WEEK 12: LEGAL EASEMENTS  road. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy.
road. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy.", when there is already an
 
(1) COSTABELLA CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS et. al.
January 25, 1991 | Sarmiento, J.  a fic ous or ar ficial necessity for it.
DOCTRINE:  For  a  servitude of right of way to be compulsory and legally demandable, there must be a real 
necessity  therefore,  ,  if  there  is  an  existing  outlet,  otherwise  adequate,  to  the  highway,  the  "dominant"  Further, respondents have failed to allege or prove that: (1) they were willing to indemnify fully
estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be convenient.  the pe oner for the right of way to be established over its property; (2) the isola on of their
  
FACTS:  Pe oner is the owner of 2 lots, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel.
Respondents owned the adjoining proper es.  A passageway which traversed the pe oner's
property was used by respondents in going to and from their respec ve proper es and the
provincial road.
Pe oner closed the aforemen oned passageway when it began the construc on of its hotel,
and opened an alternate passageway for respondents, this was also eventually fenced and closed.
Respondents filed an ac on for injunc on against the pe oner.
The CFI found that respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in controversy
based on its long existence and its con nued use and enjoyment not only by the private
respondents, but also by the community at large.
Upon appeal, the CA held that the easement of right of way is a discon nuous one which can
only be acquired by tle and not by prescrip on, but nonetheless granted the easement of right
of way in the interest of jus ce as one that is not dependent upon the claims of the par es but a
compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner
of the servient estate.
Hence, this pe on, where pe oner contends that the decision of the respondent appellate
court is grossly erroneous and not in accord with the provisions of Ar cles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code on easements.
  
Issue: WON respondents are en tled to an easement of right of way.
  
HELD: NO. 
It is well se led that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discon nuous and as such
can not be acquired by prescrip on. Unfortunately, a er making the correct pronouncement, the
respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the
dismissal of the complaint a er holding that no easement had been validly cons tuted over the
pe oner's property. The appellate court commi ed reversible error when it held that the
passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the
"dominant" estate, may demand from the pe oner the la er being the owner of the "servient"
estate.
Based on Art 649 and 650, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory
right of way only a er he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the
(dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) a er payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isola on was not due to the
proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. Addi onally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lie on the
owner of the dominant estate.
Here, respondents failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respec ve
proper es to a public highway. In fact, there is another outlet for the respondents to the main
exis ng adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for
one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is en rely
unjus fied. For to jus fy the imposi on of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not
property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts; and (3) the
passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the pe oner. Hence, the
Private respondents' proper es can not be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory easement
is demandable.
Servitudes of right of way are are demanded by necessity, that is, to enable owners of isolated
estates to make full use of their proper es, which lack of access to public roads has denied them.
Under Ar cle 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory and hence, legally demandable, subject
to indemnity and the concurrence of the other condi ons above-referred to.
As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for
the dominant estate. Hence, if there is an exis ng outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the
"dominant" estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be convenient. The
isola on of the dominant estate is also dependent on the par cular need of the dominant owner,
and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or
not a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the owner. Pe on
GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(2) BRYAN VILLANUEVA v. Hon. TIRSO VELASCO, Julio Sebas an, and Shirley Lorilla
November 27, 2000 | Quisumbing, J. 
DOCTRINE:  As  a  compulsory  easement,  it  is  inseparable  from  the  estate  to  which  it belongs as provided 
for  in  Art  617.  The  essential  requisites  for  an  easement  to  be  compulsory  are:  (1)  surrounded  by 
immovables  and  no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of indemnity; (3) isolation is not due 
to  the  owner  of  the  dominant  estate;  4)  least  prejudicial  AND  5)  to  the  extent  consistent  with  the 
foregoing rule where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest 
FACTS:  Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of a parcel of land which he bought from Pacific
Banking Corpora on, the mortgagee of the said property, who had acquired from spouses
Maximo and Jus na Gabriel at a public auc on. When Villanueva bought the parcel of land, there
was a small house on its southeastern por on occupying 1 meter of the 2 meter wide easement
of right of way that Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of
respondents (Julio Sebas an and Shirley Lorilla) in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to Villanueva, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the small
house that encroached upon the 2 meter easement and that respondents had filed a civil case for
easement. The TC issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunc on ordering the Gabriels to
provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement.
Judge Velasco issued Alias Writ of Demoli on. Villanueva filed a 3rd party claim with prayer to
quash the writ of demoli on. He maintains that the Writ of Demoli on could not apply to his
property for he was not a party to the civil case. 3rd party claim with prayer to quash was denied.
CA affirmed the decision. Villanueva asserts that the existence of the easement of right of way
was not annotated in his tle and that he was not a party to a civil case; hence, the contract of
easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas could not be enforced against him
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 1 
ISSUES:   Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma, Inc. sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor Transfer
1. WON there is a right of way in favor of Espinolas? Cer ficates of Title were correspondingly issued. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to
2. WON it binds Villanueva? his son and daughter-in-law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione. When the Pacione
spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, visited the property in 1987, they found out
HELD: YES both issues.  that the lot was occupied by a squa er named Juanita Geronimo and a por on was being used as
The subject easement was originally cons tuted by agreement between Gabriels and Espinolas. a passageway by pe oners to and from Visayas Avenue.
The easement in this case is both: (1) easement by grant or a voluntary easement; and (2) an
easement by necessity or a legal easement. Legal easement is one mandated by law, cons tuted Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their property to the barangay
for public use or for private interest and becomes a con nuing property right. office. At the barangay concilia on proceeding, pe oners offered to pay for the use of a por on
of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses rejected the offer. When the par es failed to
As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs. The essen al arrive at an amicable se lement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence.
requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: Pe oners protested the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by
residen al houses belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas
● surrounded by immovables and no adequate outlet to a public highway; Avenue except through the property of the Paciones.
● payment of indemnity;
● isola on is not due to the owner of the dominant estate; As their protest went unheeded, pe oners ins tuted an ac on for easement of right of way
● least prejudicial; AND with prayer for the issuance of a TRO. The trial court issued a TRO direc ng the Pacione spouses
● to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule where the distance from the dominant to cease and desist from fencing the disputed property. At the instance of the par es, the trial
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. court ordered an ocular inspec on of the property. Therea er, the deputy sheriff of the court
submi ed his report and on the basis thereof, the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that
The small house occupying 1 meter of the 2 meter wide easement obstructs the entry of one essen al requisite of a legal easement of a right of way was not proved, i.e., the absence of
respondent’s cement mixer and motor vehicle. 1 meter is insufficient for the needs of the an alterna ve adequate way or outlet to a public highway, in this case, Visayas Avenue.  CA
respondents. It is well-se led that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the affirmed the decision of the RTC
easement. Conformably then, pe oner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the
easement in view of the needs of the private respondent’s estate. As already explained, it is in the ISSUE: WON pe oners are en tled to a compulsory easement of right of way
nature of legal easement that the servient estate of the pe oner is legally bound to provide the
dominant estate of respondent’s ingress from and egress to the public highway. HELD: NO. 
The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
DECISION:  WHEREFORE, the instant pe on is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolu on of estate. In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against pe oner. Court of Appeals, an outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the le side of
pe oners' property and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meter
long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters wide and,
(3) CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL et. al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, Cesar Ledesma Inc., finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for the
and Sps. Jesus & Lerma Pacione needs of the dominant estate, hence pe oners have no cause to complain that they have no
June 22, 1998 | Bellosillo, J.  adequate outlet to Visayas Avenue.
DOCTRINE:  To  be  entitled  to  a  compulsory  easement  of  right  of  way,  the  preconditions  provided  under 
Arts.  649  and  650  of  the  Civil  Code  must  be  established.  These  are:  (1)  that  the  dominant  estate  is  Pe oners' concept of what is "adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well-entrenched
surrounded  by  other  immovables  and  has  no  adequate  outlet  to  a  public  highway;  (2)  that  proper  doctrine that in order to jus fy the imposi on of an easement of right of way there must be a
indemnity  has  been  paid;  (3)  that  the  isolation  was  not  due  to  acts  of  the  proprietor  of  the  dominant  real, not fic ous or ar ficial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
estate;  and  (4)  that  the  right  of  way  claimed  is  at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so  what is required by law as the basis for se ng up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
far  as  consistent  with  this  rule,  where  the  distance  from  the dominant estate to a public highway may be  necessity, if it can be sa sfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
the shortest. 
DECISION:  WHEREFORE, Pe on is DENIED. The 16 January 1996 Decision and the 14 June
FACTS:  Pe oners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon 1996 Resolu on of the Court of Appeals denying reconsidera on thereof are AFFIRMED. Costs
City, where they have been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., against pe oners.
on the other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which once
included the disputed residen al lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2. The said lots were originally part of a
private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc.

