starting 25 July 2002, which period was
extended up to 30 April 2003.
1.PANDACAN OIL DEPOT
MUST GO: SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA CASE
DIGEST
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel
respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then
mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under
the reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area
are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the
oil companies.
In 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with the oil companies.
They agreed that scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals was the most viable
and practicable option.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the
MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same
resolution.
the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months
The SC ruled that respondent had the
ministerial duty under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance
of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027.
After the SC promulgated its Decision,
Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the oil
companies) and the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought
to intervene and ask for a reconsideration
of the decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the
DOE allowed in the interest of justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third
party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to
enable him, her or it to protect or preserve
a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceedings.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion
to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. While the motions
to intervene respectively filed by the oil
companies and the DOE were filed out of
time, these motions were granted because
they presented novel issues and arguments.
DOEs intervention was also allowed
considering the transcendental importance
of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly
repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Repeal by implication proceeds on the
premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals the intention of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect.
Implied repeals are not favored and will not
be so declared unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The
first is: where the provisions in the two acts
on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act,
to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one. The
second is: if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law. The oil companies
argue that the situation here falls under the
first category.
For the first kind of implied repeal, there
must be an irreconcilable conflict between
the two ordinances. However, there was no
legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No.
8027. There is no conflict since both
ordinances actually have a common
objective, i.e., to shift the zoning
classification from industrial to commercial
(Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed
residential/commercial (Ordinance No.
8119). While it is true that both ordinances
relate to the same subject matter, i.e.,
classification of the land use of the area
where Pandacan oil depot is located, if
there is no intent to repeal the earlier
enactment, every effort at reasonable
construction must be made to reconcile the
ordinances so that both can be given effect.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in
statutory construction that a subsequent
general law does not repeal a prior special
law on the same subject unless it clearly
appears that the legislature has intended by
the latter general act to modify or repeal
the earlier special law. The special law must
be taken as intended to constitute an
exception to, or a qualification of, the
general act or provision.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it
deals specifically with a certain area
described therein (the Pandacan oil depot
area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be
considered a general law as it covers the
entire city of Manila.
Mandamus lies to compel respondent
Mayor to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus
does not lie against respondent in
consideration of the separation of powers
of the executive and judiciary. However,
while it is true that Courts will not interfere
by mandamus proceedings with the
legislative or executive departments of the
government in the legitimate exercise of its
powers, there is an exception ân to enforce
mere ministerial acts required by law to be
performed by some officer thereof. A writ
of mandamus is the power to compel the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust or station.
The oil companies also argue that
petitioners had a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to compel respondent to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027, which was to
seek relief from the President of the
Philippines through the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) by virtue of the
Presidents power of supervision over local
government units. This suggested process,
however, would be unreasonably long,
tedious and consequently injurious to the
interests of the local government unit (LGU)
and its constituents whose welfare is sought
to be protected. A party need not go first to
the DILG in order to compel the
enforcement of an ordinance. Besides, the
resort to an original action for mandamus
before the SC is undeniably allowed by the
Constitution.
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and
valid
The tests of a valid ordinance are well
established. For an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate
powers of the LGU to enact and be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with
public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable. There is no showing that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional.
TAKE NOTE POLICE POWER
The City of Manila has the power to enact
Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the
exercise of its police power. Police power is
the plenary power vested in the legislature
to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. This power flows
from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is
the supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the
national legislature, such power may be
delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as
the general welfare clause, encapsulates
the delegated police power to local
governments. LGUs like the City of Manila
exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies, in this case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city
council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can
enact ordinances for the general welfare of
the city.
This police power was also provided for in
RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the
power to “reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city.”
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a
legitimate exercise of police power
As with the State, local governments may
be considered as having properly exercised
