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III.

EQUAL PROTECTION the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
A. General Considerations 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of
1987

(c) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively


1. BIRAOGO VS PTC targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
FACTS: species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past
and present, who may be indictable.

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth


Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners
and argued that:

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
commited by third-level public officers and employees, their President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of 9970 and setled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot form such bodies.
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, setle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to appropriated by Congress.
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the


Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the later’s jurisdiction.

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the


power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
funds for its operation. because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the ISSUES:
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto question E. O. No. 1;
inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds
for public offices, agencies and commissions;
E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
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3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
DOJ; securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
RULING: sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, find

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers maters of
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; atention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in precedents
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc commitees. This flows
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into maters which
exercise of the powers of that institution. the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised
and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,


powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
prerogatives as legislators. usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury atributable to the would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing
implementation of E. O. No. 1. rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts
so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has
to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of

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Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated


should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal equal protection clause of the Constitution
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state’s duly constituted authorities. B. Bases for classification

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a 2. GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS                       G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; FACTS:
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
Nicolas Montesclaros, a 72-year-old widower married Milagros Orbiso,
equally to all members of the same class.
who was then 43 years old, on 10 July 1983. Nicolas filed with the GSIS an
application for retirement benefits under the Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and In his retirement application, he designated his wife as his sole
obligations imposed. beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective
17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first
five years and a monthly annuity after.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with the GSIS a claim for
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to survivorship pension under PD 1146 but was denied the claim because,
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of under section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for
manifest. the pension.

Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984. Milagros filed with the trial court a
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Sec. 18
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past of PD 1146.
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial including interest. Citing Articles 115and 117 of the Family Code, the trial
differences do not make for a valid classification. court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for
services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through
monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement
benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, are conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section
at least, have the authority to investigate all past administration 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family
Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to prejudice or impair vested rights.

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The trial court held that Section 18 of PD 1146 was repealed by the (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law
Family Code, a later law. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this appeal. there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from
another.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she
has accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to
However, the Court will still resolve the issue despite the manifestation of the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
Milagros because social justice and public interest demand the resolution pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the
of the constitutionality of the proviso. pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the
dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for
pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable
ISSUE: connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The
law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a
Whether the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional. prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed
marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year
prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not
from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
HELD: substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those
marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified
NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under
for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience
Section 18 of PD 1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving
to avail of pension benefits.
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably
Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies equal the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA
protection of the law. 8291), otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of
1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the
provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
member immediately before the members death is still qualified to
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving
protection of the laws.
spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.

The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent


Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse
within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham
contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited
marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS
period.
law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the
surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
years before the members retirement or death. The law acknowledges
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer
The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to
surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
social legislation.
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.

Wherefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is


A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the
void for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
and equal protection of the law.
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. Republic vs. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo


(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

Page 4 of 36
GR No. 221029; April 24, 2018 Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who
filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating
him to remarry.
FACTS:

Conformably with Navarro, et al. vs. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling,
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married in the Philippines to Yoshino the meaning of the law should be
Minoro, a Japanese national. She divorced Minoro in Japan and a Japanese
court issued the divorce decree dated December 6, 2011.

based on the intent of the lawmakers. In view of the legislative intent


behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo
On January 10, 2012, she filed in the RTC of Dagupan City a petition for as still married to the Japanese national who is no longer married to her.
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Manila, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. She also prayed that
she be allowed to use her maiden surname: Manalo. She claims there is an
imperative need to have the entry of marriage cancelled so that it would
not appear that she is still married to a Japanese national who is no
longer married to her, and so that she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by said entry should she decide to remarry. ISSUE:

The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Dagupan questioned the W/N a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law
caption of the petition and alleges that the proper action should be a after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
petition for recognition and enforcement of judgment; this was judgment against his/her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
admitted by Manalo and accordingly amended the petition.

RTC Ruling: Petition denied.


RULING:

The divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized based


on Article 15 of the New Civil Code. YES, pursuant to Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. However, this case
was remanded to the RTC to allow Manalo to prove the Japanese law on
divorce.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the


status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

CA Ruling: RTC ruling was overturned.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner


is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly

Page 5 of 36
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. The purpose of Par. 2 of Art.26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is
no longer married to the Filipino souse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino souse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country.

[Regardless of who initiates the foreign divorce proceeding, a favorable


decree has the same effect upon the Filipino spouse]

Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or


not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
[Plain-Meaning Rule or Verba Legis Rule] circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
ties to their alien souse are severed by the operation of the latter’s
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
national law.
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino souse is the petitioner or the respondent
in the foreign divorce proceeding. The legislature is presumed to know [Par. 2 of Art.26 violates the Equal Protection
the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statue.
Verbal egis
Clause - Sec. 1 Art. III of the Constitution]
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

The limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce initiated by the


alien souse is unreasonable a
[The spirit of the law and the true intent of the
it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

legislature prevails]
A Filipino married to another Filipino is NOT similarly situated with a
Filipino married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material, and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should NOT be treated
Assuming arguendo that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien
spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do
so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the There are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. Fililpino national who is married to an alien souse has to contend with.
More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino
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against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an following manner: 
alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner. "SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination
for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." 
On the contrary, there is NO real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his/her alien spouse. functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a


recognized college of medicine;
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The x x x 
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Par. 2 of Art
26, both are still married to their foreign spouses who are no longer their (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. The treatment gives undue favor to accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”
one and unjustly discriminate the other.
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to
medical schools: 

The differentiation in Part. 2 of Art. 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in


"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any
obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Arts. 35, 36, 37, and 38 of
completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of
the FC. In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to
Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing
chooses
in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from
establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirementsthat may be deemed admissible.”
4. TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,
1987]
Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes  uniformadmission test called the National Medical Admission Test
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility foradmission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with theschool year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The
Facts:  NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward
upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of
2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from other admissionrequirements as presently called for under existing rules,
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. eligibility foradmission into the medical colleges.
The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Issue: 
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946,
known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. 
Page 7 of 36
TOPIC:  Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022
 
Held:  FACTS:
                Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain recruitment and placement agency.
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools                 Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-
in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was
deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non- She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as
waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the                 Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
general community. An important component of that public order is the Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and
health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing that “she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and
of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy
and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only
whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her,
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general                 On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the
approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the
all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of National Labor Relations Commission finding
protecting the health and safety of the public.  respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of
salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this attorney’s fees
type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the ISSUE:
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted                 Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of
to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by her salary due to illegal dismissal.
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other  
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree HELD:
the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The                 YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent
need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in of respondent’s salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to
ourprofessional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the unexpired term of the employment contract.
the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely                 In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3)
an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
objective of "upgradingthe selection of applicants into [our] medical unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the due process.
country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to                 A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not
the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;
That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who                 The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of No. 10022 in 2010.
the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary Ruling on the constitutional issue
injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.                 In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch
or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner
inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law
that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any
5. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that
vs. is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.                 Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is
G.R. No. 170139               August 5, 2014 inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
  reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
  provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
PONENTE: Leonen
Page 8 of 36
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa and
as to warrant a reverse conclusion. Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these
                The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as nominations and invited resource persons to validate the qualifications
provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to and credentials of the nominees.
equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor
General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel
that would warrant us to revisit the precedent. Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on
                The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents
7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National
8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void Artists. This was subsequently announced to the public by then Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.

