SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

DELA ROSA, SABRINA JOYCE S.

General Provisions
Definition and Concept. NCC 774, 776, 712, 1311

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante

80 Phil. 776 (1948)

The estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the
purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a
certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.
His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate
of the deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and operate the said plant.

Petitioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate
of Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate
applied for is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE: WON the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial personality.

RULING: Yes, because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be
considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of
his properties.” Fragante has rights and fulfillment of obligation which survived after his
death. One of those rights involved the pending application for public convenience
before the Public Service Commission. The state or the mass of property, rights left by
the decedent, instead of heirs directly, become vested and charged with his rights and
obligations. Under the present legal system, rights and obligations which survived after
death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.

Opening of Succession and its Effects

Puno v. Puno
G.R. No. 177066, 11 September 2009
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders
of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder
of the corporation - the stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate
proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the
corporation; During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the
stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the
legal title to the stock.

FACTS: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent
Puno Enterprises, Inc. Petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos,
initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred
that he is the son of the deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As
surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as
stockholder of respondent. The complaint prayed that respondent allow petitioner to
inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into
and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the
shares of Carlos.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the
legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni
Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni
Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and the same.

RTC ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioner’s
certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos.

Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno,"
certified by the Civil Registrar of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality. RTC
conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as genuine and authentic.

RTC was in favor of Joselito Puno, ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to
allow Petitioner to inspect the corporate books and records of the company including
the financial statements of the corporation.

CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint and held that petitioner was not able to
establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos since his birth certificate was
prepared without the intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of paternity
by Carlos. CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that he be allowed to examine
respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but
was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos, an incorporator of the corporation.

ISSUE: WON petitioner has a right to inspect respondent corporation’s books and
receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos, as the latter’s heir.

RULING: No. Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased
stockholder. However, SC agrees with CA that petitioner was not able to prove
satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to
be an heir of the latter.

Only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the

corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of
the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of
the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings,
and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section
63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between
the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During such
interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or
administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent
are held by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the
administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as
stockholder.

Even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son
of Carlos, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to
receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of
the shares owned by Carlos were transferred to him. This would only be possible if
petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased.

Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming

proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must
be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the
estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a
decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the
recovery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific
performance — to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights
that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.

Wills
Definition, NCC 783

Vitug v. CA
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death."
FACTS: Romarico Vitug, widower, filed a motion to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties belonging to his wife’s estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate
which he claimed were personal funds. Rowena Corona opposed the motion on the
ground that the same funds withdrawn were conjugal partnership properties and part of
the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement.

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank. It provides
that after the death of either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor.

The trial court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted Vitug’s motion. CA,
however, held that agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not
comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code."

ISSUE: WON the survivorship agreement is a will.

RULING: No. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies
with duties to take effect after his death." In other words, the bequest or device must
pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies were in the nature of conjugal funds.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation
between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to
the other.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature,
but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being
death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for
such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our
laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership. The conclusion is accordingly
unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired
upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of
the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the
separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
 Interpretation of Wills. NCC 788, 789, 790-94, 930

Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon
G.R. No. L-24561, 30 June 1970

The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words.

FACTS: In the will left by the deceased Agripina Valdez, she divided, distributed and
disposed of all her specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her
estate appraised at P1,801,960.00 among her six children. Upon appraisal of the
properties, it was found that two (Marina and Tomas) of Agripina’s six children were
bequethed with properties valued more than their legitimes. On the other hand, the
remaining children were bequethed with properties valued lower than their legitimes.

Marina and Tomas then submitted a project of partition whereby the other children will
receive the properties respectively given to them in the will, plus cash and/or properties,
to complete their respective legitimes, which shall be deducted from the properties given
to Marina and Tomas. The other children made a counter-project of partition whereby
all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half
(1/2) of the entire estate and the remaining half shall be divided among them equally.

The lower court approved Marina and Tomas’ project of partition.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in approving Marina and Tomas’ project of
partition

RULING: No. Under Articles 788 and 791 of the Civil Code, "If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are
to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."

Notably, the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her
estate by will. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in
the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "Should a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This
right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs
to their legitime.

To protect legitimes, the Civil Code contains Arts. 906 and 907. This was properly
complied with in the Tomas' and Marina’s project of partition, wherein the other
children, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them
by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes
each were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who admittedly
were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.

