DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED:

BIGAMOUS and POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
FC Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by
Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the
effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall
take effect"has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).
FC Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

FC Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. —
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor,
in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.chanrobles virtual law library

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.chanrobles virtual law library

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall
also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

Wiegel v Sempio-Diy
Facts:
 Karl Wiegel file a case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
 Lilia Wiegel had subsisting marriage with Maxion, when she married Karl Wiegel.
 She claimed that, she and Eduardo Maxion have been allegedly force to enter said marital union.
Issue:
 W/N the marriage of Lilia to her first marriage is void, to the fact that they were been forced to enter the said
marital union.
Held:
 No. Even though there was a presence of vitiated force between the parties, the marriage will be still valid not be
void but merely voidable and therefore valid until annulled. Accordingly her marriage to Wiegel is void.

Dorothy Terre v Atty. Jordan Terre

Facts:
 Dorothy was married to Merlito Bercentilla, but was considered void marriage, due to incestuous relationship (first
cousins).
 Jordan courted Dorothy and persuade her that her marriage with his first cousin was void ab initio.
 Jordan and Dorothy got married after getting consent by the family of Dorothy and begot a child.
 Jordan after the celebration of marriage, disappeared and unaware of the reason for his disappearance.
 Jordan was found out married to a certain Helina Malicdem. ( 3 years of disappearance)
 Dorothy filed a case for Bigamy against Vilma Malicdem.
 Issue: W/N Jordan is held liable for bigamy

Held:
 Yes. When the second marriage was entered into. Jordan prior marriage with complainant was still subsisting and
No judicial declaration of the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Domingo v CA
Facts:
 Delia and Domingo were married in Pasig.
 
 Their relationship tour sour. Delia Avera filed a petition declaring nullity of marriage and separation of property
against Roberto Domingo.
 Roberto had a subsisting marriage with Emerlina dela Paz, which is still valid and existing.
  Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in the Philippines when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her employer.
 Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence.
 Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession of Roberto, who disposed some of
the said properties without her knowledge and consent;
 While Delia was on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman.
 Emerlina Paz sued them for the grounds of Bigamy.
ISSUES:
 W/N a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. (If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.)
 W/Nthe petition entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
 HELD:
 Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the
basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution
would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.
On the other hand, the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage.
 2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of
their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA’s decision is affirmed.

Carino v Carino
Facts:
 SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages.
 First was with Susan Nicdao with two offsprings.
 Second was with Susan Yee cohabited for 10 years.
 The first marriage was void since they do not give marriage license.
 SPO4 Santiago become ill and later died.
 Both Nicdao and Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance.
 Yee filed case for collection of sums of money against Nicdao.
 RTC decision in favor of Yee
Issue:
 W/N the non-declaration of nullity of a marriage of Roberto made his subsequent marriage void.

Held:
 The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The
marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
 determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

Bobis v Bobis
Facts:
 Isagani Bobis contracted 3 marriages.
 First marriage was with Maria Dulce Javier.
 Second marriage was with Imelda Marbella-Bobis.
 Third marriage was with Julia Sally Hernandez.
 Imelda Marbella-Bobis file complaint against Isagani for Bigamy.
 Isagani inititiated a civil action for the judicial nullity of his marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without
marriage license.
Issue:
 W/N the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Held:
No. The subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage does not constitute a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will
also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting.
In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted
his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential
to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Mercado v Tan
Facts:
 Vincent Mercado contracted two marriages.
 First marriage was with Thelma Oliva, begot two children.
 Second marriage was with Consuelo Tan, begot a son.
 Consuelo Tan filed complaint for Bigamy against Vincent Mercado.
 A month after the Bigamy case was filed, he then file an action for declaration of nullity of Marriage against
Thelma Oliva.
 RTC decision favored Mercado and marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
Issue:
 Is the judicial declaration of nullity of prior marriage necessary for remarriage?
Held:
 The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision. Under
Article 40 of the Family Code, “ The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purpose of remarriage
on a basis solely of final judgement declaring such previous marriage void, but here the final judgement declaring
accused’s previous marriage null and void came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after when the
case for bigamy against the accused was already tried in court. A first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy case.

