VALERIANO F. NUÑEZ vs.​ ​JUDGE FRANCISCO B.

IBAY
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 June 30, 2009

Facts:
Complainant was a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall. On April 1, 2005, at around five
o’clock in the afternoon, he parked the government vehicle which he was driving, an L-300 van with plate number
SFN-767, at the basement of the Makati City Hall and left the key in their office because drivers were not allowed
to bring such vehicles home. After the flag ceremony on April 4, 2005, complainant went to the Office of the
Engineering Department where he received an Order from respondent Judge, directing the former to appear
before the latter on that same day at ten o’clock in the morning and to explain why he occupied the parking space
allotted for respondent Judge.
When complainant appeared before respondent Judge, the latter asked him if he had a lawyer. Although
complainant replied in the negative, respondent Judge still further questioned the complainant. Complainant
apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent Judge’s space, and that he did not know
that such space was reserved for respondent Judge.
However, respondent Judge refused to accept complainant’s apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct
contempt of court for using the former’s parking space, sentencing complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and
a fine of one thousand pesos (₱1,000.00).​3​ Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring complainant to the City
Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the latter was incarcerated for two days.

Issue:
Whether Judge Ibay is guilty of grave abuse of authority

Ruling:
Yes. Based on the testimonies of both parties and their witnesses, the undersigned Investigating Justice believes
that the complainant was not the person who parked the van on respondent judge’s parking slot, but rather that it
was Oscar de los Reyes. Complainant during the hearing maintained that he parked the L-300 van in the middle,
and not on the side, which was the parking slot assigned to respondent judge. Although the witness, Oscar de los
Reyes testified that, after buying "merienda" (on April 2, 2005), he parked the van at the same place, he failed to
explain where exactly he parked the van. Thus, we cannot discount the possibility that De los Reyes might have
parked the van at the same place, meaning the basement parking, but not necessarily on the very same spot or
slot.
But whether it was complainant or it was Oscar de los Reyes who parked the van, it would not change or alter the
fact that respondent judge committed grave abuse of authority in holding the complainant in contempt of court
for parking on his slot. Respondent judge himself declared that had he known that it was De los Reyes who parked
the van he would not have asked complainant to explain, but instead De los Reyes. Obviously, respondent judge
was really bent on citing for contempt of court the person responsible for doing the parking in the parking slot
which he believed, (perhaps erroneously), was his assigned parking slot. Obviously, too, there is a streak of cruel
sadism, of pettiness or meanness, in respondent judge’s character, as it would seem that he could not refrain from
exhibiting such excesses as causing the manacling (apparently in open court at that), of an unintentional offender
like the complainant herein, who had the misfortune to injure, if innocuously, his wounded pride and ego as a
judge.
In this case, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds no reason why complainant’s act of parking on the parking
slot of respondent judge would constitute contempt of court. Therefore, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is
found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant Valeriano F. Nuñez for contempt without legal
basis.
 ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN
vs. ​BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA
G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of
the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax
ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." However,
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ​showed
that respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is
a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino
prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It
appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the
same subject matter.

Issue:
Whether respondent Balajadia is liable for indirect contempt

Ruling:
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to project
himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting
of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was, indeed,
the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his
lack of intent to illegally practice law. The petition is DISMISSED.
 PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al
G.R. 151809-12, April 12, 2005

Facts:
In 1976, the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. The Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s
assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s
liquidation as mandated by RA 265.
After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al.
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al.,
which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment
as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza
The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service.”
Held:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar
is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza
on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He
also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in
the Civil case of sequestration. The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
substantial.
People vs. Villanueva
G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965

Facts:
On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with crime of
Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the
same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private-prosecutor, having securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice.
Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in
this case, “this time invoking Sec. 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain
attorneys from practicing.

Issue​:
Whether or not Atty. Fule violated Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain
attorneys from practicing

Ruling:
The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule
had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, JR.
 A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006

Facts:
Atty. Saguico, the complainant in this case, contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the
operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating
and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent
instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and
sign an affidavit to support the complaint.
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, another P10,000 for
the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor

Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition
on a government employee to “engage in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions.”
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not
a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the
law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge,
the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”

CATU VS. RELLOSA

 A.C. NO. 5738 (FEBRUARY 19, 2008)

Facts:
Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of
the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5​th​ District of Manila where the respondent was
the Punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing
to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of
the appropriate action in court.

Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of
this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as
Punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that as Punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and
that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The
complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2)
of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of
Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended
suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Issue:
Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper

Held:​
No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional
Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to
former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any
matter in which they had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an
incumbent Punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.
While under RA 7160, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total
or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the Punong barangay and the members of the Sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed
to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.

Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a
lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months.
 Olbes vs. Atty. Deciembre
A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005

Facts:
Complainants were government employees. Through respondent, Lourdes renewed a loan
application from Rodela Loans Inc., in the amount of P10,000.00. She issued and delivered 5 PNB blank
checks, which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as for the future loans. Lourdes paid
respondent P14,874.37 intended to the loan plus surcharges, penalties, and interests, for which the
latter issued a receipt. Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up the blank
checks entrusted to him by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and
deposited the same checks which were dishonored upon presentment because the account is already
closed. Thereafter, he filed a criminal case against complainants for Estafa and for violation of B.P. 22.
Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for the disbarment of Atty. Deciembre and charged the
respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
YES. Respondent lawyer violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for he
seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had
not been agreed upon at all and despite full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the
checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted
to for his material gain. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct.
He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming a member
of the bar. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the
filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Respondent is hereby
indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law.