CASE 1

De Leon vs. Esguerra

G.R. No. L-78059, August 31, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J
FACTS:
1. In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was
elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners (Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta.
Anna, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion) as Barangay
Councilmen.
2. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Gov. Benjamin B. Esguerra
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain. Another
memorandum was also signed by the same on February 8, 1987 designating the other
respondents (Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta, Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S.
Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino) as Barangay Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores.
3. Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that the
respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions.
4. Respondents rely on Section 2, Article 3 of the Provisional Constitution which allowed
the appointment to be made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD:
No, while February 8, 1987 is still within the one-year deadline, the respondents cannot proceed
with their takeover due to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. It was
provided by Section 3, Article 18 of the 1987 Constitution that all previous Constitutions shall be
superseded, hence the OIC governor cannot rely on the Provisional Constitution. Officials were
no longer authorized to appoint their successors under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the
designation by the OIC Gov. who have become inoperative was not validly made.
WHEREFORE, the Memoranda issued have no legal force and effect and the Writ of Prohibition
is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the takeover of the
petitioners’ positions.
 CASE 2

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R 122156 February 3, 1997

Facts:
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to the
privatization of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the
Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) but which GSIS refused to
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

Held:
1. Yes, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. Yes, in its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage, while it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
 CASE 3
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution directing the Committee
on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund.”

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr and seven other Associate Justices for “culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” This
complaint was then endorsed to the House Committee on Justice conforming to the Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution.

On October 13, 2003, the House Committee on Justice ruled that the impeachment complaint
was “sufficient in form”, but later voted to dismiss the said complaint on October 22, 2003 for
being “insufficient in substance”.

On June 2, 2003, Representative Gilbert C. Teodoro, Jr. and William B. Fuentabella, filed
another impeachment complaint against Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the previously mentioned House Resolution.
This complaint, accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/ Impeachment”, was signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court could determine what constitutes an impeachable offense.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5)
of Article XI of the Constitution.

RULINGS:
1. No, the said issue, in accordance with the Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution, is
beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court. The Courts should not contravene
with the issue of constitutionality unless unavoidable or is the *crux of the controversy. (*crux-
main point)
2. Yes, the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of Rules on Impeachment violates the Section 3 (5)
of Article XI. It is to be known that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law of the land.
3. Yes, in accordance to the Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution which states that “no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.”
 CASE 4
GONZALES VS COMELEC, G.R. NO. L-28196, November 9, 1967

FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions
suggesting (1) and increase in the number of seats in the lower house from 120 to 180, (2)
calling for a constitutional convention and (3) allowing members of the lower house to run as
delegates in the aforementioned constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that
the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups questioned this act as
they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to
the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather
than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came
up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and
other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the
courts because it is a political question.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments violates the constitution,
specifically Sec. 1, Article XV.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

HELD:
I. Yes. Sec. 1, Art. XV states “The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately
may propose amendments to this constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in
an election at which amendments are submitted to the people of their ratification”. The proposal
was help null and void since such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress and it did
not give enough time for the people to study said amendments.

II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special
election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that
the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the
previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
 CASE 5
Imbong v. COMELEC (1970)
Makasiar, J.

Petitioner: Manuel B. Imbong

Respondent: Jaime Ferrer (Chair of COMELEC), Lino M. Patajo and Cesar Miraflor

FACTS:

1.) Find the timeline of events below

• MARCH 16, 1967 - Passed Resolution # 2 calling for a Constitutional Convention

o 2 delegates per representative district
o Election to commence on Nov. 1970
(Congress as a Constituent Assembly)

• (undated) – RA 4914 was passed

o This is the implementing legislation practically restating Resolution #2
(Congress as a legislative body)

• JULY 17, 1969 – Passed Resolution #4 amending Resolution # 2

o Constitutional Convention be composed of 320 delegates
▪ Apportioned among representative districts according to number of
inhabitants
▪ PROVIDED at least 2 delegates per district
▪ Same qualifications as any congressman.
(Congress as a Constituent Assembly)

• AUGUST 24, 1970 – RA 6132 was passed REPEALING RA 4914.

o Implementing legislation of Resolution 2 and 4.
(Congress as a legislative body)

2.) Manuel Imbong & Raul Gonzales as members of the Bar & taxpayers filed for a PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF impugning the constitutionality of RA 6132 saying that it
prejudices their rights as candidates. (Consolidated cases of Imbong and Gonzales)

3.) Raul Gonzales (GR L-32443) assails the validity of the entire law and sections 2,4, 5, and
paragraph 1 of 8(a) of RA 6132.

