The  court  Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
disagrees.  The very allega ons in pe oner MWSS’ complaint show that the subject property June 16, 2006 | Callejo Sr., J.
was sold through contracts which, at most, can be considered only as voidable, and not void.  DOCTRINE:   When  there  is  no  special  provision  which  ordains  otherwise,  the  time  for  prescription of all 
   actions shall be counted from the day they may be brought. 
CONTRACT IS VOIDABLE   
As noted by both lower courts, pe oner MWSS admits that it consented to the sale of the FACTS:  Pe oner is a real estate developer and constructed the Maka Tuscany Condominium.
property, with the qualifica on that such consent was allegedly unduly influenced by the Respondent is a corpora on established to manage the condominium units. 270 parking slots
President Marcos. Taking  such  allegation  to  be  hypothetically  true,  such  would have resulted in  were made, 164 allo ed. 98 units were le retained by pe oner to be put on sale to unit
only  voidable  contracts  because  all  three  elements of a contract, still obtained nonetheless. The owners who would want more parking.
alleged vi a on of MWSS’ consent did not make the sale null and void ab ini o.
The Master Deed and Declara on of Restric ons did not reflect or specify the ownership of the
As the contracts  were  voidable  at the most, the four year prescriptive period under Art. 1391 of  98 parking slots. Nevertheless, pe oner sold 26 of them to unit buyers in 1977-1986.
the  New  Civil  Code  will  apply.  This  article  provides that the prescriptive period shall begin in the cases 
of  intimidation,  violence  or  undue  influence,  from  the  time the defect of the consent ceases", and "in case  SEC.  5.  Accessories  to  Units. To be considered as part of each unit and reserved for the
of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same time".  exclusive use of its owner are the balconies adjacent thereto and the parking lot or lots
which are to be assigned to each unit.
Hypothe cally admi ng that President Marcos unduly influenced the sale, the prescriptive period 
to  annul  the same would have begun on February 26, 1986 which this Court takes judicial no ce SEC.  7.  The  Common  Areas. The common elements or areas of the Maka Tuscany shall
of as the date President Marcos was deposed. Prescription  would  have  set  in  by  February  26,  comprise of all the parts of the project other than the units, including without limita on
1990 or more than three years before petitioner MWSS' complaint was filed. the following:
(d) All driveways, playgrounds, garden areas and PARKING AREAS OTHER
However, if pe oner MWSS'  consent  was  vitiated  by  fraud, then the  prescriptive  period  THAN THOSE ASSIGNED TO EACH UNIT UNDER SEC. 5 ABOVE
commenced  upon discovery. Discovery commenced from the date  of  the  execution  of  the  sale 
documents  as  petitioner was party thereto. At the least, discovery is deemed to have taken place Respondent did not object, and Cer ficates of Title were issued. In September 1989,
on the date  of  registration  of  the  deeds  with  the  register  of  Deeds  as  prescrip ve period Mul -Realty, through its President, Henry Sy, who was also a member of the Board of Directors
commenced  in  1983  as pe oner MWSS actually knew of the sale, or, in 1984 when the of MATUSCO, requested that two Mul -Realty execu ves be allowed to park their cars in two of
agreements were registered and tles therea er were issued to respondent SILHOUETTE. At the Maka Tuscanys remaining 72 unallocated parking slots
latest, the action  would  have  prescribed  by  1988,  or  about  five  years  before the complaint was 
instituted. 
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 6 
In a le er, through its counsel, MATUSCO denied the request, asser ng, for  the  first  time, that
the remaining unallocated parking slots were common areas owned by it. On April 26, 1990,
Mul -Realty filed a complaint against MATUSCO for Damages and/or Reforma on of Instrument
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunc on
Pe oner alleged they had retained ownership of the 98 parking lots, however was not specified
in Sec 7 (d). In its Answer, respondent alleged that pe oner had no COA against it for
reforma on of their contract. By its own admission, pe oner had sold various parking slots to
third par es despite its knowledge that the parking areas, other than those men oned in Sec. 5 of
the Master Deed belonged to respondent.
Trial Court dismissed, on the ground that pe oner failed to prove any ground for the
reforma on of its agreement with respondent rela ve to the ownership of the common areas.
There is no evidence on record to prove that the respondent had acted fraudulently. CA
Dismissed on ground of prescrip on
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in dismissing pe oner’s appeal on ground of prescrip on
HELD: YES  HELD: NO,
Pe oner asserts that under the New Civil Code, its ac on for reforma on of the Master Deed
accrued only in 1989, when respondent, by overt acts, made known its inten on not to abide by
their true agreement; since the complaint below was filed in 1990, the ac on was filed within the
prescrip ve period therefor. In this case, pe oner executed the Master Deed in 1975. However,
pe oner had no doubt about its ownership of the unassigned parking lots, and even sold some
of them.
Respondent did not even object to these sales, and even offered to buy some of the parking slots.
Respondent assailed pe oner’s ownership only in 1989 and claimed ownership of the
unassigned parking slots, and it was then that pe oner discovered the error in the Master Deed;
the dispute over the ownership of the parking slots therea er ensued. It was only then that
pe oner’s cause of ac on for a reforma on for a reforma on of the Master Deed accrued. Since
pe oner filed its complaint in 1990, the prescrip ve period had not yet elapsed.
Ar cle 1150 of the NCC provides that the me for prescrip on of all ac ons, when there is no
special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. It
is the legal possibility of bringing the ac on that determines the star ng point for the
computa on of the period of prescrip on.
MARIA ESPAÑOL v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS of Philippine Veterans Administra on
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
June 29, 1985 | Makasiar, J.
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  Pe oner Español, widow of the late veteran German Español,
applied for monthly pension with the PVA. Her applica on was approved. On Nov. 1, 1951, PVA
cancelled the pensions in pursuance of its administra ve policy. On June 27, 1973, SC declared
the said policy as invalid. On Feb. 25, 1974, Español filed a Pe on for Mandamus to compel PVA
to restore the payment of her monthly pension before the CFI. CFI granted said pe on. PVA
then appealed to the SC arguing that Español's ac on already prescribed. The SC held in the
nega ve. The 10-year prescrip ve should be counted from 1973 when the policy was declared
invalid.
DOCTRINE:   The  right  of  action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, 
namely:  FACTS:  Callanta was employed by Carna on as a salesman. Five years a er, Carna on filed an
1. a  right  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  by  whatever  means  and  under  whatever  law  it  arises  or  is 
created; 
2. an  obligation  on  the  part  of  defendant  to  respect  such  right; and (3) an act or omission on the 
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. 
FACTS:  Pe oner Maria U. Español was the widow of the deceased veteran German Español,
who died in the service during World War II. She applied for monthly pension under R.A. No. 65
with the Philippine Veterans Administra on (PVA). Her applica on was approved and she and her
children received their monthly pension.
On Nov. 1, 1951, PVA, in pursuance of its administra ve policy, cancelled their monthly pensions.
On Feb. 25, 1974, or 22 years a er the cancella on, Español filed with the CFI a Pe on for
Mandamus against PVA for the restora on and con nued payment of their monthly pension. CFI
ruled in her favor. PVA appealed to the CA, which elevated the appeal to the SC due to ques on
of law. PVA contented that the ac on of Español already prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether the ac on of Español already prescribed
 
