Art. 41.

A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a)
Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding (2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio. Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the (2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the
parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of the other;
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (n) Revised Penal Code
Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
termination shall be considered legitimate; proper proceedings.
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the
innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except

that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other
spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad

faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad

faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)

New Civil Code

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
 If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an
affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of
either spouse as in the case at bar, the action for annulment
became extinguished as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of
SSS v De Bailon the Civil Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
Facts:
Voidable marriage under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil
 In 1955, Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Code, cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years later, proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only
Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either,
death of Alice, she being an absentee. The petition was in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
granted in 1970. marriage had been perfectly valid.
 In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together
until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to
claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that
granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon- might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried
Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a out “in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they spouse,” as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule
be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses
of Clemente. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance
 They further claim that Clemente contracted three with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s
marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive beneficiary of Bailon.
and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged. Cecilia
claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s
presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the
whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily
located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon
all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital
affairs.
 SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had
been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since
she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits
should go to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further,
SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to
be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed
the decision of the SSS before the Social Security
Commission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA
however ruled the contrary.

Issue:

WN the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared

presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent
marriage.

Held:

No. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate

the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.

Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a

presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by
fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided
by law.

New Civil Code
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Family Code
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Arca v Javier
Facts:
 On November 19, 1937, Salud R. Arca and defendant
Alfredo Javier had their marriage solemnized by Judge
Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At the
time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son
named Alfredo Javier, Jr.
 In 1938, defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United
States on board a ship of the United States Navy, such
that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca,
defendant Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in
the United States Navy.
  Salud R. Arca, who is from (Maragondon), Cavite, chose
to live with defendant's parents at Naic, Cavite. But for
certain incompatibility of character (frictions having
occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and
defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found it
necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and
transfer her residence to (Maragondon), Cavite — her
native place.
 Since then the relation between plaintiff Salud R. Arca
and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained.
 On August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier brought an
action for divorce against Salud R. Arca before the
Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA.
  In July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from
plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9, 1941 — defendant
Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American
citizen.
 In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife,
obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by
the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the
United States Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier returned to
the Philippines.
 After his arrival in the Philippines, Alfredo Javier married
Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of
the Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950.
 In July 25, 1950, Salud Arca filed Bigamy case against
Alfredo. However, defendant Alfredo Javier was
acquitted of the charge of Bigamy in a decision rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Issue:
WN the foreign divorce decree earned by Alfredo have a valid
effect in the Philippines.
Held:
1937, A, a natural born Filipino citizen, married S, another Filipino
citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, who
thereby became legitimated. A enlisted in the United States Navy
and later sailed for the United States leaving behind his wife and
child. On August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the
Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, U. S. A., alleging as
ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of the
complaint, S filed an answer alleging, among other things, that A
was not a resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite,
Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause of their
separation was abandonment on her part but that A was in the
United States, without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.
S. Navy. The Circuit Court of Mobile County granted the divorce
on April 9, 1941. Does this decree have a valid effect in this
jurisdiction? Held: This court, in a number of cases of similar
nature, has invariably denied the validity of the divorce decree. In
essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the
validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be
acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in
which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). *
* * "And assuming that (plaintiff) acquired legal residence in the
State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers,
this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant
divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that
could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was
still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person." Arca, et al. vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579,
No. L-6768 July 31, 1954
In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said
that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction
over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed
appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could
not have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County
when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time, he
was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room
where he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift
duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is shown
by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he
moved to New York where he bought a house and a lot, and after
his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S.
Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of
Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said
that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the intention of
permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his
permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce
from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
on the court.

It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority

or precedent in the present case for the reason that the Haddeck
case which was cited by the court in the course of the decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Williams vs. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim is
not quite correct, for the Haddeck case was merely cited as
authority for the statement that a divorce case is not a
proceeding in rem, and the reversal did not necessarily overrule
the ruling laid down therein that before a court may acquire
jurisdiction over a divorce case, it is necessary that plaintiff be
domiciled in the State in which it is filed. (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the
Canson case may be justified on another ground: The courts in
the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband,
and if the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree
cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction.  national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Van Dorn v Romillo
Facts:
 Alice Reyes Van Dorn Contracted two Marriages.
 First Marriage was with Richard Upton, an American
Citizen.
 They married in Hong Kong and established their
residence in Philippines
 They begot two children
 Their relationship turns sour and got divorced in Nevada,
USA.
 Second Marriage was with Theodore Van Dorn in
Nevada.
 Richard Upton (from the first marriage) filed a suit
against Alice Reyes Van Dorn, asking that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in
Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.
Somera v Pilapil
Facts:
 Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with
private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany.
They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and
named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
 Their relationship turns sour, Eric Ekkehard initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before
the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.
 The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15,
1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
 On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that
while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with
William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

Issue: Issue:
 WN the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the WN a criminal case for adultery which took place after a
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. divorce is barred by the previously acquired decree of
 WN the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is divorce.
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets? Held:

The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and

Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared
that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained
a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the
husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard

Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
 both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married
in the Philippines.” It maintained that their divorce obtained in
1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in
Philippine jurisdiction. The question to be determined by the trial
court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from
Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent’s claim to
Quita v CA heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
Facts: petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under
 Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
not however blessed with children. presupposes a legitimate relationship.
 Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe file a divorce in San Francisco, California, The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate
also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married heirs is AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
 On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Padlan.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent
Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition.
 The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio
and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972,
that the marriage existed between private respondent
and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.
 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings

Issue:

Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper

heir of the decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful

heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No dispute exists
either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary
shares. Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. The
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the
trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as
well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing
the evidence.

The trial court did not grant private respondent’s prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that

Llorente v CA
Facts:
 Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September
30, 1957
 February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church,
in Nabua, Camarines Sur
 Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed
for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home
 November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United
States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
 1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to
visit his wife and he visited the Philippines, He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was
“living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente
 December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered
in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo
Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
blank
 Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
 February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written
agreement which was witnessed by Paula’s father and
stepmother to the effect that:
 all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations
for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be
suspended
 they would dissolve their marital union in accordance
with judicial proceedings
 they would make a separate agreement regarding their
conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and
 Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous
act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to
separate from Lorenzo peacefully.  
 November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego
 December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final
 January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila and lived together as husband and wife and bore
3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
 March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament where he bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children
 December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga,
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved
that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate
 January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason
that the Lorenzo was still alive
 January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was
duly executedthe will to probate
 June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died
 RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by
Paula over Lorenzo’s estate contending that she was the
surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate
proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s
petition
o divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is
void
 Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½
conjugal estate
 illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly: 1/3 estate
 RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
“legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not
legally adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the
estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
 CA: Affirmed with modification
Issue:
W/N the divorce is valid and proven
Held:
YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of
divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County
of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952. REMANDS the
cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity
of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions
that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to
settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the
Rules of Court.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:
 nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality
 Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law
Quita v. Court of Appeals:
once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable
 Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity.  Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
 The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to
his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in
the will he executed.  We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity.
 Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. 
 Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law.  In fact, the will was duly probated.