Attempt On Attempt PDF

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Page 1 Monday, February 24, 2020

Printed For: Ananya Das, National University of Study & Research, Ranchi
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(1984) 2 SCC J-42
An Attempt on “Attempt”
AN ATTEMPT ON “ATTEMPT”*
by
B.B. Pande
The case of State v. Mohd. Yakub
— The law of attempt — Enigmatic and notorious for its intricacies — Three factors
that contribute to the unusual state of the law at present — Supreme Court decision in
State v. Mohd. Yakub (1980) — Notable and reflects judicial effort to grapple with the
problem and provide some answers — Facts of Mohd. Yakub case in brief — Attempt to
take silver outside India by three accused — Conviction by the trial Magistrate —
Acquittal by the Addl. Sessions Judge and the High Court — Conviction by the
Supreme Court — Critical evaluation of the concurring judgments of Sarkaria and
Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. — Absence of definition of attempt in IPC — Three kinds of
treatment accorded to attempt in IPC — Sections in IPC on attempt referred to —
Effort to define “attempt” stated — Legislative guidelines in this respect laid down
under S. 511 IPC and other statutory provisions — New S. 120C proposed in the 1972
Amendment Bill defines attempt — S. 1(i) of the Criminal Attempt Act, 1981 of
England defines attempt — Observations of Sarkaria and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. as to
what constitutes “attempt” — The two views summed up — The proximity requirement
discussed — Identification of crucial overt act is vital — Examples given citing case
laws as to the nature of the overt-act — Most workable test suggested by Glanville
Williams for the identification of the Proximate acts — Distinction between
‘preparation’ and ‘attempt’ laid down in Abhayanand case — Reliance placed on
Abhayanand by Sarkaria, J. in Mohd. Yakub — Malkiat Singh contrasted with
Abhayanand — When a person commits the offence of offence summed up — Differing
views of Sarkaria and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. on the concept of proximity — Justice
Chinnappa Reddy's novel approach to resolve the proximity issue stated —
Observations in this regard quoted — Balance between a blameworthy state of mind
and a blameworthy overt act stressed by Lord Hailsham in Haughton v. Smith —
Propositions quoted — The problem of proof — Reference made to Cecil Turner on the
question of proof of actus reus — Chinnappa Reddy, J's disagreement with Cecil Turner
— Rationalizing the broad interpretation — Justice Sarkaria's approach to the question
of attempt involving national economy — Justice Chinnappa Reddy's view in this
regard — Appreciating the decision in Mohd. Yakub — View of Sarkaria, J. preferred to
that of Chinnappa Reddy, J. — Conclusion — Need to debate, deliberate and design a
modern criminal law, including the law of attempt remains unfulfilled — Need for a
fresh legislative initiative in this direction stressed.
The law of attempt continues to be somewhat enigmatic and notorious for its
intracacies. The factors that contribute to the unusual state of the law at present are:
First, a lack of a precise legislative definition of the inchoate offence; Second, mental
and physical ingredients varying considerably with the nature of the substantive
offence attempted; and third, the possibility of a ‘broad’ or ‘narrow’ interpretation of
the offence by the courts in view of the prevailing penal policy. The Supreme Court
decision in State v. Mohd. Yakub1 is notable because it highlights these problems and
reflects judicial effort to grapple with them and provide some answers.
The facts of the case relate to various grounds for attempt to contravene provisions
of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 19472 , Imports and Exports (Control) Act,
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19473 , and the Customs Act, 19624 . The accused were prosecuted for an attempt to
smuggle out of India 43 silver ingots weighing 1312.410 kg. The accused (three in
number) had brought the silver ostensibly meant for being taken outside India, in a
jeep and a truck to a lonely creek at about midnight. Some bundles of silver had
already been unloaded at a point from where they could be conveniently loaded into a
seacraft. Just when the cargo was being unloaded the witnesses heard the engine
sound of a mechanised seacraft. Officials of the Central Excise surrounded the vehicles
and took the accused and the cargo under custody. The trial Magistrate convicted the
accused. On appeal the Additional Sessions Judge ordered acquittal on the ground that
the facts proved showed that the accused had not proceeded beyond the stage of
preparation and since they “had not yet committed any act amounting to a direct
movement towards the commission of the offence” the act was not yet an attempt.
The High Court also upheld the acquittal on the same ground. On an appeal by the
State the Supreme Court refused to endorse the High Court judgment and expressed
their disagreement in these words:
“We are of opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that the
circumstances established by the prosecution fell short of constituting the offence of
an ‘attempt’ to export unlawfully silver out
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of India. We therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the acquittal of the accused-
respondents and convict them under Section 135(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 read
with Section 5 of the Imports and Export Control Act, 1947 and the order issued
thereunder.”5
The two separate but concurring judgments of Justice Sarkaria and Justice
Chinnappa Reddy call for a critical evaluation with a view to appreciating their import
for the law of attempt in India.
(i) The definition tangle
‘Attempt’ is nowhere defined in the Indian Penal Code, though the common law
principle creating criminal liability for offences in the attempt stage is fully subscribed
to by the provisions relating to attempt in the Code.6 The difficulties of defining
attempt stem from the fact that by its very nature in each case attempt has to derive
its form and content from the nature of the offence attempted and its essential
ingredients. This renders the task of precisely laying down the boundaries of attempt,
in a generalised way, extremely intricate and even futile. However, since every case
relating to attempt involves the resolution of the definition issue or what constitutes
an attempt, either explicitly or implicitly, the decision-maker has in each case to rely
either on scholarly definitions7 or the judicial pronouncements.8 This way a working
definition of attempt is conjured up in each case to solve the problem on hand in the
light of the relevant statutory provisions.9 However, the definition issue receives
central or peripheral treatment depending upon the matter at stake and the decision-
maker's appreciation of the cruciality of the definition issue itself. In the recent times
there has been some effort to legislatively define “attempt”. The Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Bill, 1972 and the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1978 did
appreciate
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the prevailing uncertainty in this field and made efforts to statutorily resolve the
definitional tangle by proposing in clause 45 (1972 Bill) a new Section 120-C which
read as follows:
“A person attempts to commit an offence when—

