G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, 
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and
a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for
the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-12426             February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination.

The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before
the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a
matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination
can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests,
this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. 

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the
practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also
embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the
legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board
of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

R E S O L U T I O N 49 SCRA 22

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the
Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar.  The Court accepted all comments on
the proposed integration.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar
integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the
legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional
authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech, as
well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax.
The Court held:

1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to
become a member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend
meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues.
Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the court
held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state”

2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer
may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make
every government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out
his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.

3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
Resolution             March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; 
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

DIOKNO, J.:

Facts:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. 

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he
obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past
few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,
and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages
of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration
of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. 
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place
by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in
the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of
the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955)
is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to
1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5%
w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.)

VERSION 2

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. 
Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time.  It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect.  The portion that was stricken down was based under the following
reasons:

1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;

3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and

4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner.  The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of
law.
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorneyin the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule
of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment
a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.
THIRD DIVISION

[ CBD Case No. 176, January 20, 1995 ]

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO AND ALFONSO M. MARTIJA,
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:

Facts:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta
charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and
unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the
execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. The letter-complaint stated
that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and
Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the
name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal
and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a sum of
money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In
the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were
declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading andevidence ex-parte was
received against them followed by a judgment by defaultrendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was
levied upon. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases,
Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP
receipt number. Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a
part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of themoney judgment which
complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the followingfindings and
recommendations:Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attachedto
the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a
faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on
aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in
said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless
to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and
abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her
husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on. However, as to the fact that
indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No.,
respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his
negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.  The explanation of
Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March
4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso
M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP
membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and
obligation of every lawyer to see toit that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he
practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.The
complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

Held:

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
theserequirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled toexpect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand,
has the fundamental duty tosatisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, espondents.
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8, 1988
Facts:
The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for which he is the registered
owner. He secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of
land for the security of the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial
foreclosure of the properties in question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The
private respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the
parcels of land. Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation
entered into a compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured another year for the said
properties. Included in the stipulations were the attorney’s fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The
private respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it came to finances and was apparently
unable to pay and secure the attorney’s fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by
petitioner and private respondent executed a document to redeem the parcels of land and to register
the same to his name. 

Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to his name but without
prior notice, the properties were already registered under the petitioner’s name. The private
respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said
certificates for the properties consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties. The
private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the Court of appeals which ruled over
the same. 
Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.
Ruling:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity
was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties
and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development
that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over
and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good
fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice,
eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are
not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for
money." 
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his liability
for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent
at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other.
A.C. No. L-1117             March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, 

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

Facts:

Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in the Sunday Tribune,
in direct violation of the provision of Section 25, Rule 127 which imposes a prohibition on soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice

Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes malpractice. Law is a
profession and not a trade. A member of the bar degrades himself or herself in adopting the
practices of mercantilism through advertising his or her services like a merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he promises to refrain from
repeating the same misconduct, the Court exercised leniency. He was merely reprimanded for his
violation and he was reminded that the most effective advertisement possible is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity as well as fidelity to
trust.
July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ.
GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO
H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R.
CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by
the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines,
or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already
passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride
on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or
of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name
in law practice is improper. 
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
Dacanay v. Baker & Mckenzie, May 10, 1985

FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the
name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used
the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman
for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay
replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his purpose of using the letterhead of
another law office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Rules of Court).

 Who may practice law. -  Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitledto practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated

with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical
because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firmname Baker & McKenzie. 
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

Facts: 

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April
11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998
Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following
documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification  issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his
place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5,
1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General  was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to
the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine
citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:

1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years
from  "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship,
as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest
civil registry.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

TOPIC: Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s
Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while
rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll,
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as
important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his
MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate
penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said
action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after
the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a
member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the
law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of
the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon
him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period,
petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.
[A.C. No. 3249. August 9, 2004]
CORDOVA vs. CORDOVA

Salvacion Cordova vs Atty. Laurence

Cordova
179 SCRA 680 – Legal Ethics – Moral Delinquency 

In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with two children, left his
wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986, Salvacion and Cordova had a
reconciliation where Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But apparently, Cordova still continued to
cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again lived with another woman and worse, he took one of his
children with him and hid the child away from Salvacion.