their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power
measure because there is a concurrence of
lawful subject and lawful method. It was
enacted “for the purpose of promoting
sound urban planning, ensuring health,
public safety and general welfare” of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this
objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the
area defined in the ordinance from
industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard
the rights to life, security and safety of all
the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class. The depot is perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as it there is such a
target in their midst, the residents of Manila
are not safe. It therefore became necessary
to remove these terminals to dissipate the
threat. Wide discretion is vested on the
legislative authority to determine not only
what the interests of the public require but
also what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. Clearly, the
Sanggunian was in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property
rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general
welfare. However, the interference must be
reasonable and not arbitrary. And to
forestall arbitrariness, the methods or
means used to protect public health,
morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was
the enactment of a zoning ordinance which
reclassified the area where the depot is
situated from industrial to commercial. A
zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions
a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection
of needs. As a result of the zoning, the
continued operation of the businesses of
the oil companies in their present location
will no longer be permitted. The power to
establish zones for industrial, commercial
and residential uses is derived from the
police power itself and is exercised for the
protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality. Consequently, the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila and any resulting burden on those
affected cannot be said to be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair,
oppressive or confiscatory which amounts
to taking without compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance
No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does
not only regulate but also absolutely
prohibits them from conducting operations
in the City of Manila. However, the oil
companies are not prohibited from doing
business in other appropriate zones in
Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised
its power to regulate the businesses and
industries in the zones it established.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and
discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the
ordinance has discriminated against and
singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite
the fact that the Pandacan area is
congested with buildings and residences
that do not comply with the National
Building Code, Fire Code and Health and
Sanitation Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable
classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law. The requirements for
a valid and reasonable classification are: (1)
it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
The law may treat and regulate one class
differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
Here, there is a reasonable classification.
What the ordinance seeks to prevent is a
catastrophic devastation that will result
from a terrorist attack.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent
with RA 7638 and RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that
Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional
because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of
1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not
contravene existing statutes enacted by
Congress. However, a brief survey of
decisions where the police power measure
of the LGU clashed with national laws
shows that the common dominator is that
the national laws were clearly and expressly
in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions
of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so
patent that there was no room for doubt.
This is not the case here. The laws cited
merely gave DOE general powers to
establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing,
distribution, utilization, conservation,
stockpiling, and storage of energy resources
and to encourage certain practices in the
[oil] industry which serve the public interest
and are intended to achieve efficiency and
cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of
petroleum products.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of
control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the
DOEs assertions is that Section 4 of Article X
of the Constitution confines the Presidents
power over LGUs to one of general
supervision. Consequently, the Chief
Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot
exercise the power of control over them.
The President and his or her alter egos, the
department heads, cannot interfere with
the activities of local governments, so long
as they act within the scope of their
authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot
substitute its own discretion for the
discretion exercised by the sanggunian of
the City of Manila. In local affairs, the
wisdom of local officials must prevail as long
as they are acting within the parameters of
the Constitution and the law.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for
failure to comply with RA 7924 and EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning
ordinances of LGUs are required to be
submitted to the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) for review
and if found to be in compliance with its
metropolitan physical framework plan and
regulations, it shall endorse the same to the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA
7924 and Section 1 of E.O. 72. They argue
that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go
through this review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not
give MMDA the authority to review land
use plans and zoning ordinances of cities
and municipalities.
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA
review and HLURB ratification are
necessary, the oil companies did not
present any evidence to show that these
were not complied with. In accordance with
the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, its constitutionality or legality
should be upheld in the absence of proof
showing that the procedure prescribed by
law was not observed.
Just the same, the Court noted that it is not
about to provoke a crisis by ordering the
immediate relocation of the Pandacan
Terminals out of its present site. The
enforcement of a decision, specially one
with far-reaching consequences, should
always be within the bounds of reason, in
accordance with a comprehensive and well-
coordinated plan, and within a time-frame
that complies with the letter and spirit of
our resolution. To this end, the oil
companies have no choice but to obey the
law.

