Against Berlin. Torbjörn Tännsjö

Against Berlin
Author(s): TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ

Source: ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law
and Social Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1985), pp. 218-233
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
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Against Berlin
BY TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ, STOCKHOLM
1. Preamble
Ever since J. S. Mill published his pamphlet On Liberty in 1859 nothing eise
published on the subject has become more widely known and influential than
Sir Isaiah Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty', which appeared a Century later, in
1959. This holds equally true today, a quarter of a Century later, when the sub
ject of liberty is at everybody's lips because of Orwell's book 1984.
Berlin's essay deserves its réputation (if not its influence). It is learned, well
written, and perspicacious. It has but one serious deficiency: it does not prove
its main point. On the contrary, as a resuit of Berlin's thoroughness and per
spicacity, implicit in it is its own rejection. It is to me a mystery that Berlin has
not noticed this himself. In this essay I will try to point it out.
Champions of various ideáis of freedom (or 'liberty'; I follow Berlin in using
these two words interchangeably) have chosen very différent stratégies. Since
'freedom' is most naturally conceived of as a relation, it is a metaphor to say of a
person that he is (absolutely) 'free'. Rather he is free in relation to some agents
to perform some actions, if he is free at all. But to which actions and to which
agents? What kind of liberty is it important to have or to respect? It is here that
the opinions differ.
J. S. Mili endeavoured to show that there is an absolute limit to what Society
should be allowed to do to the individual 'in the way of compulsión and control'.
It is often conceded that Mill's objective is difficult, that Mill himself did not
prove his case, that the limit cannot be drawn sharply, and so forth. But, even
so, when this has been admitted it is still said, more often than not, that there
is something to Mill's idea, after all. I have tried elsewhere to show that this is
not so.1 Berlin seems to argue along similar lines. He writes, in 'Two Concepts
of Liberty':
In so far as I live in society, everything that I do inevitably affects, and is af
fected by, what others do. Even Mill's strenuous effort to mark the distinc
tion between the spheres of private and social life breaks down under exami
nation.2
So when Berlin defends an ideal of liberty, it is not the ideal stating that an
absolute private sphere be specified and respected.
Another strategy adopted by those in favour of liberty has been to try to
show that some particular rights ought to be upheld. Even if no sharp distinction
between private and social action can be marked, the possible and allowable
grounds for society's interfering with the individual's liberty must be severely
T. Tännsjö, 'Against Liberty', The Journal of Value Inquirey, Vol. 18 (1984), pp. 82-97.
Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', quoted from Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford
UP. 1969, pp. 154-155.
Against Berlin 219
circumscribed. The point has been that some v

terms of 'liberty' can be established, restriction
which social interférence may ever be acceptab
unacceptable grounds in, say, a constitution or
I think the prospects of specifying such restr
non-trivial and yet tenable manner, are remot
that not even the Western ideal of 'freedom of
nation, tenable.3 In particular, in today's worl
the mass media, this ideal does not seem compa
of the lenient sort advocated by J. S. Mill. Ou
mass communications seems to warrant extensive social control over media of
a kind which is patently in conflict with the ideal of 'freedom of expression',
at least as it is usually conceived of. Berlin does paranthetically defend an ideal
of freedom of thought; this defence includes a discussion of moral autonomy. I
will examine it and try to oppose it in Section 4, when discussing the problem
of the value of liberty.
Berlin's main strategy, however, is more straightforward. He tries to defend
a comparative view of liberty. Even if no one is ever (absolutely) free, some
people are freer than others. There is always some kind of loss of value, when
liberty is restrained. This does not mean that liberty must never give way to
other values. Berlin writes about conflicts between liberty and other values:
To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some,
or all, of my freedom: I may do so willingly and freely: but it is freedom that
I am giving up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow
men. I should be guilt-stricken, and rightly so, if I were not, in some circum
stances, ready to make this sacrifice.4
Perhaps the most reasonable interprétation of Berlin, then, is that he holds
that, ceteris paribus, the more freedom the better. And when various claims for
liberty come into conflict, then, ceteris paribus, the more equal the distribution
of liberty, the better.
But how, then, are we to interpret this reference to more or less or equal
amounts of freedom?
2. Negative liberty
As is obvious from the title of Berlin's essay he distinguishes between two sorts
of liberty, 'positive' and 'negative'. The former is said to be involved in the
answer to the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interférence
that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?'. The latter is
said to be involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which
the subject - a person or a group of persons - is or should be left to do or be
what he is able to do or be, without interférence by other persons?'
T. Tännsjö, 'Against Freedom of Expression forthcoming.