6. ALMARIO V. EXEC. SECRETARY (G.R. NO. 189028; JULY 16, 2013) Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be
FACTS:  conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry
into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition,
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that
Proclamation No. 1001and, upon recommendation of the Board of the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the
Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-
category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have
Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National
Artist. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in
Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
into law. It established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name National
(NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the development, Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the
promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or against the
the Filipino cultural heritage. recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.

CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to ISSUE:
promote, develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts,
and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by former President
bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Arroyo?
Award.
HELD: 
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees
were considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 Legal Standing. The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of
names was compiled. a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. They
must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out of the also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some
32 names in the preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer
deliberation was conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel thereby in some indefinite way.
comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the living National Artists.From the 13 names in the In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or
second shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National
Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar- Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on respondents
Alcuaz. Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno. In particular, they will be
denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National
CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President. Artists.
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the
Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office
of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors,
cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Equal Protection. It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-
Page 9 of 36
Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided
of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not to work together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They
make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration
included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated of the National Artist Award. An administrative regulation adopted
differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines
rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the and policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the
Order of National Artists. CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective
statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, are binding upon executive and administrative agencies,including the
Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.
distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown
that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws,
undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, the discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of National
it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and
regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have considered
cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered
be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper
foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA
protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing and the CCP "shall advise the President on the conferment of the Order of
in this case. National Artists." Applying this to the instant case, the former President
could not have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection
Limits of the President's Discretion. The "power to recommend" and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the respective
includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws
essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules
is made." and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and implement
policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the regard will also become meaningless.
President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming
CCP is subject to the President's discretion. respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The grave abuse of discretion.
Presidents power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws.
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of
the laws by the President
7. League of cities v. comelec
The President's discretion in the conferment of the Order of National
Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully Facts:
execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009
as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of
connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
executive issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.
Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No.
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood
7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973
bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during
constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists Awards Committee and
the 11th Congress.
tasked it to "administer the conferment of the category of National Artist"
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives
upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the rules to
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the
guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists".
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the
Page 10 of 36
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population
mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as herein.
follows: (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
Republic Act No. 9009. is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign (c) The average annual income shall include the income
them. accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood transfers, and non-recurring income.
Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government valid classification under the following conditions:
Code. 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the
the Constitution and the equal protection clause law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions
Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal
only; and
protection clause
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the
Ratio: same class.
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
in the local government code and subject to approval by a even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government C. Underinclusiveness argument and inverse equal protection
units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.
The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
8. De Guzman vs Comelec
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
FACTS:
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a
order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996".
it has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold
million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it
election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or
has either of the following requisites:
subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred
city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission
(100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
to a new station outside the original congressional district.
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the reassigned to different stations by the COMELEC.
National Statistics Office.

Page 11 of 36
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to
violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege
because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission
COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is
municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from
substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the
therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives,
provision of law under attack. COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The
respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is
based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection
clause. 
ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection


clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. 

HELD:

No. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate
election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore
people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
clause of the Constitution. the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
adhere to a policy of all or none". the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is
classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is
addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that set aside insofar
the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently
served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by
breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA
8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized 9.1 TITLE: Philippine Judges Association vs Prado
representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say
that without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the CRUZ, J .:
registration of voters can hardly be carried out.

The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of


RA 8189. FACTS:

The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and
9. Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado Case Digest the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the
Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado  lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the
227 SCRA 703 constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 (see ISSUE for the grounds stated by the
petitioners).
G.R. No. 105371

November 11, 1993


ISSUE:

Page 12 of 36
WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds: * "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry
1) its *title embraces more than one subject and does not express its and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
purposes;
** Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary. All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except
those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts
Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue
the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and
HELD: that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as
may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not
required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the
title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the D. Doctrine of relative constitutionality
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or
the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional 10. CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. BANGKO SENTRAL
requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing clause which includes the NG PILIPINAS, GR No. 148208, 2004-12-15
withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject Facts:
of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central
required to be briefly expressed in its title. Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for
prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the President, to restrain respondents from... further implementing the last
mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose unconstitutional.
an entirely new provision. The court also added that said the bill in Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage
Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification by Senate President surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an
and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was then presented to integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development
and approved by President the President. Under the doctrine of program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its... own system
separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An enrolled Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however,
bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall
into the petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative under salary grade 19 and below shall be in... accordance with the rates
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.
such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an
unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1)
3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction Standardization Law (SSL)
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and
that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt
franking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem of the class)
respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the Respondent BSP, in its comment,[10] contends that the provision does
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional
government. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial same law, such as "fiscal and... administrative autonomy of BSP," and the
distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of
management."
Therefore, Sec 35 of RA 7345 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Issues:
-----------------------

Page 13 of 36
whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . superficial,[56] but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
denied the equal protection of... the laws." distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and
the seven other GFIs.
Ruling: In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the
UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID. economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the benefit specifically withheld from the lower... grades. Officers of the BSP
exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the
address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate... rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP
against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of rank-and-file employees are paid the... strictly regimented rates of the SSL
treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education
and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher
not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in... the legislative sense. [19] compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority,
HE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL if not all, the rank-and-file... employees consist of people whose status
OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real
VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
THE policy of the
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the
exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity quality of life for all."[108] Any act of Congress that runs counter to this...
out of the challenged proviso. constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and- can pass muster.
file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically Principles:
denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does
petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL objects upon which different rules shall operate
in 2000![39 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section against inequality, that every man, woman... and child should be affected
15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing... the proviso alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and- not identity of rights. The Constitution... does not require that things
file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its either in the object to which it... is directed or by the territory within
operation, so as practically to make... unjust distinctions between persons which it is to operate.
who are without differences.[ Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality [15] The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.[16] If the
cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and groupings are... characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It... fails to appreciate that what is differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each another.[17] The classification must also be germane to the purpose of
law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same... class.[
unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable
other doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
GFI... n the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the [21] An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to
exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the be within constitutional... limitations.[22] To justify the nullification of a
seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the... anomaly of

