A.C. No. 7360               July 24,2012 that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty.
that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito
M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1)
Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously
appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe
Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in
Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP)
Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable
only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of
Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of
six months, then to a suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as
public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor
Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder,
in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with
Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to
relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from
the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name,
Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous
delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private
prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to
relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting
the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer
and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of
the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case
for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed
the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to
less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified
her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo
Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a
homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still
remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from
Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an
entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped
and aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as
evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation,
the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No.
27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt,
of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor
from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the
Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims
that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also
denies any relationship between himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as "self-
serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan
and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic]
not amount to a crime.’" He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was
convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he
was convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00.
[Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that
he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself
familiar with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case.
The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file
a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred
more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based
on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement
denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we
take note that the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong
before this disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would
undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe
money could not be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in
said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence
has been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given
the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty.
Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011,
the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the
practice of law to two years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the
Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01
which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered
his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently
forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can
only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to
appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent
participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail.
Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David: 4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he
is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or
advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is
not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. 5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that
there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with
Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa
made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14
June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio
Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio
to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely
denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. 6 Atty. Silvosa failed in
this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against
a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses
do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of
the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the
bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. 7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not
binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no
doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings
of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from
which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 8 Section 1, Rule
139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by
a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and
that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case.
There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter
of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting
documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty.
Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. 10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected
with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the
offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also,
the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and
duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the
crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27
of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime.
We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that
Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required
of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer,
but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his
character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to
exercise this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his

name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record
as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to
the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
362-7821
Pilar
[A.C. NO. 6672 : September 4, 2009] Cel.:
Grace Park, Caloocan
(0926)
City
2701719
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION Back

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. SERVICES OFFERED:

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
he persistently called them and sent them text messages. INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Complainant also attached "respondent's" calling card:6

Front

(emphasis supplied)

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO Hence, this complaint.

LAW OFFFICE Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.7
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME
SERVICES The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 8

Fe Marie L. Labiano Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
Paralegal recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Tel: 362- personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules
Flr. Rm. M-01 7820 of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Fax: (632) warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant's
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
which a lawyer's services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade
the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty. 18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals' suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano's word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labiano's "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano's connection to his
office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal practice.
He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer's
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free exercise
of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to
the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client's cause. If the
lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client's case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
client's cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the
exercise of the Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on
lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based
on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer's name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from
their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198075               September 4, 2013
KOPPEL, INC. (formerly known as KPL AIRCON, INC.), Petitioner,
vs.
MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is an appeal1 from the Decision2 dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 116865.
The facts:
The Donation
Fedders Koppel, Incorporated (FKI), a manufacturer of air-conditioning products, was the
registered owner of a parcel of land located at Km. 16, South Superhighway, Parañaque City
(subject land).3 Within the subject land are buildings and other improvements dedicated to the
business of FKI.4
In 1975, FKI5 bequeathed the subject land (exclusive of the improvements thereon) in favor of
herein respondent Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Incorporated by way of a conditional
donation.6 The respondent accepted the donation with all of its conditions. 7 On 26 May1975,
FKI and the respondent executed a Deed of Donation 8 evidencing their consensus.
The Lease and the Amended Deed of Donation
One of the conditions of the donation required the respondent to lease the subject land back
to FKI under terms specified in their Deed of Donation. 9 With the respondent’s acceptance of
the donation, a lease agreement between FKI and the respondent was, therefore, effectively
incorporated in the Deed of Donation.
Pertinent terms of such lease agreement, as provided in the Deed of Donation , were as
follows:
1. The period of the lease is for twenty-five (25) years, 10 or until the 25th of May 2000;
2. The amount of rent to be paid by FKI for the first twenty-five (25) years is
₱40,126.00 per annum .11
The Deed of Donation also stipulated that the lease over the subject property is renewable for
another period of twenty-five (25) years " upon mutual agreement" of FKI and the
respondent.12 In which case, the amount of rent shall be determined in accordance with item
2(g) of the Deed of Donation, viz:
g. The rental for the second 25 years shall be the subject of mutual agreement and in case of
disagreement the matter shall be referred to a Board of three Arbitrators appointed and with
powers in accordance with the Arbitration Law of the Philippines, Republic Act 878, whose
function shall be to decide the current fair market value of the land excluding the
improvements, provided, that, any increase in the fair market value of the land shall not
exceed twenty five percent (25%) of the original value of the land donated as stated in
paragraph 2(c) of this Deed. The rental for the second 25 years shall not exceed three
percent (3%) of the fair market value of the land excluding the improvements as determined
by the Board of Arbitrators.13
In October 1976, FKI and the respondent executed an Amended Deed of Donation 14 that
reiterated the provisions of the Deed of Donation , including those relating to the lease of the
subject land.
Verily, by virtue of the lease agreement contained in the Deed of Donation and Amended
Deed of Donation , FKI was able to continue in its possession and use of the subject land.
2000 Lease Contract
Two (2) days before the lease incorporated in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation was set to expire, or on 23 May 2000, FKI and respondent executed another
contract of lease ( 2000 Lease Contract )15 covering the subject land. In this 2000 Lease
Contract, FKI and respondent agreed on a new five-year lease to take effect on the 26th of
May 2000, with annual rents ranging from ₱4,000,000 for the first year up to ₱4,900,000 for
the fifth year.16 The 2000 Lease Contract also contained an arbitration clause enforceable in
the event the parties come to disagreement about the" interpretation, application and
execution" of the lease, viz :
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this 2000 Lease Contract shall be governed,
interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this 2000 Lease
Contract shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in accordance with
the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall be
binding upon FKI and respondent.17 (Emphasis supplied)
2005 Lease Contract
After the 2000 Lease Contract expired, FKI and respondent agreed to renew their lease for
another five (5) years. This new lease (2005 Lease Contract )18 required FKI to pay a fixed
annual rent of ₱4,200,000.19 In addition to paying the fixed rent, however, the 2005 Lease
Contract also obligated FKI to make a yearly " donation " of money to the respondent. 20 Such
donations ranged from ₱3,000,000 for the first year up to ₱3,900,000for the fifth
year.21 Notably, the 2005 Lease Contract contained an arbitration clause similar to that in the
2000 Lease Contract, to wit:
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this 2005 Lease Contract shall be governed,
interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this 2005 Lease
Contract shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in accordance with
the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall be
binding upon FKI and respondent.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Assignment and Petitioner’s Refusal to Pay
From 2005 to 2008, FKI faithfully paid the rentals and " donations "due it per the 2005 Lease
Contract.23 But in June of 2008, FKI sold all its rights and properties relative to its business in
favor of herein petitioner Koppel, Incorporated. 24 On 29 August 2008, FKI and petitioner
executed an Assignment and Assumption of Lease and Donation 25 —wherein FKI, with the
conformity of the respondent, formally assigned all of its interests and obligations under the
Amended Deed of Donation and the 2005 Lease Contract in favor of petitioner.
The following year, petitioner discontinued the payment of the rent and " donation " under the
2005 Lease Contract.
Petitioner’s refusal to pay such rent and "donation " emanated from its belief that the rental
stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract, and even of the 2000 Lease Contract, cannot be
given effect because they violated one of the" material conditions " of the donation of the
subject land, as stated in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation. 26
According to petitioner, the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation actually
established not only one but two (2) lease agreements between FKI and respondent, i.e. ,
one lease for the first twenty-five (25)years or from 1975 to 2000, and another lease for the
next twenty-five (25)years thereafter or from 2000 to 2025. 27 Both leases are material
conditions of the donation of the subject land.
Petitioner points out that while a definite amount of rent for the second twenty-five (25) year
lease was not fixed in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation , both deeds
nevertheless prescribed rules and limitations by which the same may be determined. Such
rules and limitations ought to be observed in any succeeding lease agreements between
petitioner and respondent for they are, in themselves, material conditions of the donation of
the subject land.28
In this connection, petitioner cites item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation that supposedly limits the amount of rent for the lease over the second twenty-five
(25) years to only " three percent (3%) of the fair market value of the subject land excluding
the improvements.29
For petitioner then, the rental stipulations of both the 2000 Lease Contract and 2005 Lease
Contract cannot be enforced as they are clearly, in view of their exorbitant exactions, in
violation of the aforementioned threshold in item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation and Amended
Deed of Donation . Consequently, petitioner insists that the amount of rent it has to pay
thereon is and must still be governed by the limitations prescribed in the Deed of Donation
and Amended Deed of Donation.30
The Demand Letters
On 1 June 2009, respondent sent a letter (First Demand Letter) 31 to petitioner notifying the
latter of its default " per Section 12 of the 2005 Lease Contract " and demanding for the
settlement of the rent and " donation " due for the year 2009. Respondent, in the same letter,
further intimated of canceling the 2005 Lease Contract should petitioner fail to settle the said
obligations.32 Petitioner received the First Demand Letter on2 June 2009. 33
On 22 September 2009, petitioner sent a reply 34 to respondent expressing its disagreement
over the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract — calling them " severely
disproportionate," "unconscionable" and "in clear violation to the nominal rentals mandated by
the Amended Deed of Donation." In lieu of the amount demanded by the respondent, which
purportedly totaled to ₱8,394,000.00, exclusive of interests, petitioner offered to pay only
₱80,502.79,35 in accordance with the rental provisions of the Deed of Donation and Amended
Deed of Donation.36 Respondent refused this offer.37
On 25 September 2009, respondent sent another letter (Second Demand Letter) 38 to
petitioner, reiterating its demand for the payment of the obligations already due under the
2005 Lease Contract. The Second Demand Letter also contained a demand for petitioner to "
immediately vacate the leased premises " should it fail to pay such obligations within seven
(7) days from its receipt of the letter.39 The respondent warned of taking " legal steps " in the
event that petitioner failed to comply with any of the said demands. 40 Petitioner received the
Second Demand Letter on 26September 2009.41
Petitioner refused to comply with the demands of the respondent. Instead, on 30 September
2009, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City a complaint 42 for
the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation
against the respondent. This case is currently pending before Branch 257 of the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.
The Ejectment Suit
On 5 October 2009, respondent filed an unlawful detainer case 43 against the petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City. The ejectment case was raffled to
Branch 77 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-307.
On 4 November 2009, petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. 44 In it,
petitioner reiterated its objection over the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract for
being violative of the material conditions of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation.45 In addition to the foregoing, however, petitioner also interposed the following
defenses:
1. The MeTC was not able to validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant unlawful
detainer case in view of the insufficiency of respondent’s demand. 46 The First
Demand Letter did not contain an actual demand to vacate the premises and,
therefore, the refusal to comply there with does not give rise to an action for unlawful
detainer.47
2. Assuming that the MeTC was able to acquire jurisdiction, it may not exercise the
same until the disagreement between the parties is first referred to arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. 48
3. Assuming further that the MeTC has jurisdiction that it can exercise, ejectment still
would not lie as the 2005 Lease Contract is void abinitio. 49 The stipulation in the 2005
Lease Contract requiring petitioner to give yearly " donations " to respondent is a
simulation, for they are, in fact, parts of the rent. 50 Such grants were only
denominated as " donations " in the contract so that the respondent—anon-stock and
non-profit corporation—could evade payment of the taxes otherwise due thereon. 51
In due course, petitioner and respondent both submitted their position papers, together with
their other documentary evidence.52 Remarkably, however, respondent failed to submit the
Second Demand Letter as part of its documentary evidence.
Rulings of the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals
On 27 April 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment53 in favor of the petitioner. While the MeTC
refused to dismiss the action on the ground that the dispute is subject to arbitration, it
nonetheless sided with the petitioner with respect to the issues regarding the insufficiency of
the respondent’s demand and the nullity of the 2005 Lease Contract. 54 The MeTC thus
disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case x x x, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.55
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). This appeal was assigned to
Branch 274 of the RTC of Parañaque City and was docketed as Civil Case No. 10-0255.
On 29 October 2010, the RTC reversed56 the MeTC and ordered the eviction of the petitioner
from the subject land:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the appealed Decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 77, Parañaque City, is hereby reversed, judgment is thus rendered in
favor of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendant-appellee, and ordering the latter –
(1) to vacate the lease[d] premises made subject of the case and to restore the
possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellant;
(2) to pay to the plaintiff-appellant the amount of Nine Million Three Hundred Sixty
Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Six Pesos (₱9,362,436.00), penalties and net of
5% withholding tax, for the lease period from May 25, 2009 to May 25, 2010 and
such monthly rental as will accrue during the pendency of this case;
(3) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱100,000.00 plus appearance fee of
₱3,000.00;
(4) and costs of suit.
As to the existing improvements belonging to the defendant-appellee, as these were built in
good faith, the provisions of Art. 1678of the Civil Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED.57
The ruling of the RTC is premised on the following ratiocinations:
1. The respondent had adequately complied with the requirement of demand as a
jurisdictional precursor to an unlawful detainer action. 58 The First Demand Letter, in
substance, contains a demand for petitioner to vacate when it mentioned that it was a
notice " per Section12 of the 2005 Lease Contract." 59 Moreover, the issue of
sufficiency of the respondent’s demand ought to have been laid to rest by the Second
Demand Letter which, though not submitted in evidence, was nonetheless admitted
by petitioner as containing a" demand to eject " in its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim.60
2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity. 61 Even assuming
that it can, petitioner still did not file a formal application before the MeTC so as to
 render such arbitration clause operational.62 At any rate, the MeTC would not be
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over an action for unlawful detainer, over
which, it has exclusive original jurisdiction.63
3. The 2005 Lease Contract must be sustained as a valid contract since petitioner
was not able to adduce any evidence to support its allegation that the same is
void.64 There was, in this case, no evidence that respondent is guilty of any tax
evasion.65
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed 66 the decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 274, in Civil Case No. 10-0255 is AFFIRMED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.67
Hence, this appeal.
On 5 September 2011, this Court granted petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order68 staying the immediate implementation of the decisions adverse to it.
OUR RULING
Independently of the merits of the case, the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals all erred in
overlooking the significance of the arbitration clause incorporated in the 2005 Lease
Contract . As the Court sees it, that is a fatal mistake.
For this reason, We grant the petition.
Present Dispute is Arbitrable Under the
Arbitration Clause of the 2005 Lease
Agreement Contract
Going back to the records of this case, it is discernable that the dispute between the
petitioner and respondent emanates from the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract.
The respondent insists upon the enforce ability and validity of such stipulations, whereas,
petitioner, in substance, repudiates them. It is from petitioner’s apparent breach of the 2005
Lease Contract that respondent filed the instant unlawful detainer action.
One cannot escape the conclusion that, under the foregoing premises, the dispute between
the petitioner and respondent arose from the application or execution of the 2005 Lease
Contract . Undoubtedly, such kinds of dispute are covered by the arbitration clause of the
2005 Lease Contract to wit:
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this 2005 Lease Contract shall be governed,
interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this 2005 Lease
Contract shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in accordance with
the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall be
binding upon FKI and respondent.69 (Emphasis supplied)
The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that "any disagreement" as to
the " interpretation, application or execution " of the 2005 Lease Contract ought to be
submitted to arbitration.70 To the mind of this Court, such stipulation is clear and is
comprehensive enough so as to include virtually any kind of conflict or dispute that may arise
from the 2005 Lease Contract including the one that presently besets petitioner and
respondent.
The application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract in this case carries with it
certain legal effects. However, before discussing what these legal effects are, We shall first
deal with the challenges posed against the application of such arbitration clause.
Challenges Against the Application of the
Arbitration Clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract
Curiously, despite the lucidity of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract, the
petitioner, as well as the MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals, vouched for the non-
application of the same in the instant case. A plethora of arguments was hurled in favor of
bypassing arbitration. We now address them.
At different points in the proceedings of this case, the following arguments were offered
against the application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract:
1. The disagreement between the petitioner and respondent is non-arbitrable as it will
inevitably touch upon the issue of the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract. 71 It was
submitted that one of the reasons offered by the petitioner in justifying its failure to
pay under the 2005 Lease Contract was the nullity of such contract for being contrary
to law and public policy.72 The Supreme Court, in Gonzales v. Climax Mining,
Ltd.,73 held that " the validity of contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings "
as such questions are " legal in nature and require the application and interpretation
of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function ." 74
 2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity. 75
3. Even assuming that it can invoke the arbitration clause whilst denying the validity
of the 2005 Lease Contract , petitioner still did not file a formal application before the
MeTC so as to render such arbitration clause operational. 76 Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 9285 requires the party seeking arbitration to first file a " request " or an
application therefor with the court not later than the preliminary conference. 77
4. Petitioner and respondent already underwent Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
proceedings before the RTC.78 Hence, a further referral of the dispute to arbitration
would only be circuitous.79 Moreover, an ejectment case, in view of its summary
nature, already fulfills the prime purpose of arbitration, i.e. , to provide parties in
conflict with an expedient method for the resolution of their dispute. 80 Arbitration then
would no longer be necessary in this case.81
None of the arguments have any merit.
First. As highlighted in the previous discussion, the disagreement between the petitioner and
respondent falls within the all-encompassing terms of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract. While it may be conceded that in the arbitration of such disagreement, the validity of
the 2005 Lease Contract, or at least, of such contract’s rental stipulations would have to be
determined, the same would not render such disagreement non-arbitrable. The quotation
from Gonzales that was used to justify the contrary position was taken out of context. A
rereading of Gonzales would fix its relevance to this case.
In Gonzales, a complaint for arbitration was filed before the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau (PA-MGB) seeking the nullification of a Financial Technical
Assistance Agreement and other mining related agreements entered into by private parties. 82
Grounds invoked for the nullification of such agreements include fraud and
unconstitutionality.83 The pivotal issue that confronted the Court then was whether the PA-
MGB has jurisdiction over that particular arbitration complaint. Stated otherwise, the question
was whether the complaint for arbitration raises arbitrable issues that the PA-MGB can take
cognizance of.
Gonzales decided the issue in the negative. In holding that the PA-MGB was devoid of any
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for arbitration, this Court pointed out to the
provisions of R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining Act of 1995, which granted the PA-MGB with
exclusive original jurisdiction only over mining disputes, i.e., disputes involving " rights to
mining areas," "mineral agreements or permits," and " surface owners, occupants, claim
holders or concessionaires" requiring the technical knowledge and experience of mining
authorities in order to be resolved.84 Accordingly, since the complaint for arbitration in
Gonzales did not raise mining disputes as contemplated under R.A. No. 7942 but only issues
relating to the validity of certain mining related agreements, this Court held that such
complaint could not be arbitrated before the PA-MGB. 85 It is in this context that we made the
pronouncement now in discussion:
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement
between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the
interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by
members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case.
The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud
and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function. 86 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court in Gonzales did not simply base its rejection of the complaint for arbitration on the
ground that the issue raised therein, i.e. , the validity of contracts, is per se non-arbitrable.
The real consideration behind the ruling was the limitation that was placed by R.A. No. 7942
upon the jurisdiction of the PA-MGB as an arbitral body . Gonzales rejected the complaint for
arbitration because the issue raised therein is not a mining dispute per R.A. No. 7942 and it is
for this reason, and only for this reason, that such issue is rendered non-arbitrable before the
PA-MGB. As stated beforehand, R.A. No. 7942 clearly limited the jurisdiction of the PA-MGB
only to mining disputes.87
Much more instructive for our purposes, on the other hand, is the recent case of Cargill
Philippines, Inc. v. San Fernando Regal Trading, Inc. 88 In Cargill , this Court answered the
question of whether issues involving the rescission of a contract are arbitrable. The
respondent in Cargill argued against arbitrability, also citing therein Gonzales . After
dissecting Gonzales , this Court ruled in favor of arbitrability. 89 Thus, We held:
Respondent contends that assuming that the existence of the contract and the arbitration
clause is conceded, the CA's decision declining referral of the parties' dispute to arbitration is
still correct. It claims that its complaint in the RTC presents the issue of whether under the
facts alleged, it is entitled to rescind the contract with damages; and that issue constitutes a
judicial question or one that requires the exercise of judicial function and cannot be the
subject of an arbitration proceeding. Respondent cites our ruling in Gonzales, wherein we
held that a panel of arbitrator is bereft of jurisdiction over the complaint for declaration of
nullity/or termination of the subject contracts on the grounds of fraud and oppression
attendant to the execution of the addendum contract and the other contracts emanating from
it, and that the complaint should have been filed with the regular courts as it involved issues
which are judicial in nature.
Such argument is misplaced and respondent cannot rely on the Gonzales case to support its
argument.90 (Emphasis ours)
Second. Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract
notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the doctrine
of separability.91
Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as independent of
the main contract.92 Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be
invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract. 93
Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further consequence of the
doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates the main contract may invoke its
arbitration clause.94
Third . The operation of the arbitration clause in this case is not at all defeated by the failure
of the petitioner to file a formal "request" or application therefor with the MeTC. We find that
the filing of a "request" pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 is not the sole means by
which an arbitration clause may be validly invoked in a pending suit.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 reads:
SEC. 24. Referral to Arbitration . - A court before which an action is brought in a matter which
is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so requests not
later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both parties thereafter, refer the
parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed. [Emphasis ours; italics original]
The " request " referred to in the above provision is, in turn, implemented by Rules 4.1 to 4.3
of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC or the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution
(Special ADR Rules):
RULE 4: REFERRAL TO ADR
Rule 4.1. Who makes the request. - A party to a pending action filed in violation of the
arbitration agreement, whether contained in an arbitration clause or in a submission
agreement, may request the court to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with such
agreement.
Rule 4.2. When to make request. - (A) Where the arbitration agreement exists before the
action is filed . - The request for referral shall be made not later than the pre-trial conference.
After the pre-trial conference, the court will only act upon the request for referral if it is made
with the agreement of all parties to the case.
(B) Submission agreement . - If there is no existing arbitration agreement at the time the case
is filed but the parties subsequently enter into an arbitration agreement, they may request the
court to refer their dispute to arbitration at any time during the proceedings.
Rule 4.3. Contents of request. - The request for referral shall be in the form of a motion,
which shall state that the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement.
A part from other submissions, the movant shall attach to his motion an authentic copy of the
arbitration agreement.
The request shall contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties specifying the date and
time when it would be heard. The party making the request shall serve it upon the respondent
to give him the opportunity to file a comment or opposition as provided in the immediately
succeeding Rule before the hearing. [Emphasis ours; italics original]
Attention must be paid, however, to the salient wordings of Rule 4.1.It reads: "a party to a
pending action filed in violation of the arbitration agreement x x x may request the court to
refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with such agreement."
In using the word " may " to qualify the act of filing a " request " under Section 24 of R.A. No.
9285, the Special ADR Rules clearly did not intend to limit the invocation of an arbitration
agreement in a pending suit solely via such "request." After all, non-compliance with an
arbitration agreement is a valid defense to any offending suit and, as such, may even be
raised in an answer as provided in our ordinary rules of procedure. 95
In this case, it is conceded that petitioner was not able to file a separate " request " of
arbitration before the MeTC. However, it is equally conceded that the petitioner, as early as in
its Answer with Counterclaim ,had already apprised the MeTC of the existence of the
arbitration clause in the 2005 Lease Contract96 and, more significantly, of its desire to have
the same enforced in this case.97 This act of petitioner is enough valid invocation of his right
to arbitrate. Fourth . The fact that the petitioner and respondent already under went through
JDR proceedings before the RTC, will not make the subsequent conduct of arbitration
between the parties unnecessary or circuitous. The JDR system is substantially different from
arbitration proceedings.
The JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early neutral
evaluation which entails the submission of a dispute before a " JDR judge " who shall merely
" facilitate settlement " between the parties in conflict or make a " non-binding evaluation or
assessment of the chances of each party’s case." 98 Thus in JDR, the JDR judge lacks the
authority to render a resolution of the dispute that is binding upon the parties in conflict. In
arbitration, on the other hand, the dispute is submitted to an arbitrator/s —a neutral third
person or a group of thereof— who shall have the authority to render a resolution binding
upon the parties.99
Clearly, the mere submission of a dispute to JDR proceedings would not necessarily render
the subsequent conduct of arbitration a mere surplusage. The failure of the parties in conflict
to reach an amicable settlement before the JDR may, in fact, be supplemented by their resort
to arbitration where a binding resolution to the dispute could finally be achieved. This situation
precisely finds application to the case at bench.
Neither would the summary nature of ejectment cases be a valid reason to disregard the
enforcement of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract . Notwithstanding the
summary nature of ejectment cases, arbitration still remains relevant as it aims not only to
afford the parties an expeditious method of resolving their dispute.
A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is that it is, first
and foremost, a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to " make their own
arrangements to resolve their own disputes."100 Arbitration agreements manifest not only the
desire of the parties in conflict for an expeditious resolution of their dispute. They also
represent, if not more so, the parties’ mutual aspiration to achieve such resolution outside of
judicial auspices, in a more informal and less antagonistic environment under the terms of
their choosing. Needless to state, this critical feature can never be satisfied in an ejectment
case no matter how summary it may be.
Having hurdled all the challenges against the application of the arbitration clause of the 2005
Lease Agreement in this case, We shall now proceed with the discussion of its legal effects.
Legal Effect of the Application of the
Arbitration Clause
Since there really are no legal impediments to the application of the arbitration clause of the
2005 Contract of Lease in this case, We find that the instant unlawful detainer action was
instituted in violation of such clause. The Law, therefore, should have governed the fate of the
parties and this suit:
R.A. No. 876 Section 7. Stay of civil action. - If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an
issue arising out of an agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which such
suit or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement: Provided, That the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.[Emphasis supplied]
R.A. No. 9285
Section 24. Referral to Arbitration. - A court before which an action is brought in a matter
which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so requests
not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both parties thereafter, refer the
parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, in operative
or incapable of being performed. [Emphasis supplied]
It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful detainer action should have been
stayed;101 the petitioner and the respondent should have been referred to arbitration pursuant
to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract . The MeTC, however, did not do so in
violation of the law—which violation was, in turn, affirmed by the RTC and Court of Appeals
on appeal.
The violation by the MeTC of the clear directives under R.A. Nos.876 and 9285 renders
invalid all proceedings it undertook in the ejectment case after the filing by petitioner of its
Answer with Counterclaim —the point when the petitioner and the respondent should have
been referred to arbitration. This case must, therefore, be remanded to the MeTC and be
suspended at said point. Inevitably, the decisions of the MeTC, RTC and the Court of
Appeals must all be vacated and set aside.
The petitioner and the respondent must then be referred to arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.
This Court is not unaware of the apparent harshness of the Decision that it is about to make.
Nonetheless, this Court must make the same if only to stress the point that, in our jurisdiction,
bona fide arbitration agreements are recognized as valid; 102 and that laws,103 rules and
regulations104 do exist protecting and ensuring their enforcement as a matter of state policy.
Gone should be the days when courts treat otherwise valid arbitration agreements with
disdain and hostility, if not outright " jealousy,"105 and then get away with it. Courts should
instead learn to treat alternative means of dispute resolution as effective partners in the
administration of justice and, in the case of arbitration agreements, to afford them judicial
restraint.106 Today, this Court only performs its part in upholding a once disregarded state
policy.
Civil Case No. CV 09-0346
This Court notes that, on 30 September 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque City,
a complaint107 for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed
of Donation against the respondent. The case is currently pending before Branch 257 of the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.
This Court recognizes the great possibility that issues raised in Civil Case No. CV 09-0346
may involve matters that are rightfully arbitrable per the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract. However, since the records of Civil Case No. CV 09-0346 are not before this Court,
We can never know with true certainty and only speculate. In this light, let a copy of this
Decision be also served to Branch 257of the RTC of Parañaque for its consideration and,
possible, application to Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED . Accordingly, We
hereby render a Decision:
1. SETTING ASIDE all the proceedings undertaken by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 77, of Parañaque City in relation to Civil Case No. 2009-307 after the filing by
petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim ;
2. REMANDING the instant case to the MeTC, SUSPENDED at the point after the
filing by petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim;
 3. SETTING ASIDE the following:

a. Decision dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP

No. 116865,

b. Decision dated 29 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274,
of Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 10-0255,

c. Decision dated 27 April 2010 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77, of
Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 2009-307; and

4. REFERRING the petitioner and the respondent to arbitration pursuant to the

arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract, repeatedly included in the 2000 Lease
Contract and in the 1976 Amended Deed of Donation.

Let a copy of this Decision be served to Branch 257 of the RTC of Parañaque for its
consideration and, possible, application to Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460             March 31, 2006
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis,
Loughran v. Loughran 1
THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino
V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite
psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic)
revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro
later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required
psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion,
social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions.
Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second
opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floro’s appointment as Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura,
reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his
own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999
recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative
complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well
that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation
against him.
In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the
OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the
following acts or omissions as reported by the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his qualification
in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1,
1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-
accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07,
Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private
practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court
and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed
by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling
the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused
to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the
mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the
accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in
open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly
criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;
 (l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals
Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within
60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of
the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to
be conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical
and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under
preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges
against him." He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both
affirmative and negative defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August
1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure
to prosecute.7 However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the
hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a
"Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator 9 which was
denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge Floro’s motion for
reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the
question of Justice Ramirez’s inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the
Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on
Judge Floro’s motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez
came out with a "Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by
reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions
of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro
Manila, Branch 73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after
Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro
had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot
him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension
follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA – against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team
Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ – against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 – against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge
Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 – against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty.
Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the
Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of
Court, Branch 73, Malabon21
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) – against former Court Administrator Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator22
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez 23
7. A.C. No. 6050 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez 24
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be
dismissed.25 On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. 26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or
using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the
case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even
without the presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on
16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was
opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on
his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001,
Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on
11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A
Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions
for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the
petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa,
the petitioner’s counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the
following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and
declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not
re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to
have the case be assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued
hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of
the case "anew" as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec.
12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the
interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding
by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable
damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at
least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since
such is only allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional
remedy and only upon the Executive Judge’s finding that if a special raffle is not conducted,
the applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.’s order is contrary to
the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that
Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not
unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position).
Such remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of
creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and
expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow
family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule
2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for
reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy
is judicial, not administrative.29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of
the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the
subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the
JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of
the OCA.30 Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 1999 31 which
was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a
Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to
Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as
well as in the second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14
February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases
to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so far
submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the
two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the
pleadings and the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-
1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to
submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the evidence
previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested
his preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M.
No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated
cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floro’s
alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our
part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as
concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of
competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on
the findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our
job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order
to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the
evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of
a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the
applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f")
will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These
charges involve common facts and to treat them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of
dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications AND for announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as
the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar
exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with "full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila
University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the start of court
session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de
Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar
Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible,
particularly the Book of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the
courtroom were given the opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No
questions were asked; hence the session commenced."33
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of
professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not
improper" and that the word "title" should be broad enough to include a Judge’s legal
standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers
do include in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like President of the
Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro
argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close
friends or by reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not
allowed by law to seek other professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro
counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested
that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce his appointment with an
introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as
the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge
should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers
in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall
not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This
means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their
profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares.
As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited
from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding
their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with
more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-
glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did
Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple
professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number
and special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards cannot be
considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law
school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity
and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by
him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice
Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated
that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floro’s very own witness, a
researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. 39
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured
against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more
favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its amendment, automatically
classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious
charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may
simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out
of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 41
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated
by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and
unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human
flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering,
however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are
held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to
observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in
open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the
courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers
and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the
public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice – confident, competent and true. And to
discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to
court the litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge
Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only.
(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floro’s chamber[s], there is a folding bed with
cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge
Floro’s driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team, the driver immediately
went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit
team saw "sleeping" on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floro’s aide or "alalay" whom
he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and especially during court sessions)
for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team
was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro
having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office
hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation would have been different if
there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such
as in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his family
used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the
electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide
as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro
should have been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were
understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide
easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section
1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance
filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in
the form of examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial
prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos.
20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma
Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino", and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz",
respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a
form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn
by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court
Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC
Dizon refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing
wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence,
Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for
probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in
behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard
and be consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith
as Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad,
barangay tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order
granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since
according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead,
after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the
session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN;
20373-MN; and 20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr.
granted a similar motion without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto
attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure
with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that –
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and
not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and
entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent
faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the
applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR
RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a
Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken
cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp
mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in
RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-
1998 – almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao,
Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers,
regarding his being a responsible member of the community where the accused
reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of direct and even cross
examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no
such requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some
matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a
Court, whether or not he has had previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for
release on recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included
the interview/hearing on the applications for release on recognizance, during criminal
trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is
held in the chambers.45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his
remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory
interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law, 46 and as we explained
in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to
ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of
the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for
provisional liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floro’s explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with
the requirement for an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law,
the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted only during the period for awaiting the
submission of the investigation report on the application for probation and the resolution
thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares 49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study
prior to action on application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to
underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation
Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no
longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the
resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish
the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for
the trial judge to resolve the application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the
accused even before the order to submit the case study and report, respondent Judge
unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment of the
prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on
recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals 50 wherein we held that "no
judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is
set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court
for filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss
in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on
recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442
entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena
Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written
orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure was not due to
inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases.
First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the
prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge
Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study
and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused
on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as
his eventual probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as
Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application
for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit
team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving applications for release on
recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the law for said purpose.
Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this
is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we
cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused
significantly deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due
process." 52
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on
probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold
it conscientiously. 54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know
and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not
every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does
not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of
harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible
judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible
discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where
the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond
permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is
so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which
is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal
cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded
accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of
their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty.
Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention
prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a
permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the
sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had
not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any
rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or
private complainant that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath
that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the
presence of his Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason
that he commiserated with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been
accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is
corroborated by independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floro’s unwarranted eagerness in
approving application for release on recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that
a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent
and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-
accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial
restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as
not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a
judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language, both written and spoken,
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent
judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of
unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding
the public’s trust in his ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone
concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to
give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions.
He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable
if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being
imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the
parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that
he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust
decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law,
but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he
should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not
merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil
aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in
open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs.
Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering
that the private complainant was not being represented by a private prosecutor, used his
moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant to settle and eventually
cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private
complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is
hereto attached as Annex "8").
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide,
Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and the
accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In the same order,
Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor has
given his comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid
order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court.
Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public
prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the
accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further reported that the private complainants
signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr.
The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the
revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto
attached as Annexes "8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the
parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz
Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-
812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint 67 dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March
1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughter’s case against the accused therein
despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the amount
to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining witness, they
requested respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to
which Judge Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon
na!" Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the
accused against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to
settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not reflect the
agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs.
Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules
of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as they openly manifested their
willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that
the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro
waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing.
Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator
Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer
of compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases.
With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded by
the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has no power to
revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated
order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we
declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and
unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the
Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after
promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on
them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in
fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and
signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after
promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice
of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and
amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu proprio, provided
that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality. (Emphasis
supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court – ostensibly
a judicial approval of a compromise agreement – which was amended or revised by removing
the stamp of judicial approval, the written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving
its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement
after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order
per the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we
find no basis for the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil
aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for
lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially approved
as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause
for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the
agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was
reached under duress at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental
and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina
ang pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-
MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused
by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the
accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused
NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo,
PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not
guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared
trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is
"nauutal", has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding
the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the
Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental
Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of
Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that
the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF
MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court
may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental
condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he
moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in
order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension,
however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely
manifested that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio
and "over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the
scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section
12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed
by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made "upon motion by the proper
party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the
arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact,
jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that
the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we
underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in
a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter.
If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel,
make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the
accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the
accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is
the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency
on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court
must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law
secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accused’s mental
fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution
which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of
Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court
and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled
dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the
lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of
these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as
collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted
that he does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings
in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is
the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a
pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil
Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert
V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus – Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V.
Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of
Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner
and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon,
Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan
confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his
picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the
said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the
above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of
law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client." Canon
5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: "A judge shall
not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend
to his personal cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge
Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed
Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of
Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in
connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the custody of their
"mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading
in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case. 78 He
likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he
had rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally,
during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as
petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy,
thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a
judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure
the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private
practice" is more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to
the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does
not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other
court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that
Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does
not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that
Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the
petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as
defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that
he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading
a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach
for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow
judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2,
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge
in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been
attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro
vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case.
Time and again we have held that although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound
by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject
to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr.
conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to
obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of
the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted
along with this report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was
appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant.
During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr.
on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang
Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure;
pagdating dito eh … dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming …
eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan … but ginawa ko lang yon … Sabi ko si Judge nagko-
complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin … except … na
hindi papayag … kasi marami diyang …"
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial,
discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine
justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:
"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang
kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera."
He continued:
"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko
retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni
Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun … ganun … Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang
katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko.
Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong
nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang
isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana
hindi naka-record eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay
fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel
due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual
absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine
judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff
in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they
twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation
took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to
the OCA sans the "yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that
the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial
copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding.
This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were taken officially
during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording
of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only
Judge Floro’s word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as
to Judge Floro’s alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language.
Resolving these particular charges would therefore depend upon which party is more
credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he
openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged
"kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that
since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always
apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did he criticize but likewise Judges and
Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "D’yan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . .
Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving?
Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as
temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and
intemperate language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court
Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding
practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-
luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not during court session, but
during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did
not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No.
25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow
judge. Take the transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court
Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for
consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open Court, before all of
us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in the
case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or
even the actual transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages
against the justice system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named
Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of
the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he integrated this
kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to
advise the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record
because it contained offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for
example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid
declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro
himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are
consistent with Judge Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with
several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed 13th in the bar
examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account of his
perception of injustice in the disposition of his brother’s case are not far removed from his
reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the
persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation
therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is
claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as
well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more
likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of
unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent
proof of violation on Judge Floro’s part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro –
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal
life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper
decorum in the court." A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge
invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court.
When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will
follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere
must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a
judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere
must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for
any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that
trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the
course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He
must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s
claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to
people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations
of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the
functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once
again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would
suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges
are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders
Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we
will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that
he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his
mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for
the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro
guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" – gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge "d" – unbecoming conduct
4) Charge "e" – unbecoming conduct
5) Charges "k" and "l" – unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a
judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in
the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of
the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he
was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And,
considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt
motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the
maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and
unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of
his office
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was
argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked
suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of
the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his
obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of
whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law
as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed
dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To
emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5
years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest secret
of the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in
psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky
"no. 13-1," and he got the 13th place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" – seeing
plenty of "dwendes" around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent
findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious
level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the
Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon.
Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV)
did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:

Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated
the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family background and
accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro
would rather talk about his work and academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate
embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental or psychological
his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the various tasks that he
examination and which necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This charge of
undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with
mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding
decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest
the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the
provocation.
service against Judge Floro.

From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied
of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of
for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995.
social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed discomfort with close
The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC
social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others’ motives as well as perceptual
Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floro’s current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is
below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic
background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with
decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as
a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing
justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the
responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking
and stress-laden situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to
seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however,
resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial
court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to
"appropriate psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the
"appropriate psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20
July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to
"submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10) days
from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22
February 2000. 96
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was
reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floro’s failure to
do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions. 97
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution
with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November
2000. 99
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or
disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation
that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged
gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959
Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo,
moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1
February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floro’s
filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the
latter’s intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court. 104 The Court en banc
agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to
psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be
ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x
x." 105
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise
sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his
own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001. 107
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000,
this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical
Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a
delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part,
stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and
suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite
his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current functioning is
gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test
protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is
an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective assessment and
judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting
to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural
beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing have
become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has
interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in
performing his court duties as a judge. 108
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior
Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in
March 2001 that –
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by
evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists,
the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be
declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier
psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals which were all
favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with his application as RTC
Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having "failed" the examination given by
the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist,
Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
 I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with
everyday demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract
requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a logical approach in
evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider
solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he
can organize procedures and details so as to get things done correctly and
on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine personal
progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept others’ ideas and
contributions especially if these oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ.
Generally, he prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the
way of his judgment and decisions.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings.
Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself
and others according to these standards. When things do not develop along desired
lines, he may become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social
stature and can be expected to comply with conventional social demands. 109
Testifying as one of Judge Floro’s witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination
that "psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every
available records of the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic
Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you
about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here
when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course
of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his power of by
location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a
trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or
making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
xxxx
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances
in the course of his private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official
duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin
ko na po nakukuha naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na
kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng iba’t iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi
compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
xxxx
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir. 110
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the
Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the
interview Judge Floro –
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a
wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and
reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment.
There is no previous history of any psychological disturbances. 111
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did
stated in his report that – not admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be
altered a little?
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying xxxx
hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in
his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor
English. He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal- in the absence of any corroborative contradiction.
directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or defensive but Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would
there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or neologisms. that be correct?
Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There A: The interview has its limitations.
were no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by
Judgment, insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
events that transpired after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to have
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr.
your evaluation altered?
do not contradict his nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112 A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floro’s witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him
that the interview had its limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left as a psychic at all?
out by his patient. 114 The following exchange is thus instructive: xxxx
Q: Would it be really more altered?
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, A: I would say so.
unheard friends known as duwendes? xxxx
DR. JURILLA: He did not. Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations
xxxx of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is capable or possessed of the power of
be the number five psychic in the country? bilocation?
xxxx
xxxx A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floro’s mental and
A: No, Your Honor. psychological x x x?
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena? A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
A: He did not. Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was
xxxx abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) A: Given the data.
kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse? Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation
A: Not during our interview. favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has
xxxx claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a letter?
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed xxxx
some information or it is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically
everything. altered. 115
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated
3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not
reveal delusional thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and
expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his
pending administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not suffering
from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place
and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately
functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He
talked about his family and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for
prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a "covenant" made during a dream
between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the first
part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and
alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The
battery of test consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA
Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sack’s Sentence Completion Test and (5)
Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above
Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is
meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented
and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as
professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-
oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor
hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His
belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro
was unfit to be a judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino
are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim
that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one
time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of
his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit,
another person, another character unseen who is with him at the same time or in tagalog
"sumapi sa kanya".
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?
xxxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about
hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like
schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or
delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-
psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in
duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with
psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was
doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as
part of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an indication … Basically the
phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental disorder. It is also common
in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a
particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would
[lose] concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as
arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say
that there is this difficulty in manners of attention span and concentration if that person
sitting as a judge experience trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by
flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well
as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a
trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that
person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these
cases held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of
Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise
moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the
trance that you see the – nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. That’s a trance that is created by the
so called… Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind
projection. He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind
projection or the hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the
person. But in my case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat
will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very moment, Mr. witness,
"meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here.
Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but… ATTY. DIZON: No,
can you see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read
and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his
testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as
this claim of his to be a normal person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show
to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and
still had a so–called counter part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that claim,
would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and
Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to
remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President
Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his
calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a
grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was
involved in a coup d’etat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic
powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of
him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and
for him to say that he is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has
been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who
distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal.
A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a
trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of
medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such
circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging
the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court
presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as
to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him
incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino
V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because
of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his
office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to
conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his
case have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to
"insanity," he was apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general layman’s
term, a catch–all word referring to various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the
appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme
Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported
signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the
people. 121 An honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in
order to promote the stability of government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying
much of the weight in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the
judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of
individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if the
judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our
disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct
or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals
assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing
the future because of his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of
a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write
while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at
the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains on people,
especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to
wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness
testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to
recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his
chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court
Clinic about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to
action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs,
especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial
thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to
apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving
controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he
rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb. In said
decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state
that "psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed
the testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floro’s decision is quoted
hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecution’s PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident)
NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor
points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable
deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti,
that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE
or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic
viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by
Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas,
and that he saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P.
INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno";
MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco
THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having
been asked to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing
by accused when he NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp.
1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or
maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING
during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have been corrected to another
word SUITABLE to Normandy’s FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had synthesized the
entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming
error ‘DAY’ should be corrected; the Court’s sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN
the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of
FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE
WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that –
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean
that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and
explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values
and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. 128
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He
is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is
to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment,
to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of
order in the social life." 129
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial
tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment
and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness
and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not
detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a
judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floro’s belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as
RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large
components of the judge’s role. Especially if he has aspired to a judge’s status, he is likely to
have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to
have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior that the
judge’s role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop and
reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court
procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court
buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous
former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization
must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a judge. 131
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public
officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with
the law to an even greater degree than legislators or executives. 132
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract
ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws
to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a
mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not, which
requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of
the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands
of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one’s own views are
incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are precisely the
presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to
expect from those entrusted with … judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment … must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not
to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of
competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as
judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a critical and
impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a
period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as
RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot
hold anyone legally responsible for such major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He
went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on
the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having failed the psychological
examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the
JBC upon Judge Floro’s submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health
professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged
that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second
opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been
guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be,
in addition to other requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the "Rules
of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had
previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6
thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. – Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and
emotional condition of the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to
perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. – The applicant shall submit to
psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a
psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a
private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be
faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of mental health professionals not
affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floro’s appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What
awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND
EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floro’s almost seven years of suspension in the light of the
fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the
admonition that such rules "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases
against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the
judge is preventively suspended pending investigation. This is the state of things even after
its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power --
consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law
cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved
to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within
ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant,
Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for
appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of the
Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative
charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floro’s suspension, albeit
indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the
Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of the records of the
case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall
terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from
the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for
the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the
Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice to
come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such
time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. 143 This is
because –
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious
offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of
the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge
until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong
likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to
shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the
continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’
image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice
solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an
exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the
vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of
all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of
the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into
his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay,
for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would
seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases;
he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate
psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him
ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact
and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived
to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against
Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case
considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly
included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled similarly in the case of
Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under
preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension.
The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar
circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court "until further
orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13½ months, during which
period he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job
that the Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the administrative case,
Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for
his family’s basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said
in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but
only a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the investigation
of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer
justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and
other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we
hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be
applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90)
days and such may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a
situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire
duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was
not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive
suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would
indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal
completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily,
therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the
payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end
of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until
further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the investigation." Judge Iturralde’s
suspension of 13 ½ months even pales in comparison to Judge Floro’s suspension of 81
months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not
practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brother’s largesse. And,
though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could
not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension
exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a
matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot
apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated
as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floro’s propensity to delay the resolution of his
case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived
connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturralde’s case, the investigation was not delayed
through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus,
using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was already
in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent,
he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed,
contributed to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde,
Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the
reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are
free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments
to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of
and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as
it is variously expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the
resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three years. This is
because Judge Floro’s separation from the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily
understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to
a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to
continue discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As
discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would
seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well
as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own
bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then the
same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live
through with Damocles’ sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could
not practice his profession.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M.
No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is
dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floro’s separation from the service renders moot the
complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this
case will not cause a ripple on the Court’s decision to separate Judge Floro from the service.
Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering
that charge "h" is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily
be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his
accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floro’s separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such
separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of
mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering
government service for positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The reports
contain statements/findings in Judge Floro’s favor that the Court cannot overlook in all
fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floro’s assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149
b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality
and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150
SO ORDERED.
c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena … not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND
(P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service
due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge
the functions of his office, effective immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May
1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.

