Presentation Outline in Criminal Law

Summary of Principles in Criminal Law I
By Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.B, LL.M
CHAPTER I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
Concept and characteristics
1. Concept. Criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature,
and provides for their punishment. It is a branch of public law because it belongs to that species of
law which governs the relationship between the government and its citizens. The purpose of
criminal law is the protection of the public, and the suppression of crime and the punishment, if not
the suppression, of the criminal class (22 CJS 1).
2. Three characteristics. Criminal law has three characteristics: (a) general, (b) territorial, (c)
prospective
a. General. Criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory (Art.
14, New Civil Code). Certain exceptions to the general application of criminal law are well-
established in law and jurisprudence namely those provided in (1)treaties or treaty provisions;
(2)laws of preferential application; and (3) exemptions under the principles of public
international law
(1) All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice
their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law (Antonio Trillanes,
Jr. v. Oscar Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 471, 489).
(2) Jeffrey Liang, an economist for the ADB, was charged of grave oral defamation
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. He claimed immunity from
prosecution on account of his status as a consultant of the ADB pursuant to the
agreement on immunity from legal process between the government and the ADB. Is
he immune from suit? No. He is not covered by the immunity because the commission of
a crime is not part of the performance of official duty. Slandering a person is not covered by
the agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime such as
defamation in the name of official duty (Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125685, January 28,
2000, 335 SCRA 125).
(3) Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence
he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his
diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations
enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions
of the organization and the fulfilment of its purposes (Liang v. People, 335 SCRA 125, 154).
(4) The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's territory is
immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon (Nicolas v. Romulo, 578
SCRA 438, 463).
1
(5) Laws of preferential application exempt a person or class of persons from the general
operation of the law.
(a) Sections 58 and 59 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempt persons below eighteen (18)
years of age from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Article
202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under P.D. No. 1619 and from any
imposition of death penalty other special laws notwithstanding.
(b) Republic Act 75 embodies the protection and recognition of the immunities, rights, and
privileges of duly accredited diplomatic representatives as enunciated under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
(c) Parliamentary Privilege from arrests for members of the Congress as provided under
the 1987 Constitution.
(6) Persons exempt from the operation of Philippine Criminal Law by virtue of the principles of
public international law include (a) Sovereigns and other chiefs of State; (b) Ambassadors,
ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges d’affairs.
b. Territorial. Since crime is defined by the law which prohibits it, it is essentially territorial. The
force and effect of the law defining and prohibiting it cannot go beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the State. As a general rule, the Revised Penal Code cannot be enforced outside the
Philippine territory.
(1) Extraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code. Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code list certain exceptions to the territorial application of the Philippine Criminal Law. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall apply against those who
(a) Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
(b) Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Island;
(c) Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
(d) While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or
(e) Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
(2) Qualified universal jurisdiction of Philippine courts for crimes punished under the
Human Security. Act. Section 58 of the Human Security Act (Republic Act 9372) provides
for the extra-territorial application of the law against those (1) individual persons who,
although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot
to commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of
the Philippines; (2)individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits
of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine
airship; (3) Individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy,
consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government
in an official capacity; (4) individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial
2
limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of
Philippine descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of
the crime; and (5) individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits
of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
(3) Republic Act No. 9851 vests universal jurisdiction to Philippine courts over crimes
in violation of the said law. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9851 provides that the State
shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether military or civilian, suspected or accused
of a crime defined and penalized in this Act, regardless of where the crime is committed,
provided, any one of the following conditions is met: (1) The accused is a Filipino citizen;
(2) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or
(3) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.
(4) Maritime criminal jurisdiction. The Philippines observes the following rules for crimes
committed on board a merchant vessel.
(a) If the vessel is on the high seas, jurisdiction over crimes committed on board the
vessel shall belong to the State where the vessel is registered.
(b) If the crime is committed on board a Philippine vessel while the latter is on the
territorial jurisdiction of another State, jurisdiction belongs to the courts of the said
State. The Philippines is following the English Rule which enunciates the authority of
local courts of the country where the vessel was at the time of the commission of the
crime committed on board the said vessel. The other rule, the French rule, enunciates
that crimes committed on board a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in
the country of the State within the territorial jurisdiction of which they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or when the
safety of the state is endangered.
(c) If the crime is committed on board of a vessel while the latter is on the high seas and
the vessel is not registered in any country, any State may assume jurisdiction over the
same because such vessel is considered as a pirate ship for want of registration in any
state.
(d) Jurisdiction over crimes committed on board a foreign military vessel belongs to the
sovereign of the said warship.
(5) Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though
neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes" (People v. Lol-lo and Saraw, G.R No. 17958,
February 27, 1922, 43 Phil. 19).
(6) Continuing crimes on board a foreign vessel which entered the Philippine territory.
When a vessel comes within three nautical miles drawn from the headlands which
embrace the entrance to the Manila Bay, she is within the territorial waters. The Philippine
courts have jurisdiction (U.S. v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7).
3
(7) Possession of opium on board a foreign vessel in transit is not triable by Philippine courts
because the vessel is considered as an extension of its nationality, but said courts acquire
jurisdiction when the tins of opium are landed from the vessel in Philippine soil (U.S. v.
Look Chow, 18 Phil. 573).
(8) Smoking opium on board a foreign merchant vessel within the Philippine territory.
This constitutes breach of public order because it causes to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
merchant vessels anchored in Philippine jurisdictional waters (People v. Wong Cheng, 46
Phil. 729).
(9) Transitory crimes may be validly tried in any territory where the offense was in part
committed. The court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged
with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed (see Yalong v. People, G.R. No. 187174, August
28, 2013, 704 SCRA 195, 205). Republic Act 9208, also known as Anti-Trafficking in
Human Person Act of 2008 punishes acts of human trafficking committed across
national borders which may be considered as transitory crimes.
c. Prospective. A penal law cannot make an act punishable in a manner in which it was not
punishable when committed. Whenever a new statute dealing with crime establishes conditions
more lenient or favourable to the accused, it can be given retroactive effect. This exception cannot
apply if the accused is a habitual criminal and whenever the law specifically states its non-
application (see Art. 22, RPC).
a. The principle of prospective operation of penal laws prohibits the enactment of ex post facto
laws. An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before
the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action;
or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order
to convict the defendant. The Supreme Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty (see Salvador v.
Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007).
4
CRIMES
Concept and characteristics of crimes and interpretation of criminal statutes.
1. Concept. A crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or

commanding it. Technically, crimes in the Philippines are known as felonies. Felonies are acts and
omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code (Art. 3, RPC).
2. Essentially statutory in character. Since the Philippine legal system is Civil Law in origin,
common law crimes or crimes which are defined and punished based on customs or usages are
not dealt with under the Philippine criminal justice system. There must be a statute providing for a
penalty of imprisonment or payment of fine for the commission or omission of an act before it may
be considered a felony or an offense.
a. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. The maxim means that no person shall be punished
except in pursuance of a statute which fixes a penalty for criminal behaviour.
b. Nullum crimen sine lege. The principle means that there is no crime if there is no statute
punishing the act.
(1) Stealing telephone calls belonging to the PLDT. Accused has not committed any crime.
Case law is that, where a legislative history fails to evidence congressional awareness of
the scope of the statute claimed by the respondents, a narrow interpretation of the law is
more consistent with the usual approach to the construction of the statute. Penal
responsibility cannot be extended beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate (Laurel v.
Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 243, 273).
(2) In considering the motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court clarified the above ruling
as follows: Indeed, while it may be conceded that “international long distance calls,’ the
matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot
be said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to the
PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely
encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructures and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone
calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of the PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and
business. Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
services are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized under said article. However, the
Amended Information describes the thing taken as “international long distance calls,” and
only later mentions “stealing the business from PLDT” as the manner by which the gain was
derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended
5
Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and
business of respondent PLDT (Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, 576 SCRA 41, 56-57).
(3) The above ruling was reiterated in a subsequent case. The Supreme Court said that the
business of providing telecommunications and telephone services is personal property
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act
of “subtraction” penalized under the said article (Worldwide Web Corporation v. People,
G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014, 713 SCRA 18, 43-44).
3. Dual nature. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (a) as an offense
against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (b) as an offense against
private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there
are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime) (Nuguid v.
Nicdao, 502 SCRA 93, 98).
a. It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless,
the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability
(Lumantas v. Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 337, 342-343).
b. Under the “threefold liability rule,” the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an
administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the
Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate the official’s alleged
transgressions (Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011, 654
SCRA 539, 556-557).
c. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the
same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Abellana v. People, G.R. No.
174654, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 683, 689).
4. Rules on the Interpretation of Criminal Statutes
It is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or application of the law
must be made in favor of the accused. Laws should not be interpreted in such a way that the
interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an authority with the jurisdiction
to issue the order (Gidwani v. People, G.R. No. 195064, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 756, 765).
a. Pro reo principle. The fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to
resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be
presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt (see
6
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409,
February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 272).
b. Principle of lenity. Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The
rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one
that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused (see Intestate Estate of
Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010, 612
SCRA 272).
c. Principle of presumption of innocence. The defendant faces the full panoply of state
authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking,
he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important,
therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the
innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Tempongko, G.R. No. 69668, October 2, 1986, 144
SCRA 583, 592).
d. Effects of repeal of penal statutes

(1) A total repeal of a penal law obliterates the crime. An accused will benefit thereby
regardless of whether he is already convicted by final judgment or not.
(2) If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shall apply except
when the offender is a habitual delinquent or when the new law is made not applicable to
pending action or cause of action.
(3) If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be applied.
(4) If the penal law is impliedly repealed, the subsequent repeal of the repealing law will
revive the original law.
(5) If the penal law is expressly repealed, the subsequent repeal of the repealing law will not
revive the original law.
5. Limitations provided under the Constitution

a. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted (sec. 22, Art. III, Constitution)
b. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment be inflicted
(sec. 19, Art III, Constitution).
c. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.
(1) The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in
the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of
the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power
7
may be appropriately exercised (Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

167011, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 639, 645).
(2) The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However,
this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged
law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an on-its
face invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate (Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 370, 418).
(3) The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or
character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus
be within the prohibition (Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 724 SCRA 1,
61).
FELONIES
Concept of felonies
1. Concept. Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are committed not
only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill (Art. 3, RPC).
2. General elements of crimes. Every crime has two elements: the act or omission (actus reus) and
the mental element which is commonly referred to as criminal intent (mens rea).
a. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his
intentions were so (see U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910, 15 Phil. 489).
b. Actus invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act (see
U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910, 15 Phil. 489).
3. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act
and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842,
November 29, 2006, 476 SCRA 461, 479).
4. Mens rea. Mens rea is the mental element of a crime. In crimes by dolo, mens rea will refer to the
requirements of freedom, intelligence and intent while doing the act or omitting to do the act.
8
5. Criminal intent. In criminal law, intent means a state of mind which willingly consents to the act
that is done, or free will choice, or volition in the doing of the act; it means that the act is voluntary,
and that it proceeds from a mind free to act (22 CJS 1).
a. Petitioner was charged for violating Republic Act 7080, otherwise known as “An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder.” He questioned the constitutionality of
the law contending that the definition of plunder which stated that plunder may be
committed through series or combination of acts punished under the Revised Penal
Code has done away with the requirement that the mens rea or the mental element of
the constitutive crimes should be proven in all criminal prosecutions for these crimes.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent
(Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA
395, 452).
6. In crimes by culpa, the mental element of the crime refers to the requirements of freedom,
intelligence and imprudence, or negligence or the lack of foresight or skill while doing the act or
omitting to do the act.
a. Setting on fire the infected wounds of a girl to cure her which resulted to burn injuries.
The actions of the accused had not been to cause an evil but rather intended as a remedy (see
US v. Feliciano Divino, G.R. No.L- 4490, December 4, 1908, 12 Phil. 175).
b. With the permission of the victim’s parents, accused, together with the other accused,
proceeded to subject the boy to a “treatment” calculated to drive the “bad spirit” from
his body. Unfortunately, the strange procedure resulted in his death. The liability arises
from their reckless imprudence because they ought to know that their actions would not bring
about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
not of murder (People v. Eutiquia Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 267,
279).
c. After alighting from a jeepney, Bentley Billon and his sister Sanily crossed the street.
Bently was first to cross and waited in the other side of the street for his sister.
However, Sanily was hit by a passenger jeepney while crossing the street. Bently ran
towards his sister, but the vehicle suddenly accelerated and its front tire ran over
Sanily’s stomach. The driver brought the victim to the hospital where she expired. Is the
driver criminally liable for intentional crime? No. While it is possible that accused
deliberately ran over the victim, it is equally possible, if not more probable, that the vehicle
moved forward because he failed to control its momentum. Indeed, this is more consistent
with the unrebutted evidence that the jeepney, which had no handbrake, was moving fast and
that the accused became confused when the accident occurred. Furthermore, accused’s act
of bringing the victim to the hospital despite numerous opportunities to flee from the scene is
more compatible with a state of mind devoid of criminal intent (People v. Renato Garcia, G.R.
No. 153591, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 583, 588).
9
7. No criminal liability flows from an involuntary act.
a. Killing his wife and injuring his father while the accused was sleepwalking. Under the
special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant’s own wife whom he
dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his
father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, there is lack of
motives for the accused to voluntarily commit the acts complained of and the motives for not
committing said acts (People v. Potenciano Taneo, G.R. No. 37673, March 31, 1933, 58 Phil.
255, 257).
8. No criminal liability flows from a lawful act.
a. Injuring an assailant in the act of defending the victim from aggression is a lawful act.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they
are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two
types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious
intent of the offender – In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious.
In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The
offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury
to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The
injury caused by the offender to another person is “unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice.” As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. Absent the malicious intent to injure
or kill the victim, the conviction of the accused for the intentional crime of homicide cannot be
sustained (see Rollie Calimutan v. People, G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006).
9. Mistake of fact. Mistake of fact which would relieve an accused of criminal liability has the
following elements: (a) The act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused
believed them to be; (b) The intention of the accused was not unlawful; and (c) There was no fault
or negligence. A mistake of fact contradicts the presumption of criminal intent for acts which would
otherwise be considered as unlawful.
a. Stabbing a supposed intruder in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his
sleeping room was a thief is justified under the principle of mistake of fact (see U.S. v. Ah
Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910, 15 Phil. 489).
b. While his wife was cooking, accused heard somebody threw stones at his house. He
took a revolver and went down. He heard a noise and saw a black figure rushing with
hands uplifted. In the belief that the figure was an outlaw, he shot at him and killed him.
He was charged of murder and was convicted by the trial court. He claimed that he had
shot the victim by mistake. Is he criminally liable? No. His ignorance or error of fact was
not due to negligence or bad faith, and this rebuts the presumption of malicious intent
10
accompanying the act of killing (see People v. Pambaya Bambayabao, G.R. No. L-29481,
October 31, 1928, 52 Phil. 309).
c. Resisting arrest on the belief that persons who entered his house are bandits are
justified under the principle. By the declaration of the witnesses for the prosecution, it was
established that accused, as soon as he had been informed that they were officers of the law,
armed with an order of arrest, peaceably submitted and accompanied them. If the accused
believed that those who had entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely justified
in calling his neighbors and making an attempt to expel them from his premises (see U.S. v.
Bautista, G.R. No. L-10678, August 17, 1915, 31 Phil. 308).
10. While mistake of fact relieves the accused of criminal liability, mistakes in the identity of the victim
(error in personae) do not exempt the accused from criminal liability because he is responsible for
the direct and natural consequences of his wrongful act, even if it be different from that intended.
a. Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were ordered to arrest Anselmo Balagtas who was
believed staying in the house of a certain ballerina named Aireen. The instruction is for
them to get him and if he resisted to get him dead or alive. They went up to the room
where Balagtas was alleged to be staying and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door, fired their guns simultaneously at the sleeping man. It turned out that
the man was not the criminal they were seeking but Serapio Tecson, an innocent man.
They interposed mistake of fact in the case for murder against them. Is the defense
tenable? No. There were no circumstances whatsoever which would press accused to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, they had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for
accused to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression
is offered by him (People vs. Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27,
1943, 74 Phil. 257, 262).
11. While mistake of fact relieves the accused of criminal liability, mistakes in the consequences of
the operation of law do not exempt the accused from criminal liability.
a. Eduardo P. Manuel married Rubylus Gana on July 18, 1975. Rubylus was charged of
estafa in 1975 and because of this, Manuel never saw her again. In January 1996,
Manuel met Tina Gandalera, whom he had married three months after. When things
began messy for the new spouses, Tina discovered Manuel’s first marriage. Tina filed
bigamy against Manuel. Manuel interposed the defense that he had remarried because
he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. Is the accused criminally
liable for bigamy? For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a
confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. In the
present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and
such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.
11
As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat (Eduardo Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November
29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461, 479).
12. An act may be justified under the mistake of fact doctrine only if the accused had no time or
opportunity to make further inquiry and if the circumstances pressed him to act
immediately.
13. Exempting circumstances for lack of intelligence. Under the Revised Penal Code the lack of
intelligence of the accused exempts him or her from criminal responsibility:
(1) Insane and imbecile persons (Art. 12, par. 1)
(2) Children fifteen years old and under (Republic Act 9344)
(3) Children over fifteen years old and under eighteen who acted without discernment (Republic
Act 9344)
(4) Persons who acted through mistake of fact.
14. Exempting circumstances for lack of freedom. Those who have acted without freedom are
always deemed exempt from criminal responsibility:
(1) Compulsion of an irresistible force (Art. 12, par. 5)
(2) Impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury (Art. 12, par. 6)
15. Crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibita. When the acts complained of are inherently
immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime
is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not
inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden.
a. Accused was the Election Officer of Alaminos, Pangasinan. Together with the other
accused, they were charged of decreasing the votes received by senatorial candidate
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., from 6,998 votes to 1, 921 votes (as disclosed in the total number
of votes in 159 precincts). Accused admitted that she had announced the figure 1921
instead of 6998. Garcia claimed good faith as a defense. When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.
Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says
they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) of the Election Code are mala in se. For otherwise,
even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given
the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
12
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and
intent to injure another (Arsenia Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006,
484 SCRA 617, 623).
b. Consented sex is not an admissible defense in the case for violation of Section 5(b) of
Republic Act 7610 for lascivious conduct. For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to
sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in
cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual
intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding
or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection (Michael
John Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 651).
c. Motive for the issuance of a bad check is not a defense for violation of BP 22. The
gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has
made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the
legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in
mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent
becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the
defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are unavailing (see Isidro Pablito Palana
v. People, G.R. No. 149995, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 296).
d. Reckless imprudence cannot be absorbed by a malum prohibitum. A mala in se felony