In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually, multiple hearing
dates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party appeared. In 1989, Salvacion sent a
telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating that she and her husband has
reconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her evidence ex parte, merely
recommended the reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.

HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has been morally
reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife. Before a person can be
admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good moral character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes “a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage” such was the case in the case at bar.
 In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The
death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries
uponhim in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity
initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his
colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two
(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to
take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed   a
petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice
of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that
his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE:

Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be

admitted to the practice of law

HELD:

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
who are seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how he has
tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of
the deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he mustshow
evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fitfor
admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation,
of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES:
 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral
character, with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the
general public and proper administration of justice is concerned.
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
those seeking admission to the Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who wouldseek
admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of
conduct expected from members of the general public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant
was possessed of good moral character.
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to take the
barexaminations and more importantly at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
IN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner
Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused the death of Raul Camaligan a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a
probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed
but was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his probation was already terminated. The
court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit him to the practice of
law.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL
and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all
Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by the court to
produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit to the
admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of
Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal profession.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,
PETITIONER. (DIGEST)

B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

TOPIC:

Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of
Attorneys

FACTS:

Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took
the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on
13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found
said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was
not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently
forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his
acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error
of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for
petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon
him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to
have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is

presumed to know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought
that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was just
an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member
of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, November 29, 1983 Digest, 211 Phil. 373

FACTS:
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr.,
of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of
petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San
Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979,
denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that
appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a
scarcity of legal practitioner. 
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate
criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious
physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in
the then Municipal Court of Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of
the U. P. College of Law where, as part of the curriculum of the university they were required to
render legal assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid.  Thus, in August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan.  Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.  Likewise,
on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute
cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants.

HELD:
YES. Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979
which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as
friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan, where se aside and respondent
judge was ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of
petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan.  Accordingly, the temporary
restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 was LIFTED.
The court found merit in the petition.  Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly
provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of
an agent appointed by him for the purpose.  Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621,
a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal
Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not
allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in
conducting his defense."
The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutor.  In the first place, the law does not impose this condition.  What the fiscal can do, if
he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation,
whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case.  On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the
active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and
control.  Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of
the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to
appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor
reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly
instituted in said criminal cases.  Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal
interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be
deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

Cruz v. Mijares
G.R. No. 154464 | Sept 11, 2008 | J. Nachura

FACTS
Petitioner Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC in a civil
case for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a nonlawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.
During the pretrial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the
Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a partylitigant. Atty.
Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pretrial brief to
which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the
Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes.
Ok?” and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing.

Petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of
the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pretrial. It asserts
that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders
the belief that justice will not be served.

In an Order, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it
was said even prior to the start of pretrial. Petitioner filed a MR of the said order.

Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In MR, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138A, but Section 34 of Rule
138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the
respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138A. Petitioner filed this case with SC.

ISSUES
1) W/N the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court may issue
2) W/N respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from trying the case

HELD
1) YES (It should be filed with CA, but SC took cognizance because it involves interpretation of
procedural rules).

This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive;
it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is
not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application
therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.

The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs;
and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions
filed directly before it. Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule
138 and Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

2) NO (But it erred in denying petitioner’s appearance).

Sec. 34 or Rule 138 recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a
party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and
that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual
litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination
of the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules
of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs
the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own
instance, can personally conduct the litigation. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as
a party exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore,
be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138A, when the
basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a
law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a nonlawyer as a party
representing himself.

No GAD on the part of Judge

Petitioner filed an administrative case against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings
of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on
whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case before her.

Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule
in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

OTHER ARGUMENTS
Right to counsel may not be waived  only applies in criminal cases
Bar Matter 730 – a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the
supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts

Ferdinand Cruz vs Mina

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES,
Respondents.

FACTS:

Ferdinand Cruz, a third year law student, filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance as private prosecutor
for the criminal case of grave threats, where his father is the complaining witness. MeTC denied his petition, so he
elevated this to the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, stating that since there was no claim for civil liability for
damages, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

ISSUE: Can the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats be prosecuted despite the absence of a claim for civil liability
for damages? YES
HELD:

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except
in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an
enemy country, and crime against popular representation. The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect
in the criminal case for grave threats, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted
with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

[G.R. No. 126625. September 23, 1997]

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE,
PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR,
ABELARDO SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS,
RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO
CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITOSALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO
TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO
PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS
ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA,
ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal
office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the
National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown, Sta.
Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked
under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its
completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private respondents and its other
employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them
wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay.
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.