Conclusion

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting

for their right to property. They allege that
they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced
to relocate. However, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, the right to life enjoys precedence
over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is
not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of
police power clashes with a few individuals
right to property, the former should prevail.

Both law and jurisprudence support the

constitutionality and validity of Ordinance
No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and
implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its
leaders who have categorically expressed
their desire for the relocation of the
terminals. Their power to chart and control
their own destiny and preserve their lives
and safety should not be curtailed by the
intervenors warnings of doomsday
scenarios and threats of economic disorder
if the ordinance is enforced.
2. KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et.
al., Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
                RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC
to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters in order
to establish a clean, complete, permanent,
and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology.
                RA 10367 likewise directs that
“registered voters whose biometrics have
not been captured shall submit themselves
for validation.”
“Voters who fail to submit for validation on
or before the last day of filing of application
for registration for purposes of the May
2016 elections shall be deactivated x  x x.”
                COMELEC issued Resolution No.
9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863
and 10013.
Among others, the said Resolution provides
that: “the registration records of voters
without biometrics data who failed to
submit for validation on or before the last
day of filing of applications for registration
for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
 
                Herein petitioners filed the instant
petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI)
assailing the constitutionality of the
biometrics validation requirement imposed
under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all
related thereto.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the statutory
requirement of biometrics validation is an
unconstitutional requirement of literacy
and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics
validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863
which fixed the deadline for validation on
October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA
8189.
 
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
                The Court held that biometrics
validation is not a “qualification” to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere
aspect of the registration procedure, of
which the State has the right
to reasonably regulate.
               It is not a qualification for such
right. The process of registration is a
procedural limitation on the right to vote.
                Thus, although one is deemed to
be a “qualified elector,” he must
nonetheless still comply with the
registration procedure in order to vote.
                Thus, unless it is shown that a
registration requirement rises to the level of
a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement as contemplated by the
Framers of the Constitution -that is, one
which propagates a socio-economic
standard which is bereft of any rational
basis to a person’s ability to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good
-the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
                In applying strict scrutiny, the focus
is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and
on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden
befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Presence of compelling state interest
                Respondents have shown that the
biometrics validation requirement under RA
10367 advances a compelling state interest.
It was precisely designed to facilitate the
conduct of orderly, honest, and credible
elections by containing -if not eliminating,
the perennial problem of having flying
voters, as well as dead and multiple
registrants. The foregoing consideration is
unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Biometrics validation is the least restrictive
means for achieving the above-said
interest
                Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721
sets the procedure for biometrics
validation, whereby the registered voter is
only required to: (a) personally appear
before the Office of the Election Officer; (b)
present a competent evidence of identity;
and (c) have his photo, signature,
and fingerprints recorded.
                Moreover, RA 10367 and
Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate
registered voters to submit themselves to
validation every time there is an election. In
fact, it only required the voter to undergo
the validation process one (1) time, which
shall remain effective in succeeding
elections, provided that he remains
an active voter.
                Lastly, the failure to validate did
not preclude deactivated voters from
exercising their right to vote in the
succeeding elections. To rectify such status,
they could still apply for reactivation.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
                Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:
System of Continuing Registration of Voters.
– x x x No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a
special election.
                The Court held that the 120-and
90-day periods stated therein refer to the
prohibitive period beyond which voter
registration may no longer be conducted.
The subject provision does not mandate
COMELEC to conduct voter registration up
to such time; rather, it only provides a
period which may not be reduced, but may
be extended depending on the
administrative necessities and other
exigencies.