(such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita
crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a
felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the
special laws enacting them (John Eric Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006.
482 SCRA 194, 208).
e. Petitioner was caught in the airport travelling with a box containing shabu. Charged and
convicted with violation of Republic Act 9165, he claimed inter alia that he was not aware of the
contents of the said box. Is defense meritorious? No. It bears stressing that the act of transporting a
prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As
such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal
intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to
13
successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. “It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who
are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony (Ho Wai Pang v.
People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011).
16. Felonies by omission are also voluntary acts such as the following:
a. Anyone who fails to render an assistance to any person whom he finds in an uninhabited place
wounded or in danger of dying (Art. 275, par. 1).
b. Any officer entrusted with collection of taxes who voluntarily fails to issue a receipt as provided
by law (Art. 213, par. 2b).
c. Every person, owing allegiance to the Philippines, without being a foreigner, and having
knowledge of any conspiracy against the government, who does not disclose and make known
the same to the proper authority (Art. 116).
17. While criminal intent is an essential element of a felony committed by dolo, motive is not. Motive is the
moving power which impels one to action for a definite result. It is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect such results.
14
CHAPTER II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Person criminally liable, unintended consequences, proximate cause, direct and logical
consequences of criminal conduct, impossible crime and judicial referral.
1. Persons criminally liable. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be
incurred:
(1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
(2) By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
a. Inapplicability to culpable crimes. Article 4 applies only in crimes committed by dolo. It has
no application in crimes committed through culpa or through negligence or reckless
imprudence. The provision enunciates the basic principle that one who commits an intentional
felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result
therefrom, whether intended or not.
b. Inapplicability to injuries arising from a lawful act.
(1) A bystander was fatally injured after the tip of the bolo hit his chest when its owner
wrestled it from the person who snatched it to prevent the same from being used
against him. Is the owner of the bolo liable for the death of the bystander? No. The
owner did not try to wound the person who tried to wrench it from him. He was only
defending his possession of the bolo. His conduct was perfectly lawful. The wounding of
the bystander was caused accidentally and without malicious intent (People v. Donato
Bindoy, G.R. No. L-34665, August 28, 1951, 56 Phil. 15, 16).
2. Criminal liability for unintended consequences of criminal conduct. The intended felony of the
offender may not come about because of (a) mistake in the identity of the victim (error in
personae); (b) mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury to one
person actually inflicts it on another (aberratio ictus); or (c) when the act exceeds the intent, that is,
the injurious result is greater than that intended (praeter intentionem).
Error in personae:
a. Accused, with intention of assaulting his adversary, mistook the victim for the latter and
inflicted on him a mortal wound with a bolo. Charged of homicide, accused claimed that
since he was not able to kill the person intended to be killed, he should have been
relieved of criminal liability. Is he correct? No. His mistake in killing one man instead of
another cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. The fact that he made a mistake in killing
the wrong man is not to be considered as a mitigating circumstance (People vs. Gona, G.R.
No.L- 31962, March 15, 1930, 54 Phil. 605, 606).
15
Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow):
a. Accused shot his former girlfriend with his revolver. However, the bullet hit another
person instead. Due to proper medical attention, the victim did not die. Accused denied
liability for the injury which the victim sustained. Is the accused criminal liable? Yes.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his
criminal liability (People v. Ramon Mabug-at, G.R. No. L-25459, August 10, 1926, 51 Phil. 967,
969).
Praeter intenionem (greater injury):
a. Incensed with wrath and anger beyond his control, accused picked up a piece of wood
nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of
severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he had done, accused picked her up in his
arms and brought her to their home. Soon his wife died. Is he criminally liable for
parricide? Yes. The fact that the accused intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical
injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime committed
(People v. Jaime Tomotorgo, G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 238, 246).
b. Accused reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back portion of the
victim’s head. The victim fell after he was shoved by one of the accused. He was able to
go home after that. Later, he was found lying unconscious on the kitchen floor,
salivating. The autopsy confirmed that he died of myocardial infraction. In this
jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he
intended; "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused). Thus, the circumstance that the accused did not intend
so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in
accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code (Amado Alvarado Garcia v. People,
G.R. No. 171951, August 29, 2009, 597 SCRA 392, 407).
3. For an accused to be criminally liable for the unintended consequences of a criminal act, the
following requisites must be present (1) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (2) that
the wrong done be the direct, natural and logical consequences of the felony committed by the
offender (U.S. v. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310, 319).
a. Accused whipped his sons with a stick which was later broken by the furious whipping.
He then brought them outside the house, tied them to a coconut tree and continued
beating them with a thick piece of wood. They walked back to the house after the
beating. One of the boys collapsed, lost consciousness and died. Charged of killing the
boy, accused claimed that he was merely disciplining his erring children. In order that a
person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is
indispensable (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
16
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no
doubt accused, in beating his son and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony.
The child expired as a direct consequence of the beating. The criminal liability of the accused
for the death of his son is clear (People v. Noel Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011, 658
SCRA 367, 377).
b. Peeved by the persistent demand of the victim for food, accused took a fire band and
applied it to his neck. The deceased ran to the place where people were gathered and
told that he was wounded and dying. He raised his shirt and showed them a wound in
his abdomen below the navel. He had undergone a medical treatment but he took out
the drainage from his wound and died of peritonitis. It is a basic principle that every person
is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own
acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not
alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in producing
the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper
treatment, which are of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally
follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in
contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But, however, this
may be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different
doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of the medical men, and the uncertainties
attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door
by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment (People
v. Juan Quianzon, G.R. No. L-42607, September 28, 1935, 62 Phil. 162, 168).
c. Accused strangled his wife with a piece of rope. The wife died and a case for parricide
was filed against accused. He claimed that the death of his wife was not due to the
strangling but to her weak heart condition. It should be noted that the heart failure was due
to the fright or shock caused by the strangling, and consequently, the defendant was
responsible for the death, notwithstanding the fact that the victim was already sick. Had not the
defendant strangled the deceased, the latter, notwithstanding her illness, would not have died.
In other words, the defendant directly caused her death (see People v. Aniceto Martin, G.R.
No. L-3002, May 23, 1931).
4. The rule is that if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger, which
causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries.
a. The accused declared a hold-up after boarding a jeepney. Two passengers jumped of
the jeepney. One of the passengers died because of the injuries she sustained after
jumping from the vehicle. Charged of robbery with homicide, accused claimed that they
should not be held responsible for the death of the passenger who jumped from the
jeepney. Are they criminally liable for the death of the said passenger? Yes. If the victim
17
jumped out of the jeepney, it must have been because she was in mortal dread that the
accused would shoot her. As fear gripped her, she, in desperation, thought of scampering out
of the moving jeepney. The rule is that if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate
sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures
himself, the man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries
(People v. William Page, G.R. No. 3707, June 7, 1977, 77 SCRA 348, 355).
b. The twin accused run amuck inside the train. Because of the rampage that they have
caused, most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run
amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. Several cases of
murder, frustrated murders and attempted murders were filed against the two accused
later. Are they criminally liable for the resulting injuries to the victims? Yes. Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended". The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of
danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the
person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (see
People vs. Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA
17).
c. The accused rose up in rage, moved towards the victim, with a big knife in hand, and
threatened to stab him because of his insubordination. When the accused approached
within a few feet away from the victim, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and
immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be
seen no more. Is the accused criminally liable for the death of the victim? Yes. As to the
criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned there can be no doubt; for
it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to
him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under
the same circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, "If a
man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person
to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a state of
mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (see People v. Calixto Valdez, G.R. No. L-
16486, March 22, 1921, 41 Phil. 497).
5. Proximate cause. For an accused to be held responsible to the resulting injury, the felony must be
the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186).
a. Accused assaulted the victim with a bolo while the latter was descending from the
stairs. The victim was wounded in the forehead which caused him to fall down. After he
fell down, accused threw a rock over his right clavicle. The victim suffered serious
physical injuries on account of the assault. Several days later, he died. The doctor
18
certified that he died of tetanus secondary to the infected wound. Is the accused
criminally liable for the death of the victim? Yes. Accused is responsible for the natural
consequences of his unlawful act (People v. Gerardo Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947,
78 Phil. 458, citing People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702.)
b. Accused hacked the victim by a bolo, hitting him on the right palm of his hand. The
victim ran away from the accused but was overtaken by the latter who hacked him again
on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. The victim was brought to a hospital.
The dispute between the two was settled. A few weeks after, the victim was rushed to
the hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, he had lockjaw
and was having convulsions. The attending physician found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. The victim died in the said hospital after being
diagnosed of tetanus. Is the accused criminally liable for the death of the victim? No.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to
a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that
the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do (see Filomeno Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1).
c. Accused stabbed the victim a sharpened bamboo on January 23, 2002. The victim was
taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. On February
14, 2002, he was brought to the San Lazaro Hospital. He died two days after. The doctor
was able to determine that he died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound. Is the
accused criminally liable for the death of the victim? No. There had been an interval of 22
days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro
Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus
infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days
later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less
than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one
hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was
merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the
proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical
injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon
Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser
offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and
19
form part of those constituting the offense of murder (see People v. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No.
186412, September 7, 2011).
d. To hold the accused responsible for the resulting death of the victim, it should be medically
established that tetanus developed from the injuries inflicted by the accused and that the
possibility of an efficient intervening cause from the time injuries had been inflicted until death
ensued is remote. The Supreme Court took judicial notice that a severe tetanus infection has
an incubation period of less than 14 days.
6. When felony not deemed proximate cause of the injury. The felony committed is not the
proximate cause of the resulting injury when (a) there is an active force that intervened between
the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely
foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or (b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act
of the victim (see Luis B. Reyes, 2012 Ed., p. 272).
a. Resulting injuries are not the direct, logical and necessary consequence of the
prohibited conduct. In the following cases, the injury is not the direct, logical and necessary
consequence of the felony committed, because the felony committed is not the proximate
cause of the resulting injury:
(1) If slight physical injuries be inflicted by A upon B, and the latter deliberately immerses his
body in a contaminated cesspool, thereby causing his injuries to become infected and
serious, A cannot be held liable for the crime of serious physical injuries (U.S. v. Delos
Santos, G.R. No. 13309).
(2) The accused struck a boy on the mouth with the back of his hand. Later, the boy died.
Death might have been caused by a fever prevalent in the locality, not by the blow on the
mouth. The accused who gave the blow was not liable for the death of the deceased
(People v. Palalon, 49 Phil. 177).
(3) The accused struck a child, who was seriously ill with fever for three weeks, upon the
thighs with a slipper, pushed and dragged him, throwing him heavily on the mat spread on
the floor. The child died two days later. As the true cause of the child’s death was not
proved, the accused was convicted of physical injuries only (U.S. v. Embate, 3 Phil. 640).
(4) Where medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time the decedent was
wounded to the time of death, the accused must be acquitted of the crime of homicide
(Urbano v. IAC, 157 SCRA 10). (see Luis B. Reyes, 2012 Ed., pp. 81-82)
7. Impossible crime. The following are the requisites of impossible crime:

(1) That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property
(2) That the act was done with evil intent
(3) That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means employed is either
inadequate or ineffectual.
(4) That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the Revised
Penal Code.
20
a. Legal impossibility. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1)
the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act;
and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category (Intod v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 57).
b. Factual Impossibility. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown

to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One
example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal
the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty (Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 58).
(1) The four accused went to the victim’s house to kill her. After finding out the location
of her bedroom, the riddled it with bullets. Fortunately, she was another city during
that time. No one was injured on account of the shelling. Are the accused criminally
liable for any crime? Yes. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the
contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless
the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of
the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element
of attempted and frustrated felonies (Sulpicio Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 58).
(2) Accused stole a postdated check amounting to P10,000.00. When the check was
deposited for payment, it turned out that the check was not funded. What crime is
committed, if any? Impossible crime. In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an
offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is
empty. Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied,
as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to
gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would
have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only
21
due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully
taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored
check (Gemma Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 209, 592 SCRA 426, 439).
c. In the Intod case, the fact that the victim was not in her house at the time of the assault is a
factual impossibility which prevented the consummation of the crime. On the other hand, the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded prevented the crime from being
produced in the Jacinto case.
6. Judicial referral. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall
submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of
the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense (Article 5, RPC).
a. In People v. Heinrich Ritter, G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991, 194 SCRA 690, the accused
inserted a foreign object into the vagina of the 12 year old girl Rosario Baluyot. She later
developed an infection because a part of the vibrator inserted into her vagina was left inside
her. She died because of the infection. Heinrich Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide
but he was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In acquitting the accused, the Supreme Court lamented the lack of criminal laws which will
adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their
own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory
rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of
pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society.
Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies
deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to
enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise the
availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. The Court was
prompted to acquit the accused but expressed its concern about the problem of street children
and the evils committed against them. It addressed the matter to the Congress stating that
something must be done about it (194 SCRA 690, 721). A year after, Republic Act No. 7610
was enacted which gives special protection to children against abuse, neglect and
exploitation.
b. In People v. Marivic Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 3, 2004, 419 SCRA 537, a woman
who killed her husband interposed the defense that she had no criminal liability because when
she killed him, she was under a condition called battered woman syndrome. The Supreme
Court defined that a battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
22
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives
or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified
as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.” However, the Supreme
Court did not consider the battered woman syndrome as a justifying circumstance that will
relieve an accused of criminal liability for the crime that she has committed against her
husband. She was convicted of parricide. A year later Republic Act No. 9262 was passed
providing that victims-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
c. In Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 724 SCRA 1, the Supreme Court took
note that there seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on the crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. In spite of this,
however, the Supreme Court cannot modify the range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties
provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through the Supreme Court’s decisions, as
that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. Quoting
Guillermo B. Guevarra’s Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court said
that the remedy is provided in Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code: This provision is based
under the legal maxim, “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege,” that is, there can exist no
punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute. No
matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act. Under the provision of this Article the Court cannot suspend the execution of
a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the
matter to the Chief Executive with the recommendation for an amendment or modification of
the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh (724 SCRA 1, 37-38).
23
CHAPTER III. STAGES OF COMMISSION OF FELONIES
Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies.
1. Consummated felony. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present (Art.6, RPC).
2. Frustrated felony. A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
a. Distinguish attempted and frustrated felonies. The distinctions between frustrated and
attempted felony are summarized as follows: 1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. 2.) In frustrated felony, the
reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the
crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance.
(1) A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission
of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from
performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency
which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of
the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to
perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt (U.S. v.
Protacio Eduave, G.R. No. L-12155, February 2, 1917, 36 Phil. 209, 212).
3. Attempted felony. There is an attempted felony when the offender commences the commission of
a felony by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance (Art. 6,
RPC). The elements of attempted felony are:
(1) The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
(2) He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
(3) The offender’s act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and
(4) The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.
a. Overt act. An overt act is some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by
24
the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense (see Rait v. People, GR 180425, July 31, 2008, 566 SCRA 285).
(1) Accused was caught in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of
a store of cheap goods. He had only succeeded in breaking one board and in
unfastening another from the wall when he was caught by the policeman. What
crime was committed by the accused? Attempted trespass to dwelling. The attempt to
commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by
overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There
is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter the store by
means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall,
in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman, did not develop
beyond the first steps of its execution. As such, he could only be liable for attempted
trespass to dwelling (People v. Aurelio Lamahang, G.R. No. L-43530, August 3, 1935, 61
Phil. 703, 707).
b. If the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only
attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused
and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less
serious or slight physical injury (Rujjeric Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, September 12,
2006, 501 SCRA 533, 551).
(1) Accused shot the victim twice but the latter was hit only in his right thigh because
the jeepney’s spare tire shielded the other parts of his body. Accused was charged
of frustrated murder. The accused had commenced the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would
have produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as,
that the jeep to which the victim was clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire
which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal
and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to
cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not having performed
all the acts of execution that would have brought about death (People v. Emeliano
Trinidad, G.R. No. 79123-15, January 9, 1989, 169 SCRA 51, 59; People vs. Phones, L-
32754-5, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 167; People vs. Garcia, L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96
SCRA 497).
(2) Accused shot the victim once on the right chest which caused her to bleed and lost
consciousness. He was charged of frustrated murder. One of the issues raised
concerns the propriety of conviction for frustrated murder since no medical
certificate was presented to prove the nature of the injuries sustained by the victim.
Is the accused criminally liable for frustrated murder? No. According to the decision
25
of the Supreme Court, the failure of the prosecution to present a medical certificate or
competent testimonial evidence showing that the victim would have died from her wound
without medical intervention, justified the accused's conviction for attempted murder only.
Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as
attempted, not frustrated murder (People v. Fernando Costales, G.R. No. 141154-56,
January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 269, 282).
(3) Accused was singing in the karaoke bar when the victims joined him. He felt
irritated and insulted as he thought that he was being mocked by the victims. The
accused shot the victims later. One of the victims sustained gunshot wound in this
shoulder. He interposed self-defense in criminal cases for frustrated homicide
brought by the victim against him. As the wound sustained was not fatal or mortal
since the treatment period was short and the victim was discharged from the hospital on
the same day he was admitted, the crime is only attempted homicide (see People v.
Palaganas, 501 SCRA 533).
(4) Intent to kill is an element of both frustrated and attempted homicide. The extent of the
injury may disclose the presence of the intent to kill. In the absence of proof either of
intent to kill or the extent of the injury or the period of incapacity for labor or of the
required medical attendance, an accused can only be convicted of slight physical injuries
(People v. Christopher Aviles, G.R. No. 172967, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 265,
276).
(5) Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the
robbery is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex
crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or
injuries committed in connection with the robbery (People v. Juan Cabbab, Jr. G.R. No.
173479, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 257 SCRA 589, 604).
4. In determining whether the felony is attempted or frustrated or consummated, (1) the nature
of the offense, (2) the elements constituting the felony, as well as (3) the manner of
committing the same must be considered (see Luis B. Reyes, 2012 Ed., p. 114).
a. Arson. The rule in cases of arson is that if a portion of the building begins to burn, however
small it may be, it is consummated. If all the acts necessary to burn the building have already
been performed, as when the defendant has started a blaze by burning rags soaked with
gasoline placed near the building but the fire is put out before any part of the building has
started to burn, it is frustrated. If the overt act is directly connected with the burning but not all
the acts of execution have been performed, as when a person has poured gasoline under the
house of another and he was about to strike the match to set the house on fire when he was
apprehended, even if actually there was no blaze, the crime is attempted arson (see Padilla,
1959 Ed., p. 88).
26
(1) After noticing that the thatched roof of his house was on fire, complaining witness
got up to fetch some water with which to extinguish the fire. He saw the accused
beside the house, carrying a stick. He shouted for help, and started to put out the
fire, which he succeeded in doing, after a small part of the roof had burned. In
answer to his cries for help, a neighbor repaired to the place and saw the accused
running away. Another neighbor also came, and on his way to the house met the
accused. Is the crime frustrated or consummated arson? The appellant did in fact, set
fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially burned. With this, the
crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards
extinguished, for, once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson
does not depend upon the extent of the damage cause (see People v. Antonio Hernandez,
G.R. No. L-31770, December 5, 1929, 54 Phil. 122).
b. Rape. In People v. Ceilito Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1999, 184 SCRA 105, the Supreme
Court set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the
labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is
sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is
hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. The Supreme
Court declared that the decision in the case of People v. Eriña 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where it
found the offender guilty of frustrated rape, there being no conclusive evidence of penetration
of the genital organ of the offended party, appears to be a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has
not been reiterated in subsequent decisions.
(6) In People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270, the Supreme
Court clarified that while the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was
considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora,
labia minora, etc., the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably
viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile
penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching
must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration,
however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips of the
female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to
attempted rape.
(7) In the crime of rape, penetration, however slight, is an essential act of execution that
produces such felony. Thus, for the accused to be convicted of the crime of attempted
rape, he must have already commenced the act of inserting his sexual organ in the vagina
of the victim, but due to some cause or accident, excluding his own spontaneous
desistance, he wasn’t able to even slightly penetrate the victim. Rape and acts of
lasciviousness are crimes of the same nature. However, the intent to lie with the woman is
the fundamental difference between the two, as it is present in rape or attempt of it, and
27
absent in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed when the ‘touching of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be
acts of lasciviousness (People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013, 712
SCRA 735, 756).
5. Theft. There is no frustrated theft.
a. Accused and his companion brought out several cartons of tide ultra from ShoeMart
(SM) complex along North EDSA and boarded them in a taxi inside the parking area.
The security guard proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking
area. When he asked the accused for a receipt of the merchandise, the latter and his
companion reacted by fleeing on foot, but the security guard fired a warning shot to
alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Accused and his companion were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. Is the crime
consummated or frustrated theft? Consummated Theft. The Supreme Court discussed:
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated
stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but
certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective,
it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the
acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since
the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This
conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that “[i]n
theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of
the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing
was frustrated.” (Aristotle Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, 525
SCRA 306, 343-345).
6. Forcible abduction. The rule in cases of abduction is that if the offended girl is carried away
against her will with lewd designs, the felony is consummated even if there are no sexual
intercourse. If the act of carrying her away is prevented by some cause independent of the will of
the accused, it is frustrated. If the offender merely started to carry her away but failed due to some
cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance, it is attempted (see Padilla, 1959 Ed.,
p.95).
7. Estafa. Estafa consists of two elements—an act of deceit to defraud another and injury or damage
caused thereafter. Hence, estafa is not consummated unless the two elements co-exist-fraud and
damage. If the offender has not realized the damage because of a cause independent of his will,
even if he has done the fraudulent act, it is frustrated. If he has not performed all the acts
necessary to defraud, it is attempted. (see Padilla, 1959 Ed., p. 100)
a. The accused, as salesman of the bookstore "Philippine Education Co., Inc." sold on the
morning of January 19, 1920, five copies of Sams' "Practical Business Letters," of the
value of seven pesos and fifty centavos (P7.50), which the accused should have
immediately delivered to the cashier but which he did not deliver, until after it was
28
discovered that he had sold the books and received their value without delivering it to
the cashier, as was his duty. The accused is guilty of the frustrated offense of estafa,
inasmuch as he performed all the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a
consequence, but which, by reason of causes independent of his will, did not produce it, no
appreciable damage having been caused to the offended party, such damage being one of the
essential elements of the crime, due to the timely discovery of the acts prosecuted (see U.S. v.
Isaac Dominguez, G.R. No. L-17021, February 23, 1921, 41 Phil. 409).
29
CHAPTER IV. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
1. Conspiracy and proposal. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable
only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. They are not
punishable unless there is a specific law which provides for their punishment.
a. Conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. On the other hand,
there is a proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its
execution to some other person or persons.
b. Examples of conspiracy and proposal

(1) Conspiracy to commit rebellion, coup d’etat, sedition (Arts. 136, 141)
(2) Conspiracy to commit treason (Art. 115)
(3) Conspiracy in restraint of trade (Art. 186)
(4) Proposal to commit rebellion, coup d’ etat (Art. 136)
2. If the crime subject of the agreement is carried out, the conspiracy which they had before
committing the crime will be treated only as a manner of incurring criminal liability. It is not a
separate offense.
3. Conspiracy may either be express or implied. It is express when the conspirators purposely met
prior to the commission of the crime to agree and plan the commission of the felony. It is implied
when, despite the lack of express agreement, the conspirators, in view of their individual acts, may
be deemed to be acting toward the same purpose. In implied conspiracy, it is sufficient if it may be
showed that at the time of the aggression, all of the accused acted in concert, each doing his part
to fulfil their common design.
a. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective then
on the part of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. What is
required is assent to the perpetration of such misdeed. That must be their intent. There is a
need for concurrence of wills or unity of action or purpose, or common and joint purpose and
design. At times, reference is made to previous concert of the criminal design. Its manifestation
could be shown by united and concerted action. Thus, a conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated. The conditions attending its commission and the acts executed may be indicative
of the common design to accomplish a criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of
circumstances to that effect, then conspiracy has been established. If such be the case then,
the act of one is the act of all the others involved and each is to be held to the same degree of
liability as the others. There was an implied conspiracy among the accused. They were all
criminally liable for murder People v. Francisco Arroyo and Rito Mina, G.R. No. 99258,
September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 616, 631).
30
b. From a legal standpoint, there is conspiracy if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of intent. Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all (see
People v. Henry Togahan, et. al., G.R. No. 174064, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 557).
c. The two accused were caught with a stolen tricycle whose owner was previously found
dead with multiple hack and stab wounds. They were convicted of Qualified Carnapping.
They questioned the basis of the conviction since there was no direct evidence linking
them to the killing and the carnapping. Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not
essential as it may be inferred from their conduct before, during, and after their commission of
the crime that they acted with a common purpose and design. The pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the only rational proposition
that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing the victim to carnap his
tricycle (see People v. Renato Lagat y Gawan, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011).
4. The Revised Penal Code is not applicable to offenses defined and punished under special penal
laws. The Revised Penal Code shall apply to offenses defined and punished under special penal
laws (1) when the special law specially provides that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
shall apply to it and, (2) when the special law used the terminology or adopted the penalties under
the Code.
31
CHAPTER V. JUSTIFYING AND EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Kinds and requisites of justifying circumstances.
1. Justifying circumstances. –The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree,
provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making the defense has no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first
and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present
and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage
to another, provided that the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Anyone who acts in the fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.
2. Distinguish justifying circumstances from exempting circumstances. In justifying circumstances,

there is neither a crime nor a criminal and hence there is neither criminal or civil liability. In exempting
circumstances, there is a crime but no criminal, and hence there is still civil liability.
a. Jose Laurel suddenly kissed Concepcion Lat on the night of December 26, 1909. He was
pursued by Exequiel Castillo, Concepcion’s lover, and his friends but they were not able to
catch him. Two nights after, Exequiel Castillo confronted Jose Laurel after having him
called down from the parochial building where the latter was watching some show. In the
middle of their altercation, Exequiel hit Jose with a cane in his head which caused him to
fall down in sitting position. Exequiel was about to hit him again with the cane but Jose
was able to stab him in the chest with a pocket knife. Jose Laurel was charged of
frustrated homicide because of the incident. He interposed self-defense. Is the defense
tenable? Yes. From the evidence, then produced at the trial, it is concluded that it was Exequiel
32
Castillo who, through the mediation of several others, invited Laurel to come down from the upper
story of the parochial building, and that it was he, therefore, who provoked the affray
aforementioned, and, also, it was he who unlawfully assaulted Jose Laurel, by striking the latter
two blows with a cane inasmuch as it is not likely that after having received a dangerous wound in
the left breast, he would have been able to strike his alleged assailant two successive blows and
much less pursue him. It is very probable that he received the said wounds after he had assaulted
Jose Laurel with the cane, and Laurel, on his part, in defending himself from the assault,
employed rational means by using the knife that he carried in his pocket. For all the foregoing
reasons, Jose Laurel must be acquitted and held to be exempt from responsibility on the ground
of self-defense. The case falls within paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the
defensive act executed by him was attended by the three requisites of illegal aggression on the
part of Exequiel Castillo, there being a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Laurel, who, as
we have said, did not provoke the occurrence complained of, nor did he direct that Exequiel
Castillo be invited to come down from the parochial building and arrange the interview in which
Castillo alone was interested, and, finally, because Laurel, in defending himself with a pocketknife
against the assault made upon him with a cane, which may also be a deadly weapon, employed
reasonable means to prevent or repel the same (U.S. v. Laurel, et. al. G.R. No. -7037, March 15,
1912. 22 Phil. 252, 266-267).
b. Juan Loquenario rocked the boat where Narciso Cabungcal and several others, great
majority of whom were women and among them the appellant's wife and son and a nursing
child, son of a married couple who had also gone in this boat, were riding. Narciso
Cabungcal asked him not to do it because the boat might capsize. However, despite the
warning, the deceased continued rocking the boat which started to take in water. For fear
that the boat would capsize and the passengers might drown, Cabungcal struck him on the
forehead with an oar. He fell to the water but when he appeared on the water, he threatened
to capsize the boat. Cabungcal struck him on the neck with the oar. He submerged and
was not seen again. Narciso Cabungcal was charged of homicide. He interposed defense
of relative (of his wife) and of strangers (other passengers of the boat). Is the defense
tenable? Yes. Due to the conditions of the river at the point where the deceased started to rock
the boat, if it had capsized the passengers would have run the risk of losing their lives, the
majority of whom were women, especially the nursing child. The conduct of the deceased in
rocking the boat until the point of it having taken water and his insistence on this action, in spite of
the appellant's warning, gave rise to the belief on the part of the plaintiff that it would capsize if he
did not separate the deceased from the boat in such a manner as to give him no time to
accomplish his purpose. It was necessary to disable him momentarily. For this purpose the blow
given him by the appellant on the forehead with an oar was the least that could reasonably have
been done. And this consideration militates with greater weight with respect to the second blow
given in his neck with the same oar, because, then the danger was greater that the boat might
upset, especially as the deceased had expressed his intention to upset it. In view of all the
circumstances of the case, in doing what the appellant did was in lawful defense of the lives of the
passengers of the boat, two of whom were his wife and child. The recourse of taking the boat to
the shore was not adequate in those circumstances, because that would require sometime,
whereas the deceased might in an instant cause the boat to capsize without giving time to arrive
at the shore. The appellant having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers
33
in the boat and the means employed having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it
was at the cost of the life of the deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability (see
People v. Narciso Cabungcal, G.R. No. L-28451, August 1, 1928, 51 Phi. 803).
c. Self-defense is inherently a weak defense because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to