When Visayas Avenue became opera onal as a na onal road in 1979, Cesar Ledesma Inc., filed a
pe on before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residen al lots.
The pe on was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residen al lots designated as Lot
1 and Lot 2.
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 2 

(4) SIMEON FLORO v. ORLANDO LLENADO (+) and Court of Appeals
June 2, 1995 | Romeo, J.  proving the existence of the prerequisites provided for in Ar cles 649 and 650, to validly claim a
DOCTRINE:  In  order  to  justify  the  imposition  of  the  servitude  of  right  of  way,  there  must be a real, not a  compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. The Llenados have failed in
fictitious  or  artificial  necessity  for  it.  Mere  convenience  for the dominant estate is not what is required by  this regard:
law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement.   a.
FACTS: Simeon Floro owns the Floro Park Subdivision in Bulacan. It has its own egress & ingress
to and from MacArthur Hwy by means of its Road Lot 4.Orlando Llenado owns the Llenado
Homes Subdivision. Before it was purchased by Llenado, the land was known as Emmanuel
Homes Subd. Bounded on the south by Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park, on
the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo,
The Llenado Homes does not have any exis ng road or passage to the MacArthur Hwy. However,
a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided
in the subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes which was approved by the defunct Human
Se lement Regulatory Commission (now HLURB). The Llenados were permi ed by Floro to use
Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park as the passageway to and from MacArthur Highway.
Then, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones. The
Llenados request for the reopening of Road Lot 5 having been denied by Floro, Orlando Llenado
ins tuted a complaint against Simeon Floro for Easement of Right of Way with a WPI.
ISSUES:
1. WON a valid contract of easement of right of way exists when the owner of one estate
voluntarily allows the owner of an adjacent estate passage through his property for a
limited me, without compensa on
2. WON an owner/developer of a subdivision can demand a compulsory easement of
right of way over the exis ng roads of an adjacent subdivision instead of developing his
subdivision's purposed access road as provided in his duly approved subdivision plan
HELD: NO both issues. 
It is not disputed that In Feb. 1983, Floro granted the Llenados verbal permission to pass through
the Floro Park in going to and from the MacArthur Hwy. Whether such permission was the month
of March 1983 only, without compensa on and as a neighborly gesture for the purpose merely of
enabling the Llenados to install stone monuments (mojones) on their land, or was in rela on to
the easement of right of way granted in their favor, the fact remains that no such contract of
easement of right of way was actually perfected between Floro and Llenado.
The Llenados tes fied the condi ons of the easement of right of way were s ll to be drawn up by
Floro's lawyer. Thus, no compensa on was agreed upon, and none was paid, for the passage
through Floro's property during the month of March. When Wenifreda Llenado saw Floro in April
1983, to nego ate for reopening of Road Lot 5, Orlando rejected said condi ons for being
onerous.
The use of Road Lots 4 and 5 by the Llenados in March was by mere tolerance of Floro pending
the nego a on of the terms and condi ons of the right of way. This is evident from the
tes mony of Wenifreda that "they said to us to go on while they are preparing for the papers"
and that "We can use that for a while, while they were making for the papers."
Although such use was in an cipa on of a voluntary easement of right of way, no such contract
was validly entered into by reason of the failure of the par es to agree on its terms and
condi ons. Thus, the Llenados cannot claim en tlement to a right of way through the Floro Park
on the basis of a voluntary easement.
Since there is no voluntary easement of right of way in favor the Llenados, it can now be
determined WON they are en tled to a compulsory easement of right of way. The burden of
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
b. a er payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
c. that the isola on was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art.
649, last par.); and,
d. that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
Llenado focused his argument on the absence of any road, other than the closed road of the Floro
Park, as his means of ingress and egress to and from his property. However, he omi ed to state
that there is a proposed access road through the Ipapo property.
In the subdivision plan of Llenado Homes Subdivision, which was duly approved by the HSRC, the
Ipapo Access Road was retained. There being an exis ng right of way over the Ipapo property, the
first requirement for a grant of a compulsory easement of right of way over the Floro Park has not
been met.
The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado did not contain a prayer for the fixing
of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of right of way be
cons tuted. Thus, the second requisite has not been established.
Llenado admi ed that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being cul vated and there was a fence
made of adobe wall theron, indica ng the rice field is abandoned. There was no reason for
Llenado's failure to develop the right of way except the inconvenience and expenses it would cost
him. Hence, the third requisite has not been met.
Instead of developing the proposed access road, Llenado applied for the conversion of Lot 14 of
Block 6 into a road lot to connect it with Road Lot 5 of the Floro Park, as it would create a "more
adequate and prac cal passage" from Llenado Homes Subdivision to the MacArthur Na onal
Highway and vise-versa.
The "convenience" of using Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park will not suffice, however, to
jus fy the easement in favor of Llenado. Thus, the fourth requisite has not been met. In order to
jus fy the imposi on of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a fic ous or
ar ficial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law
as the basis for se ng up a compulsory easement.
Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be sa sfied without imposing the servitude, the same
should not be imposed. This easement can also be established for the benefit of a tenement with
an inadequate outlet, but not when the outlet is merely inconvenient. Thus, when a person has
already established an easement of this nature in favor of his tenement, he cannot demand
another, even if those first passage has defects which make passage impossible, if those defects
can be eliminated by proper repairs. In total, Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of
way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 3 

(5) EUSEBIO FRANCISCO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and Cresencio Ramos
September 15, 1989 | Narvasa, J. 
DOCTRINE:  All  four  requisites prescribed in Articles 649 and 650 must be established in order to warrant  DECISION:  WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
the creation of a legal or compulsory easement of way.  ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. 66-V-73 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is
FACTS:  Lot 860 was owned by Cornelia and Frisca Dila, and had a frontage along Parada Road
and adjoining it was Lot 226, owned by Eusebio Franciso, respondent.  Lot 860 was then
par oned (Lot 860 – A to D) however the former co-owners overlooked the fact, by reason of
the subdivision, Lot 860-B came to include the en re frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along
Parada Road, and thus effec vely isolated from said road the other lots.
Lot 860-A was then sold to Cresencio J. Ramos, pe oner, who set up a piggery in the said land.
He asked his lawyer to ask (through a le er) Francisco for a right of way through the la er’s land.
Nego a ons were fu le. Francisco’s proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1sqm from
him to 3sqm from Ramos, as supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.
In 1972, Ramos obtained a 3m wide passageway through Lot 860-B owned by Epifiania Dila. Yet
in 1973, he put up a 10-foot high concrete wall on his lot which closed the very right of way
granted to him across Lot 860-B. Due to this Francisco then made a stone wall on his lot along
Parada Road. Complaints were then filed regarding the right of way. The CFI decided in favor of
Ramos which the IAC affirmed.
ISSUE: WON pe oner, Ramos, is en tled to a right of way?
HELD: NO.  Anastacia refused to accept the payment and was barred from passing through her property.
Compulsory easement of way cannot be obtained without the presence of 4 requisites provided
for in Ar cles 649 and 650 of the CC, which the owner of the dominant estate must establish:
a. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway;
b. A er the payment of proper indemnity;
c. That the isola on was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
d. That the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with his rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.
Private respondent had been granted an adequate access to the public highway through the
adjacent estate of Epifiania Dila even as he was trying to nego ate a sa sfactory agreement with
Francisco for another passageway through the la er’s property. If at the me he filed suit against
the Francisco, such access could no longer be used, it was because he had it closed off by
erec ng a stone wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began for no reason to which
the record can a est except to demonstrate the isola on of his property alleged in his complaint.
But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as Ramos has done, isolate his property
from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third
of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isola on of
his property had not been met-indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary
condi on and thereby vi ated his claim to such an easement.
It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or
inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable
by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience a ending the use of
a ending the use of an exis ng right of way does not jus fy a claim for a similar easement in an
alterna ve loca on.
DISMISSED, the private respondent declared without right to the easement sued for, and the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunc on issued in said case is LIFTED. Costs against the private
respondent.
(6) ANASTACIA QUIMEN v. COURT OF APPEALS and Yolanda Oliveros
May 29, 1996 | Bellosillo, J. 
DOCTRINE:  In  easement  of  right  of  way,  that  easement  where  the  way  is  shortest  and  will  cause  least 
prejudice  shall  be  chosen.  However,  if  the  two  circumstances  do not concur in a single tenement, the way 
where  damage  will  be  least  shall  be  used  even  if  not  the  shortest  route.  Least  prejudice  prevails  over 
shortest distance. 
FACTS:  Pe oner Anastacia and her siblings inherited and subdivided among themselves a piece
of property.  Located behind pe oner and her brother Sotelo’s lot is the share of her brother
Antonio. Respondent Yolanda, niece of pe oner, purchased the aforemen oned lot owned by
Antonio through pe oner as the administratrix with the assurance that pe oner would give
respondent a right of way on pe oner’s adjoining property.
Yolanda constructed a house on the lot using as her passageway to the public highway a por on
of Anastacia s property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway
Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, located directly behind the property of her
parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house.
Yolanda filed an ac on with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia’s
property. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of ac on, explaining that the
right of way through Soteros property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cu ng
through Anastacia's property would no longer make the path straight
On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court and held that she was en tled to a right of way on
pe oner’s property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and
detriment to the servient estate. Hence this pe on.
  