3.MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY VS SPS RAMOS
The Factual Antecedents
MERALCO is a private corporation engaged
in the business of selling and distributing
electricity to its customers in Metro Manila
and other franchise areas.
The respondents are registered customers
of MERALCO.
MERALCO entered into a contract of service
with the respondents agreeing to supply the
latter with electric power in their residence
at 2760-B Molave St., Manuguit, Tondo,
Manila.
To measure the respondents' electric
consumption, it installed the electric meter
outside the front wall of the property
occupied by Patricia's brother, Isidoro Sales,
and his wife, Nieves Sales (Nieves), located
beside the respondents' house.
On November 5, 1999, MERALCO's service
inspector inspected the respondents'
electrical facilities and found an outside
connection attached to their electric meter.
The service inspector traced the
connection, an illegal one, to the residence
and appliances of Nieves. Nieves was the
only one present during the inspection and
she was the one who signed the Metering
Facilities Inspection Report.
Due to the discovery of the illegal
connection, the service inspector
disconnected the respondents' electric
services on the same day.
The inspection and disconnection were
done without the knowledge of the
respondents as they were not at home and
their house was closed at the time.
The respondents denied that they had
been, using an illegal electrical connection
and they requested MERALCO to
immediately reconnect their electric
services.
Despite the respondents' request,
MERALCO instead demanded from them
the payment of P179,231.70 as differential
billing.
On December 20, 1999, the respondents
filed a complaint for breach of contract
with preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages against MERALCO before the RTC,
Branch 40, City of Manila.
In a decision dated August 22, 2006, the
RTC ordered MERALCO to reconnect the
respondents' electric service and awarded
damages
MERALCO appealed the RTC's decision to
the CA.
In its assailed July 30, 2010 decision, 5 the CA
denied the appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed the RTC's order of reconnection
and award for payment of damages.
The appellate court held that MERALCO
failed to comply not only with its own
contract of service, but also with the
requirements under Sections 4 and 6 of
Republic Act No. 7832, or the Anti-
Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 (R.A.
7832)
MERALCO moved for the reconsideration of
the decision, but the CA denied its motion
in a resolution6 dated January 3, 2011. The
present petition for review
7
on certiorari  was filed with this Court on
March 4, 2011, as a consequence.
The Petition
1. MERALCO argues that under R.A. 7832, it
had the right and authority to immediately
disconnect the electric service of the
respondents after they were caught in
flagrante delicto using a tampered electrical
installation.
2. MERALCO also claims that by virtue of
their contract of service, the respondents
are liable to pay the differential billing
regardless of whether the latter benefited
from the illegal electric service or not. It
adds that this is true even if the
respondents did not personally tamper with
the electrical facilities.
3. Finally, MERALCO contends that there is
no basis for the award of damages as the
disconnection of the respondents' electric
service was done in good faith and in the
lawful exercise of its rights as a public utility
company.
The Respondents' Comment
In their comment8 of June 29, 2011, the
respondents pray for the denial of the
present petition for lack of merit.
1. They argue that the discovery of an
outside connection attached to their
electric meter does not give MERALCO the
right to automatically disconnect their
electric service as the law provides certain
mandatory requirements that should be
observed before a disconnection could be
effected. They claim that MERALCO failed to
comply with these statutory requirements.
2. the respondents contend that MERALCO
breached its contractual obligations when
its service inspector immediately
disconnected their electric service without
notice. They claim that this breach of
contract, coupled with MERALCO's failure to
observe the requirements under R.A. 7832,
entitled them to damages which were
sufficiently established with evidence and
were rightfully awarded by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA.
3. Lastly the respondents argue that they
are not liable to MERALCO for the
differential billing as they were not the ones
who illegally consumed the unbilled
electricity through the illegal connection.
We DENY the petition for review
on certiorari as we find no reversible error
committed by the CA in issuing its assailed
decision.
ISSUE
The core issue in this case is whether
MERALCO had the right to immediately
disconnect the electric service of the disconnection of the respondents' electric
respondents upon discovery of an outside service is presumed to be in bad faith.
connection attached to their electric meter.

HELD

The distribution of electricity is a basic

necessity that is imbued with public
interest. Its provider is considered as a
public utility subject to the strict regulation
by the State in the exercise of its police
power.
 Failure to comply with these regulations
gives rise to the presumption of bad faith
or abuse of
9
right. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nevertheless, the State also recognizes that

electricity is the property of the service
provider. R.A. 7832 was enacted by
Congress to afford electric service providers
multiple remedies to. protect themselves
from electricity pilferage.
These remedies include the immediate
disconnection of the electric service of an
erring customer, criminal prosecution, and
the imposition of surcharges. However, the
service provider must avail of any or all of
these remedies within legal bounds, in strict
compliance with the requirements and/or
conditions set forth by law.
In view of MERALCO's failure to comply with
the strict requirements under Sections 4
and 6 of R. A. No. 7832, we hold that
MERALCO had no authority to immediately
disconnect the respondents' electric
service. As a result, the immediate

