Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
A.N. Veeraraghavan*
Introductory
Short history
(/) King's courts
Law, as a profession, appears to have been in vogue in ancient India
though its concept was quite different from what it is today. The provisions
regarding the legal profession as they have existed for some years past, and
as they are today are the natural outcome of the legal system introduced by
the Britishers, and it would be sufficient for the present purpose to begin
the history of the profession from about the time when the Britishers came
to this country.
Courts of Record in the name of Mayor's Courts and Courts of Record
in the name of the Court Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery were set
up in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta on the 24th of September, 1726 by
a Charter granted by King George I. They were authorised to frame rules
of practice. But there was no provision as to who could act or plead before
those courts. The language of the courts appeared to have been English.
The Mayor's Court at Madras ceased to function when Madras was captured
by the French. After the peace treaty of 1749, Madras was restored to
the East India Company. Then the Company surrendered the Charter
of 1726 and King George II granted to the Company a fresh Charter in
1755. By this Charter, the Mayor's Courts and the Courts of Oyer and
Terminer were re-established in the three settlements.
Thereafter pursuant to the Regulating Act of 1773, authorised by the
King's Charter or Letters Patent, the Supreme Court was established at
Fort William in Bengal through a Charter issued on the 26th of March, 1774.
The language of the court was English. Clause 11 of the Charter provided :
The 'advocates' entitled thus, to appear were only the English and
Irish barristers and members of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland; the
attorneys referred to were the British attorneys and solicitors. The cou:t
was thus an exclusive preserve for members of the British legal profession.
And Indian lawyer had no right of appearance in the courts.
When the Supreme Courts with the same jurisdiction and power were
established at Bombay and Madras later, the same powers for the enrolment
of advocates and attorneys-at-law were conferred on them. The Indians had
no right to appear before the courts.
clerk for three years was sufficient besides passing of certain examinations.
The High Court was given the power, under section 6 to make rules
as to the qualifications, admission, and certificates, of proper persons to be
(a) pleaders of the subordinate courts and of the revenue offices, and (b)
to be mukhtar s of subordinate courts, and the fees to be paid for the examina-
tion and admission of such persons. The rules made by the different High
Courts regarding the qualifications of pleaders varied. In this connection
it may be pointed out that In re Regina Guha1 and in the Matter of Application
by Miss Sudarshan Subala Hazara2 the Calcutta and Patna High Courts
held that under the Rules made by the High Court under section 6, women
could not be admitted and enrolled as pleaders. To remove doubts
entertained as to the eligibility of women to be enrolled, the Legal Practit-
ioners (Women) Act, 1923, was passed to provide that notwithstanding
anything contained in the previous enactments or other provisions in this
regard, "no woman shall, by reason only of her sex, be disqualified from
being admitted or enrolled as a Legal Practitioner." Since this enactment,
women have been getting enrolled as legal practioners and the number has
been increasing year after year. Reference may be made to the rules in
Madras under which law graduates and graduates who passed the pleader-
ship examination if not enrolled in the High Court, could practise in all the
civil and criminal courts in any three contiguous districts, by getting enrolled
as 1st grade pleaders. Persons could get enrolled as 2nd grade pleaders
if they were graduates in Arts only and had passed the pleadership examina-
tion. They could practise in certain courts in any one district. Persons
admitted previously as revenue agents were continued under the proviso to
section 10.
A mukhtar could apply to be enrolled in any civil or criminal court
mentioned in the certificate issued. On enrolment he could practise in
the civil court referred to in the certificate and in the subordinate courts;
and subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, appear and
plead in the criminal court within the limits of the above reflerred court
and its subordinate courts.