Issue:  WON respondent is en tled to an easement of right of way over pe oner’s property
despite there being a shorter route to the public road.
  
HELD: YES. 
The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which pe oner now denies but which
the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity
cons tuted by law.
A right of way is a privilege cons tuted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of
persons to pass over another’s property when his tenement is surrounded by real es belonging to
others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can
demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for
the beneficial use of his property.
The condi ons sine  qua  non  for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 4 
dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isola on was not due to the acts of ● plain ffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the proper es of
the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the defendants in going to and from their lot;
servient estate. ● defendants' mother even promised plain ffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the
la er an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from
The evidence shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other their property to the road; and
persons including that of pe oner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her ● alterna ve defendants, despite plain ffs' request for a right of way and referral of the
right of way as agreed between her and pe oner; that she did not cause the isola on of her dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement.
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Thus, plain ffs prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established
Pe oner insists that the proposed right of way is not the lease onerous to the par es. The Court in their favor. They also prayed for damages, a orney's fees and costs of suit. RTC and CA both
does not agree. Ar cle 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of found for Fajardo and granted the easement of right of way. On appeal, the Sta. Maria's allege
way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as that Fajardo failed to prove that it was not their own ac ons which caused their lot to be
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may enclosed or cut-off from the road.
be the shortest.
ISSUE:  Whether or not the plain ffs failed to prove the third requisite or that the isola on was
The criterion of  least  prejudice  to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest  not caused by the plain ffs themselves?
distance  although this is a ma er of judicial apprecia on. While shortest  distance  may ordinarily
imply least  prejudice,  it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstruc ng the HELD: NO. 
shortest  distance;  while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstruc ons and the The plain ffs sufficiently proved that they did not by themselves cause the isola on. As to the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus: "Neither have the private respondents been able to
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way show that the isola on of their property was not due to their personal or their
is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. predecessors-in-interest's own acts." In the instant case, the Court of Appeals have found the
existence of the requisites. The pe oners, however, insist that private respondents'
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, predecessors-in-interest have, through their own acts of construc ng concrete fences at the back
the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This and on the right side of the property, isolated their property from the public highway. The
is the test. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide conten on does not impress because even without the fences private respondents' property
egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an remains landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
avocado tree to be cut down, the second alterna ve should be preferred. Pe on DENIED. CA
AFFIRMED. Again, for an estate to be en tled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code,
to wit:
● the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to
(7) Sps. CESAR & RAQUEL and FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA v. a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
COURT OF APPEALS and Sps. Arsenio & Roslynn Fajardo ● there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
January 28, 1998 | Davide Jr., J.  ● the isola on is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649,
DOCTRINE:  Requirements  of  compulsory  servitude  of right of way: (1) surrounded by immovables and no  last par.); and
adequate  outlet  to  a  public highway; (2) payment of indemnity; (3) isolation is not due to the owner of the  ● he right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
dominant estate; (4) least prejudicial [and shortest if possible]  insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
FACTS: Plain ff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land,
Lot No. 124, in Bulacan.  Plain ff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant pe on for review is DENIED and the challenged decision
northeast por on thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Floren no Cruz, on the southeast por on; by of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Lot 6-a and a por on of Lot 6-b owned respec vely by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and
Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the
northwest.

On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Sta. Maria for the
establishment of an easement of right of way. Plain ffs alleged that:
● their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by proper es belonging to other persons, including
those of the defendants;
● since plain ffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of
way passing through either of the alterna ve defendants' proper es which are directly
abu ng the provincial road would be plain ffs' only convenient, direct and shortest
access to and from the provincial road;

Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 5 

 pe oner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the
(8) REMIGIO RAMOS Sr. v. GATCHALIAN REALTY Inc., Eduardo Asprec, and Court of Appeals legal requisite.
October 12, 1987 | Gu errez Jr., J. 
DOCTRINE:  One  could  not  claim  any  such  servitude  without  first  establishing  the  preconditions  for  its  We agree with the appellate court's observa on that the pe oner should have, first and
grant  fixed  by  Articles  649  and  650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: (1) That it is surrounded by other  foremost, demanded from the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and
immovables  and  has  no  adequate  outlet  to  a  public  highway  [Art.  649,  par.  1];  (2)  After  payment  of  maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that
proper  indemnity  [Art.  649,  p.  1,];  (3)  That  the  isolation  was  not  due to the Central's own acts [Art. 649,  he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow
last  par.];  and  (4)  That  the  right  of  way  claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and  the pe oner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way
insofar  as  consistent  with  this  rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may  provided by the pe oner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows
be the shortest.' [Art. 650].  pe oner a much greater case in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to
completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an
FACTS: Pe oner Ramos is the owner of a house and lot containing an area of 901 square meters easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
covered by TCT No. 14927 situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila. The lot was serve as its basis. To jus fy the imposi on of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fic ous
acquired by the pe oner from Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision. In the subdivision survey or ar ficial, necessity for it."
plan of Lot 4133-G, (LRC) PSD-172544, the lot is more par cularly described as Lot 4133-G-11
Two road lots abut (next to) pe oner's property namely lot 4133-G-12 with an area of 2,160 DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the pe on is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
square meters clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan and Lot 4135 merit. The ques oned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
of the Parañaque Cadastre now known as Palanyag Road but more commonly referred to as
Gatchalian Avenue. (9) Sps. MANUEL & ROSALINDA MEJORADA v. GLORIFICACION VERTUDAZO et. al.
October 11, 2007 | Sandoval-Gu errez, J. 
Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent
Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the DOCTRINE:  A  legal  or  compulsory  easement  is  constituted  by  law  for  public  use  or  for  private  interest. 
Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions, by the respondent Asprecs. A complaint for an easement of a Pursuant to the above provisions, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right of way only 
right of way with preliminary mandatory injunc on was filed by Ramos against the private after  he  has  established  the  existence  of  these  4  requisites:  (a)the  estate  is  surrounded  by  other 
respondents. He alleges that: immovables  and  is  without  adequate  outlet  to  a  public  highway;  (b)  after  payment  of  the  proper 
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (d) the right of way claimed is at a 
a. He has since resided at 27 Gatchalian Avenue with his family from 1977 up to the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. 
present; that during construc on of the house, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8 feet  
high concrete wall right infront of appellant's premises, blocking his entrance/exit to FACTS:  Glorificacion and Sol Vertudazo and their co-respondents established their permanent
Gatchalian Road, the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the residence on a 300 sqm lot in Surigao del Sur. Their property is landlocked being bordered on all
public road or highway, formerly Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, sides by different lots. As an access route to Quinones Street, they u lized a proposed
Parañaque; and undeveloped barangay road on the south side of their property owned by Rosario Quiñones.
b. that with the construc on of the 7-8 feet concrete wall pe oner and his family have
been constrained to pass through the back por on of their lot bounded by other lots Sps. Mejorada bought Rosario's lot. Included therein is an area of 55.5 sqm which serves as an
belonging to different owners, which is grassy and cogonal as temporary ingress/egress adequate outlet that the Vertudazos and the general public have been using that area as a
with great inconvenience and hardship, and this becomes all the more pronounced passageway. Sps. Mejorada closed the passageway by building a new garage for their service jeep,
during the rainy season due to flood and mud thus, the Vertudazaos then filed a complaint praying for a grant of easement of right of way.