4. FERNANDO VS ST.
SCHOLASTICA COLLEGE
The Facts
Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC)
and St. Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc.
(SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions
organized under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4)
parcels of land measuring a total of
56,306.80 square meters, located in
Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537.
Located within the property are SSA-
Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the
Benedictine Order, the formation house of
the novices, and the retirement house for
the elderly sisters.
The property is enclosed by a tall concrete
perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years
ago. Abutting the fence along the West
Drive are buildings, facilities, and other
improvements.3
The petitioners are the officials of the City
Government of Marikina.
On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted
Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the
Municipality of Marikina."
In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 217 5 and
2006 were enacted to amend Sections 7 and
5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as
amended,
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of
Marikina sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to demolish and replace the
fence of their Marikina property to make it
80% see-thru,
and, at the same time, to move it back
about six (6) meters to provide parking
space for vehicles to park.
 On April 26, 2000, the respondents
requested for an extension of time to
comply with the directive.
 In response, the petitioners, through then
City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on
the enforcement of the subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a
petition for prohibition with an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273
(RTC), docketed as SCA Case No. 2000-381-
MK.
The respondents argued that
1. the petitioners were acting in excess of
jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192,
asserting that such contravenes Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
2.That demolishing their fence and
constructing it six (6) meters back would
result in the loss of at least 1,808.34 square
meters, worth about ₱9,041,700.00, along
West Drive, and at least 1,954.02 square
meters, worth roughly ₱9,770,100.00, along
East Drive.
3.It would also result in the destruction of
the garbage house, covered walk, electric
house, storage house, comfort rooms,
guards’ room, guards’ post, waiting area for
visitors, waiting area for students, Blessed
Virgin Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi-
purpose hall, resulting in the permanent
loss of their beneficial use.
4.The respondents, thus, asserted that the
implementation of the ordinance on their
property would be tantamount to an
appropriation of property without due
process of law;
5. and that the petitioners could only
appropriate a portion of their property
through eminent domain.
6. They also pointed out that the goal of the
provisions to deter lawless elements and
criminality did not exist as the solid
concrete walls of the school had served as
sufficient protection for many years.
The petitioners, on the other hand,
countered
1.that the ordinance was a valid exercise of
police power, by virtue of which, they could
restrain property rights for the protection of
public safety, health, morals, or the
promotion of public convenience and
general prosperity.13
On June 30, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing the
demolition of the fence at SSC’s Marikina
property.14
Ruling of the RTC
On the merits, the RTC rendered a
Decision, dated October 2, 2002, granting
the petition and ordering the issuance of a
writ of prohibition commanding the
petitioners to permanently desist from
enforcing or implementing Ordinance No.
192 on the respondents’ property.
The RTC agreed with the respondents that
the order of the petitioners to demolish the
fence at the SSC property in Marikina and to
move it back six (6) meters would amount
to an appropriation of property which could
only be done through the exercise of
eminent domain.
It held that the petitioners could not take
the respondents’ property under the guise
of police power to evade the payment of
just compensation.
It did not give weight to the petitioners’
contention that the parking space was for
the benefit of the students and patrons of
SSA-Marikina, considering that the
respondents were already providing for
sufficient parking in compliance with the
standards under Rule XIX of the National
Building Code.
It further found that the 80% see-thru fence
requirement could run counter to the
respondents’ right to privacy, considering
that the property also served as a residence
of the Benedictine sisters, who were
entitled to some sense of privacy in their
affairs. It also found that the respondents
were able to prove that the danger to
security had no basis in their case.
Moreover, it held that the purpose of
beautification could not be used to justify
the exercise of police power.
It also observed that Section 7 of Ordinance
No. 192, as amended, provided for
retroactive application. It held, however,
that such retroactive effect should not
impair the respondents’ vested substantive
rights over the perimeter walls, the six-
meter strips of land along the walls, and the
building, structures, facilities, and
improvements, which would be destroyed
by the demolition of the walls and the
seizure of the strips of land.
The RTC also found untenable the
petitioners’ argument that Ordinance No.
192 was a remedial or curative statute
intended to correct the defects of buildings
and structures, which were brought about
by the absence or insufficiency of laws.
It ruled that the assailed ordinance was
neither remedial nor curative in nature,
considering that at the time the
respondents’ perimeter wall was built, the
same was valid and legal, and the ordinance
did not refer to any previous legislation that
it sought to correct.
The RTC noted that the petitioners could
still take action to expropriate the subject
property through eminent domain.
Ruling of the CA
In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA
dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA reasoned out that the objectives
stated in Ordinance No. 192 did not justify
the exercise of police power, as it did not
only seek to regulate, but also involved the
taking of the respondents’ property without
due process of law.
In affirming the RTC ruling that the
ordinance was not a curative statute, the CA
found that the petitioner failed to point out
any irregularity or invalidity in the
provisions of the National Building Code
that required correction or cure. It noted
that any correction in the Code should be
properly undertaken by the Congress and
not by the City Council of Marikina through
an ordinance.
Ruling of the Court
The ultimate question before the Court is
whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance
No. 192 are valid exercises of police power
by the City Government of Marikina.
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City
Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise
of its police power.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police
power as the rationale for the enactment of
an ordinance and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, two
tests have been used by the Court – the
rational relationship test and the strict
scrutiny test:
Even without going to a discussion of the
strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192,
series of 1994 must be struck down for not
being reasonably necessary to accomplish
the City’s purpose. More importantly, it is
oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an
ordinance must pass the following
requisites as discussed in Social Justice
Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:28
As with the State, local governments may
be considered as having properly exercised
their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its
exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and lawful method.
Lacking a concurrence of these two
requisites, the police power measure shall
be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights and a violation of the due
process clause.
The CA was correct in affirming the decision
of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition.
The petitioners must permanently desist
from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the
assailed ordinance on the respondents'
property in Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
October 2, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court in SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK is
AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
writ of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to
permanently desist from enforcing or
implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of
Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as
amended, on the petitioners' property in
question located in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila.