The High Court could suspend or dismiss any pleader or mukhtar
holding a certificate issued to him who was convicted of a criminal offence
implying a defect of character which made him unfit to be a pleader or
mukhtar as the case may be. It could also, after such inquiry, if it thought
fit, suspend or dismiss any pleader or mukhtar holding a certificate, guilty
of fraudulent or improper conduct in the discharge of his professional
duty, or in the other circumstances mentioned in section 13 of the Act. The
presiding officer of any subordinate court who on enquiry found that the
pleader or mukhtar should be dismissed or suspended, had to report to the
High Court, which could acquit or suspend or dismiss him
Section 27 empowered the High Court to fix and regulate from time
to time the fees payable by any.party in respect of his adversary's advocate,
1. I.L.R. 40 Cal. 290.
2. I.L.R. 1 Pat. 104f
1972] LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961 233
(iv) The Chamier Committee and the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926
of the advocates of one High Court to practise in another High Court was
made subject to the rules made by the High Court. The rules made by the
Bar Councils had stipulated that advocates of other High Courts would
be permitted to appear and plead in the respective High Courts only with
the permission of the Chief Justice provided an advocate enrolled in that
High Court appeared with him. The provisions in the Bar Council's Act
were regarded as unsatisfactory.
(yi) The recommendations of the All India Bar Committee and the Law
Commission
The Bar was not satisfied with passing of the Bar Council's Act, 1926.
The Act had not covered the pleaders, mukhtars and Revenue agents practis-
ing in the mofussil courts and revenue offices and consequently did not set
up a unified Indian Bar. Further the powers conferred on the Bar Councils
constituted under the Act were limited and the Bar Councils were neither
autonomous nor had any substantial authority. Therefore, several non-
official members' bills8 had been introduced to amend the law relating to
the legal profession and had lapsed and nothing concrete emerged. With
the coming into force of the Constitution in 1950 and the establishment of
a Supreme Court for India the need for an all-India Bar was stressed by the
legal fraternity. In this situation, the Union government set up a committee
known as the All India Bar Committee under the Chairmanship of justice
S.R. Das of the Supreme Court. In 1953 the committee recommended,
inter alia, an All India Bar Council and the maintenance of a common
roll of advocates by the All India Bar Council. The committee had con-
sidered at length the questions of the constitution and powers of the state
Bar Councils and the All India Bar Council and made detailed recommenda-
tions. It proceeded on the principle that the Bar should be autonomous
in matters relating to the profession. But the government did not take
any steps in pursuance of the committee's recommendations.9
Subsequently in 1955 the Law Commission, presided cover by Mr.
M.C. Setalvad, then Attorney-General of India, in its fourteenth report
on the Reform of Judicial Administration endorsed the recommendations
of the All India Bar Committee, as regards the creation of a unified all
India Bar as well as the establishment, composition and functions of the
state and All India Bar Councils. The Law Commission further
recommended, inter alia, that the requirement of a certain number of years'
practice in the High Court for enrolment as a Supreme Court advocate
should be dispensed with, the advocates on the common roll should have
the right to practise in all the courts in India, the dual system should continue
on the original side of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and the Bar
should be divided into senior advocates and advocates.10
and vvho, within the prescribed time, express an intention in the prescribed
manner, to practise within the jurisdiction of the Bar Council; and all other
persons who are admitted to be advocates on the roll of the state Bar Council
under the Act on or after the appointed day.
The rolls of advocates to be maintained by every state Bar Council
have to be in two parts, thefirstpart containing the names of senior advocates
and the second part containing the names of other advocates. Every state
Bar Council has to send to the Bar Council of India an authenticated copy
of the roll of advocates prepared by it for the first time under the Act, and
has thereafter to communicate to it all alterations in and additions to
to the roll as soon as the same have been made.12
The common roll which the Bar Council of India has to prepare and
maintain under section. 20 comprises the entries made in all state rolls,
copies of which are received by it under section 19, and the names of all
advocates entitled as of right to practise in the Supreme Court immediately
before the appointed day, i.e., 1-12-1961 and whose names are not entered
in any state roll. No person can be enrolled as an advocate on the roll of
more than one State Bar Council.