Ty v CA
FACTS:
 In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church wedding in the same year
as well.
 In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one
for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties.
 In 1979, prior to the JDRC of QC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of the celebration
and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna.
 Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage license including the specific license number
designated. The lower court however ruled that Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by
the CA applying the provisions of the Article 40 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Can the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes be invoked in the case at bar?
Held:
Article 40 of the Family Code provides, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be
passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the Family Code.
Both marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the Family Code. The old Civil Code did not have any
provision that states that there must be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia’s marriage with
Reyes is valid. The provisions of the Family Code (which took effect in 1987) cannot be applied retroactively especially
because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the Civil Code which was operational during her marriage with
Reyes. GRANTED.

Tenebro v CA
Facts:
 Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The
two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
 On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before
Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage,
she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
 Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage
between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect

Held:
 As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
 As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
 Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second
marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the
presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the
crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED

Morigo v Morigo
Facts:
 Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
 After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
 In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
 In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.
 In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
 On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
 On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
 On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the  Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
 On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seeks (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity
of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
 On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information  filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Issue:
W/N the Marriage of Morigo and Lucia Barrete was valid
Held:
No. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence
of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3  and 4 of
the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for
all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void  ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."  The records show that no
appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final
and executory.

Teves v People
FACTS:

 Cenon Teves and Thelma got married in 1992.

 After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for vacations. While
on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. To
verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage
indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001.

 Petitioner was charged with bigamy.

 During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage of
petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

 Petitioner appealed before the CA contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or
liability had already been extinguished.

 Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all,
and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.

 He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the
former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same
purpose, need not be judicially determined.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law that would sustain petitioner’s contention.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:

 The elements of this crime are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of
petitioner.

Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with
Edita on 10 December 2001. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally
subsisting.

The second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in
fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.

It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with
bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit.

The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with
Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be
made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.

Nollora v People

Facts:
 While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years has another
wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a
certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.

 Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy.  When asked about the moral damages she
suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her
money in the amount of P 50,000.

 Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to
1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim
in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.

 Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know
Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the one lawfully married to Nollora
because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the
first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert.  After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert,
she and he also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.

Issue:  Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.

Held:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as
such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their
marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of
his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack
of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage.

Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. Granting arguendo that he is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were
not conducted in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of  the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
 In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim
solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's
religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.

His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines providing: "[N]o
Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as
enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim
be permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and should
any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent
to the proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,
Muslim Personal Laws)

Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of his marriage contracts do
not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an
essential requirement for marriage, his omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration
about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.

It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been
violated.

Montanez v Cipriano
FACTS:
 On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said
marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano.
 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates
on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003,
the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
executory on October 13, 2003.
 On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the
MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage
was already declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio
on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent
filed her petition for declaration of nullity.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that both wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and not the
Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the Information
for bigamy filed against her.

HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In
the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy
charges against her.

CAG.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI,
Respondents.

FACTS
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner thereafter
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null
and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy.

RULING:
NO.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3,
1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner
and

private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does
not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain
a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

ISSUE
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

RULING
No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

G.R. No. 191566               July 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

Facts:
Odtuhan married Jasmine Modina in 1980. Then, he remarried Alagon in 1993. He filed a petition for annulment for his
marriage to Modina in 1994.

In 1999, RTC granted a petition and declared marriage void for lack marriage license. Evelyn Alagon learned of Odtuhan’s
previous marriage to Modina and was charged with Bigamy

RTC ruled in favor of Alagon and was indicted in an information for Bigamy. Upon filing an Omnibus Motion praying for
presentation of evidence support his motion and his motion to quash be granted, RTC denied the petition. Respondent
went to CA where the petition was granted through applying Morigo vs People Case and RTC was ordered to give due
Cours to receive evidence on petitioner’s motion to quash. CA denied MR before the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Bigamy

Ruling:
Petition is meritorious. The Respondent was guilty of Bigamy. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration,
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. If the SC allow respondent's line of
defense and the CA's ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before
anyone institutes a complaint against him.[41]

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained the
declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such
contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the
time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.