The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre
and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio
admitted petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and
thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived
petitioner’s right to file its position paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were
dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to pay the employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied
due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner.

NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiters.

RULING: It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address
in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summons served on
Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and
authorized representative of petitioner.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or partnership must be
made upon its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
These persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know their responsibilities and
immediately discern what to do with any legal papers served on them.

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised the
construction project. 9 According to the Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio
attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he
had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him
and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner
was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims of private
respondents is another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent
Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .

A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written
proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice
or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a
party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its members, with written authorization from
them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter. 11

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members of a legal
aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was
authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority
especially since both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this
authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not
bind petitioner.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear as
representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters
and respondent Commission. Petitioner’s liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay.
A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the
express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be
duly established by evidence.

Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to
bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or
express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge
of a client’s claim.

After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as promised, Labor Arbiters
Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective position papers. The arbiters
forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring private respondents to
substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file position papers but
petitioner’s waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid and
settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its
“promise,” there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to
order the parties to file their position papers.

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree upon an
amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order
stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties
to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.

MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA, PETITIONER. VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GERRY R. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTC, BR.
76, MARIKINA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed against Perla Y.
Corpuz in an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila.  By
the same token, on a countercharge of petitioner, Perla Y. Corpuz was charged in an information
for the same offense before the same court.
The cases were consolidated and both parties were duly represented by counsel, the trial court
rendered a decision dated January 12, 1989 convicting the petitioner of the crime charged and
sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium period of eleven (11) days
to twenty (20) days but acquitting Perla Y. Corpuz with costs de oficio in both cases. Upon
appeal, the RTC rendered judgment modifying the penalty to a straight penalty of eleven days
imprisonment. Motion to the RTC was denied.

On September 20, 1989, petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days from September 30, 1989 or up to
October 19, 1989 within which to file a petition for review on the ground that she has to look for
another lawyer to represent her and prepare the necessary petition.  The motion was granted by
the appellate court in a resolution dated October 16, 1989.

However, instead of filing the petition for review, petitioner in her own behalf filed on October
9, 1989 a written manifestation and motion to withdraw petition for review for the purpose of
applying for probation in the court of origin, “she being a first offender and possesses (sic) all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for under the said probation law."[1] The
motion was granted by the appellate court in a resolution dated October 24, 1989, copy of which
was received by petitioner on October 30, 1989. The entry of judgment was made on October 25,
1989.

On November 17, 1989, the petitioner filed a joint or alternative motion for reconsideration and
reinstatement of petition for review and petition for relief from judgment with prayer for a
temporary restraining order based on the ground that the motion to withdraw the petition for
review was filed without the advice of her lawyer and under the honest impression that her
application for probation pending with the lower court will be granted.

In a resolution dated February 20, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion for lack of
merit. Hence this petition for review on certiorari with prayer for restraining order.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner may conduct a litigation personally.

HELD:
Yes.

Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

"SEC. 34.  By whom litigation conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.  In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar."
From the foregoing provision of the rule, it is clear that a party in a case may conduct a litigation
either personally or by an attorney in the courts.  He may also be assisted by an agent or friend
for the purpose in the inferior courts.  And even if a party may have chosen to appear through
counsel, he may at any time dispense with the services of his/her lawyer and prosecute or defend
his/her case personally.

In this case the Court notes that before the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial
Court, the petitioner was duly represented by counsel.  However, when she decided to elevate her
case to the Court of Appeals she chose to handle her case personally, first, by asking for an
extension of time within which to file a petition for review and second, by filing thereafter a
petition to withdraw the petition for review to enable her to apply for probation.  Unfortunately,
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No 1257 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990
dated October 5, 1985, it is specifically provided that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted when the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.”