Furthermore, the two ordinances have

completely different purposes and subjects.
Ordinance No. 192 aims to regulate the
construction of fences, while Ordinance No.
303 is a zoning ordinance which classifies
the city into specific land uses. In fact, the
five-meter setback required by Ordinance
No. 303 does not even appear to be for the
purpose of providing a parking area.

Conclusion

Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1

and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were
acting in excess of their jurisdiction in
enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the
respondents.

5.MOSQUEDA VS PILIPINO
BANANA GROWERS
FACTS:
After several committee hearings and
consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of
2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City.
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the
ordinance on February 9, 2007. The
ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007
after its publication in the newspaper
Mindanao Pioneer.  reversing the judgment of the RTC. The City
Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the
ban against aerial spraying would be
strictly enforced three months thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely:
1.Davao Fruits Corporation and
2.Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation (PBGEA, et al.),
filed their petition in the RTC to challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance, and
to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs
through a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The residents living within and adjacent to
banana plantations in Davao City led by
Wilfredo Mosqueda, joined by other
residents of Davao City, (Mosqueda, et al.)
submitted their Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of
a Preliminary Injunction.
The RTC granted the prayer for issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, and
subsequently issued the writ. After trial, the
RTC rendered judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and
constitutional.
PBGEA, et al. appealed, and applied for
injunctive relief from the CA, which granted
the application and consequently issued a
TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of
the ordinance.
The CA promulgated its assailed decision
of Davao and the intervenors filed their
respective motions for reconsideration, but
the CA denied the motions. Hence, the
separate, but now consolidated, appeals by
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City has authority to enact
Ordinance No. 0309-07 (YES)
(2)
(2) WON Ordinance No. 0309-07 is
ultra-vires act (YES)

