SIMPLICIUS

On Aristotle
Physics 1.3-4
This page intentionally left blank
SIMPLICIUS
On Aristotle
Physics 1.3-4

Translated by
Pamela Huby and C.C.W. Taylor

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

 Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway

London New York
WC1B 3DP NY 10018
UK USA

www.bloomsbury.com

Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in 2011

Paperback edition first published 2014

© 2011 by Pamela Huby and C.C.W. Taylor

Pamela Huby and C.C.W. Taylor have asserted their rights under the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Authors of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any
information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the
publishers.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining

from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury
Academic or the author.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-3921-4

PB: 978-1-4725-5792-6
ePDF: 978-1-4725-1531-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Acknowledgements

The present translations have been made possible by generous and

imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment
for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an
independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the
British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society
(UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del
Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis
Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham
College; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown
Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research (NWO/GW); the Ashdown Trust; Dr Victoria
Solomonides, the Cultural Attaché of the Greek Embassy in London.
The editor wishes to thank Mossman Roueché and Catherine
Osborne for their comments, Era Gavrielides for preparing the
volume for press, and Deborah Blake at Duckworth, who has been
the publisher responsible for every volume since the first.

Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain
 Contents

Conventions vi
Abbreviations vii
Textual Emendations viii
Introduction 1

Translation 13
1.3 15
1.4 58

Notes 89
Bibliography 112
English-Greek Glossary 113
Greek-English Index 123
Subject Index 145
Index of Passages 147

v
 Conventions

[}] Square brackets indicate additions to the translation to complete

the sense.
< > Angle brackets indicate additions to the Greek text.

vi
 Abbreviations

DK = H. Diels, rev. W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn,

Berlin, 1951, 3 vols.
FHSG = W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas,
ed. and tr., Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings,
Thought and Influence, Leiden, New York, Köln, 1992, 2 vols (Phi-
losophia Antiqua liv.1-2).
Guthrie = W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge,
1962-81, 6 vols.
KRS = G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philo-
sophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd edn, Cam-
bridge, 1984.
LSJ = H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn, rev.
H.J. Jones and R. McKenzie, with a revised supplement, Oxford,
1996.
RUSCH = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, Eude-
mus of Rhodes, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh and I. Bodnar, 2002.
Wehrli = F. Wehrli, Eudemos von Rhodos, Basel, 1955 (Die Schule des
Aristoteles viii).

vii
 Textual Emendations

106,20-4 We have removed Diels’ brackets and the word hêtis.

108,24 kenoinônêke should be kekoinônêke.
116,1 read de for te.
134,19 Diels prints ei, ‘if’, but notes that it is absent in MS D. In
this quotation from Alexander it seems better to omit it.
150,32 Reading, following Diels, dio kai duskinêtotera hoion gên.
Eti puknotera phêsi instead of the MSS’ dio kai dus-
kinêtoteron ou mên eti puknotera phêsi.
152,24 Reading, following DK, auto gar moi touto theos dokei einai
instead of the MSS’ apo gar moi touto ethos dokei einai.
157,7 Reading, following DK, ho de nous, hos aei esti, to karta kai
nun estin hina kai to alla panta instead of the MSS’ ho de
nous hosa esti te karta kai nun estin hina kai ta alla panta.
158,5 Reading, with DK and other editors, threphtheisa instead of
the MSS’ thruphtheisa.
158,13 Reading, with DK and other editors, mathê instead of the
MSS’ methê.
158,18 Reading, following Sextus M. 9.10, atalanton hapantêi in-
stead of the MSS’ atalanton hekaston.
159,2 Reading, with DK and other editors, pêi de ke kêxapoloito
instead of the MSS’ pêi de kai kêrux apoloito.
159,15 Reading, with DK and others, leukon horan kai thermon
hapantêi instead of the MSS’ thermon horan kai lampron
hapantêi.
161,7 Reading, following M.R. Wright, Empedocles, The Extant
Fragments, revised edn, Bristol Classical Press, London and
Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1995, p. 194, hoti sphisi gennai en
orgêi instead of the MSS’ hoti sphisi gennan orga.
162,25-6 Reading, following DK, ei toinun mêden ên instead of the
MSS’ ei tukhoi nun mêden ên or ei tukhê nun mêden ên.
178,34 Following the Aldine edition we insert ou before ta suntheta.

viii
 Introduction
Simplicius
Simplicius came from Cilicia and spent some time in Alexandria, but
eventually went to Athens and was one of the Neoplatonist pagans still
flourishing there in 529, when Justinian II decided to do something
about it and, perhaps, prevented them from continuing to teach in the
Academy. Seven, including Simplicius, went off to Persia, at the invita-
tion of the ruler Chosroes. But it didn’t work out, and they left Persia in
532. It is still uncertain where each of them went, but it is clear from
his later writings that Simplicius at least still had access to a large
library. He remained a pagan, and was hostile to the Alexandrian
commentator Philoponus, who was a Christian, and frequently wrote
against him.
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics Simplicius preserves a large
amount of material from the works of the Presocratics, much of which
is not available to us anywhere else, and also from previous writers like
Eudemus and Adrastus, which are also largely lost. He even quotes from
a lost work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, much of whose other writings has
survived. Simplicius is a careful scholar, and took considerable care to
transcribe the words as he found them in his sources. He was able to record
material from Presocratics like Melissus and Zeno partly from their own
works and partly from Plato, Aristotle, and later commentators.
He is frequently repetitious, and can be obscure, but is also inquisi-
tive, and enquires, for example, whether the dichotomy argument really
belongs to Zeno, or to Parmenides, as Porphyry claimed. At times he
dons a Neoplatonist hat and tries to interpret Plato and Parmenides
through Neoplatonist concepts, but usually he expounds standard Aris-
totelian metaphysics, including the ten categories and the four causes,
although he also makes play with the alien notion of hypostasis. He uses
the system of logic of his time, which includes both Aristotelian and
Stoic elements.
In places his methods are puzzling: thus he raises questions about
Zeno in connexion with what other writers have said, but then says that
he has Zeno’s own words to hand, and he is erratic in his quotations from
Parmenides. All this could be explained on the hypothesis that his
studies were intermittent and conducted in various places.

1
2 Introduction

Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 1.3

Pamela Huby
As has been pointed out, Simplicius had access to a variety of sources,
and frequently acknowledges them. But it is likely that he used Alexan-
der and Porphyry in particular more often than he says. In this volume
he first deals with the Eleatics, especially Parmenides and Melissus,
who argued that being was one. Aristotle criticises both but says that
Melissus is the more tedious. In particular he is guilty of the logical fault
of assuming that if p implies q, not p implies not q, stating that if what
comes to be has a starting-point, what does not come to be does not have
a starting-point.
Simplicius says that Parmenides, on the other hand, had the argu-
ment: ‘What is other than Being is not-Being, what is not then Being is
nothing’ and not adding ‘other than Being is nothing’ which follows, but
‘Being is one’. He then turns to a detailed study of Melissus’ arguments.
Melissus, as reported by Simplicius, used a condensed style: ‘But if there
is something, either it has come to be or it has always existed. If it has
come to be, [it has come] either from what is or from what is not; but it
is not possible either for something to come to be from what is not, nor
from what is. For in this way it would exist and would not come to be.
Therefore Being does not come to be. Therefore it exists forever, and
Being will not be destroyed.’ There follows the error that Aristotle
castigated, and then arguments that Being is infinite, one, unchanging,
and, ultimately, full. Simplicius then spends some time on the logical
aspects of Melissus’ error, and brings in Eudemus’ remark that all that
is actually proved by Melissus is that Being is uncreated.
Aristotle then distinguishes between a starting-point in time and the
starting-point of a thing. A quotation from Theophrastus is supposed to
lend support to the view that some things come about instantaneously.
In addition the heavenly bodies show that some things have always
existed but are finite.
Simplicius tries to understand Melissus, and says that his being is
incorporeal, but that what is perceived has come to be, referring to
Plato’s Timaeus for a similar distinction, and quoting from Eudemus in
support. After a long development he brings back Eudemus, who refines
the notion of infinity by suggesting that time is infinite in the past, but
finite at the present, and that there could be more than one infinite
thing existing together. Alexander added that for Melissus being was
motionless, but that he did away only with spatial motion, but not other
kinds of change. Simplicius disagrees with that and then brings in
the void, which Melissus discussed and rejected. He gives a long
quotation from Melissus about changelessness, which includes not
merely lack of physical change but also freedom from pain and grief.
In connexion with the argument that motion requires a void, Sim-
plicius points to Aristotle’s argument that a thing can move within

2
 Introduction 3
itself without void, like water in a vessel. Since things can be one by
being in the same species, Simplicius considers how this might be. He
suggests that it might be by relation to their matter, but dismisses it,
bringing in Aristotle’s four causes.
Then he notes that being is infinite for Melissus, but finite for
Parmenides. But both say that being is one, and he quotes from Alexan-
der the short statements of both Theophrastus and Eudemus of
Parmenides’ argument, admitting that he himself may not have full
knowledge of Eudemus’ work. He then argues that, just as many things
may be beautiful, so many things may be said to be, and still be many.
He excuses Parmenides on the grounds that the later refinements of
language had not then been worked out. He then quotes from Porphyry,
implying that the latter is not being true to Parmenides in his elabora-
tions, and returns to Aristotle. There follows a brief quotation from an
early part of Parmenides’ poem and then Aristotle’s objection that
Parmenides is treating ‘being’ as having only one meaning, when in fact
many words have more than one meaning. So being can apply in each of
the categories; further even if it applied only to substance, Eudemus
showed with the example of beautiful that even if ‘beautiful’ had only
one meaning there could still be many beautiful things, and the same
would apply to ‘being’, using a similar argument to that of Aristotle
regarding ‘white’. Again, with genus and species, things that are one in
genus or species are still many in number. Further, something may be one
by continuity, but what is continuous can still be several. Even within
‘white’ one can distinguish between the colour and the coloured object, both
of which are called white. A further distinction is made with ‘hypostasis’
which is distinguished from both ‘substrate’ (hupokeimenon) and ‘sub-
stance’ (ousia) (it could be thought of as ‘thing’).
The Megarians are then cited as an extreme example of philosophis-
ing, for thinking that for each word there is a separate entity. Unlike
them, Parmenides was able to describe his One by several terms, still
regarding it as one. Simplicius tries to explain this kind of unity in
Neoplatonist terms, and goes on to refine further by distinguishing
between ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’, and later between accident and that of
which it is an accident. He then quotes, from Porphyry, an extract from
the commentator Adrastus, who says that substrates are the primary
substances of the Categories, and develops this view at length, going on
to analyse sentences and definitions. Simplicius goes on to bring in the
just-existent (Aristotle’s to hoper on) and argue that being is substance
and its substrate, referring to the Categories. Simplicius interprets
Aristotle as saying that Parmenides actually brings in not-being, and
refers to the great kinds of Plato’s Sophist, which set being apart from
the rest.
The text then turns to Aristotle’s argument that being cannot have
size, attacking both Parmenides and Melissus, and Simplicius quotes
Parmenides statement that being is a sphere. Simplicius thinks that

3
4 Introduction
Aristotle is saying that if substance alone exists it will not be divisible,
but says that Alexander thinks that Aristotle is talking about quantity
and substance.
Aristotle then argues that the just-existent is divided into just-exis-
tents, and cannot itself be an accident of anything. Alexander is
supposed, by Simplicius, to be saying that Aristotle said that the
just-existent has size, but Simplicius shows that Aristotle said the
opposite. Later, in a passage that still seems to be based on Alexander,
the division is into the parts of the definition, and the conclusion is that
the whole universe is composed of indivisibles. This refers to one sen-
tence in Aristotle which is best taken as a query: ‘Is the all made up of
indivisibles?’ but which can also be seen as a statement of fact. Sim-
plicius says that Alexander supposed that the all was made up entirely
of substances. Simplicius then lists the arguments set out by Alexander
in a formal way: they are arguments independent of Aristotle and lead
to the conclusion that in no sense of one can being be one.
Simplicius then attacks the view held by the commentator Aspasius
that the just-existent is the genus of existing things, and again uses the
arguments of Alexander. Some of these are puzzling, including the
claim that in some works Aristotle placed the just-existent above genus,
but in general Alexander sticks close to Aristotle’s text. At the end,
however, he refers to works which must be later than those of Aristotle.
The quotation from Eudemus, taken from Alexander, which follows is
puzzling, but seems to mean that Eudemus denied that Parmenides
could have referred to genus as a universal.
Aristotle says that as a result of the arguments of the Eleatics, some
said that not-being existed, others that there were indivisible lines.
Simplicius explains that the latter are replying to the dichotomy argu-
ment of Zeno, who wanted to help Parmenides by showing that the
supposition that there were many things had equally ludicrous implica-
tions. Then he quotes Alexander’s account of what Plato meant in the
Sophist, and follows that with a different account by Porphyry, who,
referring to the Timaeus as well, says that Plato distinguished be-
tween form and matter, and the latter is something that does not
exist. Simplicius replies to Alexander by quoting from the Sophist to
show that Plato was bringing in not the absolute not-being, but some
not-being.
Alexander attributes the dichotomy argument to Zeno, and says that
Xenocrates accepted it and so invented indivisible lines. Simplicius has
some doubts about whether it was Zeno’s, and says that Alexander took
the idea that it was from Eudemus. Simplicius concludes that Zeno was
arguing on both sides, and puzzlingly quotes from Zeno’s own book, after
not appearing to know it. He then says that Porphyry attributed the
argument to Parmenides, and gives a detailed argument, going on to
Xenocrates and his indivisible lines. After more indecision about the
matter he again quotes from Zeno’s own work, giving several arguments

4
 Introduction 5
from it, but thinking that they are aimed at doing away with the many
not supporting the one.
Simplicius then introduces the distinction between actual and possible
infinity, and quotes an important passage from Porphyry on this subject.
Xenocrates may have wanted only to say that actual slicing to infinity was
impossible, so that something unsliced would always remain.
Simplicius returns to Parmenides, quoting at length from his poem
and arguing that he had a being that was uncreated and indestructible,
incorporeal, unmoving and the first cause, interpreting it in Neoplaton-
ist terms as at the highest level in which all is united. He also defends
Parmenides’ language as being poetic, and applies some of his terms to
the soul and the intellect. Finally he tries to show that both Plato and
Aristotle were sympathetic to Parmenides.

Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 1.4

C.C.W. Taylor
In chapter 4 Aristotle begins his discussion of previous views of the
principles of nature, beginning with those who think that there is a
single physical principle. The opening section of the chapter, down to
187a21, is devoted to these physical monists. Aristotle distinguishes two
forms of monism, one identifying the physical principle with either fire,
air, or water or with some other stuff intermediate between one or other
of those three elements on a scale of rarity and density, the other
identifying the principle as a mixture of opposites (probably undifferen-
tiated between properties and stuffs); in the former theory non-basic
stuffs are formed from the basic by the processes of condensation and
rarefaction, in the latter they are separated out from the primal mix-
ture. Density and rarity being opposites, mention of them allows Aris-
totle to digress in comparing physical monism with Plato’s theory that
the elements of reality are unity and the opposition of the great and the
small, the difference being that for Plato the great and small plays the
role of matter which is given form by unity, whereas for the physical
monists the opposites are differentiae which give specific form to the
primitive matter.
Simplicius’ commentary on this section follows the order of Aristotle’s
exposition, his chief contributions being the addition of factual detail on
earlier philosophers and criticism of rival commentators. He provides
names (omitted by Aristotle) of theorists who maintained the primacy
of each of the three elements (149,7-8), and then engages in a debate
with other commentators on the identity of the proponent or proponents
of the intermediate theory. Alexander attributes it to Anaximander
(149,11-13), Porphyry, following Nicolaus of Damascus, to Diogenes of
Apollonia (149,13-18). Simplicius disagrees with both; Anaximander
held the mixture theory (150,22-3), while Diogenes identified the prin-
ciple with air (149,7-8). In passing Simplicius criticises Porphyry for

5
6 Introduction
describing Anaximander as treating the basic substrate not as a mix-
ture, but ‘in an undifferentiated way’ as a simple stuff, i.e. presumably
treating it as something simple without saying what kind of thing it is.
That is incompatible with Aristotle’s testimony that Anaximander gen-
erated the non-basic things by extraction (149,13-27). Simplicius does
not himself (any more than Aristotle) name any proponent of the
intermediate theory (nor has subsequent scholarship identified any
particular candidate for that honour, see the relevant note in Ross 1936,
pp. 482-3). In the digression on Plato, in addition to elucidating Aris-
totle’s remark that Plato treated the great and small opposition as
matter (150,4-11), Simplicius offers his own suggestion that Plato may
have meant that in itself matter has no size, and is therefore small, but
is also the cause of all dimensions, and is therefore large (150,15-18). He
takes the opportunity of adding some further information on Plato’s
views, including the information from Alexander and others that the
great and small, otherwise known as the indefinite dyad, and the one
were the principles of the Forms (151,6-11), but urges in his own person
that Plato could not have treated the great and small as matter, on the
ground that in the Timaeus space, which Simplicius identifies, wrongly,
with matter, belongs to the physical world, whereas the great and small
are principles of the intelligible Forms (151,12-19).
The debate mentioned above on the nature of the theory to be
ascribed to Diogenes of Apollonia provides Simplicius with the pretext
to quote extensively from the latter’s On Nature (151,31-153,22). These
passages establish beyond doubt that Diogenes followed Anaximenes in
identifying the basic stuff as air.
At 187a21 Aristotle moves on to consider those who say that the
principles are both one and many, citing Anaxagoras and Empedocles by
name. The section on both is a mere five lines (187a21-6), in which Aristotle
says only that while both separate things out from a mixture, they differ
in that (a) Empedocles places that process in an eternal cycle of mixing and
separation, whereas Anaxagoras believes in a single original separation,
and (b) Anaxagoras’ elements are an infinite number of natural stuffs and
opposites, Empedocles’ are the four elements, earth, air, fire and water.
With this preamble Aristotle then goes on to the examination and critique
of Anaxagoras which occupies the remainder of the chapter.
Simplicius elaborates this preamble in several ways. He raises ques-
tions about the sense in which the principles of Empedocles and
Anaxagoras are one and many. Is it the elements which are many, and the
organising principle (Mind for Anaxagoras, Love and Strife for Empedo-
cles) one, or is it rather in each case the mixture of elements which is one?
(154,9-14). He quotes Theophrastus in support of the latter suggestion in
the case of Anaxagoras (154,14-23), and takes up a hint in a comment of
Alexander’s to suggest that Empedocles’ theory affords a place for oppo-
sites no less central than does that of Anaxagoras (155,1-20). He quotes
extensively, chiefly from Anaxagoras (155-7) but also from Empedocles

6
 Introduction 7
(158-61), partly to support his own suggestion that both accept a Pla-
tonic account of reality in which the physical world is a representation
of an eternal, intelligible world of archetypes (157,5-24, 160,22-6).
Aristotle prefaces his critique of Anaxagoras with an account of the
principles underlying his theory (187a26-b7). These are (a) nothing
comes into being from not-being (which Aristotle describes as a belief
common to [sc. all] natural philosophers), and (b) opposites come into
being from their opposites. Further, he says, Anaxagoras observed that
everything comes into being from everything (which must presumably
be understood as ‘anything comes into being from anything’). On the
basis of these principles Anaxagoras concluded that everything must
already be present in everything; i.e. every portion of any stuff contains
portions of every stuff, imperceptible because of their smallness. Aris-
totle adds that according to Anaxagoras things derived their perceptible
character from their predominant microscopic ingredients. (It has to be
said that Aristotle’s identification of Anaxagoras’ principles is too sche-
matic to show why his conclusion might seem to follow. Thus from
‘Nothing comes into being from not-being’ and ‘Opposites come into
being from their opposites’ all that seems to follow is that if something
F comes to be, it must have come to be from something not-F.
Anaxagoras’ principle is the stronger one that if something F comes to
be (e.g. something hot) it must have come to be from something which
was itself F. And that is certainly not a principle common to all natural
philosophers.) Simplicius does not offer any criticism of Aristotle’s
statement of Anaxagoras’ principles, accepting his account of ‘nothing
comes into being from not-being’ as a common axiom, and illustrating it
by citations from Parmenides and Melissus (161,23-163,8). Regarding
the second principle, that opposites come into being from their oppo-
sites, Simplicius seems to suggest that rather than concluding, as
Anaxagoras is reported by Aristotle as having done, that all opposites
are already present in their opposites, he should have said that oppo-
sites are present together with their opposites, either by juxtaposition
or by mixture (163,35-164,2). In this instance, unusually, instead of
expanding on Aristotle’s elucidation, he seems to be objecting to the
doctrine which Aristotle is elucidating.
The rest of Aristotle’s chapter, 187b7-188a18, is taken up with seven
arguments against Anaxagoras’ theory, with a final sentence comparing
Anaxagoras unfavourably with Empedocles on grounds of redundancy.
I provide a paraphrase of each argument (in italics) in order, followed in
each case by a summary of Simplicius’ comment.

I (187b7-13) The infinite is as such unknowable, both quantita-

tively and qualitatively. But Anaxagoras’ elements are infinite both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Therefore what is composed of
them is unknowable, for what is composed of unknowables is
unknowable.

7
8 Introduction
Simplicius first gives a brief summary of Anaxagoras’ principal doc-
trines, illustrated by quotations (164,11-165,5), before turning to Aris-
totle’s criticisms. He begins by reporting a disagreement between
Porphyry and Alexander on the identification of Aristotle’s target:
Porphyry says the argument is directed against all those, including the
atomists, who say that the elements are infinite in any respect, whether
in number (as the atomists hold that there are infinitely many atoms),
size (they hold that the void is infinite in extent) or in diversity
(Anaxagoras says that the homoiomeries are infinitely diverse in kind),
while Alexander says that it is aimed at Anaxagoras alone (165,8-
166,6). Simplicius sides with Alexander (166,7-12), on the ground that
his interpretation gives a better argument; since the atomists, unlike
Anaxagoras, hold that the atoms are all of the same kind, they are not
vulnerable to the argument that the elements, and hence the things
composed of them are unknowable both quantitatively (it is impossible
to say how many there are) and qualitatively (it is impossible to say, i.e.
to specify completely, what kinds of things they are).
Simplicius argues that since Anaxagoras holds that Mind knows all
the elements, his thesis that the elements are infinite in number and
diversity must mean that they are beyond the capacity of human beings
to count and describe, not that they are literally infinite in number and
diversity (165,30-166,2). He does not discuss the possibility that an
infinite mind could comprehend an infinite number of things of infi-
nitely diverse kinds.

II (187b13-21) If the parts of a thing can be arbitrarily big or small,

the thing of which they are parts can be arbitrarily big or small.
But since it is impossible for a plant or animal to be arbitrarily big
or small, it is impossible for their parts, such as flesh or bone or
fruit, to be arbitrarily big or small.

In elucidating Aristotle’s argument Simplicius distinguishes between

theoretical division, which goes on to infinity, and division into actual
constituents. Considered purely as a mathematical quantity, any
amount of any stuff is theoretically (in Aristotelian terms potentially)
divisible ad infinitum. But since there is a minimum size for any actual
member of a natural kind, including any actual amount of a natural
stuff, division into actual constituents has a limit (167,12-26).
In our text, and in Simplicius’, Aristotle gives fruit as his example of
the parts of a plant. Alexander, according to Simplicius, interprets ‘fruit’
as ‘seed’, on the ground that elsewhere in the text Aristotle says that
seed is one of the parts of a plant (167,30-168,1). (Since that statement
is neither in our text nor in that read by Simplicius this, together with
other small variations cited by the latter, is evidence that at this point
Alexander’s text differed from both.) As the conclusion of this section
Simplicius proposes on behalf of Anaxagoras a defence against argument

8
 Introduction 9
II, and then rebuts the defence (168,25-169,2). Both defence and rebut-
tal are obscure; for a suggested interpretation see the translation, n. 73.

III (187b22-34) Given that every finite body is exhausted by the

repeated abstraction of a finite body, the assumption that every-
thing is contained in everything leads to absurdity. E.g. the
repeated extraction of quantities of flesh from a quantity of water
either comes to an end, or goes on to infinity. If the former, when it
comes to an end the water will contain no more flesh, so it is not the
case that everything is contained in everything. If the latter, the
infinitely many extractions produce infinitely many equal quanti-
ties of flesh, contained within a finite quantity of water, which is
impossible.

Simplicius begins by setting out the argument as above, stating that

on the interpretation of Alexander (and Themistius) it assumes a pre-
miss of argument II, namely that there is a minimum actual amount of
any natural stuff (169,5-24). He then suggests that the argument does
not have to assume that premiss, apparently thinking that Aristotle
may now be conceding to Anaxagoras ‘in a way’ that there can be
arbitrarily small magnitudes, but still arguing that, even given that
concession, the absurd result follows (169,25-170,7). If that is Sim-
plicius’ interpretation, he does not succeed in making clear what he
thinks Aristotle’s revised argument is. Further, it is clear from Aris-
totle’s text that he does not in fact make the supposed concession (see
translation, n. 80). Simplicius criticises Alexander for describing the
results of infinite extraction as equal finite magnitudes, apparently on
the ground that he is not entitled to the assumption that the magnitudes
are equal (170,7-13). It is true that that assumption presupposes that
there is a minimum amount of any natural stuff, which Simplicius is
suggesting Aristotle may no longer be insisting on. But since Alexander
is explicitly following Aristotle on this point (see 187b33-4), Simplicius
is in effect criticising Aristotle for (allegedly) failing to see an implica-
tion of his own view.

IV (187b35-188a2) Since every body decreases in size when some

part of it is removed, and there is a minimum amount of any
natural stuff, it is impossible to remove anything from a minimum
amount, for then there would be something smaller than the small-
est amount.

Simplicius’ elucidation (171,12-28) is unproblematic. He points out,

correctly, that the assumption that from a minimum amount of any
natural stuff a smaller amount of that stuff is extracted generates a
contradiction.

9
10 Introduction
V (188a2-5) Each natural body would have to contain infinite
separate amounts of natural stuffs such as flesh, blood and brain,
which is absurd.

Simplicius again emphasises that the hypothesis is that the infinite

amounts of different stuffs exist, not merely notionally or potentially,
but as actual constituents (172,11-14). He clearly reads Aristotle’s text
as saying that these stuffs are separate from one another (172,13-20:
see translation, n. 88), interpreting ‘separate’ as both ‘distinct in na-
ture’, and as ‘spatially discrete’. He argues that separate things cannot
be infinite, (a) because separate things limit one another (172,14-16), (b)
because the distance between such things added to the sum of their sizes
produces a total larger than infinity (172,31-173,3). The former argu-
ment arguably, the latter certainly assumes spatial discreteness. He
draws an implication of Anaxagoras’ theory which Aristotle does not
mention; since every stuff contains every stuff, and there is an infinity
of kinds of stuff, not only does every stuff contain infinitely many
constituent stuffs, but every constituent stuff contains infinitely many
constituent stuffs, and so on ad infinitum (172,20-31).
He next cites Alexander as suggesting, as a possible defence of
Anaxagoras, that his theory should be understood as claiming, not that
everything is in everything, but that every perceptible body is a com-
pound of every principle. But Alexander himself blocks this escape route
by pointing out that Anaxagorean theory does not allow for simple princi-
ples. Hence every component of a perceptible body is just as much a
compound as the body itself, so the original objection remains (173,8-28).
Simplicius himself now repeats his suggestion that in describing the
elements as infinite Anaxagoras means no more than that they are
incomprehensible to us, though in themselves finite both in kind and
number. If there were infinitely many elements Mind could not organise
them, and if they were infinitely diverse in kind Mind could not have a
determinate conception of them (173,29-174,18). Simplicius thus pro-
vides Anaxagoras with an escape route from the arguments from
infinity, but concludes this section by bringing some objections against
his account of extraction as the process by which things come to be. He
adduces some phenomena which cannot be adequately accounted for by
extraction, such as the organisation of natural stuffs into individual
organisms. If, as Anaxagoras insists, flesh comes into being by extrac-
tion from a compound containing flesh, how can he avoid conceding that
a horse comes into being by extraction from a compound containing a
horse? (174,19-175,5).

VI (188a5-13) Anaxagoras is right to hold that things can never be

completely separated from one another, though he does not under-
stand why. The reason is that attributes are inseparable from their
subjects. Anaxagoras’ Mind is in the absurd situation of trying to

10
 Introduction 11
separate the inseparable, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Things are qualitatively inseparable because attributes are insepa-
rable from their subjects, and quantitatively inseparable because
there is no smallest magnitude.

After paraphrasing Aristotle’s argument (175,11-21) Simplicius quotes

Eudemus in elaboration of the thesis that attributes are inseparable
from their subjects (175,21-33). He then points out that since
Anaxagoras himself maintains that there is no smallest quantity of
anything and that the elements cannot be separated from one another,
the description of Mind as trying to separate the elements is inaccurate.
Mind separates out discriminable amounts of different stuffs from the
original undifferentiated mixture (these discriminable stuffs them-
selves being mixtures of stuffs in different proportions) (175,33-177,8).

VII (188a13-17) Anaxagoras is wrong about the way homogeneous

stuffs come into being. In one sense a quantity of mud is composed
of smaller quantities of mud, but in another sense it is not [but
rather of earth and water]. And the ways in which bricks come from
a house and a house from bricks are not the same as the ways in
which water and air come from each other.

Simplicius paraphrases Aristotle’s argument, emphasising the central

point that Anaxagoras cannot admit the generation of a stuff such as
flesh from a combination of elements none of which is flesh (177,20-
178,8) He records Alexander as suggesting the possibility of a variant
reading of 188a13-14 (178,8-11: see translation, n. 105).
Aristotle concludes by remarking (188a17-18) that Empedocles’ the-
ory is superior to that of Anaxagoras in having fewer elements, i.e. a
finite number, [instead of infinitely many]. After paraphrasing (178,14-
28), Simplicius repeats his suggestion that Anaxagoras does not hold
that the elements are infinitely many, but merely that they are uncount-
able by us (178,28-30). He then suggests (against the clear evidence of
the texts) that for Anaxagoras the only elements are the opposites such
as hot and cold, wet and dry. On that supposition his elements would be
more genuinely elemental than those of Empedocles, since earth, air,
fire and water can be analysed as different combinations of hot, cold, wet
and dry (178,33-179,12). He concludes (179,12-19) by saying that matter
and form are more basic elements than those of either Empedocles or
Anaxagoras.

11
This page intentionally left blank
 Simplicius
On Aristotle Physics 1.3-4

Translation
This page intentionally left blank
 Simplicius On Aristotle
Physics 1.3-4

1.3, translated by Pamela Huby

186a4-13 To those who follow this way it seems impossible that 102,16
existing things should be one, and from what they [i.e. Par-
menides and Melissus] add in support of their conclusion it is
not difficult to refute, for both argue sophistically, both Melissus
and Parmenides, for they adopt false [premises] and their argu-
ments are invalid; but Melissus is more tedious and
unprovoking; having started with a single absurdity the rest
follow. That is not difficult. It is clear then that Melissus argues
illogically, for he thinks that it has been accepted that if every-
thing that comes to be has a starting-point,1 then also what does
not come to be does not have one.2
Aiming at the complete destruction of the hypothesis, so that it may 20
not seem that it is refuted [just] through the feebleness of its support-
ing arguments, he [i.e. Aristotle] goes on further to refute also the
arguments on which those who argued that Being3 is one relied, not
guaranteeing that belief4 by these means, but persuading those de-
termined by his arguments to feel uncertain about that hypothesis.
For if, both, he overturns the belief, and, the arguments which 25
supported it are refuted, it remains unquestionably [true] that the
opposing view will be strengthened. For if there be a primary demo-
lition of [some of] the opposing views, this becomes per accidens the
defence of their opposites; hence when the statement that Being is
one is destroyed, [the position] that it is many is established. And in
this way it did not escape the notice of Socrates that Zeno’s argument,
through showing that many absurd things follow those who say that
the things that exist are many, helps Parmenides, who says that 30
Being is one.5 But he [i.e. Aristotle] says that it is not difficult to refute
the arguments, because he will show both that the premises are false 103,1
and that the figures used in the combinations are not valid. He finds
more fault with the argument of Melissus, as has been said earlier,
either because, as well as the rest, he also says that Being is infinite,
or because he too both seems to adopt false premises, and to put them
together invalidly, when he says that if what comes to be has a
starting-point, what does not come to be does not have a starting 5
point, when in negating the consequent he ought to say ‘what does
not have a starting-point has not come to be’. For in this way the
 16 Translation
second mood6 of hypothetical syllogisms is completed. Parmenides
puts the premises in order, and adds to the premises not the deducible
conclusion but a different one when he says: ‘what is other than Being
10 is not-Being, what is not Being7 is nothing’ and not adding ‘other than
Being is nothing’ which follows, but ‘Being, then, is one’. But these
things will be tested later on.
Let us now look at the argument of Melissus,8 which he [i.e.
Aristotle] earlier opposed. For Melissus used the axioms of the natu-
15 ral philosophers, and began his writing on coming to be and passing
away thus:9 ‘If there is nothing, what could be said about that as if it
were existent? But if there is something, either it has come to be or it
has always existed. But if it has come to be, [it has come] either from
what is or from what is not; but it is not possible either for something
to come to be from what is not (nor for something else which is
nothing, and much less what exists absolutely), nor from what is. For
in this way it would exist and would not come to be. Therefore Being
20 does not come to be. Therefore it exists forever, and Being will not be
destroyed. For neither is Being able to change into not-Being (for this
too is agreed by the natural philosophers) nor into Being. For in that
case it would still remain and not be destroyed. Neither therefore has
Being come to be nor will it be destroyed: it always has been, there-
fore, and [always] will be. But since what comes to be has a
25 starting-point, what does not come to be does not have a starting-
point, and Being has not come to be, it would not have a
starting-point.10 Again, what is destroyed has an end. But if some-
thing cannot be destroyed, it does not have an end. But what has
neither a starting-point nor an end is11 infinite. Therefore Being is
infinite. And if it is infinite, it is one. For if it were two, they could not
[both] be infinites, but they would have limits towards one another.
30 But Being is infinite: therefore existing things would not be more
than one. Therefore Being is one. But if it is one, it is also unchanging.
For what is one is always like itself. But what is like [itself] would
104,1 neither be destroyed nor would it become larger nor would it change
its shape nor does it feel pain or grief. For if it underwent any of these,
it would not be one thing. For what undergoes any type of alteration12
is changed from one thing and into another. But there was nothing
other beside the one and so this will not be altered. And, by another
5 route, nothing is empty of Being. For the empty is nothing. The nothing
therefore would not exist. Therefore Being is not altered. For it has
nowhere to go to since the empty does not exist. But also it cannot
contract into itself. For in this way it would be rarer and denser than
itself. But that is impossible. For the rare cannot be equally as full as
the dense. But in fact the rare is emptier than the dense. But the
10 empty does not exist. And we ought to judge whether Being is full or
not by whether it receives another [thing] the same [as itself] or not.
For if it does not receive [anything], it is full. But if it were to receive
 Translation 17
something, it is not full. If then it is not empty, it must of necessity
be full. And if that is so, it does not change,13 not because it cannot
change because it is full, as we say of bodies, but because total Being
cannot either be changed14 into Being (for there is nothing beside it), 15
nor into not-being. For not-being does not exist.’
This much then is enough from Melissus with regard to Aristotle’s
refutation. His premises, speaking shortly, are like this: ‘Being has
not come to be. What has not come to be has no starting-point, since
what has come to be has a starting-point. What does not have a
starting-point is infinite. The infinite could not be second alongside
another, but [must be] one. And the one and infinite is unchanging.’ 20
Among these [arguments] he [i.e. Aristotle] first criticises the first
statement which says that if what comes to be has a starting-point,
what does not come to be does not have a starting-point. And in this
he first criticises it for being invalid, and then he finds fault with the
falsity of its premises. For in a syllogism a fault in the figure is greater
than one in the premises. An indication of this is that from a faulty
figure there never comes a syllogism, but it can come from false 25
premises, if they only agree to assume [for example]: ‘man is winged;
the winged is a laughing thing: therefore man is a laughing thing’. So
he [i.e. Aristotle] found fault, because the result was invalid, with the
fact that the sequence of the premises was the reverse of what it
should have been. For ‘what has not come to be does not have a
starting-point’ does not follow from ‘what has come to be has a
starting-point’, but ‘what does not have a starting-point has not come 30
to be’ does. For in hypotheticals the sequence by conversion is valid
when, taking the opposite of the consequent, we conclude to the
opposite of the antecedent. For the converse of the proposition which 105,1
says: ‘If it is a man, it is also an animal’ is ‘if it is not an animal, it is
also not a man’; the first, therefore the second, but not ‘if it is not a
man, it is also not an animal’. So also in the argument of Melissus,
the sequence would have been valid if, taking the opposite of the
consequent ‘what does not have a starting-point’, we were to add the
opposite of the antecedent ‘it has not come to be’. And the whole thing 5
would have been like this: ‘If what has come to be has a starting-point,
what does not have a starting-point has not come to be’: the first,
therefore the second. But this would have been of no use to Melissus.
For if there were added the premise which says: ‘but Being has not
come to be’ the whole syllogism will be: ‘Being has not come to be;
what does not have a starting-point has not come to be’.15 And it will
be in the second figure, but the combination will not be valid, because 10
even if they were not negations but affirmations by transposition,16
in the second figure there is no necessary conclusion from two prem-
ises of the same form. But Melissus, taking ‘what has not come to be
does not have a starting-point’ and having shown before that Being
has not come to be, for it is not possible for it to come to be either from
 18 Translation
Being or from not-Being, deduced that Being does not have a start-
15 ing-point. But someone may perhaps say that often the conversion
from the antecedent is true, when the antecedent is equivalent to the
consequent. For if man is a rational mortal animal, and if it is not a
man, [then] it is not a rational mortal animal. But with what Melissus
assumed, there does not seem to be equivalence; for even if everything
that comes to be has a starting-point which is limited as to the thing,
20 yet not everything that is limited has come to be, like the sun and the
moon and the heaven.
Eudemus,17 however, says that even through these premises18
nothing else is proved except what was there originally, that Being is
uncreated,19 for the valid conversion is: ‘what does not have a start-
ing-point is uncreated, and Being does not have a starting-point’. But
it is said [by him] like this: ‘it is not the case that if what has come to
be has a starting-point, what has not come to be does not have a
25 starting-point; rather, what does not have a starting-point is un-
created. For it is in this way that the sequence of the negations comes
about. So Being becomes uncreated for him. For it does not have a
starting-point.’

186a13-16 Then this too is absurd, that there is a starting-point

of everything, as a thing, and not merely of time, and of coming-
to-be not simply, but also of qualitative change,20 as if change
30 does not [ever] happen instantaneously.
Having shown that the combination is invalid, he [i.e. Aristotle] then
attacks the premises as being false, criticising the hypothetical
[premise] ‘what has come to be has a starting-point’, assuming it as
106,1 true with regard to time, but changing it [to being false] with regard
to a starting-point of the thing, and [charging it with] being a sophis-
try from the homonymy. For it is necessary, if one takes the starting-
point with regard to time as belonging to everything that comes to be,
about which Melissus made his argument, to keep this in the proof;
5 but he took the starting-point with regard to the thing instead of that
[with regard to time], as is clear from his adding to ‘what does not
have a starting-point’ that it is infinite. For one kind of starting-point
is spoken of as equivalent to cause, like what acts, i.e. the source of
alteration,21 and the ‘from which’, i.e. matter, and as the form, i.e. the
account of substance, and in addition to these the ‘for the sake of
which’, i.e. the purpose.22 In another sense starting-point is spoken of
10 as of size, and this we also call limit. And if anything has this we call
it limited. But if anything were supposed not to have it, we say it is
infinite. And in this sense the point is the starting-point of the line,
the line of the plane, and this of the solid. And [it is also spoken of as]
the parts first in order, like heart or head or root. For it is limited also
by these. In another sense the starting-point is spoken of as that of
 Translation 19
the coming-to-be of each thing in time, being the time itself at which 15
it first began to come to be, which is not easy to define because of the
infinite divisibility of time. There are other senses in which ‘starting-
point’ is used. But these are enough for the present.23
With regard to what is commonly said to have come to be, every-
thing has its starting-point from which it began to come about in time,
which is also the starting-point of its coming to be, but not everything
has its starting-point regarding the thing, but some come about as 20
substance, and their coming to be, is said to be simple because they
come about in themselves, whereas things that come about in the
other categories are not said to come to be simply. Thus Socrates is
said to come to be himself in himself, but heat is not said to come to
be in itself, rather it is a body that becomes hot, and air that becomes
illuminated. The things that come to be as substance and their
coming to be have, not only a starting-point in time but also a 25
starting-point from some part of the object, like that of animals from
the navel or the heart, that of plants from the roots, and of the house
from its foundations. And since changing things are also said to have
a starting-point and their coming-to-be is change24 (for white comes
to be from black and hot from cold), with these it is not true that
everything that comes to be has a starting-point with regard to the 30
thing, but some things all together and their parts as a whole begin
to change, as do the things that freeze,25 in which it is not in any
particular part that the change with regard to freezing begins, but as
a whole and at once, and everything advances in it [the freezing] at
once; and the fact that it happens all at once, as I think, does not show
that it is timeless, as Porphyry26 understood it; he tries to argue that 107,1
alteration27 is timeless; but that all the parts [change] simultane-
ously. For freezing and illumination of the air do not happen
timelessly, but they have their beginning in time, at this special part
of time, but all the parts undergo the effect together. Or some part is 5
altered28 at once and is divisible to infinity itself, and is not affected
first in a part, as Aristotle himself too in Book Z of this work will
show, when he says ‘nor is there any part of the thing that has
changed29 which has changed earlier’,30 and he has written this still
more clearly in the last book31: ‘also with any kind of change32; for
even if the thing to be changed is divisible to infinity, the change itself 10
is not for that reason likewise [divisible to infinity], but often it
happens all at once, as with freezing.’
And Theophrastus too, in the first book of his On Motion,33 is
clearly thinking the same on this point.34 He says this: ‘About the
motion35 of the moving thing and the [passive] motion of the thing
that has been moved, one ought to say36 – and this also applies to
bodies and their alteration37 – that not always is the half first but 15
sometimes [it happens] all together.’ For all these reasons it does not
seem to have been a satisfactory assumption that everything that
 20 Translation
comes to be has a starting-point with regard to the thing; so that the
additional assumption which says: ‘but what comes to be has a
starting-point’, is not true, and the proposition that comes from the
conversion, and says: ‘what does not come to be does not have a
20 starting-point’, seems to be faulty, not only in the form of the conver-
sion that comes from the antecedent, but in that it is also false itself,
if again one were to take the starting-point of the thing and not of
time. For the sun and the moon and the heaven and the things in the
heaven and the whole universe itself, which have not come to be in
time, yet do have a starting-point with regard to the thing since they
25 are finite. And Parmenides, declaring that Being has not come to be,
makes it ‘[extend equally from the centre in every direction’.38 What
is limited in this way has a starting-point regarding the thing, so that
both premises are false. And the [syllogistic] figure has been shown
to be invalid.
Aristotle has refuted these well, replying with reference to appear-
30 ances.39 But since Melissus was a clever man, we ought to aim at the
thought of a man like that, resolving the objections that have been
108,1 brought against him. And that he took Being to be incorporeal40 is
clear from his showing that it is motionless and indivisible, because
bodies show clearly that they are mobile and divisible. But for the
perceived and what has dimension he takes that which has come to
be, as does Timaeus in Plato, who says ‘it has come to be; for it is
visible and touchable and has a body’,41 and for the intelligible and
5 what is without parts [he takes] that which does not come to be, as
again Plato says of this: ‘what is that which always exists, and does
not have a coming-to-be?’42 When then he [i.e. Melissus] says that
what has come to be has a starting-point, he is referring to the
perceived and what has dimension, in that what is limited has a
starting-point and a limit. For body is not unlimited. And Eudemus
too adds that even if with some few43 other things that have come to
10 be there are no starting points with regard to the thing, yet with what
Melissus means and supposes, there are. And he writes like this: ‘But
perhaps with a few things there are not starting-points, but with
what he [i.e. Melissus] deals with it is reasonable that there are. So
we must stand aside from this, and must look at the sequence.’44 But
when Melissus adds: ‘What has not come to be does not have a
starting point’ he then says that what truly exists is without parts
15 and has neither starting-point nor end: hence it is also infinite. And
in this way neither of the axioms is taken falsely. For even if altera-
tion45 happens all at once, especially if all the parts are actually
altered together, yet the whole alteration does not come about alto-
gether, but it too has a starting-point and an end. Then, in the
alteration the thing altering is not the whiteness, but the body with
regard to its whiteness. The body which is altering and which is
20 coming to be has a starting-point and a limit in this way, as subject
 Translation 21
to alteration. And that which does not come to be in this sense of the
term has truly been said not to have a starting-point, being without
dimension and without parts. For the heaven and this universe have
many and wonderful things from the Creator,46 but it has also at least
a share of body. Hence it has parts, and a starting-point and an end.
But Aristotle also agrees that Being had not come to be, and welcomes 25
the teaching itself, and Melissus’ proof about this teaching. And
Eudemus agrees that what simply exists has not come to be, saying:
‘It is well to agree that the whole of what there is47 did not come to be
all at once, since it is not possible for it to come to be out of what does
not exist; but it is of course reasonable that many things come to be
and pass away in parts, and we see that’. And in this way the 30
premises have been taken truly and the conversion of equivalents is
not prevented from occurring with the antecedent; as when we say ‘If
it is a man, it is also a rational animal and mortal’, and ‘if it is not a 109,1
man, neither is it a rational mortal animal’.
If then being created is equally true with having a starting-point
and an end, it is no different from the conversion of the antecedent.48
For being uncreated is also equivalent to not having a starting-point,
and the example of the heaven and in general the eternal bodies does
not impede us. For these are uncreated not as partless, but as not 5
having come to be from the starting-point of time.49
And Melissus is criticised for the fact that, since arkhê50 has
several senses, he takes, instead of beginning with regard to time,
which is appropriate to what has come to be, that with regard to the
thing, which does not also belong to the things which alter51 all at
once. But52 it seems that he, even before Aristotle,53 made the fine 10
suggestion that every body, even that which is eternal, being limited,
has a limited beginning in time. But because of the continuous
guiding motion of the Controller54 it is always at the beginning, and
exists forever, so that what has a beginning and an end in size has
these things also in time, and vice versa. For what has a beginning 15
and end in time does not all exist at one time. So he bases his proof
from its beginning and end in time. He does not say that what is not
all, that is, what is not whole at the same time, is without beginning
in this way and without end. That belongs to the things that have no
parts and are truly infinite, that is, to what exists absolutely and
most perfectly. For all that belongs to Being. And Melissus speaks of
these matters in this way: ‘When therefore it did not come to be, but 20
exists, it always was and always will be and does not have a beginning
or an end, but is infinite. For if it had come to be, it would have had
a beginning (for it would have begun, if it came to be at some time)
and an end (for it would have had an end if it came to be at some
time)55: but if it did not have either a beginning or an end, and has
always been and always will be, it has neither a beginning nor an end;
for it is not possible for what is not all to exist for ever.’ And it is clear
 22 Translation
25 that the word ‘pote’ (at some time) has a chronological sense; and that
with coming to be he meant ‘has come to be’ in relation to substance,
which until it exists is coming to be, and not Being, is clear from ‘it
would have had an end at some time if it came to be existing’ and from
‘it is not possible for what is not all to exist for ever’, since what
always exists, which is also all, is contrary to what has come to be.
And that just as he says the ‘came to be at some time’ is limited as to
30 substance, so he also means that what always exists is infinite in
substance, he made clear when he said ‘but just as it always exists,
so also its size must always be infinite’. But he does not call what has
dimension size. For he himself shows that Being is not divisible: ‘For
if Being is divisible, it changes.56 But what changes would not be all
altogether’. And he calls the extent (diarma)57 of the substrate size.
110,1 For that he wants Being to be incorporeal he showed when he said ‘If
it were Being, it ought to be one. But being one it ought not to have a
body’. And next he attached being infinite with regard to substance
to the eternal, when he said ‘nothing that has a beginning and an end
is either eternal or infinite, so that what does not have them is
5 infinite.’58 Then from the infinite he argued also to the One, from the
words ‘if it were not one, it would be limited towards something
else’.59 But Eudemus criticised this as being stated imprecisely, when
he [i.e. Eudemus] writes like this: ‘If anyone were to agree that Being
is infinite, why will it also be one? It is not because they are several
that they limit one another in some way. For it seems that past time
is infinite, although it is brought to an end at the present. So perhaps
10 things that were several would not be infinite in every way, but it
seems that they could be towards one another. One ought then to
define in what way they would not be infinite, if they were also
several.’