G.R. No. 159031               June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
On February 16, 1968, Judge Salazar of the MTC Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro
Patingo without the benefit of a marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any
affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed
their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding
marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences. On
December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony. Their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment
of marriage and damages against Socorro. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations
and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage.

ISSUE:
W/N Lasans committed bigamy

RULING:
YES. This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was
void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself
for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid
marriage license except in those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage
license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding
cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.

G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. EDNA A. AZOTE, Respondent.

FACTS:
On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS, were married in civil rites. On April 27, 1994,
Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter,
Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries. On
January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the
wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another
Form E-4 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote
(Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was
considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump
sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS
averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a
newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the publication, no answer was filed and
Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC further wrote
that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one Rosemarie Teodora Sino
was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no
showing that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved.

ISSUE:
W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled to the benefits

RULING:
No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is
clear that only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In
this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by
their marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating
Rosemarie as his spouse.

It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the Family Code was
already in force. For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was no
impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled
is the rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by
substantial evidence." Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled
or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What
is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the
legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of
Edgardo.

G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served an information for
Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he entered into the 2 ndmarriage; he
was able to escape while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she married him, she thought he was
single. She soon averred that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage license, wherein she should not then be
charged with bigamy. 11 years after inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution.
She alleged that she had met petitioner and introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and stated
that she met Estela only after she had already married Nicanor.

Issue:
W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.
W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid

Held:
            Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the
following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly
showed their disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status
(3) Estela, who was the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Nicanor. InPeople v. Archilla, knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes
an indispensable cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice. She is not
co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

Facts:
On 1972, Lea (respondent) married Bautista. On 1979, she married Renato (petitioner). On 2001, Renato filed for a
declaration of nullity on the ground of bigamy. On 2002, she filed a declaration for nullity of her first marriage to Bautista
and it was granted and declared null and void for lacking marriage license and same court issued Certificate of Finality to
make the decision final and executory. On 2007, RTC declared null and void the marriage between petitioner and
respondent for being bigamous. It said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void,
the fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since she failed
to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her 1 st marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside

Issue:
W/N CA erred in finding marriage herein valid and that properties acquired during marriage be declared conjugal

Held:
Court upholds CA decision. The Civil Code governs in this case since the Family Code was not yet born on the day the
parties herein celebrated their marriage. Odayat, Mendoza,  and Aragon doctrine provides that the Civil Code contains no
express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. Also, subsequent decision
annulling her first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid. 

DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
Subsequent Marriage, upon reappearance of absent spouse
FC 41, in relation to FC 42-44

Art. 41.
A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the  Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 42.
The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (n)

Art. 43.
The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44.
If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.

NCC
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If
he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession
may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.

G.R. No. L-43701             March 6, 1937

In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escaño. 
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee, 
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.

FACTS:
Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport. She
never heard from him again. In 1919, she filed for a proceeding to judicially declare Arthur missing. On October 25, 1919,
the court declared Arthur as an absentee with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect
until six months after its publication in the official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code. In 23 April 1921,
the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in
the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Marciana contracted a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela.
When Marciana died intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones, Marciana’s
daughter from her first marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the only heir of her mother and that her mother’s
marriage to Felix was null and void on the ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the court issued an order for the taking
effect of declaration of absence & publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother and Felix’s marriage) was below the 7-
year prescriptive period. With this, the marriage would be null and void and would render her as the sole heir.

ISSUE:
W/N the marriage of Marciana and Felix is null and void. W/N Felix is a legitimate heir of Marciana.

HELD:
Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on
which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years
elapsed. The validity of the marriage makes him a legitimate heir.

G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

EPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of  Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a
bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to respondent’s hometown of San Jose,  Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in
San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,  Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also  claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco,
without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such
declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-
founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified
and set aside.

G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.

NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and
LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, respondents.