The right of ac on accrues when there exists a cause of ac on, which consists of 3 elements,
namely:
a. a right in favor of the plain ff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
b. an obliga on on the part of defendant to respect such right; and
c. an act or omission on the part of such defendant viola ve of the right of the plain ff.
Español cannot be said to have a cause of ac on, in compelling PVA to con nue paying her
monthly pension on November 1, 1951, because PVA's act of cancella on, being pursuant to an
administra ve policy, cannot be considered a viola on of Español's right to receive her monthly
pension.
It is only when SC declared invalid the ques oned administra ve policy in the case of Del Mar vs.
PVA, promulgated on June 27, 1973, can Español be said to have a cause of ac on to compel
PVA to resume her monthly pension; because it is at that point in me, when the presump on of
legality of the ques oned administra ve policy had been rebu ed and thus it can be said with
certainty that PVA's act was in viola on of Español's right to receive her monthly pension. The
10-year prescrip ve period should be counted from June 27, 1973 and not from Nov. 1, 1951. SC
ordered respondents to pay pe oner her monthly pension.
VIRGILIO CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILIPPINES Inc. and NLRC
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
October 28, 1986 | Fernan, J.
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  Callanta was illegally dismissed by Carna on. Callanta filed for such
ac on three years a er his dismissal. Carna on argued that his ac on had already prescribed. SC
ruled that the provisions in the NCC work as a supplement to the provisions in the Labor Code.
Hence, Callanta won.
DOCTRINE:  As  a  general  rule,  the  statute  of  limitations  extinguishes  the  remedy  only.  Although  the 
remedy  to  enforce  a  right  may  be  barred, that right may still be enforced by some other available remedy, 
which is not barred 
applica on for clearance to terminate the employment of Callanta on the alleged grounds of
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 7 
serious misconduct and misappropria on of company funds amoun ng to P12k. The applica on
was approved and Callanta’s employment was terminated.
Three years a er his termina on, Callanta filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for
reinstatement, backwages, and damages against Carna on. Carna on responded, alleging that his
ac on is barred by prescrip on since he filed the case three years a er his termina on.
Labor Arbiter: Termina on of Callanta is without valid cause; Carna on must reinstate Callanta
with backwages of one year and all benefits provided by law and company policy.
NLRC: Set aside Labor Arbiter’s decision. Callanta’s complaint has already prescribed.
ISSUE:  Whether Callanta’s complaint for illegal dismissal against Carna on has already
prescribed?
HELD: NO.  truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno.
Based on jurisprudence, the Court held that an ac on for damages involving a plain ff separated
from his employment for an alleged unjus fiable causes is one for the injury to the rights of the
plain ff and must be brought within four years.
Addi onally, the period of prescrip on is men oned under Art. 292 of the Labor Code, which
refers to money claims for an injury suffered by a working man. As for reinstatement,
jurisprudence also shows that an ac on for such nature will only prescribe a er four years from
his dismissal from work. Hence, in this case, Callanta’s argument that the four-year prescrip ve
period under Art. 1146 of the NCC applies by way of supplement.
The ac on for illegal dismissal was filed by Callanta on July 1982 or three years, one month, and
five days a er the effec vity date of his dismissal on June 1979, which is well within the
four-year prescrip ve period under Art. 1146 of the NCC.
Even if we take the argument of Carna on that money claims can only be filed within the
three-year prescrip ve period, a strict applica on of the Labor Code will not destroy the
fundamental rights of employees.
As a general rule, the statue of limita ons ex nguishes the remedy only. Although the remedy to
enforce a right may be barred, that right may s ll be enforced by some other available remedy,
which is not barred.
Addi onally, the Court found that the reason behind Callanta’s delay in filing the ac on was due
to the threat that he would be charged with estafa should he pursue an ac on against Carna on.
Wherefore, Carna on is ordered to pay pe oner Callanta backwages for three years without
qualifica on and deduc on. As for reinstatement, Carna on is now under a different
management, hence, the decision will en rely ma er on their own assump on of liabili es.
VICTORIA & JOSEPHINE CAPUNO v. PEPSI COLA BOTTLING COMPANY  The SC affirmed the decision of CA. There can be no doubt that the present ac on is one for
OF THE PHILIPPINES and Jon Elordi
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
April 30, 1965 | Makalintal, J.
RECIT-READY:  The case started from a vehicular collision in Pampanga, which involved the truck
driven by Elordi, and private car driven by Capuno. Elordi was charged with triple homicide
through reckless imprudence. When the accused was acqui ed of the charges against him, the
plain ffs commenced a civil ac on for damages. However, the lower courts dismissed the case on
the ground that the ac on had already been prescribed. The SC affirmed the decision of the
lower courts, sta ng that the civil ac on had already been prescribed.
DOCTRINES: 
● An action for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. 
● An  action  based  on  a  quasi-delict  is  governed  by  Article  1150  of  the  Civil  Code  as  to  the 
question  of  when  the  prescriptive  period  of  four  years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day 
(the  action)  may  be  brought,"  which  means  from  the  day  the  quasi-delict  occurred  or  was 
committed. 
● The  institution  of  a  criminal  action  cannot  have  the  effect  of  interrupting  the  institution  of  a 
civil action based on a quasi-delict. 
FACTS:  The case is an appeal from the decision of CFI and CA dismissing the appellant’s
complaint for recovery of damages for the death of Cipriano Capuno. The case started from a
vehicular collision occurred in January 3, 1953, in Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery
On January 5, 1953, Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. The
informa on was amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three vic ms. On
October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses
and their heirs filed a civil ac on, also for damages against the defendants. Included in the
complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623, allegedly paid by the Estate to the
Heirs of Capuno under the Workmen’s Compensa on Act.
In the criminal case, the appellants were represented by their respec ve counsel as private
prosecutors: A ys Navarro, Diokno and Ilagan. The accused, moved to strike out the appearances
of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. On the ground that as far as the Capuno heirs
were concerned they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had
already claimed and received compensa on for the death of their decedent. On the part of the
Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by civil ac on.
The appearance and interven on of the said a orneys was disallowed by the Court. No Appeal
was taken from either. On June 11, 1958, the par es entered into a Compromise and Se lement.
For P290k, the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement
of the sum of P2,623, previously paid to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen’s Compensa on
Act. The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.
At that me the criminal case s ll pending, judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959,
wherein the accused Elordi was acqui ed of the charges against him. On September 26, 1958,
the plain ffs commenced a civil ac on for damages against the defendants. The lower courts
dismissed the mo on on grounds that the ac on had already prescribed and that appellees had
been released from appellants’ claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the la er.
  