(a) he, with intention or knowledge requisite for committing it, does any act
towards its commission;
(b) the act so done is closely connected with, and proximate to the commission
of the offence; and
(c) that the act fails in its object because of the facts not known to him or
because of circumstances beyond his control.”
The same kind of legislative effort is reflected in the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981 of
England, which defines attempt in Section 1(i) as: “If, with intent to commit an
offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely
preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting to commit the
offence.”
The Supreme Court in Mohd. Yakub was clearly conscious of the definitional tangle.
Both Justices Sakaria and Chinnappa Reddy devoted some time to it. In this context
Justice Sarkaria observed:
“What constitutes an ‘attempt’ is a mixed question of law and fact depending
largely upon the circumstances of a particular case. ‘Attempt’ defies a precise and
exact definition. Broadly speaking all crimes which consist of the commission of
affirmative acts are preceded by some covert or overt conduct which may be
divided into three stages. The first stage exists when the culprit first entertains the
idea or intention to commit an offence. In the second stage, he makes preparation
to commit it. The third stage is reached when the culprit takes deliberate overt act
or step to commit the offence. Such overt act or step in order to be ‘criminal’ need
not be the penultimate act towards the commission of the offence. It is sufficient if
such act or acts were deliberately done, and manifest a clear intention to commit
the offence aimed, being reasonable proximate to the consummation of the
offence.”10
Justice Chinnappa Reddy undertook the definitional exercise even more rigorously.
He explored the English judicial decisions and scholarly treatises for expounding the
best possible definition of an attempt, and finally concluded:
“In order to constitute an ‘attempt’ first, there must be an intention to commit a
particular offence, second, some act must have been done which would necessarily
have to be done towards the commission of the offence, and, third, such act must
be proximate to the intended result. The measure of proximity is not in relation to
time and place but in relation to intention. In other words, the act must reveal with
reasonable certainty,
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in conjunction with other facts and circumstances and not necessarily in isolation, an
intention, as distinguished from mere desire or object, to commit that particular
offence.”11
On the question of definition of attempt the two decisions can be summed up as