Thus, as petitioner failed to secure favorable action on her application for probation, she filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the appellate court - granting her motion to
withdraw - or in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment alleging that she was not duly
assisted by counsel then and that she was under the honest impression that she could apply for
probation, and that if the motion is granted, petitioner could very well demonstrate that the
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses by the lower court which was relied upon by the
Regional Trial Court is misplaced as the one who decided the case is different from the judge
who heard the case.

The said alternative motion for reconsideration or petition for relief from judgment, however,
was filed only on November 17, 1989, beyond the reglementary period.  Petitioner received a
copy of the questioned resolution dated October 24, 1989 on October 30, 1989.  Hence, said
resolution had become final by the time petitioner filed her motion.  Besides, the alternative
petition for relief from judgment is not accompanied by an affidavit of merit as required by the
rules.[3]

The Court emphasizes the fact that it is always better for a party to be represented by counsel in a
litigation.  Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to appear in his or her own behalf to
prosecute or defend cause in court.  If in the process petitioner suffered reverses, she has only
herself to blame.  She is bound by the consequences of her own voluntary act.

The judgment of conviction of the petitioner for slight physical injuries inflicted by the petitioner
upon the offended party was arrived at by the Regional Trial Court based on the testimony of the
offended party corroborated by her witnesses and proof of the injury.  Such judgment has
become final and petitioner must now face the reality of submitting herself for its execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, 

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, governor of Antique was one of the several defendants in Criminal Cases for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a case against both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman. Petitioner alleged that the latter, as Tanodbayan  was no longer vested with power and
authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against
public officials and employees, under the 1987 Constitution, hence the cases filed were all null and void.

The Court then issued a TRO ordering respondents Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to cease and desist
in further investigating and arrest of the petitioner.

However, Gonzales continued filing a case against Zaldivar and also issued an alleged contemptuous
statements to the media, the “Philippine Daily Globe:” stating that Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft
Case, and that SC is only favoring the rich and the influential persons. The latter also said, that while the
President had been prodding him to prosecute graft cases, even if they involve the high and mighty, the
SC had been restraining him to do his official duties. Thus, this prompted Zaldivar to file a motion for
contempt to Gonzales.

SC ordered Gonzales to explain himself. The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was
merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of
qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

ISSUE:

Whether Gonzales is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:

Yes, Gonzales is guilty of contempt.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.

The Court is compelled to hold that the statements made by Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and
call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent’s statements,
especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision, necessarily
implying that the justices of the Court betrayed their oath of office, constitute the grossest kind of
disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.

In re: Almacen, the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzales indefinitely from the practice of law.

MANUEL L. LEE,  A.C. No. 5281

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
 
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
CORONA, J.:
Facts:

Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial
Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in
containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which
were also questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their
respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged
before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5,
1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA).

Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly
exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law
and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint
was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that
did not prosper.

However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In
resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with
modification against the respondent and in favor of the complainant.

Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal
Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?

Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct as he
violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty.
Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his Notarial commission revoked. In
addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as
an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary Public.

Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE SUSPENSION OF HOWARD D. TERRELL FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW
Reference: G.R. No. 1203            May 15, 1903
FACTS
An action for the suspension of attorney-at-law Howard Terrell from the practice of law
was filed in the CFI of Manila for allegedly assisting in the organization of “Centro Bellas Artes”
and acting as attorney for such association with full knowledge that it was created for the
purpose of evading the law then in force in said city. The CFI of Manila held that the charges
against Terrell were true and made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the
Philippine Islands. Aside from the action for his suspension from the practice of law, Terrell was
also charged with estafa in a separate criminal action but was eventually acquitted.
ISSUES
Whether or not Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law?
RULINGS
Yes, he should be suspended.
 The promotion of an organization for the purpose of violating or evading the penal laws
amounts to such malpractice on the part of an attorney at law as will justify removal or
suspension.
Assisting a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest or conniving at a
violation of law are acts which are enough to justify disbarment. However, Terrell’s acquittal on
the charge of estafa serves to lower his sanction to suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippine Islands for the term of one year from February 7, 1903.

IN RE GUTIERREZ, 5 SCRA 661

Facts:

Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While he was the municipal mayor of Calapan, he and other co-
conspirators murdered the former municipal mayor of Calapan, for which they were held guilty and sentenced to the
penalty of death. Upon review by the Supreme Court the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a
portion of the sentence, Gutierrez was granted conditional pardon by the President. The unexecuted portion of the
prison term was remitted on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. The
widow of the murdered victim then filed a complaint with the Supreme Court asking that Gutierrez be removed from
the rule of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5.