FACTS:
On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco. Twenty years after, without his marriage being
dissolved, he contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita Camacho. In 1967, Aurelio met petitioner Nenita
Bienvenido, who he lived with from 1968 until at the time of his death in 1989. Sometime in 1982, Aurelio bought a house
and lot which was registered in his name. 2 years after, he executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner
Nenita, the TCT was issued in her name. After the death of Aurelio, respondent brought a petition before the RTC seeking
the annulment of the sale of the property of petitioner. Petitioner answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased
the property in question using their joint funds and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void.

HELD:
That exception involved by respondent in accordance with Art. 83 of the NCC refers to the subsequent marriage of
the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the seven year period has lapsed; That this
exception cannot be invoked because it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting
marriage to Consejo, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous. There is no basis for
holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and Aurelio because there was no
such partnership in the first place. Until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be
presumed.

G.R. No. 184621               December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
 FACTS:
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their
conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent
quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have
intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since
then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC
a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that
she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her
brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she
also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts,
the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

ISSUE:
W/N the petition for the declaration of presumptive death should be granted

RULING:
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a
stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry,
which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the
following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that her hospital
visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a
diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court
thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a
finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present
conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to
locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco,
the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient
as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search.
Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she
inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the
respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-
founded belief that her husband was already dead.

GR 214792
Republic vs Hon. Estrada (Missing Case)

Facts:
Teresita alleged she married Diego on 25 November 1973 in Impasug-ong, Bukidnon. Sometime in December 1976,
Diego left their residence and never came back.

He failed to communicate with her for the past 32 years and never made contact with any of their children or immediate
relatives. She alleged that she exerted all efforts to reach her husband but failed. She filed the present petition to declare
her husband presumptively dead so that she could contract another marriage without any impediment.

On 10 August 2009, the RTC Malaybalay granted her petition and declared Diego for all legal intents and purposes
presumptively dead in accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code. Upon appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Office
of the Solicitor General filed a Petition for Certiorari contesting the grant of petition. On 12 December 2013, the appellate
court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not there was error on the part of the lower courts in their appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the
death of Diego as the insufficiency of efforts of Teresita in locating Diego's whereabouts which let her to form a belief that
the latter is already dead.

Ruling:
Petition was denied. In this case, Diego's absence for more than 30 years, which far exceeded the law-required four years
of absence, is more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for all legal intents and purposes. Further, it can be
clearly gleaned from the totality of evidence that Diego had already died due to the prevalence of New People's Army in
Malaybalay.

G.R. No. 210929               July 29, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia, Bukidnon.
The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. While she was in Singapore(1993) , her children informed her
that her husband left their home without telling them his whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to go back to
the Philippines to look and find his husband. Edna searched and made inquiries about her husband thru their common
friends, and parents-in-law in Iligan and Valencia City and even went far as to his birthplace in Negros Oriental.

15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
During the trial, she was presented as the lone witness.

RTC grants her petition.

The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the decision of the RTC on the
ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the
Court in Republic v. Nolasco, and U.S. v. Biasbas.

CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of her husband.

RULING.
 NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was found out that it was all
consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. Edna did not present additional witnesses (her
children, their common friends, parents-in-law) but herself alone. There was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the
authorities at the time her husband disappeared.

Therefore, The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared presumptively dead is
DENIED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., respondent.

FACTS
 On November 4, 2008, Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition before the (RTC) for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon (Netchie).
 Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991, they later became sweethearts and
on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and
wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For
three months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts.
 While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental. He returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie's relatives and friends about her
whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was.
 Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC
so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
 Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie's aunt, Consuelo Sande.
 The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that
his wife was indeed already dead.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari,
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 The CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error at all in the RTC's judgment granting Jose's Petition for the
declaration of the presumptive death of his wife, Netchie.
 The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose's alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or
generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.
 Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie declared
presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUE
W/n the alleged efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife do not sufficiently support a "well-founded belief" that
respondent's absent wife x x x is probably dead.