ISSUE: Whether the plain ff’s ac on had already prescribed?
HELD: YES. 
recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which ac on must be ins tuted within four (4) years
(Ar cle 1146, Civil Code). Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is,
under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon
Elordi.
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 8 
The informa on therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allega on
concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the vic ms of the accident for which Elordi was
being prosecuted.
But appellants' interven on was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the
Court's order to that effect. And when they commenced the civil ac on on September 26, 1958
the criminal case was s ll pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy
afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that ac on would have been premature and in any event
would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acqui al in the criminal case.
In other words, the civil ac on for damages could have been commenced by appellants
immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or
thereabouts, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal ac on for
homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was led only on September 26,
1958, or a er the lapse of more than five years.
This Court held that an ac on based on a quasi-delict is governed by Ar cle 1150 of the Civil
Code as to the ques on of when the prescrip ve period of four years shall begin to run, that is,
"from the day (the ac on) maybe brought" which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or
was commi ed.
The foregoing considera ons dispose of appellants' conten on that the four-year period of
prescrip on in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal ac on against Jon Elordi
inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil ac on nor reserved the right to ins tute it
separately. Such reserva on was not then necessary; without having made it they could file — as
in fact they did — a separate civil ac on even during the pendency of the criminal case. Thus, "the
ins tu on of a criminal ac on cannot have the effect of interrup ng the ins tu on of a civil
ac on based on a quasi-delict."
LAURA CORPUS, and her children Ricardo, Teresita, and Corazon Marcia   DOCTRINE:  Right  to  enforce  a  judgment  prescribes  in  10  years  counted  from  the  date  said  judgment
v. FELARDO PAJE and Victory Liner Transporta on Co. Inc.
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
July 31, 1969 | Capistrano, J.
DOCTRINE:  An  action  upon  a  quasi-delict  must  be  instituted  within  4  years  starting  from  the  day  the  instance of PNB, said judgment was revived and condemned Bondoc to pay P16,841.64 plus 7%
damage was committed.  interest. (2nd civil case). This was not enforced (AGAIN!!)
FACTS:  In 1956, a collision happened between Victory Liner bus, driven by respondent, Felardo
Paje and a Jeep driven Clemente Marcia. Clemente died. An informa on was filed against Paje for
Homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Heirs of Clemente
(Pet.) reserved their right to independent civil ac on for damages.
CFI Pampanga held Paje to be Guilty. He appealed with the CA. On Nov. 21, 1961, while on
appeal in the CA, Pe oner filed with CFI Rizal, a separate civil ac on for damages based upon
the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Paje and Victory Liner. However CA reversed CFI
Pampanga and acqui ed Paje. Defendants therefore filed in the civil ac on a mo on to dismiss on
the ground that the ac on was barred by the acqui al by the CA. The mo on was denied.
At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense
that plain ffs' cause of ac on based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the
complaint was brought four years and eleven months a er the collision and that according to
Ar cle 1144 of the Civil Code an ac on based upon a quasi-delict must be ins tuted within four
years. The lower court, in its order of May 31, 1966, dismissed the complaint on the ground that
plain ffs' ac on was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed.
ISSUE:  Whether the case should be dismissed on the ground of prescrip on of an ac on for
quasi-delict (damages)
HELD: YES. 
First of all, the case must be dismissed since the defendant had already been acqui ed of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence resul ng in Homicide and Double Serious Injuries in the CA. The
verdict of acqui al already ex nguished the criminal ac on against the defendant. Along with
that was the ex nguishment of the civil ac on for damages based upon the same act.
Second, even assuming arguendo that the civil ac on for damages for the death of Clemente
Marcia was based upon a quasi-delict, the trial court's finding that on that basis the ac on had
prescribed is correct. An ac on upon a quasi-delict must be ins tuted within four (4) years
(Ar cle 1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescrip ve period began to run from the day the
quasi-delict was commi ed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of the said period was
not interrupted by the ins tu on of the criminal ac on for reckless imprudence. The pe oner
only filed an ac on for damages on 1961 which is 4 years and 11 months late.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JOAQUIN BONDOC 
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
July 30, 1965 | Bengzon JP, J.
SUMMARY:  May 3 civil cases. 1st, Bondoc was ordered to pay PNB ng P10k pero never executed.
2nd, nag file si PNB to revive such judgment and be executed. So judgment lumaki na amount.
Pero hindi pa din naenforce. So 3rd, nag file ulit to revive the judgment sa 2nd. Sabi ni lower court,
nag prescribe na daw kasi 1949 tapos 1962 yung 3rd ac on to revive. Pero sabi ni SC, yung 2nd
judgment is different naman from 1st and since ang nirerevive is yung from 2nd civil case, it must
run from 1957 and not 1949 so pasok pa din siya sa 10 years.
 