(iv) Transfer
A person whose name is entered in the roll of a state Bar Council
can apply for transfer of his name to another state Bar Council. The
application has to be made to the Bar Council of India in the prescribed form
and the Bar Council of India has to direct the transfer of the name without
the payment of any fee. The Bar Council of India may reject the application
if the application is not bona fide or if it is by a person against whom any
disciplinary action is pending. A rule made by the Bar Council of India
on these matters provides that every advocate shall be under an obligation
to see that his name appears on the roll of the state Council within whose
jurisdiction he ordinarily practices, provided, however, that this rule shall
not apply to advocates whose names are entered in the common roll and
are not entered in any state roll.14
(v) Senior advocates
Persons who were senior advocates immediately before the appointed
day, i.e., 1-12-1961 have been deemed to be senior advocates for the purposes
of the Act. Besides, power has been conferred under section 16 of the Act
to the Supreme Court and the High Courts to designate any advocate as
senior advocate if in its opinion by virtue of his ability, experience and
standing at the Bar, he is deserving of such distinction. Senior advocates
are governed by the rules of the Supreme Court applicable to them,15 and
12. S. 19.
13. S. 17(4).
14. Rule 1, chapter III, part IV, Rules of the Bar Council of India.
15. Order V, Supreme Court Rules.
242 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 14 : 2
are also subject to the restrictions laid down by the Bar Council of India
in the interest of the legal profession.16
(vi) Entries in rolls—seniority
(a) Rolls of state bar councils
Entries in each part of the roll of advocates have to be in the order
of seniority. The principles for determining seniority have been laid down,
but they are subject to the rules made by the Bar Council of India in this
behalf, which provide for seniority on the basis of the date of enrolment
under the Bar Councils Act in the case of those whose names are entered
under section 17(l)(a), and in the case of those enrolled under the Advocates
Act under section 17(1)(Z?).17
(Practise in High Courts) Act, 1951, it was open to him to express such
intention and get his name enrolled in the roll of a state Bar Council. If
he did it and the name was included, his seniority would be counted from
the date of enrolment as advocate under the Bar Councils Act. But if he
chose not to express such intention and did not get his name included in
the roll, he would nevertheless be entitled to practice, and his name
has to be included by the Bar Council of India in the common roll. Diffe-
rent Bar Councils had prescribed different dates as the last date for intimation
and the dates fixed by all of them have expired long ago.
In this connection, it is necessary to invite attention to special provisions
made under section 58A and section 58AA (by a later amendment) for certain
advocates who were deemed to be persons enrolled as advocates under
the Bar Councils Act, 1926, and with reference to those who were practising
the profession of law in the Union Territory of Pondicherry and also to
section 58AB with reference to certain persons enrolled in the High Court
of Mysore.
(viii) Qualifications for admission as an advocate
Section 24 of the Act lays down the qualifications for admission as
an advocate. Broadly speaking, the following are entitled to be admitted
as advocates, if they fulfil also certain other requirements laid down under
the section :
(/) A person who has obtained a degree in law from any university
in India or from any university outside the territory of India,
recognised by the Bar Council of India for the purposes of the
Act;
(if) a barrister;
(///) A vakil or a pleader who is a law graduate if his application for
enrolment was made within two years from the appointed day
viz. 1-12-1961;
(z'v) A person who has for at least three years been a vakil or a pleader
or a mukhtar or was at any time entitled to be enrolled under
any law for the time being in force as an advocate of a High
Court or of a Court of Judicial Commissioner or in any union
territory.
An applicant for admission has to be a citizen of India and should
have completed the age of 21 years. He should pay a fee of Rs. 250 to
the state Bar Council and should fulfil the other requriements as laid down
by the rules of the state Bar Councils, which generally include an application
for admission on the production of the certificate granted by the university
in respect of the degree in law granted by the university, and certificates
of character. However, a national of any other country may be admitted
as an advocate in a state roll, if citizens of India duly qualified are permitted
to practise law in that country.