HELD
YES! The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that... his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a... mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded belief that Netchie was already dead upon the following
grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie's parents while he was still out of the country, but did not reach them as they
had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain
any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie's relatives and friends;
(3) Jose's testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by
Jose's older brother, and by Netchie's aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband
and wife only for one month and that after this, there had been no information as to Netchie's whereabouts.
Given the Court's imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC's finding that Jose's Petition complied with the
requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose's
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had... inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to
Netchie's whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or
met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he... sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the
 particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific
persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NILDA B. TAMPUS, respondent.

FACTS
 Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days thereafter,
or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned.
 The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but
her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for
the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from
him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
 The RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as presumptively dead for all legal purposes. CA Affirmed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring Dante as presumptively dead.

HELD
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two
(2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive
one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such
absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents,
relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than
making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to
the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the
authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a
combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the
said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to
actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives,
and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent

FACTS
 Private Respondent Ludyson and Shanaviv were cohabiting with each otheras husband and wife, and had 2
children together.
 Ludyson and Shanaviv eventually married in 2003. The marriage wassolemnized by a Municipal Judge in Rizal,
Cagayan.
 Sometime in 2006, while Ludyson was working abroad, Shanaviv left their house and never returned (Ludyson’s
relatives took care of the children).
 Ludyson flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. He inquired with close friends and relatives and even
travelled as far as Bicol, where he wife was born and raised, but to no avail. He also searched various hospitals and
funeral parlors, also to no avail. 
 Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the fact of his wife’s disappearance. 
 In 2012, Ludyson filed a petition with the RTC to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
 The RTC granted the petition.
 Petitioner, through the office of the SolGen, elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
contending that Ludyson failed to establish a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead.
 The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that Petitioner should have filed a MR with the RTC. The Petitioner filed a
MR but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE
 Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Art. 41 of the Family Code.

HELD
NO. There are 4 requisites under Art. 41 that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper:
1. The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if suchspouse was in danger of death when the
disappearance occurred;
2. The present spouse wants to remarry;
3. The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In this case, Ludyson has complied with the 1 st, 2nd, and 4th requisites, but has not satisfied the 3 rd requisite as he has not
established a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the
absent spouse. Ludyson failed to establish his allegations. He did not present the friends and family he claims to have
made inquiries to. While he did have a certification from Bombo Radyo’s manager, he did not seek help from government
agencies like the police or NBI. Ludyson’s assertion, uncorroborated by evidence, falls short of the diligence required to
engender a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

NOTE: Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any
civil purpose.
FACTS
 On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the (RTC) petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo). The allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo]
2. [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat,
Pampanga
3. The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at San Miguel,
Tarlac City;
5. On September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the
Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made
contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission, [Wilfredo]
was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her] beloved
husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news
of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after
more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially with a
meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong
to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least a declaration
of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No.
1638 as amended.
 RTC grant the petition. CA reversed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the Decision of RTC declaring Wilfredo as presumptively dead.
HELD
No. The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized
suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
RTC Erred in Declaring the Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's Petition for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death Is Not Based on Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil Code.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the
application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows
that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of  contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a
prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the
same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was
clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code 11as the basis of her
petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil
purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If
he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of
for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that—like the one filed
by the petitioner in the case at bench—only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.
Such a petition is not authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

Doctrines/Provisions Involved:
PROCEDURE

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, respondent.
PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
IMPORTANT JURISPRUDENCE:
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.—It bears reiterating that a voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court
action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not
terminate such marriage.—If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance,
and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated
as provided by law.
FACTS
In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. Fifteen plus years later, Clemente filed an
action to declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her
husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed
that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the
reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with
Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that
Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice
or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She
went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she
shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated
Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively
death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC
affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE
Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the
subsequent marriage.
HELD
The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance
of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of
the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee‘s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage,
will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the
former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law,
he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s marriage prior to the
former‘s death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, respondent.