RATIO:
(1) The Ordinance Was Enacted Under
Davao City’s Corporate Powers.
To be considered as a valid police power
measure, an ordinance must pass a two-
pronged test:
(A)the formal:
– whether the ordinance is enacted within
the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and
– whether it is passed in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law
(B)the substantive
– involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes,
– as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and
– its consistency with public policy
AS TO THE PROCEDURE. The formalities in
enacting an ordinance are laid down in
Section 53 and Section 54 of The Local
Government Code. These provisions require
the ordinance to be passed by the majority
of the members of the sanggunian
concerned, and to be presented to the
mayor for approval. With no issues
regarding quorum during its deliberation
having been raised, and with its approval of
by City Mayor Duterte not being disputed,
we see no reason to strike down Ordinance
No. 0309-07 for non-compliance with the
formal requisites under the Local
Government Code.
We next ascertain whether the City of
Davao acted within the limits of its
corporate powers in enacting Ordinance No.
0309-07. The corporate powers of the local
government unit confer the basic authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses
and occupations in order to promote the
general welfare.
Such legislative powers spring from the
delegation thereof by Congress through
either the Local Government Code or a
special law. The General Welfare Clause in
Section 16 of the Local Government Code
embodies the legislative grant that enables
the local government unit to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared
objects of its creation, and to promote and
maintain local autonomy.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of
delegated powers, namely: the general
legislative power and the police power
proper.
(A) General legislative power refers to the
power delegated by Congress to the local
legislative body, or the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the case of Dayao City, to
enable the local legislative body to enact
ordinances and make regulations. This
power is limited in that the enacted
ordinances must not be repugnant to law,
and the power must be exercised to
effectuate and discharge the powers and
duties legally conferred to the local
legislative body.
(B) The police power proper, on the other
hand, authorizes the local government unit
to enact ordinances necessary and proper
for the health and safety, prosperity,
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the local government unit
and its constituents, and for the protection
of their property.
Section 458 of the Local Government Code
explicitly vests the local government unit
with the authority to enact legislation
aimed at promoting the general welfare.
In terms of the right of the citizens to health
and to a balanced and healthful ecology,
the local government unit takes its cue from
Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution. Following the provisions
of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution, the acts of the local
government unit designed to ensure the
health and lives of its constituents and to
promote a balanced and healthful
ecology are well within the corporate
powers vested in the local government
unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City is vested with the requisite
authority to enact an ordinance that seeks
to protect the health and well-being of its
constituents.
Advancing the interests of the residents
who are vulnerable to the alleged health
risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift
justifies the motivation behind the
enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of
legislation that will promote the general
welfare, specifically the health of its
constituents. Such authority should not be
construed, however, as a valid license for
the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it
deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin
but well-defined line separates authority to
enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.
(2) Ordinance No. 0309-07 Is An Ultra Vires
Act
The function of pesticides control,
regulation and development is within the
jurisdiction of the FPA under Presidential
Decree No. 1144. The FPA was established
in recognition of the need for a technically
oriented government entity that will
protect the public from the risks inherent in
the use of pesticides.
Although the Local Government Code vests
the municipal corporations with sufficient
power to govern themselves and manage
their affairs and activities, they definitely
have no right to enact ordinances dissonant
with the State’s laws and policy. The Local
Government Code is not intended to vest in
the local government unit the blanket
authority to legislate upon any subject that
it finds proper to legislate upon in the guise
of serving the common good.
The function of pesticides control,
regulation and development is within the
jurisdiction of the FPA under Presidential
Decree No. 1144.
For sure, every local government unit only
derives its legislative authority from
Congress. In no instance can the local
government unit rise above its source of
authority. As such, its ordinance cannot run
against or contravene existing laws (i.e, PD
1144), precisely because its authority is only
by virtue of the valid delegation from
Congress.
Devoid of the specific delegation to its local
legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded
its delegated authority to enact Ordinance
No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
must be struck down also for being an ultra costs of suit.
vires act on the part of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Davao City.

CONCLUSION
We must emphasize that our ruling herein
does not seek to deprive the LGUs their
right to regulate activities within their
jurisdiction.
They are empowered under Section 16 of
the Local Government Code to promote the
general welfare of the people through
regulatory, not prohibitive, ordinances that
conform with the policy directions of the
National Government.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this
test as it contravenes the specific regulatory
policy on aerial spraying in banana
plantations on a nationwide scale of the
National Government, through the FPA.

Finally, the unconstitutionality of the ban

renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07 in
its entirety. Consequently, any discussion
on the lack of the separability clause
becomes entirely irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the

consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-
07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY
ENJOINS respondent City of Davao, and all
persons or entities acting in its behalf or
under its authority, from enforcing and
implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07;