becomes final 
  
FACTS:  On June 29, 1949: PNB obtained a judgment from CFI against Bondoc for P10,289,60
plus 7% interest per annum. (1st civil case). Such was never executed. On Feb, 20: 1957: upon
On June 7, 1962: PNB ins tuted again for enforcement of judgment rendered in 2nd civil case (3rd
civil case). The lower court dismissed on ground of prescrip on – right to revive the judgment has
prescribed as more than 10 years elapsed from June 1949 to June 1962. PNB appealed
  
ISSUE: Whether or not right to revive of PNB has already prescribed
  
HELD: NO. 
Ar cle 1144(3) NCC: right to enforce a judgment prescribes in 10 years counted from the date
said judgment becomes final. As PH derived from Code of Civil Procedure of California: a
proceeding by separate ordinary ac on to revive a judgment is a new ac on rather than a
con nua on of the old, and results in a new judgment cons tu ng a new cause of ac on upon
which a new period of limita ons begins to run.
In this case, what was being asked to revive was the decision rendered on Feb 20, 1957. In
pursuant to Art. 1143(3), ac on upon such judgment must be brought within 10 years from 1957
or un l 1967. Therefore, this instant case is well within the prescrip ve period. Case remanded.
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 9 
 ISSUE: Whether the Pe oner’s COA is imprescrip ble
CONSTANCIA TOLENTINO v. COURT OF APPEALS and Consuelo David
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on HELD: NO. 
June 10, 1988 | Gu errez Jr., J. All ac ons, unless an excep on is provided, have a prescrip ve period. Unless the law makes an
SUMMARY: Ito yung si pet Constancia 3rd wife na siya ni Arturo Tolen no because the 2nd wife ac on imprescrip ble, it is subject to bar by prescrip on and the period of prescrip on is five (5)
died already and si priv resp Consuelo is the 1st wife of Arturo who’s been legally divorced from years from the me the right of ac on accrues when no other period is prescribed by law (Civil
him granted by the CFI for the reason of “deser on and abandonment of the wife” for 3 years. Code, Art. 1149).
Nag file ngayon si pet Constancia ng injunc on against kay priv resp Consuelo to stop her
(Consuelo) from using the surname “Tolen no”. Nag rule yung RTC in favor kay pet Constancia, In the case, the conten on cannot be accepted because the use of a surname by a divorced wife
but was reversed by the CA because prescribed na daw yung ac on ni pet Constancia kasi the for a purpose not criminal in nature is certainly not a crime. The Civil Code provides for some
case according to the CA was a case of quasi-delict so 4 years lang yung prescrip on perid. Nag rights which are not ex nguished by prescrip on but an ac on as in the case before us is not among 
contend si pet Constancia ngayon na imprescrip ble daw yung ac on niya kasi the use of priv them. The  rule  on prescription in civil cases such as the case at bar is different. Art. 1150 of the Civil Code 
resp Conssuelo of the surname “Tolen no” is a crime. Hence, the issue of WON THE ACTION OF provides:  "The  time  for  prescription  for  all  kinds  of  actions,  when  there  is  no  special  provision  which 
PET CONSTANCIA IN PROHIBITING RESP CONSUELO TO USE THE SURNAME “TOLENTINO” ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought." 
is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE? Sabi ng SC NO kasi  (1)  "The  time  for prescription for all kinds of actions, when 
there  is  no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought." In  the  case,  whatever  the  period,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the action has long prescribed whether the
and (2) Art.  1149  provides  that  all  other  actions  whose  periods  are  not  fixed in this code or in other law  cause accrued on April 21, 1945 when the pe oner and Arturo Tolen no got married, or on
must  be  brought  within  5  years  from  the  time  the  right  of  action  accrues. In the case, the Civil Code August 30, 1950, when the present Civil Code took effect, or in 1951 when Constancia Tolen no
provides for some rights which are not ex nguished by prescrip on but an ac on as in the case came to know of the fact that Consuelo David was s ll using the surname Tolen no.
before us is not among them. Anyway, sabi ng SC na kahit ano pa yung period of prescrip on ni