186a16-18 Then why is it motionless, if it is one? Or just as this

actual part, as a unit, like this water, moves within itself, why
not also the all? Then why would there not be alteration
(alloiôsis)?
‘Melissus, having shown that it is infinite from its having neither
beginning nor end, and from its being infinite that it is one, next
shows also that it is motionless’, as Alexander60 says, ‘from the fact
15 that what moves must move either through something full or through
a void (and in this way there would actually be something else [other
than Being]). But that it is not possible for something to move
through what is full, and that a void cannot be among the things that
exist (for the void is nothing, and if it existed Being would still not be
infinite; for if it were possible for it to change around in itself, it is
clear that it would be larger than itself, but nothing is larger than the
20 infinite)}’61 Alexander wrote these things in his own words like this,
 Translation 23
and [said] that Melissus did away only with spatial motion, and not
other kinds of alteration.62 He gives this account because of Aristotle’s
remark: ‘then why would there not be alteration?’63 But it seems to
me that Melissus is completing what he had said about Being, that it
has not come to be and is eternal and infinite and one and like itself, 25
[and] through these taking away from Being all the other changes
connected with coming to be, and showing first that neither as being
destroyed nor as growing nor as getting smaller nor as being altered
is Being changed, or made different as a whole, which would be
common to growth and alteration. For it would be neither eternal nor 111,1
infinite nor one nor like itself if it underwent these things. Then also
[he said] that there is no void. For the void, not that [empty] of body
but [that] empty of Being, is nothing. Assuming first then that Being
is more,64 that is, the same as full, and, showing that void does not
exist, he concludes that it would not move in space as into another 5
place beside itself, for there is nothing empty of Being into which it
could move, nor into itself. For it was necessary that it would have
become denser from rarer. But it would not be dense and rare. For the
rare has some void, and the void does not exist, neither as a whole nor
especially in it [i.e. Being], because it is more [i.e. full]. And that Being
is more he shows from the fact that it receives nothing else into itself;
for if it did receive [something], there would be a void in Being, and 10
void does not exist.
But that it is not as Alexander understood,65 the proof proceeds in
this way, from the fact that the moving thing must move either
through what is full or through void; but that Being itself ought to be
full Eudemus also shows when he says, ‘In what way is it immobile?
Because it is full; and it is full because what is infinite has no part in 15
void.’ But since it may be archaically,66 but not unclearly, that Melis-
sus actually wrote this, let us set out his archaic words in order that
readers can be more accurate judges of quite relevant explanations.
So Melissus says this, completing what he had said earlier, and
bringing in, in this way, the things about motion. ‘Thus therefore it
is eternal and infinite and one and all alike. And it would neither be
destroyed nor become larger nor would it change its shape nor feel 20
pain or grief. For if it were to undergo any of these things it would not
still be one. For if it were altered, it would be necessary that Being be
not alike, but that the previous Being be destroyed and for what is
not to come to be. If again67 by one hair in a thousand years the all68
were changed, it would be destroyed in the whole of time. But it is
also not possible for it to be disarranged. For the arrangement that 25
existed before is not destroyed, and what was not does not come to be.
When nothing can be added, nor destroyed, nor altered,69 how could
any bit of what exists be rearranged? For if anything became differ-
ent, it would at once also be rearranged. Nor does it suffer pain; for it 112,1
would not all be in pain. For there could not always be a thing in pain,
 24 Translation
and it would not have equal power to a thing in health; nor would it
be like itself, if it were in pain. For it would be in pain if something
were removed or added, and it would not be like itself. Nor could the
5 healthy be affected by pain; for the healthy and the existent would be
destroyed, and the non-existent would come into being. And about
grief it is the same story as about pain. Nor is there any void; for the
void is nothing. Therefore the nothing would not exist. Nor does it
move; for it has nowhere into which to move; but it is full. For if there
were void, it would move into the void. But since there is no void it
10 does not have anywhere to go to. And it would not be dense and rare;
for it is not possible for the rare to be full like the dense, for the rare
is already emptier than the dense. One must decide in this way about
the full and what is not full: if it has room for or receives anything, it
is not full; but if it has no room and does not receive [anything], it is
full. It is necessary therefore for it to be full, if there is no void. If
15 therefore it is full, it does not move.’ These then are the words of
Melissus.
But Aristotle finds fault, first [asking] why it is necessary, if it is
one, for it not to move spatially,70 if even whole things can move71
staying in one and the same place through the interchange of their
parts,72 not needing any void, like this water staying in one and the
20 same vessel and being shaken.73 What then prevents the all, too, from
moving but neither losing74 space nor adding to it, with the parts in
it moving with their mutual interchange, just as the whole sphere
also is seen to be moving around its poles and its axis which stay still,
and [so too] every sphere and cone and cylinder; for a thing can move
in its place and not change from place to place, as has been said. And
25 just as he says a portion of water ‘moves within itself’,75 so what
prevents the whole Being also [doing likewise]? But since Melissus
removed alteration76 also from being one, ‘why’, he [i.e. Aristotle]
says, ‘would there not be alteration’77 of what is one, if it is possible
for that one, staying the same in substance, to exchange one quality
for another at different times, like becoming cold from hot or black
from white, or being ill from being healthy? But it seems that Aris-
30 totle’s terseness78 has often caused the commentators to go wrong.
For when he said, ‘then why would there not be alteration?’79 Alexan-
der explained it like this: ‘as Melissus, through showing that Being
cannot move in a spatial motion, ascribing to it complete immobility’
113,1 (for these are Alexander’s exact words) although Melissus had earlier
done away with the other types of motion even before that of spatial
motion, as the quotation given before shows. As [Aristotle did] about
the One being able to change and alter80 and stay still one in sub-
stance, so now Aristotle met [the difficulty] by taking the ‘one’
5 generally according to common usage (for we say that Socrates stay-
ing one and the same feels pain in his leg and gets relief) and Melissus
takes One more strictly and not more generally, as the other things
 Translation 25
he said show, and not least81: ‘If again by one hair in a thousand years
the all were changed, it would be destroyed in the whole of time’, with
its being necessary, if it is one, to be like itself and eternal in the strict 10
sense. So that if it stayed the same in everything it would not have
anything by which it would receive change.82 For it was necessary for
what was changing and altering in any way to change from one state
to another. And if it were to move spatially by whirling around like
water, if there were no void it must have a circular shape like one that
is spherical or conical or cylindrical. For the other figures83 when 15
whirled around touch different places at different times. And what
has a shape would be limited and not infinite. If something that was
unmoved before were to move in the same place, of necessity the
starting-point of the motion would be some part getting denser or
rarer. And in general revolution is a movement of bodies. And Melis-
sus has shown that Being is bodiless.

186a19-22 But it is not possible for [the contents of the uni- 20

verse] to be one even in species except in their matter84 (some of
the natural philosophers also speak of the one in the latter way,
but not in the former) for man is different from horse in species,
and the opposites from one another.
In the universal85 words there are three separate meanings of the
word ‘one’, that by continuity, that as undivided, and that [as having]
the [same] account, and having shown that by none of these meanings
can Being be one, and having also replied to Melissus’ actual words, 25
in my opinion he [i.e. Aristotle] brings in this common argument that
in general it is not possible for being to be one in species, except in its
‘from which’, that is, except by its material cause. ‘For by this’, as
Alexander explains, ‘it is possible for being to be one in species,86 as
some other of the natural philosophers also said, Thales and Hippo87
speaking of water, Anaximenes of air, and Heraclitus of fire. It is 30
however absurd to say that for that reason these things are one in
species. For if anyone were to say this, that things are one in so far
as all things have come from some one thing and one principle,88 he 114,1
would be giving an account that had also been given by some of the
said natural philosophers; for according to those for whom the origin
of things is one, all things would be one in account, as from one
[origin], but not as they [now] are. For according to this, having
different accounts, and some even opposite [accounts], how would
they be the same as one another? As man and horse, or rational 5
animal and irrational, would be the same in matter, but not the same
in species. It is clear that it is more absurd than that the differences
should be the same that the opposites should be the same.’
It is worthwhile to concentrate on what Alexander is looking at
when he says that it is possible to say that things are one in species
 26 Translation
by their relationship to their matter.89 Surely it is forced, to say ‘the
10 species of the matter’,90 and better to say that in general it is not
possible for something to be one by its species, but if it is, after all,
the case, we must take the ‘one’ by some common feature, like matter
and the ‘from which’, as some of the natural philosophers said. Hence
he [i.e. Aristotle] also added ‘for man is different from horse in species
and opposites [are different] from one another’, speaking of what
applies to each as species, but not the ‘from which’.91 It is clear that if
15 someone were to speak like this of the species as the compound, of
which a compound definition is given, Melissus would not accept that
Being is species. But if it were put in this way, that species is the
matterless and the absolutely simple, perhaps he would accept it. For
there are many things that he ascribed to it [Being]: not having come
to be, immobility, being infinite, and many others. But Melissus
would neither say this, that it is one by the ‘from which’ and the
material, nor as the natural philosophers say (for he says that Being
20 is incorporeal), nor by matter in the strict sense, if he says that
Being does not receive anything nor change in any way, whereas
matter both receives and changes. And again he [i.e. Melissus]
says: ‘there is nothing that is superior to genuine Being’. But
matter is most inferior.

186a22-24 And against Parmenides the same kind of argu-

ments, even if there are some others special [to him]; and the
solution is first that [what he says] is false, and secondly, that
there is not a valid conclusion.
25 Both in the theory and in the defence of the theory some things are
common to Parmenides and to Melissus, but others are special [to one
or the other]. Common in the theory is that Being is one and immo-
bile, special are that Melissus [says that] it is infinite, and Par-
menides that it is finite. Common to their positive arguments are
again that they argue invalidly and that they adopt false premises.
30 But specific are the actual premises which each of them used. For it
was not through the same premises that they both produced their
115,1 proofs. And so some parts of the counter-argument against them will
be produced in the same way, but others in one or another way. For
whatever has been said to destroy generally the claim that Being is
one, these have equally been said against both, as also with both that
the argument is faulty and that each assumes false premises and that
5 the conclusion is not valid. For this too is brought in common towards
a refutation. About the things which are said in reply to the special
premises of each of them, these he [i.e. Aristotle] meets individually
to each, and as they differ in their opinions, the one saying that Being
is infinite and the other [that it is] finite, it is also for this reason
necessary for the opposing arguments to differ.
 Translation 27

186a24-25 [the premise] is false in taking ‘being’ as used in a 10

single sense.
The argument of Parmenides, as Alexander reports, Theophrastus92
sets out like this in the first book of his Research concerning Nature:
‘What is other than Being is not: what is not is nothing: therefore
Being is one’, but Eudemus like this: ‘What is other than Being is not:
but also ‘being’ is used in one sense only: therefore Being is one.’ I
cannot say if Eudemus set this out anywhere else as clearly as this, 15
but in his Physics he wrote the following about Parmenides, and it is
perhaps possible to derive the stated conclusion: ‘Parmenides does
not appear to prove that Being is one, not even if anyone were to agree
with him that “being” is used in only one way, unless as in the “what”
category of each thing, as “man” of men. For when the accounts of
each have been given the account of Being will be one and the same
in all, just as the account of animal in all animals. Just93 as, if all 20
beings were beautiful and there were nothing to be found that was
not beautiful, all things would be beautiful, and yet the beautiful will
not be one but many, (for a colour will be beautiful, and an activity,
and whatever else) and thus also94 all things will be existent, but
[they will not be] one or the same; for water is one thing, and fire
another. Someone might be amazed at Parmenides for following these 25
untrustworthy95 arguments and being deceived by things of this kind,
but these matters had not yet then been clarified (for neither did
anyone refer to “[being spoken of] in many ways”, but Plato was the
first to introduce “in two [ways]”,96 nor [did anyone speak] of the “in
itself” or the accidental).97 But98 it seems that he [i.e. Parmenides] was 116,1
indeed misled by these matters. These things have been studied
through the arguments and counter arguments and the method of
syllogising. For there was no agreement, unless it appeared neces-
sary.99 But our predecessors made claims without proof.’ And having
got so far about Parmenides he [i.e. Eudemus] turned to Anaxagoras. 5
Porphyry100 himself wrote what follows, partly, as I think, from the
words of Parmenides and partly from those of Aristotle, and partly
from what someone wanting to set out the view of Parmenides
persuasively might say. His account is like this: ‘If there is something
other than white, that is not white, and if there is something other
than good, that is not good, and if there is something other than 10
Being, that is not Being. But what is not Being is nothing. Being
therefore alone exists: Being therefore is one. For if existing things
are not one but several, either they will differ from one another in
existence, or in non-existence; but neither would they differ in exist-
ence (for they are alike in actually existing, and like things, as like,
are indistinguishable and are not other [than one another], and what
are not other [than one another] are one), nor in non-existence; for 15
things that differ must first exist, but things that do not exist differ
 28 Translation
in no way from one another; if, therefore, he [i.e. Parmenides] says
that several postulated things are not able to differ and be other than
one another, either by existing or by not existing, it is clear that all
will be one and that will be uncreated and imperishable.’ Aristotle,
however, in what follows, seems to recall Parmenides’ argument in
20 this way: if ‘one’ signifies Being, and the [two parts of the] contradic-
tion cannot hold at the same time, there will be nothing non-existent.
And he [i.e. Parmenides] thinks the same as his predecessors.101 For
if ‘one’ signifies Being, what is other than it does not exist and is
nothing. And if the [parts of the] contradiction, so that the same thing
can be being and not-being at the same time, do not hold together, it
is clear that what is other than Being will not exist, and what does
not exist is nothing.
25 If anyone wants to hear Parmenides himself stating these prem-
ises, the first, saying that ‘What is other than Being is not being and
nothing’, which is the same as the saying that being102 is spoken of in
only one way, you will find it in these lines:

The one, that it is and it cannot not be, is the way103 of persua-
sion, for truth accompanies it,104 the other that it is not and that
30 it is necessary for it not to be, which I declare is a wholly
unconvincing way.105 For neither would you know what is not,
117,1 for it is not possible nor would you tell it.

And that the [parts of the] contradiction are not true at the same time
he [i.e. Parmenides] says in those words with which he criticises those
who bring the contraries together. For in saying: ‘For it is possible to
5 be, and nothing does not exist; that I order you to tell; for I keep you
off this first106 path107 of enquiry’. He adds:

But then from that along which mortals, knowing nothing,

wander108 two-headed; for impossibility in their hearts controls
10 their drifting mind. But others are carried along being both deaf
and blind, however, dazed, confused tribes; by them Being and
not-being are thought to be the same and not the same, and the
path109 of all things turns back on itself.

15 Of this account Aristotle first shows the falsity of the premises, and
then the invalidity of the argument. And the falsity comes from the
fact that he [i.e. Parmenides] takes ‘being’ in only one way, when it is
used in many ways, as many ways as he [i.e. Aristotle] has shown it
is used in the Categories. For the statement: ‘if anything exists other
than Being, that is non-existent’, if ‘Being’ were spoken of in only one
way, it would perhaps have been rightly said. But not with the things
that are said in many ways. Just as if someone were to say: ‘If
20 something exists other than the crab, that is not a crab.’ For we will
 Translation 29
ask about a crab of a different kind. For the crab in the heaven is other
than the crab that lives in water, or the crab of the smith.110 And there
is no impediment to there being a species of crab other than the one
in the heaven. Likewise if there is anything other than what is, i.e.
other than substance, that is not substance, but there is no impedi-
ment to its being quality or quantity, and if there is anything other 25
than quality, it is not quality, but may be quantity or substance. And
so nothing prevents there being many existing things and even Being
itself not to be, but not the opposites.111 For Socrates is a man, but not
a horse, and a substance, but not a quality. And the lemma112 is
absurd for other reasons. For with ‘If anything other than Being
exists, it is not Being’ at the same time they grant that the same thing
may possibly be and not be; but this in the case of what is said to be
‘in itself’ is absurd. If anyone were to produce the first premise113 with 30
‘being’ spoken of in many ways, this will be true, but the one following
it will not be true, the one which says that what is not being is 118,1
nothing; for this is equivalent to ‘what is other than substance is
nothing’ although there are many things which are not substances.
So in this way the premises given by Theophrastus are rejected as
being false, and their combination as invalid, because the following
conclusion drawn was ‘what is other than Being is nothing’. But he
[i.e. Theophrastus] added: ‘Being then is one’. And if one supposes
that ‘what is’ is spoken of in only one way, as Eudemus records, he 5
also takes it as false. For ‘being’ is not [spoken of] as one, at least if
[it is spoken of] in ten ways.114 And then also it is not in this way that
the conclusion is reached that Being is one. And if someone supposes
there is nothing other than substance, nothing prevents there being
substances alone, but that these are many, which Eudemus also
showed through his saying: ‘Nor if anyone were to agree with him 10
that being was spoken of in only one way’, and the following: ‘Just as
if all beings were beautiful and there were nothing to be found that
was not beautiful, all things would be beautiful, and yet the beautiful
will not be one but many, (for a colour will be beautiful and an activity
and whatever else)’,115 and Aristotle showed the same thing with the
case of white116: ‘in this way all things will exist, but they will not be
one and the same’. And the conclusion that says ‘Being therefore is 15
one’ is false, and is not deduced from the assumptions. For even if
‘being’ [is spoken of] in only one way, it is not immediately true that
Being is one. For it is spoken of in one way both in genus and in
species. And many things [are spoken of] in either way. And it will
happen in the case of Eudemus’ example of beautiful, where he says:
‘because all things will be beautiful, still the beautiful will not be one’
in number. For the things that are one in account are not immediately 20
also one in number. But Aristotle brought together the same [i.e.
white] things under white. And if anyone were to say that it is not in
number that being is brought together as one, but in species and in
 30 Translation
genus, he [i.e. Aristotle] immediately agrees that existing things are
many in number. And the things which are one in genus and account
are many. And if they [i.e. Parmenides and Melissus] say that Being
is one in this way, how will they still say that because it is one it is
25 motionless?

186a25-32 and [the argument] is inconclusive, because if only

white things were supposed to exist and if white meant ‘one’
nonetheless the white things would be many and not one. For
the white will be one neither by continuity nor in account. For
being white will be different from being that which has received
white. And there will not be anything separate apart from the
white. For it is not by its being separate but by its existing that
the white [colour] is different from that to which it belongs. But
Parmenides did not yet understand that.
And if someone were to agree with him [i.e. Parmenides], he [i.e.
Aristotle] says, that ‘being’ is spoken of not in many ways but in one
way, so that the premise is true which says ‘what is other than Being
does not exist’, and ‘being means one’, not even so is it the conclusion
that Being is one in number. For the conclusion is: ‘what is other than
30 Being is nothing if it is not one’.117 But if anyone wants to draw the
119,1 opposite conclusion to this, as being derivable from the conclusion,
which is what Parmenides appears to do, since [it is] by conversion
with negation,118 the conclusion will then be: ‘the one then is Being’.
For if the sequence were: ‘what is other than Being, that is, what is
not, is not one’, there arises from the conversion ‘the one then is
Being’, which is different from ‘Being is one or one is Being’119 But he
5 himself [i.e. Aristotle], with the case of white, shows that there is no
conclusion, taking being now as a certain kind of accident, but after
a while as substance, and with each showing that it not possible for
Being to be one. For if white alone existed, and nothing else, with
everything beside white not existing, and what does not exist being
nothing, not even in this way is it shown that the white is one in
10 number, but if, then, it is one, it is so either in genus or in species,
which are actually many. And that it is not one in number he shows
by reminding us of the preceding division of the one of this kind.120
For if it was one in number, it was going to be one as continuous, or
as undivided, or as the same in account. But neither as continuous is
it necessary for it to be one; for white things can be many, and
15 scattered, with these premises laid down. Nor is white one by conti-
nuity, as121 snow, or swan, or white lead, but it has been divided up.
And yet even if someone were to agree that it was continuous, it has
been shown by the division that the continuous is many. And, in
another way, if someone were to agree that white was continuous, it
will not be one in account, for each of the white things taken sepa-
 Translation 31
rately is divided into the substrate, which by sharing in whiteness is
said to be white, and the colour itself which is shared. For this too is 20
called white, and [said] to be white, and the form of whiteness. And
the account will be peculiar to each, the one as subject, as of the swan
that it is this kind of animal, which is whitened, of the other as of a
subject and in a subject, for in both cases it is said by him [i.e.
Aristotle] of the accident that it is a colour discriminatory of sight.122 25
So that white things will be many and the premise, that other than
the white there is nothing, will remain true. For there is a different
account of each, although both are called white. And we need not be
disturbed about being forced, if we say that the accident is something
other in account than the substrate, to grant that the hypostasis123 is
separate from the substrate. For it is not necessary, where the account 30
is different, that these things should also be separated from one
another by the hypostasis. For the things which share a hypostasis
with one another have their own special accounts, and receive their
own impact124 on the soul, like surface and body. For neither is it
because they are separate that they have their own accounts. This, 120,1
he [i.e. Aristotle] says, Parmenides did not yet see, that it is possible
for things that are one in hypostasis to have different accounts and
for that reason to be many.125 And that is not surprising, because the
rules of [using] accounts had not yet been sorted out, but were later
decided upon from things themselves, and so brought in to contribute 5
to greater accuracy. And Eudemus bears witness to this when he
says: ‘Someone might be amazed at Parmenides for following these
untrustworthy126 arguments and being deceived by things of this
kind, but these matters had not yet then been clarified. For neither
did anyone refer to “[being spoken of] in many ways” but Plato was
the first to introduce “in two ways”, nor [did anyone speak of] the “in
itself” or “the accidental”; and it seems that he [i.e. Parmenides] was 10
indeed misled by these points. These have been studied through the
arguments and counter arguments, and the syllogistic <figure>.127
For there was no agreement unless it was seen to be necessary.128 But
our predecessors made claims without proof.’ 129 And because of their
ignorance of these matters the philosophers called Megarians,130
taking as obvious the premise that things that have different ac-
counts are different, and that different things are separate from one
another, appeared to prove that each one is separate from itself. For 15
since there is one account of musical131 Socrates, another of white
Socrates, Socrates himself would actually be separate from himself.
But it is clear that with regard to the substrate, of which he actually
is Socrates, he is the same, but with regard to the accidents he is
different, but also one and many by different aspects. It is clear
however that Parmenides most of all was not ignorant of this distinc- 20
tion, since when speaking of the One he ascribed to it so many
features; for it is ‘whole with a single origin, unmoved, and uncreated’
 32 Translation
and immobile and eternal and undivided and a thousand other
25 things, which through the indeterminate unity of these things attrib-
uted to it were in all respects one, with everything after it having been
determined by the one cause; from them we refer to it the categories
that have been determined. But nowhere did Parmenides bring in the
rule132 itself; for this system of rules did not belong to the limited
vocabulary of the ancients. But Aristotle wanted to show more force-
30 fully, with the hypostasis133 of the same thing, as with the white body,
121,1 that white is many in account, both as substrate and as in substrate.
And yet the name of these is not the same. For the substrate is not
white nor is it so called in itself, except when it is taken with its
whiteness. So that if it is so, there will be the same name in different
accounts, not of the substrate and of what is in the substrate, but of
the two together, because we say that both the active partaker is
5 white, with its partaking, and the colour itself, which is that which is
partaken. But, being more precise, neither is the name of these the
same, if the one is white and the other whiteness, and the one [is] a
thing qualified, the other a quality. For this reason too we define
whiteness as a colour discriminatory of sight, but the white body as
partaking of whiteness. Seeing these things, as it appears, Eudemus
10 was not forced to show the difference between the accounts with the
case of the one [thing] being the same in hypostasis, but he made his
proof with a common element, ‘beautiful’, applying it to many things
differing in account so that all seem to be one in what they share, but
many in their accounts. He wrote like this: ‘Just as if all existing
things were beautiful, and there were nothing to be found that was
not beautiful, all things would be beautiful but the beautiful would
15 not be one but many (for this colour will be beautiful <and this>
activity and whatever else)134 and in this way beings will be many,
but not one nor the same. For water is one thing and fire is another.’
But perhaps Aristotle avoided this kind of proof, because if he sup-
posed that being was one as common, whether as genus or as species
or as a homonymous135 sound, at once he also introduced the many.
20 For what is common is necessarily common to several. Hence, sug-
gesting that it is one in number, since this kind of one is one either as
continuously one, or as the same in account, or as undivided, he
showed that it is not one as continuous, nor as the same in account,
and he omitted to refute the contention that it was undivided, as
being clearly absurd, since the undivided is supposed to have a bodily
25 limit.

186a32-186b12 It is necessary to assume not only that ‘being’

signifies one thing, of which it is stated, but also ‘just-being’ and
‘just-one’.136 For the accident is stated of some substrate, so that
that of which being is an accident will not be. For it is different
 Translation 33
from the existent. There will then be something non-existent.
Indeed the just-existent will not belong to something else. For it
will not be possible for it to be something existing, unless being
signifies many things, in such a way that each is something. But
it has been assumed that being signifies one. If then the just-ex-
istent belongs to nothing, but the other things belong to it, how
can the just-existent signify more being than not-being? For if
the just-existent is also white, and being white is not just-exis-
tent (for neither is it possible for being to belong to it; for what
is not just-existent is nothing existent) therefore the white does
not exist; and not as something not existing, but not existing at
all.137 The just-existent therefore is not existent; for it is true to
say that it is white, and this signified not being. So that white
also signifies just-existent. Being therefore signifies many
things.
It may be that what has been said just now, and these words, are
aimed not only at Parmenides but also at Melissus. For since of
existing things some exist as accidents, others as the substrates in 122,1
which the accidents occur, and these are not the same as one another
but also in a way subcontraries,138 the one existing in itself and the
other having its being in something else, it is necessary to call being
one of these, either the accident or the substrate to this. And so even
at the beginning of his argument against them he says: ‘The most 5
appropriate starting-point of all, since “being” is spoken of in many
ways, is how those who say that all things are one say [it], whether
all things are substance, or quantities, or qualities.’139 Assuming
earlier therefore, through the case of white, that the nature of acci-
dent is being, he showed through this example that it is not possible
for being to be one. For when the accounts are different, these things 10
are different from one another, and not one but many. And the
account of an accident is different from that of that of which it is an
accident, even if they are inseparable from one another. And there
must also be the substrate, if the accident is going to exist. For such
is its nature. And since both exist, being is not one. He [i.e. Aristotle]
has shown this earlier, but he now adds a proof of the same [point]
like this: For if the accident is Being,140 that of which this is an 15
accident will be Being too and will not be Being by the same token.
For to the extent that what happens to it is Being, being different
from Being, it is not Being (for it was only being as accident), and in
reverse, to the extent that being is an accident to it, by this it is being;
for the substrate of something receives the category of its accident
either by the same name or derivatively.141 So we call white that of 20
which white is an accident, just as that of which being is an accident
will be existent. Something then will be being and not-being for the
same reason (for it is so through its substrate), which is absurd. So
 34 Translation
that it is impossible to say that being is accident. And at the same
time it was absurd to reproach famous men in this way: that they did
not know that an accident always brings with itself something else of
25 which it is an accident. One ought therefore to suppose that they
speak of being as that which is properly and most of all Being, and, as
Plato would say, Being itself,142 and Aristotle the just-existent.143 This
for him signifies that which is properly and most of all being, which
he considers to be substance, as subsisting in itself and being the
cause of existence for others. It is not reasonable therefore for them
30 [i.e. Parmenides and Melissus] either to speak of Being as accident or
the One as one, and the conjunction of the two, should anything of
this kind exist, not as an accident of something else, but as existing
itself by itself. But Adrastus,144 wanting to show what ‘just-being’
is,145 is, slightly sidestepped the assumptions; and as what he said is
123,1 useful, and Porphyry actually recorded it,146 I think it better not to
pass them by. He [i.e. Adrastus] says that of all things some are
substrates, and some are the things which belong to them through
their substrate. Properly speaking, the substrates are each of the
primary substances,147 like some particular man like Socrates, or this
5 stone, but more generally everything to which something else is
attributed. For the particular white and the particular knowledge of
letters in themselves are in no way substrates, but they are in a
substrate, the one in this body and the other in this soul. Of sub-
strates, however, they themselves [i.e. the substrates] have an ac-
count, for we attribute to the one white, or colour, and to the other
10 either knowledge of letters or just knowledge. But of all the things
referred to in some way, some are applied to the substrate as belong-
ing and in themselves, and others, in a way, as external and as
accidents. In themselves and as belonging are those that signify the
‘what it is’ and the substance of the subjects, like the definitions, and
what are completive148 of their substance and are taken up in the
definitions, like the genera and the differentiae, and the species
15 themselves and the properties and the things that differ only in
name, as in the case of things that have several names. For in all
these cases each thing in a way is predicated of itself, and synony-
mous with it becomes the category of the substrate which receives the
name, and the account of what is categorised, so that the matter is
and is said to be what is categorised. For Socrates is said to be a
rational mortal animal and what a rational mortal animal is. And
20 again Socrates is described as an animal and is what an animal is,
and what rational is and as a man and what a man is. And white, like
the white of this swan, is said to be white and what white is, and [is
said to be] a colour discriminatory of sight and what a colour discrimi-
natory of sight is. If however white were applied to something else as
25 an accident and by accident, like a garment, this garment will be said
to be white, but not also what white is. For no one would call it a
 Translation 35
colour discriminatory of sight. Nor, similarly, with anything else
among things applied accidentally is it correct to apply ‘just-being’. It
happens that Socrates is snub-nosed and sits or converses and many
other things; but he is said to be snub-nosed, but is not said to be 30
snub-nosedness, nor what snub-nosedness is; for Socrates is not
curvedness in the nose. And if he were called, as it might be,
learned,149 he does not receive the definition of learning. For never
does the substrate receive the definition of the accident, nor is it said
to be what the accident is’.150 I think we ought to understand that 124,1
what partakes of the accident is not what the accident is, because the
learned is not what learning is, and similarly what partakes of the
difference is not what the difference is; for the rational is not what 5
rationality is, and in general what is named from something deriva-
tively is not that from which its name derives. Man, however, is what
animal is, because it is not so-called derivatively. ‘Of accidents’, he
[i.e. Adrastus] says, ‘some are always present in the things of which
they are accidents, like the snubness or the bandiness: others are
sometimes present and sometimes not, like sleeping or walking or 10
whatever can belong to the same thing sometimes and sometimes not;
the substrate receives the definition of none of the accidents, but
neither in the definition of the substrates is there included any of the
accidents. Hence neither is the substrate said to be what the accident
is. For neither is the nose said to be what snubness is, nor is Socrates
said to be what conversing is. However, the substrate is included in
the definitions of permanent accidents, as the nose is in the definition 15
of snubness and the legs in that of bandiness. For snubness is said to
be curvedness in the nose, and bandiness to be curvedness in the legs.
However neither in these is either the substrate what the predicate
is, nor the predicate what the substrate is. Again these things must 20
be defined, that, simply, every sentence is made out of two parts, like
nouns and verbs; for in ‘Socrates converses’ the parts of it are the
‘Socrates’ and the ‘converses’. And likewise the sentence with ‘to be’
and ‘substance’; for this too is completed from the genus and the
differentiae.151 And in each whole sentence are embraced and in-
cluded its parts and again the accounts of these, that is the defini-
tions, but in the parts and the accounts of them the accounts of the 25
wholes are not [included]. Thus in the definition of man, I mean
rational mortal animal, or footed two-footed [animal], (for Aristotle
sets this as the account of man, as being how Plato defined it) there
is the account of animal and of two-footed and likewise with the
others; but in animal and in two-footed or in the definitions of these
there is not existent or included the definition of man. Similar, but 30
not involving a definition, is the sentence which says that Socrates is
walking. And in this whole sentence there is both the account of
Socrates and the account of walking, but in each of these the account
of the whole is not there’ With these things defined, it is clear that if
 36 Translation
Being is one, as the followers of Parmenides152 say, there will be
125,1 nothing else of which this is an accident, but according to what is
predicated of it, it is necessary for this to be called both what Being153
is and what One is, as if Being were being predicated of itself. For if
[it is] not like this, but ‘being’ were to be said of something else as an
5 accident, that will be something other than Being, and for that reason
not-being at the same time as Being: which is absurd. For to be
something and not be the same is impossible. So that if Being is one,
it will also be the just-existent, and will be an accident of nothing. For
it will not [be possible] for Being to be154 to that to which it is an
accident, if it is other than being, unless beings were many in such a
way that they are something other than being, as the accident is other
than the substance. But it is their [i.e. the followers of Parmenides]
10 hypothesis that Being signifies one.155 It remains, therefore, that
substance, rather, and the substrate to the accident, are being in its
proper sense, even if the accident is not; for that is subsequent. For
what is in fact the cause of existence to the rest, that would most be
being; and substance is like that. For all the others are said to be
either of the substrate of substance or in the substrate to it, as we
15 have learned in the Categories.156 But, also, substance in the strict
sense alone is one. Of the rest each is called one as accident, by the
fact that this substance of which it is an accident is one. But it is
impossible for substance to be one. For if what is strictly being, which
we call just-existent, is an accident to nothing else, but to that
something else is an accident, if it is the substrate, in what way does
20 it signify more the being which is just-existent, but not not-being? For
if this being is only the substrate and the just-existent, its accident
will not be being, such as white. If then the just-existent is also white
because white is an accident of it, but the white which is its accident,
which we call being white, that is, whiteness, is not-being, not some-
thing not being, but absolutely not-being (for there is nothing in being
25 which is not the just-existent) then both what shares [in it] and that
to which it is an accident will be strictly not-being; for that of which
not-being is an accident is not-being, just as that of which being is an
accident is being. Substance therefore, or the just-existent, will not
be being simply, and the same [will be] strictly being and strictly
not-being; for what is an accident to the substrate, if the just-existent
were an accident – I mean existing at the same time and not existing
– this itself happens to the just-existent, if it were assumed as
30 substrate: except that to that substrate being belongs through acci-
dent, but not-being through itself, but contrariwise to this, since here
the just-existent is substrate, but there it is taken as accident. If then
these things are impossible, and the just-existent is being as it is
126,1 substrate, it is also necessary that its accident should be being and
the just-existent, if there is nothing else other than the just-existent.
So that ‘being’ signifies several things, and being is not just one but
 Translation 37
also the accidents of substance. And it seems to me that with these
words157 Aristotle shows Parmenides that in wishing to do away with
not-being, and through this supposing that Being is one, since what 5
is other than being is nothing, he not only brings in something
not-being through that supposition, but also shows that Being itself
is not-being. And this has been shown previously by Plato in the
Sophist,158 and that Being is one and is not many. For Being is neither
motion nor rest nor [any] other kinds159 of things. Aristotle,160 how-
ever, will show to those who say that Being is one that [on their 10
supposition] Being is not something not being, but absolute161 not-being.
But in his language it produced considerable lack of clarity when he,
postulating that being was substance, instead showed that it was not
accident, in the words ‘for the accident etc’.162

186b12-b14 Therefore <being, if it is> the just-existent, will

also not have size; for to either the being of the parts will be 15
different.163
Next he shows that one ought not to say that what is one is either
limited or infinite, attacking both Parmenides and Melissus together.
For if Being is one, he says, it will not also have size.164 And if it does
not have size, it is clear that it will be neither limited nor infinite; but
Parmenides seems to have attributed size too to it directly, both from 20
being a whole and having parts, when he says:

Like the mass of a sphere well-rounded on all sides equal from

the middle.165

It is then clear that if it is one it will not have size, if the one is not
many and does not have many,166 but what has size has parts; and 25
what has parts has many and is many, because each of the parts has
a different existence.167 Those things whose existence is different,
they differ from one another and are many. But in this way the
argument seems to be about difference, showing that there are
many.168 But Aristotle seems also to attack with regard to the just-ex-
istent; for he was suggesting now that the one being is substance, and 30
added ‘if it is the just-existent’,169 meaning, I think, nothing else than
that if substance alone exists, it will not be divisible, for what is
divided into several parts has quantity. And seeing that he said ‘for 127,1
either of the parts its being will be different’,170 Alexander171 says it is
more appropriate to understand it not as being about parts of size but
as if both size and substance were two parts of what is– quantity and
substance. But perhaps he said ‘to either’ because what is first put
together from parts ought to have been put together from the mini- 5
mum [number] of parts – from two, therefore and not more. But
perhaps he said ‘either’ as showing that two is a finite number, and
 38 Translation
for that reason clearly indicating a participating in quantity by what
is. But perhaps Aristotle is not bringing this absurdity against them
[i.e. Parmenides and Melissus], as many of the commentators think,
that Being would not have size, although it was said by them to be
10 either infinite or limited (for he was not ignorant that they did not 172
want it to be sizeless and indivisible, and gave a proof), but that if
Being were supposed to be one alone, there will be nothing among
things that exist that has size or is a whole and parts. But this is very
much opposed to what is obvious, because all sensible and natural
things have size.