JURISPRUDENCE
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Evidently
then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC
judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final and
executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse
was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

FACTS
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa
City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove
her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the  appeal.
She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a
summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUE
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death based on
evidence that respondent had presented.
HELD
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting the
petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
RULING
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken
together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive
death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory.
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From
the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does
not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.
It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits,
conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of
their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a
diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony.
In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues
that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other
government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse
was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

Doctrines/Provisions Involved:
BAD FAITH OF BOTH SPOUSES
FC 44
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.

FC 43
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:

(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith,
such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession.

FC 40
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

FC 45
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below
twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

FC 81
Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a
future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the
marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be
valid. 

FC 86
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage
settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in
general.

Doctrines/Provisions Involved:
 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Family Code 36, 39, 68-71

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family.
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of
their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied
from the separate properties.
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

Republic Act No. 8533

AN ACT AMENDING TITLE I, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE 39 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, NULLIFYING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR ACTION OR DEFENSES
GROUNDED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title I, Chapter 3, Article 39 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

TITLE I – MARRIAGE
CHAPTER 3 – VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

"Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."

Section 2. Effectivity clause. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS,
respondents.

FACTS
 Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter
lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent
interference of Julia’s parent as averred by Leouel.
 The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living
independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months
later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990,
Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but
to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s
psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even
with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is
incompetent.
 The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by the
lower and appellate court.
ISSUE
Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD
 No. Julia’s failure to return home or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years is not
psychological incapacity
Justice Sempio-Diy opined that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The case at bar can,in no measure at all, come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
FACTS
 Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988.  After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the
house of defendant’s mother.  There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing
happened until their fourth night.  In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s
relatives went with them. 
 Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or
sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room.  Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but
no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.  Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a
urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. 
 The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential
even the medicine prescribed.  There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country.  Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared
void on the ground of psychological incapacity. 
 On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he
has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can
still overcome their differences.  Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there
is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection. 
ISSUE
Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal.  Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children
thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.  

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
respondents.
FACTS
 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio,
on the ground of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila, After a year Reynaldo
showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
 That he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family;
 that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged;
that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
 that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo
had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
 and that it would be to the couple’s best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
 On August 16, 1990 Roridel O. Molina, filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. The Solicitor General insists that “the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ (as provided under Art.
36 of the Family Code).
ISSUES
Whether or not the psychological incapacity of Reynaldo Molina can be a basis for annulment.
HELD
Family Code article 36 state that; A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It is clearly that the article 36 pertaining on psychologically incapacitated that been used by petitioner was lack of merit
because the signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father been surface after the manifestation of
their marriage.

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
FACTS
 Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang
Catholic Parish Church
 Three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that
from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to
support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking
sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his
promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD).
 She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life.
Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with... him when he left the conjugal home
 Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
 Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and
botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her... student for two consecutive semesters. They became
sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were
married.
 Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner
provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty member
of the Philippine Christian University.
 Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of
coffee, rice and polvoron.
 From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help
petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had
other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private... respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends
and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a
certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student... whose husband was working in
Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena.
Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said
he would... end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner
and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondent's
infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
 Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines,
Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991,
because he availed himself of the early retirement... plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement
pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and
consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
 While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing
became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had
relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki;
 Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road
Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by
whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva
 When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up
 According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of
1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment
 Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was
then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly
spent time with them.
 Petitioner told private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
 It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had already
abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle
East. Since then, private respondent's... whereabouts had been unknown.
 On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner.
 CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUES
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's
psychological incapacity.
HELD
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume
the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
No evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's
youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner.
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial
court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the
marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality. Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical,
capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent..

FACTS
 Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacanang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. They got married twice, first was on September 6, 1982 and on May 8, 1983 and blessed with five children.
 After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not succeeded. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as
a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would also inflict physical harm on their children. In 1992, they were
already living separately. On October 16, 1994, when Brenda saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. 
 Wilson then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid.  On
October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she
submitted herself to medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center.
 Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage in the RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. The court
ruled the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. But the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. Hence, this appeal.
 ISSUE
Whether or not there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological incapacity?
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity?

HELD
The testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker were not enough to sustain a
finding that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence
she presented does not show such incapacity. Although Supreme Court is convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root “cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified
as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice
was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was
prematurely rendered.