fabricate and difficult to prove. Thus, for this defense to prosper, the accused must prove with
clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if the evidence of the
prosecution is weak, it cannot be disbelieved if the accused admitted responsibility for the crime
charged (see Fernando Estabas Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008, 574
SCRA 737).
3. Unlawful aggression. In U.S. v. Guy Sayco (G. R. No. 4912. March 25, 1909, 13 Phil. 292), the
Supreme Court describes unlawful aggression as: “In order to consider that an unlawful aggression
was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act
positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is
punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed
in self-defense. ” Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of
immediate and imminent kind (see People v. Alconga, 76 Phil. 366).
a. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent
danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of a weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to his life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not constitute aggression
warranting self-defense (People v. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 625,
635-636).
(1) In the afternoon of May 30, 1965, Severino Cabaral told Jose Encomienda that he was
sent by the hacienda owner to tell him that he cannot work in the hacienda and that he
will be removed as tenant. When Jose asked why he was being removed as tenant when
it was his means of livelihood, Severino replied that he had no right to work on the land
because it was not in his name. Severino got angry when he replied that he could not be
removed and with his right hand drew his revolver tucked in his left side when they were
about one meter apart. With his left hand, Jose immediately grabbed the victim's right
hand holding the revolver, causing Severino to lean on the stairway. During their
struggle, the revolver fired four times continuously that with the bolo in his right hand
Jose struck the victim's right forearm. When Severino wanted to get the gun with his left
hand, Jose boloed his left arm about one inch from the left wrist. He shook Severino’s
right arm downward causing the gun to fall to the ground. When Severino tried to pick
up the gun, he stepped backward and hacked his forehead causing Severino to fall
backward on the stairway, as he (Jose) retrieved the gun to prevent him from picking it
up again and then stepped about two meters backward for Severino might grab him.
Severino died from the injuries that he sustained. Charged of Homicide, he claimed self-
defense. Yes. Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of
34
immediate and imminent kind. Here when the deceased drew his gun with his right hand,
accused grabbed with his free left hand the victim's right hand holding the revolver, forced the
victim to lean on the stairs and pinned the victim's right hand also on the stair. During the
struggle, the revolver fired four times continuously and he hacked the victim's right forearm.
When the victim tried to get the gun with his left hand, appellant boloed the victim's left arm
and then shook the victim right arm downward causing the gun to fall to the ground and the
victim tried to pick up the gun, accused stepped backward and hacked the victim's forehead,
after which he himself picked up the gun so as to prevent the victim, from retrieving the same.
If the deceased had no intention to use his gun on the appellant, he would not have drawn it or
resisted accused's attempt to prevent him from using it. There was therefore real danger to the
life or personal safety of the accused (People v. Jose Encomienda y Navarro, G.R. No. L-
26750, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 522, 535-536).
b. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression (People v.
Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 204, 215).
(1) For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be real danger to life or personal safety.
For this reason, a mere push or a shove, not followed by other acts, has been held
insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression. A playful kick at the foot by way of greeting
between friends may be a practical joke, and may even hurt; but it is not a serious or real
attack on a person's safety (see People v. Teodoro Sabio, G.R. No. L-23734, April 27,
1967, 19 SCRA 901, 902).
(2) For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an “actual, sudden and unexpected attack,
or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude” and the accused must
present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. For this reason, an accused’s observation
that one of the men was pulling an object from his waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful
aggression. A threat, even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about to be
attacked, is not sufficient. An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough (see People
v. Bingky Campos and Danny “Boy” Acabo, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011, 653 SCRA 99,
114-116).
(3) When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or
wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in
retaliation against the original aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the
accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor
was injured by the accused (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013, 692
SCRA 127, 145-146).
(a) The victim assaulted the accused with a pingahan. The accused avoided the blow by
falling to the ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the
guardhouse. Later, a hand to hand combat ensued and when he sustained
several wounds, he ran away. After running a distance of about 200 meters,
accused was able to catch up with him and slashed him with a bolo which led to
35
his death. It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant
and the deceased. The initial stage commenced when the deceased assaulted accused
without sufficient provocation on the part of the latter. During the second stage of the
fight accused was no longer acting in self-defense. That the deceased was not fatally
wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the fact that he was still able to run a
distance of some 200 meters before being overtaken by accused. Under such
circumstances, appellant's plea of self-defense in the second stage of the fight cannot
be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no aggression (People v. Dioscoro
Alconga and Adolfo Bracamonte, G.R. No. L-162, April 30, 1947, 78 Phil. 366, 375-376).
(b) Accused stabbed the victim in his neck after the latter placed his hand in her
thigh. Prosecuted for homicide, she claimed defense of honor. Is the defense
meritorious? No. According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the
learned trial court in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and
appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on
the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted
with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the
chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility
of her being raped. And when she gave the victim a thrust at the base of the left side of
his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few
moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently
excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally
declared completely exempt from criminal liability (People v. Nicolas Jaurigue and
Avelina Jaurigue, C.A. No. 384, February 21, 1946, 74 Phil. 174, 182-183).
4. The second requisite of defense means that (1) there be a necessity of the course of action taken
by the person making a defense, and (2) there be a necessity of the means used. Both must be
reasonable (see Luis B. Reyes, 2012 Ed., p.183). What is reasonable in the face of an actual
aggression does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of the injury
and must be judged by the circumstances surrounding the person attacked who acts under the
instinct of self-preservation.
a. Different theories in determining the reasonableness of the apprehension of imminent

danger.
(1) Theory that reasonableness must be viewed from the standpoint of the court. The rule has
been asserted by a number of cases that a person killing another in alleged self-defense is not
the final judge as to the danger and necessity under which he acted, whatever his
apprehension or belief may have been of the reasonableness of the grounds upon which he
acted; that being a question which the court is to determine (see Francisco, 1954 Ed., p. 207).
(2) Theory that reasonableness must be viewed from the standpoint of defendant. The view
obtaining in the minority of jurisdiction and what seems to have been the common rule, is that
the circumstances must be viewed from the standpoint of accused alone, and if they are
sufficient to induce on him an honest and reasonable belief that he is in danger of great bodily
harm or loss of life, he is justified or excused in killing (see Francisco, 1954 Ed., p. 208).
36
(3) Theory that reasonableness must be viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable man. What
appears to be prevailing rule in America asserts that the apprehension of danger and belief of
necessity which will justify killing in self-defense must be a reasonable apprehension and
belief, such as a reasonable man would, under the circumstances, have entertained. It is not
what a person who killed another may have thought of the surrounding circumstances. His
actions on such occasion are to be judge by the standard of what a man of ordinary reason
and firmness would have done on such an occasion (see Francisco, 1954 Ed., p. 209).
b. Test in determining the reasonableness of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression. Whether the means employed is reasonable, will depend upon the nature
and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition, character, size and other
circumstances, and those of the person defending himself, and also the place and occasion of the
assault. Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which
the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than reason, that moves or impels the
defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon
the imminent danger of such injury (People v. Enconmienda, G.R. No. L-26750, August 18, 1972,
48 SCRA 522, 534).
(1) Accused was challenged to a fight by the private complaint. He tried to pacify him but
the latter threw stones at him. He was able to dock just in time to avoid getting hit and
instinctively retaliated by hitting the left leg of the private complainant with a bolo
scabbard. The private complainant fell to the ground. Accused then continuously
mauled the private complainant with a bolo scabbard, until the latter’s cousin
restrained him. Private complainant sustained two (2) bone fractures, one in his left
leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months for these injuries to
completely heal. In a charged of Frustrated Homicide, accused interposed self-
defense. Did the accused act in self-defense? No. While the first and third elements of
self-defense are present, the second one is lacking. First, unlawful aggression on the part of
private complainant was manifested by his attack upon the person of the petitioner in
throwing a stone at the latter. This sudden and unexpected assault posed actual danger on
the life or limb of the petitioner, prompting the latter to take steps in his defense. To the
mind of the Court, this is an offensive positively strong enough to be the basis for a
defensive action. Second, there is lack of sufficient, if not total absence of, provocation on
the part of the accused. The facts are clear that it is private complainant who invited the
confrontation with petitioner—by shouting violent threats at the latter. In arguing that the
means employed was reasonable to repel the unlawful aggression, the accused invokes the
application of the “doctrine of rational equivalence,” delineated in People v. Gutual, to wit: It
is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is
rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the
emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct,
more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof
does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
37
The very application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, invoked by the accused,
militates against his claim. The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the
consideration not only of the nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender and
the assailant—but of the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis-à-vis, the
unlawful aggression. Significantly, a perusal of the facts shows that after petitioner was
successful in taking down private complainant—the former continued to hack the latter, who
was, by then, already neutralized by the blow. Clearly, this “continuous hacking” by the
petitioner constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private
complainant’s attack—and is therefore unjustified (Ladislao Espinsosa v. People, G.R. No.
181071, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 446, 450-455).
8. The third requisite is present when