Respondent filed a mo on to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of ac on and bar by prior
judgment alleging that the complaint was merely a reproduc on of what was filed before which
was dismissed for failure to prosecute within a reasonable length of me. RTC granted the mo on
to dismiss; CA affirmed the RTC sta ng that the pe oner failed to establish the existence of the
precondi ons in order that he could legally be en tled to an easement of a right of way.
ISSUE: WON pe oner has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of
an easement of a right of way in his favor are present.
HELD: NO.  preliminary mandatory injunc on.
We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the pe oner failed to
prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian
Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the
Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the
buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is s ll undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the
Sps. Mejorada claimed that there is an alternate route which the Vertudazos have been using
although it was long, circuitous and muddy; and the Vertudazos never offered to pay
compensa on for the right of way; and that they failed to show that the easement is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate.
During the hearing, the trial court ordered that the passageway to Quinones St. be opened during
the day and closed in the evening during the pendency of the case. Sps. Mejorada agreed to open
it, however, they did not abide with their commitment. Thus the Vertudazos and co-respondents
filed joint mo ons to cite Sps. Mejorada in contempt of court and to revive their applica on for
ISSUE: Are the Vertudazos en tled to the easement of right of way on the property owned by
Sps. Merjorada?

Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 6 

HELD: YES. 
Pe on denied.  Easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor of which the
easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient
estate.  Here, the dominant estate is the Vertudazos property, while the servient estate belongs to
Sps. Mejorada.
A legal or compulsory easement is cons tuted by law for public use or for private interest.
Pursuant to the above provisions, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right of
way only a er he has established the existence of these 4 requisites:
a. the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway;
b. a er payment of the proper indemnity;
c. the isola on was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and
d. the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Here, these 4 requisites have been sa sfied. First, there is no other road which the Vertudazaos
could use leading to Quiñones Street except the passageway on Sps. Mejorada’s property. Second,
the Vertudazaos have offered to pay Sps. Mejorada proper indemnity for the easement of way.
Third, the isola on of the Vertudazos property was not due to their acts, and fourth, the easement
is at the point least prejudicial to Sps. Mejorada’s property. In fact, the area of the easement
which is 55.5 sqm is located at the corner of Sps. Mejorada’s landholding, hence, does not cause
them inconvenience in anyway.
(10) CRISPIN DICHOSO Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe Benito  
v. PATROCINIO MARCOS
April 11, 2011 | Nachura, J.  and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensa on was
DOCTRINE:  In  order  to  justify  the  imposition  of  an  easement  of  right  of  way,  there  must  be  real,  not  affirmed in toto the trial court decision. Hence, this pe on.
fictitious  or  artificial,  necessity  for  it.  Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by 
law  as  basis  of  setting  up  a  compulsory  easement.  Even  in  the  face  of  necessity,  if  it  can  be  satisfied  ISSUE:  WON the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensa on for the taking of a por on of his
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.   property for use as easement of a right of way.
FACTS:  Pe oners, Dichoso, Valdez, & Benito, filed a complaint for easement of right of way
against respondent, Marcos. They alleged that they are owners of Lot No. 21553 while
respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. They had no access to a public road to and from their
property, they claimed to have used a por on of Lot 1 in accessing the road since 1970.
Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though pe oner have been
granted another passageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce), the owners
of another adjacent lot, designated as Lot No. 21559-B.
Respondent, in his answer, denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot 1 as passageway. He stated
that the claim of right of the pe oners was only due to expediency and not necessity. He
maintains that there is an exis ng easement of right of way available to pe oners granted by the
Spouses Arce. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of pe oners which the CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON the pe oners are en tled to the right of way?
HELD: NO.  patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case,
Pe oners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to sa sfy the above-enumerated
requirements. An easement involves an abnormal restric on on the property rights of the servient
owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon
the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of
all precondi ons before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.
Pe oners had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses
Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway.
Clearly, there is an exis ng outlet to and from the public road. The convenience of the dominant
estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory way. To be sure, the true standard
for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.”
DECISION:  WHEREFORE, premises considered, the pe on is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated January 31, 2007 and Resolu on dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No.
85471 are AFFIRMED.
(11) NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION v.
COURT OF APPEALS and Dick Manglapus
September 20, 2000 | Pardo, J. 
DOCTRINE:  Public lands that are awarded by free patent when subject to conditions on public easements, 
do not require just compensation to be paid for being used as an easement fo right of way. 
  