follows:
(a) Both the opinions support the traditional view relating to the stages in the
commission of a crime and would place attempt stage in a sequence after the
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preparation stage.
(b) Both the opinions agree that for constituting an attempt the requirement of
mens rea, i.e. the state of mind to commit the offence attempted, and the actus
reus, i.e. an overt act, must be established.
(c) Both the opinions agree that it must be established through independent
evidence that the accused had intention of committing the offence attempted.
(d) However, on the question of precise type of actus reus required the two opinions
seem to be taking different lines. Justice Sarkaria specifically prefers the actus to
be “reasonably proximate to the consumation of the offence”, but no such
condition appears to emerge from Justice Chinnappa Reddy's opinion.
(ii) The proximity requirement
Mens rea enquiry in case of attempt is easier to determine. But as the question of
liability is resolved on the basis of what is done by the accused, the identification of
crucial overt act becomes vital. All the cases of attempt relate to situations where the
accused's effort falls short of the actual offence stage. But each case might vary in
respect of the time span of the offence, thereby making both, the nature of the overt
act done and the nature of the objective aimed at, crucial. As the nature of the
overtact, one may have been equipped with a live charcoal ball for committing
mischief by fire,12 may have planned, prepared and commenced the writing of a forged
title deed,13 may have despatched an application along with forged certificates in order
to appear in an examination fraudulently14 or may have conjured
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up false story of an accident with a view to claiming from the insurance company.15
Courts are required to determine the sufficiency of the overt act for the attempted
offence in diverse situations like these.
The real issue in the context of sufficiency of overt act is the relationship of the
overt act to the offence attempted. What is already done by the accused should be
sufficiently proximate to the intended consequences. Thus, where the act is still
remote to the actual offence the overt act cannot be rightly described as the actus
reus required for the attempt. Professor Glanville Williams observed in this context
that: “The requirement of proximity refers to the sequence of events leading to the
crime that the accused had it in mind to commit. To be guilty of attempt the accused
must have progressed a sufficient distance along the intended path.”16 There are
several tests in vogue for the identification of the proximate acts. Glanville Williams
suggests the most workable test: “the equivocality theory of proximity”, which is
explained in these terms: “It is as though a cinematograph film which has so far
depicted merely the accused person's acts without stating what was his intention, has
been suddenly stopped, and the audience were asked to say to what end those acts
were directed. If there is only one reasonable answer to this question then the accused
has done what amounts to an ‘attempt’ to attain that end. If there is more than one
reasonably possibly answer, then the accused has not yet done enough.”17
In Abhayanand the Supreme Court had categorically laid down that “the moment
he commences to do an act with the necessary intention he commences his attempt to
commit an offence and it is exactly what the provisions of Section 511, I.P.C.
require”.18 Such a view favours a broad interpretation of the attempt stage, which
could be supposed to begin the moment the first act is done towards the commission
of the offence. The only limitation is that the overt act in question “must be an act
during the course of committing that offence”.19 In Mohd. Yakub, Justice Sakaria relied
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upon the Abhayanand view in these words: “As pointed out in Abhayanand Mishra v.
State of Bihar there is a distinction between ‘preparation’ and “attempt’. Attempt
begins where preparation ends. In sum, a person commits the offence of ‘attempt to
commit a particular offence’ when (i) he intends to
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commit that particular offence; and (ii) he, having made preparations and with
intention to commit the offence, does an act toward its commission; such an act need
not be the penultimate act towards the commission of that offence but must be an act
during the course of committing that offence.”20 Justice Sarkaria found no difficulty in
holding that the overt act in the instant case was proximate because:
“They had reached close to the shore and had started unloading the silver there,
near a creek from which the sound of the engine of a sea-craft was also heard.
Beyond the stage of preparation, most of the steps necessary in the course of
export by the sea, had been taken. The only step that remained to be taken towards
the export of the silver was to load it on a sea-craft for moving out of the territorial
waters of India.”21
Thus, Justice Sarkaria considered proximate in terms of the actual physical
proximity to the objective of exporting silver outside India.
Justice Chinnappa Reddy's concept of proximity is somewhat different from that of
Justice Sarkaria. He advocated a novel approach to resolve the proximity issue in these
terms: “The measure of proximity is not in relation to time and action but in relation to
intention.”22 Taking such a view of proximity and applying it to the facts on hand he
observed as follows:
“The fact that the truck was driven up to the lonely creek from where the silver
could be transferred into a seafaring vessel was suggestive or indicative, though not
conclusive, that the accused wanted to export the silver … the circumstances that
all this was done in a clandestine fashion, at dead of night, revealed, with
reasonable certainty the intention of the accused that the silver was to be
exported.”23
What does understanding proximity in this way mean? Alternatively in what sense
is it different from the traditional understanding of proximity? Ordinarily proximity
referred to by Glanville Williams or Justice Sarkaria is an aspect of the actus reus of
the offence, which treats overt acts as a chain of physical acs ultimately leading to the
offence, without any reference to the mental element. That is the notion of proximity
inherent in Glaville William's cinematograph film illustration, in which he specifically
excludes reference to the State of mind of the wrongdoer. Such a view of proximity
ensures that the accused should have advanced sufficiently close to the offence not
only at the mental level but also at the physical level. Justice Chinnappa Reddy
appears to be determining the proximity issue more on the basis of its relation to the
state of mind of the wrongdoer. According to this view an overt act from which an
intention can be inferred with reasonable certainty is a proximate act. Such a
perception of proximity is based on an assumption that ultimately the traditionally
asserted physical proximity requirement
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also serves the same objective of reflecting the blameworthiness of the accused. But it
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is not unimportant to remember that blameworthiness is a mixed product of both, a
blameworthy state of mind as well as a blameworthy overt act. The balance between
the two has been tellingly stressed by Lord Hailsham in Haughton v. Smith in the
following propositions:
“(1) There is a distinction between the intention to commit a crime and attempt
to commit it…(2) In addition to the intention, or mens rea, there must be an overt
act of such a kind that it is intended to form and does form part of a series of acts
which would constitute the actual commission of the offence if it were not
interrupted … (3) The act relied on as constituting the attempt must not be an act
merely preparatory to commit the completed offence, but must bear a relationship
to the completion of the offence referred to in R.V. Eagleton as being ‘proximate’ to
the completion of the offence and in Davey v. Lee (1968)… as being immediately
and not merely remotely connected with the completed offence.”24
Furthermore, even the intention-oriented proximity suggested by Justice Chinnappa
Reddy would be ultimately dependent upon some kind of physical or contextual
indicators from which the intention would be inferred. Is this link not enough to bring
in the traditional notion of proximity, though in an indirect manner?
(iii) The problem of proof
Justice Chinnappa Reddy has registered his express disagreement with Cecil
Turner25 on the question of proof of actus reus. He has quoted Turner's following
observation: “It is, therefore, suggested that the test for the actus reus in attempt is
that the prosecution must prove that the steps taken by the accused must have
reached the point when they themselves clearly indicate what was the end towards
which they were directed. In other words the steps taken must themselves be
sufficient to show, prima facie, the offender's intention to commit the crime which he
is charged with attempting. That there must be abundant other evidence to establish
his mens rea (such as confession) is irrelevant to the question of whether he had done
enough to constitute the actus rea” and followed it up with this comment: “We must
say here that we are unable to see any justification for excluding evidence advised on
the question of mens rea in considering what constitutes the actus reus. That would be
placing the actus reus in too narrow a pigeon-hole.”26 The import of Turner's
observation is that there should be sufficient evidence to establish both the elements
of the offence independently. This insistence on independent evidence does make the
task of the prosecution difficult. But this difficulty largely flows from the nature of the
offences itself, which lays stress on the presence of both the elements. The
independent
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evidence limitation also ensures some sort of external manifestation of the offence,
which otherwise could be created on the basis of confession or other documentary
evidence relating to the state of mind only.
(iv) Rationalizing the broad interpretation