I. Testamentary Capacity & Intent

Supervening incapacity, NCC 801

Torres v. Lopez
48 Phil., 77

The presumption is that every adult is sane.   It is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the
courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document. 

FACTS: Tomas Rodriguez died, leaving a considerable estate.  Shortly thereafter,

Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will, asked that the will  of  Rodriguez
be allowed.  Opposition was entered by  Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the
deceased,  on the grounds: (1)  That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the
time of the execution of the supposed will he  was suffering from senile dementia and 
was under guardianship; (2)  that undue influence had been exercised by the persons
benefited in the document in  conjunction  with others  who  acted in their behalf; and
(3) that the signature of  Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained  through fraud
and deceit.  After a prolonged  trial, judgment  was rendered denying the legalization of
the will.

ISSUE: WON Tomas Rodriguez was of sound and disposing mind.

RULING: YES. A “sound mind” is a “disposing mind.”  One of the grounds for
disallowing a will is “If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of  the
execution of such an instrument at the time of its execution.”  

Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition
of testamentary capacity:  “Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the
nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to  be  disposed of and  the persons who  would naturally be  supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to  comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.’ The mental capacity of the
testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will. Various
tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only later to be
rejected as incomplete.  Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age,
physical infirmities, feebleness of mind* weakness of the memory, the appointment of a
guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary
incapacity.  Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.

There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of some
practical utility.  This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will.  Is the
will simple or complicated?  Is it natural or unnatural? The mere exclusion of heirs will
not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound mind.

The presumption is that every adult is sane.   It is only when those seeking to overthrow
the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary document. 

Specific requirements, NCC 805, 806

Icasiano v. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964

Inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a will is
not fatal.

FACTS: Josefa Villacorte died in Manila. She executed a last will and testament in
duplicate at the house of her daughter Felisa Icasiano, published before and attested by
3 instrumental witnesses. The will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said 3
instrumental witnesses on the same date before a Notary Public. The will was actually
prepared by Atty. Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and
signing of the said will. Of the 3 instrumental witnesses, only 2 were in the Philippines
at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity of
the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the
testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also Atty Samson, who actually prepared the
document. The latter also testified that he prepared 1 original and 2 copies of the last
will and testament at his house but he brought only 1 original and 1 signed copy to
Manila, retaining 1 unsigned copy at his house.
A petition was filed for the allowance and admission to probate of the original the
alleged will of the deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as
executor.

Natividad Icasiano & Enrique Icasiano, daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their
opposition.

Petitioner commenced the introduction of his evidence, but he filed a motion for the
admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a
will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate which he allegedly found.

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously
with the filing of the petition consists of 5 pages, and while signed at the end and in
every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses on page 3
thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is
signed by the testatrix and her 3 attesting witnesses in each and every page.

The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of
the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and
every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the 3 witnesses
in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing
signature by on eof the witnesses on page 3 of the original); that pages of the original
and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause contains all
the facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting
witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix ;
that the attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses;
that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the
original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public.

The witness, Atty. Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original,
admits that he may have lifted 2 pages instead of 1 when he signed the same, but
affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.

Natividad and Enrique filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and
supplemental petition, but by order of the court admitted said petition. Natividad filed
her amended opposition. The parties presented their respective evidence, and after
several hearings the court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to
probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this Court.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the
signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or
affixed on the same occasion as the original.

ISSUE: WON failure of one of the witnesses to affix his signature to page 3 of the said
will is sufficient to deny probate of the will.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court is satisfied that the testatrix signed both original and
duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the 3 attesting
witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually
prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a
language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and
by the testatrix and Atty. Samson, together before they were actually signed; that the
attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the
witnesses.

SC hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of 2 pages in the course of signing, is not per
se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective
page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before
whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all 3 witnesses. The law should not be
so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained.

Cruz v. Villasor
54 SCRA 31 (1973)

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as
the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will.

FACTS: Cruz, the surviving spouse of the deceased opposed the allowance of the will
alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue
influence; that the said instrument was executed without the testator having been fully
informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and
that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.

Of the three witnesses, one of them, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom
the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
ISSUE: WON the will was executed in accordance with law?