If the application is on the basis of the degree in law obtained from
a university in India or outside the territory of India, section 24(1) (d)
244 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 14:2
and recognition of degrees in law of the university prescribe inter alia the
following conditions :
A person to be eligible to join the course of study in law should be a
graduate of a university or hold such academic qualification which is con-
sidered by the Bar Council of India equivalent to a graduate degree of
a university. The duration of the course of instruction shall be three years.
This is with reference to those who join the course of instruction in or after
the first term of the academic year 1967-68. In the case of fourteen universi-
ties, however, for reasons considered sufficient by the Bar Council of India,
it was the first term of the academic year 1968-69 instead of 1967-68. The
course of instruction comprises ten compulsory subjects and six others
as optional as mentioned in the rules.18
During the last year of the course, the instruction and practical training
should also be imparted for a period of six months in the rules of courts
and in drafting and pleadings and documents.
According to the resolution of the Bar Council of India, practical
training would include—pleading and conveyancing; moot courts and
conducting civil and criminal proceedings; attending courts; maintaining
a record of the above three requirements and arrangements of at least six
lectures on professional ethics, attendance at four of which shall be compul-
sory. The scope and nature of training as set out in this resolution is not
to be deemed as exhaustive. It should thus be open to the universities
and law colleges to add to the same and work out a report on this matter
and send it to the Bar Council of India at the earliest. Practical training
should be made a part of the examination system for which marks should
be assigned and awarded.
The rules on standards of legal education were made, as required
under the Act, in consultation with the universities imparting legal education
and the state Bar Councils. In accordance with the above rules, the Bar
Council of India in exercise of the powers conferred under sections 24(l)(c)(iii)
of the Advocates Act, has recognised degrees in law obtained from any
of the universities which fulfils the requirements of rule 11 of its rules and
obtained by those who had commenced the three-year course of instruction
as provided for, in the first term of the academic year 1967-68 by actual
attendance at colleges. Under the powers vested in it, it has permitted
the postponement of the three-year course to the academic year 1968-69
in the case of the universities of Kanpur, Madras, Meerut, Bangalore, Aligarh,
Mysore, Bhagalpur, Patna, Agra, Ranchi, Behrampur and Jiwaji, Sardar
Patel and Yikram universities, One of the functions of the Bar Council
of India is as mentioned earlier, to visit and inspect universities, imparting
legal education.
J8. The compuslory subjects are : Indian Legal and Constitutional History;
Contracts; Torts; Family Law including Hindu and Mchammadan Law ; Crimes and
Procedure; Constitutional Law of India; Property Law; Evidence; Legal Theory
(Jurisprudence and Comparative Law); Civi] Procedure, Limitation and Arbitration, .
246 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 1 4 : 2
to practise. One of the objects of the Act is to have in course of time only
one class of legal practitioners. Different provisions of this chapter have
been brought into force at different times. For instance, section 32 which
empowers the courts to allow persons who are not enrolled as advocates
to appear before them in particular cases was brought into force from
4-1-1963. Sections 29,31,33 and 34 were brought into force from 1-6-1969.
Section 30 has not yet been brought into force. Section 29 provides that
subject to the provisions of the Act as from the appointed day (1-6-1969),
there shall be only one class of persons entitled to practise the profession
of law, namely, advocates. Under section 30 all advocates are entitled
as of right to practice throughout the territories to which the Act extends
in all courts including the Supreme Court, before any tribunal or person
legally authorised to take evidence or before any other authority or person
before whom such advocate is entitled to practise. Further under section 33
advocates alone are entitled to practise in any court.
However, sections 29, 30 and 33 have to be read along with section
50(2) and sections 55 and 58 of the Act. Section 50(2) provides that on the
date on which chapter III (Admission and Enrolment of Advocates) comes
into force (it came into force on 1-12-1961) certain sections of the Legal
Practitioners Act, 1879, Bombay Pleaders Act, 1920, Indian Bar Councils
Act, 1926, and Letters Patent of High Courts which relate to the admission
and enrolment of legal practitioners stand repealed. Under sections 55
and 58 rights of certain existing legal practitioners are protected. The
net effect of the above provisions is that there can be no fresh admission
of any other class of legal practitioners such as pleaders, mukhtars or revenue
agents under any of the other enactments till then in force as these provisions
stand repealed, and the other classes of legal practitioners so far admitted
can get their sanads renewed, and exercise the same rights as they had under
these enactments as before.