pet Constancia, prescribed na talaga yung ac on niya kasi she should not have waited for 20 The pe oner should have brought legal ac on immediately against the private respondent a er
years from the moment she discovered resp Consuelo’s use of “Tolen no” as her surname un l she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of the surname of her former
the filing of this case. So talo si pet Constancia. husband. As it is, ac on was brought only on November 23, 1971 with only verbal demands in
between and an ac on to recons tute the divorce case. The  petitioner  should  have  filed  her 
DOCTRINES:  complaint  at  once  when  it  became  evident  that  the  private  respondent  would  not  accede  to  her 
● "The  time  for  prescription  for  all  kinds  of  actions,  when  there  is  no  special  provision  which  demands instead of waiting for twenty (20) years. 
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought."   
● Art.  1149  provides  that  all  other  actions  whose  periods  are  not  fixed  in  this  code  or  in  other  As  aptly  stated  by  the Court of Appeals, "where the plaintiff fails to go to the Court within the prescriptive 
law must be brought within 5 years from the time the right of action accrues.  period,  he  loses  his  cause,  but  not  because  the  defendant  had acquired ownership by adverse possession 
● "where the plaintiff fails to go to the Court within the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, but  over  his  name  but  because  the  plaintiffs  cause  of  action  had  lapsed  thru  the  statute  of  limitations." 
not  because  the  defendant  had  acquired  ownership  by  adverse  possession  over  his  name but  PRIVATE RESPONDENT WON.
because the plaintiff's cause of action had lapsed thru the statute of limitations." 
WILLIAM ALAIN MIAILHE v. COURT OF APPEALS and the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:  Pe oner Constancia is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolen no, married Apr 21, 1945 Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
in Manila, with 3 children. 2nd wife Pilar Adorable died. PR Consuelo David (1st wife) was legally March 20, 2001 | Panganiban, J.
married to Arturo on Feb 8, 1931, and was dissolved and terminated on Sep 15, 1943, during the
Japanese occupa on, where the CFI granted a decree of absolute divorce. PR Consuelo DOCTRINES: 
con nued using the surname Tolen no a er the divorce, as it was consented by Arturo and his ● If  the  ground  for  annulment  is  vitiation  of  consent  by intimidation, the four-year period starts 
family (brothers and sisters). from the time such defect ceases. 
● The  running  of this prescriptive period cannot be interrupted by an extrajudicial demand made 
A complaint was filed by Pe oner Constancia against PR Consuelo with the CFI-QC for the by the party whose consent was vitiated. 
purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunc on from using the surname Tolen no. PR   
Consuelo filed her answer admi ng she has been using and con nuing to use the surname FACTS:  Miailhe were the former registered owners of three parcels of land located at Manila. The
Tolen no. proper es had been owned by and in the possession of Miailhe and their family for over one
hundred (100) years un l August 1, 1976. During the height of the mar al law regime of the late
TC – issued an Order gran ng the Pe oner’s ac on; Consuelo David must stop using Tolen no. President Ferdinand Marcos, Republic of the Philippines, through its armed forces, forcibly and
PR Consuelo filed for a M/leave to file a third party complaint against her former husband. unlawfully took possession of the aforesaid proper es.
Third-party defendant Arturo Tolen no filed his answer.
Republic of the Philippines, through its armed forces, con nued its lawful and forcible occupa on
TC – ruled in favor of Pe oner Constancia & dismissed the third-party complaint. PR appealed of the premises from August 1, 1976 to August 19, 1977 without paying rentals, despite plain ffs
to the CA sta ng that the Pe oner’s COA has already prescribed. CA – reversed TC decision. demands. The Office of the President showed interest in the subject proper es and directed DBP
The pe oner insists that the use by respondent Consuelo David of the surname Tolen no (Development Bank of the Philippines) to acquire for the government the subject proper es.
cons tutes a crime hence her COA is imprescrip ble.

Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 10 

Through threats and in mida on employed, Miailhe, under duress, were coerced into selling the
subject proper es to defendant DBP for the grossly low price. DBP, in turn, sold the subject
proper es to Republic of the Philippines.
A er the late President Marcos le the country on February 24, 1986 a er the EDSA revolu on,
Miailhe made repeated extrajudicial demands upon DBP for return and reconveyance of subject
proper es to them. Despite demands, DBP unjus fiably failed and refused, and s ll unjus fiably
fail and refuse, to return and reconvey the subject proper es.
On March 23, 1990, Miailhe filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages
against Republic of the Philippines and Development Bank of the Philippines. TC denied mo on
to dismissed on the ground of prescrip on CA ruled that the pe oners ac on had prescribed.
Thus, this pe on.
ISSUES:  Contending that the second ac on filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed,
1. Whether the pe oner’s ac on had prescribed
2. Whether the pe oner’s extrajudicial demands did not interrupt prescrip on
  
HELD: YES both issues 
The records in this case indubitably show the lapse of the prescrip ve period, thus warran ng the
immediate dismissal of the Complaint. The period for prescrip on would be that pertaining to an
ac on for the annulment of contract; that is, four years from the me the defect in the consent
ceases.
The foregoing clearly shows that the alleged threat and in mida on, which vi ated pe oners
consent, ceased when Marcos le the country on February 24, 1986. Since an ac on for the
annulment of contracts must be filed within four years from the me the cause of vi a on
ceases, the suit before the trial court should have been filed any me on or before February 24,
1990. In this case, pe oner did so only on March 23, 1990. Clearly, his ac on had prescribed by
then.
In order for extrajudicial demand to interrupt prescrip on there must be a creditor-debtor
rela onship established.
ART. 1155. The prescrip on of ac ons is interrupted when they are filed before the
court, when there is extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
wri en acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
It is clear that for there to be a creditor and a debtor to speak of, an obliga on must first exist. In
the present case, there is as yet no obliga on in existence. In the absence of an exis ng
obliga on, pe oner cannot be considered a creditor, and Ar cle 1155 of the Civil Code cannot
be applied to his ac on. Thus, any extrajudicial demand he made did not, or will not, interrupt the
prescrip on of his ac on for the annulment of the Contract of Sale. Respondents WON. Pe on
was denied. WHEREFORE, the Pe on is DENIED  and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against pe oner.
ANNOTATIONS:  and then declared that at any rate, the second ac on was filed within the balance of the period
● Prescrip on must yield to the higher interest of jus ce.
● An ac on for annulment of a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated
persons shall be brought within four years from the me the guardianship ceases.
● An ac on to annul a voidable contract based on fraud should be brought within four (4)
years from the discovery of the same.
JAIME LEDESMA v. COURT OF APPEALS and Rizal Commercial Banking Corpora on
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
June 30, 1993 | Regalado, J.
FACTS:  Herein pe on is a mo on for reconsidera on of the court’s March 24 1993 decision to
deny pe on for review on cer orari. On August 21, 1980, RCBC filed a case against pe oner
to enforce term of their Trust Receipt Agreement executed by them on April 1, 1974 but
pe oner failed to comply. As summons could not be served on the la er, case was dismissed.
On December 2, 1988, respondent bank filed another civil case on the same cause of ac on and
subject ma er. Pe oner’s mo on to dismiss on the ground of prescrip on was denied.
Pe oner’s mo on for review on cer orari was denied, hence this present mo on for
reconsidera on.
pe oner invokes the rulings in Vda. de Nator, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.3 and Fulton 
Insurance  Co.  vs.  Manila  Railroad  Co.,  et  al.4 and invites us "to give a second look at the apparently
conflic ng or divergent jurisprudence."
  
ISSUE: Whether the 2nd case filed by respondent has prescribed
  
HELD: NO 
Ar cle 1155 of the Civil. Code provides that the prescrip on of an ac on, involving in the present
case the 10-year prescrip ve period for filing an ac on on a wri en contract under Ar cle
1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by:
a. the filing of an ac on
b. a wri en extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and
c. a wri en acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
The ma er of the interrup on of the prescrip ve period by reason of a wri en extrajudicial
demand by the creditor was decided in Overseas  Bank  of  Manila  vs.  Geraldez, et al (go to last part of 
this  Digest).  The case of Fulton  Insurance  Company  is not clear either on the ma er of the
interrup on of the prescrip ve period where an ac on is filed in court. It was there held that:
There  are  two  school(s)  of  thought  as  to  the  legal effect of the cessation of the interruption by 
an  intervening  action upon the period of prescription. There is the view expressed and perhaps, 
not  without  reasons,  that  the  full  period  of  prescription  should  start  to  run  anew,  reckoned 
from  the  date  of  the  cessation  of  the  interruption.  The  contrary  view  is,  that  the  cessation of 
the  interruption  merely  tolls  the  running  of  the  remaining  period  of  prescription,  deducting 
from  the  full  period  thereof  the  time  that  has  already  elapsed  prior  to  the  filing  of  the 
intervening action. Nevertheless, all discussion on this point is academic; considered in the light 
of either view, we find that the second action is not barred 
In the aforesaid case, the defendant therein moved for the dismissal of the second case alleging
that the filing of the first case neither tolled nor interrupted the running of the prescrip ve
period. This Court ruled that the filing of the first ac on interrupted the running of the period,
remaining. It concluded that the issue of whether the filing of the ac on merely tolled or it
actually interrupted the running of the prescrip ve period was moot and academic because, in
either case, the second ac on was s ll filed within the prescrip ve period. Consequently, the
Fulton case cannot also sustain the thesis of pe oner.
On the foregoing considera ons, we are convinced and so hold that the correct interpreta ons of
Ar cle 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 11 
Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine Na onal Railways Company, not only because they are
later in point of me but because the issue is squarely resolved in a decisive and logical manner
therein. Pe oner's submission would result in a bifurcated interpreta on of Ar cle 1155, aside
from the irra onal conclusion that a judicial ac on itself cannot produce the same result on the
prescrip ve period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an acknowledgment of the debt.
  