FACTS
 On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the
Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates
were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20,
1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he
indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

 In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him.  Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date.  In July 1990, Erlinda
filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper
of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda
testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
 The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing
whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there
was no collusion between the parties. 

 However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the
investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article
36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely
rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.  The
Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor
General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but
because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”
ISSUE
 Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the
husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and
a fugitive from justice?
HELD
No. it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply
with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified
and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In
fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. CA’s decision is set aside.

G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

FACTS

 Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, left respondent Lolita Hamano and their daughter a month after the
celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them
Japanese citizens.
 But except for 2 months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters the
respondent sent.
 He even visited the Philippines but did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts
to contact him, but to no avail.
 Respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
in which the trial court rendered it so.
 CA affirmed trial court’s decision contesting before the SC that the requirements in Molina and Santos were not
applicable for the case at bar involves a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national.

ISSUES

1) Whether or not, Toshio is psychologically incapacitated.

2) Whether or not, requirements in Molina and Santos applicable in mixed marriages.

HELD

1) NO. The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. His act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness.

As the Court ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness.

2) YES. In proving psychological incapacity, no distinction must be made between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse.
The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

In proving psychological incapacity, no distinction must be made between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. The
Court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.

Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.*

LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.

FACTS
 Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
 Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding
at Pasig in December 1990.
 A child was born but died 5 months later.
 Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as
adopted child of their family.
 They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November
1991.
 Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article
36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE

Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability
to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations
on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate
stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of
respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would
be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 168328. February 28, 2007.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE,
respondents.

FACTS
 Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San Jose got married and had two children.
 For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolito’s parents.
 Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of
Taguig.
 On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her parents’ house.
 On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
 Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at the National Center for Mental Health, declared that
from the psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she found Manolito, whom she did not
personally examine, to be psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband.
 RTC denied Lalila’s petition. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not, Manolito is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. The report of Dr. Tayag shows that her conclusion about Manolito‘s psychological incapacity was based on the
information supplied by Laila which she found to be ―factual. Undoubtedly, the doctor‘s conclusion is hearsay. It is
unscientific and unreliable. Dr. Tayag's Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality
disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the
 incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely states that "such disorder is considered to
be grave and is deeply immersed within the system and continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life."
Manolito's alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability
to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Manolito's state or
condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition.

G.R. No. 179620. August 26, 2008.*

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner, vs. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254,
and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondent.

FACTS

 Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners.

 They begot 3 children.
 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
 Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children is often
unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight.
 Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle
towards his mom.
 He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida.
 Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male
companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior to their marriage.
 She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she
saw Manuel kiss a man.
 The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s
concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC).
 The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s
concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD

No. It is found out that there was no concealment of homosexuality done by Manuel.

To nullify an existing marriage, there are requisites which are provided by the Family Code. As expressly stated in Art. 45
part 3 of the Family Code, “That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife”. It was not proven that
Manuel concealed his homosexuality which would eventually lead to fraud.

The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment of
homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court
should not have taken the public’s perception against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower
court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even
granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged
and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.

G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.*

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner, vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

FACTS

 On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te a freshman in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.
 They developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that
they elope.
 At first, he refused but Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They left Manila and went to Cebu that month.
Edwards money lasted for only a month and they could not find a job.
 On April 1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home.
As his family was away, Rowena threathened him that she would commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house.
 On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. The couple continued to stay at
Rowena’s uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisoner and was not allowed to go out unaccompanied.
 After a month, Edward escaped from the house and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from
Rowena.
 On June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and told her that they should live with his parents but she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives.
 On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City, for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
 On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
 On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove
the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied
only on the information provided by petitioner.
 In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration
of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before the SC the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
 He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological
incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent.