Sir I. Berlin, op. cit. p. 125.
220 Torbjörn Tännsjö
The concept of positive liberty will be dealt

the value of liberty. The natural point of dep
Berlin's essay, however, is the concept of neg
elaborates and it plays a crucial role in his a
when Berlin says of one person that he is, n
other person?
I don't think that Berlin wants do dispute
nal term. A person, S, is 'free' with respect
to perform a certain action, A. This is what
freedom (the more the better, and so forth)
It is crucial to Berlin's conception that ther
my doing a certain action, if we are to say
Nature herseif cannot restrain my (social
matter whether the interférence is the resul
actions directed to the end of stopping me f
tive' means such as absence of action, which
a certain action. And it does not matter whether the interférence is delibérate or
not:
... absence of ... freedom is due to the closing of ... doors or failure to
open them, as a resuit, intended or unintended, of alterable human practices,
of the opération of human agencies; although only if such acts are deliberate
ly intended (or, perhaps, are accompanied by awareness that they may block
paths) will they be liable to be called oppression.5
It seems incontestable to take political or social unfreedom to obtain only
when some agent (individual or collective, physical or institutional) has 'blocked
some path' for someone. The point is made by Berlin in the following way, and
it seems to me convincing:
If I say that I am unable to jump more that ten feet in the air, or cannot read
because I am blind, or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel, it would
be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced.6
It seems, moreover, reasonable also to take intended failures to act, forbear
ances, to be possible bars to our freedom. If, with the intention of making me
unable to visit a certain press Conference I am refused a vital medicine, then my
freedom to attend the press conférence has been blocked. I find it surprising,
however, that Berlin takes involuntary actions to be possible bars to our liberty.
If I am prohibited by not being given medicine or by the police from attending
the press conférence my freedom to attain is barred; but, or so it seems to me at
least, if the press conférence cannot be held because of an épidémie disease, then
my freedom to attend it is not restrained. To be sure, my freedom to be in the
area is, but my freedom to take part in the Conference need not be. Otherwise,
it seems to me, the concept of unfreedom has been defined in much too inclu
sive a manner. Most cases of inability to perfrom actions will qualify as cases of
5 Sir I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty ; the quotation is from the Introduction, p. xl.
6 Sir I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 122.
Against Berlin 221
social unfreedom. For, indirectly, ther

inadvertently, has some part in the cause
zart's concerto for the clarinet but none
Because I was taught to play the clarinet b
'eccentric' to say that my clarinet teacher
that everyone who could have taught me
so restrains my freedom to play the piano
The meaning of the word 'intention' is, of
it mean to say of a person that he intend
about by some action of his? The meaning
he desired the resuit for its own sake t
'reasonably' (in a legal sense) have foreseen
it is the latter, legal meaning that is relev
to any piano teacher, must have realized th
to play the piano. They did restrain my l
concertos by Mozart in particular at least
piano teachers, who did not even know tha
Berlin does not want to say, then, that
tion implies that I am socially unfree to p
me. It may be due to a lack of capacity or
about by my own actions only, or by nat
voluntary actions performed by others, I
the converse relation? If, in relation to so
certain action, does this imply that I cann
clear on this point. Sometimes he claims t
are not 'interfered' with, that no one 'obst
les' to them. In other places he explicitly r
obstacles to them. Sometimes he seems to
comparative. If an alternative is made more
then my freedom is restrained, and this res
costly the alternative is made for me.
I am not altogether happy with the com
seems to be very difficult to assess how m
certain person. This must dépend, not on
on the person in question, what preferen
thing has its price. But we do not want t
are socially restrained.
The reason why social liberty should n
where the degree of unfreedom is a funct
actions, tells equally against the idea that m
our actions restrain our social liberty. Ag
every action is socially unfree. And how d
enough to warrant our judgment that som
if costs were said to restrain our freedom
If I can curtail a person's liberty by makin
be able to do so by bribing him as well. He