(1) No provocation at all was given to the aggressor by the person defending himself;
(2) Even if a provocation was given, it was not sufficient;
(3) When, even if a provocation was given, it was not given by the person defending himself;
(4) When, even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate
and immediate to the act of aggression (see Luis B. Reyes, 2012 Ed., p.195).
9. For fulfilment of duty to be considered justifying circumstance the following requisites must be
established:
(1) That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
(2) That the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
a. Accused was a police officer looking for an escaped prisoner. While he was at a distance
from his companions, the deceased suddenly appeared before him and hit him with a
stone. When he gained his composure, he chased the deceased and fired warning shots
into the air. After four warning shots, he fired a fifth shot at the fleeing accused as he
was in an act of jumping down into the creek. Thereafter, they saw the deceased floating
in the water. Charged of Homicide, accused interposed fulfilment of duty. Is the defense
meritorious? Yes. The act thus performed by petitioner — and which unfortunately resulted in
the death of the escaping detainee — was committed in the performance of his official duty and
was more or less necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully eluding the
officers of the law. To hold him guilty of homicide may have the effect of demoralizing police
officers discharging official functions identical or similar to those in the performance of which
petitioner was engaged at the time he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result that
thereafter we would have half-hearted and dispirited efforts on their part to comply with such
official duty. This of course, would be to the great detriment of public interest (Elias Valcorza v.
People, G.R. No. L-28129, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 143, 149).
b. Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. Some days
afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the
house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance,
and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The
policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not
38
hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. This peace officer went
after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him. Charged of
Homicide, Delima interposed performance of duty. Is the defense meritorious? Yes, the
killing was done in the lawful performance of duty. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an
extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances
(People v. Felipe Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, December 22, 1922, 46 Phil. 738).
10. In lawful performance of duty, the victim need not act in aggression against the police officer unlike
in self-defense.
11. To be a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be present in following a superior
order:
(1) That an order has been issued by a superior;
(2) That such order must be for some lawful purpose;
(3) That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
a. Defendant admitted that he prepared the falsified documents with full knowledge of their
falsity, but he claims the data were furnished him by his immediate chief, deceased
Fernandez, and only in obedience to instructions from him. Is he criminally liable? Yes.
In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a
compliance with “a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that
the person commanding, act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule, an inferior
should obey his superior but, as an illustrious commentator has said, “between a general law
which enjoins obedience to a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which
plaintiff forbids what that superior commands, the choice is not doubtful.” (1 Penal Code,
Viada, 5th edition, p. 528.) (People v. Luciano Barroga, G.R. No. L-31563, January 16, 1930,
54 Phil. 247).
b. Defendant Dolores was accused with Wilson of crimes of falsification of telegraphic dispatch,
estafa through falsification of mercantile document and falsification of mercantile document
respectively. Both Wilson and Dolores were employed by San Carlos Milling. The defense of
Dolores was that he did nothing but carry out the order of his superior, Wilson. Is Dolores
criminally liable? Yes. For the act to be justified, both the person who gives the order and the person
who executes it must be acting within the limitations prescribed by law (People v. Joseph Wilson and
Alfredo Dolores, G.R. Nos. L-30012-30015, March 9, 1929 52 Phil. 919).
c. The deceased Diego Testor was asked to furnish fish to a constabulary detachment. Testor
brought another kind of fish called kalapion. Sgt. Marten slapped the fish into the face of Testor
who was tied and given him fist blows. Three soldiers also maltreated Testor who died the
following day. Counsel for appellant contends that, in the absence of proof of conspiracy,
appellant should not be held liable for the said crime because he merely obeyed the orders of
his superior. Is the appellant criminally liable for the death of the prisoner? Yes. Obedience to an
order of a superior give rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the order is for some
39
lawful purpose (art. 11, par. 6, Revised Penal Code). Sergeant Margen’s order to have the
deceased tortured was not that did not give the sergeant the right to take the law in his own
hands and have the offender subjected to inhuman punishment. The order was illegal, and
appellant was not bound to obey it. Moreover, it does not appear that in taking part in the
maltreatment of the decease, appellant was prompted solely by his sense of duty toward his
superior. What appeared is that he and his companions had a common grievance against the
deceased, because the latter had misappropriated a quantity of fish intended for their
consumption. It was, therefore, but natural that they should all want to teach the deceased a
lesson by making him suffer for the fault he had committed (People v. Dario Margen, G.R. No. L-
2681, March 30, 1950, 85 Phil. 839).
d. In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense has to prove that these two requisites
are present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such
duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes an incomplete one
thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same
Code. (People v. Daniel Pinto, Jr., G.R. No. 39519, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 9, 27).
e. Around 6:30 p.m., five fully armed policemen in uniform escorted the deceased in
Barangay Sinasahan, Nueva Ecija to recover the missing flower vase and radio. The
deceased, who was not handcuffed, was between the accused and his companion at the
right bench of the police mobile. Just after the jeep had crossed the PNR bridge and
while the jeep was slowly negotiating a bumpy and potholed road, the deceased
suddenly grabbed the other police officer’s M16 Armalite and jumped out of the jeep.
The accused acted immediately. Without issuing any warning of any sort, and with still
one foot on the running board, accused fired one shot at the deceased, and after two to
three seconds, fired four more successive shots. The shooting happened around 7:00
p.m., at dusk or “nag-aagaw ang dilim at liwanag.” Accused approached the deceased’s
body to check its pulse. Finding none, he declared him dead. Charged of homicide,
claimed claimed self-defense and fulfilment of duty as defenses. Facing imminent danger,
the policemen had to act swiftly. Time was of the essence. It would have been foolhardy for
the policemen to assume that the deceased grabbed the M16 Armalite merely as a souvenir of
a successful escape. Neither did they have much choice. The shooting of the deceased was
an immediate and spontaneous reaction to imminent danger. The weapon grabbed by the
deceased was not just any firearm. It was an M16 Armalite (SP02 Ruperto Cabanlig V.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2003, 464 SCRA 324, 3377-338).
B. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Kinds of exempting circumstances and their requisites
1. State the exempting circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
40
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
(1) An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which
the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in
one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.
(2) A person under nine years of age.
(3) A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is
adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the
provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care
and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and
education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or
person mentioned in said Art. 80.
(4) Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
(5) Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
(6) Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal
or greater injury.
(7) Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by
some lawful insuperable cause.
2. Minimum age of criminal responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15)
years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The
exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws (sec. 6, R.A. 9344).
a. Basis for determination of age. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor (see sec. 7, RA 9344).
b. Under Sec. 20 of RA 9344, children below the age of criminal responsibility (15 years and
below) shall be immediately released to their parents or guardians or to the child’s nearest
relative subject to the appropriate rehabilitation programs to be conducted by the local social
welfare officers.
41
c. Children above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment shall be
referred to appropriate diversion program (see sec. 22, RA 9344).
(1) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the diversion program shall be conducted by the law enforcement officer or
punong barangay with the assistance of the local social welfare or development office.
(2) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the diversion shall be conducted by the local social welfare or development
officer.
(3) Where the imposable penalty for the crime exceeds six (6) years imprisonment, diversion
may be resorted to only by the court (see sec. 23, RA 9344).
d. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong and
such capacity may be known and should be determined by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act but also after and even during trial. In short, it is mental capacity to
distinguish what is right and what is wrong (see People v. Duquenia, 68 Phil. 580).
Discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. It means the
mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
e. In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB, fifteen-year old
in the second floor of her family’s house in Palatiw, Pasig. The accused arrived holding
a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. He then undressed BBB
and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and
also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. He then
warned them not to tell anybody what he did. Charged of rape, BBB claimed exemption
from criminal responsibility because of his minority. Is he exempt from criminal
liability? Yes. R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May
20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a
child at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner
appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition measures such as care,
guidance and supervision orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational
training programs and other alternatives to institutional care. More importantly in the context of
this case, this law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor
offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended, previously provided – i.e., from “under nine years of age” and “above nine years
of age and under fifteen” (who acted without discernment) – to “fifteen years old or under” and
“above fifteen but below 18” (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from
criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law – as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article
12 of the RPC did – presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to
distinguish right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they
cannot be held accountable. The current law also drew its changes from the principle of
restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and
gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention
42
measures. The Supreme Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 9344 retroactively and
dismissed the cases against the accused (Robert Sierra v. People, G.R. No. 182941, July 3,
2009, 591 SCRA 666, 667-669).
3. Insanity.
a. A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the
burden of establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the
crime was committed. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs.
Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660). In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting
circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act
or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. (People v. Honorato Ambal, G.R. No. L-52688, October
17, 1980, 100 SCRA 325).
4. Explain the tests in determining whether an accused is criminally irresponsible due to legal
insanity. To determine whether an accused was legally insane during the commission of the
crime, two distinguishable tests are used: (a) the test of cognition – whether there was a “complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act” and (b) the test of volition – whether there
was a “total deprivation of freedom of the will.” Case law shows common reliance on the test of
cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is
exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an
accompanying “complete deprivation of intelligence.” This is expected, since a person’s volition
naturally reaches out only towards that which is represented as desirable by his intelligence,
whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. Establishing the insanity of an accused often
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception;
or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist (see People v. Anacito Opuran, G.R. Nos.
147674-75, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 654)
a. Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is,
the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability (People v. Ernesto
Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, June 29, 1981, 105 SCRA 151).
(1) After bumping the victim, accused left but after a few minutes he returned. Without
saying a word and without warning, the accused delivered a stabbing blow with a
dagger which was concealed in his hand. The victim was hit on the right chest. The
victim died and the accused was charged of murder. Accused claimed insanity as
defense. Is the defense meritorious? No. Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts
have established a more stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. In our jurisdiction, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough;
43
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Every individual
is presumed to have acted with complete grasp of one’s mental faculties. Appellant’s past
does not discredit the facts that (1) he did not act with complete absence of the power to
discern; (2) he was not deprived of reason; and (3) he was not totally deprived of his will.
Inasmuch as the accused failed to present convincing evidence to establish his alleged
insanity at the time he stabbed the victim, he should be held responsible for the death of
the latter (People v. Randy Belonio, G.R. No. 148695, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 579, 596-
597).
(2) Accused suddenly grabbed the child by his feet and slammed his head on the
cement floor several times. As a consequence, the young girl was rendered
unconscious. The child died after being brought to the hospital. Convicted of
murder for what he did to the girl, accused pleaded insanity on appeal not for
acquittal but merely for the reduction of his sentence. Is the accused legally insane?
No. Whenever the facts of the case show that accused’s behavior when he committed the
crime is such that it creates doubt as to the voluntariness of his acts, the court should
conduct appropriate measures to determine the mental state of the person. The mere fact
that accused’s felonious acts are so bizarre does not necessarily mean that he is insane or
that he should be immediately subjected to mental examination. Insanity is usually
invoked by offenders in order to seek reduction of their penalty, avoid criminal prosecution
or just plainly attract compassion instead of condemnation. The court should consider the
factual circumstances of the case and whether it was intended for the actual determination
of the defendant’s mental state or simply to delay or interrupt judicial proceedings or
frustrate justice (People v. Manuel Talavera, G.R. No. 139967, July 19, 2001, 361 SCRA
433, 439-441).
(3) Accused raped private complainant. After the sexual intercourse, the accused
cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the
house, otherwise he would kill her. Accused was later on charged of rape. He
claimed insanity as defense. Is the defense meritorious? No. The fact that the accused
threatened complainant with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by
him, indicates that he was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault (People
v. Policarpio Rafanan, Jr., G.R.No. 54135, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 65. 204 SCRA
65, 80).
(4) Accused killed his two children out of rage for his wife whom he believed was
having an affair with another man. When accused realized that his mother and
siblings had seen his two children lying lifeless on the floor, he stabbed himself on
the chest with a kitchen knife, to the shouts of horror of his mother and siblings. He
tried to end his life by jumping out the window of their house. He sustained a head
injury from his fall but he and his two children were rushed
to Mary Johnston Hospital by his siblings and some of their neighbors. Once at the
hospital, accused received treatment for his injuries but the two children could no
longer be revived. Charged of parricide, accused-appellant interposed insanity as
defense. Is the accused legally insane? No. Accused acted out of jealous rage at the
thought of his wife having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not
44
equivalent to insanity. There is a vast difference between a genuinely insane person and
one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or
good judgment in what he does. We reiterate jurisprudence which has established that
only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of
.the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered (People v.
Honorio Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 1010, 632 SCRA 510, 517-522).
b. A feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of
his acts. He acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for his acts (People v. Reynaldo Villanueva,
G.R. No. 172697, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 147, 153-155).
c. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. However, not every aberration of the mind or mental
deficiency constitutes insanity. To determine whether an accused was legally insane during the
commission of the crime, two distinguishable tests are used: (a) the test of cognition – whether
there was a “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act” and (b) the test of
volition – whether there was a “total deprivation of freedom of the will.” Case law shows common
reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any
case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom
of the will, i.e., without an accompanying “complete deprivation of intelligence.” This is expected,
since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is represented as desirable
by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. Establishing the insanity of an
accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on
his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. A careful scrutiny of the
records, however, indicates that the accused failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
defense of insanity. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting, such
deportment of the accused, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to himself,
staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof that he
was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior
may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability
(People v. Anacito Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 654).
5. Accident
a. Accused, a police officer, was charged of shooting the deceased, a master teacher at
the Concepcion College who was arrested for robbery. He claimed that the shooting was
due to accident which happened when the deceased tried to grab his gun. Is the
accused criminally liable? No. The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was
at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere
accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the
injury. From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of the
incident, accused was a member -- specifically, one of the investigators -- of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in
the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his
45
superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation. Again, it was in
the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that accused tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an
enforcer of the law, accused was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by
anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to
facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including accused himself. Accused
cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he
had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times,
especially within the premises of his working area. At no instance during his testimony did the
accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. The
participation of accused, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the
gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots --
all of which led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been
consequences of circumstances beyond the control of accused. At the very least, these
factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter’s culpability (Roweno Pomoy v.
People, G.R. No. 150647, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 439 452-466).
6. Impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
a. Accused drew seven post-dated checks in favor of Manila Doctor’s Hospital to apply for the
hospital expenses of her mother. The checks were dishonored for being drawn on account
closed. Accused reasoned out that she was compelled to do so by fear that her mother would
be given inhumane treatment by the hospital if she would not pay the latter. Is her defense
meritorious? No. The fear harbored by the accused was not real and imminent. It is speculative
fear. It is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law (Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275,
September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 221, 230).
7. Compulsion of an irresistible force
a. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invitofactus non est meus actus. An act done
by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to
reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat (People v.
Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 111, 131).
(1) Defendant Raop admitted his participation in the robbery but he averred that he
acted under duress exercised by his friend, Ernesto Sarip. Raop testified that at six
o'clock in the morning of April 30, 1966, his friend, Ernesto Sarip, went to his house
46
at Barrio Kalilangan and requested him to accompany Ernesto to the house of the
latter's aunt located at Barrio Lampanosan. At first Raop refused but when Sarip
allegedly threatened him by pointing his rifle at Raop, Raop consented to go with
him. Ernesto gave him a homemade gun called "paliuntod". Then, they went to the
victim’s house and took the chickens and carabao under the house and killed the
victim. Raop claimed exemption from criminal responsibility on account of duress.
Is the accused criminally responsible? Yes. It is clear that his version of the robbery
with homicide does not exculpate him at all. His counsel de officio argues that Raop acted
against his will. That contention is belied by Raop's admission that he and Ernesto are
close friends. The two were residents of Barrio Kalilangan. Raop did not prove that he
acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. His pretension that he was threatened with
a gun by his friends, Ernesto, is not credible because he himself Raop was armed with a
rifle (People v. Ernesto Sarip, et. al., G.R. Nos. L31481-83, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA
666, 673).
(2) At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while AAA and the victim Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the place. Inside the house, she
saw and recognized accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and heard the latter
uttering “somebody will die”. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her
into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his
hands tied. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando
Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred. The Revo then
proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was
when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon
reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle.
Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): “Make a
decision now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for
this girl.” Lando, Al, Dick Tañedo (Dick), Roberto Tañedo (Bet), Marvin Lim
(Marvin), Necitas Ordeñiza-Tañedo (Cita), and Fred Doe were later charged with the
crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate
Information. Al claimed that he was forced to participate in the crimes. Is Al
criminally responsible? Yes. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is
exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person
does not act with freedom. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must
establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that
committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he
was under duress from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to
47
exempt him from incurring criminal liability (People v. Alberto Anticamara, G.R. No.
178771, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 489, 508)
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
1. Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy
and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.
2. Absolutory causes are either justifying or exempting circumstances. Other legal exemptions are
provided in different provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
(1) Spontaneous desistance of the person before commencing any elements of the felony.
(2) Accessories exempted from prosecution because of their relationship to the principals of the
felonies (Art. 20, RPC).
(3) Detention or confinement of accused who committed a crime or those afflicted by violent
insanity or ailments requiring compulsory hospital confinement (Art. 124, RPC).
(4) Death or physical injuries inflicted under exception circumstances (Art. 247, RPC).
(5) Trespass to dwelling to prevent some serious harm to himself, or to the occupants of the
dwelling or a third person, or to render some service to humanity or justice (Art. 280, RPC).
(6) Persons exempt from criminal liability for crimes against property on account of their
relationship to the owners of the property (Art. 344, RPC).
(7) Instigation. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been
held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in
his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of
a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense
was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an
agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a
prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent;
and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the
public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the
plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a
48
prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or
hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary (see People v. Chu, 56 Phil. 44, 52-53).
(8) Special provisions of RA 9262 and RA 9344
Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense. Under section 26 of RA 9262, victims-survivors who