4.) Manuel Imbong (GR L-32432) assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1 of Sec 8(a) of RA
6132 on same grounds as Gonzales.

ISSUES/HOLDING:
*Whether or Not, the enactment of Secs. 2,4,5 and 8(a), paragraph 1 of RA no. 6312 are
unconstitutional. NO, they are not!

Ratio:

I. Sec 4 of RA 6132 is constitutional.

o Merely and application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec 2, Article
XII of the constitution
o It is not a denial of due process or equal protection
II. RA6132 as a whole is constitutional.

CONGRESS
AS A CONSTITUENT AS A LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY (CONASS) BODY
-has full and plenary -power to enact
authority to propose implementing details
amendments or call for a
convention

Calling of Constitutional -does not exclusively

Convention includes all
powers essential to the
effective exercise of this
principal power (e.g. fix
qualifications, number,
apportionment, and
compensation)
-exclusive to congress
pertain to Congress as a
Constituent Assembly
-within the competence of
congress in exercise of its
comprehensive legislative
power
-It is valid as long as it
does not clash with Consti

When congress (as CONASS) omits to provide implementing details after calling for
a concov, Congress (as Legislative Body) can exact legislation to fill in the gaps.
(May still be vetoed by the President)
III. Sec 2 of RA 6132 is constitutional

oGonzales: Not in accordance with proportional representation. Thus, a violation of

the consti!

o SC: Wrong! IF the framers wanted the apportionment of the delegates to be based
on the number of inhabitants in each representative district, it would have done
so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of
representative districts.

▪ Sec 2 was just a reinstatement of the intent of the Congress as ConAss

in Reso 4.

oABSOLUTE PROPORTIONAL APPORTIONMENT IS NOT REQUIRED AND

POSSIBLE.

▪ It is enough that the basis employed is reasonable and resulting

apportionment is substantially proportional.
 ▪ Sec 5, Art VI of Consti: “as nearly as may be according to their responsive
inhabitants, but each province shall have at least 1 member.”

▪ Error of Macias et al. v. COMELEC in granting more reps in provinces

with less population is not apparent in the case at bar since minimum is 2
representatives.

IV. Sec 5 of RA 6135 (Disqualifies for any public office in any election or from
assuming any appointive office or position in any branch of government until
after final adjournment of concov.) is CONSTITUTIONAL.

o VALID LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC OFFICE PURSUANT TO

POLICE POWER.

▪ Citizens do not have inherent/natural right to public office.

▪ Obvious reason for limitation – to immunize delegates from the perverting

injustice of self-interest, party interest, or vested interest.

▪ To focus solely on interest of nation

▪ It is only a TEMPORARY disqualification, not a permanent one.

▪ Equal Protection

• Substantial Distinction

• Germane to the purpose of law

• Applies to all members of the same class

V. Par 1 sec 8(a) is CONSTITUTIONAL

It is not a violation of due process, equal protection, freedom of expression,

freedom of assembly and freedom of association
• These are neither absolute or illimitable rights

• Subject to pervasive and dormant POLICE POWER

• Gonzales vs. COMELEC used CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST to

determine if a stature trenches upon such constitutional guarantees.

o The period for the conduct of an election campaign or partisan political

activity may be limited w/o offending constitutional guarantees TO AVOID
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL OF
DEBASEMENT OF ELECTORAL PROCESS.

• Sec 8(a) permits to seek help from his family until the 4th degree of consanguinity
and affinity for his campaign.
 • He cannot be denied of any permit to hold a public meeting. (Freedom of
expression and assembly)

