Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Economics 30501
Topics in Economic Theory
P. Reny
422 SHFE
Office Hours: By appointment
This course is intended to introduce you to various topics in economic theory. There is no textbook.
There will be a take-home midterm (Feb. 7-9) and a take-home final exam (March 13-15), each
worth 50% of your grade.
TOPICS
Readings marked with an asterisk (*) are either articles that are particularly closely related to
some of the material from class, or are books that are particularly useful for the topic.
1.
Border, K. (1991): “Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach,”
Econometrica 59(4), 1175-1187.
Border, K. (2007): “Reduced Form Auctions Revisited,” Economic Theory 31(1), 167-181.
Eso, P. and B. Szentes (2007): “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap
1
Auction,” Review of Economic Studies, 74, 705-731.
Gutmann, S., Kemperman, J.H.B., Reeds, J.A., and Shepp, L.A. (1991): “Existence of
Probability Measures with Given Marginals,” The Annals of Probability 19 (4), 1781-1797.
Hart, S. and Reny, P.J. (2015): “Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Simple Approach
and a New Characterization,” Economic Theory Bulletin, 3, 1–8.
Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B. and Stacchetti, E. (1999): “Multidimensional Mechanism Design for
Auctions with Externalities,” Journal of Economic Theory 85(2), 258-294.
Jehiel, P., and B. Moldovanu (2001): “Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations,”
Econometrica, 69, 1237-1260.
*Krishna, V. and M. Perry: “Efficient Mechanism Design,” mimeo, Penn State University,
https://sites.google.com/site/vjkrishna/Efficient Mechanism Design.pdf.
Li, Hao, and Xianwen Shi (2017): “Discriminatory Information Disclosure,” American
Economic Review 107(11), November 2017, 3363-3385.
*Manelli, A. and D. Vincent (2010): “Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the
Independent, Private Values Model,” Econometrica 78(6), 1905-1939.
*Moldovanu, B., A. Gershkov, and X. Shi (2011): “Bayesian and Dominant Strategy
Implementation Revisited, mimeo, University of Bonn.
*Myerson, R.: “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operation Research, 1981, 6, 58-73.
Myerson, R. B., and M. Satterthwaite (1983): “Efficient Mechanism for Bilateral Trading,”
Journal of Economic Theory 28, 265-81.
2
Pavan, A., I. Segal, and J. Toikka (2012): “Dynamic Mechanism Design,” mimeo,
Northwestermn University, http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~apa522/DMD-revised-
final.pdf.
Ryser, H.J. (1957): “Combinatorial Properties of Matrices of Zeros and Ones,” Canadian
Journal of Mathematics 9, 371-377.
2.
Birkhoff, G. (1967): Lattice Theory. American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI.
*Blair, Charles (1988): “The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple
Partners,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 13, 619-628.
*Chiappori, P. A., and P. J. Reny (2016): “Matching to Share Risk,” Theoretical Economics, 11,
227–251.
*D. Gale and L. S. Shapley: "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage", American
Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-14, 1962.
Dubins, L., and Freedman, D. (1981). Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. The
American Mathematical Monthly, 88(7), 485–494.
Gul, F. and E. Stacchetti (1999): “Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 1999, 87, 9-124.
Hatfield, J. and P. Milgrom (2005) “Matching with Contracts,” American Economic Review 95,
913-935.
Roth, A. E. (1984). The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case
study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy, 92, 991–1016.
Roth, Alvin E. "The College Admissions Problem Is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem."
3
Journal of Economic Theory, 1985a, 36, pp. 277-88.
____. "Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open
Questions." Mathematics of Operations Research, 1985b, 10, pp. 379-89.
____. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional
Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom." American Economic Review,
1991, 81(3), pp. 415-40.
____. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided
Matching Markets." Econometrica, 1986, 54, pp. 425-27.
____. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching." Econometrica, 1984, 52, pp. 47-
57.
Roth, Alvin E. and Peranson, Elliott. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American
Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design." American Economic Review,
1999, 89, pp. 748-80.
3.
*Athey (2001): "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in
Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 69, 861-889.
Baye, M. R., G. Tian, and J. Zhou (1993): "Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in
Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs," Review of Economic Studies, 60,
935-948.
Eilenberg, S., and D. Montgomery (1946): "Fixed point Theorems for Multi-Valued
Transformations," American Journal of Mathematics, 68, 214-222.
4
McAdams, D. (2006): "Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions," Review of Economic
Studies, 73, 1039-1056.
Mertens, J. F. (1986): "The Minmax Theorem for U.S.C.-U.S.C. Payoff Functions," International
Journal of Game Theory 15, 237-250.
*Milgrom, P. and R. Weber (1985): "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete
Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 1985, 619-32.*
*Reny, P. (1999): “On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in
Discontinuous Games,” Econometrica, 67, 1029-1056.
*Reny, P. (2011): “On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games,
Econometrica, 79, 499-553
Simon, L. (1987): "Games with Discontinuous Payoffs," Review of Economic Studies," 54, 569-
597.
*Simon, L. and W. Zame (1990): "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules,"
Econometrica 58, 861-872.*
Sion, M. (1958): "On General Minimax Theorems," Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 8, 171-176.
Van Zandt, T. and X. Vives (2007): "Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic
Complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 339-360.
4.
Aumann, R.J., Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies, Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 1 (1974), 67-96.
Battigalli, P., Structural consistency and strategic independence in extensive games, Richerche
Economiche, 48 (1994a), 357-376.
*Blume, L., A. Brandenburger and E. Dekel, Lexicographic probabilities and choice under
uncertainty, Econometrica 59 (1991), 61-79.
__________ and W.R. Zame (1989): The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential
equilibrium, Econometrica 62 (1994), 783-794.
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*Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, Perfect bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium, Journal
of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 236-260.
*Kohlberg, E. and Reny P. (1997): “Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent
Assessments in Game Trees,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 280-313.*
Kuhn, H. (1953), Extensive games and the problem of information, in Contributions to the
Theory of Games 2 (1953), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 193-216.
Rényi, A. (1955): “On a new axiomatic theory of probability,” Acta Mathematica Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae, 6, 285-335.
Selten, R. (1975): “Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive
games," International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25-55.