are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
Status offenses under RA 9344. Section 57 of RA 9344 provides that any conduct not
considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered as an
offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
Offenses not applicable to children. Section 58 of the RA 9344 provides that persons below
eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and
prostitution under art. 202 of the RPC, of mendicancy under PD 1563, and sniffing of rugby
under PD 1619, such prosecution being inconsistent with the UN Conventions on the Rights of
the Child; provided that said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and treatment
program.
Exemption from the application of death penalty. Section 59 of RA 9344 provides that the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, RA 9165, and other special laws notwithstanding, no
death penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with the law.
49
CHAPTER VI. MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Kinds and requisites of mitigating circumstances
1. Enumerate the mitigating circumstances under the Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The following are mitigating circumstances:
(1) Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites
necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective
cases are not attendant.
(2) That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In
the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 80.
(3) That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.
(4) That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act.
(5) That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
(6) That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.
(7) That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt
before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution.
(8) That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some
physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or
communications with his fellow beings.
(9) Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-
power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness
of his acts.
(10) And finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to
those above mentioned.
2. Incomplete self-defense.
a. It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense,
unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non must be present. There can be no self-
defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression when the
peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force
or actual use of a weapon (People v. Roman, G.R. No. 198110, July 31, 2013, 703 SCRA 94,
109).
50
(1) In the afternoon of May 21, 1978, Fernando de los Santos was taking a nap in their
house at Aspere Avenue, Tatalon Estate, Quezon City. At about 2:00 o'clock that
afternoon, he was awakened by the shout of a small boy who informed him that his
father, Feliciano de los Santos, was engaged in a quarrel. Forthwith, he proceeded
to the scene of the quarrel at nearby Araneta Avenue. Upon arriving thereat he saw
Yalong in the act of aiming a gun at his father. Instinctively, Fernando shouted at his
father to run, but the latter was fired at by Yalong before he could do so. Then, while
Fernando's father was still on his feet, de Jesus suddenly grabbed the gun from
Yalong and himself fired at the victim once, causing the latter to fall as he was about
to run away Thereafter, both Yalong and de Jesus ran away; while Fernando
immediately went home to look for his brother, Pat. Narciso de los Santos. When the
two brothers returned to the crime scene, Fernando could no longer feel the pulse of
his father. Forthwith, Narciso left to hunt for the killers; while Fernando reported the
incident to the police authorities, to whom he gave the names of the suspects and a
verbal account of the incident. Later, both de Jesus and Yalong were charged of
murder. Yalong claimed that he alone shot the deceased after the latter tried to stab
him. He claimed self-defense. Is he entitled to acquittal? No. While there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased, the means that the accused used to defend
himself is not reasonable. The deceased was in a state of drunkenness, so he was not as
dangerous as he would if he had been sober. His aim proved faulty and easily evaded as
shown by the fact that Yalong was not hit by the stab attempts-blows directed against him.
At best, accused may be credited with incomplete self-defense in his favor, the necessity
of the means he used to repel the aggression not appearing reasonable (People v. Nilo de
Jesus and Wilfredo Yalong, G.R. No. 58506, November 19, 1982. 118 SCRA 626, 627)
3. Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong
a. Paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the
offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act, and not to his
intention during the planning stage. Thus, while it may be argued that the agreement was only
to rob the victims, the perpetrators' acts at the time of the incident show that the conspiracy not
only contemplated the commission of the robbery, but also the elimination of any witnesses to
the crime (see People v. Lascuna, G.R. No. 90626, August 18, 1993, 225 SCRA 386).
(1) On June 20, 1993, Lyndon Flores alias Jojo kicked Manuel Lazarte alias Ato. Ato
was then opposite Rustico Malvar’s (witness) house lying on the pavement seven
arms length from him dead drunk. Thereafter, Ato Lazarte was brought to the
hospital where he died two days after the incident. Charged with murder, Flores
denies having kicked the victim. He asserts that he merely touched, with his right
foot, the victim who was lying dead drunk on the pavement to wake him up so that
the victim could explain the circumstances of the loss of Emperatriz Lazarte’s
cassette recorder. Is the accused criminally liable for murder? Yes. Under Paragraph
1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
51
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. Thus, anyone who inflicts injuries voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the
consequences of his criminal act, such as death that supervenes as a consequence of the
injuries. Here, accused is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused by the
violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital parts of the victim’s body. And, as earlier
discussed, since the assault was qualified by treachery the crime committed is murder and
not homicide as suggested by accused. However, the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Paragraph 3, Article 13, Revised
Penal Code) should be appreciated in favor of accused for he had no intent to kill when he
attacked the victim. His intention was merely to inflict injuries on the victim (People v.
Flores, G.R. No. 116324, January 18, 1996, 252 SCRA 31, 41).
(2) Accused confronted his two sons because they left their house for the fluvial procession of
Our Lady of Penafrancia without permission. He then whipped them with a stick which was
later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s
hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, accused continued beating them with a thick piece of
wood. During the beating Maria, the boy’s mother, stayed inside the house and did not do
anything as she feared for her life. When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back
to the house with accused assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior
fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also
saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly
thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when
Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told accused that their son was
already dead. Charged of parricide, accused claimed that his son died not because of his
beating but for his heart ailment which was worsened by an epileptic attack. Accused was
convicted but the trial court appreciated voluntary surrender and lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong as mitigating circumstances. Is the accused entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed? No. In
order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there
is no doubt accused in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed
a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Accused’
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear. The presentation by accused of
himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent “to save
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture” which is
the essence of voluntary surrender. However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Accused adopted means to ensure
the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent
their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar
suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be
appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did
actually produce the death of the victim.” (People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011,
658 SCRA 367)
52
4. Sufficient provocation
a. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. In order to be mitigating, provocation must be
sufficient and should immediately precede the act. Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to
excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. That
the provocation must immediately precede the act means that there should not be any interval
of time between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the
person provoked. The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by
itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law
(Oriente v. People, G.R. No. 156094, January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 348, 366).
(1) The defendant had been fishing on the night of the crime and when he came
back at midnight the house was closed; he knocked at the door but his wife did
not awake, so he knocked again, but still she slept on; then he went to the part
of the house where his wife usually slept, and knocked on the wall; she awoke
then opened the door; and when he went up, there was a man who jumped out
of the window, and when he asked his wife why there was a man inside the
house, she answered that there was no man, but as he insisted that there had
been one, and that he had jumped out of the window, and as his wife would not
tell the truth, for that reason alone he killed her." Charged of parricide, he
claimed that he had killed his wife for having surprised her in the act of adultery.
The trial court convicted him but considered the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation. Is the accused entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation? Yes. It was established at the trial that on the occasion of
the crime, the defendant saw an unknown person jump out of the window of his house
and that the appellant's wife begged for his pardon on her knees. The first of these
facts, under the circumstances, warrants the conclusion that the defendant believed
his wife to be unfaithful, and was overcome by passion and obfuscation. The second
fact leads us to believe that the wife could not have been wholly unaware of the
unknown person's presence in her house that night, inasmuch as she considered
herself guilty and begged her husband's pardon, which is an undisputed fact in these
proceedings. Such conduct on the part of his wife, thus inferred from the proceedings,
constitutes a sufficient provocation, which must be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in the face of the defendant (People v. Marquez, G.R. No. L-31268, July
31, 1929, 51 Phil. 260).
5. Passion and obfuscation
a. In the afternoon of 9 August 1996, Vicente Rabanillo and Raul Morales had a heated
argument which culminated into a fistfight. Morales reprimanded Rabanillo in front of
their drinking mates for dousing him with water, which entered into his ear. Rabanillo
resented it and felt humiliated. Hence, a fistfight ensued, but was eventually broken
up. Half an hour after the fisticuff while Morales, Suarez, and one Mauro Pascua were
53
having a conversion in the terrace of the house of Morales, Rabanillo went out of his
house wielding a one-meter samurai. Rabanillo went straight to Morales and hacked
him. Morales died and Rabanillo was charged of murder for his death. Rabanillo
claimed that Morales came out of his house and challenged him to a fight. Irked by
Morales’ challenged, he claimed to meet the latter and hacked him by a bolo. The trial
court convicted him. Is the accused entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation? No. For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate
from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight
should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or
offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement
which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute
obfuscation. Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
have regained his normal equanimity. Thus, it has been held that where at least half an hour
elapsed between the previous fight and the killing, the accused cannot be given the benefit of
the attenuating circumstance of obfuscation. In this case, 30 minutes intervened between the
fistfight and the killing of Morales by Rabanillo. The attack cannot, therefore, be said to be the
result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. Having been actuated more by
the spirit of revenge or by anger and resentment for having been publicly berated by Morales,
Rabanillo cannot be credited with the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
(People v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 130010, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 613, 623-624).
b. For about five years, accused was living illicitly with the victim. The victim later on
separated from him and contracted an illicit relation with another American. The
accused sought for the victim in the house of the other man and after altercation with
the latter, he shot her. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the
ground, and died in a little more than an hour later. Convicted of homicide, accused
claimed that he is entitled to some mitigating circumstances. Is the accused entitled to
any mitigating circumstance? No. No mitigating circumstances is present, not even that
mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control
produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate
the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate
feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions (U.S. v. Hicks,
G.R. No. L-4971, September 23, 1909, 14 Phil. 217, 220)
c. Accused had an altercation with the victim in the market over the right to use the market table
to display their fish. They were pacified by the mayor. After a while, the victim raised his voice
again. Accused uttered in soft voice, “sobra na ina na imo pagdaogdaog” while sharpening his
bolo. When the victim turned around, the accused hacked him on the nape with his bolo.
Charged and convicted of murder, accused claimed that he should be entitled to mitigating
circumstances. “The act of the victim in berating and humiliating accused was enough to
produce passion and obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in a market place
within full view and within hearing distance of many people” (People v. Real, G.R. No. 93436,
March 24, 1995, 242 SCRA 671, 678).
54
6. Vindication of grave offense
a. After eloping with the Salome Diokno, the accused was sought for by her brother and
father. When they found him, they stabbed him for several times in spite of his pleas for
mercy. The victim was brought to the hospital where he died. Later, the two accused
were convicted them of murder. Is the accused entitled to any mitigating circumstance?
Yes. The presence of the fifth mitigating circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
that is, immediate vindication of a grave offense to said accused, may be taken into
consideration in favor of the two accused, because although the elopement took place on
January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th of said month and year, the offense did not
cease while Salome's whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased
unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to
the vindication thereof. Our opinion on this point is based on the fact that the herein accused
belong to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes
a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home
and at the same time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the members thereof.
The presence of the sixth mitigating circumstance of said article 13, consisting in having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation, may also
be taken into consideration in favor of the accused. The fact that the accused saw the
deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with
them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in
their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit the crime with which
they are charged (People v. Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno, G.R. No.L-45100, October
26, 1936, 63 Phil. 601, 608-609).
7. Voluntary surrender. The requisites of voluntary surrender are (a) that the offender had not
actually been arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latter’s agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary (People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-32243,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47, 56).
a. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) acknowledges his guilt or (b) he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture
(People v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 130010, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 613, 627).
(1) Accused went to the police station to clear his name after learning that he was being
accused for killing the victim. Is he entitled to mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender? No. In order that he could be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, it must be shown that the intention of the accused was to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he
wished to save them the trouble and expense in looking for him and capturing him. In the
case at bar, accused's purpose in going to the police station was not to give himself up but
to clear himself of involvement in the killing because he was not guilty (People v. Reynaldo
Evangelista, G.R. No. 84332-33, May 8, 1996, 256 SCRA 611, 625).
55
(2) Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article
13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution
should be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the
two circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty are both present even though the two mitigating
circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the
accused, it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner (Legrama v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
178626, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 270, 282).
(3) Physical and mental illness
a. Accused invited his girlfriend for a dinner in his aunt’s house. After dinner, accused, without the
woman’s consent, had carnal knowledge with her for five times from night till morning of the
following day. The woman narrated that she could not fight with him because during the
intercourse, he was poking his balisong to her neck. Accused was charged with rape. He
disclaimed knowledge of the crime because of insanity. “The law presumes every person to be
sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegations of
insanity. This the accused has failed to prove—that he was insane at the time he raped the
victim—and offered no evidence of his total deprivation of intelligence while he was raping her
for five times (People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029, March 24, 1993, 220 SCRA 440, 451)."
b. Complainant was on her way home when the accused threatened her and put his knife on the
right side of her body and told her not to move or she might be killed. He dragged her to a
darker portion of road and raped her. When she regained consciousness, she told the accused
that she would go with him wherever he would go but first she should go home to get some
clothes and money. Accused allowed her to go and when she saw her co-boarders she told
them what happened. They called the police so that the accused could be arrested. Accused
claimed mental retardation as a defense. “Imbecility, like insanity, is a defense which pertains
to the mental condition of a person. Our case law projects the same standards present in
respect of both insanity and imbecility, that is, that the insanity and imbecility must constitute
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act, or total deprivation of the
will. The behavior of the accused on the night he raped the victim showed that he was quite
conscious of his acts and aware of the moral quality thereof (People v. Buenaflor, G.R. No.
93752, July 15, 1992, 211 SCRA 492, 499)."
c. Accused killed his 8 year old niece, by boxing her on the head and kicking her for several times
in different parts of her body, and mauled his two nephews. Charged of murder and two counts
of frustrated murder, accused claimed that he was suffering from schizophrenia. “Proof the
existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will not exempt the accused from
culpability, if it was not shown that he was completely deprived of freedom and intelligence.
Accused's recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions afterwards indicate
that he was sane before, during, and after the commission of the crimes. The psychiatric report
states that he felt guilty about the death of his niece and apprehensive for being in jail for a
56
longer time. A feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he
was conscious of his acts. He acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for his acts (People v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 17269, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 147, 153-154)."
d. There is no dispute that the accused has a history of mental illness. He was diagnosed to be
suffering from “Schizophrenia, Paranoid, Episodic with Inter episode Residual Symptoms”
which began in 1985 and was characterized by intermitted episodes of psychotic signs and
symptoms since then until accused’s examination on June 21, 2000. Such illness diminished
the exercise of the accused’s will power without however depriving him of the consciousness of
his act. In fact, accused was aware that he hurt his niece “for he perceived her as a big man
with a horrifying appearance” (see P v. Villanueva, id., 155)."
B. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Concept and kinds of aggravating circumstances
1. Concept. Aggravating circumstances are based on the greater criminal perversity of the offender
as shown by the means employed, the time, place and occasion of such commission, and the
personal circumstances of offender, and which, if not offset by any mitigating circumstances, will
increase the penalty to its maximum period.
2. The four kinds of aggravating circumstances are:

a. Generic—those that can generally apply to all crimes such as dwelling, nighttime and
recidivism.
b. Specific—those that apply only to particular crimes such as treachery and cruelty in crimes
against persons, and ignominy in crimes against chastity.
c. Qualifying—those that change the nature of the crime such as treachery which qualifies
homicide to murder, unlawful entry which makes the taking robbery, and abuse of confidence
which makes theft qualified.
d. Inherent—those that are already a part of the commission of the felony and do not have the
effect of increasing the penalty such as abuse of public office in bribery, and the breaking of
wall or unlawful entry in robbery committed by force upon things.
a. Distinctions between generic aggravating and qualifying circumstances. The effect of a

generic aggravating circumstance, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, is to increase
the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the maximum period, but without
exceeding the limit prescribed by law while that of a qualifying aggravating circumstance is
not only to give the crime its proper and exclusive name but also to place the author thereof in
such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed by law for said
crime (People v. Bayot, 64 Phil. 269).
Different aggravating circumstances.
57
1. Advantage be taken of public position. In order for this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is
necessary that the person committing the crime be a public official and that he uses the influence,
prestige or ascendancy which such office gives him as the means by which he realized his
purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in this inquiry, “Did the accused abuse his office
to commit the crime? (US v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150).
a. Policeman Domingo Ural boxed the detention prisoner Felix Napola inside the
detention cell. Napola collapsed on the floor. The accused stepped on his prostrate
body and left for a while. He returned holding a bottle and poured its contents on the
body of the victim. He then ignited it with a match and left the cell again. The victim
died of the burns. Accused was convicted of murder. Did the accused take advantage
of his public position when he committed the crime? Yes. He could not have maltreated
the victim if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to
the cell where the victim was confined. The deceased was under his custody (People v. Ural,
G.R. No. L-3080, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 145-146).
b. After being elected as a councilman, accused directed to his subordinates that the
death of all large animals must be reported to him by the owners. Several carabao
owners complied with the directive. Thereafter, accused collected P5 for each dead
animal from their owners. The animal owners paid the fines believing that the
municipality had authorized the accused to collect the fines from them. Accused was
convicted of estafa later on for unauthorized collection and spending of the alleged
fines. Did he take advantage of his public position when he committed the crime? Yes.
The fact that the accused was a councilman at the time placed him in a position to commit
these crimes. If he had not been councilman he could not have induced the complaining
parties to pay the alleged fines. It was on this account of his being councilman that the parties
believed that he had the right to collect fines and it was for this reason that they made the
payments. It is true that a municipal councilman is not an official designated by law to collect
public fines. But these facts do not destroy or disprove the important fact that the accused
did, by taking advantage of his public position, deceive and defraud the injured parties of the
money which they paid him (US v. Torrida, G.R. No. 7450, 7451 and 7452, September 18,
1912, 23 Phil. 189, 193).
c. If abuse of office is a necessary element of the crime, this aggravating circumstance is not
present. For example, the crime of bribery and other crimes committed by public officers.
2. Contempt of or with insult to public authorities. The circumstance of contempt of or with insult
to public authorities is considered aggravating if (1) the person in authority is engaged in the
exercise of his functions and (2) he is not the person against whom the crime is committed.
a. This is not applicable when it is the public authority himself who is the offended party or who is
injured by the commission of the offense, or where the offended party is an agent of person in
authority.
58
3. Disregard of rank, age, sex, or if committed in dwelling. There are two aggravating
circumstances here namely (1) disregard of respect on account of the rank, age, or sex of the
offended party, and (2) that the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party.
a. Insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex
requires proof of the specific fact or circumstance that the accused disregarded the respect
due the offended party other than the victim is one of high rank, or an old man or is a woman. It
must also be shown that the offender deliberately intended to offend or insult the rank, age, or
sex of the offended party (People v. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548).
b. Dwelling is the place of abode where the offended party resides and which satisfies the
requirements of domestic life. To be aggravating, the crime must be committed not only in a
dwelling but in the dwelling of the offended party, provided that the latter has not given
provocation.
c. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. In a case, robbery with
violence was committed in the house of the victims without provocation on their part. In robbery
with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in this class of
robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the
offended party’s house. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. He who goes to another’s house
to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (People v.
Evangelio, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 579, 598-599).
d. Dwelling is aggravating in the following cases:

(1) When the deceased was fired upon in his house when he had his back turned (People v.
Ambis, 68 Phil. 635).
(2) Though the aggressor did not go up or enter the interior of the house yet the fact that he
entered the ground of the same and went under the house to inflict on the offended party
the very severed wound resulting in death, it is obvious that there was present in the
commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance that the same was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party (People v. Bautista, 79 Phil. 652; US v. Moro Macarinfas, 40
Phil. 1).
(3) Theft of three carabaos which were kept in an enclosure of the house (US v. Tapan, 20
Phil. 211).
(4) Murder committed on the foot of the staircase of the house (People v. Alcala, 46 Phil. 739).
(5) Dwelling is aggravating if the deceased was dragged from his house to be killed in the
open field (People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-7030, January 31, 1957).
e. Dwelling is not aggravating in the commission of the offense in the following cases:
(1) If both the offended party and offender shared the dwelling.
(2) Dwelling does not belong to the offended party.
(3) The offended party gave provocation.
59
4. Abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. In order for this aggravating circumstance to