ISSUE

Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD

Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the narcissistic
and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

G.R. No. 180668. May 26, 2009.*

MARIETTA C. AZCUETA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

FACTS

 Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta
(Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
 Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
 Marietta complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always
depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions.
 It was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental. Rodolfo also
pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfo’s mother.
 When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could support their needs. They
had sex only once a month which Marietta never enjoyed.
 When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused.
Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child.
 When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave
and see if he would follow her. He did not.
 Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo
was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the
couple lived in.
 The psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused,
responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
 Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people.
 The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother who
was the dominant figure in the family considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house.
 She added that the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage.
She stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and
incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his personality.
 She, thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
responsibilities.
 Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City Prosecutor found no
collusion between the parties.
 Based on the evidence presented by Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio.
 The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based solely on the
information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged psychological disorder was present at the start
of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and incurable.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision.
 Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage to Marrieta is void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD

Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder.
His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.

Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos
[397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician
or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s
testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a
settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
Marietta’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
her expert witness.

The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience in the field of psychology and
psychological incapacity, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13
February 2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”

Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility,
overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s
Dependent Personality Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a
by-product of his upbringing and family life.

Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his
mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not
wanting a child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High Court for being
speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ finding that
 Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time of
his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.

A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)

One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even
the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and
emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert
opinion, and carefully examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under
Article 36. Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply ingrained in his
system since his early years.

G.R. No. 165424. June 9, 2009.*

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, petitioner, vs. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

 Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili
null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
 He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
 However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent
and started dating other women.
 Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a
married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.
 Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and
self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan.
 The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his
capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.
 On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was
denied.
 The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs
decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
 Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought
to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented,
especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial
court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE

Whether or not, psychological incapacity of the petitioner is a sufficient ground for the nullity of marriage.

HELD

Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as:

 a personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack
self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times
they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that
petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioners mother even had to be
the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to
respondent was for real.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the
time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively
renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is declared null and void

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 164817. July 3, 2009.*

DIGNA A. NAJERA, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO J. NAJERA, respondent.

FACTS

 Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for
Legal separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
 Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently
living in the (United States of America). They were married but are childless.
 Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage;
(1) that respondent was jobless and was not exerting effort to find a job at the time of marriage; only with the help of
petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as
a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner
and falsely accuse her of having an affair with another man whenever he came home, and took to smoking marijuana and
drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical
violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after the said incident respondent left the family home,
taking along all their personal belongings, and abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the police
station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.

ISSUE

Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 1: of the Family
Code.

HELD

No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct toward petitioner
and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only
and not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 185286. August 18, 2010.*

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, petitioner, vs. RAMON REYES, respondent.

FACTS

 Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP Diliman, in 1972 when they
were both 19 years old.
 Petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who
were restricted by a university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat
Restaurant.
 Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even
by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. On December 5, 1976, petitioner and respondent got married.
 They lived with Ramon’s parents and they were supported by them. They had a child which made their financial
difficulties worse.
 All the business ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro became the breadwinner of the family.
 To make things worse, despite the fact that Socorro would undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that
he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room.
 They tried to attend counseling sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that
respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
 RTC granted the petition.
 CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not, Ramon is psychologically incapacitated

HELD

Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. In the instant case, respondent’s pattern
of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by
his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of
estafa.

G.R. No. 166357. September 19, 2011.*

VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent.

FACTS

 Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973, maintained a
relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four children.
 Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano who gave birth
to a son.
 In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living
with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.
 In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his
marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.
 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in
accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
 Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines
and chose to live with Malyn.
 Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two
younger children, Miggy and Jay.
 According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged
weekend plans with their father.
 Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was
manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation.
 Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard
Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
 Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity,
habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).
 The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code.
 The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.

HELD
 The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal
and factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely
disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that
respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her
duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD,
there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence
points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and
incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties.

The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.

G.R. No. 166357. January 14, 2015.*

VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent.

FACTS

 In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
 Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality
and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
 However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity
of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated
as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of
the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next
one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions
of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis
by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a

physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological
incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could
possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be
weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial
judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed
after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental
state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family
Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate
the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties
and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions
would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young
children.
 The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully
exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious
act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB
JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.