Page 14 of 36
a doubtful and equivocal breach.[23]... he concept of relative threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement. He
constitutionality. removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined She wept and cried out for help but those were useless since nobody was
by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the there. She didn’t report the incident at first because of Arzadon’s threats
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to but then she found out she’s preggy so she eventually filed the complaint
one set of facts and invalid in its application to... another.[24] for rape.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of
altered circumstances.[25] Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a
former adjudication, is... open to inquiry and investigation in the light of AAA failed to appear for the 4 consecutive orders to take the witness
changed conditions.[26] stand in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Because of this, dismissed the Case for
of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes lack of probable cause. He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the
in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban[29] upheld the constitutionality of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
moratorium... law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by cause “to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
the State of its police power[30] - but also ruled that the continued oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and
oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the... country's business,
industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its
continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine
oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:[31] the complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence
C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the
determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute documentary evidence and transcript of stenographic notes may
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its sufficiently establish this.   
operation. Though the law itself be fair on... its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment that the finding of
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
probable cause by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or
their rights, the denial of... equal justice is still within the prohibition of
obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring petitioner and her
the Constitution.
witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause.

 
IV. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ISSUE: WON Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in


A. General considerations
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause

1. AAA v. Carbonell; June 8, 2007; YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:


HELD: YES.

Soliven v. Makasiar: The constitutional provision does not mandatorily


require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
FACTS:
witnesses.  Instead, he may opt to: 1)personally evaluate the report and
Feb. 28, 2001 to Aug.16, 2001: AAA worked as a secretary at the Arzadon supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or 2) he may
Automotive and Car Service Center. He Boss Arzadon is the accused. disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses.  ->
May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m.: Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to
an office located at another building but when she returned to their office,
the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed. But she still went
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge
in to get her handbag.
is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor.  

On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a
pipe. He told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he
In this case, Judge Carbonell dismissed the case without taking into
Page 15 of 36
consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES–
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the LAUD– Petitioner Respondent
panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department
of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against Nature of the case: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are
Arzadon.  Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support the Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated October 17,
thereof. Respondent judge’s finding of lack of probable cause was 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding
premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the
FACTS
judicial determination of probable cause. 
PNP, through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto Fajardo, applied with
 
the Manila-RTC for a warrant to search three caves located inside the
Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in
alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called
her Sinumpaang Salaysay. and Complaint-Affidavit .  She attended several
"Davao Death Squad" may be found. In support of the application, a
clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case.  The
certain Ernesto Avasola was presented to the RTC and testified therein
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on October 11,
that he personally witnessed the killing of six persons in December 2005.
2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and
Judge William Simon Peralta, acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-
the specific time and place of the incident.  She also claimed that she bore
RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus,
a child as a result of the rape and, in support of her contentions,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was later enforced by the
presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence.  In contrast,
elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The
Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of all
search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the
defenses.
presence of human remains.
 

After a careful examination of the records, the SC found that there is


Herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud, filed an Urgent Motion
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. 
to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the
ground that, among others, the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue
Search Warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City. Manila-RTC
Thus, respondent Judge committed GAD in the dismissal. for lack of granted the motion. The People filed a petition for certiorari which the CA
probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to granted. Laud moved for reconsideration, but was later denied. Hence,
take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient this petition.
basis on record to support a finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary
ISSUE/S
for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and her
witnesses.  Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioner’s absences in the 1. Whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta
scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407— NO.
case.  In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the
same.    2. Whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant
despite non-compliance with the compelling reasons requirement
  under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court—YES.

Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. 3. Whether the requirements of probable cause and particular
description were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule
under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated—YES.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.   RATIO

1. NO. While the Court does agree that the imposition of said
administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s
2. LAUD v. PEOPLE GR No. 199032 authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the
abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the
Date: November 19, 2014 invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge
Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto
PER CURIAM officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.

Page 16 of 36
warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the
above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an exception to
The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that
that third persons cannot always investigate the right of one a search warrant is being applied for in connection with a special
assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have a right to criminal case as above-classified already presumes the existence of a
assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be
such. Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with.
color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed
valid insofar as the public – as distinguished from the officer in
question – is concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for 3. YES. In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account
protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally
official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
being lawful officers. part of the group that buried the victims.

2. YES. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less
requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special criminal than evidence which would justify conviction. In light of the
cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These special criminal foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the
cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, existence of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations length of time" attended the search warrant’s appliycation from the
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual crime’s commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of
Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As
and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a
Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for such cases may be criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable
filed by "the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by
National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of
"personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As in ordinary the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal
search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe therein case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s
the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein.
as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of these In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not
physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are
authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue the warrants,
if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the
jurisdiction of the said courts." constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of
"the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." A
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, community. Any designation or description known to the locality
PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
searched and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in requirement. Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with
his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant the foregoing standard since it particularly describes the place to be
which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside the searched, namely, the three (3) caves located inside the Laud
territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC. Compound.

Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule
criminal case" excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which,
under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on search to note, was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot

Page 17 of 36
warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against
offense. Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers
only for one specific offense – that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises
counts – it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
Court had been violated. properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
RULING journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011
profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the
and the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
G.R. SP. No. 113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Notes
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
 Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that “[t]he warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an
administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically
operate to divest him of his position as such.”
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
 (Rule 126) SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be
corporations and
filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following: x x x
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within
the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced. x x x Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of
 Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution: he right of the constitution and the Rules of court by:
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of be seized;
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
seized.
 Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court: Requisites for issuing (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases
search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon filed against the petitioner;
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be (5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW


The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in
3. STONEHILL V. DIOKNO    G.R. No. L-19550    June 19, 1967 accordance with law; The defects of said warrants were cured by
petitioners consent; and in any event, the effects are admissible
regardless of the irregularity.

FACTS: The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
However, by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar
as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.

Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were
alleged to have committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” ISSUE:

Page 18 of 36
WON the search warrant issued is valid. Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that
the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

HELD:

4. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion

NO the search warrant is invalid. May 19, 1999

Nature: Petition for certiorari and prohibition

The SC ruled in favor of petitioners. Ponente: Panganiban, J.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and FACTS:
seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for (1) the
nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March
23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 104, of Quezon City;  and (2) the issuance of temporary
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B.
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with IS No. 95-167
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied


In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.

1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the


As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its]
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the
sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. described;

2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law
to take possession and bring to the described properties
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy,
of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C.
Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without Asuncion issued the contested search warrant.
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives.
to all business transactions of petitioners regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal.

Page 19 of 36
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared
petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash"  before the trial court. Subsequently, before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the
they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of
"Motion to Suppress Evidence."  On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the introducing Witness Bacolod.
first contested Order which denied petitioners' motions.  On August 3,
1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying The trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions,
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod. Obviously, His
Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this
practice in this language:

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may procedure and attach them to
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared order that the Judge may be able to properly
NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on determine the existence or non-existence of the
October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
costs. giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false.

Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him


RATIO:
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed
that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject
firearms. This, however, does not meet the requirement that a witness
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.
and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid
down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Particularity of the Place to Be Searched

In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the


Constitution to be searched only to those described in the warrant.  Thus,
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is this Court has held that "this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and only under stringent procedural safeguards."  Additionally, the requisite
the things to be seized.( Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court) of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at
least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description
will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the
magistrate that the described items are to be found in particular place.
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing place with particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the
for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the
place to be searched was not described with particularity. Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence

Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution


and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials
No Personal Examination of the Witnesses seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." As the
Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence
Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported
was "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
against unreasonable searches and seizures."  Verily, they are the "fruits
Moriro, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements
of the poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional
of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod
Page 20 of 36
right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual until after they had been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means evidence means of of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible
coercing evidence . . .." that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a ―plain view
of the items from his vantage point in the sala. In sum, the circumstances
attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the ―plain
view doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized
5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO 411 SCRA 81 (2003) items. The things belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the
warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be ordered
A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of returned to him. Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals
appelant Benny Go in search of evidence for the violation of Republic Act and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been certified to
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the Comprehensive be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack Go, son of not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State
the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the to be disposed of according to law. Moreover, the various bankbooks and
time they then called on two barangay kagawad to act as witnesses on the passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the
said search. They then seized properties and objects even those which instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
were not included in the warrant. When they were almost finished with party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an
their search Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
was made to sign the inventory receipt. Based on the evidence taken from by third parties.
the search Go was charged for violation of R.A. 6425. Upon hearing,
testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the prosecution
against Go. However, the two witnesses questioned the validity of some of 6. People vs. CA
the evidence presented such as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal G.R. No. 117412.  December 8, 2000
drugs said to have been seized from the search. The Regional Trial Court
Facts: On August 13, 1992, operatives of the PNP-Special
of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense charged. On appeal, Go
Investigation Service Command (PNP-CISC) were conducting a
assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search surveillance of suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine
performed by the raiding team and the admissibility of the evidence Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City. Among their targeted
taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties seized that suspects was private respondent Valentino “Toto” Ortiz. Spotting the
were not included in the search warrant. latter alighting from his Cherokee jeep and noting that he had a
suspiciously bulging pants pocket, the police officers immediately
moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was frisked and yielded an
unlicensed .25 caliber “Raven” automatic pistol with one magazine
and seven rounds of live .25 caliber ammunition. A search of his
ISSUE:
vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a sealed cellophane packet of
“shabu” from the glove compartment. The police then took private
Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be respondent into custody.
returned to go. Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant
against private respondent for violation of P. D. 1866 of Parañaque.
Supporting the application were the depositions of two police
officers asserting that they had personal knowledge that private
HELD: respondent was keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street,
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, the following
unlicensed firearms: “Baby armalite M-16; Shotgun, 12 g; pistol cal.
It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement
9mm; pistol cal. 45 and with corresponding ammunitions (sic)”. On
that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant commanding
limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly the PNP officers “to make an immediate search at any reasonable
described in the search warrant – to leave the officers of the law with no hour of the day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession”
raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, the personal property subject of the offense described in the
passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and warrant.
Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC team,
stamp pads as ―seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain
accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a brgy.
view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a security officer, went to private respondent’s residence in
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and Parañaque at about 7:30 P.M. of the same date to search said
may be presented as evidence. To be sure, the policemen also filed a premises. Private respondent’s wife and their child’s nanny were
complaint against Go for alleged possession both present during the search, but neither consented to be a
of instruments or implements intended for the commission of falsification witness to the search. The search resulted in the seizure unlicensed
under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis firearms and ammunition. Private respondent’s wife signed a
receipt for the seized firearms and ammunition. A return of search
of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellant‘s residence.
warrant was executed and filed by the police with the issuing court.
The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established

Page 21 of 36
At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state But was the time during which the search was effected “reasonable?”
prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private respondent’s Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a
person and jeep in Makati invalid for violating his constitutional search warrant in the metropolis. We find no reason to declare the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a warrant should be left
prosecutor found the search conducted in Parañaque valid. Private to the discretion of the law enforcement officers. [15] And in judging
respondent moved for reinvestigation alleging that the dismissal of the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may be taken not just of
the charges against him arising from the illegal search and seizure in the realities of law enforcement, but also the prevailing conditions
Makati also applied to the search conducted in his house in in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in
Parañaque. The trial court denied the same. Private respondent a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the
moved for reconsideration and deferral of arraignment, but said residents are still up-and-about. To hold said hour as an
motions were likewise denied. He moved to quash the search unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only hamper law
warrant on the following grounds: (1) that he was not present when enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling
his house was searched since he was then detained at Camp Crame; criminals to conceal their illegal activities by pursuing such
(2) that the search warrant was not shown to his wife; and (3) that activities only at night.
the search was conducted in violation of the witness-to-search rule. The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in
The trial court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. CA also the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public
denied the motion to quash search warrant. He filed with the Court from the abrasiveness of official intrusions. A nighttime search is a
of Appeals for certiorari and prohibition of the order of the trial serious violation of privacy.[18] In the instant case, there is no
court denying his motion to quash search warrant. But promulgated showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an “abrupt
its decision declaring as inadmissible in evidence the firearms and intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark”  or that it caused
ammunition seized in the house of the private respondent. private respondent’s family such prejudice as to make the execution
of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the
Issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that the search could have caused “inconvenience” for private respondent’s
firearms and ammunition seized from private respondent’s house family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures.
are inadmissible as evidence for being the fruits of an illegal search Moreover, no exact time limit can be placed on the duration of a
search.
Held: The CA decision was reversed and the firearms seized in the But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police
house of private respondent was admitted as evidence. officers who conducted the search notwithstanding the absence of
The rule governing the time of service of search warrants private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of his
is Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides: household to act as witnesses to the search?
“Sec. 8. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of
that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the Rule 126, which reads:
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in “Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other premise
of the day or night. shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof
The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application the same locality.”
asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the
searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on aforementioned rule since the searchers were justified in availing of
the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondent’s
firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondent’s wife and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced
residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that by the “Certification of Orderly Search” and the receipt of the
the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of property seized signed by respondent’s wife.
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a We find merit in the petitioner’s argument that private respondent’s
search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness to the search
the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance
statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises
a warrant. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the
the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search to be made “in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age
search “at any reasonable hour of the day or night.” Absent such and discretion residing in the same locality.” There was no
abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed, is irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the
not improper Parañaque court and the barangay security officer to act as
witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful
As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by
Court dated October 1, 1985: law to be witnesses.
“e.  Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the
judge.  The duplicate copy thereof must be given to the person B. Warrantless Searches
against whom the warrant is issued and served.  Both copies of the
warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid
and must direct that it be served in the daytime.  If the judge is
satisfied that the property is in the person or in the place ordered to 7. People vs. Leangsiri
be searched, a direction may be inserted in the warrants that it be
served at any time of the day or night;”
Page 22 of 36
Facts: appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however,
exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's
Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their
bringing into the country approximately more than * kilo of heroin. In his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
arrest, he informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to
deliver to three other people in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. Note:

Immediately, the NARCOM formed a group for a follow up Plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not,
operation in the said Hotel. In the accused’s cooperation, he was allowed searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
to check in to Room 504, where the others will meet him to give the comes across an incriminating object.
drugs.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on
Around 10 pm, Amidu two other co-appellants entered Room the application of the doctrine.
504 and Leagsiri gave them the drugs, before the appellants leave the
room, the NARCOM officers barged in and arrested the appellants. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
Amidu, told the officers that he is staying in Rm 413 and that which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
the two others are in royal Palm Hotel. The officers then went to the room accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification
of Amidu, searching for evidence and subsequently confiscated a whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
telephone address bearing the name of Leangsiri, other possessions and lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
documents of Amidu were also confiscated. unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
In the case of the two other, the police confiscated a suit case legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
and masking tape and empty transparent bag, allegedly will be use in have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to
transporting the drugs. extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.
The appellants were charged and was convicted in conspiring
to transport heroin violative of RA 6425. Hence this petition, alleging that When there is waiver of right or gives his consent
the search is illegal being conducted not in the direct premises of the
arrest. A Valid waiver of right in Sec 2 art III, elements

Issue: (1) The right to be waived is existing

Whether the articles sought in the other room and hotel, (2) The person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive
outside the direct premises of the arrest admissible as evidence?
(3) He or she has actual intention to relinquish the right.
Held:

No. those article are inadmissible as evidence as it was


obtained not in plan view nor within the direct premises of the arrest. 8. Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815

The plain view doctrin applies to OBJECTS OF THE PLAIN


VIEW OF AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE POSITION TO
HAVE THAT VIEW ARE SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND MAYBE PRESENTED Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character
AS EVIDENCE.

Thus, what can be admitted are evidences seized within the


direct premise where the accused has an immediate control which should Republic of the Philippines
only be Rm. 509.

In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the


Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel,
and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and
address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of
vs.
paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against

Page 23 of 36
Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any
weapons either on the person or within the area of his
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondent immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the
petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside
the room where the gun was found; therefore the room where
the gun was found could not be “in his immediate control.”
FACTS: Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are
permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found
during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the
firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a and therefore not incidental.
case of kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and
arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live
ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was
later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right
but to another person. against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the
evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be
used against him.

The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and
searched (without a search warrant) in the boarding house of his
children. They pointed their guns on him and tied him and pulled him 8.1 JERRY VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the room September 3, 2009
exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the
petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum G.R. No. 164815
Receipt.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: A petition for review on certiorari involving


Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential the decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the RTC
Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial of Quezon City in finding the petitioner-accused Jerry Valeroso liable of
number 52315 without securing the necessary license/permit. The illegal possession of firearm.
petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be
reconsidered. FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged
before the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE/S: On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly
issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping
for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in
Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found
ammunition has merit and valid tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms
and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed
to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

HELD/DECISION:

1. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as


follows: A person who was arrested lawfully may be searched so
that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may
be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the
officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also
to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused.
Page 24 of 36
The defense on the other hand contended that Valeroso was search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is
arrested and searched in the boarding house of his children in New Era usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
Quezon City. He was aroused from his slumber when four heavily armed against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
men in civilian clothes bolted the room. The pointed their guns on him incriminating object.
and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside,
searched and ransacked the room. Moments later an operative came out Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of
of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. Adrian Yuson, an Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant of
occupant to the adjacent room testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a
testified that the firearm with live ammunition was issued to Jerry prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they
Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt. would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in
this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject
The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the RTC. On firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Hence this petition. Valeroso.
Petitioner raised the issue of legalilty of the search and the admissibility
and validity of the evidence obtained as the same was the “fruit of the Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s
poisonous tree”. right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm against him.
and ammunition valid.
Luz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008
Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET 18APR
ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition. [SERENO, J.]

RATIONALE/REASON: From the foregoing narration of facts, we can FACTS: PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal
readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while
without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza invited the Luz to come inside their
under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of sub-station since the place where he flagged down the Luz is almost in
the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to front of the said sub-station. While issuing a citation ticket for violation of
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on
his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any getting something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take
weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it.  Luzo bliged and slowly put out the contents of the
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about
the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1)
any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But under pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said container,
the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza
search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it, and that upon his
concealed areas in that room itself. instruction, the former spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu. Luz was
(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the later charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In the case before
us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have  
been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the
bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest. ISSUE #1: Can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic
violation under the city ordinance, and such arrest lead to a valid search
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under and seizure?
the "plain view doctrine."
HELD #1: NO, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged down
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory reason, arrested.