be present in the commission of a crime, it is essential that the confidence must be a means of
facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party’s belief
that the former would not abuse the confidence reposed in him. There must be a relation of trust or
confidence between the person committing the crime and the one against whom it is committed
and that the former make use of such relation to commit the crime (US v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150).
a. In the morning of December 13, 1970, a stabbing incident took place at the New Bilibid
Prison. Basilio Beltran, a prisoner, was carrying bread ration for breakfast when he was
suddenly attacked by four accused. The victim died of multiple stab wounds, numbering
12 in all, on the different parts of his body. The aggravating circumstance of obvious
ungratefulness was present as the victim was suddenly attacked while in the act of giving
assailants their bread and coffee for breakfast. Instead of being grateful to the victim, at least
by doing him no harm, they took advantage of his helplessness when his two arms were used
for carrying their food, thus preventing him from defending himself from the sudden attack
(People v. Bautista, et. al., G.R. No. L-38624, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 460, 470).
b. The accused is a security guard in the bank. He robbed the bank and stabbed its
manager-cashier several times on his body which lead to the death of the latter. He was
convicted of robbery with homicide. Being security guard in the bank, the manager-cashier
was his superior. Indeed, it was his duty precisely to defend him from any aggressor. But in
disregard of the respect he owed him, on account of the latter’s superior rank, he assaulted
him. Such disregard of respect is aggravating circumstance (People v. Nismal, G.R. No. L-
51257, June 25, 1982, 114 SCRA 487, 494).
c. The very fact that petitioner “forced open” the main door and screen because he was denied
access to private complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by
private complainant. Without ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that
were the subject of the taking, it cannot be said that private complainant had a “firm trust” on
petitioner or that she “relied on his discretion” and that the same trust reposed on him
facilitated Viray’s taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified theft
(Viray v. People, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013, 709 SCRA 227, 238).
5. Place of the commission of the crime. The place of the commission of the crime such as the
palace of the Chief of Executive, offices of persons in authority, or churches, is aggravating
regardless of whether official or religious functions are being held at the time of the commission of
the crime.
6. Night time, uninhabited place or by a band. The circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place
or by a band, if they concur jointly in the commission of a felony may be accidents of only one
aggravating circumstance but this does not exclude the possibility of their being considered
separately when their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently revealing a
greater degree of perversity.
60
a. In construing the provision of the Penal Code relating to nocturnity, it was repeatedly held that
nocturnity would be considered as an aggravating circumstance only when it appeared that it
was especially sought by the offender or that he had taken advantage thereof in order to
facilitate the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity (see People v. Matbagon,
G.R. No. L-42465, November 12, 1934, 60 Phil. 887). Nighttime is that period of darkness
beginning at the end of dusk and ending at dawn. It cannot be considered aggravating when
the commission of the crime began at daytime.
(1) The two accused drank some wine with the deceased. Then, the deceased went to
the hand-rail of the door of his house and rested there. At midnight, the wife of the
deceased was awakened by the noise produced by a blow, so she got up and saw
the accused holding the deceased in the neck while the other accused, who had a
club in his hand, held the knees of the deceased. The two accused brought the
deceased to the house and ran away. They were later on charged and convicted of
murder. Are there aggravating circumstances present in the case? Yes. While it does
not positively appear that the accused sought the nighttime for the perpetration of the
crime, the fact is that they at least took advantage of it for they approached the house at
an early time, and yet they did not commit the crime until late in the night. This is sufficient
in order that the aggravating circumstance may be held to exist. And although the accused
were found with the deceased at the foot of the staircase of the house, that place must be
regarded as an integral part of the dwelling of that family. The porch of a house, not
common to different neighbors, is a part of the dwelling (People v Alcala, G.R. No. L-
18988, December 29, 1922, 46 Phil. 739, 743-744).
b. Uninhabited place is aggravating when the crime is committed in solitary place, where help to
the victim is difficult and escape of the accused is easy, provided that solitude was purposely
sought or taken advantage of, to facilitate the commission of the offense.
c. A band is consists of more than three armed malefactors. When more than three armed
malefactors take part in the commission of a crime, it shall be deemed to have been committed
by a band.
7. Occasion of public calamity. The reason for this circumstance is found in the debased form of
criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted,
adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them (US v. Rodriguez, 19
Phil. 150).
8. With aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. Reliance upon the aid of
armed men is sufficient for actual aid is not necessary.
9. Recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code.
a. Distinctions between recidivism and habitual delinquency.
61
(1) In recidivism, it is sufficient that the accused, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of
the Code; in habitual delinquency, the crimes are specified, namely: serious or less serious
physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification.
(2) Recidivism must be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance if the essential
requisites are present, no matter how many years have intervened between the previous
conviction and the time of the trial for the new crime; while habitual delinquency requires
that within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes
specified, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
(3) In recidivism, it is sufficient if there has been a final conviction for the second offense
embraced in the same title; in habitual delinquency, the accused must have been found
guilty the third time or oftener of any of the crimes specified.
(4) As to their effects, recidivism, if not offset by a mitigating circumstance, serves to increase
the penalty only to the maximum; whereas, if there is habitual delinquency, an additional
penalty is imposed.
b. Quasi-recidivism. Any person who shall commit a felony or an offense after having been
convicted by a final judgment but before beginning to serve sentence, or while serving the
same, shall be punished with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by the law for the
new felony (art. 160, RPC).
10. Reiteracion or habituality. Reiteracion is based on one previous conviction for an equal or
greater felony or more than one conviction for lighter offenses. The felonies need not be under the
same title, as in recidivism, nor for specified felonies as in habitual delinquency.
11. In consideration of price, reward or promise. The generic aggravating circumstance of price,
reward or promise is taken into account against the person so induced. When a felony is
committed by one because of the inducement of another thru price, reward or promise, both are
principals—one by direct participation and the other by inducement.
12. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, derailment of locomotives or

any other artifice involving great waste or ruin. The killing of the victim by means of such
circumstances as inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, derailment of locomotives,
qualifies it murder.
13. Evident premeditation. In order for this circumstance to be taken into account as aggravating, it is
necessary (a) to establish the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) a
notorious act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.
62
a. In order to be appreciated, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be

“evident premeditation.” To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must
establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (c) sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Evident premeditation,
like other circumstances that would qualify the killing as murder, must be established by clear
and positive evidence showing the planning and the preparation stages prior to the killing.
Without such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and
probable, will not suffice (People v. Sabangan, G.R. No. 191722, December 11, 2013, 712
SCRA 522, 544).
b. To justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period sufficient in a

juridical sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and sufficient to allow the
conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to harken to its
warning (US v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530).
c. The rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much
time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It
must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its
execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or
persistent attempt. In a case, the Supreme Court said that the lapse of time from the moment
the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient for the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his act (People v. Alawig, G.R. 187731, September 18, 2013,
706 SCRA 101-102).
d. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of
unknown persons, the first he encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance
of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the
perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injuries are the same, and the fact that the
victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person
having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is
considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the
moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed is
manifestly evident (see US v. Manalinde, G.R. No. L-5292, August 28, 1909, 14 Phil. 77, 81-
82).
14. Craft, fraud or disguise. These are three separate aggravating circumstances.
a. Craft involves intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused.
b. Fraud in contracts is defined as insidious words or machination of one party whereby the other
is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
63
c. Disguise includes any device to conceal the identity of the offender in the commission of the
felony.
15. Abuse of superior strength or means employed to weaken the defense. There are two
circumstances involved here, namely (a) advantage be taken of superior strength and (b) means
be employed to weaken the defense of the offended party.
a. The first circumstance depends upon the relative strength of the one attacking and the one
attacked. There must be evidence that the accused were physically stronger and have abused
such superiority.
(1) Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor. The fact that there were two persons who attacked
the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The
evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they
had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance
depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties (see People v. Beduya, G.R. No.
175315, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 275, 284-289).
b. The second circumstance contemplates the use of means to weaken the defense, as when the
offender throws acid or sand into the eyes of the victim or in having made the deceased
intoxicated.
16. Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.
a. Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown:
a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person
attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means, method or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Treachery involves not only
the swiftness, surprise, or suddenness of the attack upon an unsuspecting victim, rendering
the victim defenseless. It should also be shown that the mode of attack has knowingly been
intended to accomplish the wicked intent. Thus, the second element is the subjected aspect of
treachery. It means that the accused must have made some preparation to kill the deceased in
a manner that would insure the execution of the crime or render it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to resort to self-defense or retaliation. The mode of attack, therefore, must
have been planned by the offender and must not have sprung from an unexpected turn of
events (People v. Canaveras, G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013, 711 SCRA 1, 12).
64
b. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims
having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to
retaliate (People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 726, 748).
c. In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the

classification of the crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must
be shown that the treacherous acts were present at and preceded the commencement of the
attack which caused the injury complained of. After the commencement of such attack and
before its termination an accused person may have employed means or methods which were
of a treacherous character, and yet such means or methods would not constitute the
circumstance of alevosia. One continuous attack, such as the one which resulted in the death
of the deceased, cannot be broken up into two or more parts and made to constitute separate,
distinct, and independent attacks so that treachery may be injected therein and considered as
a qualifying or aggravating circumstance (US v. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6432, March 22, 1911,
19 Phil. 164, 172-173).
d. Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not
preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part
of the deceased as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the
spur of the moment (People v. Likiran, G.R. No. 201858, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 217, 227).
e. The aggravating circumstance of treachery should be proven as fully as the crime itself.
Treachery cannot simply be deduced from presumption, except in the following cases:
(1) Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists (People v.
Umawid, G.R. No. 207990, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 582, 609).
(2) When the victim was tied elbow to elbow with his body sustaining many wounds and his
head cut off, treachery is considered (US v. Santos, 1 Phil. 222, 224-22) or if a person is
first seized and bound, with a view to rendering him incapable of defense, and he is then
slained either by the person who reduced him to his helpless state or by another," alevosia
is present (see People v. Mongado, G.R. No. L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642)
(3) The Supreme Court has held that an attack on a victim who just awakened or who was
roused from sleep is one attended by treachery because in such situation, the victim is in
no position to put up any form of defense (People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 180915, August
9, 2010, 627 SCRA 383, 391-392).
17. Ignominy. Ignominy is caused by circumstances which add suffering and humiliation to the victim.
a. There is ignominy when the accused ordered the victim to exhibit to them her complete
nakedness for about ten minutes before raping her that brought about a circumstance which
65
tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating (see People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-
28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450).
18. Unlawful entry. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for
the purpose.
19. Breaking of wall, roof, floor, others. The breaking must be a means to the commission of the
crime.
20. With aid or persons under fifteen or by means of motor vehicles, others. This contains two
separate and distinct aggravating circumstances, namely (1) with the aid of persons under 15
years old; or (b) by means of vehicles, airships, and other similar means.
21. Cruelty. For cruelty to be considered an aggravating circumstance, it is essential that the wrong
done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented and that such wrong is
unnecessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the offender. It is a specific aggravating
circumstance in crimes against persons.
a. The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused

deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for
its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his
person or corpse (People v. Bernabe, G.R. No 185726. October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 216,
236-237).
(1) From the records and varied written admissions of the accused, Diego Balondo, that
on Sept. 29, 1966, at about 6:00 o'clock a.m., he was in his farm in the barrio of
Balacson, Kawayan, Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte. That he stayed in his farm for
about three hours clearing his camote plantation; that at about 9:00 o'clock in that
same day, he went home to take his breakfast; that at about 1:00 o'clock, he saw
Gloria Bulasa going to the direction of the nipa grooves of the Ayono Asilo, behind
the Aglipayan church; that upon seeing her, he followed behind surreptitiously; that
upon seeing her cutting the banana leaves he told her, "why, you are here again to
cut the banana leaves?", that the late Gloria Bulasa answered, 'it is none of your
business for it's the property of the government'; that he got furious and
immediately grabbed her by his left hand strangled her by the neck and pushed her
violently to the ground face downward; that he firmly held her left arm and neck;
rode on her back and pinned her down with his knees and then continuously lifting
her head and smashed her face against the mud; that he choked and buried her face
in the mud for about an hour until she died. The commission of the crime by the
defendant was attended by the aggravating circumstances of (1) disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of her sex, and (2) that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not
necessary for its commission.
66
b. The number of wounds found upon the corpses does not, by itself alone, justify the acceptance
of the circumstance of cruelty, it being necessary to show that the accused deliberately and
inhumanly increased the suffering of the victim (see People v. Curiano, G.R. Nos. L-15256-57,
October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 123).
Rules on the appreciation of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Mitigating or aggravating

circumstances shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in
conformity with the following rules:
a. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or

which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
Examples: unlawful entry or breaking of doors in robbery through force upon the thing (Art. 299, Art.
302) and abuse of confidence in qualified theft (Art. 310).
b. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such
a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Examples: relationship in parricide (Art. 246); sex in crimes against chastity (Art. 333), and abuse of
public position in bribery (Art. 210).
c. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from
his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such
circumstances are attendant.
Examples: Passion and obfuscation are circumstances arising from the moral attributes of the
offender. Minority is a circumstance pertaining to cause personal to offender.
d. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to
accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had
knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein (see Art. 62,
RPC).
Examples: Treachery and cruelty in murder would aggravate the liability of persons who had
knowledge thereof at the time of execution.
C. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Kinds and requisites
67
1. The alternative circumstances of relationship, intoxication, and degree of instruction may be

aggravating or mitigating depending on the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission.
2. The nature of the relationship which may either aggravate or mitigate the criminal liability exists
where the injured person is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate or illegitimate or
adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree. As a general rule, relationship
is mitigating in crime against property, and is even exempting in theft, estafa and malicious
mischief. It is aggravating in crime against chastity.
3. Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the said felony.
Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance
(People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47, 55).
a. The person pleading intoxication must present proof that he had taken a quantity of alcoholic
beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of blurring his
reason; and at the same time, he must prove that not only was intoxication not habitual but
also that his imbibing the alcohol drink was not intended to fortify his resolve to commit the
crime (People v. Laroy Buenaflor, G.R. No. 93752, July 15, 1992, 211 SCRA 492, 500).
4. Lack of instruction is generally mitigating, except in crimes against property and chastity. Should
the accused abuse his educational attainment to commit a felony, the circumstances should be
considered as aggravating.
68
CHAPTER VII. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Principals, accomplices, and accessories.
1. The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: (1) principals, (2) accomplices,
and (3) accessories.
a. Grave and less grave felonies. Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches
the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in
accordance with Art. 25 of this Code. Less grave felonies are those which the law
punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in accordance
with the above-mentioned Article. (Art. 9).
2. The following are criminally liable for light felonies: (1) principals, and (2) accomplices.
a. Light felonies. Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with
the exception of those committed against persons or property (Art. 7). Light felonies are
infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided. (Art. 9, par. 3)
b. Examples of light felonies. The light felonies under the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) Slight physical injuries (Art. 286)
(2) Theft (Art. 309, pars. 7 and 8)
(3) Alteration of boundary marks (Art. 313)
(4) Malicious mischief (Art. 328, par. 3; Art. 329, par. 3)
(5) Intriguing against honor (Art. 365)
3. The following are considered principals:

a. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
b. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and
c. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would
not have been accomplished.
4. Principals by direct participation do not only participate in the criminal resolution but proceed to
personally take part in the perpetration of the crime. The expression those who take a direct part in
the commission of the deed means those who, participating in the criminal resolution, proceed
together to perpetrate the crime and personally take part in the same end (see People v. Tamayo,
44 Phil. 38).
a. A person may be convicted of the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been
conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. In other
words, the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design
entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design.
It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
69
attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is, furthermore, necessary

that the latter, with knowledge of the former’s criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or
material aid in the consummation of the crime (see People v. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664).
b. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have

performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity (People v. Jose, G.R. No.
200053, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 609, 619-620).
5. To be a principal by inducement, it is necessary that the inducement should precede the

commission of the offense and be the direct and determining factor thereof.
a. If the inducement should amount to violence, the person coerced would be exempt from
criminal liability, if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force (art. 12, par. 5).
b. If the inducement should consist of a price, reward or promise, the commission of the felony
would be attended by that aggravating circumstance as against persons who offered them
(art. 12, par. 11).
6. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, it is essential that there must be participation in the

criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of
the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
a. To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose
does not necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred the
circumstances of each case (see People v. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571).
b. It is a well-known rule that, without proof of conspiracy, mere passive presence at the scene of
another’s crime does not constitute complicity (see People v. Samano, 77 Phil. 136).
7. An accomplice to a felony is one who participates in its execution by previous or simultaneous acts,
provided he did not take direct part in its execution nor has directly forced or induced others to
execute it, nor has cooperated in its execution by an indispensable act, for if any of these
circumstances should exist, he would no longer be an accomplice but a principal. Therefore,
complicity implies certain participation in the will or purpose to commit the felony for to cooperate
means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily
mean previous understanding for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each
case (see People v.Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571).
a. An accomplice in crimes against persons is one who, in the absence of conspiracy, performs
a previous or simultaneous act having a relation with that of the principal but does not inflict
the mortal wounds, and his cooperation is confined to only those of minor character or after
the victim had already been fatally wounded by the other accused principals (Padilla, 1956
Ed., p. 424).
70
b. Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the

Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1)
that there by community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution
by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice (People v.
Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 529).
8. An accessory does not participate in the criminal design nor cooperate in the commission of the
felony, but with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently take part in any of the
three ways: (1) profiting by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing the body, effects or instruments
of the crime; and (3) assisting in the escape of the principle provided he acts with abuse of public
functions, or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
a. Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered or in this case, to the seized
timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, the court has ruled
that even a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence (Villarin v. People, G.R. No. 175289, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 500, 520-521).
9. The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, illegitimate, and adopted brothers
and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of
accessories falling within paragraph 1 of Article 19 (Art. 20, RPC).
Obstruction of justice and fencing
1. Punishable acts of obstruction of justice. Any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution
of criminal cases committing any of the following acts:
a. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
b. Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object with
intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases;
71
c. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;
d. Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or
the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for
the same purpose or purposes;
e. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders
or disturbing the proceeding in the fiscal’s offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
f. Making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity
and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in
criminal cases;
g. Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from,

discontinuing, or impending the prosecution of a criminal offender;
h. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor
or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such
person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or
imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing
in the investigation of, or in official proceedings in criminal cases;
i. Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies
from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or
fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for
purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the
same to mislead the investigation or the court (see sec. 1, P.D. No. 1829).
2. Fencing. Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (sec. 2a,
P.D. No. 1612).
3. Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (sec. 5, P.D. No. 1612).
72
CHAPTER VIII. FORMAL OR IDEAL PLURALITY OF CRIMES
Complex crimes and continued crimes
1. Plurality of crimes. Plurality of crimes consists in the successive execution by the same individual
of different criminal acts upon any of which no conviction has yet been declared.
a. There are two kinds of plurality of crimes: (1) formal or ideal plurality, and (2) real or material
plurality. Article 48 provides for two cases of formal or ideal plurality of crimes. There is but
one criminal liability in this kind of plurality. In real or material plurality, there are different
crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender. In such cases, the offender shall be
punished for each and every offense that he committed.
b. Plural crimes of the formal or ideal type are divided into three groups:
(1) When the offender commits any of the special complex crimes defined under Art. 48 of the
RPC.
(2) When the law specially fixes a single penalty for two or more offenses committed.
(3) When the offender commits continued crimes.
2. Complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum (art. 48, RPC). The two kinds of complex
crimes are: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or les grave felonies, also known
as compound crime, and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, also
known as the complex crime proper.
a. The first kind of complex crime has the following requisites: (1) that only a single act is
performed by the offender; (2) that the single act produces (a) two or more grave felonies, or
(2) one or more grave and one or more less grave felonies, or (c) two or more less grave
felonies.
(1) The single act of throwing a hand grenade produces multiple murders and attempted
murders (see People v. Guillen, .G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950, 85 Phil. 307, 318-
319).
(2) The utterance of a defamatory statement made on a single occasion against a family of
lawyers designated by their common surname but not separately mentioned is only one
offense of grave oral defamation (see People v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. L-8777-79, August 14,
1956, 99 Phil. 713, 716).
(3) Several shots from a submachine gun causing several deaths are considered several acts
(see People v. Desierto, 45 O.G. 4542).
73
(4) Accused raped the victim after threatening to kill her with a gun. As he was suffering from
gonorrhea, he infected the victim with it. Later, she was found suffering of peritonitis and
great pain because of gonorrhea. She died because of peritonitis. Is the accused liable for
the death of the victim? Yes. The victim died of peritonitis which was the result of the
venereal disease with which she was infected by the accused through sexual intercourse
with her against her will. Such fact constitutes the complex crime of rape with homicide on
the ground that both crimes were but the result of a single act which is sexual intercourse
(People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 40903, April 28, 1934, 60 Phil. 158, 161).
(5) Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to
rape the victim (People v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 200080, September 18, 2013, 706 SCRA
150, 154).
b. An offense is a necessary means for committing the other when the following requisites are
present: (1) at least two offenses are committed; (2) one or some of the offenses must be
necessary to commit the other; (3) both or all the offenses must be punished under the
Revised Penal Code.
(1) Falsification of a public document by an accountable officer is an offense which is

necessary to commit malversation is a complex crime of malversation of public funds
through falsification of public documents (see People v. Barbas, G.R. Nos. 41265, 41266,
60 Phil. 241, 244).
(2) Kidnapping the victim to murder him in secluded place. Although homicide or murder may
be committed whenever the victim may be found, yet if the charge in a complaint or
information is that the victim was kidnapped and taken to another distant place in order to
demand ransom for his release and kill him if ransom is not paid, the offense charged
would evidently be a complex crime of murder through kidnapping, the latter being a
necessary means to commit the former (see Parulan v. Rodas, G.R. No. L-1536, July 31,
1947, 78 Phil. 855, 857).
(3) Accused took over the car of the victim and with gun poked upon her, brought her in
remote place in Batangas. They then shot and left her for dead. Aside from
carnapping, what other crime is committed? Complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with frustrated murder. A complex crime is committed when a single act
constitute two or more, grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other (People v. Roxas, G.R. No. 172604, August 17, 2010, 628
SCRA 378, 401).
74
c. Rebellion absorbs the common crimes committed to pursue it. One of the means by
which rebellion may be committed in the words of Art. 135 is by engaging in war against the
forces of the government and committing serious violence in the prosecution of the said war.
Being within the purview of engaging in war and committing serious violence, said resort to
arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or
more offenses, but only one crime—that of rebellion plain and simple. National, as well as
international, laws and jurisprudence, are overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition that
common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offence, are divested of their character
as common offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are
mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense,
or complex with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty ( see People v. Amado
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 541).
(1) Rebellion cannot be complexed with a common crime. The Hernandez ruling remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Note: SC did not dismiss the
case but merely said that the charge should be read as simple rebellion (see Enrile v
Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217, 228).
(2) All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the
crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves
(see Enrile v Amin, G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 573, 580-581).
(3) The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex
net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion through crimes in
themselves are absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer,
knowing to well that the victim is a person in authority is mere component or ingredient of
rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge. Where the accused who was charged with murder admitted his
membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime is not
murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code
(see People v. Dasig, G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993, 221 SCRA 549, 558).
(4) The phrase “necessary means” has been interpreted not to mean indispensable means
because if it is, then, the offense as a “necessary means” to commit another would be an
indispensable element and would an ingredient thereof.
3. Continued crime. A continued (continues or continuing crime) is a single crime consisting of a

series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution.
(1) Under sound principles, the act of taking two roosters, in response to the unity of thought
in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the
75
accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully taken belonged to two distinct persons.
There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only of
one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime (see
People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, 440-441).
(2) There is only a single offense when in obedience to an order several accused
simultaneously shot many victims without evidence how many each killed under the single
criminal impulse theory (see People v. Lawas, G.R. No. L-7618, June 30, 1955).
4. Special complex crimes. Robbery with homicide (art. 294, par. 1), or robbery with rape (art. 294,
par. 2), or kidnapping with serious physical injuries (art. 267, par. 3) are not complex crimes under
art. 48. They are special crimes to which the Code separately applies distinct penalties as
indivisible crimes.
5. There is no complex crime when one offense is committed to conceal the other such as when
falsification of a public or official document involving public funds was committed to conceal the
misappropriation done by an accountable official. When the offender had to falsify a public or
official document to obtain possession of the funds which he misappropriated, the falsification is a
necessary means to commit the malversation.
76
CHAPTER IX. EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1. Criminally liability is totally extinguished:

(1) By the death of the convict,;
(2) By service of sentence;
(3) By absolute pardon;
(4) By prescription of the crime;
(5) By prescription of the penalty;
(6) By the marriage of the offended woman with the offender (Art. 89, RPC).
a. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability,
as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case (People v. Broca, G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 369, 374-376).
2. Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by
correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years with the exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or similar offenses shall prescribe in one
year. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses
prescribe in two months. When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall
be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of
this article (Art. 90, RPC).
a. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC).
3. The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:

(1) Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
(2) Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
(3) Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which
prescribes in five years;
(4) Light penalties, in one year (Art. 92, RPC).
a. The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up,
be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty,
or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription (Art. 93, RPC).
77
4. Prescriptive periods of offenses punished under special laws

(1) Offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both,
prescribe after 1 year.
(2) Offenses punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years,
prescribe after 4 years.
(3) Offenses punished by imprisonment for two years or more but less than six years, prescribe
after 8 years.
(4) Offenses punished by imprisonment for six years or more, prescribe in 12 years (see Act 3763).
78
CHAPTER X. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PENALTIES
Basic principles, indeterminate sentence law and probation, relevant provisions of RA 9165.
Penalties
1. Penalty is the punishment prescribed by the law prior to the commission of a felony which is
imposed by the court on any person convicted of having committed a felony (see Padilla, 1959 Ed.,
p. 439).
2. Theories justifying penalty
(1) Prevention. The State must punish the criminal to prevent or suppress the danger to the
State and to the public arising from the criminal acts of the offender.
(2) Self-defense. The State has the right to punish the criminal as a measure of self-defense
so as to protect the society from the threat and wrong inflicted by the criminal.
(3) Reformation. The object of punishment in criminal cases is to correct and reform, as the
State has the duty to take care and reform the criminal.
(4) Exemplarity. The criminal is punished to serve as an example to deter others from
committing crimes.
(5) Justice. The absolute theory of penalty rests on the theory that crime must be punished by
the State as an act of retributive justice, a vindication of absolute right and moral law
violated by the criminal.
3. No felony shall be punished by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission (art. 21,
RPC).
4. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal as the term is defined in rule 5 of article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same (art. 22, RPC).
a. A person shall be deemed a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the
date of his last release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener (art. 62, RPC).
5. A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in article
344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by
his express waiver (art. 23, RPC).
79
6. The imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) Perpetual penalties—convict shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty of 30 years,
except when he is not worthy of pardon by reason of his conduct or some serious cause.
(2) Reclusion temporal—12 years and 1 day to 20 years.
(3) Prision mayor and temporary disqualifications—6 years and 1 day to 12 years.
(4) Prision correccional, suspension and destierro—6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
(5) Arresto mayor—1 month and 1 day to 6 months.
(6) Arresto menor—1 day to 30 days.
(7) Bond to keep peace—the period during which the bond shall be effective is discretionary to the
court (see art. 27, RPC).
Indeterminate Sentence Law
7. Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103)
a. Disqualified offenders:
(1) Those convicted of offense punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.
(2) Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason.
(3) Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage.
(4) Those convicted of piracy.
(5) Habitual delinquents
(6) Persons who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
(7) Those who have been granted pardon but violated the terms thereof.
(8) Those convicted by maximum prison term of one year.
b. How to determine the maximum and minimum sentences.

(1) Crimes punished under the RPC. The maximum term shall be taken in the penalty that can
be properly imposed under the RPC considering the attending circumstances. The
minimum penalty shall be taken within any period of the penalty next lower in degree to
that prescribed by law.
(2) Offenses punished under special laws. The maximum term shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the said
law.
Probation
8. Probation
a. Purposes of Probation:
(1) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
(2) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be
less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(3) prevent the commission of offenses.
80
b. Disqualified offenders:
(1) Those sentenced to serve maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years.
(2) Those convicted of subversion or any crime against national security or the public order.
(3) Those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day or fine of not less than 200 pesos.
(4) Those who have been once on probation under PD 968.
(5) Those who are already serving sentence at the time PD 968 became applicable.
(6) Those who have perfected an appeal.
c. The Probation Law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail himself of probation. This requirement outlaws the element of speculation on the part
of the accused to wager on the result of his appeal that when his conviction is finally affirmed on
appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he
now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts
affirmance of his conviction. However, when the appeal was taken because the trial court
imposed an erroneous penalty which prevented the accused from applying for probation, an
application for probation may still be made after the appellate court imposed the correct penalty
which is well-within the penalties allowed under the Probation Law (see Colinares v. People,
G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011).
d. Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, reads:Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.
Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting
an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, that no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction. Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. An order
granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
e. An accused may be allowed to apply for probation even if he has filed a notice of appeal,
provided that his appeal is limited to the following grounds:
(1) When the appeal is merely intended for the correction of the penalty imposed by
the lower court, which when corrected would entitle the accused to apply for
probation; and
(2) When the appeal is merely intended to review the crime for which the accused was
convicted and that the accused should only be liable to the lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the crime for which he was originally convicted and the
proper penalty imposable is within the probationable period.
f. Probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:
81
(1) When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty
imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a
notice of appeal; and
(2) When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his
conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the correction of the
penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is
necessarily included in the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is
within the probationable period.
Relevant provisions of RA 9165
9. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – An accused who is over fifteen (15)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but
not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been
promulgated after having been found guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a
suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions:
(1) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act, or of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code; or of any special
penal laws;
(2) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOH-accredited
physician; and
(3) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended. While under
suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of
the Board, under such conditions that the court may impose for a period ranging from six (6)
months to eighteen (18) months (see section 66, RA 9165).
Discharge after Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-Time Minor

Offender. – If the accused first time minor offender under suspended sentence complies with the
applicable rules and regulations of the Board, including confinement in a Center, the court, upon a
favorable recommendation of the Board for the final discharge of the accused, shall discharge the
accused and dismiss all proceedings (see section 67, RA 9165).
10. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First-Time Minor Offender. –
The privilege of suspended sentence shall be availed of only once by an accused drug dependent
who is a first-time offender over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the
violation of Section 15 of this Act but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when
judgment should have been promulgated (see section 68, RA 9165).
11. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. – Upon
promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation,
even if the sentence provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on
82
probation, or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the

supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in
coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon
compliance with the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court
recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the
court shall issue such an order (see section 70, RA 9165).
83

Presentation Outline in Criminal Law

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Presentation Outline in Criminal Law

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Summary of Principles in Criminal Law I

By Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.B, LL.M

CHAPTER I. BASIC PRINCIPLES

Concept and characteristics

Concept and characteristics of crimes and interpretation of criminal statutes.

1. Concept. A crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or

4. Rules on the Interpretation of Criminal Statutes

d. Effects of repeal of penal statutes

5. Limitations provided under the Constitution

may be appropriately exercised (Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

7. No criminal liability flows from an involuntary act.

8. No criminal liability flows from a lawful act.

d. Reckless imprudence cannot be absorbed by a malum prohibitum. A mala in se felony

CHAPTER II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY

b. Inapplicability to injuries arising from a lawful act.

Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow):

Praeter intenionem (greater injury):

7. Impossible crime. The following are the requisites of impossible crime:

b. Factual Impossibility. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown

CHAPTER III. STAGES OF COMMISSION OF FELONIES

Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies.

5. Theft. There is no frustrated theft.

CHAPTER IV. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

a. Conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

b. Examples of conspiracy and proposal

CHAPTER V. JUSTIFYING AND EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Kinds and requisites of justifying circumstances.

1. Justifying circumstances. –The following do not incur any criminal liability:

2. Distinguish justifying circumstances from exempting circumstances. In justifying circumstances,

c. Self-defense is inherently a weak defense because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to

a. Different theories in determining the reasonableness of the apprehension of imminent

8. The third requisite is present when

Kinds of exempting circumstances and their requisites

1. State the exempting circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.

6. Impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

7. Compulsion of an irresistible force

(8) Special provisions of RA 9262 and RA 9344

Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense. Under section 26 of RA 9262, victims-survivors who

CHAPTER VI. MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Kinds and requisites of mitigating circumstances

3. Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong

5. Passion and obfuscation

6. Vindication of grave offense

(3) Physical and mental illness

Concept and kinds of aggravating circumstances

2. The four kinds of aggravating circumstances are:

a. Distinctions between generic aggravating and qualifying circumstances. The effect of a

Different aggravating circumstances.

d. Dwelling is aggravating in the following cases:

4. Abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. In order for this aggravating circumstance to

a. Distinctions between recidivism and habitual delinquency.

12. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, derailment of locomotives or

a. In order to be appreciated, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be

b. To justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period sufficient in a

a. Craft involves intellectual trickery or cunning on the part of the accused.

c. In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the

a. The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused

Rules on the appreciation of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Mitigating or aggravating

a. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or

Kinds and requisites

1. The alternative circumstances of relationship, intoxication, and degree of instruction may be

CHAPTER VII. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

Principals, accomplices, and accessories.

3. The following are considered principals: