Once bitten… Color

Revolutions and Path

dependence: The Case of
Tajikistan
Rob Kevlihan and Amri
Sherzamonov
Presented at BCB Research Seminar,
KIMEP, Almaty April 2009
Color Revolutions Reviewed
Term used to describe a series of political
protests in Eastern Europe / former CIS,
including Slovakia (1998), Serbia (2000),
Belarus (2001), Georgia (2003), Ukraine
(2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) with less
successful efforts in Uzbekistan, Russia,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan (2005) and again
Belarus (2006).
But what is a color revolution?
Skocpol (1980) defined a social revolution as “a
rapid transformation of a society‟s state and class
structures”, including a simultaneous social and
political transformation and the presence of
popular uprising rather than elite bargaining
Color „revolutions‟ do not meet this standard and
so are not revolutions similar to the Chinese or
Russian revolutions
Defining color revolutions
Commonalities in symbolism (color) and process
(„revolution‟) (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001)
Diffusion of campaign methods and repertoires
(Tilly 2004) through demonstration effects and
deliberate program efforts focusing on elite
learning (Bessinger 2007)
International social capital of color motif - The
Marketing of Rebellion (Bob 2005)
In a Central Asian context such contentious
episodes do not necessarily lead to more
democratic outcomes (Collin 1999, 2006)
So why Tajikistan?
Explaining a counter-factual – the absence
of a contentious episode in Tajikistan
compared to Kyrgyzstan in 2005
Interesting natural experiment for the
purposes of small „N‟ qualitative analysis:
Independent Variable: Recent history of civil
war
Dependent Variable: Presence or absence of
contentious episode within a defined period
 Variation in Independent Variable
Tajikistan suffered from a civil war from mid
1992 to 1997 after gaining independence in 1991;
one of most intense wars in CIS zone; At least
60,000 killed; despite peace agreement, de facto
victory of current regime
Kyrgyzstan, despite some small scale violent in
the Ferghana Valley has successfully avoided
large scale civil conflict since independence in
1991
 Variation in Outcomes
Kyrgyzstan: Elections on 27th Feb and 13th March:
by 24th March Akiev had been ousted and fled the
country as a result of color revolution type
mobilization (Cummings, 2008)
Tajikistan: Elections in the same sequence at same
time, but resulted in no contentious episode, to the
extent that there were no calls for any contentious
mobilization from opposition leaders despite their
welcome of events in neighboring Kyrgyzstan
Control Variables
Control variables defined by theory:
Presence of contestable elections: Mobilizing
public response to elections an important
component of contentious episodes (Tucker
2007) (x1)
Wave pattern of similar contentious episodes
likely to have similar impact on states in the
region (x2)
Government efforts to surpress opposition (x3)
Control Variables

Similar socio-economic conditions when

compared to other Central Asian states – lack
of oil / gas revenues (neither rentier states) (x4)
Similar HDI indicators – Tajikistan ranked 122
of 177 in 2006, Kyrgyzstan ranked 110 (x5) –
both medium developed states at the bottom
end of the scale
Mills Method of Similarities

IV Control Variables DP

Kyrgyzstan Absence of X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 Contentious

recent civil Episode
war
Tajikistan Presence of X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 No
recent civil contention
war
Confounding factors
Potential problems with control variables
X3 may be a bit of a stretch as a control – freer civil
society in Kyrgyzstan than Tajikistan, and more efforts
on part of Tajik government to limit democracy
promotion activities
Highlights general limitations of small N natural
experiments:
Limits to similarity between cases: no two countries
identical
Theoretical relevance of control versions
Role of contingency, agency and chance
So what?
Highlights the importance of path dependence in
understanding the potential impact of waves of
contentious politics
Tajikistan has experienced contentious politics
before - between 1990 and 1992, Tajikistan
witnessed a series of leadership changes as a result
of (mainly peaceful) political mobilization
However, the outcome was not stability, but civil
war – beginning in the summer of 1992, leading to
approx. 60,000 deaths from 1992-1997
So what explains the difference
Consequence is a continued reluctance to publicly
challenge the current government (who were the
winners of the civil war) in Tajikistan
Concern is not without foundation – Large N
studies (Collier, Hoeffler et al 2005) have found
that risks of new civil wars higher in the wake of
civil wars
Delays in democratization may contribute to
stability (Paris 2004), if time is used to build
institutions (Paris 2006)
What lies ahead for Tajikistan?
Limits of path dependence – legacy of war in
Georgia placed a break on contention there until
the Rose Revolution (Ó Beacháin, D. and A.
Polese 2008)
Youth bulge and risk of conflict (Urdal 2006)
Migrant labor as a safety valve
Failures of governance
The myth of Islamic radicalism and risk of
external intervention
Recent indications of civil protest