Page 25 of 36
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may 10. ONGCOMAHADJIHOMARvs.PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary Doctrine 1. TheConstitutionguaranteestherightofthepeopletobesecu
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical effectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.Anyevid
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
shallbeinadmissibleforanypurposeinanyproceeding.Whi
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the timesbenecessarytothepublicwelfare,theexerciseofthisp
belief and impression that submission is necessary.
shouldnotviolatetheconstitutionalrightsofthecitizens.To
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no drugsinevidence,itisindispensabletoascertainwhetheror
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the contrabandwaslawful.
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, 2. Arrestisthetakingofapersonintocustodyinorderthatheor
PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of commissionofanoffense.Itiseffectedbyanactualrestrainto
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
person'svoluntarysubmissiontothecustodyoftheonemak
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
actualforce,manualtouchingofthebody,orphysicalrestrai
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police required. Itisenoughthattherebeanintentiononthepar
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody,
the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, other,andthattherebeanintentonthepartoftheothert
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. impressionthatsubmissionisnecessary.

ISSUE #2: Assuming that Luz was deemed arrested, was there a valid
Facts ● Prosecution’sversion:PO1TanandCA(civilianagent)Tan
warrantless search and seizure that can still produce conviction?
mantheSouthWingofRoxasBoulevardoneAugusteveningi
HELD#2: NO. Even if one were to work under the assumption that Luz
was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and jaywalking.Hewasimmediatelyaccostedandwastoldtouse
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid
arrest were not complied with. ● HomarpickedupsomethingfromthegroundpromptingTan

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the knifeandsoonenough,aplasticsachetwhichtheysuspected
duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the
● Homar’sversion:Heclaimedhewasonhiswayhomethatni
arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons
shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to whenthepolicestoppedandfriskedhimdespitehisrefusala
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against
them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional Theyallegedlyforcedhimtogowiththem,confiscatedhiskit
requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous forallegedpossessionofshabu.
drugs.
● RTC:ConvictedHomarduetopresumptionofregularityinth
[T]here being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thearrestingofficers.
inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes ● CA:AffirmedtheRTCbasedonRule113,Section5(a)1whiche
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
warrantlessarrestispermitted.Homarcommittedjaywalk

Page 26 of 36
arrestwasvalid.

● Thesubsequentfriskingandsearchwereincidenttoalawful 4. Accostvs.Arrest:Thepolicetestifiedthatthey
“accosted”Homarwhenhejaywalked.However,
Likewise,hewascaughtinflagrantedelictoinpossession this isdifferentfromanactualarrestas
contemplatedbytheRulesonwarrantlessarrests.
● Homar’sarguments:Shabuisinadmissiblebecausethe SeeDoctrine3.

anycrimeandnocriminalchargeswerefiledagainsthim.

“whichmayhavebeenusedorconstituteproofinthecommission
5. Noarrestprecededthesearchbecausetheydid
notintendtobringhimundercustodyorrestrain
hadnothingtodowithjaywalking.
his liberty.Thelackofintentwasfurtherproven
bytheabsenceofcriminalchargesagainsthim.
● Respondent’sposition:Non-filingofacriminalcharge
Intent onlycameaftertheyallegedlyconfiscated
theshabu.Theshabuwasnotrecovered
cannolongerquestionhisarrestsincehealreadysubmitted
immediatelyafter theallegedlawfularrestbut
onlyaftertheinitialsearch.

Ratio/Iss W/Ntheprosecutionwasabletoprovealawfulwarrantlessarrest

ues person(NO)–1,2. Intenttoarrestisindispensablebecauseotherwise,anyevidenceobtainedin


violationthereofwillbe inadmissible(LuzvPeople

(1 PoliceallegedthatHomarcommittedjaywalkinginflagrante W/NHomarhadwaivedtheinadmissibilityofthe
) evidenceseizedwhenhesubmittedtothecourt’s
jurisdiction(NO)
prosecutionhastoprovethelegalityofthewarrantless

case,theshabu)willbeinadmissible.

(1) Despitehavingactivelyparticipatedinallthe
(2 Toconstituteavalidinflagrantedelictoarrest,tworequisites
proceedings,thiswaiverdoesnot
)
automaticallycarry withitawaiverofthe
inadmissibilityoftheevidenceseized.
arrestedmustexecuteanovertactindicatingthathehas

attemptingtocommitacrime;and(2)suchovertactisdone (2) Theshabuasevidenceisinadmissibleand


precludesconviction.
thearrestingofficer.

1. Theprosecutionwasnotabletodischarge
Held PetitionerACQUITTED
thisburden,particularlythatHomarwasactually committingacrime.
TheydidnotidentifytheplacewhereHomarallegedlycrossedandthatit
was illegaltocrossthatarea.Hewasalsonotchargedwithjaywalking.
11. Miguel vs People
2. NOTE:Thefilingofacriminalchargeisnot
requiredtoproveavalidwarrantlessarrest
becausethe prosecutionstillhastoprovethe
legalityofthewarrantlessarrest.
Facts:

 An information was filed before the RTC charging Jeffrey


Miguel (petitioner) of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
3. Presumptionofregularity:Thiscannot
penalized under 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous
overcomethepresumptionofinnocenceor
Drugs Act of 2002”
proofofguilt beyondreasonabledoubt.The
 Prosecution alleged that (prosecution version of facts):
accusedstillenjoysthisconstitutionalright
untilprovenotherwiseby theprosecution.