puzzling one.
It might be retorted that it is not freed
treason and torture. This is what Berlin claims:
.. . not all choices are equally free, or free at all. If in a totalitarian State I
betray my friend under threat of torture, perhaps even if I act from fear of
losing my job, I can reasonably say that I did not act freely.7
I think that this may very well be a free action, however. If I am given that
option, then I am free to betray my friend as well as to undergo torture. There
is another action which I am not free, in that situation, to perform, of course,
viz. not betraying my friend and not being tortured. But this does not mean
that I do not have a free choice between the alternatives I have been offered.
In the présent context I think it would be to improve Berlin's treatment of

the subject, if it were explicitly required that it must be impossible for an agent
to perform an action if in relation to anyone eise he is to be said to be 'unfree' to
perform it. For everything which Berlin is trying to say in his comparative terms
can be said in my absolute terms. When Berlin wants to say that I am almost not
free at all to abstain from betraying my friend, when this means my undergoing
torture, I can reply, in my terms, that I am free (absolutely) to abstain but that I
am not free (absolutely) to abstain without being tortured. We need not go into
the (unsolvable) problem of measuring how much I am restrained.
There is also a temporal aspect of liberty, not explicitly mentioned by Berlin
but of some importance. Society, say, may rrestrict my liberty so that I am not
allowed at one time, say before the age of 18, to perform certain actions which I
am allowed, afterwards, to perform.
We may now define (and slightly improve) the basic relation of liberty which
is implicit in Berlin's treatment of his subject;8 it is convenient to treat the nega
tive case first:
Def. (negative unfreedom): The person, S, is negatively unfree in relation to the

agency, Q, to perform the action, A, at the time, t =df.
(i) Q deliberately does, or has done, or will do, something in order to render it
impossible for S to perform A at t,
(ii) this makes it impossible for S to perform A at t.
If S is not unfree in relation to Q to perform A at t, then S is free in relation to
Q to perform A at t.
Ibid., note 1, p. 130.

My définition is inspired by, but not quite the same as, F. Oppenheim's in Dimensions
of Liberty, New York, 1961. Oppenheim's book is, in my opinion, the best that has been
written about the subject. Oppenheim's définition has been generalized by G. C. Mc
Callum, jr., in 'Negative and Positive Freedom', The Philosophical Review, Vol. 76,
1967, pp. 312-334. His generalization of the concept makes it inadéquate for my pur
poses in the présent context, however, where the interest is exclusively in political or
social liberty.
Against Berlin 223
3. Amounts of negative liberty
I have explicated a relation of social liber

plicit in Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liber
an action, A, at a time, t, and some agen
quantitative terms. He says such things
than another. What does this mean?
In a footnote Berlin gives his most elab
The extent of my freedom seems to dép
open to me (although the method of co
impressionistic. Possibilities of action a
which can be exhaustively enumerate
these possibiÜties is to actualize ; (c) how
my character and circumstances, these
each other; (d) how far they are closed
(e) what value not merely the agent, bu
in which he lives, puts on the various p
be 'integrated', and a conclusion, necess
drawn from this process. It may well b
able kinds and degrees of freedom, and
single scale of magnitude. Moreover, in
such (logically absurd) questions as 'Wou
of Mr. A more than it would that of
added together'? The same difficulties
Nevertheless, provided we do not dema
valid reasons for saying that the averag
the whole, a good deal freer today than
nia. Total patterns of life must be comp
method by which we make the compari
are difficult or impossible to demónstra
and the multiplicity of the criteria inv
matter itself, not of our imperfect me
of presice thought.9
In his clause (d) Berlin faces us once agai
degree of effectiveness of various restr
should do so, we conceive of social liberty
take social unfreedom to imply inability
the part of the restrained person, then w
If we accept my 'improved' définition of
(d) from our discussion.
It is also difficult to see how Berlin can
value of a certain liberty may dépend on
of it but, according to Berlin, I am free
Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', note
perform, if the reason for my failure is mi