NOTE: Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez 
The interrup on of the prescrip ve period by wri en extrajudicial demand means that the said
period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of
interrup on as dis nguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescrip ve period. A wri en
extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the
prescrip ve period.
That same view as to the meaning of interrup on was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil
483, 488, where it was ruled that the interrup on of the ten-year prescrip ve period through a
judicial demand means that "the full period of prescrip on commenced to run anew upon the
cessa on of the suspension." When prescrip on is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full me
for the prescrip on must be reckoned from the cessa on of the interrup on
The interrup on of the prescrip ve period by reason of a wri en acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor was dealt with in Philippine National Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et  the ac on had not yet elapsed on June 20, 1957, when the complaint was presented.
al.,6 thus:
Ar cle 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the "prescrip on of ac ons is interrupted"
inter  alia, "when there is any wri en acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." This
simply means that the period of prescrip on, when interrupted by such a wri en
acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever me of limita on might have
already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of ac on is thereby negated and
rendered inefficacious.
The effect of the interrup on spoken of in Ar cle 1155 is to renew the obliga on, to make
prescrip on run again from the date of the interrup on.
JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA and Cresencia Potestas Omulon v. MARIANO TIANO
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
July 31, 1963 | Paredes, J.
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  The father of herein plain ffs, including Josefina who did not sign the
DOS and Cresencia who was then a minor, sold their land to defendant Tiano on July 2, 1947. On
June 20, 1957, plain ffs filed an ac on against defendant. On July 2, 1957, Tiano received the
summons and answered he is the owner by virtue of acquisi ve prescrip on. The TC ruled in
favor of the plain ffs. Tiano appealed directly to the SC arguing that the ac on of the plain ffs
already prescribed since the summons was received by him exactly 10-years from the date of
sale. The SC ruled that the prescrip on shall end on July 2, 1957 but the plain ffs already filed
their complaint on June 20, 1957, prior to the expira on of the prescrip ve period. The date of
the issuance and service of summons is of no moment.
DOCTRINE:  The  commencement  of  the  suit  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  applicable  limitation  period,  dismissed without prejudice.
interrupts the running of the statute. 
  
FACTS:  Sps. Potestas were the parents of herein plain ffs. They acquired a parcel of agricultural
land during their life me. On July 2, 1947, Ciriaco, the surviving husband and three children
(Isabelo, Lourdes and Cresencia), purportedly sold the above men oned parcel to herein
defendant Tiano. At the me of the sale, Cresencia was only 16 y.o., and the other child, Josefina,
did not sign the deed of sale, and did not know about the transac on.
On June 20, 1957, an ac on for Par on and Recovery of Real Estate, with Damages was filed by
Josefina and Cresencia against Tiano. In the complaint, it was alleged that they were en tled to a
por on of the land, since Josefina did not sign the sale and Cresencia was a minor.
On July 2, 1957, summons was served to Tiano. In Answer, he claimed that the plain ffs herein
knew of the sale and that he was not aware of any defect in the tle of his vendors. As a Special
Defense, defendant alleged that he was the absolute owner of the land by acquisi ve prescrip on
of 10 years, from the date of purchase.
The TC ruled in favor of the plain ffs. Hence, this pe on. Tiano contented that the ac on of the
plain ffs is barred by prescrip on, since the same prescribed on July 2, 1957 when the summons
was served to him.
  
ISSUE: Whether the ac on of the plain ffs is barred by prescrip on?
  
HELD: NO. 
Since the sale of the property took place on July 2, 1947, the 10-year period within which to file
The fact that summons was only served on defendant on July 2, 1957, which incidentally and/or
coincidentally was the end of the 10-year period, is of no moment, since civil ac ons are deemed
commenced from date of the filing and docke ng of the complaint with the Clerk of Court,
without taking into account the issuance and service of summons.
Tiano cannot avail himself of acquisi ve prescrip on, for the simple reason that no finding was
made by the trial court that his possession from the me of the sale was with just tle, in good
faith, in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted. SC affirmed the
decision of the TC.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. TERESITA OSETE, Jose Crespo, and Estelita Cuya
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
July 18, 1968 | Concepcion, CJ.
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY:  PNB filed a case against Crespo for collec on. PNB claimed that no
prescrip on can be availed since it was interrupted. SC ruled based on the following reasons
enumerated in the ruling. Crespo won.
DOCTRINE:  Not  all  acts  of  acknowledgment  of  a  debt  interrupt  prescription.  To  produce  such  effect, 
acknowledgment  must  be  written  so  that  payment,  if  not  coupled  with  a  communication  signed  by  the 
payor, would not interrupt the running period of prescription. 
  
FACTS:  PNB commenced this ac on to recover from the respondents the sum of P522, with
interest, a orney’s fees and costs, based upon a judgment in a civil case, which was held on
January 8, 1953. Cuya and Crespo pleaded prescrip on of ac on, whereas the complaint was
The court rendered judgment in favor of PNB. Crespo appealed to the CFI. CFI ruled in favor of
Crespo based on the ground of prescrip on.
  