Page 27 of 36
o Around 12:45 am of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan  CA Ruling
operative of Brgy. San Antonio Village, Makati, o CA affirmed conviction
named Reynaldo Bahoyo was doing his rounds when o It held that search made on petitioner was valid as it
he received a report of a man showing off his private was done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his
parts at Kaong Street! private parts on public
o Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark o As such, said marijuana is admissible in evidence
Velasquez then went to said street and saw a visible and sufficient to convict him for the crime charged
intoxicated person, which they later identified as  Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence
petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts the petition to the SC
while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty  Petitioner argues that the search and arrest was illegal and,
lot thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from him is
o When they asked petitioner where he lived, the inadmissible in evidence
latter answered “Kaong Street”
o Bahoyo then said he lived on the same street but
petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for
an ID, but petitioner failed to produce one
o Velasquez repeated the for an ID, but instead, Issue:
petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of
cigarettes containing one stick and two pieces of Whether or not the there was a valid search incidental to a lawful
rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves warrantless arrest
o This prompted the Bantay Bayans to seize the items,
take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as
well as the items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo
Ruling:
o SPO3 Castillo then inventoried the items, and
prepared a request for qualitative examination of
 NO
the rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug
 (First, the Court established that the Bill of Rights apply to
testing
Bantay Bayan operatives)
o Tests confirmed it was marijuana and that petitioner
 The Bantay Bayan operatives are not government agents like
was positive for the presence of Methamphetamine
the PNP or the NBI in charge of law enforcement, but are
but negative for THC-metabolites
civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to assist the
 Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and presented a different version
law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security.
of facts (petitioner version of facts):
The Bill of Rights generally cannot be invoked against the acts
o He was just urinating in from of his workplace when
of private individuals, however, they may be applicable if such
2 Bantay Bayan operatives approached him and
individuals act under the color of a state-related function
asked him where he lived
 In this case, the acts of the Bantay Bayan relating to the
o Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street, they
preservation of peace and order in their respective areas have
frisked him, took away his belongings, and the color of a state-related function. As such, the Bill of Rights
thereafter handcuffed and brought him to the Brgy. may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who arrested
Hall and subsequently searched petitioner.
o He was detained for about an hour before being
taken to the Ospital ng Makati and to another office
where a bald officer questioned him  (Next, the court determined that the arrest and search was NOT
o He was then taken back to the Brgy. Hall where they validly made)
showed him 2 sticks of marijuana joints allegedly  The Bill of Rights provides that evidence obtained from
recovered from him unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
 RTC Ruling evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, being the
o RTC found petitioner guilty for the crime charged proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The law requires that
o They ruled that the Bahoyo and Velasques there first be a lawful arrest first before a search can be made –
conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as petitioner this process cannot be reversed.
was scandalously showing his private parts at the  A lawful arrest may be made without a warrant, provided the
time of his arrest parameters defined in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
o Thus, the incidental search which yielded the seized of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
marijuana was also lawful  In Section 5(a), or in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements must
 Petitioner appealed to the CA concur, namely:

Page 28 of 36
a. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.
indicating that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
b. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the
 Section 5(b), requires that at the time of the arrest, an offense premises of Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and
committed it they began to force their way inside the house. They indicated their
 In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the finding of
fact of the commission of an offense is essential clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves
 On the basis of the testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe covered in newspaper.
that petitioner went out to the street to urinate (note that there
was no CR in his workplace) when the Bantay Bayan operatives
chanced upon him. That latter then approached and
Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his
questioned petitioner, and thereafter went on to search his
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated
person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana.
that he never got the chance to review the purported warrant that Aguilar
 Verily, the prosecution’s claim that petitioner was showing off
and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and
his private parts was belied by the testimonies (important
took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.
note: the Bantay Bayans testified in the cross examination that
petitioner was showing off his private parts while urinating
and turning his back from them. How the hell can you show off
your private parts when you are turning your back and
The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana.
urinating? lol)
Salanguit appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly
 Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on
an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the
NO overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed
 Neither do these circumstances necessitate a “hot pursuit” unnecessary force in executing the warrant.
warrantless arrest as the arresting operatives do not have any
personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed
an offense
 Moreover, if the arrest was made because of the alleged display ISSUES:
of private parts, then the proper charge should have been filed
against him. However, records are bereft of any showing that 1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu
such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge was inadmissible in evidence against him.
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. This strengthens the
view that no prior lawful arrest was made which led to a valid 2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit
search incidental thereto. pursuant to plain view doctrine.
 There must be a lawful arrest FIRST, before a search can be
made, the process cannot be reversed.

HELD:
12. PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were
satisfied.

2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant
and it was not in plain view when it was seized.
FACTS:

Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for
possession/use of shabu, and the second, for possession/use of RATIO:
marijuana.  Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to
search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu 1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu
paraphernalias. He presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover and drug paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did
Page 29 of 36
not indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.
as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug
paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging down of
Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for more than one his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on
specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two “suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,” does not constitute
different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure.
in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what
provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search
and seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit
argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched ISSUE:
with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The against the appellant.
location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on record,
there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.
RULING:

It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police
officers in the case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant.
2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and
thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it
police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The
sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the
marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws,
illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the
provided such searches are made at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like
contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.
as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible
in evidence against Salanguit.
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without
warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was
13. CABALLES vs. CA G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002 Warrantless
probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
Search
present in such a case.
FEBRUARY 21, 2019
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right
FACTS: against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in
this instance is limited to the following instances:
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in
Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger jeep unusually (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
covered with “kakawati” leaves. which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a
vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4)
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5)
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, and appeared inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
nervous.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The
With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires of herein petitioner’s vehicle.They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). When asked kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
where the wires came from, appellant answered that they came from cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.
The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers
The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the
reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to

Page 30 of 36
them, was unusual and uncommon.

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and
is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
constitute “probable cause” as would justify the conduct of a search shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
without a warrant. company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the workplace.  Any officer or employee found positive for use of
Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an implied dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
acquiescence to the warrantless search. ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article
282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on
record are insufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. His guilt can only
be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable search and seizure. (f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
The impugned decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
Rudy Caballes was ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in


14. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. (Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
Laserna v. DDB and PDEA), regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c),
(d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims
that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
FACTS:  In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy,
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons (4) age, and (5) residency.  Beyond these stated qualification
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member
reads as follows: of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify
these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done


by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the (SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
quality of the test results.  x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice
the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory Society (SJS), a  registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous
test which will confirm a positive screening test.  x x x  The following shall Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
be subjected to undergo drug testing: from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on
the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary of drug testing.  For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection
and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee
contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice to the deemed undesirable.  And for a third, a person’s constitutional right
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x; against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

Page 31 of 36
what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in
the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633) provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment,
as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec.
36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the
guarantees. Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the
following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
ISSUE/S: governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the
departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such
an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers.  The
Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”

2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to
equal protection clause? substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The
substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of
Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
HELD: prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose
an additional qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress
CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution. administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress
while paragraphs (f) and (g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause. right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.