think we may, in the name of consistency, d
is due to a conflation of the problem of the
of the définition of it, a distinction correctly
Clause (a) alone faces us by insurmountable
self is not unaware of them. When summing
'vagueness of the concepts'. A problem with h
a whole, he says, is also 'the multiplicity of t
Now, if clause (a) alone is taken into consid
any 'multiplicity of concepts'. The (only) im
natives are excluded for a certain agent (by ot
this concept a vague one? Perhaps it is. Bu
wrong with it. I agree that we must often to
necessitated by 'the subject-matter itself.
alternatives that are excluded for a certain p
not only vague, in addition it is confused. Be
self although he does not seem to realize the
ties of action are not discrète entities like a
enumerated'.
If we consider ail the concrete actions a person has performed, or attempted

to perform, we can perhaps count them, in principie at least. We can individúate
them by temporal and spatial means in some conventional way. But the impor
tant thing, from the point of view of Berlin's concept of social liberty, is not on
ly how often we are or have been frustrated. Actions which are also possible
must also count. And there are, for any agent, an indefinite number of possible
actions which he would have been able to perform, if other people had acted
otherwise. For each action which is free in relation to every agency in Sweden
there corresponds some action which is free in relation to every agency in Alba
nia, and for each action which is unfree in relation to some agency in Albania
there corresponds some action which is unfree in relation to some agency in
Sweden. We may compare two constitutions, Cx and C2, of the societies, Si and
S2, to see which constitution is the more liberal one. To the extent that they
'overlap' we may make comparisons. If ail the types of actions expressly forbid
den in Cx are also forbidden in C2, but not vice versa, then Ci is, in a sense,
'more liberal' than C2. The Citizens living in 5"x andS2 must also be considered,
however. Perhaps some of the restrictions made in C2 but not in C, make it
impossible for people in S2 to exploit each other. This means that people may
have some liberties against each other in S2 which they don't have in Sj. In
which society, then, is the overall balance of freedom for the average citizen lar
gest? This is a meaningless question.
There is a related problem with Berlin's attempt to quantify liberty, which
has to do with collective action. If, say, I am a member of a trade union, then a
collective discipline, which bars some alternatives for me (I may not work when
C.f. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford UP, 1971, p. 204.
Against Berlin 225
the others are on strike) may, on some o

me, qua a member of the union (we gain
of the owner of the factory where we
cipline means only a loss of liberty. On t
of 'distributing' the collective power of
tuting the collective which acts. And ag
vidual, on equal terms with its member
towards fascism, which is concerned ab
or the party, and so forth).
From a utilitarian point of view there
involving conflicts like this one, at leas
of discipline and liberties which contrib
ían is here at a loss. There is no way of
native arrangements con tain.
As a matter of fact, I suspect that Ber
clause (a). For, had this clause been merel
there would have been no good reason to
can, in principie at least, count alternat
then why bother about how important t
or for the Society in which he lives? Wh
clauses (c) and (e) he does so, I suspect
not work.
The clauses (c) and (e) are not 'congenial', to put it mildly, to Berlin's own
conception of liberty. For our liberty is restrained, says Berlin, even when paths
are closed along which we have no intention nor any desire to walk. And the
view taken by 'society' of the importance of a certain path that has been closed
may be the resuit of manipulation and earlier restrictions of liberty. Judging
from (c) and (e) alone it is not clear at ail that the average citizen of Albania
enjoys less freedom than the average citizen of Sweden. In Sweden there is
very much fuss about society's interférence with the individual. In Albania,
so far as I am aware, there is very little of this. I need not be surprised if it were
to tum out upon closer inspection that there is a more extensive agreement
among the people of Albania than among the people of Sweden that they have
their essential preferences satisfied. My point is not the reversai of Berlin's, that
there is more freedom in Albania than in Sweden. My point is rather that the
comparison is nonsensical.
4. The value of liberty
In his original version of 'Two Concepts of Liberty' Berlin seems to have iden
tified unfreedom with frustration of human desires (by the activities of others).
Such a conception would have allowed for quantifications of freedom, at least
in principie, for, even if exact measurements are not within our reach, it does at
least make sense to say of a certain person how much frustration of his desires
he suffers because of the activities of others. As a matter of fact, there are re
miniscences of such a concept even in the final ve

