EN BANC
Renomeron.
[ A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991 ]
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON, RESPONDENT.
200 SCRA 584
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant
Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V &
G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short),
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City, for irregular actuations with
regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163
pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of
lots in its subdivision.
Pro Forma Law and Legal Definition. Pro forma is a
Latin term meaning "as a matter of form". It is used to
describe doing something in a perfunctory manner to
satisfy minimum or basic requirements. Pro
forma rulings may be made by a court as a formality in
order to proceed with the progress of a case.
Feb 16, 1987 – no action was made by Renomeron
despite follow-ups made by Collantes. Renomeron
requested Collantes to submit additional requirements
which Collantes complied with.
Renomeron suspended the registration of the
documents pending compliance of V&G with certain
“special agreement’ between then that V&G would
provide Renomeron with a weekly Tacloban-Manila
round trip ticket with P2,000 pocket money. He said he
would act favorably on their application if that agreement
would be fulfilled.
Collantes sent plane fare (P800) to Renomeron through
his niece. But pocket money was not given.
Renomeron then imposed additional requirements
which angered Collantes, leading the latter to challenge
Renomeron to act on the 163 pending applications by
V&G within 24 hours.
May 22, 1987 – Renomeron denied the application for
ambiguity of the subject matter.
Collantes appealed for a reconsideration and elevated
the matter to the Administrator of the National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration.
The NLTDRA ruled that the documents were registrable.
The NLTDRA recommended Renomeron‘s case to the
DOJ and the Secretary of Justice found him guilty. The
president then dismissed Renomeron from public
service.
A disbarment case was then filed by Collantes against
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the
respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be
disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public
official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a
public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.
HELD:
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court:
People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations
and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarm
ent or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben
E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public
officials and employees to process documents and
papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d]) and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a
financial or material interest in any transaction requiring
the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the
course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office (Sec. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the
Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any
corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 1.03).
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule
7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are
"competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for
every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in
the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs.
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 6788 (FORMERLY CBD 382), August 23,
2007 ]
DIANA RAMOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE
R. IMBANG, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the
assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing
civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and
Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as
attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000
only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings
of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
always told her to wait outside. He would then come out
after several hours to inform her that the hearing had
been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six
times and for each “appearance” in court, respondent
charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant
became suspicious. She personally inquired about the
status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San
Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that
respondent never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to Imbang, Ramos knew that he was in the
government service from the very start. In fact, he first
met the complainant when he was still a district attorney
in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of
PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for
the complainant's daughter.[6]
In 1992, Ramos requested him to help her file an action
for damages against the Jovellanoses.[7] Because he
was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was
not an indigent, he declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised
the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative
who was a private practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however,
did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable
to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, Ramos
allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the
Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on
hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the
P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's
acceptance fee.[11]
A year later, Ramos requested Imbang to issue an
antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked
her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given
the respondent for safekeeping.[12] Because Ramos was
a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15,
1992.[13]
On April 15, 1994, Imbang resigned from the PAO.[14] A
few months later or in September 1994, Ramos again
asked Imbang to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses.
Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, Imbang
agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was
unable to finalize it as he lost contact with Ramos
HELD:
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with
honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more
conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to
public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but
also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.[24]
Government employees are expected to devote
themselves completely to public service. For this reason,
the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with their official function.[25]
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle
private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective
offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while
he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he
accepted money from the complainant and the receipt
confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt
showed that he accepted the complainant's case while
he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly
violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of
attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of
providing free legal assistance to indigent
litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of
the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the
Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative
and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted
attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent
violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other
than his salary.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This
undertaking includes the observance of the above-
mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent
when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases
was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on
the private practice of profession disqualified him from
acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against
handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent also surreptitiously deceived the
complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he
should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action
against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that
the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to
pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took
place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of
the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity
and good moral character required of all lawyers,
specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public
office are expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence
of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity
of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government
lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice.
[ G.R. No. 109870, December 01, 1995 ]
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
judgment affirming his conviction for violation of the
"Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was
denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February 9,
1994, petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled
"SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"[3] setting
forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:
"6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly
discovered evidence and excusible (sic) negligence, and
shall be supported by affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will
exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of
the owner of Ultra Corporation (the Corporation that
employed petitioner), which actually exercised control
over the affairs of Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the
first time and explain why he was unable to do so earlier."
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, among other
things, granted the substitution but denied the motion for
leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been
already denied on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a
"MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL", and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND
MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. The Court
thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on
said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from
notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.
RECOMMENDATION:
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time
were given by the Court,[8] the Solicitor General himself
recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial,
proceeding from the same impression that a certain
Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement
is an admission against interest which may ultimately
exonerate petitioner from criminal liability.
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
"Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.
"However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a
declaration against his own interests under Section 38,
Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on
the culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the
petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should
be given a hard look by the Court.
"The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the
genuineness and due execution of his brother's affidavit
in the interest of justice and fair play.
HELD: "The above duty is well founded on the instruction
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a
sovereign `whose obligation to govern impartially is
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to
Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein, published
on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Italics
supplied.)"
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965])
decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled
that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly
newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as
to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain
a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein",
The rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not
abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v.
People" and "People v. Amparado".
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside
technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor
General, granted new trial to the convicted accused
concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or
affidavits of persons which the Court considered as
newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to
reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly
circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein
petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes
all the more plausible under the circumstances
considering that the "People" does not raise any
objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor
General ought to be specially commended for displaying
once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality.
The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.
DOCTRINE:
"Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent
the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not
duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to see
that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states: `
Canon 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
`Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in
public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice
is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for
disciplinary action.'
EN BANC
[ A.C. NO. 4018, March 08, 2005 ]
OMAR P. ALI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MOSIB
A. BUBONG, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty.
Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave
misconduct while holding the position of Register of
Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment
proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case
earlier filed by complainant against respondent, which
was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with
illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating the criminal
complaint filed against Hadji Serad, Bauduli Datu and
others for violation of the Anti- Squatting Law. It appears
from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of
respondent.
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of
respondent, absolved respondent of all the charges
brought against him. The case was then forwarded to the
DOJ for review, then Secretary Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction
and infidelity in the custody of documents, but held guilty
of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT
and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad
Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-accused. As a result of
this finding, former President FVR issued AO No. 41
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary
Drilon. Respondent questioned said AO before this
Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition claiming that the Office of the President did
not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him
from office and insisted that respondents violated the
laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo
V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a
breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his
authority to resolve the administrative complaint against
him (herein respondent), but was dismissed for failure on
the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned order. Respondent MR was
denied with finality. On the disbarment proceeding,
complainant claims that it has become obvious that
respondent had proven himself unfit to be further
entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he
poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal
profession.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular
with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the
Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and
jurisprudence support his stance that it was his
ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City,
to act on applications for land registration on the basis
only of the documents presented by the applicants. In
the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents
they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence,
he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their
favor. Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do
with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of
the Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation
in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces
tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who
required him to produce the various land titles involved
in said dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of
this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order
relative to the transfer of venue of this case and
penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of
Deeds of Marawi City.
RECOMMENDATION/FINDING:
The finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of
respondent by the Office of the President was fully
supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong
weight in considering the professional misconduct of
respondent in the present case. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification,
which pertained solely to the period of suspension from
the practice of law from a five-year suspension to a two-
year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied
as by that time, the matter had already been
endorsed to this Court.
HELD:
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as
established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his
qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his
office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent
had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain
his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter.
Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the
people’s confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of
the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the
withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
DOCTRINE:
The Code of Professional
Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact,
by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers
in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer
who holds a government office may not be disciplined as
a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as
a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his
oath a member of the legal profession.
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 07, 2010 ]
JOVITO S. OLAZO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUSTICE
DANTE O. TINGA (RET.), RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel
of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the
Municipality of Taguig, previously part of Fort Andres
Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for
disposition. A Committee on Awards whose duty was to
study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the
applications to purchase the lands declared open for
disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by
the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros.
Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
The complainant claimed that the respondent abused his
position as Congressman and as a unduly interfered with
the complainants sales application because of his
personal interest over the subject land.
The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted
undue pressure and influence over the complainants
father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the
complainants sales application and claim the subject
land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the
respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on
various dates, sums of money as payment of the latters
alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant
further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer
of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the
respondents deceased wife. As a result of the
respondents abuse of his official functions, the
complainants sales application was denied. The
conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and
his sales application were subsequently given due
course by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within
the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the
respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to
convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings,
the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999,

the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of
nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that
the respondent wanted the rights over the land
transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he
was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in

unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under
Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of
the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award.
Thus, the approval of his sales application by the
Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the
objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum
No.119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent

violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the
practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period,
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards

HELD:

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that

the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuels land when the former was
still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was
limited only in the preparation of a single document. In
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we specifically described
private practice of law as one that contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondents act fell

within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to Show that the legal
representation was made before the Committee on
Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the
complainant to prove and we cannot consider any
uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.