Reference may in this connection be made to two decided cases. The
High Court of Mysore in its judgment dated 26th March, 1964 in writ petition
No. 2497/1963—E.C. Agrawala and others v. Mysore State Bar Council
and another,21 held that section 58(4) only empowers the renewal of sanads
of pleaders who had been admitted before 1-12-1961, and does not permit
fresh admission of pleaders after that date by way of issue of fresh sanads.
The other decision is that of the Calcutta High Court in Sunil Kumar v.-
State of West Bengal and others,22 holding that section 58(4) cannot apply
to persons who had not acquired the necessary rights under section 6 of
the Legal Practitioners Act before 1-12-1961.
Section 50(3) provides that on the date on which chapter IV came into
force, the sections referred to therein of the Legal Practitioners Act, of the
Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, as also the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice
in High Court) Act, 1951, and the provisions of the Letters Patent of the
21. Unreported.
22. A.I.R. 1965 Cal. 614.
248 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 1 4 : 2
High Courts dealing with the right of advocates to practise, shall stand
repealed. The provisions of the Act referred to in section 50(3) stand
repealed, when section 30 is brought into force. Excepting section 30 there
was no other provision in the Act as originally enacted and brought into
force, dealing with the right to practise of persons enrolled under the Act.
When chapter III of the Act was brought into force from 1.12.1961, the
High Courts ceased to have the right conferred under the Bar Councils
Act to admit persons as advocates and the power of enrolment passed over
to the state Bar Councils newly constituted under the Act.
As under section 50(2) of the Act, so much of the provisions of the
Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, the Bar Councils Act, 1926 and the Letters
Patents, relating to the admission and enrolment of legal practitioners stood
replealed on the date when chapter III came into force, a difficult situation
arose as section 30 on right to practise had not been brought into force
and this necessitated an Ordinance in the first instance, and in due course
an amendment of the Act and section 58 was added as a provision for the
transitional period till chapter IV is brought into force.
Section 58, inter alia, confers the following powers :
(/) Persons enrolled as advocates under the Bar Council Act or under
the Advocates Act will be entitled as of right to practise in the
Supreme Court, subject to the rules made by the Supreme Court
in this behalf.
(//) Until chapter IV comes into force every person enrolled under
the Advocates Act, 1961, shall also be entitled to all the rights
of practise conferred on the advocates under section 14 of the
Bar Councils Act, 1926.
The effect of section 58 is that : an advocate not enrolled as an advocate
of the Supreme Court will be entitled to practise (/) in the Supreme Court,
(//') in the High Court of the Bar Council where he is enrolled and (//7) in
all the subordinate courts and tribunals in India including the subordinate
courts where he is not enrolled, subject to the rules if any made in this behalf.
It follows, therefore, that he will not be entitled to practise in the ordinary
course, or as of right in the other High Courts of the Bar Councils where
he is not enrolled.
But a person enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court will be
entitled to practise in all the courts in India—the Supreme Court, all the
High Courts, and all the subordinate courts as provided in that Act subject
to certain restrictions. The position is anomalous, but it will be so till
section 30 in chaper IV is brought into force when the matter will cease
to be governed by section 58 and section 3 will apply.
In In re Lilly Isabel Thomas2* "the proper construction of article
145(i)(a) of the Constitution in the context of a declaration that rule 16 of
order IV of the Supreme Court Rules is invalid," was the principal point
raised by an advocate entitled under the Advocates Act, 1961, to practise
in the Supreme Court having been originally enrolled in the Madras High
Court under the Bar Councils Act, 1926. Rule 16 which now corresponds
to rule 5 provided for the qualifications requisite for an advacate to be
registered as an advocate on record. It was held that section 58(3) of the
Advocates Act which confers on the advocates the right of practise in the
Supreme Court is itself subject to section 52 which specifically sayes the
right of the Supreme Court to make rules under article 145 of the Constitution.