Liberty' such as, for example, when Berlin writes:
... all coerción is, in so far as it frustrâtes human
... while non-interference, which is the opposit
such.11
The extent of a man's, or a people's, liberty to choose to live as they desire
must be weighed against the claims of many other values, of which equality,
or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are perhaps the most
obvious examples.12
Not even from the point of view of such a conception of freedom, however,
would it be veiy reasonable to argue that, ceteris paribus, the more freedom the
better. For, even if unfreedom implies frustration, it is possible that some con
crete instances of it causes a decrease of frustration in the world, as a whole.
And, if everything eise is equal, even the balance of frustration over satisfaction,
why prefer a situation with more liberty to one with less? Is frustration caused
by nature préférable to frustration caused by other persons? This seems stränge.
Anyhow, this conception of liberty, as frustration of human desires by the acti
vities of others, is not Berlin's final one, and not the one I have defined above.
He writes the following about his final conception, in the Introduction to
Four Essays on Liberty:
... I wish to correct a genuine error in the original version of Two Concepts
of Liberty ... In the original version ... I speak of liberty as the absence of
obstacles to the fulfilment of a man's desires... I offered criticisms of this
définition, and of this entire line of thought in the text, without realizing that
it was inconsistent with the formulation with which I began. If degrees of free
dom were a function of the satisfaction of desires, I could increase freedom as
effectively by eliminating desires as by satisfying them .. . The sense of free
dom, in which I use this term, entails not simply the absence of frustration
(which may be obtained by killing desires). but the absence of obstacles to
possible choices and activities — absence of obstructions on roads along which
a man can decide to walk. Such freedom ultimately dépends not on whether
I wish to walk at all, or how far, but on how many doors are open, how open
they are, upon their relative importance in my life, even though it may be
impossible literally to measure this in any quantitative fashion.13
As was pointed out in the previous section, this final conception of liberty
does not allow for quantification; it does not make sense to say of one man that
he is 'freer' than another. 'The more liberty the better' does not make sense
either. And even if it had made sense, it could not have been supported by the
argument that more unfreedom means more frustration. It does not. I am unfree
to do a certain thing even if I don't want to do it and don't care whether I am
allowed to do it or not. Moreover, I am often 'free', according to Berlin's con
Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty ', p. 128.

Ibid., p. 170.
Sir I. Berlin, Four Essays in Liberty, the Introduction, pp. xxxviii-xl.
Against Berlin 227
ception, to perform actions which, from i

and so forth, I cannot perform. So there is
unfreedom. Perhaps I would sometimes be
to do what I cannot do anyway?
Consequently, if frustration of human de
conclude that liberty is not of value in its
ral as a means to what is good.
There is another argument which Berlin
of 'Two Concepts of Liberty' to establish
ever. And this argument does not présupp
ty nor that frustration of desires is bad
attempt to show that (negative) liberty in
at most, if it is valid, that some particular
but as means to positive liberty or, as/pr
He expresses his argument in the following
.. . it seems to me that the belief that som
found whereby ail the diverse ends of m
demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the en
them are in principie compatible with
conflict - and of tragedy - can never wh
either personal or social. The necessity of
the inescapable characteristic of the hum
freedom as Acton had conceived of it — a
porary need, arising out of our confused
lives, a predicament which a panacea could
Berlin here writes as if he meant, but
liberty is good in itself. He cannot really m
to tell whether a person has a great deal o
not recognise this point of mine, but becau
are quite harmless, to wit, those that the
alone cares about. The point must be, rath
unfreedom are bad since they threaten our
not acting autonomously is considered by B
'Two Concepts of Liberty' has sometim
ideal of positive liberty and as an argum
should give way to negative liberty. But B
reading when he writes, in the Introductio
It is doubtless well to remember that bel
with, and (so far as ideas influence condu
great and lasting social evils. My point is
or disguised by the kind of specious argu
ly used by the champions of 'positive' free
Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty p. 169.