RULING: No. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as
genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead
of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to
avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other
to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to
obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to
the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805 be requiring at
least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses
appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the law
would not be duly in observed.

Substantial Compliance, NCC 809

Caneda v. CA
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with
Article 805.

FACTS: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children,

executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses. He was assisted
by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad. In the will, he left by way of legacies and devises
his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be
related to the testator.

4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will
and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the
probate court regarding the will. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his
petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Thereafter one of the legatees,
Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.

Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted
a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the
testator’s will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. In the
course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on
the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in poor
state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the
genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and
testament of the late Mateo Caballero. On appeal, petitioners asserted that the will in
question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective
since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

Nevertheless, CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially

complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective

RULING: Yes. Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The
attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to the
attesting witnesses.It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact
that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. The
attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a
will and to insure the authenticity thereof.

The Court agrees that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically state the fact
that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their
presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of each other. Clearly lacking is the statement that the
witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or
imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here
sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally
omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect
to the form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by
intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings
shall be revived.

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with
Article 805.

Revocation of Wills & Testamentary Dispositions

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Gago v. Mamuyac
49 Phil. 902, January 29, 1927

In a proceeding to probate a will, the burden of proof is upon the proponent to clearly
establish not only its execution but its due existence. Having proved its execution by
the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked.

FACTS: Sometime in July 1918, Miguel Mamuyac executed a will which was presented
by Francisco Gago for probate. Cornelio Mamuyac et al. (respondents) opposed the
petition, alleging a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed
by the said Miguel Mamuyac; b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during
the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and c) that the said will was not the last will and
testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac. That will presented for probate by
Francisco Gago was a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of
the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per
testimony of witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator sometime in 1919,
and Carlos Bejar, who saw in 1920, that the last will and testament being presented for
probate by Gago was actually cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured
Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house and the land where the house
was built, he had to cancel it (will being probated), executing thereby a new testament.

ISSUE: WON the revocation of the will has been established.

RULING: Yes. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation
of a will to be preserved. If it can be established that a will which can no longer be found
was last seen in the possession of the testator, the presumption is, in the absence of
other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it
cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The
force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying
greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but
may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to
revoke it.

Allowance of Wills, NCC 838

Concept of Probate

Maninang vs. CA
G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. On the other hand,
disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

FACTS: Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall
be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for
the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his
adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent
Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.

ISSUE: WON Bernardo preterited?

RULING: In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under
the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited,
and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are
two diverse concepts.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for
a cause authorized by law.

By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that

controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court
was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face
of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The
Special Proceeding is remanded to the lower court.
 Disallowance of Wills, NCC 839, 1335, 1337, 1338

OZAETA vs. CUARTERO

G.R. No. L-5597, May 31, 1956

Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive

evidence of an existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator of the said Will.

FACTS: Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to
Carlos Palanca Taguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos
had been duly established by testimonial and documentary evidence. One of the pieces
of evidence presented was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that
he married Rosa Gonzales in which marriage they had eight children.

ISSUE: WON the declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as
conclusive evidence of an existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator.

RULING: Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as

conclusive evidence of an existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator of the said
Will. Palanca executed his will and he made the solemn declaration in said document
that since 1923 and for some years thereafter he maintained amorous relations with
Maria Cuartero and had by her six natural children whom, according to him, he had
liberally fed and supported. He said nothing about having married Maria; on the
contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he regarded her unworthy of being the
guardian of the persons and property of his children by her and so appointed Felisa
Joson de Fernandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians of their persons, and
property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his marriage to
Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him
were legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. Said declaration in the will
may not be taken lightly, as a statement of little significance. When he made said
statement he was about 76 years old and must have felt that he had not many years left
to live.

Concurrence of compulsory heirs and their corresponding legitimes

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
“It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration hence,
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble
and compassionate objectives of the law.

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently
be authorized by some way of interpreting the law. “

FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname.

Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir,
and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should
be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.

The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her
mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING: Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of Their Father) is silent as to what middle
name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

 Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) a legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother.

Collation, NCC 1061-1077

Arellano v. Pascual
G.R. No. 189776, December 15, 2010

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.

FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters
Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual
and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and
Issuance of Letters of Administration” filed by respondents on April 28, 2000,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in
Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to
petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, “may be considered as an
advance legitime” of petitioner. Respecting the donated property, now covered in the
name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it “may be
considered as an advance legitime” to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court,
held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

ISSUE: WON the property is subject of collation.