• It is constitutional because it promotes equal protection of the law

o Equality of chances

▪ Does not create hostile discrimination against any party or group

and confers undue favor or privilege on an individual.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petition are hereby DENIED and RA6132
including sections 2, 4, 5, and 8(a) par 1 CANNOT BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Digester's notes:
Section 2: Composition of the Convention; Qualifications of Delegates.
[The Constitutional Convention] "shall be composed of 320 delegates who shall have the
same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives."
Section 4: "Persons Holding Office. Any person holding a public office or position,
whether elective or appointive, including members of the armed forces and officers and
employees of corporations or enterprises owned and/or controlled by the government,
shall be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
That any government official who resigns in order to run for delegate and who does not
yet qualify for retirement under existing laws, may, if elected, add to his length of service
in the government the period from the filing of his certificate of candidacy until the final
adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."
Section 5: Disqualification to Run. Any person elected as delegate to the Constitutional
Convention shall not be qualified to run for any public office in any election or to assume
any appointive office or position in any branch of the Government until after the final
adjournment of the Constitutional Convention.
Section 8(a) par. 1 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party
or any other organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious,
professional or other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his
certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise,
favorable to or against his campaign for election.
 CASE 6
G.R. No. L-56350
April 2, 1981
Samuel C. Occena, petitioner, V.S Commission on Election

FACTS:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine
Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution were challenging the validity of three Batasang Pambanasa Resolutions as follows:
Resolution 1- proposing an amendment allowing a natural- born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes;
Resolution 2- dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly; and Resolution 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections.
The suit for prohibition was filed on March 6, 1981. On March 10, 1981, respondent was
required to answer within 10 days from notice. The case was set for hearing and was duly
argued on March 26, 1981 by the petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for
respondents.

Issues:

1. Is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments were

constitutional?

2. Whether or not the sovereign people were properly informed on the proposed
amendments?

3. Is the proposed amendments were so extensive in character that they go far beyond the
limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa?

Held:

1. Yes, the 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime
Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call
of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it
acted by virtue of such impotence its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt.

2. Yes, As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time the
proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, so that it cannot,
therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed amendments.
3. No, And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment;
because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The
fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no
argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or
total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the
same is ratified by the sovereign people."
 CASE 7
TOLENTINO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held
on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is
entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the
COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said
plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no
force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with
the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the
Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution,
the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to
the Constitution.

HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of
aConstitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time
but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In
the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
 CASE 8
SAMBINO VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Amendment to the Constitution

FACTS:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial
law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the
previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the
same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its
“whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the
question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly
in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute
itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises
a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this
Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving
the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has
the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution
itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution
and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at
that time also sits as the legislature.
 CASE 9
Santiago vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
G.R. No. 127325, August 31, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J

FACTS:
1. On December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin founding member of the
People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) filed with the public
respondent COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative”/the “Delfin Petition”. Delfin cited Section 2,
Article 17 of the Constitution which provided for the people’s power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Other petitioners also include spouses Alberto Pedrosa
and Carmen Pedrosa, cofounders of PIRMA.
2. Upon filing of the Delfin Petition, the COMELEC issued an Order (a) directing Delfin to
publish the petition and (b) setting the case hearing on December 12, 1996.
3. On the day of the hearing, Senator Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
Upon hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin to file their “memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda” within five days.
4. On December 18, 1996, petitioners Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments, among others:
a) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative
on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution.
b) The COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which provided for “the conduct of initiative on
the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws” is ultra
vires insofar as the initiative on the Constitution is concerned.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not R.A. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not that portion of the COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct
of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid.
(3) Whether or not the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the Delfin
petition.
HELD:
(1) No, only the Congress can provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right to
initiate proposals on the amendments to the Constitution. Section 2, Article 17 of
Constitution is not self-executory as it includes the provision, “The Congress shall
 provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.” As a result, Section 2 cannot
operate without implementing legislation.
Further, While R.A. 6735 provides subtitles for National Initiative Referendum (Subtitle 2)
which deals with national laws, and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle 3), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(2) No, it logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right.
(3) No, the respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under
any of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300. The Delfin
petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 therefore, the COMELEC should not have entertained it.
WHEREFORE, the petition was granted and the COMELEC was ordered to dismiss the
Delfin petition
 CASE 10
LAMBINO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006
FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold plebiscite for
ratification under Sec. 5 (b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under
the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential System to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend Constitution, pursuant to Santiago vs
Comelec ruling.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution
2. Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitution
requirement or direct proposal by the people

RULING:
1. Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from Bicameral - Presidential to a
Unicameral – Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and
the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.
2. No. Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art XVII on direct proposal by people.
Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant
American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first
seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign
on a petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon apetition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be present.

2elementsofinitiative:
1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent
orrepresentative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.