Sir I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, the Introd
Berlin's point is not, and has never been, tha

negative freedom good. As a matter of fact, h
freedom in his argument for the value of negat
While negative freedom is a complicated rela
action at one time) positive freedom, or aut
That a person acts 'autonomously' means that t
performed by him. To be 'free' in the posit
own master'. What this really amounts to is n
Berlin suggests that there is an 'original' meanin
very explicit about this meaning. He is more a
tical philosopher when writing about positive li
that an action performed by a person is not au
result of the choice of the agent and, further
because the agent wanted (in the situation) to
ously if I am so manipulated that when I decid
turn to the right; and I am not autonomous, i
turn to the right although I want to turn to th
may also be needed. It seems as though Berlin
be, in some sense, 'independent of causal facto
easy to come to grips with. Berlin concedes th
tened by determinism. I find this Strange. Ho
by nature herseif? I will not go into these diffi
of argument I shall also take this requirement
sense can be given to it and that it is not su
autonomy vacuous.
How, then, can lack of negative freedom be a threat to autonomy?
This is not very easy to see. For it seems as though the main threat to auto
nomy would be, not negative unfreedom but, in addition to determinism,
manipulation. I may decide autonomously even if I am given but two alterna
tives, say, treason and torture. But if I am being hypnotized, drugged, or made
the victim of brain surgery, I may be unable to choose autonomously even if I
am presented with all sorts of alternatives. Moreover, too much positive freedom
in a society, accordingto Berlin, may threaten the negative freedom; 'the positive
liberty of self-realization' may clash 'with the negative liberty of non-inter
ference'16. A problem of practical politics is to balance these claims against each
other; people must be given the right to have a voice in the laws and practices of
the society in which they live and be accorded an area, in which they are their
own masters. For the sake of argument, however, let us suppose that some cases
of negative unfreedom do threaten our autonomy. Berlin concentrâtes mainly on
cases where our 'freedom of opinion' is restrained; and perhaps such cases are
fatal to the free development of our moral outlook. And it is the free develop
ment of our moral outlook, our moral autonomy, which primarily concerns
Ibid., p. lvii.
Against Berlin 229
Berlin in his argument. It is good in itself

one's own mind about what values to adop
This seems to me an error. I have argued
is without positive (or negative) value in it
teils equally against the view that moral au
will not repeat it in the présent context. B
which présupposés that moral autonomy h
his point. Now, does this argument of his
no value in itself? It does, of course, if it is
sound or not.
The argument Berlin puts forth, quoted above, is that the 'necessity of
choosing between absolute claims' is an "inescapable characteristic of the human
condition'. This somehow sceptical view of human values (two conflicting ab
solute moral claims cannot both be absolutely true) is taken to be an argument
proving why it is good to make up one's own mind about moral problems. And
the value of making value judgements autonomously is taken to be an argument
showing that it is a good thing to be allowed to have some negative freedom (of
moral opinions).
This is very différent from the argument by J. S. Mill. Mill's point was that
unless there is liberty of thought and discussion we will not be able to find the
truth. And, even if we were to find it, it wopld not strike us vividly enough, nor
would we be able to grasp the whole of it ; the growth of human genius would be
hamstrung. Berlin does not share this view:
No one would argue that truth or freedom of self-expression could flourish
where dogma crushes all thought. But the evidence of history tends to show
(as, indeed, was argued by James Stephen in his formidable attack on Mill in
his Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) that integrity, love of truth, and fiery in
dividualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities among,
for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under
military discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; and if this is
so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of hu
man genius falls to the ground.18
Berlin's point, then, is not that there is absolute truth in morality which we
fail to grasp if we are not left on our own to search for it but that there is no
absolute truth in morality to be found. That's why we have to make up our own
mind about problems of value.
It seems to me, however, that Berlin ail too hastily equates four very différent
theses, viz.
(1) The nihilistic thesis, that there are no absolute moral facts.
(2) The incompleteness thesis, that there are no criteria of value which are both
necessary and sufficient; in concrete cases competing claims have to be balanced
somehow against each other, how this is to be done is up to our best judgment.
T. Tännsjö, 'Against Personal Autonomy', forthcoming.

Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p. 128.
(3) The undecidability thesis, that there is no

mining mechanically what to do in particular
(4) The irreconcilability thesis, that people w
decide for themselves, disagree about mor
outlook.
It is obvious that (3) follows from (2) and that (2) follows from (1), but not
conversely. The thesis (4) is logically independent of the other ones.
It seems as though Berlin accepts all of the theses (1)—(4). He advocates a
value relativism which clearly implies (1). His view of moral conflict seems to
imply it. In his argument for moral autonomy he relies on it. (Neither (2) nor
(3) suffices to show the value of moral autonomy. On the contrary. If moral
décisions must be left to our best judgment, why not trust moral experts in
stead of deciding for ourselves?) This thesis (1) is, of course, quite controversial.
Berlin does not argue in defence of it, however. He persuades us insiduously by
gradually insinuating that those who do not share his belief in (1) must believe
that (2) and (3) are false, i.e. must believe that problems of morality can be
solved by 'actuarían calculation' or by the adoption of a 'slide-rule', to use his
own phrases.
I have questioned (1) elsewhere19 but I will, for the sake of argument, take its
truth for granted in the présent context. In what way, then, does the alleged fact
that there are no absolute moral facts show that moral autonomy is of positive
value in itself? In no way it seems to me.
If it is true that there are no absolute moral facts, no absolute truths in moral
ity incorrigible by our expériences, then this view cannot have as a logical consé
quence the view that moral autonomy is good in itself. For, in that case, the
view that moral autonomy is good in itself is not really a view at all, a statement
capable of beíng true or false or of following logically from any statements
whatever; it is just an attitude, or something of that kind. Perhaps it is an atti
tude shared by Berlin with most modem libérais. Berlin claims that this is the
case:
Most modem libérais, at their most consistent, want a situatio

many individuáis as possible can realize as many of their en
without assessment of the value of these ends as such, save in
may frustrate the purposes of others.20
Incidentally, a similar view of values as subjective seems to be
takes as part of the rationale of his ideal of liberty; he writes i
Justice:
.. . within the limits allowed by the principies of right, th

standard of correctness beyond that of deliberative rationality
plan of life meets this criterion and if he succeds in carrying
doing so finds it worthwile, there are no grounds for saying
have been better if he had done something eise.21
" T. Tännsjö, Moral Realism, forthcoming.
10 Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', note 1, p. 153.
" J. Rawls, op. cit., p. 564.
Against Berlin 231
This, however, does not impress me or any

told that there are no absolute values we re
Berlin and Rawls on the other hand, are just
any absolute sense to be wrong. So we hold o
be coerced (or manipulated) to decide hetero
to the extent that this makes them or other
if the thesis (4) is true, this may be a way o
And we stick to the view that such manipu
does not hurt anyone, it does not mean that
has to be counter-balanced by good effects).
by such coerción we ought to exert it.
Berlin argues that, 'in the end men choo
choose as they do, because their life and thou
moral catégories and concepts that are, at a
and space, a part of their being and thought
what makes them human'22. Moral auton
'fundamental need'. Such references to pers
are not very convincing, however. In the fir
they are, even if, by choosing values we cho
matter of fact, we need moral autonomy, w
human nature? 'Authoritarians' do not hesita
and absolutely true moral reasons, to stop us
Moreover, there seems to be an 'argument',
existence of arguments, to the effect that
(or negative) value, which strikes me, at leas
that hardly anyone, and indeed no decent pe
like today's Sweden, that racist views may n
actively taught at school that all 'races' hav
pagated by radio and televisión because the
one wants to investígate scientifically wheth
the races, which could form the rationale fo
project will most certainly be turned dow
matter how ingenious his methods are and
may be. It is at least arguable that this mas
an autonomous stand on racism impossible a
propaganda is accepted ail the same (perh
accepted principally because, on balance, it is
ings of insecurity among immigrants, in spi
some autonomy. Indeed it seems to be the r
loss of value at ail. That there is an active pr
have equal value seems no more remarkable
ganda for Darwinism. If this is so, however
who share this common view, believe in the
" Sir I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty', pp. 17
wish to remain consistent. (Admittedly (1), if