FACTS:  A free patent over 3 hectares of land was granted to respondent’s predecessor-in-interest
Vicente, subject to the provisions on public easements under Commonwealth Act No. 141. 
Respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale. NIA entered
into a contract with Villamar Development Construc on, with the undertaking that it was to
construct canals. NIA then entered a por on of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings
thereon.
Manglapus filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against NIA, alleging that NIA's diggings
paid for its taking. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Manglapus. Upon appeal, the CA
  
HELD: NO. 
The Transfer Cer ficate of Title and the Original Cer ficate of Title covering the subject parcel of
land contained a reserva on gran ng the government a right of way over the land covered
therein.
Under the Original Cer ficate of Title, there was a reserva on and condi on that the land is
subject to "to all condi ons and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by
law especially those men oned in Sec ons 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended." This reserva on, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not
limited by any me period and thus is a subsis ng condi on.
Ar cle 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the
will of the owners. The former are called legal and the la er voluntary easements." In the present
case, the Court find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the
government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free
just compensa on must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a
right of way. Pe on GRANTED.
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 7 

(12) CONCORDIO ABELLANA Sr. et. al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, Orlando Naya,
Rosendo Estoye Jr., and Municipal Government of Talisay Cebu
April 24, 1992 | Griño-Aquino, J  However in 1960, de Sagun constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring
DOCTRINE:  Easements  of  right  of  way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous  25 meters long and about a meter wide was cons tuted to provide access to the highway. ½
easement.  meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other ½ was taken from
  
FACTS:  Abellana et al are owners of a parcel of land on the NW side of Nonoc Subdivision, Cebu.
They sued to establish an easement of a right of way over a subdivision road, which they claim
they’ve acquired through prescrip on since their ancestors have been using these since me
immemorial.  They pray that the concrete wall surrounding the village be taken down to allow easy
access to the public highway.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-exis ng footpath in the place before it was
developed into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not
the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from the pe oners' land to the
public highway. RTC found for the pe oners. CA reversed, averring that road lots in subdivisions
are private property and may only be used as a public highway once acquired by the government
through dona on, purchase or expropria on.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescrip on?
HELD: NO. 
Art. 620 of the Civil Code provides that only con nuous and apparent easements may be
acquired by prescrip on. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered con nuous
because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man. Neither may pe oners
invoke Sec on 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:
Sec. 29. Right  of  Way to Public Road. — The owner or developer of a subdivision without
access to any exis ng public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road
or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the
requirement of the government authori es concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which pe oners are not)
without access to a public highway. The pe oners' allega on that the footpaths which were
converted to subdivision roads have acquired the status of public streets, is not well taken. In the
first place, whether or not footpaths previously existed in the area which is now known as the
Nonoc Homes Subdivision, is a factual issue which this Court may not determine for it is not a
trier of facts. WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the pe on for review, the same is DENIED with
costs against the pe oners.
(13) TOMAS ENCARNACION v. COURT OF APPEALS, Intestate Estate of Eusebio De Sagun,
and Heirs of Aniceta Magsino Vda. De Sagun
March 11, 1991 | Fernan, CJ.  of 62.5 square meters a er payment of the proper indemnity.
DOCTRINE:  Art  651  provides  that  “the  width  of  the  easement  of  right  of  way  shall  be  that  which  is 
sufficient  for  the  needs  of the dominant estate and may accordingly be changed from time to time”. This is 
taken  to  mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the 
width of the passage; and these needs may vary from time to time. 
FACTS:  Pe oners Encarnacion and private respondent Eusebio de Sagun were the owners of 2
adjacent estates. (Encarnacion – dominant estate; de Sagun – servient estate). The servient estate
stands between the dominant estate and the na onal road. Prior to 1960, when the servient
estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, people going to the highway just crossed the
servient estate at no par cular point.
another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensa on was asked and none was given for
the por ons cons tu ng the pathway.
Pe oner then started his plant nursery business on his land. Later, when the business flourished,
and when it became more difficult for pe oner to haul the paints and garden soil through the
use of pushcarts, he decided to buy an owner-type jeep. The jeep could not pass through the
roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him 1
and ½ meters of their property to be added to the exis ng pathway so as to allow passage for his
jeepney. His request was refused.
Pe oner then filed an ac on before the RTC of Batangas to seek the issuance of a Writ of
Easement of a Right of Way over an addi onal width of atleast 2 meters over the de Sagun’s 405
sq.meter parcel of land. During trial, it was presented that there was another passageway to the
highway. TC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: WON pe oner may be granted the writ over an addi onal area of atleast 2 meters.
HELD: YES. 
Art 651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient
for the needs of the dominant estate and may accordingly be changed from me to me”. This is
taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ul mately
determine the width of the passage; and these needs may vary from me to me.
When pe oner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do
with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the na onal highway. But the business grew and with it
the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and
garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing.
To force pe oner to leave his jeepney in the highway and plants exposed to the risk of the
simply because he could not pass through the improvised pathway is SHEER PIGHEADEDNESS
on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-produc ve for all people concernes.
Pe oner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since
that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, in conformity with the foregoing discussion, the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1987 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Pe oner Tomas
Encarnacion is hereby declared en tled to an addi onal easement of right of way of twenty-five
(25) meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2) meters wide over the servient estate or a total area
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 8 
 respondent's lot to Braulio Street. Pe oners could not have been inconvenienced by the
(14) LORETO VDA. DE BALTAZAR and Nestor Baltazar v. passageway for, as borne out by the records, the same is separate and dis nct from the gate used
COURT OF APPEALS and Daniel Panganiban by them to enter their lot and residence. Such being the case, we conclude that respondent is
June 27, 1995 | Romero, J.  en tled to claim a compulsory easement of right of way over pe oners' Lot 1026-B.
DOCTRINE:  By  express  provision  of  Article  649  and  650  of  the  New  Civil  Code,  the  owner  of  an  estate   
may  claim  a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, namely:  DECISION:  WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
(1)  the  estate  is  surrounded  by  other  immovables  and  is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)  same is hereby AFFIRMED.
after  payment  of  the  proper  indemnity;  (3)  the  isolation  was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) 
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as consistent with  (15) PACITA DAVID-CHAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc.
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest."  February 26, 1997 | Panganiban, J. 
FACTS:  Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residen al land consis ng of 117 sqm DOCTRINE:  An  owner  cannot,  by  his  own  act  isolate  his  property  from a public highway and, then claim 
denominated as Lot no. 1027 located at Sta. Ines, Bulacan. Immediately to the front of said land is an easement of way through an adjacent estate. 
Lot 1026 of Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and her son Nestor Baltazar. Immediately behind is the Sta.   
Ana River. On either side are Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and Jose Legaspi, FACTS:  Pacita filed a pe on seeking to Rabbit Bus Lines from fencing its property and depriving
respec vely. Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of Lots. 1025, 1026 and her of access to the highway. She alleged that her property in Pampanga, was delineated on its
1028. northern and western sides by various business establishments, on its southern boundary was the
land of the Pineda family, on its east-northeastern boundary, and lying between her property and
Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars who are owners of Lot 1026 for the the MacArthur Hwy, was another lot owned by Rabbit Bus Lines.
establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to
the provincial road. Pe oners opposed the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary She claims, her only access to the highway was a very small opening of 2 . 4 inches wide
injunc on arguing that there exists two other rights of way adjacent to private respondent's through the property of Rabbit Bus Lines. Pacita believed she was en tled to a wider compulsory
property. easement of right of way through the said property of Rabbit Bus Lines.
RTC dismissed the complaint sta ng that the property of plain ff (respondent) is accessible to
and from the provincial road via 2 other passageways. Panganiban appealed to the CA reversed The prospec ve subservient estate was a por on of a bigger lot formerly owned by the Singian
the order of dismissal and granted respondent’s right of way. Hence the pe on Brothers Corpora on and was sold to Rabbit Bus Lines without the knowledge and consent of
Pacita, who was thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right of pre-emp on or right of
ISSUE: WON respondent Panganiban is en tled to claim an easement of right of way over the redemp on.
Baltazar’s property
Rabbit Bus Lines denied the allega ons of Pacita. The parents and rela ves of Pacita were never
HELD: YES.  tenants or lessees of the Singian Brothers; rather, they were found to be illegally occupying the
It is not disputed that the first  requisite has been established by the court a quo in its Order, property as ruled by the MTC. Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform Pacita of the
respondent Panganiban's property is indeed surrounded by immovables on three sides and a river sale. Also, Pacita had another access to the highway without passing through lot in ques on.
on the fourth.
ISSUES: 
As for the second  requisite, Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate: "There would indeed be some 1. Is Pacita legally en tled to a right of way through Rabbit Bus Lines’ property?
point in looking askance at a reading of the law which would impute to it a strict requirement to 2. Is Pacita en tled to such easement through the recogni on and applica on of the
pay 'proper indemnity' in advance of a suit the purpose of which, in addi on to crea ng an Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao?
easement, is precisely to fix the amount of the indemnity to be paid therefor." We agree with the
Court of Appeals when it ordered the remand of this case to the lower court for the purpose of HELD: NO. 
fixing the proper indemnity. Pe on Denied. Ci ng Ar cles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, Pacita submits that "the owner of
an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only a er she has established the existence of 4
With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was likewise able to establish that the requisites. She nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to sa sfy their
isola on of his property was due to his own act for he merely bought Lot 1027, which was requirements.
formerly part of the Baltazars' Lot 1026-A, from pe oner Nestor Baltazar's
predecessors-in-interest. The Court of Appeals found that Lot 1026-B which the respondent have Second requisite: Pacita’s complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement of
been using as a right of way, has been "exis ng, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by right of way had been made a er payment of the proper indemnity. There was no showing that
the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the life me of pe oner's grandfather, plain ff ever made a tender of payment of the proper indemnity for the right of way.
Fidel and his father, Onisimo Baltazar." It was also established that the right of way was "closed
and obstructed by the pe oners when they closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of Third requisite: It was Pacita who built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her
Lot 1026-B when pe oners constructed their present residence." property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of the
case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the Na onal
As regards the fourth  requirement, both par es agreed that the passage claimed by respondent Highway without passing through the property of Rabbit Bus Line. If she wants a bigger opening,
as his right of way, compared to the other passageways, is the shortest distance from then she can always destroy a por on of the concrete fence which she erected and pass through
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 9 
the property of the Pineda family which has an open space on the southern boundary of
plain ff's land.
Pacita, who claims to be an "ordinary housewife (with) . . . meager resources," pleads that "those
who have less in life should have more in law" and that the Court should apply the Filipino values
of pakikisama and pakikipag-kapwa-tao in resolving the case. Such appeal is based on equity
which has been aptly described as "jus ce outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Pacita is not legally
en tled to a right of way on the property of Rabbit Bus Lines. Thus, such equitable arguments
cannot prevail over the legal findings.
(16) MA. LINDA ALMENDRAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, Urcicio Tan Pang Eng, and Fabiana Yap
March 13, 1997 | Mendoza, J. 
DOCTRINE:  Where  the  easement  may  be  established  on  any  of  several  tenements  surrounding  the  December 10, 1991 | Gu errez Jr., J.
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chose. 
  