The court held that on the express terms of article 145(1), the impugned
rules 16 and 17 are valid and within the rule-making power.
roll of such state Bar Council and who is ordinarily practising in such courts.
They also contain a rule that no advocate shall be entitled to appear, plead
or act for any person unless an appointment in writing is signed by such
person or his recognised agent or other person authorised under a power
of attorney or signed by the advocate. The rules also contain other pro-
visions necessary for advocates appearing before the Court including certain
requirements as to firms or partnership of advocates, dress, etc.
Different High Courts have made rules on robes of advocates. Under
section 52 the power of the Supreme Court to make rules under article 145
of the Constitution is preserved for laying down the conditions subject
to which a senior advocate shall be entitled to practise in that court; and
for determining the persons who shall be entitled to act in that court.
(a) Proceedings before state Bar Councils and the disciplinary committees
The state Bar Council on the roll of which an advocate is enrolled
has the jurisdiction and the power to act on receipt of a complaint
or otherwise. A fee of Rs. 25 is prescribed by the Bar Council of
India as payable on a complaint, which shall be in the form of a petition
duly signed and verified as required under the Civil Procedure Code. If
the state Bar Council has reason to believe that the advocate concerned has
been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it has to refer the case
for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
The disciplinary committee to which the case has been referred may
summarily reject the complaint. If it does not do so, it should fix a date
for the hearing of the case and cause notice thereof to be given to the advocate
concerned and to the Advocate-General of the state (the Solicitor-General
in the case of the Delhi Bar Council). After giving him an opportunity
of being heard it should make its order.
The rules made by the Bar Council of India provide that the disciplinary
committee may determine the matter on documents and affidavits unless
1972] LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961 251
27. Unreported.
1972] LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961 253
Bar Council of India was competent. The Supreme Court held that it was
competent. It observed :
[I]f the commissioner of workmen's compensation is a person
competent to file a complaint we see no reason why for the purpose
of appealing to the Supreme Court of India, he is not a person
aggrieved The complainant in this case is a public servant.
The case of Adi Phirozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai™ before the Supreme
Court was one in which suo motu action was taken against the advocate
by the Bar Council of Maharashtra. Notice was given to the Advocate-
General as required under the Act. The Advocate-General appeared
before the committee. The disciplinary committee was satisfied that there
was no reason to hold that the advocate was guilty of professional or other
misconduct. The Advocate-General filed an appeal against the said order
under section 37 of the Act. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council
of India in its order allowed the appeal and suspended the advocate for a
year over-ruling, inter-alia, the objection that the Advocate-General was
not competent to file the appeal. The advocate appealed to the Supreme
Court of India. In its judgment by the majority Their Lordships Hidayat-
uliah, C.J.,Shelat, J., Mitter, J, (Their Lordships Vaidyalingam, J, and Ray,
J, dissenting), it was held that the appeal by the Advocate-General was
incompetent.
The judgments refer to several decisions of the courts in India and
other countries, particularly with reference to the words 'person aggrieved'.
They contain a discussion at length as to the position and status of the
Advocate-General and his powers with reference to disciplinary proceedings.
They deal with the provisions of the Bar Councils Act, 1926, and the Advocates
Act, 1961, relating to disciplinary matters and the implications thereof on
the question of the right of the Advocate-General to file an appeal.
The majority held that a person cannot have a right of appeal merely
because he has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given
a right to appear and make his submission. The order must cause
him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something.
That the order is wrong or that it acquits someone who should have
been convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance. The
Advocates Act gives the Advocate-General a right of preaudience, which
gives him a standing for the hearing of cases, but does not confer on him
any other rights. The phrases such as, leader of the Bar, keeper of the
conscience of the Bar, have no meaning neither now, nor had under the
Bar Councils Act, 1926. They are just titles but are not grounded in law.