Issue:

Whether or not the conditional pardon to Gutierrez places him beyond the rule of disbarment.

Held: NO.
 
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder
is, without doubt, such a crime. “Moral turpitude” includes everything contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
 
In the Lontok case, on which Gutierrez relies, the respondent, Lontok, was granted absolute or
unconditional pardon after conviction for the crime of crime of bigamy. It was held that such pardon releases the
punishment and blots out existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense.
 
In the case at bar, the pardon granted was conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his
term. It was not a full pardon which could have blotted out the offense committed.
 
The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in band, by taking
advantage of his official position, and with the use of a motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude warrants
disbarment. Admission of a candidate to the bar requires academic preparation and satisfactory testimonials of good
moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must adhere to
them or incur the risk of suspension or removal.
A.C. No. 1109             April 27, 2005

MARIA ELENA MORENO, Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA

A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11,
000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is
closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted
the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The
Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for
having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. 

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed
account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel,
we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from
the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant
case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and
that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In
fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent
unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his
conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.”
A.C. No. 5816

DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to
dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from
the Dominican Republic.

On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce
decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their
union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her
of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter  written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.”
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however,
that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her
marital obligations. Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed
by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.

 
IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complaint against Atty. Baydo – dismissed for
dearth of evidence.

ISSUE:
WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.

Ruling:

Yes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes
these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral,

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to
in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at
that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently,
he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his
firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution
of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported
love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.
A.C. No. 5581               January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Facts:

Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, entered into a contract
of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted
another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still
valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first
marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

 Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

Issue:

 whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice

Ruling:

 For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders
him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar

 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
 Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA vs. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON

FACTS: Sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, while Ventura was sleeping in the maid’s room
at respondent’s house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips,
sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood
stain in her panty. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty
where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her not
to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.

In her Supplemental-Complaint, complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his
house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High School.
She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when respondent went
on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and nobody
could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that respondent forced her to ride a
multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated
shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.

The complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their
respective Affidavits of Desistance. Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her
in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed
against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty of Disbarment is proper

RULING: The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the
bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer may be it in the lawyer’s
public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee,
constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual
intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did
nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having
carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very
young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human
person and the ethics of his profession. Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him
by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether the
sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is of
no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act.
Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should
be disciplined accordingly.
 The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the
legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. Complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings
in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as
a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief
to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct,
Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Adm. Case No. 4680             August 29, 2000

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, 

vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held the
position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The
respondents helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes received by them by either adding
more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes
of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative complaint for their disbarment.
Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake, oversight and fatigue.
Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated them from any
offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.

Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing
of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the
same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the
canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as
an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude
of the error renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply
unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of
votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures
in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns.
A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true
and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By
express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition,
they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” The Court found the
respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warning that
similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.

IBP Election

October 6, 1989

A.M. No. 491

Facts

The new national officers of the IBP who were elected on June 3, 1989 were schedule to take their oath
but was suspended by the SC because of a widespread news and allegation that the said election was
done with extensive electioneering, overspending of candidates, use of government planes and officious
intervention influencing votes which were done contrary to the IBP-bylaws by the candidates namely
Atty. Drilon, Atty. Nisce and Atty. Paculdo. The court issued subpoena to all persons concerned; the
columnist, the candidates, managers of Hotels and other persons that would help shed some light to the
truth of the said allegation surrounding the IBP election.

Issue

Whether or not the candidates had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility through their
defiance of the IBP-bylaws.

Ruling

Yes, the court found through the testimony and evidences presented like the testimony of the
candidate4s themselves, their disclosure of their campaign expenses, testimony of other lawyers and
persons to the acts of the candidates in the preparation to the election clearly violated Sec 14 of the IBP-
bylaws and made travesty of the idea of a strictly non-political IBP

The candidates and many of the participants in the election, not only violated the IBP-bylaws but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyer as a corollary of their obligation to obey
and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to respect for law and legal processes and to abstain
from activities aimed at defiance of law or at lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.01 Canon
1). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves who are supposed to be minions of the
law engages in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.