FACTS:  Almendras, pe oner, is a registered owner of a parcel of land in Banilad Cebu. The land
is bounded on the north and east side by the lots owned by Eng and Yap, respondents, on the
south by the lots owned by Celedonio Bongo, and on the west by the proper es of Tomas Opone
and Zosimo Opone. In the western boundary of Almendras’ land exist a private road, which
passes through the Opone siblings land and leads to another private road located on the property
of Bienvenido Tudtud which in turn connects to the provincial road.
In 1987, Eng and Yap built a concrete wall on their property on the northern and eastern sides of
pe oner’s lot. Almendaras wrote them a le er offering to buy a por on of their lot so that she
could have access to the provincial road. This was denied because of the exis ng private land on
the western side of her lot providing adequate outlet to the provincial road. The respondents also
said that if it was granted it would greatly reduce the value of their property since it would cut
across in the middle of their property.
Celedonio Bongo also fenced his property, closing off the southern boundary of the Almendras’
property. Almendras then brought this ac on in the RTC of Cebu for the establishment of right of
way. Opone subsequently closed off the western side of pe oner’s property by erec ng a fence
on his lot, making the pe oner’s property inaccessible. The trial court rendered judgement in
favor of pe oner but the CA reversed said judgement.
  
ISSUE: WON a right of way in Eng and Yap’s property should be granted?
  