The Advocate-General does not represent the executive or the legislature
or the judiciary in disciplinary proceedings. He finishes his duty when
the hearing is over and cannot be considered to be a party interested or
'a person aggrieved' whether the decision is in favour of the advocate or
against him. If anybody represents the Bar, it would be the Bar Council
of India, and in the case of the states, the state Bar Councils. Referring
to the unreported decision of the Supreme Court of India in B.M. Madnani
v. Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation, Bombay,28° Chief Justice
Hidayatuliah observed that the said decision can be justified on the ground
that in some cases before the court a party which moves the court or a
person brought before the court to be bound by the order may be a person
aggrieved, but there may be some doubt whether the commissioner was
a person aggrieved by the penalty imposed in the first instance.
The minority view was that the provisions of the Indian Bar Councils
Act, 1926, established the important position occupied by the Advocates-
General under that Act. The scheme is slightly different under the Advocates
Act, 1961, which gives the Advocate-General a very important and responsi-
ble position. The Advocate-General and the Attorney-General of India
are heads of the respective Bar. The proceedings before the disciplinary
committees affect the discipline and dignity of the Bar, and touch the
professional conduct of an advocate. The intention of the statute is that
the Advocate-General and the Attorney-General are not to be neutral
observers. It is not necessary to go to the extent of holding that there is
a 7w' before the disciplinary committees, and that the Advocate-General
is a party in the sense in which that expression is ordinarily understood in
law. The use of the words in the Act, 'person aggrieved', instead of'party
aggrieved' have to be noticed. In view of the several steps indicated in
the Advocates Act with reference to the Advocate-General, such as notice of
hearing, opportunity for hearing him, his being entitled to appear in person
or through an advocate, and to be communicated by a copy of the order
passed by the committee, the Advocate-General will be a 'person aggrieved'.
The same reasoning will apply to the Attorney-General of India. The
docision of the Supreme Court in MadnanVs case repelled the contention
that the Advocate-General cannot be a person aggrieved.
In view of the decision of the majority it is clear that the Advocate-
General or the Attorney-General of India will not be a person aggrieved
and cannot file an appeal provided for under the Act. But the question
arises as to who are all the other persons entitled to file the appeal
or who could be said to be a 'person aggrieved'. In spite of the views
expressed it cannot be taken as laying down that a state Bar Council
or the Bar Council of India is a 'person aggrieved' entitled to file the appeal
as other persons or bodies, and as coming within the expression 'person
aggrieved'. It is very desirable and necessray that the legislature should
have suitably and properly amended the relevant provisions dealing with the
notice to the Advocate-General or the Attorney-General and the persons
entitled to appeal. It may also be considered whether it is not also necessary
to provide for the parties to be implicated in such appeals.29
2Sa. Civil appeal 877/1968.
29. See the observations in Bhatraju Nageswara Rao v. Hon'ble Judges of the
Madras High Cour., A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 223 and the observations of the Supreme Court on
the same \nAdi Phirozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, supra note 28.
i972j LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961 255
3, Power to review
Section 44 confers powers of review on the discipinary committee
of a Bar Council by its own motion or otherwise. However, no order or
review of the disciplinary committee of state Bar Council shall have effect
unless it has been approved by the Bar Council of India. In O.N. Mahindroo
v. Dist. Judge, Delhi,™ the Supreme Court upheld the view of the Bar Council
of India that the Bar Council of India has no power to review an order made
by its disciplinary committee on appeal. But the Bar Council can refer
to the disciplinary committee matters for its reconsidertion. As already
stated the power of revision is expressly granted to the disciplinary committee
of the Bar Council which may on its own motion or otherwise review any
order passed by it. The word 'otherwise' is wide enough to include a case
referred by the Bar Council for review. The court was of the view that
since disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer will not only involve the
particular lawyer but the prestige of the legal profession as such, the powers
of review of the disciplinary committees should be interpreted widely so
as to enable them to exercise such powers in a suitable case for or against
a lawyer even after the matter had been examined by them. The analogy
of the powers of review by the courts under the Civil Procedure Code or
that of the autrefois convict or outrefois acquit under the Code of Criminal
Procedure should not be made applicable.