15 186b14-186b35 It is also clear by reasoning that the just-exis-

tent is divided into some other just-existents, just as, if man is
some just-existent, it is necessary that animal also is some
just-existent, and two-footed. For if they were not some just-ex-
istent, they would be accidents. Either then they would be
accidents to man, or to some other substrate. But that is impos-
sible. For this is said to be an accident, either what can belong
or not belong, or that of which that to which it is an accident,
belongs in its definition [or in which the definition exists to which
it is an accident] (like sitting is a separate thing, but in ‘snub’ the
account of the nose is included, to which [nose] we say that ‘snub’
is an accident); again the things that are in the defining account or
out of which it [i.e. the defining account] is, in their account is not
included the account of the whole, as in the account of two-footed
that of man, or in that of white that of white man. If therefore these
things are like this and two-footed is an accident of man, it must
be separable, so that it would be possible for man not to be
two-footed, or else in the account of two-footed is the account of
man. But that is impossible; for that [i.e. the accident] is in the
account of that [i.e. the subject]. If two-footed and animal are
accidents of another thing, and neither is some just-existent, man
also would be one of the accidents to something else. But let the
just-existent be an accident to nothing, and let both terms and
what comes from them be said of it.
Alexander says that ‘having shown that the accidents are brought
together with the just-existent, he [i.e. Aristotle] now shows that even
if it were granted to them [i.e. Parmenides and Melissus] that the
just-existent alone exists, by the fact that this is strictly Being, and
that accidents exist in a different way, even so Being itself will not be
20 one, but many just-existents; for the division, as of size, which he
recorded, will be into just-existents. And it is also necessary to divide
according to the account into several just-existents, that is, according
to the definition. Having shown then according to size and its division
into parts that being becomes many and dissimilar, if each of the
 Translation 39
parts is different, he finally brings in also the <division> according to
the definition.’173 25
With these words Alexander interprets Aristotle as having shown
that the just-existent has size, although he [i.e. Aristotle] says the
opposite: ‘nor will being have size, if it is the just-existent’.174 Perhaps
then, accepting their hypothesis that Being is one, he removes from
this both its being finite and infinite or like the mass of a sphere 30
well-rounded from the middle175 as Parmenides says. For such things,
being of a size and being divided, are many and not one. And through
the fact that this just-existent, which they suppose to be one, is
divided according to the definition into just-existents, he [i.e. Aris-
totle] shows that it is not one, so as to make inescapable for them from
every direction the refutation potentially argued thus, in accordance 35
with the so-called conversion with negation: ‘if Being is one, it does
not have size, because it is not divided, but if it is divided, as appears 128,1
according to the definition, it is not one’.176 And he [i.e. Aristotle]
demonstrated177 the consequence through size being divided, and that
what is is divided through: ‘that what is is divided into several
just-existents that differ in account is clear’, he says, ‘from the
definition’.178 For as the definition is, so also is what is defined. If then 5
the defining account of man is ‘footed two-footed animal’, the parts of
this, I mean the animal and the footed and the two-footed, are
just-somethings,179 and substance and [are] different in their ac-
counts. For either they are substance or accidents, that is, either in a
substrate or not in a substrate, and there is nothing apart from these.
And if they are accidents, [they are accidents] either of the man 10
himself or of something else. But both are impossible. For if they
happened to the man himself, either they happened to him as sepa-
rate things, like sitting, and sometimes man will not be animal, or not
footed, or not two-footed, which is absurd or as inseparable – an
accident is inseparable when in its account there exists that of which
it is an accident – or snub is an inseparable accident of the nose: hence 15
when we define snubness we include the nose; for snubness is hollow-
ness of the nose. He [i.e. Aristotle] says in the Posterior Analytics180
that these things actually belong in themselves. If then in the account
of animal and footed and two-footed and of the whole of the things
that complete the definition man is not included (for in defining 20
animal we do not include man, but conversely in defining man we do
include animal) it is clear that these things will not exist as insepa-
rable accidents of man. And if these are accidents of something else,
at once there will be several existing things. For that of which they
were accidents would be substance and the just-existent. But he [i.e.
Aristotle] did not lead the argument in this direction, but in that in 25
which he proposed to prove that the just-existent is divided by reason
into just-existents. If then it [i.e. the just-existent] is an accident of
something else, it is clear that the whole completed from these, that
 40 Translation
is, man, will also be an accident of that thing. For if it belongs to
something to be animal and footed and two-footed, it will also belong
to it to be man. But man is substance and the just-existent. And the
just-existent and substance are substrate to nothing that is an acci-
30 dent, so that neither will the things included in the definition be
accidents, but all will be the just-existent. So that if being is divided
into beings, in this way again beings will be many. And if each being
is not many but one, neither will it have size through the conversion
with negation,181 nor will it be either whole or parts. But neither will
it be a definition of something. For neither will the account have
35 parts, but it itself will be indivisible. Then the whole will be made up
of indivisibles which are parts like man and horse and the rest, if none
of these is divisible. And it is clear that the whole itself also is
indivisible both what is and what is spoken of. For neither will the
129,1 indivisibles be many for there is not quantity in the one Being, and if
there were many, what has been put together from them will be
indivisible. For when several points come together they all become
one point, as in fact he [i.e. Aristotle] himself will show. But these
things are absurd. For it is clear, and has been shown, that not only
5 is the whole divisible, but also each of the things that exist. By this it
also seems a fortiori that not only the whole being will be many, but
also every one of all the things [there are].182
But Alexander wants to understand ‘the all then is [made up] of
indivisibles’183 in this way: that [the all is made up] of what are not
accidents, and are not able to be separated from it, and are not things
10 of a different nature, but are of the same [nature] as the all. And the
all and Being are substance, and the parts of it are substances, as if
he had said ‘the all then is [made up] of substances’; it is [made up] of
these, and it is divided into these. Hence the proposition that the
just-existent is divided into just-existents has been proved. So that the
statement that the all is [made up] of indivisibles has been brought in,
15 not as absurd but only as a consequence of what has been said.
This is the whole thought of what has been said.184 As to the words,
when he says: ‘The things that are in the defining account or from
which it is [made up]’,185 he shows that even in those things which do
not have a definition, as in indivisible substances, there are however
some things of which they are composed. And the ‘of which both’ and
20 the ‘let it be said to be [made up] of these’186 either mean that in
general this should be, and be spoken of, as what is made out of the
parts, which in fact is both the parts, if the parts are accidents, and
the whole. Or rather, conversely, that the parts should be called this
which is also that [made out] of the parts. And what was [made out]
of the parts was substance and the just-existent, and existing as the
accident of nothing. And the parts, therefore, are substances and
just-existents and not accidents. But it is also written187 as: ‘of which
25 both and either, and that made from these’, that is, of which both and
 Translation 41
either were said, or each of the parts, of this also that [made] from the
parts should be said. A consequence of this would be: ‘and also man
would be [one] of the accidents’. Among these things he put in: ‘but
let the just-existent be an accident to nothing’.188 In these matters this
too must be added: it is clear that the just-existent being divided now
should be divided neither as genus nor as species, from the fact that 30
man is divided not into atoms, but into the definition.189
But since Alexander brought together the formal arguments on
this topic with great care,190 let us too set them out in the approved 130,1
way, like this, from the beginning of his account:191 [1] ‘those who say
that being is one say that being is spoken of either in many ways or
in only one way. But if in many ways, they agree that existing things
are many (for they are substance and quantity and quality and the
rest into which being is divided), but not one. So [it is] not [spoken of] 5
in many ways. In one way then, according to what is called the fifth
indemonstrable.192 [2] Then the second argument, with the assump-
tion that being said in one way is itself disjunctive like this: the one
being is either substance or accident, according to the twofold division
that occurs in the division of things that exist, into that which is in a
substrate and that which is not in a substrate. But it is not an
accident: it is therefore substance, and this too is deduced according 10
to the fifth indemonstrable. [3] And that the one being is not accident
the third argument shows like this: ‘if being is accident its substrate
exists and does not exist at the same time. But this is impossible.
Therefore being is not accident’ by the second indemonstrable.193 He
proved the consequent from the fact that the substrate to the one and
only being does not exist, because, first, there does not exist another 15
thing other than it (for there was not anything else other than Being)
and, secondly, because being belongs to it, and it itself becomes being.
[4] And also, that substance is not what is strictly being, or as he
himself says, the just-existent, he shows again like this: ‘if substance
is the just-existent, the just-existent signifies no more being than
not-being.194 So that the just-existent will be alike being and not
being. And ‘being’ signifies several things, when it was supposed that
it was one only. But these things are impossible. Therefore substance 20
is not the just-existent’. [5] And that the just-existent is no more being
than not-being he shows like this: ‘If the just-existent is substance
and substrate, and accidents belong to substance, and they are not-
being because they are other than being, and that to which not-being
belongs is not existent, substance and the substrate will be not-being,
and not just any not-being, but wholly not-being. For such was the 25
not-being of the accident that belonged to it [sc. substance]’. [6] And
that the just-existent signifies several things he shows like this: ‘if
the just-existent is substrate, it is possible to name it from an
accident, like white. So that it will also be said to be white, and to be
one, and the just-existent (for there is nothing else other than this),
 42 Translation
and thus what is will be many.’ [7] And also, that the one being will
30 not have size, he shows like this: ‘The just-existent itself as only
substrate is not many, and does not have quantity: what has size is
many: therefore the just-existent will not have size’. [8] And that
131,1 what has size is many he shows in this way: ‘Size has parts: what has
parts has things that are other in account: what has things that are
other in account has many things in itself and is many.’ [9] And at the
end, finally, that the just-existent is divided into just-existents and
things that differ in account, he shows with one [case of] the just-ex-
5 istent, taking its definition and concluding that its parts are
themselves just-existents. He concludes like this: ‘They must be
either substances or accidents: but they are not accidents: sub-
stance,195 therefore’. This too in accordance with the fifth
indemonstrable. If therefore the one, as has been said earlier,196 is one
as being continuous, or as things of which the account is the same, or
as indivisible, and it has been shown that the one being is not able to
10 have size, nor a definition, and is not indivisible, it is clear that
according to none of the meanings of ‘one’ would Being be one.
But since throughout all my exegesis I myself too have treated the
just-existent as substance, and substance as individual and one in
number, but some of the commentators on Aristotle, among whom is
Aspasius,197 take the just-existent as the genus of existing things, and
15 since Alexander of Aphrodisias has spoken adequately against them,
let there be set out in shortened form the things said by him:
‘For some’, he [i.e. Alexander] says, ‘understood his words as if he
[i.e. Aristotle] were saying that it is necessary for those who say that
being is spoken of in only one way to suppose a common genus for all
existing things, to which all the things existing belong as parts, and
20 to say that this is being and so one, since taking none of the things
under being can they still say that being is one by bringing together
with the supposed [one] the others too. For the accidents are brought
together with the substance, and substance with the accidents, as he
showed.198 He [i.e. Alexander] confirmed this account from the [state-
ment] in the Topics that places the just-existent above the genus,
saying ‘man is what animal is’199 instead of ‘in the animal genus’. But
25 that he [i.e. Aristotle] is not speaking like this now of the just-exis-
tent, but [indicates that it] signifies substance, he shows from what
was said before. For even if it is necessary to speak out against this
hypothesis,200 he has already spoken in the words he used: ‘if there
are going to be substance and quantity and quality, and whether
these are separated from one another or not, existing things are
many’.201 For the one who speaks of being as genus supposes that all
30 these things exist. So that it has been said202 against this opinion also,
if indeed it needed any refutation. For he [i.e. Aristotle] seems to
despise an open refutation. For the man who wanted there to be one
thing only as being one in number, would not say that this [kind of
 Translation 43
one] was genus, because genus at once brings in with itself a quantity
of species and individuals. But from what is it clear, someone might
say, that Parmenides spoke of it as one in number?203 It is also clear
from that man [i.e. Aristotle] that he does not speak of the just- 35
existent as genus, but as substance. [1]204 For he shows that it [i.e. the
just-existent] is not accident, from the fact that accident is spoken of 132,1
as in a substrate, so that it itself is not in a substrate, but is a
substrate which is a substance standing by itself and not needing
anything itself for existing.205 But206 genus, it too, is [one] of the things
that are in a substrate. So that the just-existent would not be genus, 5
if what is in a substrate is clearly distinguished from it. [2] Again,
after a little time he [i.e. Aristotle] says: ‘Who understands being
itself except as some just-existent?’207 If then being itself is related not
to genus but to substance, the just-existent would be substance. In
connexion with this it should be said that Plato uses ‘itself’ of the
genera and not of the subgenera, but of what move through all by one 10
common nature.208 [3] Again, if he [i.e. Aristotle] takes the opposite of
the accident, as is clear from [the words] ‘but let the just-existent be
an accident to nothing’,209 the opposite of accident is not genus but
substance, and this would be the just-existent. [4] Again, by a division
he made a contrast, and divided it between accident and the just-ex-
istent.210 For it was not a necessary211 question: what do they call 15
being, accident or genus? For there is something other than these; so
that [it can be divided to include] substance. The just-existent then is
substance. [5] Again, dividing how ‘one’ is spoken of, he selected one
in number. He did not make mention of one in genus or in species, as
obviously bringing in number. [6] Again, genus has two [divisions],
the substantial212 and the common, but substance has to be substance
alone. If then he nowhere speaks against what is common, but only 20
against substance, the just-existent is not genus but substance. [7]
Again, further on, he himself says: ‘If then the just-existent is an
accident of nothing’,213 and some genera are accidents, even if not of
those things of which they are genera, but genera of the accidents are
said to belong to substance, like a colour to a man,214 if then in the
genus there is actually some accident, but in substance there is
nothing like that, and he himself places the just-existent in opposition 25
to accident, he would call the just-existent the substance, not the
genus, which is attached also to the nature of accident. [8] Again,
advancing, he says: ‘If therefore the just-existent is an accident of
nothing, but [other things are accidents] of that’.215 If then that to
which accidents occur is substance, but not genus, the just-existent
would be substance, not genus. [9] Again, dividing the just-existent, 30
he does not divide it into species and individuals, which is the way
genus is divided, but into definition and what are in that, that is, into
genus and differentiae, which would be the way substance is divided,
but not genus. Hence there is a genus of substance, but there is no
 44 Translation
genus above the very highest genus of all. [10] Again, he shows that
genus and differentiae are just-existents because they are parts of the
35 just-existent. If then genus is the just-existent through something
else, it would not be the just-existent itself, but substance [would be
133,1 that], through which the genus of substance is substantiated, as the
[genus of] accident is accident. [11] Again, this216 would have ap-
peared neither to be a mere suggestion nor a paradoxical proposal; for
it seems to many of the philosophers that being is one as genus. [12]
Again, if the just-existent were supposed to be a genus, how is it that
he said that white or any other of the accidents did not exist? For
5 these are species of what is just as substance is as well. But he
himself, taking them as not existing, brought in as also not existing
in the same way the just-existent, to which these belong, and not
existing not as some thing not existing, but as absolutely not existing.
And yet how would the accident be absolutely not existing, if its genus
is the just-existent? [13] Again, if the just-existent is a genus, why
will all the things under it be either not existent or just-existents? For
10 it is not the case that everything under the genus is a genus itself.
[14] Again, ‘For if’, he says, ‘the just-existent is, <the same as>
white’.217 And yet nobody would call the genus white, but we do say
that the substance which shares in it is white. From this it is clear
that he speaks of substance at the individual level, but not at that of
genus. [15] Again, it was very easy to show that existing things are
many by setting out the definition of genus; for the genus is of several
15 things. But he nowhere refers to this clearly when he shows that
there are many existing things, and it is clear that he takes the
just-existent as not being a genus. And if anyone thinks it right for
this reason to say that the just-existent is genus, because in other
works he calls the just-existent the genus,218 it is time for him to call
the just-existent also the differentia. For there he also calls that [sc.
the differentia] the just-existent as completive219 of the just-existent.
20 And in those works, however, in which he calls the genus the just-ex-
istent, as substantially predicated and making that of which it is
predicated what it is, in this way he calls it the just-existent. And
Eudemus, following Aristotle in everything, did not accept that the
just-existent is genus. At any rate speaking about Parmenides in the
first [book] of his Physics he wrote this (as Alexander says; for I have
not found this statement in my Eudemus material):220 ‘He would not
25 mean the common.221 For neither were these matters enquired into
yet, but later on, from the arguments, there was an advance, nor
would there be accepted what he [i.e. Parmenides] says about Being.
For how will this be “equally extending from the centre” and similar
points. But to the heaven, they say, nearly all such arguments are
appropriate.’222
 Translation 45

187a1-11 And some yielded to both points,223 to the one [point], 30

that all things are one, if being signifies one, by saying that
not-being exists, and to the other, from the dichotomy, by creat-
ing indivisible lines. It is obvious that it is not true, if being
signifies one, and it is not possible for both parts of the contra-
diction to be true at the same time, that there will not be
anything non-existent; for nothing prevents not-being, not from
simply existing, but from being something which is not. To say
that if there is nothing else apart from the one, all things will be
one, is absurd. For who understands being itself except as some
just-existent? And if that is so, nothing prevents existing things
from being many, as has been said. So it is clear that it is
impossible for being to be one in this way.
He [i.e. Aristotle] himself, having refuted Parmenides’ argument both
as adopting false premises (the premise was that being is spoken of
in one way only – either ‘There is nothing other than what is’ or ‘What 134,1
is not is nothing’ – for these are equivalent) and as putting them
together in a non-syllogistic way (for the conclusion asserted does not
follow) he says that some yield to both arguments, both that stated
by Parmenides and that stated by Zeno, who wanted to help the
argument of Parmenides against those who tried to mock him on the 5
grounds that if one is many he will be saying224 things both laughable
to reason and self-contradictory. Zeno shows that their hypothesis,
which says that there are many things, involves still more laughable
things than the one [which says] that there is [only] one, if anyone
were to attack it properly. For Zeno himself, in Plato’s Parmenides,225
seems to be a witness to this account. And the statement of Par-
menides is this, that all things are the one Being, if being means one. 10
For other than it there will be nothing. And as Theophrastus pro-
posed: ‘What is other than being is not. What is not is nothing’.226 And
he [i.e. Aristotle] says that some give in to this argument. And to give
in to an argument is to agree to the premises which establish it, or to
the combination. They say that Plato gave in to the premise that says
that what is other than being is not. (For indeed he says in the 15
Sophist227 that motion and rest and same and other are different from
being) but he still does not agree that what is not is nothing. For he
also says that what are different from being, even if they are not
beings, still however exist, and by this he brings in what is not.
And Alexander says that he [i.e. Plato] agrees on the one hand that
Being is one, but he still does not on the other agree that all things
are one, when he assumes that among all things are not only Being 20
but also not-being. ‘And it is not’, he says, ‘in this way that he [i.e.
Plato] said that not-being existed, as being some thing among the
things that are under being. For he was not saying that there was
something not existing and something existing, nor that [it is that]228
 46 Translation
which is included in what is assumed to be, but [it is] that which has
25 another nature other than what was agreed and postulated, when he
accepted that Being was one and was spoken of in only one way. But
agreeing to the premise that other than Being there is nothing, but
saying that there is something other than the being assumed in the
premise, he [i.e. Plato] says that there is a contradiction.229 For,
granting that what is other than being does not exist, he says that on
the contrary what is other than being does exist and falls into the
contradiction by saying that not-being exists simply. If however
someone were to say that not-being exists, but not the simple not-be-
ing, but some not-being, he does not fall into the contradiction. For
30 that which is something other is not other. For it was shown that
being was not one in number through its being taken that it was
spoken of in one way.’ These then are the words of Alexander.
135,1 But Porphyry says that Plato says that not-being also exists, but
in this way, as not being. For he [i.e. Plato] declared that what truly
exists is form, and that is really substance, and that the highest, first,
shapeless and formless matter,230 from which all things come, exists,
but is none of the things that exist. For it, thought of in itself, is
5 potentially all things, but actually nothing. But the thing completed
from the form and the matter, in as far as it partakes of form, to this
extent it is something and is named after the form, but in as far as it
[shares in] the matter, and through this finds itself in continuous flow
and change, on the contrary exists neither simply nor firmly. At any
rate Plato divides them up in the Timaeus231 and says: ‘What always
10 exists, and does not have an origin, and what comes into being, but
never exists’. And when he said that not-being exists, he did not [say
that] Being was not-being, nor that not-being was Being. [These are]
not contraries according to the antithesis. For man cannot also at the
same time be not-man, but it is true that he [can be] not a horse.
15 But in reply to Alexander it is enough to set out the words of
Plato,232 to which Alexander himself referred, which show clearly, I
think, that Plato was bringing in not the absolute not-being, but some
not-being. These words go like this: ‘Do you know then that we have
had doubts about Parmenides’ statement and gone far away from his
prohibition? In what way? Going further than he forbade us to look,
20 by searching forwards we have taught him something. How? Because
he says somewhere:

For never shall this prevail that what are not, are, but you, keep
your thought away from this path233 when enquiring.

Yes, he does say this. But we have shown not only that what are not
are, but have also revealed what kind of thing <not-being>234 is. For
25 having revealed the nature of Other as existing and being scattered
out over all the things there are in relation to one another, opposing
 Translation 47
the part of each thing related to being to it,235 we have been bold
enough to say that this itself is what is genuinely not-being. Let no
one therefore tell us that, having revealed that not-being is the
opposite of being, we dare to say that it is. For we long ago said
goodbye to the question whether there is an opposite to it, whether it 30
is or is not, having an account or being entirely without an account.
But about what we have said about not-being existing, let someone
persuade us by a refutation that we have not argued well, or, to the
extent he cannot, he must also say as we say, that the genera are 136,1
mixed with one another, and Being and Other, going through all
things and one another, and on the one hand the Other, sharing in
Being, has existence through this sharing, not however being that in
which it shares, but other, and being other than Being, necessarily 5
most clearly can be not-being. On the other hand not-being again
sharing in the Other, would be other than the remaining genera. And
being other than all of those it is not each of them, nor all the others
except itself, so that indisputably Being again is not thousands upon
thousands, and the others individually, like this, both in many ways
are everything and in many ways are not’.236
From these words Alexander thought that Plato was introducing 10
the absolute not-being, taking absolute not-being as being genus. It
was enough to hear Plato himself saying: ‘Let no one therefore say of
us, that having revealed that not-being is the opposite of being, we
are bold enough to say [that it is],237 and that ‘each thing exists
through its sharing in Being, but it is not Being’. And before these
words he showed clearly what kind of not-being he was introducing 15
by saying: ‘whenever we speak of not-being, as it seems, we do not
speak of something opposite to being, but of [what is] different
only.’238 It was enough to hear also the words spoken about what was
absolutely not-being and opposed to Being, as Plato dismissed any
argument about it whatsoever. For neither the one saying that it is, 20
nor the one saying that it is not, is free from censure. Nor is saying
anything about it safe. So then these things that I said were suffi-
cient. It is necessary to comprehend that the Being assumed by Plato
is what is studied in accordance with the bare peculiarity of Being
itself, which is set in the division against both the other genera and
not-being. For he says that this too is a genus, but not complete being,
which contains all the genera in itself. To that, complete not-being would 25
be opposed, if it is possible to speak of opposing with regard to it. This
kind of being would not be a genus, if genera are opposed to one another
in a division. And these are circumscribed by one peculiarity, and
distinguished from the intellectual239 union, in which all were one, as
Parmenides said, and descending first into the mental section, divided
undividedly, and then into the sensible portion, and between these into 30
the psychical conjunction. So that it is far from true that Plato intro-
duced the absolute not-being which is opposed to absolute Being.
 48 Translation
And Porphyry observed well that Plato did not introduce absolute
not-being, but that he taught in the Sophist that the created being
137,1 was not Being about which he says in the Timaeus, ‘and what is
coming to be,240 but never Being’, this seems to me to be worthy of
examination. For it is not in the division containing the sensible but
in that of the mental forms that Plato appears to find not-being, for
at some time he would say these things about the enmattered and
5 sensible: ‘What, by Zeus? Shall we easily be persuaded that motion
and life and soul and thought are truly not present in the entirely
existent, and that it does not live or think, but, solemn and holy, not
having mind, it exists staying unmoved?’241 I reply in common to
Alexander and Porphyry that Plato did not as clearly say that some
not-being, which he introduced, existed, as Aristotle alleged in accus-
10 ing him of introducing absolute not-being. And still, however, he [i.e.
Aristotle] would not in these words be objecting to Plato, that he
feared in vain, that if what is other than Being is not, all things are
one, and brought in not-being for this reason. For Plato did not show
that there are many things by bringing in not-being, but he showed
that, after having demonstrated that One is one thing, and Being
15 another, and from its wholeness to be like the mass of a sphere
well-rounded from every direction, and equal from the middle,242 and
<demonstrating >243 not-being and calling the sophist a maker of
images,244 and [saying that] the image has something false, but that
falsity does not exist unless not-being exists. For the liar either says
20 that what is is not, or that what is not is.
These then are about one way out of the difficulty, with Aristotle
neither agreeing that being is spoken of in only one way, nor accept-
ing the proposition saying that what is other than being is not; unless
someone were to say of not-being that it is not substance, but is not
prevented from being something else. And, before Aristotle, Plato also
25 proclaimed that. And it is clear that Aristotle also saw that not-being
is included with plurality. For nothing, he says prevents not-being,
not to be absolutely, but to be some particular not-being.245 Next,
however, he says246 that even if the proposition were true, which says
that what is other than being is not, it is not immediately necessary
that all things are one in number. For Being itself,247 which they
postulate, nobody would understand as other than what is spoken of as
30 the just-existent, that is, strictly being, that is, substance. And this being
so, it has been shown earlier that whether the just-existent shares in
accident, existing things are many, or whether it does not share [in it],
things in themselves, which are what beings are, are also many, through
the things substantially included in the definition of the just-existent. It
138,1 is worthwhile to understand that the just-existent has also been called
Being itself, according to the Platonic custom.
Alexander says that the second argument, the one from dichotomy,
is by Zeno, who says that if being had size and were divided, both
 Translation 49
Being and not-being would still be many; and through this shows that 5
the One is none of the things that exist. But about this argument, and
through what came before, he says that Aristotle spoke when he said:
‘The later of the ancients were disturbed too’,248 and he provided the
solution with the words: ‘as it is not possible for the same thing to be
one and many, at least not as opposites, Being is one both potentially
and actually’.249 ‘To this argument’, he [i.e. Alexander] says, ‘the one 10
about the dichotomy, Xenocrates of Chalcedon yielded, having ac-
cepted that the all, when divided, is many (for the part is different
from the whole), and that the same thing cannot be one and many at
the same time, because the [parts of the] contradiction cannot be true
together, but yet did not agree that every magnitude is divisible and
has parts; for there are some indivisible lines, of which it is not true 15
that these are many. In this way he thought to find the nature of ‘one’
and escape the contradiction through the fact that neither is what is
divided one but many, nor are the indivisible lines many but only one.’
It is worthwhile to consider these remarks of Alexander, first
[asking] if this is Zeno’s own saying, that One is nothing of the things
that exist.250 At any rate he wrote many arguments to the contrary, 20
doing away with the view that there are many things, so that by the
destruction of the many he would strengthen the view that all things
are one, which Parmenides also wanted. Next it was necessary to
explain the usefulness of the mention of Zeno’s argument and of the
ineffectual concessions to him, since for those who gave in to Par- 25
menides’ argument, but introduced not-being, its usefulness was
clear; for it was to show that existing things are many, which Par-
menides did not want. But if Zeno himself destroyed the One by
showing that there are many things, the argument did not need any
support, unless someone should say that he mentioned it because this
argument was opposed to the one saying that existing things were
only many.
But it seems that Alexander took from the words of Eudemus the
opinion that Zeno did away with the One. For Eudemus says in his 30
Physics: ‘is it then that One is not this, but it is something?251 For
there was a question about this. And they say that Zeno said that if
anyone were to give him whatever One is, he would have the power
to say what the things that exist are.252 And there was a question, it
seems, because each of the sensibles was said to be many both by the 139,1
categories and by division, but the point was supposed to be nothing.
For what would neither increase something when added to it, nor
diminish it when taken away, was not thought to be among the things
that exist’. And it is likely that Zeno was arguing on both sides with
exercises (for which he was also called ‘double-tongued’),253 and when
wondering about the One [was likely] to produce arguments of this
kind. In his book, however, which has many attempts at argument, 5
he shows in detail that the man who says there are many things finds
 50 Translation
that he is making opposing utterances; one of these is the attempted
argument254 in which he shows that if there are many things, they are
both large and small, large so as to be unlimited in size, and small in
such a way as to have no magnitude. In this he shows that what has
10 neither magnitude nor thickness255 nor bulk would not even exist.
‘For’, he says, ‘if it were attached to another existing thing, it would
make it no bigger; for when there is no magnitude, and it is at-
tached,256 it is not possible to add anything to magnitude. And so at
once what is attached would be nothing. And if when it was removed
what remains is not less, nor again when it is attached that will not
15 increase, it is clear that neither what was attached nor what was
removed was anything.’ And Zeno says this, not destroying the One,
but [saying] that each of the many has magnitude and is without
limits,257 because before it is taken away there is always something,
through the slicing to infinity; and that he proves, having earlier
proved that nothing has magnitude from the fact that each of the
many is the same as itself, and one. And Themistius258 says that
20 Zeno’s argument argues positively that Being is one from its being
continuous and indivisible, ‘for if it were divided, he says, it will not
be one in the strict sense because of the cutting of bodies into infinity’.
But it rather seems that Zeno said that it would also not be many.
Porphyry, however, says that Parmenides, in his argument from
25 dichotomy, was trying to show from it that Being was one. He writes
as follows: ‘There was another argument by Parmenides, the one
through the dichotomy, thinking to show that Being was one alone
and this without parts and indivisible. For if it were divisible, he says,
let it be divided in two and then each of the parts in two, and with
this happening continually it is clear, he says, that either there will
30 remain some final least magnitudes which are individuals and unlim-
ited in number, and the whole will be made up of the things which are
the smallest, but which are unlimited in number; or it will have gone
away and will be dissolved into nothing and will come together out of
nothing: these things are absurd. It will not therefore be divided, but
140,1 will remain one. For in addition, since it is in every way alike, if it is
divisible it will be divisible in all ways alike, but not here, yes, and
there, no. Let it be divided then in every way: it is clear then again
that nothing will be left, but it will have gone away, and if it should
come together, again it will come together out of nothing. For if
anything is going to remain, it will not have been entirely divided. So
5 that, he says, from these things it is clear that Being is something
indivisible and without parts and one.
‘Xenocrates259 agreed that the first implication held, that is, that if
Being is one it will also be undivided, but not that Being is undivided.
Hence again Being is not just one, but many. However while divided,
it does not go on to infinity, but stops at some individuals. These
10 however are not individuals as being without parts and smallest, but
 Translation 51
fissile with regard to quantity and having parts, but individual and
primary in form, supposing that there are certain primary indivisible
lines, and the planes from these and primary solids. Xenocrates
thinks that he can solve the problem meeting us from the dichotomy 15
and, simply, the cutting and division to infinity, by bringing in the
indivisible lines and making absolutely indivisible magnitudes, es-
caping the difficulty that if Being is one it will be dissolved into
not-being and be expended, since the indivisible lines from which
existing things are made remain unsliced and undivided.’
If, in these words uttered by Porphyry, there is a verbatim record
of the argument from dichotomy through absurdity consequent on the 20
division, bringing in that Being is undivided and one, that would be
fine. But it is worthwhile to consider whether the argument is indeed
by Parmenides260 and not by Zeno, as it actually seemed to be to
Alexander. For nothing like this is to be seen in the works of Par-
menides, and the broadest enquiry assigns the problem of the
dichotomy to Zeno. And mention is also made of it in the arguments
about motion, as being by Zeno. 25
And why should I say any more, for it also exists in the treatise of
Zeno? For again, showing that if there are many, the same things will
be limited and unlimited, Zeno writes thus verbatim: ‘If there are
many, necessarily they are as many as they are, and neither more of 30
them nor fewer. But if they are as many as they are, they would be
limited. If they are many, existing things will be unlimited. For there
are always other things in between existing things, and again other
things in between them. And in this way existing things will be
unlimited.’ And in this way he demonstrated the unlimited in quan-
tity from the dichotomy, but [the unlimited] in magnitude he
[demonstrated] earlier by the same argument. For having shown first 141,1
that ‘If Being did not have size it would also not exist’, he adds: ‘but
if it exists, it is necessary for each thing to have some size and
thickness and be apart from it the one from the other. And about that
which projects there is the same argument. For that also will have
size and part of it will [again] project.261 It is the same to utter this 5
once and to say it always. For nothing of it like this will be last, nor
will there not be another related to another. In this way if they are
many it is necessary for them to be small and large, small so as not
to have magnitude, and large so as to be unlimited.’ Perhaps then the
argument from dichotomy is indeed Zeno’s, as Alexander wants, but
not however doing away with the One, but rather [doing away with] 10
the many by the fact that those who support them are affected by the
same contradictions, and in this way supporting the argument of
Parmenides which says that Being is one. So that both the present
reference to the argument from dichotomy is reasonable, and that to
those who unjustifiably yielded to it, [saying] that if there did not
exist some indivisible magnitudes, existing things would necessarily
 52 Translation
be unlimited in both number and size, and for this reason postulating
15 indivisible lines, so that both existing things may be many, and the
number and the size should not advance to infinity. And yet they
appear to have fallen into a contradiction in speaking of sizeless size.
Hence Aristotle does not accept this solution. For it is not the case
that if magnitude were divisible to infinity, immediately its parts
would also be actually infinite, but [they would be] actually one,
potentially many. Hence Aristotle did not do well in bringing in the
20 contradiction, or the solution of those who said that the one and the
many were the same. For those, however, who show that they are
infinite it is not true to say that the parts of the continuum are
potentially infinite. For they would at some time have become actu-
ally infinite, unless the potential was useless. But it must be re-
marked that Porphyry said that ‘it is one thing for the continuum to
25 be divisible to infinity, and another for it to have been divided to
infinity.’ For division can always come about, and that is for it to be
to infinity, but it never can have come about and have ceased, since
in stopping at least it has been given a limit. For there is a difference
between something having been divided to infinity and dividing
something to infinity. For the one thing would never come about and
30 have been completed, whereas the other would never cease continu-
ally happening. For through the one always coming about and not
being able to cease, the other would never be completed. Let therefore
no one worry about how what is divisible to infinity, having the
potential to be divided (for what is divisible is what is capable of being
divided), will never, even so, be divided to infinity. For it will appear
that the potential which will never end up in actuality is irrelevant.
35 Let this therefore not disturb you; for what is divisible to infinity has
not been potentially divided to infinity, but is being divided to infin-
142,1 ity. This always holds in actuality, if every given thing is divisible,
and is divided, at least if nothing prevents it, if not by us, by nature,
which is continually being applied and dividing it. And it is clear that
with everything continuous being divided to infinity the view that
5 there is no magnitude and that it is being divided neither into
indivisible magnitudes nor into non-magnitudes is strengthened. For
of every given continuum there is some part which is itself also
continuous, even to infinity. And if every division is into magnitudes,
it is clear that [this] division will be to infinity. And that it is into
magnitudes is clear, if points can neither touch one another nor
create a distance between them. For a point put next to a point
makes a point, but not a magnitude. Therefore it is neither formed
10 from points nor divided into points; but neither will it ever be
divided into infinite magnitudes since it is finite. For from those
into which it is divided, from them it is formed; but what was
[made up] of magnitudes infinite in quantity, would itself be infi-
nite in magnitude. For if it were finite, it would receive an addition
 Translation 53
of something else like what made it up; and thus those things were
not infinite in quantity. 15
But since Xenocrates was also a clever man, how did he come to
suggest the indivisible lines? For he was not ignorant of the nature of
magnitude, but neither did he say that it was divisible in species.262
For not only do the smallest lines have that, but also the largest
bodies. Perhaps then Xenocrates opposes, not the slicing to infinity
(for as a geometer he would not do away with a geometrical principle), 20
but, the being divided into infinity when there were always some
undivided magnitudes; these are not by nature strong enough in
themselves, because of their smallness, to be divided, but united back
with other bodies, with the whole divided like this, in themselves they
accept the division to which by themselves alone they would not have
stood up. So just as Plato said that the first and smallest bodies were 25
plane surfaces, so Xenocrates said [they were] lines indivisible be-
cause of their smallness, but these too being divisible in nature.
But since we have already arrived at the end of the arguments
against Parmenides, it would be well to search out Parmenides’ own
opinion about the one Being,263 as agreeing with what has been said, 30
and to examine what the disagreements are about. That Parmenides
supposes that the one Being is not part of the things that come to be
and pass away, is shown by his indication which says that the
uncreated and unending is one, in which he says:

There remains a single account of a journey, that it is. On this 35

way there are very many signs, that being uncreated, it is also
indestructible.264

Moreover he certainly does not want the one Being to be corporeal, 143,1
since he says that it is indivisible, in the words:

Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike.265

So that the things he has said are not connected with the heaven, as
Eudemus says that some suppose, hearing of266 [the words]: 5

Like the mass of a sphere well-rounded on all sides.267

For the heaven is not indivisible, and also it is not like a sphere. But
a sphere is the most precise of natural things. And also, that Par-
menides says that the one Being does not have a soul he [i.e. Eude-
mus] shows by his [i.e. Parmenides] saying that it is unmoving,
thus,268

It is unmoving; for its name is all things,269 10

 54 Translation
since mental substance, according to the Eleatics, does involve move-
ment. And he says also that Being is all together:

since all is now together,270

And with regard to the same things and being similar:

15 remaining the same in the same it lies by itself.

And clearly both in substance and in potentiality and in actuality it

has both ‘the all together’ and the ‘according to the same’ which are
beyond271 the mental hypostasis. And perhaps he does not even say
that it is thinking,272 for the thinker exists by its distinction from the
20 thought, and by its turning273 towards the thought, and the one Being
he says is both thinking and thought and mind, clearly when he
writes like this:

It is the same thing to think and that for which the thought
exists, for you will not find thinking without the existing thing,
25 (that is the object of thought),274 in which it is expressed.275

Again, the intellectual276 is divided up into forms, just as the

thought has acquired the division of the forms by way of union.277
And where there is division, there there is also otherness; and
since this is so, not-being appears beside it. For the one thing is not
what the other is, and Parmenides entirely excludes not-being
30 from the one Being.

For never shall this prevail, that what are not, are, but you, keep
your thought away from this path when enquiring.278

144,1 But he does not want the one Being to be [1]279 any commonness,280
neither that which is generated later and arises from abstraction in
our thoughts, for that is neither uncreated nor indestructible, but also
5 not [2] the commonness in things, for that is sensible and among the
things of opinion, and deceptive, about which he speaks later, and
there is another [3] from the differentiae, as having already under-
gone otherness and not-being. How with this sense would it be true
that all would be everywhere now, or that there were joined together
in itself the thinker and the thought? But is it that he does not say
that the one Being is indivisible substance, or is this further [from the
10 truth]? For the indivisible substance is created and separated by
otherness, and enmattered and sensible and other than the accident.
And also it is divided and in motion. It remains, therefore, that the
thought, the cause of everything, and through which are both the
thinker and thinking, in which all things by one union are taken
 Translation 55
together, joined and united, this is the Parmenidean one Being, in
which there is one nature both of the One and of Being. Hence Zeno
used to say that if anyone could show him the One, he would reply 15
with Being,281 not as departing from the One, but as coexisting
together with the One. Indeed all the aforementioned conclusions fit
with this one Being. For the uncreated and indestructible is also
perfectly unique. For what is before all distinction would not be a
second with another to Being. To this ‘being all together’ is appropri- 20
ate, and that not-being has nowhere any place in it, and again being
undivided and unchanging with regard to every kind of division and
change, and being about the same things and in the same way, and
standing on the edge282 of all things. But if this is that for which
thinking exists, clearly it is the thought. For both thinking and the
mind are for the thought. But if the thinking and the thought are the
same in the same, the extremity of this unity would be ineffable. And 25
provided that I do not appear fussy to anyone, I would happily add to
these records the words of Parmenides, which are not many, about
the One, but to give confidence in what has been said by me and
through the scarcity of Parmenides’ treatise. What comes after the
destruction of not-being is like this:

There remains a single account of a journey, that it is.283 For this 145,1
there are very many signs that, being uncreated, it is also
indestructible,284 a whole, unique, unshaken, and perfect.285 And
it was not once, and will not be, since it is now all together, One, 5
continuous; for what birth would you seek for it? Grown to
where and whence? Nor will I let you say or think that it is from
not-being. For it is not to be said or to be thought that it is not.
And what actual need would have driven it to grow later or
earlier, beginning from nothing? Thus it is necessary for it to 10
exist either completely or not at all. Nor will a reliable strength
allow anything ever to become out of what is not,286 beside it. For
this reason Justice has never relaxed her fetters to allow it
either to come to be or to be destroyed, but holds it. And the 15
judgment about these matters is in this:287 It is or it is not. It has
been decided therefore as necessary, to let the one [way] go as
unthinkable, nameless (for it is not the true way),288 and the
other to be and to be true. How then would Being be afterwards, 20
and how would it come to be? For if it has come to be, it is not,
nor if it will at some time be. Thus coming to be has been
extinguished, and being destroyed is unheard of. Nor is it divis-
ible, since it is all alike. Nor is there anything more here,289
which would prevent it from holding together. Nor is it in any
way worse, but all is full of being. It is all by being continuous; 25
for by being it gets near to Being. But unchanged in the limits
of great bonds it is without beginning, unceasing, since coming
 56 Translation
146,1 to be and destruction have wandered far away, and true belief
has pushed them aside. Remaining the same in the same it lies
by itself. And thus held it stays there; for strong necessity holds
it in the bonds of a limit, that holds it all around. So it is not
5 lawful for being to be incomplete. For it is not in need: not being,
it would be in need of everything. It is the same thing to think
and that for which the thought exists, for you will not find
thinking without the existing thing, in which it is expressed.
Nor if time is, or will be, will there be anything besides being,290
10 since fate has bound the whole to be changeless. All things have
names which mortals have given them believing them to be true,
coming to be and passing away, existing and not, and changing
place and altering their bright colour. But since there is a final
15 limit, it will be completed on every side, like the mass of a
well-rounded sphere,291 equally extended from the centre in
every direction; for it is necessary for it to be neither somewhat
greater in any way nor somewhat smaller here or here. For there
is not not-being, which would check it from arriving at its like,
20 nor is it existent in such a way as to be more here, less there,
since all is inviolate. For it is equal from every direction, reach-
ing evenly to its limits. Here I end my trustworthy account and
thought about truth; from now on learn the belief of mortals,
25 hearing the deceitful beauty of my words.

These are the words of Parmenides about the Being which is one.
After them it is left for him to discuss the things of opinion, and
describe the principles which he supposes to be in them, and to which
Aristotle also refers in what follows, saying: ‘for Parmenides makes
hot and cold principles, but he calls them fire and earth’.292 But if he
[i.e. Parmenides] says that the one Being is like the mass of a
30 well-rounded sphere do not be surprised; for through his poetry he
touches upon a kind of mythical style. In what way does saying this
147,1 differ from how Orpheus spoke of ‘a silvery egg’?293 And it is clear that
some of the reports of what he said more generally apply to other
things that come later.

Thus294 ‘uncreated and indestructible’ apply both to the soul and to

the intellect and ‘unchanging and staying in the same place’ [applies]
5 to the intellect. And all together and understood in themselves they
fit that. For even if in one sense the soul is uncreated, and the
intellect, it is still led aside by the intelligible. And it has the unchang-
ing in a strict sense, in which both the change by way of activity has
not been distinguished, and remaining in the same place belongs
strictly to what is remaining. But soul and the highly valued intellect
10 have come out from what is remaining and turned back to it. And it
is clear that the things that are said to belong to it as united have
 Translation 57
been received into it, but as distinguished, and, as appears from the
account of them, have come forth from it after it.
And it seems to have been treated as the first cause by Parmenides,
if ‘the all together’ and ‘final limit’ are one. But if he did not simply
call it one, but one Being, and if ‘unique’, and if the limit is ‘per- 15
fected’,295 perhaps he shows that the ineffable cause of all things is
established beyond it.296 How then is it that both Plato and Aristotle
are clearly speaking against Parmenides? Or, [that] Plato opposed
him in two ways, both with regard to saying that Being is one, and
with regard to completely doing away with not-being, and made his
opposition from the universe that is mental297 and contains distinc-
tions, in which both, Being has been distinguished from the One, and 20
the two did not remain one, and the parts [have been distinguished]
from the whole. For it was from these [arguments] that Plato showed
that existing things are not one but more than one. And [that] the
not-being [is something] he showed from the otherness in the forms
that had been distinguished, through which there the being, taken
according to one special feature, is being, but is not change or staying
the same. And each of the others is what it is, and is not the others. 25
And it is clear that this (not-being) is entirely there where distinction
and otherness have also been revealed, by the forms in the mental298
area, and by separation in that of the senses. And that this is
not-being Parmenides himself clearly agrees in his part about opin-
ion, when he calls deceptive the beauty of his verses, which are about
the opinions of mortals. Where there is deceit, there there is not-be-
ing. For he who considers not-being to be, or Being not to be, is 30
deceived. As to what is entirely non-existent, not only does Par-
menides do away with it, but also Plato, who evades enquiry into it
by saying: ‘Let no one therefore tell us that having revealed that
not-being is the opposite of being we dare to say that it is. For we long
ago said goodbye to the question whether there is an opposite to it,
whether it is or is not, having an account or being entirely without an 148,1
account. But about what we have said about not-being existing, let
someone persuade us by a refutation that we have not argued well,
or, to the extent that he cannot, he must say as we say.’299 And there
is nothing surprising in the fact that he showed this kind of not-being 5
to be defined like this by one special feature, with such not-being
having no place for the Being which is perfect and intelligible and all
things in union with being before all things. But Aristotle, bringing
in his opposition by a division, says:300 either ‘being’ has many mean-
ings, and in this way will be many, or only one, and will be either
substance or accident. And it is clear that none of these are relevant
to the intelligible, since this division appeared in [the world of] 10
coming to be, and was assumed, if at all, for some reason in the
intellectual distinction.301
But let no one blame Plato and Aristotle for speaking against other
 58 Translation
ideas. For in a kindly way they prevent the misunderstandings which
might come about, since they show that they think Parmenides
clever, Plato302 by witnessing to the totally noble depth of the thought
of the man, and reporting that he was the teacher of the loftiest
15 subjects [studied by] Socrates, and Aristotle, thinking him to be
looking in another direction, placing him in relation to the natural
philosophers. Since both Plato reported this one Being in the Par-
menides, praising his superiority, and Aristotle, in his Metaphysics,
maintaining that the one itself exists, and shouting out that ‘many
20 heads are not good’,303 he304 too proclaiming before him [i.e. Aristotle]
the unification, and observing, well, that there mind and thought and
substance and possibility and activity are the same. But enough of
these matters, lest we should seem to anyone to ‘leap over the
trenches’305 – according to the proverb, putting the loftiest of divine
matters into the subject of nature.