RULING:  NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the

compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding
the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when
there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the
free
portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The
records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property
which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was
at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral
relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed
as donation made to a “stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There
being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

Reserva Troncal, NCC 891

Solivio v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came.

FACTS: On October 11, 1959, Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died leaving all
her property, including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, to him. Esteban Jr,” died a
bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His
only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, the
spinster half-sister of his mother, SalustiaSolivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

Pursuant to an agreement between Concordia and Celedonia, the latter would take care
of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation. Celedonia in good faith
and upon the advice of her counsel, filed for a Special Proceeding for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that
after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.

Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages. Celedonia averred that the estate of Esteban Jr. was subject to
reservatroncal and thus it should redound to her as a relative within the 3rd degree on
his mother side.

ISSUE: WON the estate of the deceased was subject to reservatroncal and that it
pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother’s side

RULING: No. There is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the estate of the
deceased was subject to reservatroncal, and that it pertains to her as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reservatroncal provision of the Civil
Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.

The persons involved in reservatroncal are:

The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.

The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—
relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and
belonging to the line from which the property came.

The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue,
making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla,
Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property,
for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia
Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold
his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his
relative within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reservatroncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant
from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
 Equality of Heirs, NCC 846, 848

Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon
G.R. No. L-24561, 30 June 1970

The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words.

FACTS: In the will left by the deceased Agripina Valdez, she divided, distributed and
disposed of all her specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her
estate appraised at P1,801,960.00 among her six children. Upon appraisal of the
properties, it was found that two (Marina and Tomas) of Agripina’s six children were
bequethed with properties valued more than their legitimes. On the other hand, the
remaining children were bequethed with properties valued lower than their legitimes.

Marina and Tomas then submitted a project of partition whereby the other children will
receive the properties respectively given to them in the will, plus cash and/or properties,
to complete their respective legitimes, which shall be deducted from the properties given
to Marina and Tomas. The other children made a counter-project of partition whereby
all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half
(1/2) of the entire estate and the remaining half shall be divided among them equally.

The lower court approved Marina and Tomas’ project of partition.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in approving Marina and Tomas’ project of
partition

RULING: No. Under Articles 788 and 791 of the Civil Code, "If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are
to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."

Notably, the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her
estate by will. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in
the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "Should a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This
right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs
to their legitime.

To protect legitimes, the Civil Code contains Arts. 906 and 907. This was properly
complied with in the Tomas' and Marina’s project of partition, wherein the other
children, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them
by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes
each were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who admittedly
were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.

Who are the intestate heirs, NCC 961

Rodriguez Et. Al. v. Borja

G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966

Accordingly, the use of the disjunctive in the words “when a will is delivered to OR a
petition for the allowance is filed” plainly indicates that the court may act upon the
mere deposit therein of a decedent’s testament, even if no petition for its allowance is
as yet filed.

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition against the
court of first instance of Bulacan for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss in
especial proceeding No. 1331 which said court is alleged to have taken cognizance of it
without jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the court has no jurisdiction to try the case
due to the pendency of another action for for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the court of First Instance of Rizal namely Special
Proceedings no 3907. They contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of
Rizal was filed at 8:00 a.m. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in
the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 a.m. an the same date, the latter court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Vda.
De Borja vs. Jan. The respondents, on the other hand, take the stand that the CFI
Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the clerk
of court on March 4, 1963 and that the case in this court therefore has precedence over
the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

ISSUE: WON the CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate
proceedings?
RULING: Yes. The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963 even if no petition for
its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited, the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place of proving the will and
issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76 of the Revised Rules of Court. Accordingly, the use of the disjunctive in the words
“when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance is filed” plainly indicates that
the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent’s testament, even if no
petition for its allowance is as yet filed.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the CFI of Bulacan ahead of any other
that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts even if it
were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. The
disposition presupposes that 2 or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of them, only one could be of proper venue yet the rule grants
precedence to that court whose jurisdiction is first invoked without taking venue into
account.

Order of Intestate Succession

Descending Direct Line, Arts. 978-984

Sps. Bolaños v. Zuñiga, et. al.

G.R. No. 180997, November 17, 2010

The provisions of the Civil Code under Articles 979 and 980 acknowledge legitimate
children’s right to inherit from the decedent in equal shares.

FACTS: Roman Zuñiga, Sr. married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife, Flavia,
he sired seven children, namely: Josefina, Flavia, Woodrow, Pablo, Manuel, Roman, Jr.
and Cresencia. When the wife died, Roman married CeferinaBendaña with whom he
had four children, herein named private respondents. The case arose when Flavia
(Roman’s daughter), without authority from her co-heirs/co-owners of the lot they
inherited from their deceased father, sold the same to her sister Cresencia. Cresencia, in
turn, executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner-spouses. As a
result, private respondents filed a complaint for declaration of partial nullity of deeds of
transfer. The RTC as well as the CA ruled that petitioner-spouses have only acquired
ownership over the undivided shares of Flavia and Cresencia.

ISSUE: WON the court erred when it ruled that petitioner spouses only acquired
ownership over the undivided shares of Flavia and Cresencia
RULING: No. The RTC correctly ruled that the subject property rightfully belongs to
the 11 children of Roman, in equal shares. Although the 11 legitimate children of the
decedent were born from different marriages, the provisions of the Civil Code under
Articles 979 and 980 acknowledge legitimate children’s right to inherit from the
decedent in equal shares. Since there was no partition among Roman’s children, the lot
was owned by them in common. Following the laws in co-ownership, a co-owner could
only dispose of his/her aliquot share in the property co-owned. Thus, what Flavia was
able to transfer was her aliquot share to Cresencia. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to
petitioner spouses was her own share and Flavia’s share in the property, which was only
2/11 of the subject property.

Collateral Line, Arts. 1003-1010

Abellana v. Borromeo
14 SCRA 986

Under Art. 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is
a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession
are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They
are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree.

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Up
to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her
estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More thanten
(10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared
presumptivelydead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate
among her heirs. Melodia left properties in Cebu City, consisting of 1/3 share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa, valued at P6,000 more or less & which was adjudicated to her
in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.

Melodia left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only
by collateral relatives, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of her
father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo, who pre-deceased her. These two classes of heirs claim to
be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in her estate.
Filomena contended that under Art. 975(1) of the NCC, no right of representation could
take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or
aunt, but rather the former succeed in their own right. However, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu ruled in favor of the nieces and nephew. They are nearer in
degree (two degrees) than Filomena since nieces and nephews succeed by right of
representation, while Filomena is three degrees distant from Melodia, and that other
collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters
of the decedent in accordance with Art. 1009 of the NCC.

ISSUE: WON a decedent’s uncles and aunts may succeed ab intestato while
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

RULING: No. in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004,
1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Art. 1009, the absence of
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. The last of the relatives
of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers
or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within
the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the
succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are
no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes. Article 1009 does not state
any order of preference. However, this article should be understood in connection with
the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same
degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed
without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood
relationship.

Partition & Distribution of the Estate

Partition, 1078-1090

Bautista v. Grino-Aquino
166 Scra 760

Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate
applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no
creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent
certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.

FACTS: Manuel Bautista is the registered owner of the subject piece of land registered
under TCT No. 2210 which he inherited from his father, Mariano Bautista.
On Dec. 22, 1966, after death of Juliana Nojadera, Manuel’s first spouse, a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition was executed by the former’s heirs. Upon registration of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition, TCT. No. 2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-
14182 was issued. The private respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property. Upon
registration of the Deed of Sale, TCT No. T-14182 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista.

On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other
private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, TCT. Nos. T-15665, T-
15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T-15670, T-15671, were issued to private
respondents.

Upon knowledge of said transactions, petitioner questioned the authenticity of the

purported document and alleged that his signature was forged. On August 1, 1974, all
the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista.
The NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic. In a decision of
January 14, 1983, the trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs.
On appeal, a decision was rendered in due course by the Court of Appeals on August 3,
1987, affirming the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the property of the surviving husband can be the subject of an
extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife

RULING: No. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial

settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without
a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of
the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.

As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an
extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased
would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law.
Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the
lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition
obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline
Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second
marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and
ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not
surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents
knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court
finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be
rescinded. Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the
property during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of future
inheritance is prohibited by law.

As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging

exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all
subsequent transactions involving the same property between and among the private
respondents are also null and void.