necessary but most people seem to aspire to it
that moral autonomy has any positive value in
If moral autonomy is not good (nor bad) in it
required to safeguard moral autonomy does n
The whole idea that negative freedom is good i
itive freedom (autonomy) is stränge. It seems
effect that negative freedom is good as a mea
case, the argument is fallacious. For moral a
negative) in itself. At least this is what I have
argument that there are no absolute moral fa
ple choose who they are by chosing their valu
selves about moral problems, Berlin does not d
is self-defeating.
5. Conclusion
Berlin has made the most ambitious attempt that I know of to give a clear mean
ing to the commonplace saying that some peoples or countries are 'freer' than
others. Yet, he has failed. This means also that the liberal views, which Berlin
expresses his sympathy for, that it is always a loss when liberty is 'sacrificed' and
that, ceteris paribus, an equal distribution of liberty is preferable to an unequal
one, lack a clear meaning as well. And again, if we endeavour to get down to
what is at the root of the ideal that it is good in itself that people be morally
autonomous we find, contrary to what is believed by Berlin, that no good argu
ment has been put forward for this view. Berlin has, very eloquently indeed,
expressed his attitudes about the matter. But he has said nothing that can make
any impression on a rational 'authoritarian' caring, say, exclusively for happiness
and pain in the world and not at all for autonomy. Ön the contrary, if Berlin is
in the right when claiming that there are no absolute moral facts, then the
authoritarian may hold on to his attitude in the secure feeling that no one can
ever prove him wrong.
Résumé/Zusammenfassung
Contre Berlin: Sir Isaiah Berlin distingue dans son essai Two concepts of liberty
une liberté négative d'une liberté positive.
Selon Berlin la liberté négative est un concept comparatif et il essaie de prou
ver qu'une liberté négative plus vaste soit préférable — ceteris paribus — à une
plus restrainte (ou moins vaste). Dans cet essai le concept d'une liberté négative
est analysé et mis en question; il en résulte qu'il est absurde d'affirmer p.ex.
qu'il y ait plus de liberté en Suède qu'en Albanie et qu'il est donc aussi absurde
de préférer la liberté négative plus vaste à la plus restrainte car si bien l'une que
Against Berlin 233
l'autre sont dépourvues de contenu. En plus

autonomie et il affirme que surtout l'au
Cette affirmation est mise en question dan
attribuée à cette autonomie morale (fo
spécieuse que Berlin a fait des conflits mor
Gegen Berlin: In seinem Essay „Two Con

Isaiah Berlin zwischen negativer und positi
lich sei, negative Freiheit als einen vergleic
der Meinung zu sein, daß — bei im übrigen
negativer Freiheit einem Weniger vorzuzi
der negativen Freiheit wird im vorliegenden
das Ergebnis der Analyse ist, daß es z.B. k
den habe mehr Freiheit als Albanien. Dam
daß — bei im übrigen gleichen Bedingung
wäre als weniger. Berlin identifiziert fern
und behauptet, daß besonders moralische A
im vorliegenden Essay in Frage gestellt, in
die Argumente Berlins für moralische Au
lyse von moralischen Konflikten ihren Au
sind.
Author's address: Prof. Torbjörn Tännsjö, Dcpt.

106 91 Stockholm, Sweden.

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Against Berlin

Author(s): TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ

BY TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ, STOCKHOLM

circumscribed. The point has been that some v

T. Tännsjö, 'Against Freedom of Expression forthcoming.

The concept of positive liberty will be dealt

social unfreedom. For, indirectly, ther

be able to do so by bribing him as well. He

In the présent context I think it would be to improve Berlin's treatment of

Def. (negative unfreedom): The person, S, is negatively unfree in relation to the

Ibid., note 1, p. 130.

3. Amounts of negative liberty

I have explicated a relation of social liber

Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', note

perform, if the reason for my failure is mi

If we consider ail the concrete actions a person has performed, or attempted

C.f. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford UP, 1971, p. 204.

the others are on strike) may, on some o

4. The value of liberty

miniscences of such a concept even in the final ve

Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty ', p. 128.

ception, to perform actions which, from i

Sir I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty p. 169.

Berlin's point is not, and has never been, tha

Berlin in his argument. It is good in itself

T. Tännsjö, 'Against Personal Autonomy', forthcoming.

(3) The undecidability thesis, that there is no

Most modem libérais, at their most consistent, want a situatio

.. . within the limits allowed by the principies of right, th

This, however, does not impress me or any

" Sir I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty', pp. 17

wish to remain consistent. (Admittedly (1), if

l'autre sont dépourvues de contenu. En plus

Gegen Berlin: In seinem Essay „Two Con

Author's address: Prof. Torbjörn Tännsjö, Dcpt.

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