1.4, translated by C.C.W. Taylor

25 187a12-21 The views of the natural philosophers take two
forms. Some regard the underlying body as one thing, either one
of the three1 or something else which is denser than fire and
finer than air, and they generate the other things by density and
rarity, making them many (these are opposites, and in general
[instances of] greater and lesser quantity, as Plato speaks of the
great and the small, except that he regards them as matter and
the one as their form, whereas they regard the underlying one
as matter and the opposites as differentiae and forms). The
others think that the oppositions are present in the one and are
separated out from it, as Anaximander says }
He has dealt with the view of those who say that what is is one, and
one in the following way, namely the only thing that there is, and
something unchangeable; this is not a view appropriate to natural
philosophers, but to those who investigate things which transcend
nature.2 (Aristotle has charitably pointed out by means of his distinc-
tion between them and the natural philosophers, who contrariwise
treat what is as body, that they [i.e. the metaphysicians] are not
30 speaking about nature, while on the other hand he shows that by
149,1 treating what is and the principle as identical even they were speak-
ing about a principle).3 So having shown that it is impossible for what
is to be one in that way, he next proposes to investigate the sense in
which the natural philosophers say that the primary element from
which things come is one. Some of them say that there is one element,
others that there are several. In the case of those who say that there
5 is one, he says that they think that things come to be from it in either
of two ways: they all assume that this one thing is something bodily,
 Translation 59
but some of them say that it is one of the three elements, Thales and
Hippon that it is water,4 Anaximenes and Diogenes5 air,6 and Heracli-
tus and Hippasus fire7 (no-one thought it appropriate to postulate
earth because it is hard to alter),8 while some postulated something
other than the three elements, which is denser than fire and finer 10
than air,9 or, as he says elsewhere,10 denser than air and finer than
water.11 Alexander12 thinks that it was Anaximander who postulated
as the principle some kind of body other than the elements, but
Porphyry, assuming that Aristotle is opposing those who say in an
undifferentiated way that the underlying substrate is a body to those
who say either that it is one of the three elements or something else, 15
intermediate between fire and air, says that Anaximander said in an
undifferentiated way that the substrate was an unlimited body with-
out differentiating its nature as fire or water or air. He himself [i.e.
Porphyry] attributed the intermediate theory to Diogenes of Apollo-
nia,13 as did Nicolaus of Damascus.14 It seems to me that it is more
natural to interpret the words [of 187a13-15] not as opposing body to
the elements and the intermediate, but as dividing it into the three 20
and the intermediate; for he [i.e. Aristotle] speaks of ‘the substrate’
[as] ‘a body, either one of the three or something else which is denser
than fire and finer than air’ (187a13-15); nevertheless he made the
general observation about all the above-mentioned theories that ‘they
generate the rest by rarity and density’ (187a15), though Anaximan-
der, as he himself [i.e. Aristotle] says (187a20-21), does not generate
them in that way, but by extraction from the unlimited. How then, if 25
he [i.e. Aristotle] was speaking of him [i.e. Anaximander] as positing
body in an undifferentiated way, did he make the general observation
about generation by alteration?15 All of these people are agreed in
speaking of the principle as one, but they divide into two classes with
regard to the ways in which things come to be. From the material one
some generate the other things by rarity and density, for instance
Anaximenes says that when air is refined it becomes fire, and when 30
it is condensed it becomes wind, then cloud, then when further
condensed water, then earth, then stones, and the rest from these.16
In his Enquiry17 Theophrastus mentions rarefaction and condensa-
tion only in the case of Anaximenes, but it is clear that the others too 150,1
[who belong to this first class] made use of rarity and density, since
Aristotle says in general about all that ‘they generate the rest by
density and rarity, making many things’ (187a15-16) out of the one
matter. And if rarefaction and condensation are opposite (as there is
a more general opposition between greater and lesser quantity, as for 5
instance Plato spoke of the great and small) (187a17-18), it is clear
that all of these people were no longer speaking of the principle as
one, but as three, and were making use of opposition, as he himself
[i.e. Aristotle] will do.18 Except that Plato spoke of great and small as
the matter of things (187a18),19 attesting that all the oppositions are
 60 Translation
potentially present in it as arising from the one opposition,20 while the
10 others said that the one substrate was the matter, and the opposites,
rarefaction and condensation, differentiae and form. So all of them
said that there are three principles, the opposites and one other thing.
Unless Plato spoke of matter not as [consisting actually of] two
principles, great and small, but [used the terms] figuratively, and
[spoke] similarly of the indefinite dyad and disorder, parts of which
are the greater and less and much and little and inequality, all [of
15 which are] attributes of matter. Perhaps that is what Plato meant by
the great and small, that matter, being non-bodily and having no size,
is therefore to be called small, but is at the same time the cause of all
bulk and dimension, and hence large. This is one form of the suppo-
sition that what is is one, namely to constitute the plurality of things
20 by rarity and density. The other form is that in which they no longer
ascribe change to matter nor explain things’ coming into being by
alteration of the substrate, but by extraction; Anaximander says that
the opposites are in the substrate, which is a limitless body, and that
they are extracted from it; he was the first to call the substrate a
25 principle.21 The oppositions are hot, cold, dry, wet etc. This is all that
the above-mentioned people said.
One should know that Aristotle considers that rarity accompanies
fineness of texture and density coarseness.22 That is why he takes fire
to be at once rare and fine, speaking of what is ‘denser than fire and
finer than air’ (187a14-15), assuming that air is coarser and denser
30 than fire. Plato too says that air is coarser than fire, and that simply
the lower elements nearer the centre are coarser-textured than the
upper nearer the periphery. That is why they are hard to displace,
e.g. earth.23 Further, he says that they are denser, because he consid-
151,1 ers that the rare and the dense are defined by the positions of their
parts, as Aristotle said in the Categories.24 If that is so, where the
parts are larger the distances between them must be larger, hence
the whole must be rarer, since it is looser-textured and not a single
thing, but like a pile of stones or nuts. But where the parts are smaller
5 the distances are smaller, hence the whole is denser, being a quantity
like a pile of sand.25 Alexander says that, ‘According to Plato the
principles of everything, including the Forms themselves, are the One
and the indefinite dyad, which he called the great and small, as
Aristotle also reports in his “On the Good”’.26 One can get this infor-
mation also from Speusippus, Xenocrates and the others, who were
10 present at Plato’s lecture on the Good; all of them wrote down and
preserved his view, and they say that he treated those as principles.27
It is altogether likely that Plato should speak of the One and the
indefinite dyad as principles of everything, since this is a Pythago-
rean doctrine, and Plato seems to follow the Pythagoreans at many
points; but how would it be consistent for him, having called the
indefinite dyad and the principles of the Forms the great and small,
 Translation 61
to use these terms to refer to matter? Plato separates matter off as 15
existing only in the perceptible universe and says clearly in the
Timaeus that it belongs to coming to be, and that what comes to be
comes to be in it; he said that the Forms are knowable by thought,
while matter is ‘believable by bastard reasoning’.28
The majority account says that Diogenes of Apollonia, like 20
Anaximenes, posits air as the primary element, but Nicolaus in his
treatise On the Gods states that he declares the intermediate be-
tween fire and air to be the principle, and Nicolaus was followed by
the most learned of the philosophers, Porphyry. One should know
that this same Diogenes wrote several books, as he recorded himself 25
in his On Nature, saying that he wrote in opposition to the natural
philosophers, or, as he calls them, sophists; he also records that he
wrote a Treatise on the Heavens, which he says includes a discussion
of the principle, and also a work On the Nature of Man. In On Nature,
which is the only work of his which I have come across,29 he sets out
to show by many arguments that there is a great deal of thought30 in
the principle which he has posited. After the introduction he writes 30
as follows [DK 64B2]:

To speak comprehensively, it seems to me that all things are

formed by differentiation of the same thing, and are the same.
This is very clear. For if the things that there are now in this
world, earth and water and air and fire and everything else 152,1
apparent in this world were different from one another, each one
different in its own nature, and if they were not the same thing
undergoing many changes and differentiations, they would be
unable to mix with one another, or do one another good or harm,
nor could a plant grow from the earth nor an animal or anything 5
else come into being, if they were not so constituted as to be the
same. But all these things come to be distinct at distinct times
by differentiation from the same thing, and they go back to being
the same.

Reading these opening words I took him to be saying that the common
substrate is something other than the four elements, on the assump-
tion that he was saying that they could not mix nor change into one
another if the principle were some one of them with its own particular 10
nature and it was not the same thing which underlay them all, from
which they are all differentiated. But immediately he shows that this
principle possesses a great deal of thought (‘For’, he says [DK 64B3],
‘things could not have been divided up this way without thought, so
as to have the measures of everything, summer and winter, night and
day, rain, winds and fine weather and the rest which anyone who
cares to consider will find to be as well arranged as possible’), adding 15
that humans and the other animals derive their life, soul and thought
 62 Translation
from this principle, which is air. These are his words [DK 64B4]: ‘In
addition we have these important indications; humans and the other
animals live by breathing air. This is soul and thought for them, as
20 will be manifestly shown in this treatise, and if it is removed, they die
and their thought gives out.’ A little later he added plainly [DK 64B5]:

And it seems to me that what possesses thought is what people

call air, and that they are all directed by this and that it controls
everything. For this very thing seems to me to be a god,31 and it
reaches as far as everything and arranges everything and is in
25 everything. There is no single thing which does not have a share
of it, but nothing shares in it in the same way as anything else,
153,1 but there are many forms both of air itself and of thought. It is
multiform, warmer, colder, dryer, wetter, more static, in quicker
motion, with infinitely many other variations of taste and col-
our. The soul of all animals is the same thing, air which is
5 warmer than the air which surrounds us, but much colder than
the air in the sun. This warmth is not alike for each animal (nor
indeed for different people), but the difference is not great, so
that they are similar. Yet it is not possible for any of the things
which are differentiated one from the other to become absolutely
alike, without becoming the same thing.32 Since the differentia-
10 tion between them is multiform the animals too are multiform
and many, and they are not like one another in appearance or
habits or intelligence, because of the multitude of differentia-
tions. Yet they all live and see and hear by the same thing, and
all have the other aspects of thought33 from the same source.

Next he shows that the seed of animals is breathy, and that thoughts
come about when air occupies the whole body along with blood
15 through the veins, and in so doing he gives an accurate anatomical
description of the veins. In this he plainly states that the principle is
what people call air. It is surprising that, while saying that the other
things come to be by differentiation from it, he nonetheless says that
it is eternal, in these words [DK 64B7]: ‘This very thing is an eternal
and immortal body, and by it things come to be and pass away’, and
20 elsewhere [DK 64B8]: ‘But this seems clear to me, that it is great and
strong and eternal and immortal and multiple in form’. This addi-
tional information about Diogenes may suffice. Next Aristotle moves
on from those who say that the principle is one to those who say that
it is one and many.

25 187a21-6 } and those who say that it is one and many, as

Empedocles and Anaxagoras do. For they too separate out the
other things from the mixture, but they differ from one another
 Translation 63
in that Empedocles makes that occur in a cycle, Anaxagoras
once [only], and Anaxagoras has infinite[ly many] things, the
homoiomeries and the opposites, but Empedocles has only what
are called the elements.
Having discussed those who say that the principle, in the sense of the
substrate, is one, whom he calls the natural philosophers, and having 154,1
set out the difference between the two ways in which they say things
come into being from the substrate, namely by way of alteration and
by way of extraction, he moves on next to Empedocles and
Anaxagoras,34 who say that the principle is one and many.
Anaxagoras posited the homoiomeries35 as principles in the sense of
substrate, saying that they are unlimited, and said that the produc- 5
tive cause was one, namely Mind which separates them. But Empe-
docles posited several principles as substrate, namely the four
elements, and posited Love and Strife as one, because each of these
is in control and is productive in turn, not both at once; in that way
what is productive is always one in his view. But perhaps one should
not say that they speak of what is productive as one thing, but rather 10
of the mixture itself [as one thing], which is composed according to
Anaxagoras of the unlimited quantity of the homoiomeries, but accord-
ing to Empedocles of the four elements, which are at one time mixed
together by Love to compose the sphere,36 and at another separated
by Strife to compose this world. Theophrastus assimilates
Anaxagoras to Anaximander, understanding Anaxagoras’ words as 15
amounting to saying that the substrate is a single nature. He writes
as follows in his Enquiry into Nature [FHSG 228B]: ‘If people were to
understand him that way he would appear to be making the material
principles infinite, as has been said, but giving change and coming-
to-be a single cause. But if someone were to suppose that the mixture
of everything is a single nature, undifferentiated in form and in 20
quantity, which is what he appears to mean, he turns out to be saying
that the principles are two in number, namely the nature of the infinite
and Mind; so that in every way he seems to be treating the physical
elements as Anaximander does.’37 Now it was appropriate for him [i.e.
Aristotle] to place those who say that the principles are one and many
after those who say that there is a single principle, whether un-
changed or changing, and before those (e.g. Democritus) who seem to 25
say merely that there are many; for they take the middle position
between the two. These adherents of a single principle share the view of
those who explain coming-to-be by combination and separation [from
one another]; but Anaxagoras is closer to those who appeal rather to
extraction [from a compound]. They [i.e. Anaxagoras and Empedocles]
differ from those who say that there is only a single principle by saying
that the principles are one and many, and from one another first in that
Anaxagoras says that once the world has come-to-be from the mixture 30
 64 Translation
it remains thereafter organised and separated off by the presiding Mind,
whereas Empedocles posits an eternal succession of contrasting periods,
at one time of combination of the four elements through Love and at
155,1 another of their separation through Strife. Secondly, Anaxagoras posits
that the many composing the whole are infinite (viz. the homoiomer-
ies), but Empedocles that they are finite, for what are called the
elements are four in number. Anaxagoras has the homoiomeries,
Empedocles the elements. Alexander says, ‘In the case of Anaxagoras
he [i.e. Aristotle] has added the words “and the opposites” (187a25-6)
5 because the oppositions are in the homoiomeries as are all the differ-
ences. For the same reason the earlier expression “or even opposites”
(184b22) is to be understood as applying specifically to the opinion of
Anaxagoras.’ But perhaps there are oppositions in the elements too,
hot-cold, dry-wet, heavy-light etc., and the words ‘and the opposites’
10 fit both opinions alike; unless perhaps there are certain oppositions
in the elements, but in the homoiomeries all the opposites are there
together at the same time, as are all the differences, and that is the
reason why the expression ‘and the elements’, including the connec-
tive, applies rather to the opinion of Anaxagoras. Or perhaps all the
opposites are in the elements, since the elements are principles, but
not all connectedly as in the case of the homoiomeries. For if sweet
15 and bitter happened to be there, on the supposition of the elements
they are not primary characteristics of the elements, but occur be-
cause of heat and cold and dryness and wetness, but on the supposi-
tion of the homoiomeries they occur as primary and in their own
right, as do the oppositions of colour. Or perhaps even in the case of
the homoiomeries some oppositions are prior to others, and the
20 secondary occur because of the primary.38
Now Anaxagoras says in the first book of his Physics [DK 59B16]:
‘Water is separated out from the clouds, and earth from the water,
and from the earth stones are congealed by the cold, and they go
further out than the water.’ Anaxagoras says that from a single
mixture, in which everything is in everything, homoiomerous things
25 unlimited in quantity are separated out, each thing being charac-
terised by what predominates in it. He makes that clear in these
words at the beginning of the first book of his Physics [DK 59B1]: ‘All
things were together, unlimited in quantity and smallness;39 for the
small too was unlimited. And since all things were together, nothing
was perceptible because of their smallness; for air and aithêr encom-
passed everything, both being unlimited; for in everything these are
30 the greatest in quantity and in size.’ And a little later [he says] [DK
59B2]: ‘For air and aithêr are separated off from the great amount
156,1 which surrounds them. And that which surrounds is unlimited in
quantity.’ And a little later [DK 59B4, 1-4.13-18]: ‘This being so, one
must believe that in all the things which are combined there are
many things of all kinds and seeds of all things with all kinds of
 Translation 65
shapes and colours and flavours. Before they were separated from one
another, when all were together not even any colour was perceptible; 5
for the mixture of all things prevented it, the wet and the dry and the
hot and the cold and the bright and the dark and the great amount of
earth which was in it and the seeds infinite in quantity, none resem-
bling one another. For none of the other things was like any other’.40
That none of the homoiomerous things comes-to-be nor perishes, but
that they are always the same, he makes clear in the following words
[DK 59B5]: ‘Once these things have been separated in this way one 10
must realise that they are all in no way fewer or more; for it is not
possible for there to be more than all, but all are always equal’. That
is about the mixture and the homoiomeries. About Mind he wrote as
follows [DK 59B12]:

And Mind is something unlimited and self-controlling, and it is

mixed with nothing, but alone is itself by itself. For if it were not 15
by itself, but had been mixed with anything else, it would have
had a share in all things, if it had been mixed with any. For in
everything there is a portion of everything, as I said previously,
and the things mixed in with it would have hindered it from
controlling anything as it can do being alone itself by itself. For
of all things it is the finest and purest, and it has all thought
about everything and the greatest power, and as many things, 20
both greater and lesser, as have soul, all of them Mind controls.
And Mind controlled the entire rotation, so that it began to
rotate. It first began to rotate in a small part, and later it is
rotating more, and it will rotate yet more. And the things that
are mixed together and separated off and separated apart, all of
them Mind knew. And such as were to be, and such as were, and 25
as many things as now are, and such as will be,41 all of them
Mind set in order, as well as the present rotation of the stars and
the sun and the moon and the air and aithêr which are separated
off. It is this rotation which caused them to be separated off. And
the dense is separated off from the rare and the hot from the cold 30
and the bright from the dark and the dry from the wet. There
are many portions of many things. Nothing is totally separated 157,1
off or separated apart from anything else except Mind. Mind is
all alike, the greater and the lesser. Nothing else is like any-
thing else, but each single thing most perceptibly is and was
what predominates in it.

He posits a twofold world order, one intellectual, the other percepti- 5

ble, derived from the former; that is clear both from what has pre-
viously been said, and from the following [DK 59B14]: ‘Mind indeed
is, now as ever, where the other things are,42 in the great amount that
surrounds them, and in things which have been combined and in
 66 Translation
things which have been separated’.43 Further, after ‘in all the things
10 that are combined there are many things of all kinds and seeds of all
things with all kinds of shapes and colours and flavours, and people
have been constructed and the other animals which have soul’ [DK 59
B4, 2-5], he goes on, [DK 59B4, 5-10]: ‘and the people have built cities
and devised works, as we do, and they have a sun and a moon and the
rest, as we do, and the earth brings forth for them many things of all
15 kinds, the most useful of which they collect in their dwellings and
use’.44 That he is hinting at a different world order from ours is made
clear by the phrase ‘as we do’, which he uses more than once. That he
thinks that it is not a perceptible world, preceding this world in time,
is made clear by ‘the most useful of which they collect in their
20 dwellings and use’. For he does not say ‘used’, but ‘use’. But he is not
talking about a civilisation similar to ours located elsewhere. He does
not say ‘They have the sun and the moon as we do’ but ‘a sun and a
moon, as we do’, speaking of different ones.45 Whether that is so or not
is worth investigating.
25 Empedocles sets out his account of the One and the limited plural-
ity and the periodic reconstitution and generation and destruction
through combination and separation in the following words in the
first book of his Physics [DK 31B17]:

158,1 I shall tell a double tale. At one time one thing grew to be alone
from many, at another many grew apart again from one. Two-
fold is the generation of mortal things, and two-fold their
passing away. One the coming together of all things brings to
5 birth and destroys, the other flew asunder, nourished as they
grew apart.46 And they never cease these continuous changes, at
one time all coming together in one through Love, at another all
being driven apart again through the hatred of Strife.47 And
again as the one thing grows apart many spring forth; in that
10 way they come to be and their life is not stable. But in so far as
they never cease these continuous changes, in that way they are
forever immovable in their cycle. But come, listen to my words;
for learning48 will increase your mind. Declaring what I pre-
viously said as the limits of my words, I shall tell a double tale.
15 At one time one thing grew to be alone from many, at another
many grew apart from one, fire and water and earth and the
limitless height of air, and destructive Strife apart from them,
like in every way,49 and Love in them, equal in size and breadth.
20 Perceive her with your mind, but do not sit staring with
astonished eyes; she is believed to be infused in mortal limbs,
and through her they think kindly thoughts and do friendly
deeds, calling her by name Joy and Aphrodite. Her no mortal
25 man has seen weaving her way among them. But you listen to
the order of my speech, which is not deceitful. All these are equal
 Translation 67
and of the same age, but each wields a separate power, and each
has its own nature, and they rule in turn through the cycle of
time. And in addition to these nothing comes to be or ceases. For
if they were continuously destroyed they would no longer exist; 30
for what would increase this totality, and where could it have 159,1
come from? And how could they be completely destroyed,50 since
nothing is without them? But again, these things exist, and
running through one another they become now one thing, now
another, ever continuously alike.

In this passage he says that the one is what comes from the plurality 5
of the four elements, and shows Love as in control at one time and
Strife at another. That neither of these completely disappears is
shown by their all being equal and of the same age, and by the fact
that nothing comes to be nor ceases. The many are the plurality from
which the One comes to be; for Love is not the One, and even Strife is
completed in the One.51 In other descriptions of the plurality he adds 10
the characteristics of each, calling fire the sun, air bright and the
heaven, and water rain and sea.52 He writes as follows [DK 31B21]:

But come, perceive the things that witness to those earlier

words, in case anything of what I said earlier was deficient in
form; the sun, bright to behold and everywhere hot, and those 15
things immortal in kind, bathed in the bright rays, and the rain,
dark and cold in everything, and from earth there flow out dense
and solid things. In Strife all are diverse in form and separate,
but in Love they come together and long for one another. From 20
these are all that was and is and will be; trees grew, and men and
women and animals and birds and fish that are nourished in water
and long-lived gods, highest in honours.53 For those things are
themselves, but they come to be of different kinds as they pene- 25
trate one another; such change does their mixture effect.

And he added a clear example of different things coming to be from

the same things [DK 31B23]:

As when painters decorate offerings, men who are knowledge- 160,1

able about their craft through their skill, when they take in their
hands pigments of many colours, mixing in proportion more of
some and less of others, from these they fashion likenesses of all 5
sorts of things, creating trees and men and women and animals
and birds and fish that are nourished in water and long-lived
gods, highest in honours; so do not you deceive your mind,
thinking that the source of all the limitless number of mortal 10
things that visibly come to be is anything other. But know this
clearly, having heard the tale from a god.
 68 Translation
And that he is thinking of these many things in the world which has
come to be, and not merely of Strife and Love, is clear from his saying
that trees and men and women and animals have come to be from
15 them. And he shows that they change into one another when he says
[DK 31B26, 1-2]: ‘And they rule in turn through the cycle of time, and
they perish into one another and increase in their portion of fate’. And
he shows that even things which come to be and are destroyed attain
eternity through their succession when he says [DK 31B26, 11-12 (=
20 31B17, 12-13)]: ‘But in so far as they never cease these continual
changes, in that way they are forever immovable in their cycle.’ That
he too is hinting at a twofold world-order, one intelligible and one
perceptible, one divine and one perishable, one containing these
things as paradigm, the other as image, is clear from his saying that
25 not merely generated and perishable things consist of these, but the
gods too, unless one were to interpret this as merely his customary
usage.54 One might also think that he is hinting at the twofold
world-order in the following [DK 31B22]:

For these, bright sun and earth and heaven and sea, are all
161,1 united with their own parts, such as wandered off and came to
be in mortal beings. Similarly such as enter into a more suffi-
cient mixture have loved one another, made like by Aphrodite.
Hostile things keep furthest apart from one another in their
5 generation and their mixture and their moulded forms, in every
way inappropriate to unite and very grim in their births in
strife, since their births are in anger.55

For he has also shown that these things have been fitted together in
mortal beings, but it is rather in intelligible things that they have
been made one and ‘have loved one another, made like by Aphrodite’,
and even though [this takes place] everywhere, it is [especially]
10 intelligible things which are united by love, but perceptible things,
which are controlled by strife and torn further apart in their genera-
tive mixture, in their moulded and image-like forms constitute things
born in strife and inappropriate to unite with one another.56 And that
Empedocles too postulated coming-to-be through combination and
15 separation is shown by what is set out right at the beginning [DK
31B17, 1-2]: ‘At one time one thing grew to be alone from many, at
another many grew apart again from one’, and also by the fact that
coming-to-be and destruction are nothing ‘but only mixture and
separation of what had been mixed’ [DK 31B8, 3], and that coming
20 together and unfolding come to be through fate.

187a26-31 Anaxagoras seems to have thought them [i.e. the

principles] infinite in this way because he accepted as true the
 Translation 69
general opinion of the natural philosophers that nothing comes
to be from what is not (that is why they say ‘All things were
together’, and that coming to be such and such amounts to
alteration, though some say combination and separation).
In this section Aristotle, rivalling Plato’s generosity, is not seeking to
undertake an examination of long-dead nonentities whose views are
in every way irrational, nor to ignore them, as condemned by default; 162,1
instead he sets out some arguments by which they were led to their
apparently absurd views. First he puts Anaxagoras on the stand,57
since he proposes, having dealt with those who say that what there
is is one, to examine those who postulate infinitely many things. For
the view of those who say that the principle is one and unchanging
appears more absurd, since it abolishes both principle and nature, 5
and next comes the view of those who posit infinitely many principles,
since it makes them indefinable and unknowable. Once these have
been examined there is left for consideration the view which posits a
finite plurality. So he says that Anaxagoras was led to his theory of
the homoiomeries by two reasons, one of which was his thinking that
‘the common opinion of the natural philosophers is true’, viz. ‘that
nothing comes to be from what is not’ (187a27-9), but that everything 10
which comes to be has its coming-to-be from what there is. And indeed
Parmenides showed that what really is is ungenerated by arguing
that it comes to be neither from what is (for there was nothing in
being prior to it) nor from what is not; for it must come to be from
something, but what is not is nothing. The additional reason why
what comes to be must always come to be from what is was wonder-
fully stated by Parmenides. For in general, he says, if it comes to be 15
from what is not, what chance determined it to come to be then, at
the time it came to be, but not earlier or later? He writes as follows
[DK 28B8, 6-10]:

For what generation do you seek for it? In what way and whence
did it arise? I shall not allow you to say or to think ‘from what is
not’; for that it is not is neither sayable nor thinkable. And what 20
need would have urged it to grow later or earlier, beginning from
nothing?

Melissus also demonstrated the ungenerability of what is by using

this common principle. He writes as follows [DK 30B1]:

What was, always was, and always will be. For if it came to be,
it is necessary that before it came to be there was nothing. Now 25
if there was nothing,58 in no way could anything come to be from
nothing.
 70 Translation
Now Anaxagoras, accepting this as a principle, that nothing comes to
be from what is not, seems to have used an argument virtually on the
following lines: What comes to be comes to be either from what is or
from what is not. But coming to be from what is not is impossible. So
it comes to be from what is. But if so, from what is already in that
30 from which it is [i.e. from which it comes to be]. For it does not seem
to come in from anywhere outside, when wasps come to be from
horses or air from water.59 So there are in the homoiomery flesh, bone,
blood, gold, lead, sweet and white, but they are imperceptible to us
because of their smallness, as everything is in everything. For how is
163,1 it apparently the case that everything comes from everything (even if
via other intermediate stages), if everything were not in everything?
Each thing presents the appearance of what most predominates in it,
and is named accordingly. For this thing cannot be purely white or
black or sweet or flesh or bone, but the nature of the thing appears to
5 be that of which it has most, since everything is always in everything.
‘For nothing’, says Anaxagoras [DK 59B17], ‘either comes to be or is
destroyed, but they are mixed together and separated from existing
things’. That is why he begins his treatise with ‘All things were
together’.
Alexander says that the words ‘coming to be such and such
10 amounts to alteration’ (187a30) refer to Anaxagoras; because likewise
in his On Coming to Be he [i.e. Aristotle] censures Anaxagoras for
calling combination and separation (by which he says things come to
be) alteration, adding, ‘though Anaxagoras was ignorant of the appro-
priate term’ [GC 314a13]. So he [i.e. Aristotle] says that [according to
Anaxagoras] the coming-to-be and destruction of such and such
amounts to alteration, though he did not apply the appropriate term,
15 alteration, to combination and separation.60 Porphyry attributes ‘All
things were together’ to Anaxagoras, but ‘Coming to be is alteration’
to Anaximenes, and combination and separation to Democritus and
Empedocles. Anaxagoras states clearly in the first book of his Physics
that coming-to-be and destruction are combination and separation,
20 writing as follows [DK 59B17]: ‘The Greeks do not have the correct
view of coming-to-be and destruction. For nothing comes to be or is
destroyed, but they are combined together and separated from exist-
ing things. And so they would be right to call coming-to-be
combination and destruction separation.’ All of this, ‘All things were
25 together’ and coming-to-be by alteration or by combination and sepa-
ration, is cited to support the view that nothing comes to be from what
is not, but that what comes to be comes to be from what is; for
alteration is something that happens to what is, and combination and
separation to things that are.
 Translation 71

187a31-b7 Also from the coming-to-be of the opposites from one

another; so they were already present. For if everything which 30
comes to be does so either from things which are or things which
are not, and if of these alternatives it is impossible to come to be
from things which are not (which all writers on nature agree),
they thought that the remaining alternative necessarily fol-
lowed, that things come to be from things which are and which
are already present, but imperceptible to us because of their
small size. That is why they said that everything is mixed in
everything, because they saw everything coming to be from
everything. Things appear different and are called by different
names from one another according to what is quantitatively
predominant in the mixture of infinite[ly many] things. For
nothing is, taken as a whole, absolutely white or black or sweet
or flesh or bone, but it is what each thing has most of, that
appears to be the nature of the thing.
This is the second reason he gives for Anaxagoras’ having posited the
homoiomeries as principles. For if the opposites are destructive, not
naturally productive, of one another, but it appears that the opposites
come to be from their opposites, what else would one suppose than
that the opposites which are already present in their opposites are 35
separated out? For they could not come into being from them.61 And
it appears absurd that opposites should be present in their opposites,
but in many cases the opposites are present together with one an- 164,1
other, not merely by juxtaposition, but also by mixture.62 Yet if
someone were to say that the opposite comes from the opposite as its
productive cause, that is in itself absurd, since everything produces
what is similar to itself. Having added to the previous one this second
reason for Anaxagoras’ giving this account of coming-to-be, he con- 5
cludes that what is said next, containing the argument and the
demonstration that what appears to come into being is already
present and separated out, is based on both premises, that nothing
comes to be from what is not and that the opposites seem to come to
be from their opposites.

187b7-13 Now if the infinite is unknowable qua infinite, the 10

infinite in number or size is quantitatively unknowable, and the
infinite in kind is qualitatively unknowable. And if the princi-
ples are infinite both in number and in kind, it is impossible to
know what is composed of them. For we think that we know the
compound when we know what kind of things and how many
things it is composed of.
Having first set out what is persuasive in Anaxagoras’ view, so that
it should not be thought that the theory was refuted through weak-
 72 Translation
ness of advocacy,63 he turns to demolishing it. Anaxagoras set out
many conclusions or doctrines, and Aristotle seems to reply more or
15 less to each. That things were unlimited he says right at the start [DK
59B1]: ‘All things were together, unlimited both in quantity and in
smallness’. And that in the principles there is no smallest and no
largest thing [DK 59B3]: ‘For neither of the small’ he says ‘is there a
least, but always a lesser. For what is cannot not be.64 And also in the
case of the large there is always a larger. And it is equal to the small
in quantity, but in relation to itself each thing is both large and small.’
20 For if everything is in everything and everything is separated out
from everything, even from what appears smallest there will be
separated out something smaller than it, and what appears largest
has been separated out from something larger than it. He says clearly
[DK 59B11] that: ‘In everything there is a portion of everything
except Mind, and there are things in which Mind is also present’. And
again [DK 59B12, 1-2] that: ‘Other things share a portion of every-
25 thing, but Mind is something unlimited and self-controlling and is not
mixed with anything’. Elsewhere [DK 59B6] he says this: ‘When there
are equal portions of the large and the small in quantity, in that way
too everything would be in everything. Nor can they be separate, but
everything shares a portion of everything. When there cannot be the
smallest, it could not be separated, nor be on its own, but as at the
30 beginning all things must be together now. In everything many
things are present, and of the things that are separated off the
165,1 quantity is equal in the larger and in the smaller.’ And here is what
Anaxagoras says in asserting that each of the perceptible homoiomer-
ies comes to be and to be characterised through the putting together
of similars; his words are [DK 59B12, 29-30]: ‘What a thing has most
of in it, that each single thing most clearly is and was’. He seems also
5 to say that Mind is unable to discriminate them when it tries to do so.
In reply to these doctrines of Anaxagoras Aristotle replies first to the
thesis that the principles are infinite.
Porphyry says that his [i.e. Aristotle’s] attack is directed in com-
mon against Leucippus and Democritus and Metrodorus and all who
10 say that the elements are infinite. Since there are two kinds of
infinity, infinity in quantity and in quality, and two kinds of quanti-
tative infinity, infinity in number and in size, all the above-mentioned
say that the elements are infinite in number, while Leucippus and
Democritus are speaking of infinity in size in saying that the void is
infinite, but Anaxagoras seems to say that the homoiomeries are
infinite [i.e. infinitely diverse] in kind, since, he says, of the things
which are infinite ‘Nothing different is like anything different’ [DK
15 59B12, 28]. Now if everything infinite is incomprehensible in so far
as it is infinite, and what is incomprehensible is unknowable, the
principles and the elements of which everything is composed would
be unknowable; so the things which come from the principles would
 Translation 73
also be unknowable. ‘For we think that we know each thing, when-
ever we recognise its causes and first principles’ (184a12-14). The
upshot is that people who try to gain some knowledge of reality from 20
these suppositions achieve its opposite, ignorance. The critical argu-
ment, which Aristotle has set out concisely, is virtually this: the
homoiomeries are infinite in kind and in number, the infinite is
unknowable qua infinite, so the homoiomeries are unknowable. If you
add that the homoiomeries are principles of the things that there are,
you will draw the conclusion that the things that there are have 25
principles which are unknowable. And if you further add that things
whose principles are unknowable are themselves unknowable, you
will draw the conclusion that the things that there are are unknow-
able, since their principles are infinite. He showed that things whose
principles are unknowable are themselves unknowable in the words
‘We think we know the compound when we know what and how many
things it is composed of’ (187b11-13). Now Anaxagoras said that the
number of kinds which are principles is infinite in this way, namely 30
incomprehensible by us, not infinite by nature, as he makes clear in
the following words [DK 59B12, 15-19]:

Mind knew all the things which are mixed together and sepa-
rated off and separated apart. And such as were to be and such
as were and as many things as now are and such as will be,65 all
of them Mind set in order. 166,1

So if they are knowable to Mind, they would not be infinite in nature,

except66 that what Aristotle says is true, viz. that if the kinds of the
principles are unknowable, the things that come from them are
unknowable too.
It should be understood that Porphyry, as I said, thinks that the
reply is directed in common against all those who assume that the
elements are infinite. Alexander, however, understands it as aimed 5
at Anaxagoras alone, and perhaps it gives a better argument if
understood in that way. For even if Democritus and Leucippus as-
sumed that the principles are infinite in number, all the same they
assumed that their kind and nature is one and limited. So in their
view the principle would not be unknowable, since they postulated
neither the shapes [i.e. atoms] nor anything else as infinite in kind. But
since Anaxagoras assumes that the principles are infinite not only in 10
number but also in kind, he has to accept the apparently absurd
conclusion that what comes from the principles is unknowable also.

187b13-21 Further, if it is necessary that something whose

parts can be of any size you please, large or small, can itself be
so (I mean the kind of part into which the whole is divided as an
 74 Translation
actual constituent), and if it is impossible that an animal or
plant can be of any size you please, large or small, it is clear that
neither can any part whatever; for [in that case] the whole will
be so too. Flesh and bone and things like that are parts of an
animal, and the fruits [parts] of plants. Now it is clear that it is
impossible for flesh or bone or anything else to be whatever size
you please, large or small.
15 Anaxagoras says [DK 59B3] that: ‘Neither of the small is there a
least, but always a lesser’ nor is there a largest. That is clear from his
own words, and also from the following words of Theophrastus in the
second book of his On Anaxagoras [FHSG 235]:

Moreover, saying that everything is in everything on the ground

that they are infinite in largeness and in smallness, and that it is
20 not possible to find the largest or the smallest, is unconvincing.

Aristotle not only refutes this, but at the same time demonstrates in
advance that there being a smallest size would be useful to him [i.e.
Anaxagoras] in practically everything which he says subsequently, by
an argument of this kind: if the parts of a whole can be of any size you
like, large or small (for this is what it is for neither the smallest nor
25 the largest to have been defined), then the whole itself can be of any
size you like, large or small. But the whole cannot be of any size you
like. Therefore, by the second hypothetical the parts cannot be of any
size you like.67 He sets out the conditional as something obvious. For
it is clear that if something is composed of parts such as feet and
hands and head and these can be larger or smaller without limit, it is
30 clear that what gets its being from the combination of those things
will be larger when they are larger, and smaller when they are
smaller. And that will go on to infinity, to whatever point on the
167,1 continuum of largeness and smallness is proportional to the small-
ness or largeness of the parts themselves. The additional assumption
he also derives from things that are obvious. For the wholes which
are combined and composed of the homoiomeries, e.g. any kind of
animal or plant, cannot be of any size you like (for it is not possible
for a man or a fig tree to be the size of a grain of millet or of a
5 mountain); their size has defined upper and lower limits. Therefore
each of the parts into which they are divided likewise has limits on
its size. And it is not possible to have flesh of any size you like, since
flesh is part of an animal; for then the animal of which it is part would
be of any size you like. It is from homoiomeries of that kind that
10 animals are composed, according to Anaxagoras, and divided into
them; on his view there is nothing further than them. So they too have
definite limits on their size; within those limits a thing remains of the
same kind [but not if it goes beyond them]. And if anyone says that
 Translation 75
every magnitude is divisible to infinity, and that it is therefore
possible to have something smaller than whatever you take, let him
know that the homoiomeries are not simply magnitudes, but magni-
tudes of certain kinds, flesh, bone, lead, gold etc., which cannot be 15
divided to infinity while preserving their kind. As magnitudes, they
too can be divided to infinity, but as flesh and bone they cannot.68
Those are the principles which Anaxagoras posited, and they are not
divisible. And the whole is composed of those parts into which it is
divided by actual separation, e.g. the homoiomeries, not bodies qua
bodies. Which is why Aristotle was careful to add ‘I mean the kind of 20
part into which the whole is divided as an actual constituent’ (187b15-
16). For the whole is not divided into bodies qua bodies, but into
amounts of flesh,69 bones etc., which are also indestructible according
to Anaxagoras. So they could not undergo division to the point which
would bring about their ceasing to be of their specific kind. Now the
parts which result from division to infinity are not present as actual 25
constituents, but merely potentially. Besides, Aristotle put in that
remark with an eye to what are spoken of as parts of something, but
into which the whole is not divided, for instance the matter and the
form are spoken of as parts of the body.
Alexander says: ‘He [i.e. Aristotle] used the expression “and the 30
fruits [parts] of plants” (187b19) meaning “the seeds”, for it is the
latter that plants are composed of. That is why a little later he names
the seed rather than the fruit as part of the plant, in the words “so
that neither flesh nor bone nor the seed of plants could be of any size
you like; for it is of these that either kind of thing is composed.”’ But 168,1
the texts I have come across do not contain these words, nor this other
passage which Alexander cites: ‘“So if animals and plants cannot be
so large or so many, that is”, he [i.e. Aristotle] says, “if neither as
continuous nor as discrete can they extend to infinity, nor will their 5
parts be as large as you like, increasing or diminishing to infinity.”’70
But notice that what he [i.e. Aristotle] says refers to size only, not to
number, which Alexander says is contrasted, in the sense of discrete
number, with size. For he did not base his demonstration on the
argument that things are not composed of parts infinite in number,71
and indeed he would have been interpreted incorrectly if having said 10
‘so if animals and plants cannot be so large or so many’, he were taken
as saying that they extended to infinity neither in size nor in number.
For to say ‘so large’ is not the same as to say ‘as large as you like’,
which signifies decrease or increase in size to infinity.72 ‘And he [i.e.
Aristotle] mentions the seed’ he [i.e. Alexander] says ‘since there are
according to Anaxagoras certain homoiomeries from the multiplica- 15
tion of which plants come into being, and the differences of plants
come into being from the differences of the seeds which multiply in
them.’ But the seed from which the plant comes into being is not one
of ‘the parts into which the whole is divided as an actual constituent’
 76 Translation
[v. supr.], nor in the animal is the seed, from which it comes into
being, preserved as one of the parts into which the animal is divided.
20 It appears that the majority of copies which contain the words ‘and
the fruits [parts] of plants’ are correct. For just like shoots and leaves,
the fruit and pericarp are parts of fruit-bearing plants, and the whole
is divided into those parts, which are present in it and capable of
being separated. That may suffice on the question of textual error.
25 Perhaps someone might say, on behalf of Anaxagoras, that if each
animal or plant contained a single constructive homoiomery out of the
different kinds of homoiomeries, e.g. one for flesh and one for bone
and one for blood, to the increase and decrease of the homoiomeries
there would necessarily correspond the differences in size of the
animals and plants. But if they contain a number of each sort of
30 homoiomery, e.g. many little bits of flesh, where would be the absurd-
ity in purging away flesh to infinity, but leaving the animal?73 But if
there are many little bits of flesh, they are either finite in number or
infinite. And if they are finite, e.g. three or four or ten thousand, the
size of the smallest and the largest would be finite, but if they are
infinite in number, a magnitude composed of an infinite number of
168,1 magnitudes must be infinite. For what is finite is divided into finite
parts, as Aristotle himself argues.74

187b22-34 Further, if all such things are present in one an-

other, and do not come into being but are there and are
extracted, and things are named according to their predominant
element, and anything comes to be from anything (e.g. water
being extracted from flesh and flesh from water), and every
finite body is exhausted by a finite body, it is clear then that it
is impossible for everything to be in everything. For once flesh
has been extracted from the water, and again more flesh from
the remainder by separation, even if what is extracted is smaller
every time, all the same it will not exceed a certain magnitude in
smallness.75 So if the extraction comes to an end, not everything
will be in everything (for in the remaining water no flesh will be
present), and if it does not come to an end, but will always have
[further] subtraction, in a finite magnitude there will be an infinite
number of finite equal magnitudes. But that is impossible.
5 Alexander says that it is by using the argument set out immediately
above76 that Aristotle now demonstrates that coming to be does not
occur by extraction, and that it is not the case that everything is in
everything, as Anaxagoras thought. So taking it as agreed that there
is a smallest body, something expressed in the words ‘even if what is
extracted is always smaller, all the same it will not exceed a certain
10 magnitude in smallness’ (187b29-30) (since it is clear that it will not
exceed the smallest body in smallness), now if one for example
 Translation 77
extracted the smallest amount of flesh from water, it having been shown
that there is a defined smallest size,77 and again another smallest, and
went on doing this, either the extraction will come to an end, since it has
been defined that there is a smallest, and the water which is left will not
contain any more flesh and so it is not the case that everything will be
in everything nor will everything be extracted from everything, or, if 15
it does not come to an end, this water from which the flesh was
extracted will have a certain definite magnitude, and if that is so, there
will be in it infinitely many amounts of flesh equal to one another; for
there will be in it infinitely many smallest amounts of flesh, equal to
one another in magnitude. But that is impossible because it was
specified that there is a smallest amount of flesh, than which a smaller
amount could not be extracted. For it was demonstrated in the previous
section that the smallest amount of flesh has been specified,78 and that 20
being so it is impossible that flesh should be extracted ad infinitum from
this amount of water, but it must come to an end; so that it is not the case
that everything will be extracted from everything. But, he says, if it were
always possible to take a smaller amount from whatever had been ex-
tracted, the extraction would not have come to an end, as in the case of the
largest. That is the interpretation of Alexander and Themistius.
But it may be possible to establish the present argument even 25
without the previously demonstrated conclusion,79 if Aristotle is now
perhaps agreeing in a way to their positing what he there showed to
be impossible, that there can be a magnitude of any size you like,80
when he says ‘even if what is extracted is always smaller, all the same
it will not exceed a certain magnitude in smallness’ (187b29-30). And
I think that Aristotle is not showing without qualification that the 30
extraction comes to an end,81 but that both from its coming to an end
and from its not coming to an end there follows an absurd conse-
quence for those who say that everything is in everything and that 170,1
everything is extracted from everything, and who maintain that
‘comes to be’ says the same thing.82 For both these assertions are
refuted by extraction’s coming to an end. For if the extraction of flesh
from this amount of water comes to an end, it is not the case that
everything will be in everything nor that everything will be extracted
from everything. For in the water that is left no flesh will be present.
But if they were to say that it does not come to an end, but it is always 5
possible to take away more, in this finite magnitude of water there
will be infinitely many magnitudes, which is impossible. It seems to
me that Alexander’s interpretation relies on the expressions ‘equal
finite magnitudes’ (187b33-4) and ‘it will not exceed a certain magni-
tude in smallness’ (187b30). For in each extraction, he says, a certain
number of smallest magnitudes will be extracted, and so the things 10
that are removed will always be in a way equal, since they are all
smallest. What would be the absurdity in there being many smallest
things, which are yet not equal, rather than just magnitudes?83 For,
 78 Translation
he says ‘even if what is extracted were always smaller, all the same
it will not exceed a certain magnitude in smallness’ (187b29-30). This
is to say that even if one concedes to them that you can always get
15 smaller magnitudes from the smaller, it would never get beyond
being a magnitude in smallness. For the division of magnitudes to
infinity results in magnitudes. But the person who says that every-
thing is in everything says that it is in it actually, not potentially, as
in the case of things which are divided to infinity. It is possible to
understand ‘equal’ applied to ‘finite magnitudes’ as equivalent to
20 ‘similar finite magnitudes’. And if being finite is a property of quan-
tity, it is more proper to speak of equal finite than similar finite
magnitudes.84 So the whole argument refutes the theses that every-
thing is in everything and that everything comes to be or is extracted
from everything by relying on the premiss that every finite body is
measured and exhausted by a finite body (187b25-6), which he him-
self [i.e. Aristotle] expressed by ‘is done away with’ in the correct
25 texts.85 For if you continually subtract from a finite cubit a finite
quantity, the cubit will cease to exist. And let the subtraction be not
theoretical, which will never come to an end, but the subtraction of
parts actually present in it, however small. Having assumed that, he
demonstrates that it is not possible for each to be in each, that is for
30 everything to be in everything, or everything to be extracted from
everything, as follows: if there were extracted from the water an
amount of flesh, and again another, even if the one that is extracted
is always smaller, all the same it will have some magnitude. One
must also assume the following as a premiss of the demonstration;
either the extraction will stop or it will not stop. But if it stops, it is
not the case that everything will be in everything (for no flesh will be
left in the water which remains); and if it does not stop, but there will
35 always be further subtraction, in a finite magnitude there will be an
171,1 infinite number of similarly finite magnitudes, which is impossible.
For according to the premiss the finite magnitude will itself cease to
exist through the finitely repeated removal of one of the finite mag-
nitudes contained in it. So there will not be an infinite number of
finite magnitudes in a finite magnitude. It is clear that, as I said, the
5 subtraction is not to be done in accordance with theoretical division
to infinity; in that sense it would not come to an end, nor is the
conclusion absurd, that something finite is composed of things
divided to infinity. In those cases the infinity is potential, not
actual. But Anaxagoras’ extraction is that of an infinity of actually
present [parts].