Justice Sarkaria clearly expounds the rationale of the ‘broad’ import given to an
attempt in the case. He observed in this context: “It is important to bear in mind that
the penal provisions with which we are concerned have been enacted to suppress the
evil of smuggling precious metal out of India. Smuggling is an anti-social activity
which adversely affects the public revenues, the earning of foreign exchange, the
financial stability and the economy of the country. A narrow interpretation of the word
‘attempt’, therefore, in these penal provisions which will impair their efficacy as
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instruments for combating this baneful activity has to be eschewed.”27 Thus, Justice
Sarkaria treats attempts concerning offences likely to affect the national economy such
as smuggling, evasion of foreign exchange, bribery and corruption, etc. as a special
class that occasion a broad interpretation. This means a kind of two-way approach to
the question of the interpretation of attempt, depending upon the social harm
component of the attempt in question. However, Justice Chinnappa Reddy is less
explicit on this issue. Nowhere does he suggest that his broad interpretation would
apply to special situations only. From his discussion of Malkiat Singh case it appears
that he prefers to describe that case as one of limited application. In this context he
observed: “We think that the test propounded by the first sentence should be
understood with reference to the facts of the case … the test is propounded with
reference to the particular facts of the case, and no as a general rule. Otherwise, in
every case where an accused is interrupted at the last minute from completing the
offence he may always say that when he was interrupted he was about to change his
mind.”28 The general nature of his approach to the question of interpretation gives an
impression that he never meant to confine his broad interpretation merely to special
statutes only.
Appreciating the decision
The finding of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yakub that the accused had committed
an attempt is unassailable. There is no doubt that the lower court's view that the
accused were still in the preparation stage had little merit. The series of overt acts
done towards the commission of the offence were enough to bring the conduct within
‘harmful’ range. Justice Sarkaria's reasoning for supporting the finding of attempt
appears more logical. It clearly accepts that the overt acts already performed were
“sufficiently proximate to the consumation of the offence”. The courts in India have
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been consistently taking such a position in respect of attempts.29 However, it is