ISSUE:  Whether the lower court erred in favoring Crespo and dismissing the ac on of PNB upon
the ground of prescrip on of ac on?
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 12 
HELD: NO.  ALFONSO BUN RAMOS et. al. v. EMILIANO CONDEZ et. al.
It should be noted that the decision of the municipal court became final and executory on January
1953. More than ten years had elapsed when this ac on was commenced since this was ini ated
on January 30, 1963.
PNB alleges that the running of the said period was interrupted by wri en demands and par al
payments even if such evidence were not admi ed in the lower court. In other words, no
evidence was introduced.
However, the court found that the wri en demands were not addressed to Crespo but rather to
Cuya, who did not appeal the decision of the lower court. Hence, it has nothing to do with the
running prescrip on as regards to Crespo.
As to the alleged par al payments, Art. 1973 of the CC of Spain provided, “The prescrip on of
ac ons is interrupted by the commencement of a suit for their enforcement, by an extrajudicial
demand by the creditor, and by any act of acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor.”
Under the said ar cle, par al payment could act as an acknowledgement of debt and interrupt
the prescrip ve period. However, it was amended by Art. 1155 of the CC of the Philippines, “The
prescrip on of ac ons is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a wri en
extrajudicial demand by the creditors and when there is any wri en acknowledgment by the
debtor.”
Under this provision, not all acts of acknowledgment of a debt interrupt prescrip on. To produce
interrup on, the acknowledgment must be wri en, so that payment, if not coupled with a
communica on signed by the payor, would not interrupt the running of the period of prescrip on.
In this case, it was right that the lower court did not allow PNB to present new evidence during
the course of the trial since it would alter the issue greatly. The current issue is “w/n more than
10 years had elapsed when the present ac on was ins tuted?” If the new evidence were
admi ed, it would be “w/n the prescrip on period was interrupted by the par al payments
allegedly made by Crespo?”
Therefore, the lower court did not err in the following:
1. In not admi ng the new complaint of PNB, which contained new evidence that would
alter the issue greatly;
2. In not considering that wri en demands had tolled the running of the prescrip on
period since such demands were not addressed to Crespo;
3. In not considering that prescrip on was interrupted by par al payments allegedly made
by Crespo; and even if they were considered, it would s ll not have produced the said
interrup on pursuant to Art. 1155 of the CC;
4. In not resolving the issue in favor of PNB; and
5. In not giving Art. 1155 the said effect PNB wished for it to have.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against PNB.
Topic: Acquisi ve prescrip on; tacking; ex nc ve prescrip on
August 30, 1967 | Angeles, J.
DOCTRINE:  The  action  being  based  on  a  written  contract,  it  must  be  brought  within  ten  years from the 
time  the  cause  of  action  accrues  (Article 1144, New Civil Code). The running of the period of limitation of 
action  was,  however,  interrupted  on  November  10,  1956,  when  the  defendants  wrote  the  plaintiffs 
acknowledging  the  validity  of  the  deed  of  sale  and  promising  to  comply  with  their  commitment  as 
embodied  therein  that  they  would  deliver  the  land  which they had sold to the plaintiffs. Hence, when the 
present action was filed on May 22, 1963, the cause of action had not yet prescribed. 
  
FACTS:  The case is an appeal from an order dismissing the case for the reason that the cause of
ac on has prescribed. On May 22, 1963, Plain ffs, filed an ac on in the CFI against the
Defendants. On June 1952, Defendants sold to the plain ffs a parcel of land.
In the early part of 1956, the plain ffs’ decided to cul vate the parcel of land sold by the
defendant. However, it was discovered that the land sold by the defendants, belonged to another
person other than the defendants. Consequently, plain ffs were not able to occupy and cul vate
the said land.
Now the plain ff prayed and ordered the defendants to jointly and severally deliver to the
plain ffs the two hectares of land. The defendants filed a mo on to dismiss on two grounds:
1. That the ac on has prescribed: Defendants argue that as the deed of sale was executed
on June 25, 1952, and the ac on was filed on May 22, 1963, more than ten years had
elapsed, thus the ac on had prescribed.
2. The complaint states no cause of ac on.
Plain ffs contended and admi ed that the cause of ac on had accrued on Jun 25, 1952,
however, in view of the defendants’ wri en acknowledgement of the validity of the deed of
absolute sale and promise to deliver the land which they sold to plain ffs, as expressed in
defendants’ le er of November 10, 1956, the running of the prescrip ve period for the
commencement of the ac on was tolled on that date. As an ac on was based upon wri en
contracts which prescribes in ten years, hence, the instant ac on which was filed on May 12,
1963, was commenced within the period of statute of limita on.
LOWER  COURT:  dismissed the case, the ac on was already prescribed based on the ground of
fraud.
  
ISSUE:  Whether the plain ff is barred from filing an ac on on the ground that the ac on already
prescribed.
  
HELD: NO. 
The SC set aside and revoked the decision of the lower court and remanded to such. The cause of
ac on in the case at bar is for a judicial declara on of plain ffs' right to the land and recovery of
the possession thereof, or for damages. Plain ffs' cause of ac on accrued on June 25, 1952,
when the deed of absolute sale was executed. The ac on being based on a wri en contract, it
must be brought within ten years from the me the cause of ac on accrues (Ar cle 1144, New
Civil Code).
The running of the period of limita on of ac on was, however, interrupted on November 10,
1956, when the defendants wrote the plain ffs acknowledging the validity of the deed of sale
and promising to comply with their commitment as embodied therein that they would deliver the
land which they had sold to the plain ffs. Hence, when the present ac on was filed on May 22,
1963, the cause of ac on had not yet prescribed.
Obligations and Contracts | Weeks 15 & 16 Cases | Page 13