10 187b35-188a2 Moreover, if every body necessarily becomes

smaller when something is removed from it, and flesh has a
maximum and a minimum size, it is clear that no body will be
 Translation 79
extracted from the smallest amount of flesh. For [in that case]
there will be something smaller than the smallest.
He assails the theses that everything is in everything and that
everything is extracted from everything by this further argument. He
assumes here too the evident premiss that every body must become
smaller when something is subtracted, since it becomes larger when
something is added, and in addition to this premiss uses here the 15
previously demonstrated thesis that there is no amount of flesh of any
size you like, but the smallest is a definite amount, just as the largest.
Given these assumptions, one can reason as follows: if something is
extracted from the smallest amount of flesh, there will be some
amount of flesh from which an amount smaller than the smallest was
extracted. But that is impossible; for the smallest was that than
which there is no smaller amount of flesh. So no body whatever will 20
be extracted from the smallest amount of flesh. And the conclusion is
true because of the premiss. And the additional assumption is evi-
dent. And if from the smallest amount of flesh it is impossible for any
body to be extracted, it will not be the case that everything is in
everything or that everything is extracted from everything. And
another absurdity follows from the assumption that something will
be extracted from the smallest amount of flesh; there will no longer
be any flesh after the extraction, for what is smaller than the smallest 25
amount of flesh will not be flesh. So it has been destroyed qua flesh.
So the homoiomeries are destructible, which he [i.e. Anaxagoras] does
not admit.86 So it is not the case that everything is in everything or
comes to be from everything.87

188a2-5 Further, in the infinite bodies there would be present

infinite flesh and blood and brain, separate from one another,88
but being no less real, and each infinite. This is absurd. 30
The fifth criticism, expressed in these words, is I think the most
serious to which Anaxagoras’ theory is subject, if one takes it at face
value;89 the attack is directed against the entire supposition that the
principles are homoiomeries infinite in quantity and that everything 172,1
is mixed in everything. Anaxagoras states that right at the beginning
of his treatise, saying [DK 59B1.1-2]: ‘All things were together,
infinite in quantity and in smallness’. For the small too was infinite.
And he often says that ‘In everything there is a portion of everything
except Mind’ [DK 59B11]. So if the homoiomeries are infinite and
everything is in each, there would actually exist infinite flesh and 5
blood and brain. For the infinite quantity of amounts of flesh which
are in the infinite homoiomeries make the whole of flesh infinite in
size, and similarly blood and brain, and obviously gold and each of the
others. So there will be a numerical plurality of infinite magnitudes,
 80 Translation
10 or rather an infinite number (for there is one for each homoiomery),
which is absurd. For an infinite magnitude is that which has no
magnitude external to it. And the infinity is not potential, as in the
case of things which come to be or are divided to infinity, but already
actual; for they already exist ‘separate from one another’, and ‘being
no less real’ (188a3-4) than the things in which they are. And even
15 more absurd is their being separate from another and yet infinite; for
things which are separate from one another are limited in relation to
one another. He [i.e. Aristotle] says that these infinite things are
‘separate’ not merely because flesh and bone and each of the others is
in the infinite separate homoiomeries, but because Anaxagoras him-
self says ‘Nothing is like anything else’. So they are themselves
20 separate in their particular nature from one another. The conclusion
which Aristotle draws will seem yet more absurd for another reason.
If the homoiomeries are infinite and everything is in everything,
everything would be in each of the homoiomeries, which are infinite.
And everything will be in each of the infinitely many in this one. And
so in every homoiomery there would be infinite amounts of flesh and
25 bones and blood and brain and all the other things, which are infinite.
And it follows that this goes on to infinity, since each thing contains
everything, and each of the things in that thing contains everything,
and this though everything is always assumed to be actual, not
potential.90 So there is a manifold absurdity in such a supposition;
that in a finite magnitude there should be an infinite magnitude is
absurd, and it is even more absurd that they should be infinite and
infinitely many times infinite. For the infinite things will be in this
30 little bit of flesh, and infinite things in each of the infinite things, and
so on to infinity. And it is absurd that the infinite things should be
separate from one another, not merely because separate things are
limited by one another, but because an infinite magnitude cannot be
composed of separate parts. For then there would be something larger
173,1 than the infinite. For the distance between the separate parts of the
infinite added to the infinite would be larger than the infinite itself.
And further, the infinitely infinite will be a plurality, infinite both in
quantity and in magnitude, and actual as well, given that ‘since they
5 are separate from one another, each of them is no less infinite’, which
is what he [i.e. Aristotle] means by ‘separate from one another, being
no less real, and each infinite’ (188a3-4).
‘But perhaps’, says Alexander, ‘this is not the way to criticise the
theory. For perhaps Anaxagoras was not applying the thesis that
10 everything is mixed in everything to the principles, giving the result
that in each of the principles there is everything (for then they would
no longer be principles, since they would be compounds), but was
saying that everything was mixed in each of the perceptible bodies
that are compounded from the principles. For it is from these that
things come to be and extractions occur. For the pure elements are
 Translation 81
neither perceptible at the beginning, nor do they even exist in them-
selves, since it is not possible for them to be separated off. But
someone who says this does nothing more than transfer the objection 15
to the compounds. For if each of the perceptible things is a mixture of
everything, which appears such and such according to what predomi-
nates in the mixing, and if everything in the compounds too is
characterised differently according to the predominance of each of the
infinite homoiomeries, and all such things are extracted, since every-
thing comes from everything; hence the perceptible things too will be 20
infinite. So if each of them is a mixture of everything, flesh would be
infinite both in quantity and in size. And similarly each of the other
kinds will be infinite. For in what is extracted everything will once
again be present and will be extracted. And the same will be said
about those things that are extracted. And so on to infinity; for the 25
things that are extracted are perceptible mixtures, since things that
were unmixed at the beginning cannot be extracted’. This is how
Alexander adduces what purports to help the theory but then refutes
that too.91
Perhaps Anaxagoras’ theory would be more plausible if it did not
say that from a single perceptible thing some perceptible thing will 30
be extracted, e.g. from this amount of flesh alone perceptible bone and
from that again some other perceptible thing, but that everything is
in each perceptible thing but is imperceptible, and everything will be
extracted from each of the perceptible things, but will remain imper-
ceptible, until from more perceptible things more things of the same
kind are extracted and combined, and so become perceptible, in that
while everything is once again present in each of the compounds, each 35
is characterised by what predominates in it. But even if they [i.e. the
adherents of the theory] were to say that, first of all either it will not
be the case that every perceptible thing will come from every percep-
tible thing, as they maintain, or the ‘infinitely many times infinite’ 174,1
conclusion92 will follow as before. Further, though it were true to say
of the elements that they are infinite in quantity, if in a finite
perceptible thing there are present an infinite quantity of ho-
moiomeries, it would be absurd as before. If, however, in describing
the elements as infinite Anaxagoras did not mean that they are in
reality infinite and innumerable, but merely incomprehensible to us, 5
though in themselves finite and bounded in nature and in number (if,
as he says ‘Mind knew all the things that were mixed together and
separated off and separated apart, and such as were to be and such
as were and as many things as now are and such as will be,93 all of
them Mind set in order’. Yet if the elements and the compounds of the
elements were in kind actually infinite in quantity [i.e. were of 10
infinitely many kinds], not even Mind would have known them or set
them in order. For setting in order is a certain arrangement, but
arrangement does not apply to infinites, and knowledge is a definite
 82 Translation
conception of the Mind, not an indefinite one, and it applies to
definite94 kinds, not to infinite ones. And that by ‘unlimited’ he does
15 not mean ‘in every way inexhaustible in quantity’ is made clear by the
fact that he describes Mind itself as unlimited, in the words ‘and Mind
is something unlimited and self-controlling’). If then Anaxagoras was
not saying that the elements are infinite in kind, the compounds
formed from them would not be infinite, but finite in kind, and in each
of them there will be finite homoiomeries.
But it does not seem that Anaxagoras simply extracted everything
20 from everything, even though he says that ‘All things were together’.
For plainly in the process of extraction it is the opposites which he
says are extracted from their opposites, not any old things. His words
are [DK 59B12, 21-5]: ‘And this rotation made them be separated out;
the dense is separated out from the rare and the hot from the cold and
the light from the dark and the dry from the wet’, so not any old thing
25 from any old thing, e.g. flesh or brain from water. This will enable
Anaxagoras to escape all the objections brought against him. For if
the principles are not infinite, neither they themselves nor the things
that come from them will be unknowable, nor will there be smaller or
larger infinities, nor will there be extraction to infinity of infinite
forms present in things, but if there are to be arguments against him
they will have to be other arguments, attacking his theory that things
30 come to be by extraction. For how could so much air be extracted from
a ladleful of water if there were no qualitative change? And what is
it that makes a human being from flesh and bones and the rest;
certainly no human is already present in them. And if we see a human
coming from what is not a human, what is there to prevent flesh itself
175,1 coming from what is not flesh through the causation of what makes
the human, whether that is Mind or any other cause? And in general,
if they do not venture to construct non-homoiomerous things like
animals and plants by extraction, why is it necessary for the ho-
moiomerous things to come into being in that way?95 Or why are the
homoiomerous things ungenerated and indestructible, but the things
5 formed from them generated and destructible? After all, wholes are
superior to parts. And it is worth pointing out that Anaxagoras treats
the brain as a homoiomerous thing, though it is an organic part, with
veins and arteries supplying it and membranes dividing it.

188a5-13 That they will never be separated is not an expression

10 of knowledge, but it is correct. For properties are inseparable.
So suppose that colours and states are mixed together; if they
are separated, there will be a certain white and a certain
healthy which are not anything else, nor [said] of a subject. So
Mind is absurd in seeking the impossible, if it wants to separate,
but to do so is impossible in respect both of quantity and of
 Translation 83
quality, in respect of quantity because there is no smallest size,
and in respect of quality because properties are inseparable.
Anaxagoras says [DK 59B12, 26-7]: ‘Nor is one thing separated off or
apart from another’ because everything is in everything, and else-
where he says [DK 59B8]: ‘Nor is either the hot cut off with an axe
from the cold or the cold from the hot’ (for nothing is purely by itself).
This, he [i.e. Aristotle] says, is not an expression of knowledge; for it
is not through everything’s being in everything that non-separation 15
results, but it results nonetheless. Therefore even if saying this does
not express knowledge, it is correct all the same. For affections, i.e.
attributes, are inseparable from substance, e.g. colours and states. If
the attribute is separated from the mixture of substance and attrib-
utes it will be no longer an attribute but a substance, as subsisting of 20
itself and not having its being in a substance; that is what he [i.e.
Aristotle] calls ‘not [said] of a subject’ (188a8-9). Eudemus puts it well
[fr. 46 Wehrli]: ‘Not only is it not possible to separate affections from
substances, but it is not even possible for all affections to be there
together, so that everything is in everything. Heat and knowledge
cannot be there together, but only things that can be mixed, and in
general a mixture is of separate things. What are separate are things 25
which are in their own right, or can be, at least. Things of that kind
are substances; therefore it is bodies that are mixed together. Of
these, we say that liquids are blended, and that solid things such as
seeds or sheep have been mixed up together, but we do not say that
white and man or knowledge and soul have been mixed. Each of these
belongs only to those things of which they are predicated. What
things have been mixed and how everything was together has been 30
more clearly delineated, since it is not the case that everything is
mixed with everything, so that not everything comes from everything.
For from white there comes, not a line, but black or grey.’ I have set
down these words of Eudemus as appropriate to the context.
But how can Mind want to separate the homoiomeries, if it is set 176,1
in charge of things to separate them and has that function, but to do
so is impossible? Attempting the impossible is appropriate to some-
thing mindless rather than to Mind. It is impossible for them to be
separated either quantitatively or qualitatively. Quantitatively, be-
cause the smallest part will not turn up, for otherwise the extraction
will stop.96 For if the smallest amount of flesh is separated off, a 5
smaller amount than that cannot be separated off. The nature of the
smallest part is quantitative separation.97 For as long as it is possible
to get something smaller than what you have got, the quantity has
not been separated. But if it stops at the indivisible, it has been
separated. But this is impossible. For it will not stop, not because of
division to infinity, as Alexander understood it, but because [on that
supposition] the extraction will stop [contrary to Anaxagoras’ hypo-
 84 Translation
10 thesis].98 But it [i.e. Mind] cannot separate them qualitatively either,
since affections are inseparable from matter. So if quantitative sepa-
ration is [identical with] stopping in the smallest quantity, and
qualitative is the separation of form from matter, both are impossible,
the former according to Anaxagoras (for stopping in the smallest is
inconsistent with everything’s being in everything), the latter accord-
ing to Aristotle, who regards qualities as inseparable. So Mind is
absurd either in being ignorant of what is impossible or in knowingly
15 attempting the impossible. Let this suffice for the interpretation of
Aristotle.
As far as I can see, Anaxagoras does not say straight out that Mind
wants to separate the homoiomeries, but that to do so is impossible
(188a9-10), but rather that it is Mind which moves things and makes
20 them rotate and sets them in order and is the cause of the entire
extraction. For having said that Mind is the cause of the rotation he
adds [DK 59B12, 21-5]: ‘It is this rotation which caused them to be
separated out, and the dense is separated out from the rare and the
hot from the cold and the light from the dark and the dry from the
wet’. Then a little later [DK 59B12, 26-7]: he adds, ‘nor is one
25 separated out or separated apart from another’. So it is clear that ‘the
dense is separated out from the rare’ and what follows is said in one
sense, and ‘nor is one separated out from another’ in another. The
former is about the coming to be from one another, not of everything
(for a line is not separated off from white), but of the opposites, while
the latter says that ‘the things in the same world are not separate
from one another, nor are they cut off with an axe’, as he says
30 elsewhere [DK 59B8]. They are together with one another and united
in one another. In Anaxagoras’ view the kinds owe both their separa-
tion and their unity to Mind. He celebrates it worthily in the words
[DK 59B12, 1-3]: ‘Mind is something infinite and self-controlling and
it is mixed with nothing, but alone is itself by itself’, and again [DK
177,1 59B12, 9-19]: ‘for of all things it is the finest and purest, and it has all
thought about everything and the greatest power, and such things,
both greater and lesser, as have soul, all of them Mind controls, and
Mind controlled the entire rotation. And the things that are mixed
together and separated off and separated apart, all of them Mind
5 knew. And such as were to be, and such as were, and as many as now
are, and such as will be, all of them Mind set in order.’99 So in
Anaxagoras’ view Mind did not want the impossible, but itself sepa-
rated the kinds in the world by its intellectual separation, while being
apart from them. And the kinds in the world are mixed with one
another both through their archetypal intellectual nature and
through the confusion of their coming-to-be.100 The thing that Socra-
10 tes adduces as a complaint against Anaxagoras in the Phaedo, that
in his particular causal explanations he does not make use of Mind,
but only material accounts,101 is in fact appropriate to natural philoso-
 Translation 85
phy. Indeed, in the Timaeus Plato himself first gives his general
description of the productive cause of everything, and then in his
detailed account cites differences of sizes and shapes as the causes of
heat, cold and the rest.102 But Socrates, wishing to set out his account 15
in terms of the final cause, cited Anaxagoras as making use of the
material cause rather than the final. Let us proceed.

188a13-17 Nor is he correct in his treatment of the coming-to-be

of the homogeneous things. For in one way mud is divided into
quantities of mud,103 but in another not. And it is not the case
that water and air are and come to be from one another in the
same way as bricks from a house and a house from bricks.
When Anaxagoras says that things come to be by extraction and that 20
each is characterised by what predominates in it, since everything is
in everything, it is clear that he wishes to achieve the coming-to-be of
each of the compounds by the putting together of similar things, since
he saw that they divided up into similar things (flesh into pieces of
flesh and bone into bones), and it seems that each thing is divided up
into what it is composed of. It is not, however, necessary that coming- 25
to-be should occur from things of the same kind, especially coming-to-
be from elements; rather it is necessary that it does not occur in that
way. Wholes of a given kind can come to be from parts of the same
kind, e.g. a larger quantity of mud from several smaller quantities of
mud. But something which comes to be from elements comes from
things which are unlike it and simpler in nature, and is divided up
into them, e.g. bricks from earth, water and straw, into which they 30
are divided. And the closer the analysis gets to the elements, the more
it results in what is dissimilar. So the parts of flesh are like it (for
they are amounts of flesh), but their elements are no longer pieces of
flesh, but blood and, going further, the four elements and their 178,1
qualities. Now something of that kind does not come to be by putting
together, in the way a house comes to be from bricks, nor is it divided
into the things that were put together, as a house is into bricks, but
in a different way. It is by alteration that ‘water and air come to be
from one another and are’ (188a16-17), not by putting together or by 5
extraction. For how could so much air have come from a ladleful of
water?104 So it is not by extraction, as Anaxagoras seems to say, but
by change and alteration, as Aristotle and others say. Alexander
explained the structure of the sentence in two ways: ‘Either’, he says,
‘he [i.e. Aristotle] means that he [i.e. Anaxagoras] is not correct in
explaining the coming-to-be of the homoiomeries by putting together,
or that he is not correct in explaining the coming-to-be from the 10
homoiomeries, in which case the words “from the” are omitted from
the sentence’.105
 86 Translation

188a17-18 Better to have fewer and finite, as Empedocles does.

Even though Empedocles and Anaxagoras agree on how things come
15 to be, since both explain it by combination and separation, they
disagree about the number of the elements. And it is ‘better to have
fewer and finite’, as Empedocles did, than more and infinite, like
Anaxagoras. The finite is better than the infinite in being graspable
both in perception and in knowledge, while the infinite is neither
perceptible nor knowable. Moreover, if the task can be carried out by
20 fewer means, why does one need infinitely many more? Since of
things generable and perishable some are generated and others
perish, the destructions of the earlier suffice as principles for the
coming-to-be of the others. Those who, like Democritus, postulate
infinitely many worlds necessarily say that the elements too are
infinite in number, but not even they are obliged to say that they are
25 infinite in kind [i.e. infinitely varied]. But those who, like Anaxagoras
and Empedocles, say that there is a single world, have no need for
infinity; which is why Empedocles does better in saying that the
elements are finite, since he escapes the absurd consequences
previously adduced against the postulation of infinity. But ear-
lier106 I tried to show that Anaxagoras does not say that the
30 elements are infinite in the sense of innumerable.107 But though
finite in kind, Empedocles’ elements, earth, water, air and fire, in
being simpler than what comes from them are more genuine prin-
ciples than those postulated by someone who thinks that the
elements are similar to the things composed of them. Unless, that
is, Anaxagoras posited as elements the simple qualities, which
have the nature of principles, but not the compounds,108 in the
words [DK 59B12, 21-5]:

179,1 It was this rotation which made them separate out, and the
dense is separated from the rare and the cold from the hot and
the bright from the dark and the dry from the wet.

And a little later he says [DK 59B15]:

The dense and dry and cold and the dark came together here
5 where now the earth is, and the rare and the hot and the dry
went out to the extremity of the aithêr.

He says that these most simple things which have the character of
principles are separated off, and that other things of a more com-
pound nature are in some cases coagulated as compounds, in others
separated off, e.g. the earth. He says [DK 59B16]:

From these things which are separated off earth is coagulated;

 Translation 87
for water is separated off from the clouds, and from the water
earth, and from the earth stones are coagulated by the cold. 10

In resorting to the simple kinds in this way Anaxagoras seems to

theorise about the elements in a way which involves more genuine
principles than Empedocles.
Perhaps Aristotle and Plato and, earlier than both, the Pythagore-
ans posited more completely elemental principles in matter and form,
and even more completely those who considered differences of shape 15
closer to matter than qualitiless body and made them underlie the
qualitative differences of the elements, the pyramid for fire and other
shapes for the others.109 Democritus seems to have done well in seeing
that, but he fails in not analysing the simple bodies into form and
matter.
This page intentionally left blank
 Notes

Notes to 1.3
1. The word arkhê is used in a number of senses. Here and in many contexts
the words ‘starting-point’, with the implication that time is involved seems
appropriate, but later on time is not relevant and ‘principle’ seems a better
rendering.
2. This error of Melissus is featured several times in Aristotle’s Topics. See
also n. 72.
3. Throughout this work it is difficult to be consistent in the treatment of the
verb ‘to be’. Simplicius is writing about the views of philosophers who lived up
to a thousand years before him, and who had metaphysical approaches that
involved what some people would regard as a misuse of language. I have used
‘Being’ where there appears to be the idea of an entity such as that described by
Parmenides, but ‘being’ when there is more emphasis on the verbal nature of
what is being referred to. It seems best to write ‘Being’ in this particular context,
but then ‘not-being’ and ‘not being’ as the occasion seems to require. As we also
have ‘exist’, and ‘is/are’ available in English these will also be used. Where I
have seen fit to emphasise the metaphysical aspect of the thought of the Eleatics
by using ‘Being’, Christopher Taylor has preferred to use ‘what is’ for his section
(148,25-179,39).
4. This seems wrong. Aristotle should have been attacking that belief, but I
have kept the text as it stands.
5. Parmenides 128A-B.
6. If the first, then the second; but not the second: therefore not the first.
7. Here it seems better to have ‘not Being’ without the hyphen.
8. Melissus’ arguments, as given by Simplicius, are studied in detail by
Barnes, 1979, who changed his mind on some important points in his revised
edition, 1989, pp. 180-1. While Simplicius is our sole source for exact quotations,
the pseudo-Aristotelian on Melissus Xenophanes and Gorgias is also useful.
9. In this extract the language used is standard Greek, whereas later on
Simplicius states that he will use Melissus’ own archaic language. Presumably
the present passage is not a precise account of Melissus’ argument. Barnes,
1982, p. xix describes it as a paraphrase, but a valuable one.
10. Diels suggests inserting ara and translating it as therefore. That gives a
smoother reading, but there is no support in the manuscripts.
11. The Greek is ‘tunkhanei’, which is commonly translated ‘happens to be’, but
that is not suitable here. An anonymous reader suggests ‘is as a consequence’.
12. There are three words commonly used for changing. ‘Kinêsis’ can often be
seen to mean ‘moving spatially’, and sometimes to mean ‘changing’ in a more
general way. Furthermore, sometimes it is not clear how it is being used.
‘Alloiôsis’ and ‘metabolê’ are also general words for changing. ‘Alteration’ here
renders kinêsis, but ‘change’ is for ‘metaballei’.
90 Notes to pages 17-20
13. The word used is kinein.
14. Again kinein.
15. This is not a complete syllogism. MS F shows unease about the reading,
and Diels has suggested bringing in from 105,6 ‘if what has come to be has a
beginning, what does not have a beginning has not come to be’, but that is only
a conjecture.
16. For affirmations by transposition see Huby, 2007, pp. 46-51. The name
was given by Theophrastus. Simplicius has embarked on a hopeless attempt to
save Melissus by treating ‘what does not have a starting-point’, which is clearly
negative in form, as being like ‘what is starting-point-less’, which could be seen
as positive in form. But he sees that even that would not help Melissus.
17. It is not easy to tell how much of this is Eudemus’ own words. I have taken
it that they are given from 105,24 ou gar to 27. The fragments of his Physics
have not yet been studied. See Baltussen, 2008, pp. 99-104 for a discussion of
Simplicius’ use of Eudemus.
18. These premises must be those given at 105,12-13: ‘What has not come to
be does not have a starting-point’, and ‘Being has not come to be’.
19. Simplicius in his account of Eudemus’ argument uses the word agenêtos
‘uncreated’, where Melissus had ou gegonê ‘has not come to be’. But then he gives
what he says are Eudemus’ own words, in which he also uses forms of gignesthai
‘to come to be’. It is only at the end line 26, that agenêtos reappears. I wonder
then whether the quotation from Eudemus ends in 105,25 (uncreated). If so, the
reference to ‘the sequence of the negatives’ would be Simplicius’ contribution,
and might be related to his thought about affirmations by transposition dis-
cussed in note 17.
20. The Greek here is alloiôsis followed by metabolê.
21. Kinêsis.
22. In this sentence Simplicius is giving terms in pairs, two for each of
Aristotle’s four causes, and I have therefore used ‘i.e.’ instead of ‘and’. See Phys.
194b24-195a3 for Aristotle’s own account.
23. Later on the word ‘arkhê’, here translated ‘starting-point’ is used of the
basic features of what there is, and is rendered ‘principle’.
24. Alloiôsis.
25. Phys. 253b23-6.
26. Presumably from Porphyry’s lost work on the Physics. Diels refers to the
passage at 10,25, which suggests that the contribution from Porphyry goes
further back here.
27. Alloiôsis.
28. Alloioutai.
29. A form of metaballein.
30. Phys. 236a27.
31. Phys. 253b23-6.
32. Alloiôsis.
33. Kinêsis.
34. Theophrastus [FHGS, 155C].
35. The verb kinein alone is used here.
36. Both the text and its sense are uncertain, but the main point is clear.
37. Alloiôsis.
38. This is part of what is given at greater length at 145,17-146,25 below.
39. I thank a reader for suggesting that this refers to what follows in Aristotle
about water (186a16-18). But Golitsis, 2008 has pointed out that there are
similar expressions at 461,10-11 and 487,18-19 about Anaxagoras. One might
have ‘with respect to the apparent meaning’.
 Notes to pages 20-22 91
40. At Metaph. 986b19-20 Aristotle says that Melissus was concerned with
the material One. Ross ad loc. thinks this disproves Simplicius’ view that Being
was incorporeal.
41. Timaeus 28B.
42. Timaeus 27D.
43. The word ‘oligos’ can mean ‘little’ as well as ‘few’. Possibly Eudemus
was referring to some very small things, but the above interpretation seems
better.
44. The rare word ‘akolouthêsis’, here translated ‘sequence’, is used by
Aristotle at Soph. El. 181a23, where the example of the relevant fallacy is
precisely that committed by Melissus here. Simplicius may be assuming that
his readers will be familiar with Aristotle’s passage, on which Eudemus’ other-
wise obscure remark is presumably based.
45. Alloiôsis.
46. In view of Simplicius’ Neoplatonist background, and the high-flown
language he is using here, a capital letter seems appropriate.
47. I think this means everything that exists, both Being itself and mundane
things.
48. That is, what has just been discussed above.
49. Compare 108,22 where Simplicius distinguishes the heaven and this
universe, which have a share of body and therefore have parts and a beginning
and an end, from Being. Simplicius is aware of a problem, and continues to
wrestle with it in what follows.
50. At this point only two senses of arkhê are recognised, that of a beginning
in time and that of the beginning of a thing. Here ‘beginning’ seems the most
appropriate translation.
51. Metaballein.
52. I have taken the de (but) here to introduce a reply to the charge which
has just been made against Melissus. Part of the reply is couched in Neoplaton-
ist terms, so that we cannot be sure about what Melissus actually said.
Eudemus’ remarks at 110,8-9 are also relevant.
53. cf. Phys. 204a34-205b1.
54. See note 49. The idea of physical things existing forever suggests a theory
of circular motion, so that no point can be seen as the starting or the ending
point, as with the stars.
55. This sentence is repeated at 109,27, but there the word ‘on’ (‘existing’), is
added at the end. The MSS vary about that addition here too: I have followed
Diels in keeping it at 27 but omitting it here.
56. Kinein.
57. ‘Diarma’ is a rare word and its meaning is uncertain in this context. An
anonymous reader suggests it is a corruption of diastêma. Furley, 1967, pp. 60-1
prefers ‘sublimity’, and rejects any implication of magnitude. He goes on to
discuss three suggested interpretations of the matter. It seems to me, however,
that there is a different problem here. Simplicius is concerned about Melissus’
use, in this context, of the word megethos, which normally means ‘size’, and I
suggest that it is he who uses diarma tês hupostaseos. Hupostasis is an unlikely
word for Melissus to have used, and there is nothing of this kind in any
quotation from him.
58. Diels thinks that the quotation from Melissus may extend to here, and I
accept that suggestion.
59. Furley, 1967, p. 59 points out that this is extended at Simpl. in De Caelo
556,16: ‘If it were infinite it would be one, for if it were two they could not both
be infinite, but would have boundaries with respect to each other.’
92 Notes to pages 22-26
60. This must be from Alexander’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, which
is lost.
61. Something seems to be missing here, either from an omission by a copyist
or by Simplicius himself.
62. Alloiôsis.
63. Phys. 186a18.
64. This is presumably the actual word used by Melissus, which Simplicius
feels the need to explain.
65. This is puzzling. The main point about Alexander’s views as reported
above is that he thought Melissus did away only with spatial motion, but the
proof that follows does not tackle that. It is only when Simplicius quotes
Melissus’ own words that it becomes clear that he rejected all kinds of change.
It is possible that the lacuna at 110,19 was of some length, and contained
considerably more of Alexander’s words. Simplicius returns to the point at
112,32-113,3.
66. The following quotation is given in archaic language. We may take it as
having at least to some extent Melissus’ exact words.
67. Barnes, 1982,p. 616, note 20 says that toinun is not inferential in
Melissus and refers to Denniston, 1934, pp. 354-7. An anonymous reader
suggests that Simplicius may have understood it as ‘therefore’, but here he is
primarily quoting Melissus.
68. The Greek is to pan, literally ‘the all’. ‘The universe’ might render it best.
69. Exceptionally here heteroioun. Presumably Melissus’ own word.
70. In the following passage the word ‘topos’ occurs frequently. It can mean
both ‘space’ and ‘place’, and I have used both as seems appropriate.
71. In what follows kinein is the verb used.
72. cf. Phys. 186a17. Aristotle’s full treatment of the void, including remarks
about Melissus, is at Phys. 213a12-217b28.
73. cf. Phys. 186a16-18.
74. Simplicius here uses the rare form apolimpanon, which suggests that he
might have in mind an older text.
75. Phys. 186a17.
76. Alloiôsis.
77. Phys. 186a18.
78. Aristotle’s remark is in a single sentence. Aristotle then goes on to use
his own technical language.
79. 186a18.
80. Alloiousthai, and heteroiousthai.
81. The following repeats 111,23-4.
82. Metabolê.
83. i.e. the non-circular figures.
84. The Greek has ex hou ‘from which’ which in Aristotle’s system amounts
to matter.
85. The MS readings here vary, and katholou is only Diels’ suggestion. The
three cases are those given by Aristotle at Phys. 185b7-9. This is in a passage
where Aristotle explores the various senses of ‘being’ and ‘one’.
86. The word is eidos, which we can render either as ‘species’ or as ‘form’.
‘Species’ seems more appropriate here.
87. Hippo of Rhegium, notable also for being an atheist.
88. At this point the word arkhê no longer means ‘starting-point’, but
‘principle’ in the sense of basic origin.
89. Simplicius is here referring to 113,27-8, which is indeed puzzling. Alex-
ander does not, at least in Simplicius’ excerpt, use the expression ‘the species of
 Notes to pages 26-29 93
the matter’, and it is not entirely clear what Simplicius is getting at. In any case
he goes on to give his own interpretation of Aristotle.
90. This is an exact translation of the Greek.
91. i.e. matter.
92. [FHSG 234]. Sharples, RUSCH III, 1988, p. 48 n. 92, argues that this is
a doxographical work.
93. 115,21-5 = 118,11-13 = 121,13-16. These are all passages from Eudemus,
quoted almost exactly alike by Simplicius. The first and the third are extended
to include a further sentence. The differences are minor, and we can be sure that
they give us essentially Eudemus’ own words. From what he says at 115,13-15
above, and later at 133,24-5, it is clear that Simplicius accepted that he did not
have access to all Eudemus’ works, and was happy to use Alexander as well.
94. 115,25-116,4 = 120,8-12. The only significant difference is that 116,2 has
the verb to sullogizesthai, while 120,11 has to sullogistikon.
95. Baltussen, 2002, p. 144, observes that this word, anaxiopistos, is rare and
is found also at 120,7. He suggests that it may be Eudemus’ own.
96. This could be thought to be a reference to the anonymous Dissoi logoi, a
sophistic work of Plato’s time, for a summary of which see Barnes, 1982, pp.
516-22. But it seems better to see it as marking a period of thought about the
senses of words, between the view that each word had only one sense, and the
view that it could have several senses. Eudemus, even only two generations
later, may have believed that the Dissoi logoi was by Plato, but in many places
Simplicius refers to his account of Plato’s own approach, e.g. at 238,23 where he
mentions Sophist 258D ff. as evidence that Plato knew that non-being had dual
meaning, and 243,1-3. At 243,1-3 he says that Eudemus said that Plato intro-
duced to disson, but again the passage is not very helpful.
97. These were among Aristotle’s innovations.
98. The MSS have te (and) here, but the parallel passage at 120,10 has de
(but), which I prefer here also.
99. These remarks must apply to the methods of Eudemus and his contem-
poraries, using Aristotelian logic.
100. Again presumably in his work on Aristotle’s Physics.
101. This is obscure: the most likely meaning is that Parmenides was like
Thales and the others who believed that there was only one basic entity. At
238,23-239,3 Simplicius says that Plato knew the two-fold meaning of not-being
in the Sophist 258D, but that passage does not help very much.
102. The word einai has been rendered ‘being’ by one translator and ‘what is’
by the other.
103. Parmenides uses three words apparently for the same thing, atarpos,
keleuthos and hodos. In English ‘way’, path’, and ‘journey’ can be used, as the
context demands. Here the word is keleuthos.
104. This is as Diels gives the text. Others would have: ‘For she accompanies
truth’.
105. Atarpos.
106. For a full and difficult discussion of the three paths see Barnes, 1982,
pp. 157-72.
107. Hodos.
108. This represents the verb found in the MSS as plattontai, which scholars
have accepted as Parmenides’ form of plazein.
109. Keleuthos.
110. The pincers of a smith were also known as crabs.
111. That is, the opposites cannot be true together.
112. This presumably refers to Theophrastus’ account at 115,11-13.
94 Notes to pages 29-32
113. The premise is: ‘What is other than Being is not’.
114. As in the ten categories.
115. This is repeated with minor differences at 121,13-16.
116. I had intended to follow Charlton in using ‘pale’, but the examples
Simplicius gives, of snow and swan and white lead, have persuaded me that
‘white’ is preferable.
117. This is not an exact account of what Aristotle says, there are problems
with the text, and it is not a well-formed conclusion, but it fits in reasonably
with what follows.
118. See n. 6.
119. Presumably the point is that in the preceding case the definite article,
to, occurs with ‘one’, but not in these alternatives.
120. cf. 113,23-4.
121. The grammar is awkward here, but this gives the sense.
122. This is how Aristotle puts it at Metaph. 1057b8. He had taken it over
from Plato Timaeus 67D-E. The exact meaning may be queried, and in Aristotle
the point is about the opposition of white and black, but I think Simplicius is
merely taking the definition from Aristotle as an example. It had also been used
by Adrastus, whom Simplicius quotes at 123,23.26.
123. Hypostasis played an important part in Neoplatonism, but that hardly
seems relevant here. Here it is distinguished from hupokeimenon (substrate)
and ousia (substance), and the meaning must be deduced from its context:
surface and body belong to the same hypostasis, but are different. One might
use ‘thing’ as an equivalent for ‘hupostasis’.
124. This rare word ‘epereisis’ also occurs at 226,26.
125. This must refer to Phys. 186a30-2. That passage of the Physics does not
contain the word ‘hupostasis’.
126. See n. 95 above.
127. Baltussen, 2002, p. 144 thinks one should add the word schema here.
But in the parallel passage at 116,2 the verb sullogizesthai is found.
128. This presumably means that people used syllogistic arguments, and
only if the conclusion was necessarily deducible from the premises was it
accepted.
129. This repeats 115,25-116,4.
130. The Megarians were a group of philosophers more or less contemporary
with Plato and notorious for their logic-chopping.
131. This is a standard translation, used e.g. by Charlton, but the word
mousikos may well mean no more than ‘well-educated’.
132. At 120,3-4 it is said that in the time of Parmenides the rules of accounts
(logôn) were not yet known, and there is much the same at 120,27-8. This
suggests that the rule mentioned here is about accounts. In this context it
should refer to the point made above that the same substrate can have many
different accounts.
133. See n. 123 above. Here again the word is used in a down-to-earth way.
134. Diels follows the MSS in omitting to de, which brings in another item.
I have added those words following the earlier quotations of this passage.
135. This word has a technical meaning in Aristotle’s logic, but here it may
mean no more than a word applied to many separate items. For a thorough
discussion of Simplicius’ use of homonymy see C. Luna in Simplicius, Commen-
taire sur les Categories trans. and comm. under the direction of Ilsetraut Hadot,
vol. III, Leiden Brill, 1990.
136. This is difficult. See Charlton, 1970, pp. 60-1, who uses ‘precisely what
is’ and ‘precisely what is one’. See n. 143.
 Notes to pages 33-37 95
137. Ross, 1936, prints ‘holôs’ but Simplicius at 126,11 has ‘haplôs’ ‘simply’.
138. In this context this word can hardly have a very precise meaning.
139. Phys. 185a20-3.
140. The Greek has a succession of forms of ‘being’. The capital B here may
help to clarify the sense.
141. These words had technical senses in Aristotle, but I am not sure that
those can apply here.
142. That is, the autoon.
143. The expression, to hoper on, is difficult. I have adopted from Ross, 1936,
‘the just-existent’.
144. One of the earliest commentators on Aristotle. This is our only fragment
from him.
145. i.e. discussing Aristotle’s usage.
146. This seems to mean that Simplicius took the passage from Porphyry.
147. These are the primary substances of Cat. 1b25-2a4.
148. Sumplêrôtikos is not an Aristotelian word. See n. 219.
149. This is a standard rendering of the Greek word ‘grammatikos’, but as
with the word ‘mousikos’, discussed above, there are other possibilities, includ-
ing ‘literate’.
150. This appears to be the end of the quotation from Adrastus. It is resumed
at 124,7.
151. This is puzzling. A reader suggests that the supposed sentence is of the
form ‘Socrates is a rational animal’. Then ‘to be’ refers to the ‘is’, and ‘substance’
to ‘Socrates’.
152. The expression is hoi peri Parmenidên, which at this period is ambigu-
ous. ‘Their’ at 125,9 must be the followers of Parmenides, or just Parmenides.
153. This passages contains both references to Parmenides and a theoretical
argument about the function of the word ‘being’ if one can put the matter in
those terms. I have tried therefore to use Being only where the reference is
clearly to Parmenides.
154. i.e. as an accident.
155. This is 186b4 with the addition of autois, ‘for them’.
156. e.g. 1a20ff.
157. For Diels this is still part of Adrastus’ work. It seems to me that here
Simplicius resumes, and is referring to the whole passage as far as 186b12.
158. 250A8ff.
159. i.e. genera in Plato’s sense.
160. Phys. 186b9.
161. Aristotle’s text has holôs, ‘wholly’ where ours has haplôs, ‘absolutely’.
162. 186a34-5: ‘For the accident is said of some substrate, so that that of
which being is an accident, will not be.’ It is at this point that Diels supposes
the quotation from Adrastus to end.
163. The text in Aristotle is uncertain. On eiper, ‘being if it is’ is omitted by
the MSS. Ross in his edition of the Physics reads to on eiper hoper on to on, ‘being
if being is the just-existent’, following some MSS. The word hekaterôi ‘to each of
two’ is also puzzling. Ross relates it to the system of dichotomy used by Zeno. That
is, the original whole is first divided into two parts, and those are again divided. We
see below that Simplicius himself was uncertain about what Aristotle meant.
164. 185b16-19.
165. This text is repeated several times by Simplicius. It is given in a longer
context at 147,15-17, and is part of DK fr. 8 of Parmenides.
166. I leave this as it stands. In its context, the meaning is: ‘it is clear that
the one does not have many parts’.
96 Notes to pages 37-41
167. This refers to 186b13-14, but misquotes it with ‘each’ (hekastôi) where
Aristotle has ‘either’ (hekaterôi). Below, however, at 127,1-2, there are the
correct words, though in a different order.
168. This seems to be a simple argument that things that are different are
spatially different.
169. Phys. 186b12-13.
170. Phys. 186b13-14.
171. Alexander has a different, more speculative, approach to this statement.
172. The reading here is uncertain. I follow Diels’ choice, which seems the
only possible one, but the uncertainty among the copyists shows that they were
aware of a problem here.
173. 186b23-7. This is the part of the Physics on which Alexander is com-
menting.
174. Phys. 186b13-14.
175. This resembles the quotation at 126,22-3 and elsewhere, but the word
order is different. Possibly Simplicius here is faithfully quoting Alexander’s own
misquotation.
176. This is quite complicated; the implied argument is: Being is divided and
therefore has size and therefore is not one.
177. Phys. 186b14-15.
178. The subject of phêsi ‘he says’ is not clear. If it is Aristotle, it seems
unnecessary, so perhaps it is Alexander. The first printed text cuts the knot
with eipein ‘saying’, to give: ‘through saying }’. In any case what follows seems
to be by Simplicius himself. Further, the quotation here is not an exact report
of Aristotle’s text. We can only guess at its origin.
179. The Greek is hoper tina, which gives roughly ‘what things are’.
180. e.g. 183b19.
181. This resembles 127,36. The argument form is: If the first, the second:
but not the second: therefore not-the first.
182. Ross, 1936, comments that this, Simplicius’ first attempt at explaining
Aristotle’s 186b35, is very obscure, but Simplicius seems to want to treat it as
a reductio ad absurdum of Parmenides’ position.
183. 186b35. This sentence has puzzled the commentators. Ross wants to
treat it as a question. For a survey of the views of commentators see his
Aristotle’s Physics, 1936, pp. 477-9.
184. This appears to finish Simplicius’ report of Alexander’s view about the
meaning of Aristotle’s argument, but the next section, about the words, down to
129,31 is likely also to be based on Alexander, after which Simplicius refers to
Alexander again and indicates that he will now give his own views.
185. Phys. 186b23.
186. Phys. 186b34-5. Aristotle’s text here is uncertain and the commentators
have taken it in various ways. In view of the peculiarity of the following
sentence one might suspect a deep corruption.
187. That is, Simplicius had found this version in his material.
188. Phys. 186b33-4.
189. This is obscure. A standard definition would be composed of genus and
differentia. But how is man divided into those?
190. Sometimes the word philoponôs is clearly used by Simplicius as a pun
on the name of his rival the Christian Philoponus. See Baltussen, 2008, pp.
188-9.
191. Simplicius appears to be reporting Alexander’s arguments, but not
claiming to repeat his words. Simplicius is being formal here, and I propose to
add numbers to distinguish his arguments. They are not in his text. We have
 Notes to pages 41-43 97
the double difficulty that Alexander was commenting on Aristotle, but it is not
always easy to be sure what he was commenting on, and he may have developed
his own arguments freely.
192. The Stoics produced the original set of indemonstrables, but by Sim-
plicius’ time they were in general use. The fifth was originally: either the first
or the second: but not the second, therefore the first, but a later list has: either
the first or the second: but not the first, therefore the second. See Speca, 2001,
pp. 36-66 for a discussion of the history of later Greek logic, with the suggestion
that Alexander was responsible for some later developments. We cannot be sure
whether this remark is from Alexander himself, or added by Simplicius.
193. If the first, the second; but not the second: therefore not the first.
194. See item 5 below.
195. The noun here is in the singular.
196. Phys. 185b7.
197. Aspasius was an early commentator on Aristotle, but his only surviving
commentary is part of the one on the Nicomachean Ethics. Golitsis, 2008, p. 70
argues that Simplicius got his information about him from Alexander.
198. It is not easy to sort out where Alexander’s remarks end, and who the
subject of ‘showed’ is, though it is likely to be Aristotle.
199. Diels refers to Topics 3.1, 116a23, but points out that the example is
from Posterior Analytics 1.22, 83a30. It is difficult to find any passage in
Aristotle which backs up Simplicius’ claim. The Topics passage is in a discussion
of what things are preferable, and only indirectly relates to the relationship
between to hoper on and genus. It does not even contain the words ‘to hoper on’.
But the following reference to Eudemus, Aristotle’s immediate pupil, shows that
Simplicius believed that there were grounds in Aristotle himself for the claim
that he regarded to hoper on as equivalent to genus.
200. That Being is a genus.
201. Phys. 185a27-9.
202. The text is uncertain, and the MSS vary greatly. Diels suggests insert-
ing to before, and arkei after, eirêmenôn to give: ‘What has been said is enough
against }’.
203. This seems to be a passing comment on the preceding sentence.
204. This seems to be the beginning of another series of argument from
Alexander, to which again I have added numbers.
205. cf. Phys. 186a34-b2.
206. What follows must be Alexander’s own comment.
207. Phys. 187a8-9.This is not about the just-existent, but about a particular
case of that, with the word ‘ti’ (some).
208. This might be an interpolation by Simplicius, following a sentence by
Alexander. The reference is to Sophist 259A4-6.
209. Phys. 186b33. The same thought has been given in a conditional at
186b4.
210. Phys. 186b17.
211. It offered only two alternatives, but there was a third possibility.
212. The word is ‘ousiôdes’, which must be connected with ousia, ‘substance’.
It occurs again at 133,20 and 137,33. The thought may be that genus can be used
to classify either substances, or, as a universal, covering all kinds of aspects of
things.
213. Phys. 186b4. The same quotation is given, with an extension, at 132,27-8
below.
214. At this point Diels ends the sentence, but I prefer to put a comma and
continue with the next few lines.
98 Notes to pages 43-47
215. Phys. 186b4. Aristotle’s own text here is difficult. I adopt Ross’s solution
of inserting ta alla after all’ in Aristotle’s text. Compare Simplicius at 125,18-
19, which shows him uncertain about Aristotle, as were the other commentators
also. Simplicius must have read the corrupted text.
216. That being is genus.
217. 186b6. There are textual problems both in Aristotle and in Simplicius.
Tauto, ‘the same’, is found in all Aristotle’s MSS, but Ross, 1936, removes it on
the grounds that it is not found in passages of Philoponus and Simplicius. I
conclude that the word was there in Aristotle’s MSS, but Simplicius and
Philoponus found it difficult. Carteron keeps it in his Bude edition. Further, the
sentence needs an apodosis, but possibly Simplicius thought the quotation by
itself was enough to make his point.
218. cf. following note.
219. This word, sumplêrôtikos, ‘completive’, is not Aristotelian. Either Alex-
ander is rewriting Aristotle, or he is referring to some works which are not by
Aristotle. He has made a distinction above between works in which Aristotle
clearly does not treat the just-existent as genus, and others, which appear to be
logical ones, which do. The use of a later logical term suggests that he was
mistaken about the latter. The word is used by Adrastus as quoted by Simplicius
at 123,13 and by Simplicius himself at 128,19.
220. Baltussen, 2002, discusses the nature of Simplicius’ copy of Eudemus at
pp. 135-6.
221. Compare 132,18-19.
222. This is difficult. Perhaps Eudemus is making a contrast between Being
and the heavens, and quoting something. That he did make some such connec-
tion is indicated by 143,4 below.
223. This is the last lemma until 148,25, where the lemma is from 187a12.
In the intervening pages Simplicius roams widely, giving the views of Alexan-
der, Porphyry and others, and taking up questions like whether the argument
from dichotomy is by Zeno or Parmenides.
224. These lines are based on Plato’s Parmenides 128C7-D2 except here,
where Plato’s MSS have paskhein but those of Simplicius have legein. The latter
makes more sense and I therefore keep it.
225. Parmenides 128D5-6
226. [FHSG 234] app.
227. Sophist 250Aff.
228. The text here is uncertain, but there is no obvious improvement. I have
tried to give the sense.
229. cf. Phys. 187a5.
230. Timaeus 27D.
231. Timaeus 27D.
232. Sophist 258C-59B.
233. Hodos.
234. The text of Simplicius has ontos, ‘being’, but Plato has mê ontos, ‘not
being’, which seems preferable here.
235. ‘It’ here refers to ‘the nature of Other’.
236. This is part of a conversation between Theaetetus and the Eleatic
Stranger.
237. The quotation here is incomplete. At 135,29 Simplicius repeats Plato’s
words at Sophist 258E6-7 which end with hôs estin ‘that it is’.
238. Sophist 257B3-4.
239. At this point Simplicius introduces a number of terms used by the
Neoplatonists, noêtos, noeros, aisthêtos and psukhikos, which were used to
 Notes to pages 48-53 99
denote different levels of being. He seems to be stating his own views. Par-
menides himself can hardly have uttered anything like this. It is likely that
Porphyry was the origin of such thinking.
240. Timaeus 27D-28A. Most of Plato’s MSS add aei ‘always’, to give ‘what is
always coming to be’.
241. Sophist 248E6-249A2.
242. It is difficult to understand the train of thought here. Diels has put a
crux in the next line and perhaps something is seriously wrong. Otherwise we
must suppose that Simplicius is using Parmenides’ words to illustrate Plato’s
position.
243. To mend a fault Diels suggests deixas, ‘demonstrating’, but that is
hardly enough.
244. Sophist 239D3.
245. Physics 187a5-6.
246. What follows is only a paraphrase of the following lines of Aristotle.
247. Plato’s autoon.
248. Physics 185b25-6.
249. Physics 186a2-3. But Aristotle’s text differs, opening with gar, ‘for’, but
saying only that ‘one’ can be both potential and actual. Our reading, from
Alexander, may be preferable.
250. cf. 138,5-6.
251. Or, possibly, ‘Is it then that this is not, but One is something?’.
252. cf. 144,15, but there the word for being is in the singular. Barnes, 1989,
p. 235 says that the word for one here might refer either to Parmenides’ One or
to a unit. But the context of 144,15 suggests that Simplicius understood it as
being of Parmenides’ One.
253. Timon at Diogenes Laertius 9.25. Melissus is also named there.
254. Hermann Frankel reconstituted Zeno’s argument from its scattered
parts in Simplicius. It is given and discussed in Furley, 1967, pp. 64-9.
255. The words pakhos and onkos have similar meanings in ordinary Greek.
I suggest that here the first may have a two-dimensional sense, and the second
a three dimensional one. The argument would apply to both equally well.
256. KRS adds the comma here.
257. Adopting Frankel’s apeiron for apeirôn (pl.).
258. 122,14 Diels.
259. The Greek has ‘those around Xenocrates’ but, as so often in similar
cases, this seems to refer solely to Xenocrates. In line 15 only Xenocrates is
mentioned.
260. As Porphyry said.
261. This is puzzling. The sentence before already provides thickness; and
we can hardly bring in a fourth dimension. Ingenious interpretations have been
given for what proukhein means, and somehow there must be an infinite
progression. Owen points out that at Physics 239b17 Aristotle uses the word
proekhein of an argument of Zeno, but it is of Achilles and the tortoise, and what
projects is the small distance remaining at every stage between the pursuer and
the pursued. Possibly here Simplicius is referring obscurely to the Achilles
argument.
262. This is obscure. Perhaps it means that a) magnitude does not have
species, and b) all things, from small lines to large bodies have it, i.e. magnitude.
263. From this point Simplicius starts using the language of the Neoplaton-
ists in his attempt to explain Parmenides. See Golitsis, 2008, pp. 104-7 for a
detailed study of the following digression, and his French translation, 1982, pp.
225-31.
100 Notes to pages 53-56
264. This is part of fr. 8, already given at 78,5 and to be repeated with context
at 145,1-2. The combination muthos hodoio is unusual, giving ‘account of a journey’.
265. This is repeated, in context, at 145,23.
266. Or ‘understanding [in this way]’.
267. This text is repeated several times by Simplicius. It is given in a longer
context at 147,15-17, and is part of fr. 8 of Parmenides.
268. The text at 146,11 has houlon, whole, and that is part of Parmenides’
poem. If the hoion of Simplicius’ MSS is correct, it must be part of Simplicius’
comment.
269. This is also quoted, more or less, at 146,11 (and 87,1). cf. 186,4. The
context is given at 146,11, but both reading and sense are uncertain, and even
the point of the end of the remark is unclear. Presumably Eudemus quoted it
first, and Simplicius here copied him.
270. This is difficult to relate to the long quotation on pp. 145-6. Since there
is a problem with the text at 146,11, this may have fallen out in that area.
271. The word epekeina used here is uncommon, and there may be a
reminiscence of Plato’s Republic 509B, where Plato speaks of the Good as being
‘beyond Being’.
272. The word is noeros, connected with nous and here contrasted with
noêtos, parts of the standard Neoplatonist vocabulary. It seems best to use
‘thinker’ and related words here, because neither ‘mental’ nor ‘intellectual’ have
the grammatical flexibility required.
273. The word is epistrophê. It played an important part in one of the triads
of late Neoplatonism, but Simplicius does not involve those here.
274. The last words are Simplicius’ own explanation.
275. Repeated in context at 146,7-9.
276. The word here is again noeron. A precise way of putting it could be ‘the
thinking thing’ In this sentence there is a contrast between the active noeron
and the passive noêton, and the point is that the divisions in the one are related
to the divisions in the other.
277. This whole sentence is expressed in Neoplatonic terms.
278. These words are found in Plato’s Sophist 242A, and quoted by Sim-
plicius at 135,21-2.
279. I have added these numerals for clarity.
280. That is, a universal.
281. cf. 138,32-3,but there the word here translated ‘Being’ is in the plural.
282. The MSS reading, which I have kept, is perati. But Diels suggests peras
ti, which would give ‘as a limit to all things’.
283. There are many problems with the text of Parmenides. I do not intend
to make a thorough survey of them here.
284. Or, with KRS, ‘that being uncreated and imperishable, it is,’
285. The reading of Simplicius is ateleston, which is awkward. I have
accepted the emendation teleion of Owen. Owen has a long note on the text at
Owen 1986, pp. 23-4, Additional Note A.
286. Some scholars accept the emendation of Reinhardt ‘from what is’ for
‘from what is not’. But Simplicius has ‘what is not’.
287. Diels prints this sentence as a remark by Simplicius, but that seems
unnecessary.
288. Hodos.
289. i.e. here and not there.
290. This is very uncertain. KRS reject the reference to time, and have: ‘For
there neither is nor will be anything else besides what is’. Golitsis, 2008, p. 228
and n. 13 does the same.
 Notes to pages 56-58 101
291. See n. 165.
292. Phys. 188a20.
293. The egg is part of the complicated theology of the Orphics, described by
Simplicius’ colleague Damascius. See also Gabor Betegh, ‘On Eudemus Fr. 150
(Wehrli)’, in Bodnar and Fortenbaugh, 2002, pp. 337-57 and M.L. West, The
Orphic Poems, 1984.
294. What follows is Simplicius’ attempt to fit Parmenides into a Neoplatost
framework.
295. The text here is uncertain. There seems to be a reference back to 145,4,
where the text again is uncertain.
296. This cryptic remark may mean that Simplicius interprets Parmenides’
way of speaking as hinting that there is something beyond even the one being.
It is significant that at 147,13 there is the expression ‘first aition’, but at 147,16
the words are ‘ineffable aitia’. This would fit in with Plato’s views, and that
would explain why Simplicius is puzzled about Plato’s attitude to Parmenides.
297. cf. n. 272.
298. cf. previous note.
299. This repeats 135,27-136,2. The quotation is extended at 136,2.
300. This may be a summary of Aristotle’s views, but the sentence which
follows, 148,9-11, is couched in Neoplatonist language and must be Simplicius’
own addition.
301. Here, as in 143,26-7 the idea is that the divisions in the thinker are
reflected in those of the thought.
302. Theaet. 183E
303. Metaph. 1076a4.
304. ‘He’ is presumably Parmenides.
305. This resembles a phrase in Plato’s Cratylus 413A8-9, but there the word
hallesthai is used, which is more poetic than Simplicius’ pedan. In Plato, as
here, the phrase refers to overdoing something. It might be related to the
activities of long jumpers, as skamma could mean an area dug up to provide a
soft landing place. If you jumped too far, you might hurt yourself. But this is
speculation. See now Golitsis, 2008, p. 17.