difficult to accept, without reservations, Justice Chinnappa Reddy's reasoning for
arriving at the same finding. It is true that the line preferred by Justice Chinnappa
Reddy will appeal to those who treat illegal or harmful tendencies, and not necessarily
the overt act, as the essence of criminal liability. According to such a line of thinking
the moment the bad intention is sufficiently ascertainable liability should arise. Such
an approach is likely to open up the possibilities of roping in many more criminals in
the making, and could in a way contribute to crime control function. But one cannot
overlook other implications of conceiving attempt in terms of intention, because it is
likely to lead to, first, obliterating the well-accepted distinction between the different
stages and their relationship with criminal liability; second, it is likely to create serious
difficulties in dealing with some instances of impossible attempts;30 and thirdly, in
cases of attempts to commit strict liability offences also it might lead to unsupportable
conclusions.
Conclusion
Determining criminal liability for attempts involves the intricate balancing of the
claims of social control through the instrumentality of criminal law and the desirability
of leaving individual freedom of action unimpaired. The general rule that no criminal
liability should arise for an offence in the contemplation and preparation stages is in
consonance with the basic policy of keeping the incidence of criminal liability within
meaningful limits. It is true that at times the ambit of criminal liability needs to be
broadened in view of the larger social interest. Furthermore, the use of criminal
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liability for achieving ordered social change is also beyond dispute. But it is always
desirable to identify special situations that call for enhancement of criminal liability
and resort to conscious, express, legislative measures to encounter them.31 Judicial
activism can, and should, fulfil the need for law reform in different crisis areas. But
crises management function should never be considered as an adequate replacement
for conscious law reform function in the field of criminal law. Thus, the need to debate,
deliberate and design a modern criminal law, including the law of attempt, remains
unfulfilled.32
———
* B.B. Pande, Reader, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi.
1 (1980) 3 SCC 57 (hereinafter referred to as Mohd. Yakub).
2
The accused were charged under Sections 12(1), 23(1), and 23(d) of the Act.
3The accused were charged for the violation of the Exports (Control) Order No. 1 of 1968 E.T.C. dated March 8,
1960.
4 The accused were charged under Sections 7, 8, 33 and 34 of the Act.
5
Per Sarkaria, J. (Chinnappa Reddy, J. concurring in his separate judgment) at p. 63.
6
Attempts have been accorded three kinds of treatment under the Indian Penal Code, 1860: First, some
attempts are treated on a par with the actual offence and entail the same sanction as the attempted offence
(Ss. 121, 124, 124-A, 125, 126, 131, 161, 162, 163, 165, 196, 197, 213, 239, 240, 241, 250, 251, 254, 385,
387, 389, 391), Second, some attempts are kept on a special footing and treated in terms of the special
provisions (Ss. 307, 308, 309, 393, 398, etc.), and third, attempts that are not covered by the first two
categories are subject to a general omnibus provision that provides the definition and sanction for attempts
under diverse situations, (S. 511). Section 511 provides the best definitional guideline in the Code in these
terms: “Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the
commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such
attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may
extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of
imprisonment provided for that offence or with time as is provided for the offence, or with both.”
7The definitions usually relied upon are the ones that are propounded by Stephen, Mayne, Glanville Williams,
Kenny, etc.
8
The Courts in India have been putting to use the definitions provided by the higher courts such as the Supreme
Court, the Privy Council and the House of Lords.
9 Section 511 and other statutory provisions discussed in f.n. 7 lay down the legislative guidelines in this
respect.
10
Mohd. Yakub at p. 62 (emphasis supplied).
11 Mohd. Yakub at pp. 66-67 (emphasis supplied).