HELD: YES. 
Pe oner failed to prove that she has a right of the establishment of such an easement through
private respondent’s property. There is no dispute that the road abu ng the western boundary of
pe oner’s lot, known as the Opone road, is an exis ng, passable, private road which connects to
another road, the Tudtud road, on the southern side of pe oner’s lot. This road leads to the
Cebu-Banilad Cadre Provincial Road located on the eastern side of pe oner’s lot.
Owner of a landlocked property that the right to demand right of way through the neighboring
estates. The easement must be established at the point which is least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, whenever possible, the shortest way to the highway. If these two condi ons exist on
different proper es, the land where establishment of the easement will cause the least prejudice
should be chosen. Thus, it has been held that “where the easement may be established on any of
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chose. However,… if these two (2) circumstances do not concur
in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not
be the shortest.”
DECISION:  WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial
Court are SET ASIDE and this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision.
NOTE:  On the land of the Opone, a servitude was annotated on the transfer cer ficates of tle
covering their land. SC remanded the case so that it will be determined which would be least
prejudicial to the estates,  that Opone and Tudtud may be heard, the private respondents may file
a 3rd-party complaint against the owners of servient estates through whose lands they believe the
right of way sought by pe oner should be established and then prove their claim.
(17) ADRIANA DIONISIO et. al. v. Hon. RODOLFO ORTIZ and Pablo Tan Gonzaga
 
DOCTRINE:  An  easement  right  of  way  cannot  be  asserted  when  by  their  own  or  voluntary  act,  they 
themselves have caused the isolation of their property. 
  
FACTS:  The pe oners are co-owners of lots con guous to each other. The private respondents
are also co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the lots owned by the pe oners which was
later subdivided into two lots.
By virtue of an agreement entered into between the owners of the con guous lots and the
members of QCIEA, a right of way was granted over Howmart Road which is a private road
traversing the con guous lots owned by the pe oners.
QCIEA paid compensa on to the pe oners for this right of way. As a result of the subdivision of
the lot, the private respondents opened a new gate also fron ng Howmart Road which is now the
gate in ques on.
Maxima Dionisio caused the digging of holes to put up steel posts in front of the gate, claiming
that the gates opened directly into the house of Maxima exposing it to air and noise pollu on.
Private respondents ins tuted a civil ac on for damages against the pe oners.
Respondent Judge Or z issued an Order gran ng the writ of preliminary mandatory injunc on.
Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the pe on on the ground that the issue has already become
moot and academic since the pe oners have already removed the barricade. Hence, this
pe on.
  
ISSUE: WON the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road.
  
HELD: NO. 
There is no ques on that a right of way was granted in favor of the private respondents over
Howmart Road but the records disclose that such right of way has expired.
Not having any right, the private respondents arenot en tled to the injunc ve relief granted by
the lower court. The party applying for preliminary injunc on must show that (a) the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substan al; (b) the right of complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. In the case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ.
Property | Week 12 Cases | Page 10 
Respondents claim that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the subdivision of Lot s pula ng a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to
272 where a wall was constructed between these 2 lots is untenable. The private respondents prejudice third par es.
can not assert a right of way when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused
the isola on of their property from the access road. Sps Valdez are neither en tled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For to be
en tled to such kind of easement, the following precondi ons must be established:
Art 649 of the NCC provides that “This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is 
due  to  the  proprietor's  own  acts.” The construc on of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small a. the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
passageway between them is an act imputable to the private respondents which precludes them highway;
from asser ng a right of way. The opening of the new gate would definitely be very convenient to b. proper indemnity must be paid;
the private respondents but mere convenience is not enough to serve as basis for the asser on of c. the isola on is not the result of the owner of the dominant estate’s own acts;
a right of way. Pe on GRANTED. d. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
e. to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
(18) Sps. VICTOR & JOCELYN VALDEZ represented by Virgilio Valdez  
v. Sps. FRANCISCO & CARIDAD TABISULA  The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
July 28, 2008 | Carpio-Morales, J.  estate, herein Sps. Valdez. Since the Sps. Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two
DOCTRINE: The requisites provided for in Art 649, for the conferment of legal easement must be complied  public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by the Sps. Tabisula of an easement on the
with to be entitled to the said legal easement. The existence of the requisites must be proven.  “western side of the Tabisula’s lot.”; it appearing that the Sps. Valdez and their family are also the
owners of two proper es adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or
FACTS:  Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from spouses Francisco Tabisula and highways.
Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land. Contained in the deed of sale is a s pula on that the Sps. Valdez
‘shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but DECISION: WHEREFORE, the May 29, 2006 Decision and November 15, 2006 Resolu on of the
which is not included in this sale’ Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the grant of the Counterclaim of respondents, Spouses
Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula, is reversed and set aside. In all other respects, the
Sps. Tabisula then built a concrete wall on the subject property. Sps. Valdez filde a case for challenged decision is AFFIRMED.
specific performance against the Tabisulas with the RTC. The Sps. Tabisula contended that Sps.
Valdez and family also are the owners of two proper es adjoining the subject property, which
adjoining proper es have access to two public roads ; and they could not have agreed to
providing pe oners an easement “on the western side of their lot” as there exists a two-storey
concrete house on their lot where the supposed easement is to be located, which was erected
long before the subject property was sold. Thus, the easement should be taken from the western
por on of the subject property and not from theirs.

ISSUE: WON the Sps. Valdez are en tled to the right of way as provided for in the deed of sale?

HELD: NO. 
An easement or servitude is “a real right cons tuted on another’s property, corporeal and
immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow
somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person.”

There are two kinds of easements according to source – by law or by the will of the owners. This
case is neither.  From the allega ons in Sps Valdez’ complaint, it is clear that what they seek to
enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: “they shall be
provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not
included in this sale.”

The s pula on harped upon by pe oners that they “shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road
right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale” is not a
disposi on of real property. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is “not included in
this sale” could only mean that the par es would have to enter into a separate and dis nct
agreement for the purpose.  The use of the word “shall,” which is impera ve or mandatory in its
ordinary significa on, should be construed as merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no
public benefit or private right requires it to be given an impera ve meaning. Besides, a document

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