Notes to 1.4
1. i.e. air, water, fire.
2. Eleatic monism, which was the topic of the preceding two chapters, belongs
to metaphysics rather than to the philosophy of nature, since it is the task of
the latter to account for change, the possibility of which is denied by the
Eleatics. ‘Natural philosophers’ here renders ‘phusikoi’, lit. ‘Those concerned
with nature (phusis)’, including the basic constituents and processes in it,
especially change. Elsewhere (e.g. 151,25) the phrase renders ‘phusiologoi’, lit.
‘Those who gave accounts (logoi) of nature’.
3. According to Simplicius, Aristotle’s comments on the Eleatics are charita-
ble (a) in acknowledging that in speaking of the one being they are not speaking
about nature (for if they were to say e.g. that nature is one and unchangeable
they would be saying something obviously false), (b) in asserting that they
nevertheless share with the natural philosophers the fundamental notion of a
principle and undertake a common investigation whether the principles of
things are one (as the Eleatics say) or many [38,6-9, quoting Phys. 184b22-4]. It
may be queried whether in fact the notion of a principle applies univocally to
the Eleatic One and to the primal stuff of the natural philosophers, and whether
102 Notes to page 59
the Eleatics really believed that there were things for the One to be the principle
of. (I am grateful to Stephen Menn for his suggested interpretation of this
difficult comment, and for the reference to the passage cited.)
4. cf. 23,21-9.
5. Of Apollonia (see below).
6. cf. 24,26-25,8.
7. cf. 23,33-24,12.
8. cf. 25,11-12.
9. Metaph. 988a30; GC 328b35, 332a21.
10. Metaph. 989a14; Cael. 303b12; GC 332a20; Phys. 203a18, 205a27. At
Phys. 189b3 Aristotle refers to a substance intermediate between water and
fire.
11. It is clear from Aristotle’s text (187a12-26) that the two forms of view
maintained by the natural philosophers are the following: (I) The cosmos is
composed of a single primal stuff (either water, air, fire or some other simple
stuff intermediate between two of the three above on a scale of rarity and
density), from which non-basic entities are formed by processes of condensation
and rarefaction. (II) The basic material of the cosmos is not a single stuff, but a
mixture of opposites (probably undifferentiated between properties such as hot
and cold and stuffs such as water and air), which are extracted from the primal
mixture and then combined to make further things. Aristotle does not name any
proponent of I, but names Anaximander, Empedocles and Anaxagoras as having
held different versions of II. (On either version the basic stuff or mixture is what
underlies change; it is referred to by Simplicius as the hupokeimenon, lit. ‘the
underlying thing’, rendered ‘substrate’ in this translation.) Simplicius sets out
this distinction plainly below (150,9-25), but at this point (149,4-11) his exposi-
tion is somewhat confusing. The fact that he postpones exposition of alternative
II to 150,20-4, focusing at this point on the distinction between the views on the
one hand that the basic stuff is water, air or fire and on the other that it is
something intermediate between air and fire, or between water and air, might
be taken to suggest that he takes Aristotle’s ‘two forms’ to be the terms of the
latter distinction, not I and II above. But, as is clear from 149,21-2, both the
view that the basic stuff is one of the three elements and the view that it is
something intermediate assume that non-basic things are generated in the
same way, namely by condensation and rarefaction. Hence in saying that those
who say that there is one element think that things come from it in either of two
ways, he clearly has in mind the distinction in between I and II. (Simplicius’
‘two ways’ (duo tropous, 149,5) echoes Aristotle’s statement that the views of
the natural philosophers take two forms (duo tropoi).)
12. The works of Alexander, Porphyry and Nicolaus of Damascus to which
Simplicius here refers are not extant. It is therefore impossible to determine
whether Simplicius represents their views correctly.
13. It appears from the fragments of Diogenes cited later in this chapter (see
below) that in fact Diogenes’ view was that the primal stuff was air, as
Simplicius says at 149,7-8.
14. cf. 23,14-16 (with n. 131) and 25,8-9.
15. Simplicius is plainly correct in his interpretation of 187a13-15, and in his
statement that Aristotle takes Anaximander’s account of the generation of
things to have been by extraction from an original mixture, not by condensation
and rarefaction. Hence if Porphyry interpreted Aristotle as Simplicius says he
did, he was wrong.
16. cf. 24,29-31.
17. ‘Enquiry’ renders ‘Historia’. Simplicius refers to what is presumably the
 Notes to pages 59-61 103
same work under the title ‘Enquiry into Nature (Phusikê Historia)’ at 115,17
and 154,17. The list of titles of Theophrastus’ works preserved by Diogenes
Laertius in his Life includes several titles dealing with nature and natural
philosophers (V.46 and 48), but does not include this precise title, which may be
an alternative title of one of the works listed.
18. At Phys. 1.5-7, where natural change is analysed as the transition of an
underlying subject from one of a pair of opposite states to the other, e.g. a
material’s becoming structured in a certain way from having been unstructured
in that way.
19. See Ar. Metaph. 987b14-988a15, with discussion by Ross, 1953, ch. 12.
20. The thought seems to be that as the matter of which something is
composed has the potential to develop or be shaped in various ways, so the
fundamental opposition of large and small has the potentiality to give rise to
various specific oppositions, and so to become something e.g. hot or cold.
21. At 24,13-16 Simplicius says that Anaximander said that the principle
(arkhê) and element (stoikheion) of things was the unlimited (to apeiron), prôtos
touto tounoma komisas tês arkhês. While the most probable sense of the latter
phrase is ‘being the first to provide this name (viz. ‘the unlimited’) for ‘the
principle’, it is also possible to take it as ‘being the first to provide this name of
principle’ (i.e. to apply the name ‘principle’). In that case Simplicius says the
same thing in the earlier passage as here. For that reason some scholars favour
reading the earlier passage in that sense, despite the linguistic awkwardness of
so doing. The alternative (favoured e.g. by Guthrie, vol. 1, p. 77) is that in the
two passages Simplicius attributes to Anaximander two distinct terminological
innovations, viz. the introduction of both ‘the unlimited’ and ‘principle’.
22. For Aristotle density (puknotês) consists in a thing’s having its parts close
together, rarity (manotês) in having parts more widely separated (Cat. 10a20-2),
while coarseness (pakhos) consists in having large parts and fineness (leptotês)
in having small parts (Cael. 303b26-7). At Cael. 303b22ff. he says that explain-
ing generation in terms of density and rarity is no different from explaining it
in terms of coarseness and fineness.
23. I translate Diels’ suggested emendation dio kai duskinêtotera hoion gên.
Eti puknotera phêsi. The MSS text dio kai duskinêtoteron ou mên eti puknotera
phêsi is ungrammatical.
24. See n. 22.
25. Against Aristotle’s theses that density and coarseness, and rarity and
fineness, always accompany one another, Simplicius maintains that things with
large parts (coarse things) must have those parts widely spaced, and must
therefore be rare, whereas things with small parts (fine things) must have those
parts close together, and must therefore be dense. While both theses are false,
it is clearly possible that things may have large parts widely spaced, and
equally that things may have small parts densely packed together. Hence
the correlations between density and coarseness, and between rarity and
fineness, cannot be universal as Aristotle, according to Simplicius, alleges,
but allow for exceptions.
26. A paraphrase of Alex. in Metaph. 56,33-5.
27. For evidence on Plato’s lecture on the Good see Ross, 1955, pp. 111-20,
with translation in Barnes,1984, vol. 2, pp. 2397-9.
28. Simplicius cites Tim. 52B2, which refers, not to matter, but to space.
Things which come to be and cease to be (i.e. material things) are perceptible,
and are ‘comprehended by belief together with perception’ (52A5-7), while
space, which is the receptacle within which material things come to be and cease
to be, is imperceptible, but ‘without perception is grasped by a kind of bastard
104 Notes to pages 61-65
reasoning, and is barely an object of belief ’ (B2). Simplicius thus interprets
space in the Timaeus as matter, which misrepresents Plato’s thought in that
Plato does not think that space is what material things are made of, but that it
is that in which they come to be and cease to be.
29. Apart from the citation by Diogenes Laertius of the opening sentence of
‘his treatise’ (9.57, DK 64B1) this chapter is our sole source of quotations from
Diogenes of Apollonia. It is likely that the treatise which Diogenes Laertius
refers to is the same as that from which Simplicius quotes.
30. ‘Thought’ renders ‘noêsis’. Other possible renderings are ‘intellect’, ‘intel-
ligence’ and ‘understanding’.
31. I translate DK’s emendation auto gar moi touto theos dokei einai. The
MSS text apo gar moi touto ethos dokei einai is ungrammatical, while ethos,
habit, does not fit the context.
32. This is the earliest known statement of the principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles.
33. Diogenes counts the senses under noêsis. This might be taken to imply
an extension of the notion of noêsis to embrace the traditional functions of the
psukhê (see DK 64B4 above) ‘this (i.e. air) is soul and thought for them’), or
conversely the substantial thesis that perception involves thought (properly so
called) in some way or other, perhaps in that perception involves recognition of the
thing perceived. This is an intriguing anticipation of issues discussed by later
philosophers (notably in Plato’s Theaetetus), but unfortunately the lack of evidence
prevents us from knowing how far (if at all) Diogenes himself pursued these issues.
34. The Greek is tous peri Empedoklea kai Anaxagoran. Since the peri idiom
seems to imply no genuine plurality, but to be a mere periphrasis, I translate
hoi peri X throughout as ‘X’. In other volumes of this series some editors prefer
more literal translations, such as ‘the followers of X’.
35. The noun homoimereia (lit. ‘thing having similar parts’) is an Aristotelian
technical term (formed from the adjective homoiomerês), designating stuffs such
as flesh, wood and gold, which are such that every part produced by division is
of the same nature as the whole; e.g. every part of an amount of flesh is an
amount of flesh. Such natural stuffs are among the elements in Anaxagoras’
physical system.
36. According to Empedocles, the ascendancy of Love culminates in the mixture
of the four elements with one another to form a totally homogeneous sphere.
37. cf. 27,17-23.
38. It is clear from the contexts that the quoted words of Aristotle refer, as
Alexander says, to Anaxagoras. Nevertheless Simplicius goes on to suggest
various ways in which they might be taken to refer to Empedocles as well: (i) In
both theories the elements include opposites, since the Empedoclean elements
are characterised by opposites, water being cold and wet, fire hot and dry etc
(155,7-9). (ii) Empedocles assigns to his elements a limited selection of oppo-
sites, while Anaxagoras includes all opposites among his elements (thereby
justifying Alexander’s comment) (155,10-13). (iii) The Empedoclean opposites,
hot, cold, wet and dry, are primary, in that they account for the wider range of
opposites, e.g. sweet and bitter, which figure in Anaxagoras’ list of elements
(155,13-18). (iv) The distinction between primary and secondary opposites
applies to Anaxagoras’ list itself (155,18-20). None of these theses impugns the
accuracy of Alexander’s exegesis of Aristotle. As regards the theses themselves,
(i) and (ii) appear to be true, while (iii) and (iv) have no textual support.
39. Quoted at 34,20.
40. ‘This being so } flavours’ [lines 1-4] quoted at 34,29-35,3. ‘Before } any
other’ [lines 13-18] quoted at 34,21-5.
 Notes to pages 65-67 105
41. Simplicius quotes this sentence four times in this chapter, here, at
165,33, at 174,8-9 and at 177,4-5. Each citation begins ‘and such as were to be
and such as were,’ but the next clause, down to ‘will be’ appears in a different
version: 165,33 is close to the present passage with ‘and as many as now are and
will be’, while 174,8-9 and 177,4-5 have ‘as many as now are not and such as
will be’. I take it that Anaxagoras’ claim is that Mind knows everything past,
present and future. In that case the present passage and 165,33 are verbal
variants of one another, while the version in 174,8-9 and 177,4-5 is deviant. On
the assumption that the differences are due to variation in the MSS, rather than
attributable to Simplicius’ citing from memory, I emend the text of the three
later passages to conform to that of the present one.
42. The MS text reads ho de nous hosa esti te karta kai nun estin hina kai ta
alla panta. I translate DK’s emendation ho de nous, hos aei esti, to karta }
panta.
43. This Neoplatonic interpretation is set out in greater detail at 34,18-35,21.
It is hard to reconcile with the passages of Anaxagoras cited by Simplicius, from
which it is perfectly clear that the universe over which Mind presides, whether
or not including a plurality of distinct kosmoi (world orders (see n. 45)) is
physical. While Anaxagoras’ system does indeed allow for a distinction between
Mind’s intellectual representation of the physical world and that world itself,
and treats Mind’s representation as the model for the physical world, it does not
allow for the suggestion that the civilisations contrasted with ours, and the
different sun and moon which they have, belong to an intellectual world distinct
from the physical world.
44. At 34,29-35,12 ‘This being so [156,2] } colours and flavours, and people
} use’ is quoted as a single continuous passage [DK 59B4, 1-10].
45. This passage has prompted a variety of interpretations, some scholars
favouring the suggestion rejected by Simplicius here (and at 35,9-13), that
Anaxagoras is envisaging distinct civilisations in remote areas of the earth,
others that he is positing a plurality of distinct world-orders distributed spa-
tially within the physical universe, as the atomists held. A variant of the latter
is the suggestion that the plural worlds are not spatially separated, but are
microscopic worlds nested within our perceptible world, in virtue of the
Anaxagorean principles that everything is in everything and that there is no
smallest thing. For a lucid and judicious survey and assessment of the compet-
ing views see Curd, 2007, pp. 212-22.
46. The first part of the sentence (line 4) describes the generation of things
by the combination of previously separate elements, the second (line 5) the
converse process, in which things are generated by the dispersal of a homoge-
neous mixture into its separated elemental components. The homogeneous
mixture ‘flies asunder’ and ‘is nourished’ (i.e. develops into an articulated world
order) as the elements ‘grow apart’. In line 5 I follow DK and others in reading
threphtheisa (‘nourished’) instead of the MSS’ thruphtheisa (‘shattered’).
47. ‘[A]t one time } Strife’: quoted at 25,29-30.
48. Reading with DK and other editors mathê for the MSS’ methê, ‘drink’ or
‘drunkenness’.
49. Reading atalanton hapantêi, a reading preserved by Sextus M. 9.10,
instead of the MSS’ atalanton hekaston. ‘[A]t another } breadth’: quoted at
26,1-4.
50. Reading with DK and others pêi de ke kêxapoloito instead of the MSS’ pêi
de ke kai kêrux apoloito.
51. The Greek is eis to hen telei. It is not quite clear what Simplicius means.
The supremacy of Strife is at its maximum when the elements are totally
106 Notes to pages 67-70
separated from one another in four distinct world masses (Ar. Metaph. 985a24-
7; DK 31A37). Perhaps Simplicius’ point is the same as Aristotle’s in that
passage, that in separating out the elements from one another Strife thereby
unifies each into a single mass. Or perhaps the point is that the four separate
world masses are contained within a single (spherical) whole.
52. cf. 32,3-4 ‘He calls fire “Hephaistos”, “sun”, and “flame”, and water “rain”
and air “aithêr”’.
53. Lines 3-10 ‘the sun } honours’ quoted at 33,10-17.
54. The Neoplatonic interpretation (cf. 31,18-26; 34,8-12) is as implausible
for Empedocles as for Anaxagoras (cf. n. 43). B21 quoted above makes it clear
that the long-lived gods are, like humans, plants and animals, part of the
natural world, compounds of elements, and thereby subject to eventual dissolu-
tion. It is noticeable that they are described, not as immortal, but as long-lived,
unlike the elements and Love and Strife, which are immortal (DK 31B16). The
point of ‘unless } usage’ may be to suggest that the only alternative to the
Neoplatonic interpretation is to treat Empedocles’ references to the gods as
some kind of figure of speech.
55. Adopting M.R. Wright’s tentative emendation hoti sphisi gennai en orgêi
for the MSS’ corrupt hoti sphisi gennan orga.
56. See n. 54. The suggestion that union through Love is somehow primarily
a feature of the intelligible world, while separation through Strife occurs only
(or primarily) in the material world (cf. 31,21-3), is at odds with Empedocles’
fundamental thesis that Love and Strife are equipollent forces, in their eternal
opposition shaping the elements into a world order whose stability consists in
the instantiation of a constantly recurring pattern of change.
57. In this introduction to the discussion of Anaxagoras Simplicius uses a
number of legal terms. Anaxagoras is treated as a litigant whose case is not to
go by default. Instead he is to put the best case he can, and then be subject to
cross-examination. Aristotle is thus treating him charitably (cf. 148,28, with n.
2). The reference to Plato’s generosity is perhaps a reference back to 148,11-16,
where Simplicius mentions Plato’s respectful treatment of Parmenides in the
Theaetetus and the Parmenides.
58. The two principal MSS have ei tukhoi nun mêden ên and ei tukhê nun
mêden ên, neither of which is grammatical. Emendation of ên to on, or of tukhê
to tukhêi, gives grammatically correct clauses, ei tukhoi nun mêden on, or ei
tukhêi nun mêden ên, but each requires nun to have temporal reference, which
gives an unsatisfactory sense: Melissus’ claim is not that if now (i.e. at the time
of writing) there happened to be nothing, in no way could anything come from
nothing, but that if ever there was nothing, in no way could anything come from
nothing. I therefore translate DK’s emendation ei toinun mêden ên, where the
force of toinun (rendered ‘now’) is sequential, not temporal.
59. Simplicius assumes, in common with ancient theorists generally, that
when wasps swarm in a decaying corpse (in his example, the corpse of a horse),
some of the matter of the corpse has turned into the wasps, as boiling water
turns to steam.
60. Having said at 187a27-9 that the reason Anaxagoras posited an infinity
of elements was his acceptance of the common principle that nothing can come
from nothing, Aristotle adds parenthetically (187a29-32) ‘That is why they say
“All things were together”, and he said that coming to be such and such
amounted to alteration, though some say combination and separation.’ ‘All
things were together’ quotes Anaxagoras [DK 59B1] and ‘he’ clearly refers to
him, since Aristotle attributes to him the view that coming to be amounts to
alteration at GC 314a13-15 (the wording is virtually identical to the Phys.
 Notes to pages 71-75 107
passage). ‘[S]ome say combination and separation’ then contrasts that view of
Anaxagoras’ with that of others who say that coming-to-be and perishing are
combination and separation, despite the fact that that is attested as
Anaxagoras’ own view by DK 59B17. Aristotle’s view seems thus to have been
that in saying that coming-to-be is combination and perishing separation
Anaxagoras really meant that they are kinds of alteration, but was not aware
of the appropriate term for the process (so Themistius in Phys. 14,1-3). Others,
by contrast (perhaps Aristotle had Empedocles in mind) really did think that
coming-to-be is combination and combination perishing. This interpretation of
Anaxagoras (with the concomitant contrast between him and ‘others’) is not
supported by any of the fragments.
61. Simplicius’ thought seems to be that opposites cannot come to be from
their opposites, in the sense that one opposite cannot turn into its opposite, e.g.
hot cannot turn into or become cold. Rather, hot is already mixed in with cold,
and emerges from it.
62. Simplicius appears to suggest that strictly speaking we should not say
that opposites are in one another, but rather that they are mixed up with one
another, either by juxtaposition, as when a mixture of sugar and salt consists of
grains of sugar mixed up with grains of salt, or by mixture, as when flour and
eggs are mixed to form batter. In these cases we do not say that the sugar is in
the salt or vice versa, or that the flour is in the eggs or vice versa (though when
a spoonful of sugar is dissolved in a gallon of water we do say that the sugar is
in the water). Clearly, Anaxagoras, who maintains that everything is in every-
thing, sees no absurdity in the claim that opposites are present in one another.
Rather than elucidating Anaxagoras’ thought, which is what Aristotle is doing
in the passage presently under discussion, Simplicius appears then to be raising
objections to Anaxagoras.
63. See n. 57.
64. The MSS text is to gar eon ouk esti to mê ouk einai, which has seemed to
some scholars to require emendation. On the textual problem and the various
proposals for emendation see Curd, 2007, pp. 39-40; she argues persuasively
that the MSS text can express the sense given in the translation, which is what
Anaxagoras’ argument requires. The thought is that since there is no minimum
quantity of anything, there can be no process of diminution by which a magni-
tude could be reduced to nothing.
65. See n. 41.
66. ‘[E]xcept’ is difficult; perhaps the sequence of thought is ‘If the principles
are knowable by Mind, they are not infinite in themselves; all the same, what
Aristotle says is true }’.
67. The argument is of the form P o Q, ™Q, therefore ™P, i.e. modus tollendo
tollens, the second of the five Stoic indemonstrables.
68. The crucial premiss in this argument of Aristotle’s and in the succeeding
two (187b12-188a2) is that, while any magnitude may potentially be divided to
infinity, there is a minimum magnitude for any actual member of a natural
kind, e.g. a quantity of flesh. Anaxagoras’ thesis that: ‘Neither of the smaller is
there a least, but always a smaller’ amounts to the rejection of that premiss.
69. Simplicius treats ‘sarx’ (‘flesh’), as a count-noun. Here he says (literally)
that the whole is divided into fleshes, bones etc., and throughout he speaks of
fleshes being divided into smaller fleshes. Since ‘flesh’ is only a mass-noun, and
never a count-noun (unlike e.g. ‘bone’, which is sometimes one and sometimes
the other) I render ‘sarx’ in these instances as ‘amount of flesh’.
70. The passages cited by Alexander are not found in any of the MSS of
Aristotle. They are an alternative version of 187b16-21, presumably rejected
108 Notes to pages 75-77
by the final redactor of the text, but preserved in some copy which does not
survive.
71. In Simplicius’ text of the Physics, which is the same as ours, Aristotle’s
argument at 187b13-21 is that if, as Anaxagoras holds, the parts of a natural
substance can be of any size you like (hopêlikonoun), i.e. arbitrarily large or
small, then the substance can be of any size you like, which is impossible. In the
text which Alexander read Aristotle says that if the substances cannot be
[arbitrarily] large or small (pêlika) nor composed of [arbitrarily] many parts
(posa), then the parts cannot be arbitrarily large or small. Simplicius objects
that Aristotle’s argument concerns only the size of the parts, not their number,
but that is merely to report what was in his text, not to show Aristotle did not
write what appears in Alexander’s (different) text.
72. Simplicius further objects that in the argument given in the text cited by
Alexander the premiss contains the word pêlika, ‘so large’, instead of hopêli-
kaoun, ‘as large as you like’, which is what is required for validity. He seems to
be suggesting that since the argument would be invalid given that text, that
cannot have been what Aristotle in fact wrote. The obvious reply is that pêlika
in the premiss is to be read, as determined by the context, as equivalent to
hopêlikaoun. (I make that assumption in inserting ‘[arbitrarily]’ in the preced-
ing note.)
73. Simplicius puts forward on behalf of Anaxagoras a defence against the
Aristotelian argument which has just been set out, and then rebuts the defence.
The argument was that Anaxagoras is committed to holding that the parts of
any natural object may be large or small without limit, from which it follows
that the object composed of those parts may be large or small without limit,
which is impossible. The defence seems to concede that that argument holds
provided that each of the organic constituents of the whole (flesh, bone, etc.) is
a single lump, but to maintain that it does not hold if each such constituent is
a combination of several numerically distinct bits. The reason why the argu-
ment is supposed not to hold on that hypothesis is obscure; perhaps the thought
is that even the subtraction of an infinite number of bits will leave an amount
of the stuff exceeding the minimum amount of that stuff. But, as Simplicius
proceeds to point out, that presupposes an infinite number of bits of the stuff,
from which it follows that the total amount of the stuff is infinite, contrary to
the original hypothesis. Any defence of Anaxagoras must challenge the principle
that a magnitude composed of an infinite number of magnitudes must be
infinite.
74. Phys. 187b25-6.
75. i.e. there is some minimum size, such that no body can be smaller than
that size.
76. Strictly speaking, the present argument uses a premiss of the previous one,
viz. that there is a minimum actual amount of any natural stuff (187b29-30).
77. The argument does not assume that any particular finite size, e.g. 1
mikron, has been defined as the minimum size, but merely that it has been
specified that there is some particular size which is the minimum size.
78. See previous note.
79. See n. 76.
80. Simplicius appears to suggest that in 187b29-30 Aristotle is conceding to
Anaxagoras what he has maintained above (at 187b13-21) to be impossible,
namely that there is no minimum quantity of any natural stuff, in order to show
that even given that concession it is impossible that everything should be in
everything. The argument would then be that given that there is no minimum
quantity of any stuff, any stuff must be divisible ad infinitum; but then any
 Notes to pages 77-79 109
finite amount of any stuff would contain infinitely many parts, which is in
Aristotle’s view impossible. On that interpretation ‘even if what is extracted is
always smaller, all the same it will not exceed a certain magnitude in smallness’
does not mean ‘however small the extracted amount, there is some given
magnitude than which it will not be smaller’, [i.e. some minimum magnitude],
but ‘however small the extracted amount, there is some magnitude than which
it is not smaller’ [i.e. some magnitude equal to or smaller than the extracted
amount]. There is, however, no indication in Aristotle’s text that 187b29-30
withdraws the earlier assertion that there is a minimum amount of any natural
stuff. Rather, the argument from 187b27 relies on that premiss, since Aristotle
there argues that, given that there is a minimum amount of any stuff, then
either the process of extraction comes to an end when all of stuff A has been
extracted from stuff B, which violates the principle that everything is in
everything, or it goes on indefinitely to produce an infinite number of minimum
(and hence equal) amounts of stuff A from a finite amount of stuff B, which is
impossible. Since Aristotle goes on to reaffirm at 187b35-6 the principle that
there is a maximum and minimum amount of any natural stuff, it is clear that,
contrary to Simplicius’ suggestion, the entire section from 187b13-188a2 relies
on that principle.
81. It is unclear whether Simplicius is responding to what he takes Alexan-
der and Themistius to have said, (viz. that Aristotle was seeking to show that
the extraction does come to an end), or making an observation on his own
account. If the former, neither his own summary nor Themistius’ text (in Phys.
16) confirms his interpretation.
82. The Greek is tois pan en panti legousi kai pan ek pantos ekkrinesthai,
tauton de eipein ginesthai axiousi. I understand the last five words as ‘and who
claim to say the same by “ginesthai”’, and take their claim to be that ‘everything
is extracted from everything’ is synonymous with ‘everything comes to be from
everything’. In that construction, in which the word ‘ginesthai’ is quoted, one
would expect the quoted word to be preceded by the definite article (in the dative
case in this particular instance). I do not know whether the absence of the article
is a decisive objection to my interpretation. If it is, I have no better suggestion
to offer.
83. Simplicius seems to criticise Alexander for describing the results of
extraction ad infinitum as not merely finite but as equal magnitudes. He
appears to be pursuing his suggestion discussed in n. 80 above, and objecting to
Alexander that the specification of the results of extraction ad infinitum as
equal magnitudes conflicts with that suggestion. But since Alexander is explic-
itly following Aristotle (see 187b33-4) on this point, Simplicius finds himself
criticising Aristotle for in effect misrepresenting his own [i.e. Aristotle’s] posi-
tion.
84. An obscure comment. Simplicius is perhaps suggesting, in support of his
own interpretation (see above), that, when applied to finite magnitudes, ‘equal’
may be understood, not in the strict sense, but in the weaker sense ‘similar’.
85. Simplicius cites the principle as pan sôma peperasmenon hupo sômatos
peperasmenou katametreitai kai dapanatai’ (translated above), and then notes
that in the correct text (lit. ‘in the things [i.e. copies] which are correctly set
down’) Aristotle has anaireitai (‘is done away with’ ) instead of katametreitai kai
dapanatai (‘is measured and exhausted’). While all the extant MSS have
anaireitai, Simplicius is presumably recording a variant reading, or perhaps
citing a popular version of the principle, rather than quoting Aristotle.
86. The Greek is hoper ou boulontai. I take the understood subject to be hoi
peri Anaxagoran. Another possibility is that the subject is hai homoiomereiai,
110 Notes to pages 79-85
giving the sense ‘[T]he homoiomeries are destructible, which they are not
supposed to be’.
87. For ‘comes to be’ as equivalent to ‘is extracted’ see n. 82.
88. This is the reading of all the MSS. Ross, 1936, inserts ‘not’ before
‘separate’, but it is clear from Simplicius’ comments that his text of Aristotle did
not contain the insertion.
89. This seems the most plausible construal of ei tis auton ekdekhoito kata to
phainomenon (lit. ‘if one were to take it according to what appears’). I take it
that the reference of auton is Aristotle’s criticism (elenkhos).
90. This stresses the absurdity that infinitely many times infinitely many
finite magnitudes are contained in any finite magnitude not merely potentially,
but actually.
91. Alexander suggests that Anaxagoras might hope to escape the above
objections by weakening his theory from ‘Everything in everything’ to ‘Every-
thing in every perceptible body’. He then blocks this escape route. Since
according to Anaxagoras nothing is completely separable from anything else,
the components of the perceptible bodies will themselves turn out to be mixtures
of all components, and so on ad infinitum, reinstating the objection.
92. See above, 172,27-9.
93. See n. 41.
94. i.e. finitely many, as opposed to infinitely many. I translate ‘definite’ to
capture the repetition of ‘hôrismenê’ from the description of knowledge. The
inference seems to be that since knowledge is determinate, what is known must
be determinate, and if determinate, then finite in quantity.
95. Simplicius cites instances of processes, the expansion of water when
turned to steam and the organisation of organic stuffs into individual sub-
stances, which cannot be accounted for by extraction.
96. The thought seems to be ‘Quantitatively, because you will never reach
the smallest part; for if you did reach it the extraction would come to an end
[contrary to Anaxagoras’ hypothesis]’. ‘The smallest part will not turn up’
renders ou phthasei to elakhiston. Phthanô has the basic sense ‘be first, do
something before someone (or something) else’; hence, assuming that ‘to elak-
histon’ is the subject of the verb, the sense ought to be that the smallest part
will in some sense not come before something else, but it is hard to see what
that other thing might be. There is a rare absolute use of the verb, applied to
time expressions, meaning ‘arrive’ (v. LSJ s.v. II.2); I suggest that Simplicius
may be extending this use to a non-temporal subject, giving roughly the sense
‘the smallest part will not be reached, come along’. But I am not at all confident
that this suggestion is correct.
97. This sentence is a literal translation of the Greek. I suggest, tentatively,
that the meaning is ‘Quantitative separation occurs when and only when there
is a smallest thing’, or perhaps ‘Quantitative separation is what gives rise to the
smallest thing’.
98. A difficult passage. I suggest (again tentatively) that what Simplicius
means is that the reason the process will not come to an end is not that division
as such goes on ad infinitum, as Alexander held (following Aristotle), but that
Anaxagoras’ principle that everything is in everything implies that the process
of extracting one stuff from another can never come to an end.
99. See n. 41.
100. Another Neoplatonic thought.
101. Phaedo 98B-C.
102. Tim. 61D-62B. The general account of causation which precedes extends
from 27C to 53C.
 Notes to pages 85-87 111
103. Lit. ‘is divided into muds’; cf. n. 69.
104. Repeated with slight verbal variation from 174,30-1. Its presence here
may be the insertion into the text of a marginal gloss.
105. At 188a13-14 all the MSS have ouk orthôs de oude tên genesin lambanei
tôn homoeidôn (‘nor is he correct in his treatment of the coming-to-be of the
homogeneous things’). Alexander suggests that the correct reading may be ‘nor
is he correct in his treatment of coming-to-be from the homogeneous things’, i.e.
ouk orthôs de oude tên genesin lambanei ek tôn homoeidôn (or possibly lambanei
tên ek tôn homoeidôn). He says that if the latter is right the words ‘ek tôn’ (sc.
‘homoeidôn’) have fallen out of the text; but since the received text has ‘tôn’
before ‘homoeidôn’, the omission would simply be that of ‘ek’ (or possibly of ‘tên
ek’). Since the received text fits Aristotle’s argument perfectly, there is no case
for emendation.
106. 165,30-166,2; 174,4-18.
107. Literally ‘unbounded in quantity’ (aperiêgêta).
108. The MSS read ‘posited as elements the simple qualities which have the
nature of principles, but the compounds’. The argument seems to require the
insertion of ‘not’ before ‘the compounds’, as in the Aldine edition of 1526.
109. Tim. 55D-56C; cf. 35,22-3.
 Bibliography

Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius, London, 2008.