thereof, to give such directions to the state Bar Council or its committees
as may appear to it to be necessary, and the state Bar Council or the commi-
ttee has to comply with such directions. Where a state Bar Council is
unable to perform its functions for any reason whatsoever, the Bar Council
of India may give such directions to the ex-officio member thereof as may
appear to it to be necessary, and such directions shall have effect, notwith-
standing anything contained in the rules made by the state Bar Council.
(0 Removal of difficulties
The central government is also empowered, to make any order not
inconsistent with the Act, to remove any difficulty that may arise in giving
effect to the provisions of the Act particularly in relation to the transition
from enactments repealed by the Act to the provisions of the Act. The
37. S. 49A.
258 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [Vol. 14:2
38. Reference may for instance be made to the following rule of the Mysore High
Court : Advocates appearing before the court, shall wear the following as part of their
dress (1) advocates appearing before the High Court (a) men advocates—black coat,
bands and gown (whenever an open collar coat is used, stiff collar of butterfly or dress
collar type or necktie type should be worn with bands, (b) lady Advocates—gown
over their ordinary or regional dress. The wearing of bands will be optional. (Note :
pattern of gown : The gown referred to will be the pattern of the academic (university)
gown. (2) advocates appearing in the District and Sessions Court or any other civil or
criminal subordinate courts : (a) men advocate—black ccat (whenever an open collar
coat is used, black tie should be worn), (b) lady advocates—ordinary or regional dress.
1972] LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961 259
The rules also provide for registration of advocates on record any advocate
who is not a senior advocate. Rule 5 lays down that an advocate shall not
be qualified to be registered as an advocate on record unless he has undergone
training for one year with an advocate on record approved by the court
and has thereafter passed such tests as may be held by the court for advocates
who apply to be registered as advocates on record. The particulars of the
test are to be notified in the official gazette from time to time. The rules,
however, exempt an attorney from such training and test. An advocates
on record is required to have an office in Delhi within a radius of ten miles
from the court house and give an undertaking to employ within one month
of his being registered as an advocate on record, a registered clerk. He is
also required to pay a registration fee of twenty-five rupees.
The Supreme Court Advocate (Practise in High Courts) Act, 1951,
conferred the right on every advocate of the Supreme Court to practise
in any high Court whether or not he is an advocate of that High Court.
In Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabindha Ghosh,29 the Supreme Court held by
a majority that an advocate of the Supreme Court became entitled as of
right to appear a i d plead as well as act in all the High Courts in India and
that he is also entitled to appear on the original side of the West Bengal
and the Bombay High Courts without being instructed by an attorney and
free from the restrictions in this regard of the Rules of the High Courts of
West Bengal and Bombay.
In view of the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961, there has been
no further admission of persons as advocates of the Supreme Court after
1.12.1961 when chapter III of the Advocates Act came into force. Under
section 50(3)(d) of the Advocates Act, 1961, the Supreme Court Advocates
(Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, shall stand repealed on the date when
chapter IV of the Advocates Act comes into force and as noted earlier
section 30 in chapter IV of the Act has not yet been brought into force.
Conclusion
What has been enumerated above will show that the Advocates Act,
1961, has marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the legal
profession by vesting largely in the Bar Councils the power and the jurisdic-
tion which the courts till then exercised , by fulfilling the aspirations of those
who had been demanding an All India Bar and effecting a unification of
the Bar in India, by the creation of a single class of practitioners with power
to practise in all the courts and bound by rules made and a code of conduct
laid down by their own bodies to which the members could resort to for the
protection of their rights, interests or privileges. The Act has enabled
representatives from the several states to come together to a common forum,
and has brought about integration.
The conferment of the power in respect of legal education and the
recognition of the degree in law and the power to visit and inspect universities
APPENDIX