12R. v. Dayal Bavri, (1869) 3 Beng LR (A Cr J) 55-57 (hereinafter referred to as Dayal Bavri). In this case the
majority view of Justice Glower and the dissenting view of Justice Mitter differed in their conclusions regarding
the sufficiency of the same overt act for constituting the attempt.
13 Kalyan Sngh v. Emp., (1894) 16 All 409 (hereinafter referred to as Kalyan Singh). In this case the court
considered the overt act as a sufficient movement towards the offence for the purposes of attempt. However, in
a similar case, Queen v. Ram Saran, (1872) 4 NW p. 46, the purchase of a stamp paper by the accused in false
name and preparing a rough draft of the deed was not a sufficient overt act to constitute an attempt to forge.
14Abhayanand Mishra v. State, AIR 1961 SC 1698 (hereinafter referred to as Abhayanand). In this case the
Supreme Court treated the overt act as sufficiently proximate to constitute the offence of attempt.
15 D.P.P. v. Stonehouse, (1977) 2 All ER 909—the overt act was considered as sufficient for the offence of
attempt. However, in an earlier case, R. v. Robinson, (1915) 2 K B 342 where the accused had stage-managed a
theft in his shop with a view to lodging a false claim against the insurance company, the court had held that
without anything more the accused could not be convicted for the offence of attempt to obtain money by false
pretence.
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16 Williams, Glanville, Criminal Law (1961), at p. 623.

17 Ibid., at p. 629.
18Abhayanand at p. 1700. In contrast to this in Malkiat Singh v. State, AIR 1970 SC 713 (hereinafter referred to
as Malkiat Singh) the Supreme Court by excluding all acts which are still “harmless” from the purview of proximity
range has given a narrow interpretation to the attempt stage.
19 Abhayanand, at p. 1703.
20 Mohd. Yakub, at p. 62.
21 Id., at pp. 62-63.
22 Mohd. Yakub, at p. 67 (emphasis supplied).
23
Ibid.
24 (1973) 3 All ER 1109 at p. 1114 (emphasis supplied).
25 Cecil Turner has edited Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (18th Edn.) and Russel on Crime (12th Edn.).
26
Mohd. Yakub, at p. 65.
29
In Dayal Bavri the issue of interpretation led to two separate judgments in the lower court, which was finally
resolved by accepting Justice Sergents broad interpretation approach. In Kalyan Singh similar broad
interpretation view was accepted in respect of forgery. Later in Abhayanand the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the narrow interpretation plea in respect of attempt to cheat. The broad interpretation view was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in S.K. Mukherjee v. State, 1973 SCC (Cri) 1007
30In Haughton v. Smith (see n. 25) despite clear intention on the part of the accused the court refused to
convict the accused because the steps taken by the accused were not considered to be sufficient to
accomplish the offence.
31The recent changes effected in the law of attempt by the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, which envisages to
provide a modern code of preliminary offences in England, is a case on point.
32
The Forty-second Law Commission Report, the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 1972 and the Indian Penal
Code (Amendment) Bill, 1978 did make an effort to rewrite the basic Criminal Law. But the demise of these
legislative proposals on account of the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in 1980, has brought the reform journey to a
dead end. Thus, there is a need for a fresh legislative initiative in this direction.
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SCC Online Web Edition, Copyright © 2020

Page 1 Monday, February 24, 2020

(1984) 2 SCC J-42

“A person attempts to commit an offence when—

On the question of definition of attempt the two decisions can be summed up as

(iv) Rationalizing the broad interpretation

been consistently taking such a position in respect of attempts.29 However, it is

11 Mohd. Yakub at pp. 66-67 (emphasis supplied).

16 Williams, Glanville, Criminal Law (1961), at p. 623.

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