Barnes, J., ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Transla-
tion, Princeton, 1984, 2 vols.
Barnes, J., The Presocratic Philosophers, London and New York, 1982.
Bodnar, I. and Fortenbaugh, W.W., eds, Eudemus of Rhodes, New Brunswick,
2002 (RUSCH XI).
Charlton, W., Aristotle, Physics, Books i and ii, translated with introduction and
notes, Oxford, 1970.
Curd, P., Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Fragments and Testimonia, text and
translation with notes and essays, Toronto, 2007.
Denniston, J.D., The Greek Particles, Oxford, 1934.
Golitsis, P., Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique
d’Aristote, Berlin and New York, 2008.
Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1962-81, 6 vols.
Huby, P.M., Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writing, Thought and
Influence, vol. 2: Logic (Philosophia Antiqua), Leiden, 2007.
Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E and Schofield, M., The Presocratic Philosophers: A
Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 1984.
Ross, W.D., Aristotle’s Physics, a revised text with introduction and commen-
tary, Oxford, 1936.
Ross, W.D, Plato’s Theory of Ideas, Oxford, 1953.
Ross, W.D., Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, Oxford, 1955.
Speca, A., Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic Logic, Leiden, 2001.
West, M.L., The Orphic Poems, Oxford, 1983
Wright, M.R., Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, 2nd edn, London, Indiana-
polis and Cambridge, 1995.
 English-Greek Glossary

absolutely: haplôs alteration: alloiôsis, kinêsis

abstraction: aphairesis
absurd: atopos
absurdity, arbitrariness, randomness,
chance: apoklêrôsis
accept: apodekhesthai, dekhesthai,
endidonai
accident: sumbebêkos
accompany: opazein
account: exêgêsis, logos, muthos,
apodosis
accuracy: akribeia
accurate: akribês
acquire: prolambanein
act: poiein
activity: energeia, epitêdeuma
actual: energeiai (dative of energeia)
actuality: energeia
actually: energeiai, entelekheiai
add: epagein, epididonai,
epilambanein, epipherein,
paragraphein, proslambanein,
prostithenai, suntithenai,
sunagein; be added to:
prosginesthai
addition: prosthêkê
additional assumption: proslêpsis
adopt: lambanein
advance: prokhôrein, prokoptein
affection: pathos
affirmation: kataphasis
agree: homologein
agreeing with: summetros
aim at: prolambanein, stokhazesthai
air: aêr
alike: homoios
all at once, together (adj.): athroos;
(adv.): athroôs
allow: anienai
alone: monos
alter: kinein, alloioun, heteroioun
altered, be: alloiousthai
amazed, be: agasthai
ancient: arkhaios
animal: zôion
another: heteros
antecedent: hêgoumenos
apart, be: apekhein
appear beside: paraphainein
appear: anaphainesthai, emphainein
appearance: phainomenon, idea
apply to: epharmottein, prosêkein
apply: prostithenai
appropriate to, be: huparkhein,
prosêkein
appropriate: oikeios
archaic: arkhaios
archaically: arkhaioprepôs
archetypal: arkhegonos
argue to: sullogizesthai
argue: apophainein, erôtan,
kataskeuazein, epikheirein
argument: epikheirêsis, logos
arise: huphistanai
arrangement: kosmos
arrive at: aphikesthai, hikneisthai
ascribe: katêgorein
ask about: punthanesthai
assert: epipherein
assign: anapempein
assume: hupotithesthai, lambanein,
tithenai; assume in advance:
prolambanein; be assumed:
keisthai, prokeisthai
attach: suntassein; be attached:
ephaptein
attack: diaballein, epexienai
attempt at argument: epikheirêma
attribute (v.): anapherein
attribute (n.): sumbebêkos
avoid: paraiteisthai
114 English-Greek Glossary
axiom, doctrine: axiôma intr.) alloiousthai; (n.): kinêsis,
axis: axôn metabolê, alloiôsis
change around: methistasthai
bandiness: blaisotês change shape: metakosmeisthai
bandy: blaisos changed: heteroios
bare: psilês changeless: akinêtos
be: pelein check: pauein
be clearly: phainesthai chronical sense, having a: khronikos
beautiful: kalos circumscribe: perigraphein
beauty: kosmos claim, make: apophainein
begin: arkhesthai clarify: diasaphein
beginning, without: anarkhos clarity, lack of: asapheia
beginning: arkhê clear: dêlos
being itself: autoon clearly: enargôs
belief: dogma, doxa, pistis clever: sophos
believable: pistos coagulate (intr.): sumpêgnusthai
believe: pisteuein coarse (-textured): pakhus
belong to: huparkhein, prosêkein coarseness: pakhos
belonging to: oikeios coexist with: sunuphistanai
between, in: metaxu cold: psukhros
beyond: epekeina colour: khrôma, khroa, khroiê
bind: pedan combination: sumplokê, suzugia,
birth: genna sunkrisis
black: melas combine (tr.): sunkrinein; (intr.)
blame: aitiasthai, memphesthai sunkrinesthai
blind: tuphlos come forth, come out: proerkhesthai
bodiless: asômatos come to an end, give out: epileipein
body: sôma come to be: genesthai
bond: desmos come together: sunerkhesthai,
book: sungramma sunistanai
both cases, in: hekaterôs coming to be: genesis
bright: phanos commentator: exêgêtês
bring against: epagein common feature: koinôtês
bring in: eisagein, epagein, prosagein common usage: sunêtheia
bring together: sunagein common: koinos
bulk: onkos commonness: koinotês
complete (v.): epitelein, sumperainein,
call: kalein, phanai, prosagoreuein sumplêroun, telein; (adj.):
called derivatively: parônumôs katholikos; thing completed:
care, with great: philoponôs apotelesma
carried, be: phoreisthai completely: katholou, pantelôs, teleôs
category: katêgoria; place in a completive: sumplêrôtikos
category: katêgorein; by the compound (n.): suntheton
categories: katêgorikôs conclude: sunagein
causal explanation: aitiologia conclusion, with no: asumperantos
cause: aitia, aition conclusion: epiphora
cease: epileipein, katalêgein conclusion: sumperasma; be
censure, free from: aneuthunos conclusion: sumperainein
centre, from the: messothen condensation: puknôsis
change (v. tr.): allassein, ameibein, condense (tr.): puknoun; (intr.):
kinein, metaballein, puknousthai
metalambanein, metapiptein; (v. cone: kônos
confidence: pistis
 English-Greek Glossary 115
confirm: pistoun definition: horismos, horos; involving
confused: akritos definition: horikos
conical: kônikos demolition: anaskeuê
conjunction of two: sunamphoteros demonstrate: apodeiknunai
conjunction: allêloukhia dense: puknos; become denser:
connected with, be: epharmottein puknousthai
connectedly: prosekhôs density: puknotês
consequent: akolouthos, hepomenos deny: euthunein
consider: hêgousthai depart from: apogignôskein
constructive: suntitheis depth: bathos
contain: sunairein derivable from, be: hepesthai
continually changing: aeikinêtos derive: sunagein
continuity: sunekheia descend: huperkhesthai
continuous (opp. discrete): sunekhês despise: kataphronêsai
continuum: parallagê destroy: anairein
contract: sustellein destroyed, be: apollusthai, ollusthai,
contradiction: antiphasis, antistrophê phtheiresthai
contradictory: enantios destruction: anairesis, olethros,
contrary to, be: antikeisthai apollusthai
contribute to: sunteloun destructive: anairetikos
control (n.): epistasia; (v.): ithunein, detect: phôran
kratein determine: anankazein
converse (v.): dialegesthai dichotomy: dikhotomia
converse: antistrophê differ, be different: diapherein; make
conversion: antistrophê different: heteroioun
convert: antistrephein difference: diaphora
corporeal: sômatikos different: diaphoros, heteroios, heteros
counterargument: antilogia differentia: diaphora
crab: karkinos differentiate: heteroioun
created: genêtos differentiation: heteroiôsis
criticise: aitiasthai, elenkhein, dimension: diastasis; having
enkalein, euthunein, memphesthai dimension: diastatos; without
curvedness: koilotês dimension: adiastatos
cutting: tomê disagreement: antilogia
cylinder: kulindros disarranged, be: metakosmeisthai
cylindrical: kulindrikos discrete: diôrismenos
discriminate: diakrinein (see also
dare: tolman separate)
dazed, be: thaptein discriminatory: diakritikos
deaf: kôphos discuss: dialegesthai
deceit: apatê disjunctive: diairetikos
deceitful: apatêlos dismiss: paraiteisthai
deceive: apatan, diapseudein disorder: asummetria
deceptive: apatêlos dissimilar: anomoeidês
decide: krinein dissolve: dialuein
decision: krisis distance: diastasis
declare: phrazein distinction: diakrisis
decrease (n.): meiôsis distinguish: diakrinein, diorizein
deduce: sunagein disturb: tarassein
deducible from, be: hepesthai disturbed, be: thorubeisthai
defence: kataskeuê divide up: antidiairein
define: aphorizein, horizein, diorizein divide: diairein, diakrinein, merizein,
defining: horistikos temnein
116 English-Greek Glossary
divided: diairetos explain: exêgeisthai
divine: theios, theologikos explanation: exêgêsis
divisible: diairetos, meristos express: phanai, phatizein
division: diairesis, diakrisis, extent: diarma
dialêpsis, merismos external: exôthen
double-tongued: amphoteroglôssos extinguish: aposbennunai
doubts about, have: apisteuein extract: ekkrinein
draw (conclusion): epagein extraction: ekkrisis
drifting: planktos extremity: huperbolê
drive: ornunai
fall into: peripiptein
earth: gê false: pseudês; be false: pseudesthai
easy: prokheiros famous: kleinos
edge: peras far from, be: apâidein
effect: pathos far, get: proagein
egg: ôeon, ôon fate: moira
element: stoikheion fault: ptaisma
elemental: stoikheiôdês faulty, be: hamartanein
elsewhere: allakhou; elsewhere, go: fear: dedienai
ekbainein feebleness: sathrotês
embrace: periekhein fetter: pedê
empty: kenos few: oligos
end (n.): peras, teleutê, telos; (v.): figure: skhêma
pauein, perainein final: eskhatos, pumatos, teleutaios;
end up: ekbainein (of cause): telikos
end, have an: teleutan find fault with: aitiasthai
end, without: ateleutêtos find: aneuriskein, heuriskein
enmattered: enulos fine (-textured): leptos
enough, be: arkein fineness: leptotês
enquire into: zêtein finite: hôrismenos
enquiry: dizêsios, historia, zêtêsis fire: pur
entirely: pantelôs firmly: bebaiôs
equally: isopalês; be equally true: fissile: tmêtos
exisazein fit: epharmottein, harmozein, prepein
equivalent: isakhôs, isos; be flow: rhusis
equivalent: exisazein, isodunamein follow: akolouthein, hepesthai,
escape notice of: dialanthanein katakolouthein
escape: pheugein footed: pezos
establish: hidrusthai, kataskeuazein forbid: apeipein
eternal: aïdios force: anankazein, biazein
evade: apopheugein forced, forceful: biaios
even: isos Form (Platonic): idea
every direction, from: pantothen form, kind: eidos, idea
everywhere: homou formless: amorphos, aneideos
examination: epistasis forms, by: eidêtikôs
examine: episkeptesthai fortiori, a: ek periousias
example: paradeigma foundation: themelios
exchange: metalambanein freeze: pêgnunai
exclude: exorizein freezing: pêxis
exercises, with: gumnastikôs from which: ex hou
exist in: enuparkhein, pherein full: pleiôn, plêres, empleos
exist: huphistanai fussy: gliskhros
expend: analiskein
 English-Greek Glossary 117
garment: himation hypothetical: hupothetikos,
generable: genêtos sunêmmenon
general, in: holôs
general: holoskherês idea: ennoia
generally: katholou ignorance: agnoia
generate: gennan ignorant, be: agnoein
generated later: husterogenês illuminated: phôteinos
genuine: alêthinos illumination: phôtismos
genus of: genikos image: eidôlon
genus: genos, genikos image-like: eikonikos
geometer, geometric: geômetrikos images, maker of: eidôlopoios
give before: proektithenai immediately: autothen
give in: endidonai immobile: akinêtos
give: apodidonai, katatithenai immortal: athanatos
go through: dierkhesthai impact: epereisis
go to: hupokhôrein impede: enokhlein; be an impediment:
god: theos kôluein
gone away: phroudon imperishable: aphthartos
goodbye, say: khairein impossibility: amêkhaniê
grief, feel: aniasthai imprecisely: adioristôs
grow: auxein, phuein in itself: eilikrinôs, eph’ heautôi, kath’
growth: auxêsis hauto
guarantee: pistoun in their own right: kath’ hauta
guide: paragein include: paralambanein; included, be:
suneiserkhesthai
habit(s): diaita incomplete: ateleutêtos
hair: thrix incomprehensible: aperilêptos
half: hêmisu incorporeal: asômatos
happen: sumbainein increase (n.): auxêsis
head: kephalê increase (v.): auxein
heads, many: polukoiraniê indefinable: aperioristos
healthy, be: hugiainein indefinite, undifferentiated: aoristos,
hear: akouein adioristos; indefinite dyad:
heart: kardia, stêthos aoristos duas
heat: thermotês, to thermon indemonstrable: anapodeiktos
heaven: ouranos indestructible: anôlethros, aphthartos
held: empedos indication: sêmeion
help: boêthein indicative: dêlôtikos
higher than, be: epanabainein indisputably: anamphisbêtêtôs
hold together (intr.): sunekhesthai, indistinguishable: adiaphoros
sunuparkhein individual: atomos
hold: eirgein, hupeinai individually: idiâi
holy: hagios indivisible: adiairetos, atmêtos,
homoiomery: homoiomereia atomos
homonymous: homônumos ineffable: aphatos, arrêtos
homonymy: homônumia ineffectual: matên
horse: hippos inescapable: aphuktos
hot: thermos infinite, unlimited, limitless: apeiros,
house: oikos apeiron
hypostasis: hupostasis inseparable: akhôristos
hypothesis: hupothesis; share a intellect, thought, intelligence,
hypothesis with: sunuphistanai understanding: nous, noêsis
intellectual: noeros
118 English-Greek Glossary
intelligible: noêtos make mention of: apomnêmoneuein
interchange of parts: antiperistasis make up: suntithenai
intermediate: metaxu man: anêr, anthrôpos
introduce: eisagein, suneisagein many meanings, with: pollakhôs
invalid(ly): asullogistos, -ôs many ways, in: pollakhêi, pollakhôs
invalid: asumperantos material (adj.): hulikos
inviolate: asulos matter: hulê
irrational: alogos matterless: aülos
irrelevant: matên mean: legein, sêmainein
meet (difficulty): hupantan
join together: sunairein mental: noeros, noêtos, psukhikos
judge (v.): krinein; (n.): kritês mention: mnêmoneuein
judgement: krisis mind: nous
just-existent: hoper on minimum: elakhistos
justice: dikê misunderstanding: parakoê
juxtaposition: parathesis mix (intr.): summeignunai,
anamignusthai, summignusthai
keep: phulassein mixture: krasis, migma, mixis,
keep away: eirgein summixis
kindly (i.e. in a kindly way): mobile, being: kinêsis
philanthrôpôs mock: kômôidein
know: eidenai, gnoein mood: tropos
knowable: gnôstos moon: selênê
knowledge: epistêmê more: pleiôn
mortal: brotos, thnêtos; of mortals:
last: eskhatos, pumatos broteios
laughable: geloios motion: kinêsis
laughing: gelastikos motionless: akinêtos
lawful: themis moulded: ekmaktos
lead aside: paragein move: kinein; move into: hupokhôrein
leap: pêdan movement: kinesis
learn: manthanein multiform: polutropos
learned: grammatikos multiply (intr.): pleonazein
learning: grammatikê musical: mousikos
leg: skelos mythical: muthikos
lemma: lemma
letters, knowledge of: grammatikê name (n.): onoma; (v.): onomazein;
life: zôê name derivatively: parônumazein;
like (itself): homoios having several names: poluônumos
like: enalinkios nameless: anônumos
likely: eikos natural: phusikos
limit (n.): peiras, peras; (v.): perainein nature: phusis; natural philosopher:
line: epos, grammê phusikos, phusiologos; natural
live: zên philosophy: phusiologia
lofty: akros navel : omphalos
look at: apoblepein, blepein, near, get: pelazein
episkeptesthai necessary: anankaios, anankê, khreôn
look: skopein need: khreos; in need: epideuês
lose: apolimpanein negating: anairetikos
negation: antithesis, apophasis
made, be: huphistanai noble: gennaios
magnitude, size: megethos, to pêlikon non-magnitude: amegethês
maintain: diateinesthai nose: rhis
 English-Greek Glossary 119
number, quantity: arithmos, plêthos, plant: phuton
to poson plurality: plêthos
poetry: poiêsis
object (v.): apoteinein point: sêmeion, stigma
objection: enklêma pole: polos
observe: theasthai, theôrein portion: diaspasmos, meros
obvious: enargês positive argument: kataskeuê
obviously: prophanôs possibility: dunamis
obviousness: enargeia possible: anustos
omit: parêkein postulate: hupotithesthai
one sense (way), in: monakhôs potential (n.): dunamis
one’s own: oikeios potentiality: dunamis
open: prophanôs potentially: dunamei
opinion: doxa; thing of opinion: power: dunamis
doxastos precede: prolambanein
oppose: antilegein; opposed to: precise, be: akribologeisthai
antithetos predicate of: katêgorein
opposite (adj.): antistrophos, enantios; predominate: epikratein
be opposite to: antikeisthai, premise: lemma, protasis
antitithesthai, enistanai, hupantan present, be: pareinai
opposition: enantiotês prevail: damazein
order (v.): anôgein; (n.): taxis prevent: eirgein, kôluein,
organise: dioikein proanastellein
origin, with a single: mounogenês primary: proêgoumenos
other: heteros principle: arkhê; having the character
otherness: heterotês of a principle: arkhoeidês
overturn: anatrepein problem: aporia
own words: lexis proceed: proerkhesthai
proclaim: anumnein, boan
pain, feel, suffer: algein, odunasthai produce: ekpherein, propherein
paradoxical: paradoxos productive: poiêtikos
part: meros, morion; have part in: project: proekhein
metekhein proof: apodeixis; proof, give:
partake: metekhein apodeiknunai; proof, without:
partaking: methexis anapodeiktôs
pass (of time): parelthein properly: hikanôs
pass away: phtheiresthai proposal: hupolêpsis
passing away: phthora propose: proagein, protithenai
path: hodos, keleuthos prove: deiknunai
peculiar: idios proverb: paroimia
peculiarity: idiotês psychical: psukhikos
perceived: aisthêtos purpose: telos
perceptible: aisthêtos push aside: apothein
perfect: atelestos, holotelês put together: suntithenai
perishable: epikêros, phthartos put: epemballein
persuade: paramuthousthai, peithein putting together: sunthesis
persuasion: peithos
persuasively: pithanôs qualified: poios; quality: poiotês, to
philosopher: philosophos poion; qualitiless: apoios
physics: (Ta) phusika quantity, number: plêthos, posotês, to
place in relation to (v.): antidiastellein poson
place: khôra, topos question: erôtêsis
plane: epipedon question, be a: aporein
120 English-Greek Glossary
quotation: rhêsis rotation: perikhôrêsis
rule (n.): kanôn
rare (in texture): araios, manos; safe: asphalês
become rarer: araiousthai sake of which, for the: hou heneka
rarefaction: manôsis same, the: homoios; of the same form:
rarity: manotês homoioskhêmôn
rational: logikos say: erein, legein, phanai
rationality: logikotês say about: epilegein
reach to: kurein scarcity: spanis
reader, be a: entunkhanein scatter: katakermatizein
rearranged, be: metakosmeisthai search: epizêtein
reason: logos search out: anikhneuein
reasonable: eikos, eulogos section: diakrisis
reasoning: logismos see: horan, sunoran
recall: apomnêmoneuein seek: dizênai
receive: anadekhesthai, eisdekhesthai, seem: dokein
hupodekhesthai, prolambanein self-controlling: autokratês
record (n.): hupomnêma, mnêmê; (v.): sense: tropos; have a sense: sêmainein
mnêmoneuein sensible: aisthêtos
refer to: mnêmoneuein sentence: logos
reference: mnêmê separate (v.), discriminate,
refine: araioun distinguish: apoluein,
refutation: antilogia, antirrêsis, dialambanein, diakrinein,
elenkhos, enantiologos, lusis khôrizen; (adj.): idios, khôristos;
refute: antilegein, dialuein, (adv.): khôris
dielenkhein, elenkhein, luein separate off: apokrinein
reject: dielenkhein separate out, extract: ekkrinein
relax: khalazein separation: diallaxis
relevant: prosphuês separation, by: diastatikôs
relevant to, be: prosêkein sequence: akolouthêsis, akolouthia
reliable: pistos set out: ektithenai; be set out:
relief, get: anapauesthai parakeisthai
rely on: pisteuein several: pleiôn
remain: menein several senses, with: pollakhôs
remind: hupomimnêskein shake: donein
remove: anairein; be removed: shape: skhêma; have a shape:
apogenesthai skhêmatizein
reply to: hupantan share in: metekhein; have a share in:
reply with: apodidonai koinônein
report: historein, paradidonai shorten: epitemnein
reproach: enkalein shout out: anaboan
research: historia show: deiknunai, dêloun, elenkhein,
resolve: apoluein epideiknunai
rest: stasis show before: prodeiknunai
reveal: apodeiknunai, apophainein, sidestep: parexerkhesthai
ekphainein sight: opsis
reverse of, the: anapalin sign: sêma
revolution: peridinêsis signify: sêmainein
revolving: peripherês silvery: argupheos
rightly: orthôs similar: paraplêsios
have room for: khôrein simple: haplos
root: rhiza sit: kathezesthai
rotate (intr.): perikhôrein
 English-Greek Glossary 121
size: megethos, to pêlikoun; of any substantial: ousiôdês; be
size you like: hopêlikosoun substantiated: ousiounai
sizeless: amegethês substrate, underlying thing:
sleep: koimasthai hupokeimenon, hupostasis
small: baios suggest: hupotithesthai, tithenai
smaller, get: meioun suggestion: thesis
smallest: elakhistos sun: hêlios
smallness: smikrotês superiority: huperokhê
smith: khalkeus support (v.): bebaioun, kataskeuazein,
snow: khiôn paristanai; (n.): sunêgoria
snub-nosed: simos suppose: hupotithesthai, lambanein,
solemn: semnos tithenai
solid: stereon surface: epiphaneia
solution: endosis, lusis surprised, be: thaumazein
solve: dialuein surprising: thaumastos
sophist: sophistês; be a sophistry: swan: kuknos
sophizein syllogism: sullogismos
sort out: diakrinein syllogistic: sullogistikos
soul: psukhê; having a soul: psukhikos syllogise: sullogizesthai
sound: phônê synonymous: sunônumos
space: topos system of rules: kanonikos
speak against: antilegein
speak out against: anteipein take: lambanein, paralambanein
special: idios, oikeios take away: aphairein
special feature: idiotês take up: paralambanein
species: eidos taste: hêdonê
sphere: sphaira teach: apodeiknunai
spherical: sphairikos teacher: didaskalos
stand: histanai teaching: dogma
stand aside: parakhôrein ten ways, in: dekakhôs
stand up to: hupomenein hupolambanein
starting: menein terseness: brakhulogia
state: diathesis, hexis test: basanos
stay the same: hupomenein theory: doxa
staying the same: stasis there: ekei
stop: katalêgein, pauein thickness: pakhos
stone: lithos thing: pragma, khrêma
story: logos think: doxazein, ennoein, huponoein,
strength: iskhus noein, nomizein, phronein
strengthen: bebaioun think of: epinoein
strictly: kuriôs think right: axioun
strong: krateros thinker: noeros, nous
strong, be: iskhuein thinking: noein, noêma, noeros
study: theôrein thought: dianoia, ennoia, noêma,
style: plasma noêtos, phronêsis
subcontrary: hupenantios time: khronos; with regard to time:
subgenus: husterogenês khronikos; it is time: hôra; at some
subject: hupokeimenon, mathêma, time: pote
pragmateia timeless: akhronos
subsequent: akolouthôs together: homou
subsist: huphistanai touch: epilambanein, haptein
substance: ousia touch upon: paraptein
touchable: haptos
122 English-Greek Glossary
transposition: metathesis unwilling, be: aboulein
treat: ekdekhesthai, paradidonai use, of: lusitelês
treatise: sungramma use: khrêsthai
trench, dig: skaptein useful: khrêsimos
tribe: phulon usefulness: khreia
true: alêthês, etêtumos useless: matên
true, be: alêtheuein; be true at the
same time: sunalêtheuein vain, in: matên
trustworthy: pistos valid: hugiês
truth: alêtheiê valued, highly: polutimêtos
try: epikheirein, peiran variation: heteroiôsis
turn back: epistrephein verb: rhêma
turning back: epistrophê verbatim: kata lexin
turning back on itself: palintropos verse: epos
two, in: dikha vessel: angeion
twofold: dikhêi vice versa: anapalin
two-footed: dipous view: doxa
two-headed: dikranos visible: horatos
two together: sunamphoteros vocabulary, limited: brakhulogia
two ways: dissos; in two ways: dikhôs void: kenon, kenos, keneos