d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency

…. His concern for the details that make up a total field represents his attempts at
being systematic and cautious." 152

e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153

Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive
nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor.

Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro’s current
administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to
judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task
of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but
clearly due to a medically disabling condition.

Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse

environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment – factors they
have no control over.
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For
Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in
contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the
limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to
insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled
"Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this
Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to
elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek
a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that
might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the
former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for
oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu
City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075
in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782,
and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica
"stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered
judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two
hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus
costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-
13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the
Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to
the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S.
Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence
favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the
negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were
insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and
instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel
for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled
threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering
unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the
Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion
for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of
the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a
falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember
that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration,
filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal
violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles
171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue
of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its
admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive
language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to
assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on
January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that
the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only
informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date,
respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing
them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof,
and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the
hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on
December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of
Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the
Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in
accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if
provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of
mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be
right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and
individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and
determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973,
cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar
to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which
happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting
lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the
Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and
veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating
that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, or doing it through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man,
just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just,
he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not
succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p.
150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it
be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so
much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than
abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the
authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this
anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del
Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered
suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of
these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals
and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our
resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to
circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar
from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three
Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying
to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-
13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the
dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned,
and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the
undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the
Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making
them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their
judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10,
1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three
Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned
against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion
for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the
names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition,
together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion
for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He,
then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other
things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision
of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would
have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the
Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a
language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar
again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our
judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal
beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of
justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements
contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No.
46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed
to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his
contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge
Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in
question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang
man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo
should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the
evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive
evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo
on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him
liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review
on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because
We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the
aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final
and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he
should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he
submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching
hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex
"A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as
Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing
correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that
human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire
from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies"
(Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous
statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued
veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear
personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973,
respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other
things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this
state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils
will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire
from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human
deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as
compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements
without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as
state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption,
graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are
among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a
complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with
understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the
legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped
by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are
absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant
to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty.
Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration
on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated
December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was
given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of
respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts
involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed
submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar
stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and
unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily
forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have
committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the
Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in
violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals
committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in
trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic
standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the
undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of
law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could
have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his
pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical
ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for
respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the
Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the
affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited
was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still
subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now
independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated
therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite
ruling of the Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading
that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del
Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of
sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever
penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily
done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this
case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt
proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which
would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its
integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of
Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138,
Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren
its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such
respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment.
That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others'
lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much
more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The
language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-
445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the
latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to
securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to
extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without
basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court
in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court
pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build  and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so
essential to the proper administration of justice (Emphasis supplied). (People
vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and
Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based
on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-
36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for
disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of
Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled
threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the
resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said
tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short,
his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law,
in disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that
his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's
faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly
invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous
statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely
pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what
to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that
what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint
of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without
considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of
mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in
the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a
sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who
dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his
long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with
ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future
will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to
imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of
justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March
5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our
resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as
he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such
suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31
SCRA, p. 562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962.]

 IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
Victorino A. Savellano for complainant.
Nestor M. Andrada for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; CONVICTION OF CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE. — Under section 5, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Murder is such a crime.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "MORAL TURPITUDE" CONSTRUED. — The term "moral turpitude" includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Basa, 41
Phil. 275. As used in disbarment status, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v.
Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF PARDON. — The rule that pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon
has been granted applies only where the pardon is absolute, but not where, as in this case,
the pardon granted is conditional and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of the penalty.
In such a case, the attorney must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for the crime he
has committed.
4. ID.; REQUISITES FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of law is a privilege
accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral
fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a
test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character.
These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on
October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro
he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this
Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G. R. No. L-7101), but the
penalty was changed to reclusión perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence
respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The
unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case,
filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of
lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time,
admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding his previous conviction but pleading the
conditional pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re
Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127 a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S.
Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel.
Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279, pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to
respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is
placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy
and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent proceeding for his
disbarment on the ground of such conviction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When
proceedings to strike on attorney’s name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on
a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held
that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the
disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the
Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to
support it, namely, In re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott v. State 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 380. Thus in Scott v. State the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We are of the opinion that after he received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
This record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace
was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S. 95 U.S. 149, and cases there
cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191."cralaw virtua1aw library
politic."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for
which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his
name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is Padilla, J., took no part.
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.’"

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted
the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte
Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offenses by him committed in
connection with the rebellion (civil war) against the government of the United States."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The foregoing considerations render In re Lontok inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez

must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he
invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been
committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal
mayor at the time) and with the use of a motor vehicle. People v. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra.
The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules
of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials
of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission; the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556; "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant;
and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under
foot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and THIRD DIVISION
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998
FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and PRICILIANO B. GONZALES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue of whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may resolve the issue of
ownership of the property involved in an unlawful detainer case has been discussed by this
Court in a number of cases, the more recent of which is that of Hilario v. Court of Appeals.1
Jurisprudence on the matter has in fact been reflected in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
under Rule 70, to wit:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession. (4a)
These developments in the law notwithstanding, there remains some misconceptions on the
issue of jurisdiction of inferior courts in ejectment cases where ownership is raised as a
defense that the Court deems proper to clarify in this petition.
Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the registered
owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,000 square meters. The land with improvements,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-54556 (383917), is situated at No. 52 Gilmore
Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
In June 1988, private respondent obtained a four million peso - (P4,000,000.00) loan from the
China Banking Corporation. To guarantee payment of the loan, private respondent
mortgaged the Gilmore property and all its improvements to said bank. Due to irregular
payment of amortization, interests and penalties on the loan accumulated through the years.
On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B. Gonzales, signed and
executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the Gilmore property and its
improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad L. Oronce.2 The deed,
which states that the sale was in consideration of the sum of P5,400,000.00,3 provided inter
alia that
x x x the VENDOR (PBGDC) also guarantees the right of the VENDEES (petitioners) to the
possession of the property subject of this contract without the need of judicial action; and
possession of said premises shall be delivered to the VENDEES by the VENDOR at the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage.
On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private respondents indebtedness
with China Banking Corporation.
In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, petitioners paid private respondents indebtedness with the bank. However, private
respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of the premises to petitioners upon
the expiration of the one-year period from April 13, 1992. Almost six months later since the
execution of the instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners caused the registration of the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register of Deeds. Simultaneously, they
obtained a new title, TCT No. 67990, consistent with the fact that they are the new owners of
the property.4 Sometime in July 1993, they paid the real estate taxes on the property for
which they were issued Tax Declarations Nos. C-061-02815 and C-061-
02816.5cräläwvirtualibräry
On November 12, 1993, petitioners sent private respondent a demand letter asking it to
vacate the premises. Said letter, just like three other consecutive notices sent through the
Quezon City post office, was unclaimed. Hence, on April 11, 1994, petitioners filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for unlawful detainer against private
respondent. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8638 was raffled to Branch 41.
Petitioners alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, they
acquired from private respondent the Gilmore property and its improvements, for which
reason they were issued TCT No. 67990. However, they added, in violation of the terms of
that document, specifically Sec. 3 (c) thereof, private respondent refused to surrender
possession of the premises. Consequently, they demanded that private respondent vacate
the premises through notices sent by registered mail that were, however, returned to them
unclaimed.
In its answer to the complaint, private respondent raised the issue of ownership over the
property. It impugned petitioners right to eject, alleging that petitioners had no cause of action
against it because it was merely a mortgagee of the property. It argued that when the parties
executed the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, its real intention was to forge an
equitable mortgage and not a sale. It pointed out three circumstances indicative of an
equitable mortgage, namely: inadequacy of the purchase price, continued possession by
private respondent of the premises, and petitioners retention of a portion of the purchase
price.
During the preliminary conference on the case, the parties agreed to stipulate on the
following: (a) the existence and due execution of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, and (b) the issue of whether or not the premises in litis are being unlawfully
detained by private respondent.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 24, 1995, the MTC7 decided the case in favor of petitioners. It ruled that petitioners
are the owners of the Gilmore property on account of the following pieces of evidence: (a)
TCT No. 67990; (b) petitioners payment to the China Banking Corporation of P8,500,000.00,
the amount of the mortgage entered into between private respondent and said bank; (c)
payment of real estate taxes for 1993, and (d) Tax Declaration No. 02816 in petitioners
names. The MTC further held that private respondents possession of the premises was
merely tolerated by petitioners and because it refused to vacate the premises despite
demand to do so, then its possession of the same premises had become illegal. Thus, the
MTC decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant and
all persons claiming rights under it to vacate the premises-in-litis located at No. 52 Gilmore
St., New Manila, Quezon City, and to peacefully surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 a month as compensation for the unjust occupation of
the same from April 11, 1994 (the date of filing of this case) until defendant fully vacates the
said premises; to pay plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus costs
of suit.
Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8cräläwvirtualibräry
On April 25, 1995, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 219, of Quezon City that docketed it as Civil Case No. Q-95-23697. Private
respondent stressed in its appeal that it was not unlawfully withholding possession of the
premises from petitioners because the latters basis for evicting it was the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage that did not reflect the true intention of the parties to enter into an
equitable mortgage. Clearly in pursuance of that allegation, private respondent filed a motion
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain its appeal. On the other hand, petitioners
filed a motion for the immediate execution of the appealed decision. The RTC granted the
motion on September 21, 1995 and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on
September 25, 1995. The following day, the sheriff served upon private respondent the writ of
execution and a notice to vacate the premises within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of its appeal, private respondent filed an action for
reformation of instrument with the RTC. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24927 and
assigned to Branch 227.
In a resolution dated December 7, 1995, RTC Branch 219 asserted jurisdiction over the
appeal. It ruled that the issue of whether or not an action for reformation of a deed of sale and
an unlawful detainer case can proceed independently of each other has been resolved by this
Court in Judith v. Abragan.9 In said case, this Court held that the fact that defendants had
previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of
pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid
reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.
On December 12, 1995, private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners and RTC Branch 219. It assailed the September 21, 1995 order granting
the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, the writ of execution and the notice to
vacate served upon private respondent (CA-G.R. SP-39227).
On December 13, 1995, RTC Branch 21910 rendered the decision affirming in toto that of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Stating that in ejectment proceedings, the only issue for resolution is
who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises involved, RTC Branch 219
held that:
x x x the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are vendees of the defendant (PBGDC) by virtue of a
deed of sale where the extent of its right to continue holding possession was stipulated. In the
agreement, the existence and due execution of which the defendant had admitted (Order,
December 16, 1994, Rollo, p. 111), it was clearly stated that the defendant shall deliver the
possession of the subject premises to the plaintiffs at the expiration of one (1) year from the
execution thereof, April 12, 1992. The defendant failed to do so. From then on, it could be
said that the defendant has been unlawfully withholding possession of the premises from the
plaintiffs.
In any case, this ruling on the matter of possession de facto is without prejudice to the action
for reformation. This is because `the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or
effect the ownership of the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein
found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving
possession (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 153; Section 7, Rule 70, Rules of
Court).11cräläwvirtualibräry
On that same date, December 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining RTC Branch 219 from enforcing the writ of execution and the notice to vacate
the premises and on January 15, 1996, the same court granted private respondents
application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of both the writ of
execution pending appeal and the decision of RTC Branch 219.
Around six months later or on July 2, 1996, RTC Branch 22712 issued an order declaring
private respondent non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial and, therefore, dismissing
the action for reformation of instrument in Civil Case No. Q-95-24927. Private respondent, not
having sought reconsideration of said order, the same court issued a resolution on August 15,
1996 directing the entry of judgment in the case.13 The Clerk of Court accordingly issued the
final entry of judgment thereon.14cräläwvirtualibräry
In the meantime, on July 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein questioned
Decision.15 It set aside the December 13, 1995 decision of RTC Branch 219 and declared as
null and void for want of jurisdiction, the March 24, 1995 decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 41. It made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining petitioners from implementing the decision of RTC Branch 219, the writ of execution
and the notice to vacate. In so holding, the Court of Appeals said:
It is quite evident that, upon the pleadings, the dispute between the parties extended beyond
the ordinary issues in ejectment cases. The resolution of the dispute hinged on the question
of ownership and for that reason was not cognizable by the MTC. (See: General Insurance
and Surety Corporation v. Castelo, 13 SCRA 652 [1965]).
Respondent judge was not unaware of the pendency of the action for reformation. However,
despite such knowledge, he proceeded to discuss the merits of the appeal and rendered
judgment in favor of respondents on the basis of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage which was precisely the subject of the action for reformation pending before
another branch of the court. Prudence dictated that respondent judge should have refused to
be drawn into a discussion as to the merits of the respective contentions of the parties and
deferred to the action of the court before whom the issue was directly raised for resolution.
On whether or not private respondent was in estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of the
MTC since it voluntarily submitted thereto the question of the validity of its title to the property,
the Court of Appeals said:
This is not so. As earlier pointed out, petitioner (private respondent here) had, in its answer to
the complaint for unlawful detainer, promptly raised the issue of jurisdiction by alleging that
what was entered into by the parties was just an equitable mortgage and not a sale.
Assuming the truth of this allegation, it is fairly evident that respondents would not have had a
cause of action for ejectment. In other words, Petitioner, since the start of the case, presented
a serious challenge to the MTCs jurisdiction but, unfortunately, the court ignored such
challenge and proceeded to decide the case simply on the basis of possession.
`The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not, if it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). (La Naval
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 [1994]).