RATIO:

1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed 2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c)
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.  To be sure, the right
pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and
be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but may even be necessary if the
chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate
enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.
test.”  Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to

Page 32 of 36
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory
but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons
the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other charged before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses
than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.  The
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and
individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, “suspicionless.”  In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They
Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.  When
and does not merit serious consideration. persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled
out and are impleaded against their will.  The persons thus charged, by
the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case
been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III
unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for to incriminate themselves.
the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C.
Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy   yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the
state’s exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched 15. Jaime dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines
and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of
a government search or intrusion. While every officer and employee in a G.R. No. 200748 | July 23, 2014 | CJ. Sereno | aarci munoz
private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she
may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling
in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be FACTS:
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a
narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be  NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito
subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules Escobido claiming that Ariel Escobido (live-in partner of
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” Corazon and son of Charito) was picked up by police officers
It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the for allegedly selling drugs.
well-being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.  An errand boy gave a number to the complainants. When they
called the number, they were instructed to go to the Gorordo
Police Station.
 In the said police station, they met “James” who demanded
Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. 100,000 (later on lowered to 40,000) in exchange for the
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court release of Ariel.
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons  After the said meeting, the complainants went directly to the
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of NBI wherein the NBI formed an entrapment operation.
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students  The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz through the use
emanates primarily  from the waiver by the students of their right to of mark-money.
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily  Jaime dela Cruz was brought to the forensic laboratory of NBI
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness The test yielded positive for presence of dangerous drugs.
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from
the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

Page 33 of 36
 Based on dela Cruz’ testimony, he was contending that he WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22
refused to the drug examination and requested to call his June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution
laywer but it was denied by the NBI. dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of
 RTC – found dela Cruz guilty of violating Sec. 15 of RA9165; the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE.
ruled that all the elements were present: 1) accused was Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
arrested 2) accused was subjected to drug test 3) confirmatory
test shows that he used a dangerous drug
 CA – affirmed RTC ruling; ruled that extracting urine from
one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence falling outside the
concept of a custodial investigation.

16. LUCAS v LUCAS


June 6, 2011 | Nachura, J. | Petition for Review on Certiorari | Paternity
ISSUE:
and Filiation
PETITIONER: Jesse Lucas
WON the drug test conducted upon Jaime dela Cruz was legal? RESPONDENT: Jesus Lucas

SUMMARY: Jesse Lucas filed a petition to establish filiation with request for DNA testin
Lower court dismissed petition by reason of the motion for the conduct of DNA testing a
HELD: failed to establish a prima facie case. SC held that CA erred in dismissing the petition an
reinstated RTC’s decision wc set the hearing of the petition. SC also said that during the
NO. FIRST, the drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons on the motion for DNA testing, Jesse must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful
DOCTRINE: Ratio 10
acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To make the provision
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that FACTS:
accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. 1. Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing). Jesse narrated that,
his mother, Elsie, migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with Ate
Belen who worked in a nightspot in Manila.
SECOND, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion. We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial 2. On 1 occasion, Elsie got acquainted with Jesus S. Lucas and an
compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases intimate relationship developed bet. the 2. Elsie got pregnant and, on
where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, March 11, 1969, gave birth to Jesse. The name of Jesse’s father was not
that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal stated in his birth certificate.
cause of the arrest. In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine
sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the 3. Elsie later on told Jesse that his father is Jesus. Jesus allegedly
CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of extended financial support to Elsie and Jesse for about 2 years. When the
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was “merely a mechanical relationship of Elsie and Jesus ended, Elsie refused to accept offer of
act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.” support and decided to raise Jesse on her own. While Jesse was growing
up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce him to Jesus, but all attempts
were in vain.

LASTLY, the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy 4. Attached to the petition were the ff: (a) Jesse’s birth cert; (b)
and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that baptismal cert; (c) college diploma, showing that he graduated from SLU
petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He in Baguio with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Cert of Graduation from the
also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in same school; (e) Cert of Recognition from the UP, College of Music; and (f)
exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was clippings of several articles from diff newspapers about Jesse, as a
still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those musical prodigy.
circumstances. Such acts were in violation of Sec 2 and Sec 17 of the 1987
Constitution. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot 5. Jesus was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,
condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel
offense for which the arrest is being made. therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy
of the petition.

6. Jesse filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
DISPOSITIVE: Case – granted.  

Page 34 of 36
7. Unaware of the issuance of the RTC Order, Jesus filed a Special RATIO:
Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not 1. SC emphasized that the assailed TC Orders were orders denying
receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was Jesus’ MTD the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying an MTD
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as is an interlocutory order wc neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he case. As such, the GR is that the denial of an MTD cannot be questioned in
was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; a special civil action for certiorari, wc is a remedy designed to correct
and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can it be the
improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter. subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is
rendered. Also, there’s no GAD on the part of the TC in denying the MTD.
8. After learning of the RTC Order, Jesus filed MR. He averred that the
petition was not in due form and substance because Jesse could not have 2. The grounds for dismissal relied upon by Jesus were (a) the courts
personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons, and
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to establish
him as Jesse’s father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of
acceptability of DNA evidence. action.

9. RTC, acting on Jesus’ MR, dismissed the case citing Herrera v. Alba: 3. On service of summons: The petition to establish illegitimate filiation
there are 4 significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action is an action in rem. By the simple filing of it before the RTC, which
which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subj matter of the petition, the
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. 
putative father and the child. The court opined that Jesse must first
establish these aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and 4. Sufficiency of petition: The petition to establish filiation is sufficient
filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like in substance. It satisfies Sec 1, Rule 8 of RoC, which requires the
blood group test and DNA test results. Court observed that petition did complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate
not show that these procedural aspects were present. facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim.  Jesus, however, contends
that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of
10. Jesse failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his Jesse’s personal knowledge. SC: Such matter is clearly a matter of
mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial
Jesus, and Jesse’s statement as to what his mother told him about his when Jesse presents his evidence.
father was clearly hearsay; (b) the birth cert was not signed by Jesus; and
(c) although Jesse used the surname of Jesus, there was no allegation that 5. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are 4 significant
he was treated as the child of Jesus by the latter or his family. procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to
face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party
Jesse filed MR wc was granted. The court stressed that the petition was is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the
sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
statement of the ultimate facts. The court remarked that the allegation proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
that the statements in the petition were not of Jesse’s personal knowledge
is 6. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such
order has yet been issued by the TC. In fact, the latter has just set the said
case for hearing.
11. matter of evidence. The court also dismissed Jesus’ arguments that
there is no basis for the taking of DNA test noting that the new Rule on 7. At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA
DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts testing w/o corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s
instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to
matter in litigation. supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving
motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other
12. Jesus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA wc ruled in his favor. filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima
Among others, the CA held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
Jesse has failed to establish a prima facie case.
8. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the
ISSUE: WoN a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It
DNA testing order – YES provides the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for
reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary
RULING: Petition GRANTED. laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available

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objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively
and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public.

9. Not surprisingly, Section 41 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely


provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. This does not mean, however, that a DNA
testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established.

10. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order,
there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these
states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under
their Consti (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause
in order to be valid. Hence, the req’t of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause.

11. SC of Louisiana: “Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the


consti prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test. xxx In cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.”

12. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to


protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA


testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish
paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court
may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing

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