Contrary to respondents pretense, the filing by petitioner of an action for the reformation of
contract may not really be an afterthought. As we understand it, Petitioner, to support its
allegation that the contract was a mere equitable mortgage, cites the fact that the price was
inadequate; it remained in possession of the premises; it has retained a part of the purchase
price; and, in any case, the real intention of the parties was that the transaction shall secure
the payment by petitioner of its loan, adverting to Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Under Article
1604 of the same code, it is provided that the presence of only one circumstance defined in
Article 1602, such as those cited above, is sufficient for a contract of sale with right to
repurchase to be presumed an equitable mortgage. Without in any way preempting the
decision of the court in the action for reformation, it is our considered view that, under the
factual milieu, the action was initiated for the proper determination of the rights of the parties
under the contract, and not just an afterthought.
No derogatory inference can arise from petitioners admission of the existence of the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage. The admission does not necessarily dilute its claim that
the same does not express the true intent of the parties.
Verily, since the case at bench involves a controverted right, the parties are required to
preserve the status quo and await the decision of the proper court on the true nature of the
contract. It is but just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending decision on said case, and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to
engage in petty warfare over possession of property which is the subject of dispute. To permit
this will be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to the social order.
(Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795 [1990]).16cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari where petitioners raise the following
assigned errors allegedly committed by respondent Court of Appeals:
I.
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE
PROVISIONS OF SEC. 33 (2) OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980
CONFERRING EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ON THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT IN EJECTMENT CASES AND VESTING IT WITH AUTHORITY, INDEED
MANDATORILY, TO RESOLVE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP TO DETERMINE ISSUES OF
POSSESSION.
II.
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IS CONTRARY TO CURRENT AND
PREVAILING DOCTRINE AS ENUNCIATED IN WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 208 SCRA 108; SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 200 SCRA 117; AND
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 229 SCRA 627.
III.
THE FILING OF THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OVER THE EJECTMENT CASE; THE DISMISSAL OF
THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED MERELY AS A
PLOY TO DELAY DISPOSITION OF EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND BARES NOT
JUST THE ERROR BUT THE UTTER INEQUITY OF THE RESPONDENT COURTS
DECISION ANNULLING THE EJECTMENT DECREE AND SETTING ASIDE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECISION OF AFFIRMANCE.
Petitioners argue that the precedent laid down in Ching v. Malaya17 relied upon by the Court
of Appeals, was based on the old law, Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), as
amended, which vested in the city courts original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful
detainer proceedings and the corresponding power to receive evidence upon the question of
ownership for the only purpose of determining the character and extent of possession.18
They claim that since the original complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on April 13, 1992,
then the applicable law should have been Section 33 (2) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). That law vests in the city courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases and the corresponding power to
receive evidence upon questions of ownership and to resolve the issue of ownership to
determine the issue of possession.19cräläwvirtualibräry
The history of the law vesting Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts with jurisdiction over
ejectment cases has invariably revolved upon the assumption that the question of ownership
may be considered only if necessary for the determination of the issue as to who of the
parties shall have the right to possess the property in litigation.20 Thus, under the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, Section 88 vested municipal and city courts with authority to
receive evidence upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the
property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 that was enacted on June 21,
1969, provided that city courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance
over ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings and
that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession.
Expounding on that provision of law, in Pelaez v. Reyes,21 this Court said:
x x x We are of the considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is to
precisely grant to the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of first instance
over the cases enumerated therein, which include `ejection cases where the question of
ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. To sustain petitioners contention about the
meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) of said section regarding the resolution of the
issue of ownership `in conjunction with the issue of possession is to disregard the very
language of the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a conferment upon the
city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over ejection cases in
which ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. It is to Us quite clear that the fact that
the issue of ownership is to be resolved `in conjunction with the issue of possession simply
means that both the issues of possession and ownership are to be resolved by the city
courts. And the jurisdiction is concurrent with the Courts of First Instance precisely because
usually questions of title are supposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other words, this
grant of special jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from the power ordinarily
accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose of determining
the extent of the possession in dispute.
Upon the approval on August 14, 1981 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, however, the power of inferior courts, including city courts, to
resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases was modified.
Resolution of the issue of ownership became subject to the qualification that it shall be only
for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In effect, therefore, the city courts lost
the jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership per se that was theretofore concurrent
with the then Courts of First Instance. Thus, Section 33 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Accordingly, the Interim Rules and Guidelines in the implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 provides as follows:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and
municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and detainer
even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the question of possession
could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, but the question of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Explaining these provisions of law, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court said:
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296 which merely allowed
inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question of title solely for the purpose of
determining the extent and character of possession and damages for detention, which
thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to the effect that if it appears during the trial
that the principal issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any question of
possession which may be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the
title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts is lost and the action should be
dismissed. With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain
jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved
without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of
ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In
other words, the fact that the issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately
interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on
jurisdictional grounds.
Another development in the law has emphasized the fact that inferior courts shall not lose
jurisdiction over ejectment cases solely because the issue of ownership is interwoven with the
issue of possession. Under the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure, as amended by a
resolution of this Court that took effect on November 15, 1991, all forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases shall be tried pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
regardless of whether or not the issue of ownership of the subject property is alleged by a
party.23 In other words, even if there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership, such fact
will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases24 that shall be tried
summarily.
When the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts was expanded, thereby amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, by virtue of
Republic Act No. 7691 that took effect on April 15, 1994, the jurisdiction of said courts over
ejectment cases was retained. Thus, in Hilario v. Court of Appeals this Court said:
x x x. As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if
the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership;
but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to ownership could be resolved
by the court for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as
merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the
nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not
possession de jure.
In other words, inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the
issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.25 These courts shall
resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a
determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of
possession. Considering the difficulties that are usually encountered by inferior courts as
regards the extent of their power in determining the issue of ownership, in Sps. Refugia v.
Court of Appeals, the Court set out guidelines to be observed in the implementation of the law
which, as stated at the outset, has recently been restated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The guidelines pertinent to this case state:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is
merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for
the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, x x x, the legal provision under
consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of
evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution
of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really
and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations of
the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of
ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the
averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim
for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the
action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.
xxx,
5. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of who the real
owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and
make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same
vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity
and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of
possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is
because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not
bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. Moreover,
Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession
only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.26 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioners clearly intended recovery of possession over the Gilmore
property. They alleged in their complaint for unlawful detainer that their claim for possession
is buttressed by the execution of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, a copy of
which was attached as Annex A to the complaint and by the issuance of TCT No. 67990 that
evidenced the transfer of ownership over the property.27 Because metropolitan trial courts
are authorized to look into the ownership of the property in controversy in ejectment cases, it
behooved MTC Branch 41 to examine the bases for petitioners claim of ownership that
entailed interpretation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that
embodies the agreement of the parties that possession of the Gilmore property and its
improvements shall remain with the vendor that was obliged to transfer possession only after
the expiration of one year,28 MTC Branch 41 apparently did not examine the terms of the
deed of sale. Instead, it erroneously held that the issue of whether or not the document was
in fact an equitable mortgage should not be properly raised in this case. Had it examined the
terms of the deed of sale, which, after all is considered part of the allegations of the complaint
having been annexed thereto, that court would have found that, even on its face, the
document was actually one of equitable mortgage and not of sale. The inferior court appears
to have forgotten that all documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and
genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as
part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.29cräläwvirtualibräry
Article 1602 of the Civil Code provides that a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage by the presence of any of the following:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending
the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that
the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
Article 1604 of the same Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to
a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. The presence of even one of the circumstances
in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as one of equitable mortgage.30 The
explicit provision of Article 1602 that any of those circumstances would suffice to construe a
contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage is in consonance with the rule that the law
favors the least transmission of property rights.
The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the 2,000-square-meter lot located
at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City provides as follows:
3. That the total consideration for the sale of the above-described property by the VENDOR
to the VENDEES is FOURTEEN MILLION (P14,000,000.00) PESOS, in Philippine currency,
payable as follows:
a) The VENDOR shall be paid by the VENDEE the sum of FIVE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P5,400,000.00) PESOS upon the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale
With Assumption of Mortgage after computation of the mortgage obligation of the VENDOR
with CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the amount of ______________________ which
the VENDEES agree to assume as part of the consideration of this sale. The VENDEES
hereby assume the mortgage obligation of the VENDOR with the CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION in the total amount of ___________________.
b) The VENDOR hereby undertakes and agrees with the VENDEES that the first-named
party shall warrant and defend the title of said real property hereby conveyed in favor of the
VENDEES, their heirs, successors or assigns, against all just claims of all persons or entities;
that the VENDOR also guarantees the right of the VENDEES to the possession of the
property subject of this contract without the need of judicial action; and furthermore, the
VENDOR binds itself to execute any additional documents to complete the title of the
VENDEES to the above-described property so that it may be registered in the name of the
VENDEES in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
c) It is hereby expressly agreed and understood by and between the VENDOR and the
VENDEES that the house and other improvements found in the premises are included in this
sale and that possession of said premises shall be delivered to the VENDEES by the
VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the signing and execution of this
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
d) It is furthermore expressly provided and agreed by and between the VENDOR and the
VENDEES that the capital gains tax shall be paid by the VENDOR while any and all fees and
expenses incident to the registration and transfer of the title to the aforementioned property
shall be defrayed and borne by the VENDEES.

e) Attached to this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage as Annex `A thereof is the
Certificate of ROSANA FLORES, Corporate Secretary of PRICILIANO B. DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws who
certified that at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of said corporation held on
December 3, 1991 at which meeting a quorum was present, the following resolution was
adopted and passed, to wit:
`RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the company, PRICILIANO B.
GONZALES DEVELOPMENT is (sic) hereby authorized the President, Mr. Antonio B.
Gonzales to enter into and/or negotiate for the sale of a property described as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383917 with an area of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQUARE METERS
under the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
`RESOLVED FURTHER, that Mr. ANTONIO B. GONZALES, is hereby authorized to sign,
execute any and all documents relative thereto.
That aforesaid resolution is in full force and effect.
(sgd.)
ROSANA FLORES
Corporate Secretary
(SGD.)
f) Full title and possession over the above-described property shall vest upon the VENDEES
upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions herein set forth.31
(Underscoring supplied.)
That under the agreement the private respondent as vendor shall remain in possession of the
property for only one year, did not detract from the fact that possession of the property, an
indicium of ownership, was retained by private respondent as the alleged vendor. That period
of time may be deemed as actually the time allotted to private respondent for fulfilling its part
of the agreement by paying its indebtedness to petitioners. This may be gleaned from
paragraph (f) that states that full title and possession of the property shall vest upon the
VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions herein set forth.
Paragraph (f) of the contract also evidences the fact that the agreed purchase price of
fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) was not handed over by petitioners to private
respondent upon the execution of the agreement. Only P5,400,000.00 was given by
petitioners to private respondent, as the balance thereof was to be dependent upon the
private respondents satisfaction of its mortgage obligation to China Banking Corporation.
Notably, the MTC found that petitioners gave private respondent the amount of
P8,500,000.00 that should be paid to the bank to cover the latters obligation, thereby leaving
the amount of P100,000.00 (P5,400,000.00 + P8,500,000.00 = P13,900,000.00) of the
purchase price still unpaid and in the hands of petitioners, the alleged vendees.
Hence, two of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are manifest in the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage, namely: (a) the vendor would remain in possession of the
property (no. 2), and (b) the vendees retained a part of the purchase price (no. 4). On its face,
therefore, the document subject of controversy, is actually a contract of equitable mortgage.
The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not binding as to its nature. The
decisive factor in evaluating such an agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown, not
necessarily by the terminology used in the contract, but by their conduct, words, actions and
deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement.32 Private respondents
possession over the property was not denied by petitioners as in fact it was the basis for their
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Neither does the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in petitioners favor import
conclusive evidence of ownership or that the agreement between the parties was one of
sale.33 In Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide, this Court said:
x x x it must be borne in mind that the equitable doctrine x x x to the effect that any
conveyance intended as security for a debt will be held in effect to be a mortgage, whether so
actually expressed in the instrument or not, operates regardless of the form of the agreement
chosen by the contracting parties as the repository of their will. Equity looks through the form
and considers the substance; and no kind of engagement can be adopted which will enable
the parties to escape from the equitable doctrine to which reference is made. In other words,
a conveyance of land, accompanied by registration in the name of the transferee and the
issuance of a new certificate, is no more secured from the operation of the equitable doctrine
than the most informal conveyance that could be devised.34cräläwvirtualibräry
A closer look into the allegations of the complaint would therefore show that petitioners failed
to make out a case for unlawful detainer. By the allegations in the complaint, private
respondent as a mortgagor had the right to posses the property. A mortgage is a real right
constituted to secure an obligation upon real property or rights therein to satisfy with the
proceeds of the sale thereof such obligation when the same becomes due and has not been
paid or fulfilled.35 The mortgagor generally retains possession of the mortgaged property36
because by mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but
ownership thereof is not parted with.37 In case of the debtors nonpayment of the debt
secured by the mortgage, the only right of the mortgagee is to foreclose the mortgage and
have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagors
default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property,
for any such effect is against public policy.38 Even if the property is sold at a foreclosure sale,
only upon expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use
of his right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold become consolidated in the
purchaser.39cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners tenuous claim for possession of the Gilmore property was emasculated further by
private respondents answer to their complaint. The latter claimed ownership of the property,
alleging that the agreement was one of mortgage and not of sale. Private respondent alleged
therein that in March 1993 (sic), it borrowed money from petitioner Felicidad Oronce alone to
redeem the subject property from China Banking Corporation. She agreed to lend it the
amount on condition that the Gilmore property should be mortgaged to her to guarantee
payment of the loan. However, petitioner Flaminiano took the money from petitioner Oronce
and paid the mortgage obligation of private respondent to the China Banking Corporation
while claiming that 50% of the amount was hers. Petitioner Flaminianos husband, Atty.
Eduardo Flaminiano, forthwith prepared the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage and,
without private respondents knowledge, had it registered for which reason a new certificate of
title was issued to petitioners. In claiming that the agreement was one of mortgage, private
respondent alleged in its answer, inter alia, that the actual total value of the property was
thirty million pesos (P30,000,000.00); that while it had possession of the property, petitioners
did not then attempt to repossess the same, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the
execution of the document; that petitioners did not pay the real estate taxes even after the
transfer of title in their favor, and that petitioners did not deliver to private respondent the
alleged purchase price.
Considering these claims of private respondent, MTC Branch 41 should have passed upon
the issues raised on the ownership of the Gilmore property for the purpose of determining
who had the right to possess the same. As it turned out, it simply accepted the allegations of
petitioners without examining the supporting documents. Had it closely analyzed the
documents, it would have concluded that petitioners could not have validly ousted private
respondent from the property since the basis for its claim of ownership, the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, was actually a document evidencing an equitable mortgage. It
would have accordingly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
In fine, had the MTC exercised its bounden duty to study the complaint, it would have
dismissed the same for lack of cause of action upon a provisional ruling on the issue of
ownership based on the allegations and annexes of the complaint. Or, exercising caution in
handling the case, considering petitioners bare allegations of ownership, it should have
required the filing of an answer to the complaint and, having been alerted by the adverse
claim of ownership over the same property, summarily looked into the issue of ownership
over the property. As this Court declared in Hilario v. Court of Appeals:
It is underscored, however, that the allegations in the complaint for ejectment should
sufficiently make out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the case may be;
otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
is, after all, determined by the nature of the action as alleged or pleaded in the complaint.
Thus, even where the defendant alleges ownership or title to the property in his or her
answer, the inferior court will not be divested of its jurisdiction. A contrary rule would pave the
way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he could
easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting
ownership.40cräläwvirtualibräry
As discussed above, even a perusal of the complaint without going over the claims of private
respondent in his answer would have sufficed to arrive at a provisional determination of the
issue of ownership. The importance of such provisional ruling on the issue of ownership is
demanded by the fact that, in the event that the claim of the plaintiff in an ejectment case is
controverted as in this case, any ruling on the right of possession would be shaky,
meaningless and fraught with unsettling consequences on the property rights of the parties.
After all, the right of possession must stand on a firm claim of ownership. Had the MTC made
a provisional ruling on the issue of ownership, the parties would have availed of other
remedies in law early on to thresh out their conflicting claims.
Private respondents action for reformation of instrument was in fact a step in the right
direction. However, its failure to pursue that action41 did not imply that private respondent
had no other remedy under the law as regards the issue of ownership over the Gilmore
property. There are other legal remedies that either party could have availed of. Some of
these remedies, such as an action for quieting of title, have been held to coexist with actions
for unlawful detainer.42 There is a policy against multiplicity of suits but under the
circumstances, only the institution of proper proceedings could settle the controversy
between the parties in a definitive manner.
Hence, although the Court of Appeals resolved the appeal under the misconception that the
action for reformation of instrument was still viable, it correctly held that the controversy
between the parties was beyond the ordinary issues in an ejectment case. Because of the
opposing claims of the parties as to the true agreement between them, the issue of
ownership was in a sense a prejudicial question that needed determination before the
ejectment case should have been filed. To reiterate, a decision reached in the ejectment case
in favor of any of the parties would have nonetheless spawned litigation on the issue of
ownership. At any rate, proceedings would have been facilitated had the inferior courts made
even a provisional ruling on such issue.
The contentious circumstances surrounding the case were demonstrated by an occurrence
during the pendency of this petition that cries out for the resolution of the issue of ownership
over the Gilmore property.
After the parties had filed their respective memoranda before this Court, private respondent
filed an urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Eduardo
B. Flaminiano, in contempt of court.43 The motion was founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo
Gonzales who resided at the contested property, deriving his right to do so from private
respondent corporation that is owned by his family. Gonzales alleged that on September 20,
1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her husband entered the property through craftiness and
intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men knocked at the gate. When the
houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate for pedestrians tentatively, the two men told
him that they would like to visit Gonzales mother who was ailing.
Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened the gate for twenty
(20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter. When Gonzales went outside the house,
he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) trucks entering the driveway. The person he
asked regarding the presence of those people inside the property turned out to be the brother
of petitioner Flaminiano. That person said, Kami ang may-ari dito. Matagal na kaming
nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa labas. After Gonzales had told him that the property was still
under litigation before this Court, the man said, Walang Supreme Court Supreme Court.
When Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the premises, to order the
people to leave, she said, Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa amin ito. Maglalagay ako ng tao
diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap. When a power generator was brought
inside the property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out because the noise it would
create would disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales, petitioner Flaminiano said, Walang
awa-awa sa akin. Atty. Flaminiano butted in and, referring to Gonzales mother, said, Ialis mo
na, matanda na pala. When Gonzales prevented the switching on of some lights in the house
due to faulty wiring, Atty. Flaminiano suggested, Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance
pa kayo 5 million, madali lang yan. Short circuit. Since the Flaminianos and their crew were
not about to leave the property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and
informed him of what happened. However, instead of confining themselves in the driveway,
the Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in food.
Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who had just been
discharged from the hospital. However, the Flaminianos stayed until the next day, September
22, 1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other fixtures in the house. Gonzales took pictures
of Flaminiano and his companions. When Atty. Flaminiano arrived, he confronted Gonzales
and told him, Hindi ako natatakot kahit kanino ka pa mag-report, kahit pa sa Supreme Court,
gusto ko nga mag-reklamo kayo para matapos ang kaso. Sa September 25, may shooting
dito, gagawin ko ang gusto ko dito.44cräläwvirtualibräry
The affidavits of Renato C. Mola, driver of Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and that of Luis R.
Fernandez, houseboy of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales, as well as the xerox copy of the sworn
statement dated September 21, 1997 of Pria B. Gonzales before the Philippine National
Police in Camp Crame where she filed a complaint against Atty. Flaminiano for the illegal
entry into their house, support the affidavit of Dr. Gonzales.
In its supplemental motion45 to cite petitioner Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Flaminiano,
in contempt of court, private respondent alleged that the Flaminianos committed additional
contumacious acts in preventing another member of the family, Mrs. Cipriana Gonzales, from
entering the property. In her affidavit, Mrs. Gonzales said that the Flaminianos and their
people used the whole house, except the bedrooms, for their filming
activities.46cräläwvirtualibräry
Thereafter, private respondent filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with this Court to enjoin petitioners, Atty.
Flaminiano and their representatives and agents from preventing private respondent, its
agents and representatives from entering the property and to cease and desist from
occupying the property or from committing further acts of dispossession of the property.47 On
October 13, 1997, this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.48 In the
motion it filed on October 21, 1997,49 private respondent informed the Court that the TRO
could not be served upon petitioners immediately because, Atty. Flaminiano, their counsel of
record, had changed address without informing the Court. It was served upon said counsel
only on October 15, 1997. However, instead of complying with this Courts order, petitioners
continued occupying the property. On October 16, 1997, after receiving a copy of the TRO,
petitioners put up a huge billboard in front of the property stating that it is the national
headquarters of the Peoples Alliance for National Reconciliation and Unity for Peace and
Progress (PANRUPP).
In their comment on the motion for contempt, petitioners noticeably did not controvert the
facts set forth by private respondent in said motion. Instead, it reasserted its claim of
ownership over the property as evidenced by TCT No. 67990. They alleged that they had
mortgaged the property to the Far East Bank and Trust Company in the amount of thirty
million pesos (P30,000,000.00) for which they are paying a monthly interest of around
P675,000.00 without enjoying the material possession of the subject property which has been
unlawfully and unjustly detained by private respondent for the last four (4) years as it was
used as the residence of the members of the family of its President ANTONIO B. GONZALES
without the said private respondent paying rentals thereon for the period from January 1995
up to October 5, 1997 when the said property was voluntarily vacated by the members of the
President (sic) of respondent corporation, ANTONIO B. GONZALES, who has since then
been a fugitive from justice having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public document and has succeeded in evading his sentence.
They averred that Tadeo Gonzales erroneously claimed that the rights of ownership and
possession over the property are still under litigation because the issue of ownership is no
longer involved in this litigation when the complaint for reformation of instrument with
annulment of sale and title filed by private respondent was dismissed with finality by reason of
non-suit. Hence, they claimed that they now stand to be the unquestionable registered and
lawful owners of the property subject of controversy and that the July 24, 1996 Decision of
the Court of Appeals has already lost its virtuality and legal efficacy with the occurrence of a
supervening event which is a superior cause superseding the basis of the judgment in CA-
G.R. No. 39227 of respondent court.
They informed the Court that they are now leasing the property to PANRUPP from October 1,
1997 to September 30, 1998. They alleged, however, that the property is in a deplorable state
of decay and deterioration that they saw the need to act swiftly and decisively to prevent
further destruction of the property where they invested millions of pesos of their life-time
savings to acquire the same. Hence, they sought the assistance of barangay officials in
Barangay Mariana, New Manila who helped them effect the peaceful entry into the property of
the petitioners without the use of strategy, force and intimidation contrary to what was alleged
in the motion for contempt. They peacefully took over possession of the property on
September 20, 1997 but allowed the immediate members of the family of private respondents
president to stay on. The family finally agreed to vacate the premises on October 5, 1997
upon the offer of the petitioners to shoulder partially the expenses for the hospitalization of
the ailing mother at the St. Luke General Hospital where she was brought by an ambulance
accompanied by a doctor at petitioners expense.
Petitioners questioned the issuance by this Court of the TRO on October 13, 1997, asserting
that when it was issued, there were no more acts to restrain the illegal occupants of the
subject property (as they) had already peacefully vacated the premises on October 5, 1997 or
more than a week after the said TRO was issued by the Third Division of this Court. They
prayed that the motion for contempt be denied for lack of merit and that the TRO issued be
lifted and set aside for the act or acts sought to be restrained have already been done and
have become a fait accompli before the issuance of the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER on October 13, 1997.50cräläwvirtualibräry
As earlier discussed, petitioners claim that the dismissal of the action for reformation of
instrument for non-suit had written finis to the issue of ownership over the Gilmore property is
totally unfounded in law. Petitioners should be reminded that the instant petition stemmed
from an unlawful detainer case, the issue of which is merely possession of the property in
question. The issue of ownership has not been definitively resolved for the provisional
determination of that issue that should have been done by the MTC at the earliest possible
time, would only be for the purpose of determining who has the superior right to possess the
property. Inasmuch as this Court has resolved that the rightful possessor should have been
private respondent and its representatives and agents, the TRO issued by this Court on
October 13, 1997 should not be lifted. That the TRO was issued days before private
respondent left the property is immaterial. What is in question here is lawful possession of the
property, not possession on the basis of self-proclaimed ownership of the property. For their
part, petitioners should cease and desist from further exercising possession of the same
property which possession, in the first place, does not legally belong to them.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as alleged by
private respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-handed. On an erroneous
assumption that she had been legally vested with ownership of the property, she took steps
prior to the present proceedings by illegally taking control and possession of the same
property in litigation. Her act of entering the property in defiance of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.

Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her husband, Eduardo
Flaminiano, a lawyer51 whose actuations as an officer of the court should be beyond
reproach. His contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore property without the consent of its
occupants and in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction issued by the
Court of Appeals and making utterances showing disrespect for the law and this Court, are
certainly unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his
comment on the motion for contempt that petitioners peacefully took over the property.
Nonetheless, such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary
injunction that he knew was still in force. Notably, he did not comment on nor categorically
deny that he committed the contumacious acts alleged by private respondent. Through his
acts, Atty. Flaminiano has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.52cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing by
either party of an action regarding the ownership of the property involved. The temporary
restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is hereby made permanent. Petitioners and
their agents are directed to turn over possession of the property to private respondent.

Petitioner Rosita Flaminiano is hereby held guilty of contempt of court for disobeying the writ
of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and accordingly fined P20,000.00 therefor. Her
counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, is ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for
committing contumacious acts unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to his record at the Office of the Bar Confidant.

This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and
JON DE YSASI, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed
have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled
their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of
reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the
inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed
elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any
judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with
other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and
dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to
such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived
on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the
surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted
over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined
for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to
January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without
due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and
written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty.
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the
remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer
for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth
month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding
that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid
cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty
for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor
and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's
ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs.  National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to
the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or
not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement,
payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is
entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal
dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions
presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function
as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from
private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and
whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason the
NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's
resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely
reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth
noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that
because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action
involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission
as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son,
his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his
own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were
noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations.
First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with
each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their
personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just
cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the
NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter
who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate
his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to
question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of
law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the
instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the
corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections
15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and
that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each
case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of
due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered
by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing.
The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does
not impair the validity of the judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution
with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio,
who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case,
presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which petitioner has not
successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application
of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of
the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not
defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to
nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot
be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker
shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may
validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by
the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates
provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of
the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also
a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation
pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work
authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred
in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial
bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as
even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt
from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982
to December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because
he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess
in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr.
Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills
sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-
50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod
City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to
handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager,
petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda
Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances
involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable
reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period
of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not
warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are
as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the
employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in
Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v.  NLRC  (191 SCRA 328), the
Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of
the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred
that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.  NLRC  (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . .
Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment.
First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside
Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations.
Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once
able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private
respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not
the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner
had no intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in
the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be
denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former
admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to
stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not
petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding
periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as
the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was
justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute
abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be
classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I
want to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his
authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or
to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his
employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as
efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a
model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a
showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm
operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to
1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and
on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular
and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as
employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers
only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to
petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit
contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring
him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would
justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be
taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer
of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the
payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes, and paid
his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December,
1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no
longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this
reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever
amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a
father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made
therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said
pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying
about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de
Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention
to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in
working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his
objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son
after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial
abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about
petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion
regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about
the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his
indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner contends
that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary,
pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his
continued service as farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be
made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of
returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it
may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge.
As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work,
private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived
at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even
after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner
would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by
his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such
acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming
and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for
molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private
respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal
activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even
command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the
nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is
unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that
these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable
therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto,
such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have
done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to
oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to
what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further
authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue
to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane
planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA
representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic)
as such planter-member;
 That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my
name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my
name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts
therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED
CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated
by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation
regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of withholding tax
reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to
work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of
one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to
abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the
presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably
advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the
proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,
pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator.
The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's
employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such
amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's
welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if
they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined
that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner,
regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an
employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere
civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act
on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does
not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and
hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer
seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private
respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in
Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work,
notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
 Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer
shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report
to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all
dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein the names of
the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by
them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy
guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner
was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending
dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private
respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due
process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on
petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the
Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of
the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied
that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second
sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at
the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded
that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just
cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not
countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of
undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General
rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure,
the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was
not complied with. This however, would not work to
invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for
dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be
upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the
notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex
"C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v.  NLRC, 170
SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may
encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules
of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be
penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not
only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he
has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of
P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that
penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to
the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be
dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every
worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the
Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some
cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of
granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained relations
between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may be
awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that
the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages
computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
Company, Inc.  vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that
when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made between
managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a
company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank
and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not
be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the
parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of
petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and
peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a
deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229,
are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of
right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of
moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the
damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case
justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and
exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault
and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted
for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead
of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal
how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between
them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each
one has a cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or
exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation
of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified.
There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a
justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright
dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty
of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not
exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary
for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1)
year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA
651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as
much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth
over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful
function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by
advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and
a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them,
despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took
pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the
contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation
even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter
"shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a
bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring
resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed
to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute,
and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking,
instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually
emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition
and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually
see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby

SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6)
months being considered as one (1) whole year.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-29543. November 29, 1969.]
GLORIA PAJARES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., Respondents-Appellees.
Moises C. Nicomedes for Petitioner-Appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for Respondents-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURE; BILL OF PARTICULARS; DENIAL OF MOTION
THEREFOR IN INSTANT CASE NOT ERROR OF LAW. — It is plain and clear that no error
of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by respondent judge in
denying appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars in the collection case instituted in the
Municipal Court of Manila by respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of
P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by
and delivered to her in 1961. Appellee’s complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant
of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance
with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENTIARY MATTERS NOT SUBJECT TO BILL OF PARTICULARS. —
Where the particulars sought all concerned evidentiary matters, the same do not come within
the scope of Rule 12, Section I of the Rules of Court which permits a party to move for a
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for
trial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICULARS INVOLVED IN INSTANT CASE WITHIN KNOWLEDGE OF
ADVERSE PARTY. — Since appellant was engaged in the business of buying and selling
merchandise and appellee was one of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit
ready-made goods for resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by
her to enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These
particulars were just as much within her knowledge as appellee’s. She could not logically
pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her own
records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in her answer whether the
outstanding balance of her indebtedness was in the sum claimed by appellee, or in a lesser
amount. Furthermore, a month before appellee filed its collection case, it had written
appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account of P354.85 within one
week and appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee acknowledging her said
indebtedness.
4. COURTS; CLOGGING OF COURT DOCKETS- COLLECTION CASE INVOLVED IN
INSTANT CASE NEEDLESSLY CLOGGED COURT DOCKETS. — In this case, the simple
collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had appellant
been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor the
reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation
that she has incurred would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to
appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated
interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this
worthless cause.
5. ID.; ID.; REMINDER TO LITIGANTS AND ATTORNEYS AGAINST FILING OF
UNMERITORIOUS CASES. — The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so
that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There
must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides
that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading
and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant’s appeal from the lower Court’s Order of
dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction against
respondent judge’s order denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the defendant in a
simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated August 16, 1968
certifying the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of law:jgc:chanrobles.com.p
"This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated July 21, 1962
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal Court
of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co.
"There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares
before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was
docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was eventually assigned to the
sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos.
"In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows:
"‘2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and
delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not make the full
payment up to the present time;
"‘3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85, representing the
balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is already overdue and
payable.’
"Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill of
particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds
of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company, the respective dates they
were taken and by whom they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging that
without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the complaint.
"After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of
particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court, she then
brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging in support of
her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion.
"But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of Preliminary injunction, for the
reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint filed by the said company in the inferior
court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the
defendant, now herein petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of action against
her so as to enable her to prepare for her defenses; and (2) that the things asked for in the
motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale of such bill.
Convinced that the said motion of the company is well founded, the lower court accordingly
dismissed the petition on April 21, 1962.
"Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court below,
Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under her lone
assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in dismissing her
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as amended
by its order dated August 18, 1962.
"The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are (1) whether the allegations of the
complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against her;
and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of
particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To our mind these are purely legal questions. A
perusal of the brief of the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions are at all
involved in this appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was
committed by respondent judge in denying appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars in the
collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by private respondent-appellee for
the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her
account for ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to her in 1961. Appellee’s complaint
precisely and concisely informed appellant of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the
cause of action against her, in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Court. 1
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion that
appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the goods
represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers on
which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and by
whom they were received." These particulars sought all concerned evidentiary matters and
do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of the Rules of Court which permits a
party "to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive
pleading or to prepare for trial."cralaw virtua1aw library
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise at
her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one of her creditors from
whom she used to buy on credit ready-made goods for resale, appellant had no need of the
evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or
to prepare for trial. These particulars were just as much within her knowledge as appellee’s.
She could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check
and verify her own records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in her answer
whether from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of
P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection case, it had
written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account in the said sum
of P354.85 within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee under date of
March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses she
has sustained in the operation of her stall, she would not be able to meet your request for
payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once. I would therefore request you to be kind
enough to allow her to continue paying you P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as
heretofore."cralaw virtua1aw library
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing appellant’s
petition for certiorari against respondent judge’s order denying her motion for a bill of
particulars, as pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of error. Well may we apply to
this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an analogous case, 2 that "the
circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain
trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves
condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious
cases."cralaw virtua1aw library

Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven
years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask
from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the
expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance,
premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellant’s brief,
and attorney’s fees would have been much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to
appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated
interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this
worthless cause.

As we recently said in another case, 3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is
needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be
avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that
"for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."cralaw
virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant’s counsel shall
pay treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the
attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future reference. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-36138. January 31, 1974.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO ROSQUETA, JR.,
EUGENIO ROSQUETA and CITONG BRINGAS, defendants-appellants; ATTY.
GREGORIO B. ESTACIO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Every now and then, although there seems to be more of such cases of late, a member of the
bar is proceeded against for failure to live up to the responsibility owed to a client as well as
to this Court. This is another such instance. In our resolution of May 25, 1973, we required
respondent Gregorio B. Estacio, counsel de parte for appellants to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file the brief for appellants
within the period which expired on March 30, 1973. He failed to show cause as thus required,
and on September 7, 1973, we issued a resolution suspending him from the practice of law
except for the purpose of filing the brief which should be done within thirty days from receipt
of notice. Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it
appeared that he did seek to explain his failure to file the brief on time, but he left it to be
mailed on June 9, 1973 with Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., father of appellants Antonio Rosqueta,
Jr. and Eusebio Rosqueta, who, however, was unable to do so as on the 10th of June, his
house caught fire. He would impress on this Court that he was not informed of such
occurrence until the preparation of his motion for reconsideration. At any rate, he would
stress that both Antonio Rosqueta, Sr. and Salvador Labariento, father-in-law of the third
appellant, Citong Bringas, informed him they would withdraw the appeal as they could not
raise the money needed for pursuing it. He had a supplement to such motion for
reconsideration filed on October 25, 1973 wherein he stated that he could not secure the
affidavits of appellants themselves as two of them were in the Penal Colony in Davao and the
third in the Iwahig Penal Colony in Palawan. On November 5, 1973, this Court required
appellants to comment on a motion for reconsideration of respondent concerning specifically
their alleged desire to withdraw appeal.
Then on December 27, 1973, there was a motion of respondent submitting two affidavits, one
from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and the aforesaid Citong Bringas and the other from Eusebio
Rosqueta wherein they indicated their consent and approval to respondent’s motion to
withdraw appeal. The joint affidavit of the first two appellants reads as follows: "1. That we are
the same persons named above who have been charged in Criminal Case No. L-36138
entitled People v. Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., Et. Al. pending on appeal before the Supreme Court
of the Philippines; 2. That we hereby consent and approve the motion to withdraw the appeal
filed by our counsel, Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio before the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
that Criminal Case No. L-36138 then pending in said Court; 3. That we have given our
consent and approval of our own will voluntarily, without duress, force, threat or fraud or
deceit; [In witness whereof], we have hereunto set our signatures this 4th day of December
1973 in the Municipality of Panabo, Davao." 1 The affidavit of Eusebio Rosqueta follows: "1.
That I am one of the accused in that case entitled People v. Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., Et. Al.
under No. G.R. L-36138 now pending before the Supreme Court of the Philippines; 2. That I
hereby give my consent and approval to the Motion to Withdraw the Appeal which has been
filed by our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio before the Supreme Court on the above-stated
case; 3. That I have reached this conclusion after I have conferred with our counsel Atty.
Gregorio B. Estacio and this statement hereby revokes and nullifies the statement signed by
me on December 5, 1973 at the Central Sub-Colony, Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan before
witnesses, namely, Mr. Abencio B. Gabayan and Miss Merle J. Jopida; 4. That I have
executed this affidavit of my own free will, without intimidation, threat, fraud, deceit, duress or
force; [In witness whereof], I have hereunto set my hand this 13th day of December, 1973 in
the City of Puerto Princesa." 2
Respondent’s liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be absolved from the irresponsible
conduct of which he is guilty. Respondent should be aware that even in those cases where
counsel de parte is unable to secure from appellants or from their near relatives the amount
necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection with the
case. It has been a commendable practice of some members of the bar under such
circumstances, to be designated as counsel de oficio. That way the interest of justice is best
served. Appellants will then continue to receive the benefits of advocacy from one who is
familiar with the facts of the case. What is more, there is no undue delay in the administration
of justice. Lawyers of such category are entitled to commendation. They manifest fidelity to
the concept that law is a profession and not a mere trade with those engaged in it being
motivated solely by the desire to make money. Respondent’s conduct yields a different
impression. What has earned a reproof however is his irresponsibility. He should be aware
that in the pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too
casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them;
he must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is
inexcusable. At any rate, the suspension meted on him under the circumstances is more than
justified. It seems, however, that well-nigh five months had elapsed. That would suffice to
atone for his misdeed.
WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The requirement to file
the brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is censured for negligence and
inattention to duty. Likewise, as prayed for by appellants themselves, their appeal is
dismissed.
Zaldivar, Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did
not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of
its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing
facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a
copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in
the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA
461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July
30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate
and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on
May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or
up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file
motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986,
it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may
still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September
9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it
is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.
R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of
"last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976
LORENZO JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco Carreon & Zosimo D. de Mesa for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and
Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio for respondents
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives (handgrenade)
and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five years, seeks a new trial which was denied him
by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and by respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the Court to resolve, viz: did respondent appellate
court commit an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's
motion for new trial "for the reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use
handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-
68 and code Name 'Safari' (both documents are dated 31 January 1968)"? 1
The following incidents are not in dispute:
On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion  of Floridablanca, Pampanga, petitioner Jose was
arrested by the local police leading to the filing with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch III of several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of firearm (Crim. Case
6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of explosives (Crim. Case 6237).
These three cases were jointly tried after which the trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a
decision dated December 15, 1969, and promulgated on January 15, 1970 2 acquitted
accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but convicted him for illegal
possession of the handgrenade that was found on his person at the time of his arrest.
After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day filed his notice of appeal.
Nine days thereafter or more particularly on January 24, 1970, petitioner filed a motion
praying that the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had
made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The trial
court in its order of January 30, 1970 denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost
jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very
date the decision was promulgated. 3
The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court of Appeals where
petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal
possession of explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime, and
(2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to
possess the handgrenade. 4 In his brief, Lorenzo Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the
alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial court for a new trial.
Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court, 5 rendered its decision of March 8, 1972,
affirming the findings of fact and the judgment of conviction of the court a quo, and declaring
that no reversible error was committed by the latter when it denied the reopening of the case
as the court had lost its "power to change, modify, or alter its decision." 6
A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that
"assuming arguendo that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon appellant's motion for
new trial because of the perfection of the appeal, this Honorable Court — before which said
motion was reiterated and which has competence to act thereon — should have granted the
same if for no other reason than to prevent a miscarriage of justice which is the inevitable
result of its denial." 7 This motion for reconsideration was denied in respondent court's
resolution of April 3, 1974. 8
A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo Jose 9 but this was
also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution promulgated on July 24, 1974. 10
Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty. Francisco Carreon, filed with Us
this petition for review which We denied outright on September 6, 1974, "the question raised
being factual and for insufficient showing that the finding of facts by respondent court are
unsupported by substantial evidence, and for lack of merit."
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the following grounds
should justify this Court to review the ruling of respondent appellate court to wit:
1. petitioners's plight is of compelling human and legal interest, and his being
imprisoned for five (5) years when there is indubitable exculpatory evidence
on hand is a result so harsh that the Honorable Court may well undertake a
review of the case just to satisfy itself of the justice and inevitability of such a
result;
2. a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Honorable Court
is involved, as the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial is,
technically, not newly discovered: and
3. the denial of a new trial in the circumstances mentioned in his above-
quoted statement of the main legal issue, is contrary to the decisions of this
Honorable Court because under these decisions, the new trial should have
been granted since there is a 'strong, compelling reason' in this case for
 granting the relief prayed for, such strong compelling reason being the very
strong probability of petitioner's acquittal if a new trial were granted.
(Workmen's Insurance Co. vs. Augusto, 40 SCRA 123; Sison vs. Gatchalian,
51 SCRA 262; Rubio vs. Mariano 52 SCRA 338; Montecines vs. Court of
Appeals, 53 SCRA 14; Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, L-38071, April 25,
1974; please see Annotation: 52 SCRA 346 ... (pp. 157-158, rollo)
The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for reconsideration
claiming that there was neither a denial of "substantial justice nor error of any sort on the part
of respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of convinction," and that it being
admitted by petitioner that the evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new trial is not
newly discovered evidence, the denial of the new trial "visibly papers as correct". This
Opposition drew a lengthy reply from petitioner's counsel.
On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the
Court that in view of the " Persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this
Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as
PC Agent and/or authority to handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was constrained to
make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter
dated December 27, 1974 with enclosures, xerox copies of which are being attached to the
manifestation as Annexes A, B, C, C-1 and D. 11
Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor General reads:
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
Padre Faura, Manila
Dear Solicitor General Mendoza:
With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please be informed that Colonel Pedrito
C. de Guzman who is now Provincial of Sorsogon Constabulary Command, confirmed that he
executed an affidavit on May 4, 1974 at Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that he appointed Mr.
Lorenzo Jose of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga as PC Agent on January 31, 1968.
The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga Constabulary Command also confirmed
the appointment of Lorenzo Jose as PC agent during the year 1968.
Attached herewith pertinent papers related to the said appointment.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
FIDEL V. RAMOS
Major General, AFP
Chief of Constabulary (p. 191, rollo)
Inclosure:
Appointmenmt paper
of subject person dtd
Jan. 31, 1968 with
Personal History
Statement
Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner Lorenzo Jose as a PC
Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code Number P-36-68 and Code
Nanie "Safari" with expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We
quote:
This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide our firearms and such other
equipment which it may deem necessary for your personal protection on the
need basis which will be covered by separate written authority. (p. 192, rollo)
In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside the denial of this petition
for review, to give due course and consider the Petition as a special civil action. In another
Resolution of April 4, 1975, the parties were given time to submit their respective
memorandum.
This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding
goal of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due-to secure to every individual all
possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The failure of
the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of
an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this Court.
At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the time-
honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al that a
prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the
solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocene shall not
suffer. (69 Phil. 556, 564-565, qouting Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court in 69
U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309) The Solicitor General now concedes that the
interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new
trial.
We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence
sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-discovered
evidence because the same — his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine
Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade — were supposed to be known to
petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter.
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different situation where he had to make a choice — reveal his Identity as an undercover agent of the
result if admitted. 12 Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and
face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the dissidents considering that
However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly discovered Floridablanca the site of the incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a
evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the possible exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution.
Rules of Court which provides: Without revealing his Identity as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before
the trial judge that he had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to
present the same. The permit however could not be produced because it would reveal his
Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgement of the
intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it the staggering impact
Court of First Instance, the appellate court may affirm or modify the judgment
of a five-year imprisonment. The competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for this
and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the
man to go to jail for a crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence
case ito the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.
concerning petitioner's appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to
possess a handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate court over an trial court because in the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.
appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the instant case where
the court may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section 13
We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of petitioner's cas to afford
of the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. 13 While Section 13, Rule 124,
him the opportunity of producing exculpating exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from
and Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered
this Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed by the
evidence, and errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial. Section 11, Rule 124
Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the documentary sought
quoted above does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the
to be produced, and of cross-examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the
determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances
accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production of the of the
warranting a new trial or re-trial.
evidence during the trial.
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate to aid and not to obstruct the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction of the herein
proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial only for
bind and chain the hand that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or
purpose of allowing said accused to present additional evidence in his defense. The trial court
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
shall inform this Court of the final outcome of the case within a reasonable time. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the
purposes of justice 14 or, in a proper case, disregard them. 15 In this jurisdiction, in not a. few
SO ORDERED.
instances, 15* this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the
statute, vis retraction of witness, 16 negligence or incompetency of counsel. 17 improvident
plea of guilty, 18 disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.
court, 19 and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the
prosecution and the defense. 20

Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity of
a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 21

Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now before Us which
may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford him an
opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged.

Thus — petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a handgrenade
in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to
possess explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he found himself in a

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26222. July 21, 1967.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO
PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA,
TAMBAC ALINDO, and RUFINO BORRES, Respondents.
Dominador L. Padilla for Petitioner.
Narbasa, Tambac Alindo & Borres for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MURDER; SEPARATE SHOTS KILLING
VARIOUS VICTIMS GIVE RISE TO SEPARATE CRIMES; SEPARATE INFORMATIONS
SHOULD BE FILED. — Where the facts alleged are that defendants fired guns in rapid
succession from outside the house of a family, killing the father, and that defendants then
forcibly entered the house, letting loose several shots, killing all the three minor children and
wounding the mother, the City Fiscal correctly presented five separate informations — four for
murder and one for frustrated murder. When various victims expire from separate shots, such
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
2. ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; SINGLE ACT, NOT SINGLE IMPULSE, IS DECISIVE. — To
apply the first half of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes as a complex
crime a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies, there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CASES OF RELATED OFFENSES MAY BE TRIED JOINTLY.
— To obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one is a laudable purpose but
cannot, by itself, justify a trial judge to order the fiscal to file only one information for multiple
murder. Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court, confers upon the judge the power to try these
cases jointly.
4. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; FISCAL NOT COMPELLED TO FILE A PARTICULAR
CHARGE; REASONS THEREFORE. — A prosecuting attorney is under no compulsion to file
a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up
the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion,
notwithstanding the possibility of abuses on his part, because he should not be unduly
compelled to work against his conviction and, in case of doubt, should be given the benefit
thereof. A contrary rule may result in courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious
cases and, worse still, a criminal suspect’s right to due process may be transgressed.
5. ID.; FISCAL’S OPINION ON WHAT CRIME IS TO BE CHARGED NORMALLY PREVAILS.
— As the question of instituting a criminal charge is addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigating fiscal, in a clash of views as what crime is to be charged, between the judge
who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the fiscal’s should normally prevail.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for
murder and one for frustrated murder, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza; and
Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his
investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-
dress trial on the merits.
The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza
and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Puga-an. City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that
guns (rifle, caliber 22) and pali-untod (home-made gun) were fired in rapid succession from
outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the
door of the house, entered therein and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza,
Epifania Mendoza and Marcelo Mendoza — all minor children of the couple — and wounding
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa
and Tambac Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their
plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Giving the nod to defendant’s claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966,
directed the City Fiscal to unity all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in
Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be
dropped from the docket."cralaw virtua1aw library
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the
ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one
victim was killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position
that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the
accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should
therefore be treated as one crime to the series of shots killed more than one victim" ; and that
only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to "obviate the necessity of trying five
cases instead of one."cralaw virtua1aw library
Primarily to annul respondent Judge’s orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having
been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the
People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and
for other reliefs.
This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.
The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with
multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they
are?
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period."cralaw virtua1aw library
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is
to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
(delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other (delito complejo). 1
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the
death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex
crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application. 2 A similar rule obtains where one
stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter’s body through and through and wounded
another. The first died instantaneously; the second, seven days later, This Court convicted
the assailant of double murder. 3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the
bomb explodes with the result that a number of persons are killed, that single act again
produces a complex crime. 4
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply
rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. 5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed
with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Grand rifles), fired volleys into a house
killing eleven and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many
crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven)." 6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for
quadruple murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo —
of a man, his common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found
guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that"
[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts committed on different
occasions and by different parties" ; that such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one
single crime" ; and that" [t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes." 7 And a third.
At the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out"
followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously
wounded but who later on also died. This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and
separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones. 8 And finally, in People v.
Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule —
who were asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst
of machinegun fire, two of the couple’s children — also asleep — were killed. The accused,
Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this
Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders." 9
The present case is to be differentiated from People v. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955.
There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It
was held that there was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no
conspiracy to perpetrate the killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts.
And the informations charge conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is
the act of all. 10 Not material here, therefore, is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to
ascertain the individual death caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne
in mind, at this point, that to apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be
singularity of criminal act, singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law. 11
The respondent judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five
cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the
trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent
Judge could easily be remedied. 12
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the
five separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe
2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder
the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with
that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the
of Article 48, which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means Fiscal’s discretion should not be controlled.
for committing the other.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly respondent Judge of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set aside and declared null
performed. 13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made
that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or
after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor’s opinion thereon. The Fiscal could whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248,
have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination
elements of that offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover thereof.
up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations charged
evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres. So ordered.
guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal’s action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the
Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has concur.
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., did not take part.
the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be
unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the
benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our court being unnecessarily swamped with
unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect’s right to due process — the sporting idea
of fair play — may be transgressed. So it is, that in People v. Sope, 75 Phil. 810, 815, this
Court made the pronouncement that" [i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being
the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed
and cannot be controlled by the offended party. 14

3. The impact of respondent Judge’s orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of
the prosecutor’s on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting
a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry
made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who
did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be
subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not
be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop a purported
enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of
justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was
‘held invalid.’" 15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits
into any of the situations just recited.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-35133. May 31, 1974.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMUNDO MADERA @
"Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @
"Ross", Defendants-Appellants.
Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.
Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, Et. Al.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz
and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for Appellee.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the Circuit
Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the cost proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970, three
men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio
Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of the
house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on
the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on the victim but the
fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die
immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far
away from their house. The victim’s wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the
wounded man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the Municipal Building of
Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some
people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but
he died on the way that same day, April 20, 1970.
We affirm the lower court’s finding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino Bana,
one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres
were with Madera at the time.
Juanito Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and saw the
appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber
firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the
appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the
victim, declared that she saw Raymundo Madera as the one who shot her husband with a
foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with
Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the dying
declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal
Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio
Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano
Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building
Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would have to take down his written statement
regarding the shooting incident, and the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was
then 3:00 o’clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and
the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman
Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that
he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in
the police force since 1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying
declaration in the Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him.
But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but
also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the identities of the
appellants to the victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria,
does not militate against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were asked
by their relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have
readily revealed appellants’ identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor
of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the
case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn on the
same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically
stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy
Andres were downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must he familiar with their house. He
testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross
examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That does not show any inconsistency
in his testimony, because on further questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him
was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground
through the back portion of their house. The falsity of this statement has not been shown by
the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently show that there was no such
opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the back portion of
the house where the kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of gunfire. But
that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
"An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise have
observed."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen edge. . . .
In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the
impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but that which focalizes
the faculties to scrutinize the circumstance of the threatened danger in order to avoid it." 2
The appellants asserted in their briefs 3 that "the evidence on record does not show that
there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana
could not have recognized the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature" 4 and, under this rule, of the time
when the moon rises or sets on a particular day. 5 This notwithstanding and for certainty, We
took it unto Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather Bureau 6 which shows that the
moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident. It reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To whom It May Concern:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following
astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April 20, at
4:27 A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees above the
western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon having
occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22, 1970.
"This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate Justice,
Supreme Court, Manila.
For the Administrator:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG
Chief, Astronomical Division"
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for
there is no doubt as to their identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI, appellant
Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that, the
paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after the incident, the test could have
given a negative result even if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because
the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been washed off by washing or could have been
removed by perspiration.
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant
Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter
fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof
whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did
nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make
them liable either as co-principals or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court,
penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio. We held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected with the
same he present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be established a logical
relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators, evidencing
a clear and more intimate connection between and among the latter, such as by their overt
acts committed in pursuance of a common design. Considering the far-reaching
consequences, of criminal conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for establishing the
crime is required to support a finding of its presence that is, it must be shown to exist as
clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
"The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an
accomplice, it must he shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal,
which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to the
commission of the offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly stated in People
v. Tamayo: ‘It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there
should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way.’ . . . From our view of the evidence it has not
been convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense,
either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external
acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an
efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive presence at the scene
of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the offense." 7

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of criminal
cases that the prosecutor’s finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of the
accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate’s natural obsession for
victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for
his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the
innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the
acquittal of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant
Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby
reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias
"Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio.
Their immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held for another
legal cause.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.


G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO
TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal
Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the annulment of
respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC—XIII-50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-
S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to
disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23, 1975, denying
petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New
Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein)
from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial Penitentiary, New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel
respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was required to file
his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary
restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the afore-
mentioned criminal cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of
the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General
informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the
rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were
not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the circumstances of the instant
case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on
hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the
oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or
innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it
was the submission of said official "that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the
rendition of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by
the accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as inay be
warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned
criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the parties shall
have adduced such additional evidence as they may wish to make, under such terms and
conditions as this Honorable Court may deem fit to impose. 2
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the
challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked
Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has
"absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence,
without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to
take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor
General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene
independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter
in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present proceedings, the
private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with
that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant
case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate
with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be
required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor
General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent
of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the
State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the
prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et al., 3 the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an
absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their
disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps
and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by
doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all,
this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." It is for the
purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed
under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts,
with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense.
'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either
expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. 5 Thus, "an offended
party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of
offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. 6 The only
exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or expressly
reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right
to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its
prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a
criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the
prosecuting official. " 8 As explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the
offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in
control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the
Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right which the procedural law reserves to the
injured party is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil
liability for the criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10 As
explained in People v. Orais: 11
... the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate
to that of the promotor fiscal because, as promotor fiscal
alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or
the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of
offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is
discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal
proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not,
depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion,
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending
in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the
offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation
of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal
desists from pressing the charge or asks the competent
Court of first Instance in which the case is pending for the
dismissal thereof, and said court grants the petition, the
intervention of the person injured by the commission of the
offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory
follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is
not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands
in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the
proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to
intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of
control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal
decreed upon petiton of the promotor fiscal himself deprives
the offended party of his right to appeal from an order
overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs
exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions
of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person
injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an
order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First
Instance upon petition of the promotor fiscal, would be
tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and
control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions
of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58.
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing
the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene
in the prosecution of the offense. 12
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the
State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Thus,
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of
the Solicitor General", provides:
SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and such,
shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party.
xxx xxx xxx
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court,
tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which in his
opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
 xxx xxx xxx
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the
State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to
that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the
Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of
the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of the
case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his
contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution on the subsequent motions by
the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor
General stated:
In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge,
petitioners assert that:
(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced
by the Larrazabals in connection with the decision of the two cases against
petitioners herein;
(b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress,
respondent judge received, through one of his court stenographers, two
bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the
deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal;
(c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent
judge, after which the latter received from one of the private prosecutors a
bottle of wine wrapped in a newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and
which allegedly contained "something else inside";
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the
memorandum of the prosecution which was literally copied in said decision
although with some corrections; and
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, respondent judge
amended his already prepared decision in the two criminal cases involved
herein by changing the penalty of double life sentence for the double murder
charge against the petitioners to the death penalty.
The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit
executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano Jr., court stenographer
of the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban City (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of
the charges made in such affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his
answer to the instant petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn claims
that it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in the
aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a copy of the draft
of his decision of conviction by the same court stenographer Gerardo A.
Makinano Jr. (please see Answer of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in
the cases of Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo vs. Juan,
62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts
alleged as constituting the grounds for disqualifying the respondent judge in
the instant petition are disputed.
Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in
denial of the alleged bribery of respondent judge, we have been informed of
evidence obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when it cannot
appropriate for us at this time, however, and we are unable to do so, to
submit to this Court definite conclusions on the charges and counter-charges.
An exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps precede the making
of categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that there are bases for
stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolutions
on the motions for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and
prejudice (See Martinez Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the
charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to
support them, we feel that respondent Judge appeared to have been
heedless to the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid
even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being
dependent on prejudice or prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring
opinion, Martinez Gironella, supra, at 252). ...
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and
impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge,
according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at all times
"wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering
a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not
only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical
conception, It is a state of mind" 14 and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an
essential manifestation of its reality. 15 It must be obvious, therefore, that while judges should
possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it
is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before
them should have confidence in their impartiality. It appears, however, that respondent Judge
is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not he should be
disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already
become moot.
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court
in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the
issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs.
[A.C. No. 1418. August 31, 1976.]
JOSE MISAMIN, Complainant, v. ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police force and a member of
the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of
certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse,
with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by
him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar’s Bakery, for the violation of the
Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of Respondent. The matter was referred
to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could
very well be the explanation for the non-appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the
scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor-General to get at the bottom of things were
thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be
expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and
adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was
one of the complaints being dismissed. This is one of those instances then where this Court
is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as
counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office
as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not
prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance
as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the
Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies
having conspired with the complainant Misamin’s attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to
trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay.
Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese
community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution
of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General’s Office set the case for
investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the
investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for
complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written motion for
postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When
the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed
once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy
‘preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila.’ When asked if he was willing to
proceed with the hearing in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared, apparently
without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought
the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active
part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good
person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent’s practice of his
profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or
removal of an attorney. The respondent’s appearance at the labor proceeding
notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may
appropriately he referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service
Commission. As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are
under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission."
3 As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant’s counsel to mislead
complainant to admitting having received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to
aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor General recommended that they
be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in
accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the
authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the Respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in
accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might
have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while
holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided
in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General.
Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for
respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that
the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office
being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not
only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to
be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should
not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar, should
refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for
the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of
membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains
unsullied.
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is
dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his
record.