unceasing: apaustos walk: peripatein

uncertain, feel: aporein wander: plazein
unchanging: akinêtos want: axioun, epithumein
unclearly: asaphôs water: hudôr; in the water: enudros
unconvincing: panapeuthês way: atarpos, hodos, keleuthos,
uncreated: agenêtos tropos; in how many ways:
undergo: paskhein posakhôs
underlying thing (see substrate) way out: endosis
understand: akouein, ephistanai welcome: asmenizein
understanding (see thought) well-rounded: eukuklos
undifferentiated (see indefinite); in whirl around: peridinein
an undifferentiated way: adioristôs white: leukos
undivided: adiairetos, adiakritos, white lead: psimuthion
atmêtos whiten: leukoun
undividedly: ameristôs whiteness: leukotês
unending: aphthartos whole: holos, oulon
ungenerated: agenêtos wholeness: holomelês
unheard of: apustos winged: ptênos
unification: henôsis witness, bear witness: marturein
union, by way of: hênômenôs wonderful: makarios, thaumastos
unique: monogenês, mounogenês word: epos, gramma, logos
unite: henoun work: pragmateia
unity: henôsis world, world order: kosmos
universal: katholou worry: tarassein
universe: diakosmos, kosmos worthwhile, worthy: axios
unlimited: apeiros write: graphein
unmoving: atremês writing: sungramma
unquestionably: anantirrêtôs wrong, go: sphallein
unshaken: atremês
unsliced: atmêtos year: etos
unthinkable: anoêtos yield: endidonai
untrustworthy: anaxiopistos
 Greek-English Index
aboulein, be unwilling, 127,11
adiairetos, indivisible, undivided,
108,1; 109,32; 113,23; 119,13;
120,24bis; 121,22.23.25; 127,11;
128,35.37; 129,1.3; 139,21.27;
140,5.8bis.18; 142,4.26; 143,1.7;
144,21
adiakritos, undivided, 120,24
adiaphoros, indistinguishable,
116,14
adiastatos, without dimension,
108,22
adiexitêtos, inexhaustible, 174,14
adioristôs, imprecisely, 110,6;
without differentiation,
149,14-16.26
adunatos, impossible, 149,2; 162,29;
169,18-20. 27; 170,7; 171,1.19;
176,2.3.12-15; 177,6
aeikinêtos, continually changing,
109,12
aêr, air, 106,24; 107,3; 113,30;
149,8-11.15-17.22.30; 150,28-30;
151,21-2; 152,1.12.17-23;
153,1.4-5.14-17; 155,29-31; 156,28;
158,17; 159,11; 174,30; 178,5-6.32
agasthai, be amazed, 115,25; 120,6
agenêtos, what has not come to be,
uncreated, ungenerated 105,22.23;
107,23.25; 108,5.21.25.27;
109,3.16; 110,24; 114,17; 116,18;
120,23; 142,32.36; 144,3.17; 145,3;
147,3.6; 162,12.23; 175,4
agnoein, be ignorant, 120,21; 122,24;
127,10; 142,17
agnoia, ignorance, 120,13
agnôsia, inability to be known, 165,21
agnôstos, unknowable, 162,6;
165,16-28; 166,3-12; 174,27
aïdios, eternal, existing forever,
everlasting, 109,4.11.13;
110,2.4.24; 111,1.19; 113,10;
120,24; 153,18-22
aisthêsis, perception, 178,18
aisthêtos, perceived, perceptible,
sensible, of the senses, 108,3.7;
127,13; 136,30; 137,2.4; 138,33;
144,5.10; 147,27; 151,16; 157,5.18;
160,22; 161,10; 165,2; 173,11-37;
174,3; 178,19
aithêr, ether (bright upper air),
155,29-31; 156,28; 179,6
aitia, aition, cause, 104,23.28;
105,32; 106,7; 113,27; 120,26;
122,29; 125,12; 144,12; 147,13;
147,16; 148,10; 154,6.19; 163,31;
164,5; 165,18; 170,8; 175,1;
176,20-1; 177,13-17
aitiasthai, blame, find fault with,
criticise, 103,2; 104,23.28; 105,32;
110,6; 112,16; cite as cause, 176,14
aitiologia, causal explanation,
176,11
akhôristos, inseparable, 122,12;
128,13bis.15.22; 175,17; 176,10.14
akhronos, timeless, 107,1bis.3; 146,1
akinêtos, unchanging, motionless,
changeless, immobile, unmoving,
unchanged, unchangeable, 103,30;
104,20; 108,1; 110,14; 111,13;
112,33; 113,17; 114,18.27; 118,24;
120,24; 137,7; 143,9.10; 144,21;
146,11; 145,27; 147,4.7; 148,27;
154,24; 158,12; 160,21; 162,5
akolouthein, follow, 115,25; 120,7;
140,20; 171,6; 172,25; 174,1
akolouthêsis, sequence, 105,26;
108,12
akolouthia, sequence (in argument),
104,28.31; 105,3; 119,3;
implication 140,7
124 Greek-English Index
akolouthos, consequent, following,
129,14.27
akolouthôs, following, subsequent,
118,4; 125,12
akouein, hear, understand, 107,1;
111,11; 116,25; 129,9; 133,22;
136,18; 137,30; 143,5; 146,25;
147,5; 153,12
akribeia, accuracy, 120,6
akribês, accurate, 111,17
akribologeisthai, be precise, 121,5
akritos, confused, 117,11
akros, lofty, 148,15.24
alêtheiê, truth, 116,29; 146,24
alêthês, true 105,16; 106,1.29;
107,17; 108,21.31; 117,32bis;
118,28; 119,26; 135,13; 136,5;
137,27; 141,22; 145,18; 146,12
alêtheuein, be true, 138,15; 144,7;
148,1
alêthinos, genuine, 114,22
algein, feel pain suffer pain, 104,1;
111,21; 112,1.2.3.4.6
allakhou, elsewhere, 115,14; 148,16
allassein, change, 146,14
allêllos, one another, 103,29;
116,12.16.17; 120,15; 122,2
allêloukhia, conjunction, 136,31
alloiôsis, change, alteration, 106,28;
107,2.9.10.15; 108,16.17.18;
110,21.28; 112,26.31; 149,27;
150,21; 154,2; 163,9-17; 174,31;
178,4.7
alloiousthai, change, be altered,
106,27.31; 107,5.10;
108,17.19.20.21; 110,27; 113,3.12;
163,9-17
alogos, irrational, without an
account, absurd, 114,5; 135,30;
148,1; 172,10.14.28.31; 174,4
amegethês, sizeless, lacking size,
127,10; 141,17; 150,16;
non-magnitude, 142,5
ameibein, change, 112,24; 146,14
amêkhaniê, impossibility, 117,9
amerês, without parts, 108,5.14.22;
109,6.18; 139,27; 140,6.10
ameristôs, undividedly, 136,29
amiktos, unmixed, 173,26
amorphos, formless, 135,3
amphoteroglôssos, double-tongued,
139,4
anaboan, shout out, 148,19
anadekhesthai, receive, 122,20
anairein, destroy, do away with,
remove, refute, abolish, 102,28;
110,21; 112,26; 113,2; 126,5;
127,29; 138,20.26; 139,16; 141,9;
142,20; 147,19.31; 162,5; 166,20;
170,2.22.24.26; 171,3; 173,28;
176,13
anairesis, destruction, negating,
refutation, 102,20; 103,6; 138,21;
144,29; 164,12
anairetikos, destructive, 115,3
anaisthêtos, imperceptible, 162,33;
173,32-3
anakhôrein, go back, return, 152,7
analiskein, expend, 140,17
analuein, analyse, 179,18
analusis, analysis, 177,31
anamignusthai, mix (intr.), 152,9
anamphisbêtêtôs, indisputably,
136,8
anankaiôs, necessarily, 178,23
anankaios, necessary, 105,12; 116,3;
120,12; 162,25; 168,28; 177,25-6
anankazein, determine, force,
compel, 102,24; 119,28; 178,25
anankê, necessary, 136,5; 137,28;
145,17; necessity, 146,3; 166,13;
169,1; 171,14; 175,3; 178,26
anantirrêtôs, unquestionably, 102,25
anapalin, the reverse of, vice versa,
104,28; 109,14; 125,32; 128,21;
129,22
anapauesthai, get relief, 113,6
anapempein, assign, 140,25
anaphainesthai, appear, 148,10
anapherein, refer, 120,27
anapneîn, breathe, 152,19
anapodeiktos, indemonstrable,
130,6.10
anapodeiktôs, without proof, 116,3;
120,12
anarithmos, innumerable, 174,5
anarkhos, without beginning,
109,16; 145,28
anaskeuê, demolition, 102,26
anatomê, anatomical description,
153,15
anatrepein, overturn, 102,24
anaxiopistos, untrustworthy,
115,25; 120,7
aneideos, formless, 135,3
anemos, wind, 149,31
 Greek-English Index
anêr, man, 107,30; 122,24; 142,16.21;
148,14
aneuriskein, find, 137,3
aneuthunos, free from censure,
136,19
angeion, vessel, 112,19
aniasthai, feel grief, 104,1; 111,21;
112,6
anienai, allow, 145,14
anikhneuein, search out, 142,30
anisotês, inequality, 150,14
anoêtos, unthinkable, mindless,
145,18; 176,3
anôgein, order, 117,5
anôlethros, indestructible, 142,36;
144,4.18; 145,3; 147,4
anomoeidês, dissimilar, 127,24
anomoios, unlike, 175,2; 177,27-32
anônumos, nameless, 145,18
anteipein, speak out, against 131,26
anthrôpos, man, human being,
104,26.27; 105,1.2.17; 108,32;
109,1; 114,5.12.18.19; 117,27;
123,4.21bis; 124,6.26.27;
128,10-36passim; 129,31; 131,24;
132,24; 135,12.13; 152,16-23;
153,6.17; 157,11-12; 174,32-3;
175,1
antidiairein, divide up, 135,9;
136,23; oppose, contrast, 149,13.19
antidiastellein, place in relation to,
132,5; 148,17
antidiastolê, contrast, 148,29
antikeisthai, oppose, be opposite, be
contrary, 102,25.26.27; 104,31.32;
105,4.5bis; 109,29; 117,3.26; 119,1;
132,10.12.25; 135,12; 136,25bis.32;
141,9.20
antilegein, refute, speak against,
oppose, 107,29; 131,26; 132,20;
147,17.18; 148,12; write in
opposition, 151,26
antilogia, counter-argument,
opposing argument, refutation,
disagreement, opposition, 115,1.8;
116,2; 120,11; 122,5; 131,30;
132,13; 142,30; 147,19; 148,7;
antiperistasis, interchange of parts,
112,18.21
antiphasis, contradiction, 116,20.23;
117,3; 134,26.27.29; 135,12;
138,13.16; 141,16
antirrêsis, refutation, 104,16
125
antistrephein, convert, 109,3
antistrophê, conversion, converse,
contradiction, 104,31; 105,1.15.22;
107,18.20; 108,31; 119,2.4; 127,36;
128,33
antistrophos, opposite, 119,1
antithesis, negation, 119,2 127,36;
128,33; opposition, 150,8-9
antithetos, opposed to, 138,27
antitithenai, contrast, 168,8
antitithesthai, be opposite to, 135,26
anumnein, praise, proclaim,
148,18.21
anustos, possible, 109,24.28; 111,25;
112,10; 116,32
aoristos, indefinite, indeterminate,
154,20; 174,13; aoristos duas,
indefinite dyad, 150,13; 151,7-14
apâidein, be far from, 144,9
apantêsis, reply (n.), 166,4
apatan, deceive, 115,26; 120,7;
147,30
apatê, deceit, 147,29
apatêlos, deceptive, deceitful, 144,5;
146,25; 147,28
apaustos, unceasing, 145,28
apeipein, forbid 135,19
apeira tôi arithmôi, infinite in
number, 168,32; 178,24
apeira tôi plêthei, to plêthos,
plêthous, infinite in quantity,
number, 154,11; 155,24-7; 156,1.8;
164,15-16; 165,11-13; 166,7;
168,34; 170,6; 171,4.33;
apeirakis, infinitely many times,
172,29; 173,3.23; 174,1
apeiria, infinity, 178,26-8
apeiros, infinite, unlimited,
limitless, 103,3.27.28bis.29;
104,19.20; 106,6.11.16; 107,5.10;
108,15; 109,18; 109,21.30;
110,3.4.5.7.9.10.11.13.14.18.19.24;
111,1.14.19; 113,16; 149,16.25;
150,22; 153,4; 154,5.18.21;
155,2.29; 156,14; 162,3.6;
164,15.25; 165 passim;
166,2-5.7-12.19.32; 169,1.16-18.21;
170,35; 171,8-9; 172-173,7 passim;
173,19-23; 174,1-18. 26-8; 176,33;
178,17-25.28; ep’ apeiron, to
infinity, 166,31-167,26;
168,5-13.31; 170,16-18; 171,5-7;
172,12.25.31; 173,25; 174,28; 176,9
126 Greek-English Index
apekhein, be apart, 141,3
aperiêgêtos, innumerable, 178,29
aperilêptos, incomprehensible,
164,16.31; 174,5
aperioristos, indefinable, 162,6
aphairein, take away, 110,26; 139,2;
170,5.10.26; 171,14
aphairesis, abstraction, 144,3;
removal, 170,27.35; 171,5
aphatos, ineffable, 144,25
aphikesthai arrive, at 142,28
aphorizein, define, separate off,
demarcate, 113,22; 148,4; 151,16
aphthartos, (what) cannot be
destroyed, imperishable,
unending, indestructible, 103,26;
116,18; 142,33; 167,23; 175,4
aphuktos, inescapable, 127,35
apisteuein, have doubts about,
135,18
apoblepein, look at, 114,8
apodeiknunai, give proof, teach,
reveal, demonstrate, 127,11.25;
135,20.25; 137,14; 169,25-6
apodeixis, proof, demonstration,
106,5; 108,26; 109,16; 111,11;
115,1; 121,18; 122,15; 137,14;
164,6; 170,33
apodekhesthai, accept, 141,18
apodidonai, give, reply with,
114,15; 115,19; 138,32; 144,15
apodosis, explanation, 177,11.15
apogenesthai, be removed, 112,3;
139,14.15
apogignôskein, depart from, 144,16
apoios, qualitiless (without quality
or attribute), 179,15
apokatastasis, reconstitution, 157,26
apoklêrôsis, chance, randomness,
absurdity, 162,16; 170,11
apokrinein, separate off
(physically), 155,24.31;
156,4.24-30; 157,2.8; 164,30;
165,32; 174,8.24; 175,11;
176,5.21-8; 177,4; 179,1.6-9
apolêgein, cease, 158,29; 159,8
apoleipein, pass away, cease to be,
153,20; 159,7
apoleipsis, passing away, 158,3
apolimpanein, (Ionic) lose, 112,20
apollusthai, be destroyed, cease to
be, 103,31; 110,27;
111,20.22.25.26; 131,28; 163,6-23
apoluein, resolve, separate, 107,31;
131,28
apomnêmoneuein, recall, make
mention of, 116,19; 140,25
apophainein, argue, make claim,
reveal, 102,22; 107,25; 116,3;
120,12; 135,2.24; 135,28; 136,13;
147,33
apophasis, negation, 105,10.26
apopheugein, evade, 147,32
aporein, feel uncertain, be a
question, 102,23; 138,31; 139,5
aporia, problem, 140,15.24
aporrêsis, statement, 135,18
aposbennunai, extinguish, 145,22
apoteinein, object, 137,11
apotelesma, thing completed, 135,6
apothein, push aside, 146,1
apustos, unheard of, 145,22
araios, rare, loose-textured, 104,7,8,9;
111,6.7bis; 112,10.11; 151,4; 156,29;
174,23; 176,22-5; 179,1.5
araioun, refine, rarify, 149,30
araiousthai, become rarer, 113,18
argupheos, silvery, 147,2
arithmos, number, 118,20
bis,21.23.29; 119,9.11.12; 121,21;
127,7; 131,13.32; 132,17; 134,30;
137,29; 165,23; 170,9; 171,3;
172,10; 174,7
arkein, be enough, 104,16; 105,17;
135,15; 136,12.17.20
arkhaioprepôs, archaically, 111,15
arkhaios archaic, ancient, 111,16;
120,28; 138,8
arkhê, starting-point, beginning,
103,5bis.6.24bis.25.27;
104,18-105,23bis passim;
105,24bis.25.27; 105,32-107,24
passim; 108,10.11.13; 108,14-109,6
passim; 109,21.22.24; 110,3;
113,18; 114,1.2; 122,5; 130,2;
156,23; 164,29; 173,14.26;
principle, origin, 114,2; 122,5;
142,20; 146,27.29; 149,1.13.28;
150,7.11-12.23; 151,6.11-14.23-30;
152,10-21; 153,17.23.25;
154,4-9.18-29; 155,13; 162,5;
163,31; 164,16; 165,17-28;
166,2-12; 167,18; 172,1; 173,9-12;
174,26; 178,22; 179,14
arkhegonon, archetypal, 177,8
arkhesthai, begin, 103,15;
 Greek-English Index
106,15.19.31; 109,22.23; 122,5;
145,10; 146,29
arkhoeidês, having the character of
a principle, 178,31; 179,6.11
arrêtos, ineffable, 147,16
artêria, artery, 175,7
asapheia, lack of clarity, 126,11
asaphôs, unclearly, 111,15
asmenizein, welcome, 108,26
asômatos, incorporeal, bodiless,
non-bodily, 110,1; 113,19;
114,19;150,16
asphalês, safe, 136,20
astra, stars, 156,27
asullogistos, invalid, 103,1;
104,22.27; 105,10.31; 107,28;
114,29; 117,15;
asullogistôs, invalidly, 103,4; 134,1
asulos, inviolate, 146,21
asummetria, disorder, 150,13
asumperantos, invalid, with no
conclusion, 118,3; 119,6
atarpos, way, 116,31
atelestos, perfect, 145,4
ateleutêtos, without end, incomplete,
109,17; 146,5
athanatos, immortal, 153,19-22
athroôs, (adv.) all together, at once,
106,30.32.33; 107,5; 108,16; 109,9
athroos, all at once, all together,
106,33; 107,4.11.16; 108,28
atmêtos, unsliced, indivisible,
undivided, 140,18; 141,13; 142,22
atomos, indivisible, individual,
129,18.31; 131,13.33; 132,30;
133,13; 138,15.17; 139,30;
140,10-17passim; 141,14; 142,16;
144,9.10; 176,8
atopos, absurd, 102,29; 113,31;
114,7; 117,28.30; 121,24;
122,22.23; 125,5; 127,8; 129,4.14;
139,32; 140,21; 166,11; 171,6.24;
172,20; 176,14; 178,28
atremês, unmoving, 120,23;
unshaken, 145,4
augê, brightness, 159,11
aülos, matterless, 114,16
autokratês, self-controlling, 156,14;
164,25; 174,16; 176,33
autoon, being itself, 122,26; 137,29;
138,1
autothen, immediately, 118,22
auxanein, grow, increase, 160,17
127
auxein, grow, increase, 110,27;
139,2; 145,7
auxêsis, growth, increase (n.),
110,28; 168,6.28
axiôma, axiom, doctrine, 103,14;
108,15; 162,24-6; 164,13; 165,6;
170,2.23.32; 171,3.13.15.21
axios, worthwhile, worthy, 114,8;
137,2; 138,1.18; 140,22
axioun, want, think right, 129,8;
133,17
axôn, axis, 112,22; 114,?
baios, small, 146,18
barus, heavy, 155,8
basanos, test, 103,12
bathos, depth, 148,14
bebaiôs, firmly, 135,9
bebaioun, strengthen, support,
102,26; 138,21; 141,11; 142,3
biaios, forced forceful, 114,9; 120,29
biazein, force, 121,9
blabê, harm, 152,5
blaisos, bandy, 124,8
blaisotês, bandiness, 124,16.17
blepein, look at, 148,16
boan, proclaim, 137,25
boêthein, help, 102,30; 134,4
brakhulogia, terseness, limited
vocabulary, 112,30; 120,29
broteios, of mortals, 146,24; 147,29
brotos, mortal, 117,8(); 146,12
damazein, prevail 135,21; 143,31
dapanan, exhaust, 170,24
dedienai, fear 137,11
deiknunai, show, prove,
demonstrate, 102,29; 103,1;
105,21.31; 108,2; 110,13.26;
112,32; 113,19.23; 115,17; 119,11;
120,15; 122,9; 126,7.8;
127,17.18.22; 128,25; 129,4.5.6.12;
130,14.17.22; 131,1.4.9; 135,16;
147,21.22; 149,2; 152,12; 153,13;
165,28; 169,5-6.12.19; 170,29;
171,15
deixis, proof, 121,11; 137,14
dekakhôs, in ten ways, 118,7
dekhesthai, accept, 114,16.17;
134,24; 138,11; 142,24
dêlos, clear, 108,1; 129,30; 131,10.34;
133,12; 137,25; 138,24; 148,13;
157,6; 171,4; 174,15; 176,25; 177,21
128 Greek-English Index
dêlôtikos, indicative, 127,12
dêloun, show, make clear, 118,9;
122,34; 149,2; 152,20; 156,10;
157,17.19; 159,7; 160,18.24;
161,8.14; 165,31; 166,17; 172,5
desmos, bond, 145,27; 146,4
diaballein, attack, 105,31
diairein, divide, 106,16; 107,6;
109,33; 119,16.19; 127,22.32.34;
128,1.3.25.31; 129,12.13.31; 130,4;
131,3; 132,14.16.18.30.31; 133,15;
134,6; 138,4; 139,28.32; 141,25;
141,28-142,24 passim; 149,20.28;
167,7-26; 168,18-22; 169,1; 171,7;
172,12; 175,8; 177,23-4.30; 178,3
diairesis, division, 108,2; 119,12.17;
127,21; 130,8; 132,13; 136,27;
140,14; 141,26; 142,7.24; 144,21;
148,7.10; 167,24-6; 170,17
diairetikos, disjunctive, 130,7
diairetos, divisible, divided, 106,16;
126,31; 107,6; 129,37; 129,5;
138,17; 139,28; 140,1.2.9.16;
141,18.25.32.33.35; 142,1.18.27;
143,3; 144,11; 145,23
diaita, habit(s), 153,11
diakeimena, arranged, 152,15
diakosmein, organise (order),
156,26; 166,1; 174,9-11; 176,19;
177,5
diakosmêsis, organisation, 157,5.16;
174,12
diakosmos, universe, world order,
147,19; 160,22-7
diakrinein, sort out, distinguish,
divide, separate, discriminate,
120,4.26bis; 136,27; 143,26;
147,8.11.19.20.23; 154,6.13.31;
156,10.25; 157,2; 163,6-24;
165,5.32; 173,14; 174,7;
175,11.16.19.33;
176,1-3.7.10.17.24.31; 177,4.7
diakrisis, section, distinction,
division, separation, 136,29; 137,3;
143,19; 143,27bis; 144,19; 147,26;
148,11; 154,27-33; 157,26;
161,14.22; 163,6-28; 176,6.11;
177,7; 178,15
diakritikos, discriminatory, 119,25;
121,8; 123,23bis
dialambanein, separate, 144,10
dialanthanein, escape notice of,
102,30
dialegesthai, converse, discuss,
123,29; 124,14.20.21; 146,27; 148,30
dialêpsis, division, 127,23
diallaxis, separation, 161,19
dialuein, refute, solve, dissolve,
102,25; 139,31; 140,15,17
dianoia, thought, 148,14
diapherein, differ, be different,
109,2; 115,7; 116,12.13.15.16.17;
121,11; 123,15; 126,27; 131,4;
147,1; 154,28
diaphora, difference, 120,21; 121,10;
154.1; 155.4.11; 168, 16.29; 177.13;
179.15-16; differentia, 123,14;
124,4bis.22; 132,32.34; 133,18;
144,6; 150,10; 154,1; 155.4.11;
168,16.29; 177,13; 179,15-16
diaphoros, different, difference,
114,4.7; 115,8; 120,3
diapseudein, deceive, 116,1; 120,10
diarma, extent, 109,34
diasaphein, clarify, 115,26; 120,8
diaspasmos, portion, 136,30
diaspazein, tear apart, 161,11
diastasis, distance, 142,8;
dimension, 150,17
diastatikôs, by separation, 147,27
diastatos, having dimension,
108,3.7; 109,32
diastêma, distance, 151,3; 173,1
diateinesthai, maintain, 148,19
diathesis, state, 113,12
diatithenai, arrange, 152,25
didaskalos, teacher, 148,15
dielenkhein, refute, reject, 102,22;
118,3
dierkhesthai, go through, 136,3
dieros, wet, 156,6; 157,1; 174,24;
176,23; 179,3
dikê justice, 145,14
dikha, in two, 139,28bis
dikhêi, twofold, 130,8
dikhôs, in two ways, 147,18
dikhotomia, dichotomy, 138,3.10;
139,24.26; 140,14.20.34; 141,9.12
dikranos, two-headed, 117,9
dioikein, organise, 154,31
diôrismenos, discrete, 168,5.8
diorizein, define, divide,
differentiate, discriminate,
demarcate, 110,11; 119,14;
124,19.33; 149,16; 168,5-8
 Greek-English Index
dipous, two-footed, 124,26.28.29;
128,6.7.13.19
dissos, two [ways], 115,27; 120,9
dittos, twofold, 154,1; 160,22-7
dizênai, seek, 145,6
dizêsios, enquiry, 117,7 (); 135,22;
144,1; 148,6
dogma, belief, teaching, 102,23.24;
108,25.26
dokein, seem, 102,20; 121,12; 130,1;
148,22
donein, shake, 112,19
doxa, view, theory, opinion, belief,
doctrine, 102,26; 114,25bis; 115,7;
116,8; 131,30; 138,29; 142,29;
146,24; 147,29; 148,26-7; 151,11;
155,9-12; 162,2-4.8-10; 164,11
doxastos, thing of opinion, about
opinion, 144,5; 146,27; 147,28
doxazein, think, 107,13
dunamei, potentially, virtually,
165,22; 167,26; 170,18; 171,7;
172,12; 172,27
dunamis, power, potentiality,
possibility, 109,11; 112,2; 135,5;
138,10; 141,19.22.23.24.32.34;
143,16; 148,21
dunatos, possible, 169,25; 170,19;
175,23; 178,20
eidenai, know, 117,8; 165,28
eidêtikôs, by forms, 147,26
eidôlon, image, 137,19
eidôlopoios, maker of images, 137,18
eidos, form, 106,8; 107,20; 119,22;
140,12; 143,26.27; 147,23; 153,21;
154,20, 161,5.12; 167,28; 174,29;
176,12; 179,14.18; species,
113,26.28.30;
114,6.8.10bis.13bis.14.16; 117,22;
118,17.22; 121,19; 123,14; 131,33;
135,6bis.7.24; 137,3;
142,18;150,11; kind, 144,21;
165,13.30; 166,2.7.9.11;
167,12.16.24; 168,26; 173,22;
174,10.13.16.18; 176,31; 177.7-8;
178,24.30; 179,11; nature, 149,17;
174,6; sort, 160,5; 168,30
eikonikos, image-like, 161,12
eikonikôs, by way of image, 160,24
eikos, reasonable, likely, 122,29;
139,3
eilikrinôs, in itself, 147,5
129
eirgein, keep away, prevent, hold,
(117,6conj. Diels); 135,22; 144,1;
145,24; 146,4
eisagein, introduce, bring in, 115,27;
120,9; 126,6; 132,18; 134,18;
135,17; 136,11.33; 137,9.10.12.13;
138,24; 140,15.21
eisdekhesthai, receive, 104,10.11;
111,9.10; 112,13; 114,20.21
ekbainein, end up, 141,34
ekdekhesthai, treat, 131,13
ekei, there, 147,23.25
ekkhôrein, go out, 179,5
ekkrima, extraction, 173,25
ekkrinein, extract, 150,23;
164,7.20-2; 169,9-28; 170 passim;
171,12.18-24; 173,13-37;
174,19.21.30
ekkrisis, extraction, 149,25; 150,21;
154,2.27; 169,6.13.23; 170,33;
171,8.25; 174,20.28-9; 175,3;
176,5.9.20; 177,20; 178,6
ekleipein, come to an end, 170,27
ekmaktos, moulded, 161,12
ekphainein, reveal, 147,26
ekpherein, bring in, produce,
120,5.28; 139,4
ektithenai, set out, 115,12; 116,7;
130,1; 131,16; 133,14
ektithesthai, set out, 164,13
elakhistos, minimum,smallest, least,
127,5; 139,30; 140,11; 142,18;
164,16-30; 166,15-21.24; 168,33;
169,8-20; 170,10-11.28; 171,16-25;
176,4-6.11-12
elassôn, lesser, smaller, 164,18-20;
165,1; 166,16.30-2; 167,6.13;
169,9.23.28; 170,13-15.31;
171,14.19-20.26; 174,27; 176,5;
177,2
elattôsis, decrease (n.), 168,6
elenkhein, refute, criticise, show,
102,21; 104,22; 117,14; 133,31;
148,2
elenkhos, refutation, criticism,
127,35; 171,31; 173,15
elenktikos, critical, 165,21
elleipein, be deficient, fail, 179,18
elleipsis, lesser quantity, 150,5.14
empedos, held, 146,3
emphainein, show appear, 108,2;
147,12
empleos, full, 145,25
130 Greek-English Index
enalinkios, like, 126,22; 127,31;
137,16; 143,6; 146,16.30
enantiologos, refutation, 131,31
enantios, opposite, contradictory,
114,4.7.13; 134,6; 135,28.29;
136,13.16.17.26; 138,20; 139,7;
141,10; 147,33.34; 150,4.10-11;
155,4-19; 163,33-5; 164,1-9
enantiôsis, opposition, 150,5-7.22;
155,8.18-19; 174,20; 176,28
enantiotês, opposition, 150,24
enargeia, obviousness, 127,13
enargês, obvious, 108,2; 120,14;
121,24; 167,2
enargôs, clearly, 127,8; 133,15
endeiknunai, show, 126,4.24; 147,15
endeiknusthai, show, demonstrate,
148,30
endekhesthai, be possible,
166,13.25-7; 170,29
endêlos, apparent, perceptible,
155,28; 156,5; 157,4; 165,4
endidonai, give in, accept, yield,
134,12bis.14; 137,22; 138,11.23bis;
141,13; become smaller, 168,13
endosis, way out, solution, 137,21;
141,17
eneinai, be in, 173,32-5
energeia, actuality, activity, 141,35;
143,16; 147,8.22
energeiâi, (dat. of energeia),
actually, 135,5; 141,19bis.23;
142,1; 167,19.25; 170,28; 170,1.7;
171,8; 172,13.27; 173,4; 174,10;
(kat’ energeian) 172,6
enistanai, oppose, 142,20
enkalein, criticise, reproach, 109,7;
122,24; 137,10
enkephalos, brain, 172,6.8.24;
174,25; 175,6
enklêma, objection, 107,31; 174,26
ennoein, think, 116,21; 136,21
ennoia, thought, idea, 107,30;
129,16; 144,3; 148,12
enokhlein, impede, 109,5
entelekheiâi, actually, 138,10
entunkhanein, be a reader, 111,17
enudros, in the water, 117,21
enulos, enmattered, 137,4; 144,10
enuparkhein, be, exist in, be
present in, 115,19; 124,30; 162,30;
164,1.7; 167,21.25; 168,18-22;
170,4.28; 171,9; 174,3.28.32
eoikôs, resembling, 156,8-9
epagein, add, bring against (i.e.
object), bring in, draw (conclusion),
state, observe, object, 103,10;
107,31; 111,19; 113,26; 114,12;
115,5; 118,4; 127,8; 129,14;
141,2.21; 149,23.26; 166,11;
174,25; 176,24; 178,28
epanabainein, be higher than,
132,34
epekeina, beyond, 143,17
epemballein, put, 148,24
epereisis, impact, 119,32
epexienai, attack, 134,8
eph’ heautôi, in itself, 109,11; eph’
heautou, itself by itself,
156,15-19; 164,29; 176,33
ephaptein, be attached, 132,27
epharmottein, apply to, be
connected with, fit, 121,11; 133,28;
143,4; 147,3
ephestôs, presiding, 154,31
ephexês, next, 149,2; 152,11; 153,13;
164,6; 166,21
ephistanai, understand, 114,8;
124,1; 138,1.18; 140,21
ephistasthai, preside, be in charge
of, 176,1
epideiknunai, show, 117,16; 144,15;
148,5
epideuês, in need, 146,6
epididonai, add, 139,13; become
bigger, 168,12-13
epidosis, increase in size (n.), 168,5
epigignesthai, come to be in
addition, 158,29; 159,8
epikêros, perishable, 160,23
epikheirein, argue, 134,5; 139,4
epikheirêma, attempt at argument,
138,20; 139,6.7; argument, 169,26;
171,13
epikheirêsis, argument, 126,28;
141,1; attack (n.), 165,8; 170,21;
171,33
epikrateia, predominance, 173,18.36
epikratein, predominate, be in
control, 154,8; 155,25; 159,6;
162,3; 173,17
epilambanein, add, touch, 112,20;
113,15
epilegein, say about, 133,27
epileipein, cease, come to an end,
141,30; 169,13-31; 170,2-5; 171,4
 Greek-English Index
epileipsis, disappearance, 158,3
epinoein, think of, 135,15
epipedon, plane, 106,12; 140,13;
142,25
epiphaneia, surface, 119,32
epipherein, add, assert, 103,8;
104,32; 108,13; 134,2
epiphora, conclusion, 118,15
episkeptesthai, look at, examine,
108,13; 142,31
epistasia, control, 109,13
epistasis, examination, 137,2
epistêmê, knowledge, 123,9; 165,20;
175,24.28; 178,19
epistêtos, knowable, 178,19
epistrephein, turn back, 147,10
epistrophê, turning towards, 143,19
epitêdeuma, activity, 115,23; 118,13;
121,16
epitelein, complete, 141,31
epiteleisthai, achieve, 177,22
epitemnein, shorten, 131,15
epithumein, want, 116,25
epizêtein, search, 135,19
epos, word, line, verse, 116,6.27;
117,2; 146,25; 146,26; 147,29
erein, say, 118,25
ergon, function, 176,2
erôtan, argue, 114,29
erôtêsis, question, 141,32
eskhatos, final, last, 139,29; 141,6
etêtumos, true, 145,19
etos, year 111,24; 113,9
eukuklos, well-rounded, 126,22;
127,31; 137,16; 143,6; 146,16.30
eulogos, reasonable, 108,12.29; 141,12
euthunein, criticise, deny, 104,20;
121,24
ex hou, from which, 106,8; 113,28;
114,12.14
exêgeisthai, explain, 112,32; 113,28;
127,27
exêgêsis, account, explanation,
110,22; 111,17; 131,12;
interpretation, 170,9
exêgêtês, commentator, 112,31;
127,9; 131,14
exisazein, be equivalent, be equally
true, 105,16.18; 108,31; 109,2.3.32
exorizein, exclude, 143,30
exôthen, external, 123,11
gê, earth, 146,29; 149,7.31; 152,1.5;
131
155,22; 156,7; 157,14; 177,30;
178,31; 179,5.8-10; (gaia)158,17;
(aiê) 159,18; (khthôn) 160,29
gelastikos, laughing, 104,27bis
geloios, laughable, 134,5.6
genesis, coming to be, 103,14;
106,15.19.20.28; 108,6; 110,26;
135,16; 136,34; 145,22.28; 148,9;
149,5.27-8; 150,21; 151,17;
154,2.19.27; 157,26; 158,3;
161,12-19; 162,11; 164,5; 173,13;
174,30; 176,27; 177,9.20-6;
178,2.9-15.22
genesthai, come to be,
103,16.17.18.19.20; 104,18-105,20;
105,24.25.26.32;
106,3.15,19-24passim; 107,18;
108,20.28.29; 109,20.26; 111,20.23;
145,13
genêtos, what has come to be,
created, 104,17; 108,3.7.9;
109,2.8.26.29; 136,24; 144,9;
160,12.24; 175,5; 178,21
genikos, of genus, 133,13
genna, birth, 145,6; age, generation,
159,8; 161,5; 162,18
gennaios, noble, 148,14
gennan, create, generate, 108,23;
149,23-5.29; 150,3; 178,21
genos, genus, 118,17.22.23; 119,10;
121,19; 123,14; 124,22; 126,9;
129,30; 131,14.18.23.24.29.32.35;
132,4.5; 136,6.11.13.24.26
geômetrikos, geometer, geometric,
142,20bis
gignesthai, come to be, 151,18;
153,20; 154,30; 156,9; 158,10;
160,18; 162,9-31; 163,1-28;
164,1-9; 165,3; 167,25; 168,15-17;
170,1.22; 172,12; 173,23; 174,33;
175,31; 177,29; 178,2-5.31
gignôskein, know, 156,25; 165,18.32;
174,8.11; 177,4
gliskhros, fussy, 144,26
glukus, sweet, 155,14; 162,32; 163,4
gnoein, know, 116,32
gnômê, thought, 156,20; 177,1
gnôrizein, know, 165,19
gnôsis, knowledge, 174,12
gnôstos, knowable, 151,18; 166,1
gramma, word, 111,16; 138,15,17
grammatikê, knowledge of letters,
learning, 123,6.9.32; 124,3
132 Greek-English Index
grammatikos, learned, 123,31;
124,3; 138,17
grammê, line, 106,12bis;
140,12.15.17; 141,15; 142,17.18.26
graphein, write, 129,24
gumnastikôs, with exercises, 139,3
hagios, holy, 137,7
haima, blood, 153,14; 162,32; 168,27;
172,6.8.24; 178,1
hamartanein, be faulty, 104,25;
107,20; 115,4
haplos, simple, 106,21; 114,16
haplôs, absolutely, simply, without
qualification, 103,19; 106,22;
108,27; 109,18; 125,24.27; 126,11;
133,7; 134,28.29; 135,9.17;
136,11bis.32.33; 137,9.26; 140,16;
147,14; 169,30; 174,19
haplous, simple, 177,29; 178,31-3;
179,6.11.19
haptein, touch, 142,8
haptos, touchable, 108,4
harmoniê, proportion, 160,4
harmozein, fit, fit together, 144,17;
161,10
hêdonê, taste, 153,3; 156,4; 157,11
hêgoumenos, antecedent, 104,32;
105,5.15.16; 107,20; 108,32; 109,3;
147,30
hêgousthai, consider, 147,30
hekaterôs, in either way, in both
cases, 118,17; 119,24
hêlios, sun, 105,20; 107,22; 119,24;
153,5; 156,27; 157,13.22-3;
(êlektôr) 160,29
hêmisu, half, 107,15
hen, one, 148,26; 149,2-4.6.15;
150,18; 151,7-12; 154,6-10,19-20;
158,7; 162,3-5; 165,4; 166,8;
173,30; 176,29; 178,25
hen hekaston, each one, 157,4
hen kai pleona, one and many,
158,1-2.9; 159,5.9-10; 161,16-17
hen kai polla, one and many,
153,23-4; 154,3.29; 157,25
hênômenôs, by way of union,
united(ly), 143,26; 144,13; 147,11;
148,6
henôsis, unity, union, unification,
120,25; 136,28; 144,13; 144,25;
148,20; 161,13
henoun, make one,unify, 142,33;
161,9; 176,31
hepesthai, follow, be deducible, be
derivable, 102,29; 103,9.11; 119,1
hepomenon, consequent, 103,6;
104,31; 105,4.16
heteroios, changed, different, 111,24;
112,1
heteroioun, make different, alter,
form by differentiation, 110,28;
111,22.27; 113,3.9.12;
151,31-152,11; 153,8
heteros, other, another, different,
104,3.19; 116,14.15.17;
120,14bis.15.19; 121,17;
122,4.10.11.17.31; 125,1.4;
126,26.27.28; 127,2; 134,16bis.17;
135,25; 136,2.4.6; 137,21; 138,12;
139,25; 140,32.33; 141,3bis.24;
143,28.29; 144,18; 152,2.26; 153,9;
156,9; 157,2-3; 165,14-15;
172,18-19; 175,11-12; 176,24-6
heterotês, otherness, 143,27;
144,7.10; 147,23.26
heuriskein, find, 116,27; 133,24;
138,16; 143,25; 146,9
hexis, state, 175,18
hidrusthai, establish, 147,16
hikanôs, properly, 134,8
hikneisthai, arrive at, 146,19
himation, garment, 123,25bis
hippos, horse, 114,5.13; 117,27;
128,36; 135,13
histanai, stay, stand, 137,7; 144,22
historein, report, state, relate,
115,11; 151,22
historia, research, enquiry, account,
115,12; 140,24; 151,20; 154,17
hodos, way, path, 117,6; 135,22;
142,34; 144,1; 145,1; 145,18
holikôs, in general, 177,13
holoklêros, perfect, 144,18
holomeles, wholeness, 137,15
holos, whole, 105,5.8; 106,30; 109,17;
112,17; 124,25.32.33; 126,20;
127,12; 128,19.27.34; 129,6.16.21;
138,12; 139,30; 142,24; 147,21;
166,22-6; 167,18.22.28; 168,18;
175,5; 177,27
holôs, in general, 109,4; 113,26
holoskherôs, general, 113,5.7; 147,2
holotelês, perfect, 148,5
 Greek-English Index
homoioeidês, of the same kind,
173,34; 177,25-7
homoiomereia, homoiomerous
thing, homoiomery, 154,3; 155
passim; 156,9-13; 162,8.31; 163,32;
165,2.14.22-5; 167,13; 168,14.26;
171,27.33; 172,5-10.24; 173,18;
174,18; 176,1.17
homoiomerês, homoiomerous (i.e.
having parts of the same kind as
the whole), 154,11; 167,2.9.19;
168,28-30; 172,17.21-2; 175,6;
178,9-11
homoios, like (itself), the same,
alike, similar, 103,31bis; 110,25;
111,1.20.22; 112,4; 113,10;
116,13.14bis; 140,1; 141,5; 142,14;
143,3; 143,7; 145,23; 157,3; 165,15;
170,19-21; 172,19; 174,3; 177,23.32
homoioskhêmôn, of the same form,
105,11
homoioun, make similar, 161,10
homologein, agree, 118,22; 130,3;
134,23
homônumia, homonymy, 106,2
homônumos, homonymous, 121,19;
122,20
homou, together, everywhere, 107,2;
143,12.13.17; 144,8; 144,19; 145,5;
like 146,20; 147,13; 155,26-8; 156,4
homou panta khrêmata, all things
together, 163,8.16.24; 164,15.30;
172,2; 174,20; 175,23.30
hopêlikosoun, as large as you like,
166,23-6; 167,4-9.33; 168,5.12;
169,27; 171,16
hoper on, just-existent,
122,27.30bis.33; 125,2-126,2;
126,29.30;
127,18bis.20.21.22.26.33.34;
128,24.25bis.29.31;
129,13bis.23.24.30;
130,18-131,5passim;
131,12-133,22passim;
137,30.31.32.33; 138,1
hôra, it is time, 133,18
horan, see, 108,30; 153,12
horatos, visible, 108,4
horikos, involving a definition,
124,31
hôrismenos, finite, 127,6
horismos, definition, 114,15;
133
127,22.25.34; 128,2.5bis.19.30.34;
129,18.31; 131,5; 132,3
horistikos, defining, 128,6
horizein, define, demarcate, 106,16;
121,7; 124,27; 128,6.20.21; 151,1;
166,8.24; 167,5-6.11; 168,33;
169,12-13.16-20; 171,16; 174,6.13
horos, definition, 123,13bis;
124,24.26.29.30
hou heneka, for the sake of which,
106,9; 128,7.25; 128,25bis; 137,33
hudôr, water, 112,19.25; 113,13.29;
115,24; 121,17; 149,7.11.17.31;
152,1; 155,22-3; 158,17; 159,12;
169,11-21; 170,3-6.31.35;
174,25.30; 177,30; 178,5-6.32;
179,8-9
hugiainein, be healthy, 112,29
hugiês, valid, 104,30; 105,3.22;
healthy, 112,3.4.5
hugros, wet, 150,24; 153,2; 155,8;
175,27
hugrotês, wetness, 155,17
hulê, matter, 106,8;
114,6.10.11.20.21.22; 135,4.6;
140,11; 150,4.10.13-16.20;
151,15-19; 167,28; 176,10-12;
179,14-18
hulikos, material (adj.), 113,27;
114,19; 149,29; 154,18; 177,11-16
hupantan, oppose, reply to, meet
(difficulty), 103,13; 107,30;
113,4.24; 115,7; 126,17.29; 140,14
huparkhein, belong to, be
appropriate, 106,3; 109,8.9.18;
115,19; 123,3; 124,10;
128,17.18.28bis; 130,16.23.24;
133,7; 140,1.9; 147,10
hupeinai, hold, 140,7
hupenantios, subcontrary, 122,2.25
huperbainein, go beyond, 170,16
huperballein, exceed, 169,9-10.29;
170,7.14
huperbolê, extremity, 144,25;
greater quantity, 150,5.14
huperkhesthai, descend, 136,29
huperokhê, superiority, 148,18
huphistanai, exist, subsist, be
made, arise, 122,3.28.32; 140,18;
143,19; 144,3
huphistanein, constitute, 150,19
huphistasthai, exist, 172,13; 175,20
hupodekhesthai, receive, 113,11
134 Greek-English Index
hupokeimenon, substrate,subject,
underlying thing,
119,19.22.23.24.29bis;
120,18.31bis; 121,1.3.4;
122,4.12.19.22; 123,2,3,8,12,17,18;
125,10; 128,9bis,30;
130,9,12,14,22,25,27; 149,14-15.21;
150,10.21-4; 152,9; 153,26;
154,2-7.16; 175,20-1
hupokeisthai, be a substrate,
underlie, 123,3,6,8; 125,9; 126,1;
128,30; 152,11
hupokhôrein, go to, move into,
104,6; 112,8,9bis
hupolambanein, suppose, 143,4
hupolêpsis, proposal, 133,2
hupomenein, stay the same, stand
up to, 112,28; 139,29; 140,3.4;
142,25
hupomimnêskein, remind, 119,11
hupomnêma, record, 144,27
huponoein, think, 148,16
hupostasis, substrate, hypostasis,
109,34; 119,29.30; 120,2.30;
121,10; 143,18
hupothesis, hypothesis, assumption
102,20; 122,9; 126,6; 127,28;
131,26; 134,7; 165,20; 171,33;
172,28
hupothetikos, hypothetical, 103,7
hupotithesthai, assume, suppose,
postulate, suggest, 106,1.11;
116,16; 117,6; 118,7; 121,19.21.24;
122,7.25.30; 125,30; 126,5.30;
127,28; 130,6; 132,4; 137,29;
140,12; 141,10; 142,17; 146,27;
149,6.9-10.13.26; 150,19; 154,33;
155,2; 157,5; 166,4.7.11; 167,17;
169,27; 172,27; 178,23.32-4;
179,14-16
husterogenês, subgenus, generated
later, 132,9; 144,2
idea, (Platonic) Form, 135,2;
151,7-19; appearance, 153,10;
156,3; 157,10
idiâi, individually, 115,6; 119,19
idios, special, separate, peculiar,
114,26; 119,19.22; 123,15
idiotês, peculiarity, special feature,
136,22.27; 147,23; 148,4
isakhôs, equivalent, 106,7
iskhuein, be strong, 142,22
iskhus, strength, 145,12
isodunamein, be equivalent, 134,1
isopalês, equal, 107,26; 126,23;
133,27; 137,17; 146,17
isos, equivalent, even, equal, 118,1;
146,22; 164,19.26-30;
170,7-12.19-21
ithunein, control, 117,10
kalein, call, 120,13; 124,10; 125,18;
133,19.20.21; 138,1
kalos, beautiful, 115,21bis.22bis.23;
118,11.12(3).13.18.19bis;
121,11.14ter.15bis
kanôn, rule, 120,4.27
kanonikos, system of rules, 120,28
kardia, heart, 106,13.26
karkinos, crab, 117,19.20bis.21.22
karpos, fruit, 167,30-2; 168,20-1
katakermatizein, scatter, 135,25
katakolouthein, follow, 133,22
katalêgein, stop, cease, 140,10;
141,27.31
katametrein, measure, 170,24
kataphasis, affirmation, 105,11
kataphronêsai, despise, 131,31
kataskeuazein, state, support,
establish, argue, 102,25.28; 107,1;
134,13; 139,20; 167,2
kataskeuê, positive argument,
defence, 102,27; 114,25.28
katastasis, institution, situation,
157,21
katatithenai, give, 146,12
katêgorein, ascribe, place in a
category, predicate of, 112,33;
114,17.5,115,18; 120,21.25;
123,5-28 passim; 124,18; 125,1.3;
133,20.21
katêgoria, category, 106,21; 117,16;
120,27; 122,19; 123,17; 130,8
katêgorikôs, by the categories, 139,1
kath’ hauta, in their own right,
155,17; 173,14; 174,6; 175,14.20
kath’ hauto, in itself, 106,21.22.23;
120,9; 121,2; 122,2.8.32; 123,11;
125,2; 126,20; 137,32; 143,15; 146,2
katharos, pure, 156,20; 177,1
kathezesthai, sit, 123,28; 128,12
kathistasthai, result, 177,32
katholikos, complete, universal,
102,20; 150,5
katholou, completely, universal,
 Greek-English Index
generally, 102,24; 113,22; 115,3;
129,20
keisthai, be assumed, lie, 118,16;
119,15; 134,22.24; 143,15; 146,2
kekhôrismenos, separate (adj.),
172,13-17.31-3; 173,1-6
keleuthos, way, path, 116,29; 117,13
keneos, void, 112,6.7.8.11
kenos, empty, void, 104,4.5.6.9bis;
110,15.17bis; 111,2-12passim.14;
112,9.14.18; 113,13; 165,13
kentron, centre, 150,31
kephalê, head, 106,13
kerannusthai, mix (intr.), 175,27
khairein, say goodbye, 135,29; 147,34
khalan, relax, 145,14
khalkeus, smith, 117,21
kharaktêrizein, characterise, 165,3;
173,36
khiôn, snow, 119,16
khôra, place, 144,20; 148,6
khôrein, have room for, 112,13bis;
131,19; 132,12
khôris, separate, apart (adv.), 164,27
khôrismos, separation, 176,11
khôristos, separate (adj.), 119,29;
120,1; 128,11; 177,7
khôrizein, separate (trans. vb.),
119,31; 120,15bis,17; 129,9;
164,29; 167,1; 168,23; 172,20;
175,22.25; 176,29
khreia, usefulness, 138,22.24
khrêma, thing, 112,2; 118,13.17
khreôn, necessary, 116,30(); 145,11;
146,18
khreos, need, 145,9
khrêsimos, useful, 122,34
khrêsthai, use, 103,14; 114,30
khroa, colour, 146,14
khroiê, colour, 153,3; 156,4.5; 157,11
khrôma, colour, 115,23; 118,13;
119,20.25; 121,5.8.15; 123,9.23.26;
132,24; 155,18; 175,18
khronikos, with regard to time,
having a chronological sense,
106,1; 109,25
khronos, time, 106,3-24passim;
109,6.8.12.14.15.16; 110,9; 111,24;
113,9; 146,9
kinein, undergo (alteration), alter,
change, move (trans.),
104,2.4.5.13.14; 107,13bis.14bis;
109,33.34; 110,15.16.27;
135
111,4.6.12;
112,7.15.17.18.21.23.24.33;
113,13.17; 176,19
kineisthai, change (intr.), 154,24
kinêsis, alteration, motion, change,
movement, being mobile, 104,2;
106,7; 107,12; 108,2; 110,15.21.25;
111,19; 112,33; 113,2.18.19; 126,9;
134,15; 137,5; 140,21.25; 143,11;
144,11; 144,21; 147,8.24; 153,3;
154,18
kleinos, famous, 122,24
koilotês, curvedness, 123,30;
124,16.17; 128,16
koimasthai, sleep, 124,9
koinônein, have a share in, 108,24;
be in agreement, 149,27; 154,26
koinos, common, 113,25; 114,25.26;
121,10.18.20bis; 123,5; 131,18;
132,10.19; 133,25; 152,9; 162,9;
165,8; 166,3
koinôs, generally, in general,
149,23.26
koinôtês, common feature, 114,11;
121,12; 132,20; commonness,
144,2.5
kôluein, prevent, be impediment,
108,31; 112,20.25; 117,22.24;
118,8; 137,24.26; 142,2
kômôidein, mock, 134,5
kônikos, conical, 113,14; 114,11
kônos, cone, 112,23
kôphos, deaf, 117,11
kosmos, universe, arrangement,
world, world order, beauty, 107,23;
108,23; 111,25; 146,25 147,27;
151,16; 152,1-2; 154,14.30; 160,12;
176,29; 177,7-8; 178,23-5
kouphos, light, 155,8
krasis, mixture, 161,2-5.11-12; 164,2
kratein, control, 152,23; 156,18-22;
161,11; 177,2-3
krateros, strong, 146,3
krinein, judge, decide, 104,10; 145,17
krisis, decision, judgment, 112,12;
145,16
kritês, judge, 111,17
kubernan, steer, direct, 152,23
kuknos, swan, 119,16.23; 123,22
kulindrikos, cylindrical, 113,14
kulindros, cylinder, 112,23
kurein, reaching to, 146,22
kuriôs, strictly, 109,19; 113,7.10;
136 Greek-English Index
114,20; 122,26.27; 123,3;
125,11.15.17.27.28; 127,19; 130,17;
137,30; 147,7.8
lambanein, adopt, take, assume,
suppose, treat, 103,4; 104,31;
105,12.18; 106,3; 107,6
108,1.10.16.30; 114,11.29;
115,5.21; 117,16; 118,6.11;
119,6.19; 120,13; 121,2.14;
131,15.18.20; 132,11; 133,16.32;
134,26; 135,21; 138,30; 139,17;
142,1.5; 147,24; 149,2; 154,18;
170,15; 176,7; (prolambanein
170,32; 171,13.17)
lampros, bright, 156,7.30; 174,24;
176,23; 179,2
legein, say, mean, 103,16; 115,27;
119,21.26; 122,23.30; 123,10.18.19;
133,25
lemma, premise, lemma, 103,1.4;
104,17.23; 105,21.32; 117,28
leptos, fine (-textured), 149,10-11.22;
150,27-30; 156,19; 176,34
leukos, white 106,28; 112,29;
116,9bis; 118,14.21;
119,5-27passim; 120,17.30bis;
121,1.6.8; 122,8.20.21;
123,6.8.22ter.24; 125,21.22.23;
130,28; 133,4.11
leukotês, whiteness, 108,19bis;
119,20.22; 121,2.7,8bis; 125,23
leukoun, whiten, 119,23.26.28.31;
120,31bis
lexis, word, wording, text, 110,20;
113,1; 126,11; 129,16; 131,17;
149,19; 166,16 kata lexin, in own
words, verbatim, 133,25; 140,29
lithos, stone, 123,5; 149,31; 155,22;
179,10
logikos, rational, 105,17; 108,32;
109,1; 114,5; 123,19.20.21; 124,4
logikotês, rationality, 124,5
logismos, reasoning, 151,19; 162,1
logos, argument, account, statement,
story, sentence, word, reason,
doctrine, theory, 102,21.25.29.31;
103,2.13; 104,21; 105,3; 106,4.8;
112,6; 113,23; 114,1.3.4.11.19.20;
113,22.25.26.4.19.20; 116,2.8;
117,14.18.20.23 119,18.27;
120,1.2.4.10.14.16.31;
121,3.10.13.22.23; 122,10.11;
123,8.18; 124,19.22.23.24;
127,22.23.26.32; 128,6.18.24.26;
130,30.32; 131,1.24; 138,3.6.23;
140,20.22.25; 141,4; 142,28;
146,23; 148,1; 151,13; 164,12;
165,21; 170,27; 171,5.31;
173,8.27.30; 174,29
luein, refute, 102,31
lusis, refutation, solution, 115,6;
138,8; 141,20
lusitelês, of use, 105,7
makarios, wonderful, 108,2
manos, rare, 150,26-32; 151,3
manôsis, rarefaction, 150,1-4.10
manotês, rarity, 149,24.29;
150,1-3.19
manthanein, learn, 132,6; 146,25
marturein, bear witness, witness,
120,6; 134,9; 148,15
matên, in vain, ineffectual, useless,
irrelevant, 137,11; 138,23; 141,24;
141,34
mathêma, subject, 148,15
mê on, not-being, non-existence,
what is not, what does not exist,
162,10-29; 163,26; 164,8.18
mêden, ouden, nothing, 162,10-27;
164,8
megas, large, 164,19-26
megas kai mikros, large and small,
150,8.12-15; 151,7.15
megethos, size, magnitude, 106,9;
109,13.31.32.34;
126,18bis.19.24.25;
127,3bis.9.12.14.20; 138,4.14;
139,9.10; 140,16.34;
141,1-18passim; 142,4-22passim;
154,20; 155,28; 165,12;
166,18.23-5; 167,5-16;
168,11.28-34; 169,16-27;
170,6-17.22.35; 171,1-4;
172,8-11.29.33; 173,3
megistos, largest, 164,17-22;
166,16.19.24; 168,33; 171,17
meiôn, smaller, lesser, 167,8.19
meiôsis, decrease (n.), 168,28
meioun, make smaller, diminish,
139,2
meiousthai, become smaller,
decrease (intr.), 110,27; 167,1
meizôn, larger, 164,19-22; 166,29-32;
167,5; 171,15; 173,1; 174,28; 177,13
 Greek-English Index
melas, black, 106,28; 112,29
memphesthai, criticise, blame,
117,3; 148,11
menein, remain, stay, 103,22;
112,18.19.22; 113,4.6.11; 119,26;
139,32; 140,18; 143,15; 146,2.3;
147,5.8.9bis.20
mênigx, membrane, 175,8
merismos, division, 139,1
meristos, divisible, 107,10
merizein, divide, 136,30
meros, part, portion, 106,13.30.31;
107,2.4.5; 108,17.24.29; 112,25;
113,18; 124,20.21.23.25;
126,20.25bis.26;
127,3.5.13.23.28.34.35.36;
129,11.20-27passim; 131,1.19;
132,35; 138,12.14; 139,28; 140,11;
141,19.23; 142,6; 147,21; 150,14;
154,32; 166,27; 167,1.19; 168,22;
172,33; 173,2; 175,4; 177,11.27.32;
para meros, in turn, 154,8
messothen, from the centre, 107,26;
126,23; 127,31; 133,27; 137,17;
146,17
metabainein, move on, 154,3
metaballein, change (v. intr.),
103,21; 104,3; 107,7.8; 109,9;
113,13; 160,14
metabolê, change (n.), 106,32;
107,7.8; 109,9; 113,11; 135,8;
150,20; 178,7
metakosmeisthai, change shape, be
disarranged, be rearranged, 104,1;
111,21.25.27; 112,1; 114,21bis
metalambanein, change, exchange,
106,1; 112,28; 136,6
metapiptein, change (v. intr.),
152,3.10
metathesis, transposition, 105,11
metaxu, in between, intermediate,
140,32.33; 149,15-21; 151,22
metekhein, have part in, partake,
have a share of, 111,14; 119,20bis;
121,4.5.8; 124,2.4; 125,25; 127,1;
133,12; 135,6; 136,34; 137,31.32;
152,25-6; 156,16; 164,24
meteôrologia, treatise on the
heavens, 151,26
methexis, partaking, 121,5; 127,7;
136,4.14
methistasthai, change around,
110,18
137
mêtis, skill, 160,2
metron, measure, 152,13
migma, mixture, 154,10.30; 155,24;
156,12; 173,16
mignusthai, mix (intr.), 154,11;
156,14-16; 172,1; 173,9-12.21;
175,18.24; 176,33; 177,9
misgesthai, mix (intr.) 152,4;
175,26-7.30-1
mixis, mixture, 154,19; 161,19;
173,17; 175,25; mikton, mixed,
173,26
mnêmê, record, reference, 138,22;
140,19; 141,12
mnêmoneuein, record, refer to,
mention, 118,6; 123,1; 127,21;
132,17; 133,15; 135,16; 138,28;
146,28
moira, fate 146,10; share, portion,
157,1; 164,24-6; 172,4
monakhôs, in one sense, in one way,
115,14.17; 116,27; 117,15.18;
118,5.6.10.16.17.28; 130,3.6;
131,17; 133,32; 134,24.31; 137,22;
148,8
monogenês, unique, 144,18; 147,15
monos, alone, 118,9
morion, part, 106,25; 107,4.6;
111,23; 112,18; 127,2.3; 135,26;
151,1; 166,13.22.28; 167,6-27.32;
168,5.17; 170,28; 175,7
mounogenês, with a single origin,
unique, 120,23; 145,4
mousikos, musical, 120,16
muthikos, mythical, 146,31
muthos, account, 142,34; 145,1
neikos, strife, 154,8.13; 155,1;
158,8.18; 159,6.9; 160,13; 161,11;
(kotos) 159,19
nephelai, clouds, 155,22; 179,9
nephos, cloud, mist, 149,31
noein, think(ing), 143,20.22.25;
144,12.23.24bis; 145,8; 146,7;
162,20
noêma, thought, thinking, 127,3;
135,22; 143,22; 144,1; 146,7; 146,9;
146,23
noeros, mental, thinking, thinker,
intellectual, 136,29; 143,18bis;
143,26; 147,19; 148,10; 157,5;
177,7-9
noêsis, thought, intellect,
138 Greek-English Index
intelligence, understanding,
151,18.30; 152,12-13.17-22;
153,1.11-14
noêtos, mental, thought, object of
thought, intelligible, 108,5; 136,28;
143,19.20; 143,23; 143,26;
144,8.12.23bis.25; 145,8; 147,7;
148,5.9; 148,21; 160,22; 161,9;
162,20
nomizein, think, 171,12; 122,28
nosein, be ill, 112,29
nous, mind, thinker, intellect,
117,10; 137,7; 143,20; 144,8.12.24;
147,4.5.6.9; 148,21; 154,6.22.31;
156,13-157,4; 157,7; 164,23-4;
165,4.32; 166,1; 172,4;
174,8.11.15-16; 176,1-3.14-21.32;
177,2-3.6.11
odunasthai, feel pain, 113,6
ôeon, egg, 147,2
oikeios, special, belonging to, one’s
own, appropriate, 115,6;
119,31.32; 120,1.28; 122,5; 123,10;
127,2; 138,19; 151,17
oikeiôs, as belonging, 123,12
oikia, house, 178,3
oikos, house, 106,27
olethros, being destroyed,
destruction, 145,22; 145,28
oligos, few, 108,9.11
ollusthai, be destroyed, 111,24;
113,9; 145,14; 146,13
ombros, rain, 159,12
omphalos, navel, 106,26
on, being, (something) which is, what
(there) is, 148,26-9; 149,1; 150,18;
162,3.10-30; 163,26-7, 164,18
onêistos, useful, 157,15-19
onkos, bulk, 126,22; 127,31; 137,16;
139,10; 143,6; 146,16.30; 150,17;
177,14
onoma, name, 121,1.3.6; 123,15,17;
143,10?; noun 124,20
onomazein, name, have name,
130,28; 146,11
onta, things that (there) are, 149,5;
150,19; 151,31; 163,28; 165,20.24-7
opazein, accompany, 116,29
ôphelêsis, benefit, 152,4
opsis, sight, 119,25; 121,8; 123,23bis
organikos, organic, 175,7
ornunai, drive, 145,9
orthôs, rightly, 117,18
ostoun, bone, 162,32; 163,4;
167,14-23.33; 168,27; 172,18.24;
173,31; 174,31; 177,24
oulon, whole, 120,23; 145,4; 146,11
ouranios, in the heaven, 117,21.22
ouranos, heaven, sky, 105,20;
107,23bis; 108,22; 109,4; 133,28;
143,4.7; 159,11; 160,29
ousia, substance, nature,
106,8.20.24; 109,26.30bis; 110,3;
112,28; 113,4; 117,23bis.25;
118,1.2.8bis; 119,7; 122,7.28;
123,4.12.13; 124,22;
125,9-27passim; 126,3.12.30.31;
127,3.4; 128,8.24.29bis;
129,10.11.13.23.24;
130,4.7.16.20.22;
131,12.13.21.22.25.27.35;
133,12bis; 135,3; 137,23.30;
143,11.16; 144,9.10; 148,8.21;
166,10; 175,18-22.26
ousiôdês, substantial, 132,19;
133,20; 137,33
ousiounai, be substantiated, 133,1
oxus, quick, 153,2
pakhos, thickness, 139,10; 141,32
pakhumerês, coarse-textured, 150,31
pakhus, coarse, 150,27-9
palintropos, turning back on itself,
117,13
pan ek pantos, everything from
everything, 163,1; 164,20-21;
169,15.22; 170,1.4.22.30;
171,12.23.27; 173,19.22.37; 174,19;
175,31
panapeuthês, unconvincing, 116,31
panta, sumpanta, all, every (to
pan, everything), 151,12;
155,1.27-30; 156,3-5.11-12;
156,16.19-26; 157,10; 158,7-9;
159,1.7; 164,24.30; 165,17; 166,1;
170, 11.23-4; 171,13;
173,16-17.19-20.24.32-3; 175,31;
176,27.34; 177,1.13
panta (pan) en panti, en pasi,
everything in everything, 155,25;
156,16-17; 157,9-10; 162,33;
163,2.5; 164,20.23.27-8; 166,18;
169,7.14.31; 170,3.17.22.29-30.35;
171,12.23.27; 172,1.4-5.21-3;
173,9; 175,12.15.23; 176,13;
 Greek-English Index
177,21; (hekaston en hekastôi)
170,29
pantelôs, complete, entirely,
136,24.26; 137,6; 147,31
pantoioi, of all kinds, 156,2-3;
157,9-10
pantothen, from every direction,
137,16; 143,6; 146,16
paradeigma, example, 109,5; 118,18
paradeigmatikôs, by way of
paradigm, 160,18
paradidonai, treat, report, 136,34;
147,13; 148,16.18
paradoxos, paradoxical, 133,2
paradramein, pass by, 123,1
paragein, guide, lead aside, 109,12;
147,7
paragraphein, add, 144,27
paraiteisthai, avoid, dismiss,
121,18; 136,19
parakeisthai, be set out, 111,16
parakhôrein, stand aside, 108,12
parakoê, misunderstanding, 148,13
paralambanein, take, take
up,include, 108,3; 123,14;
124,12.24.30; 128,16.19.20.21.30;
129,28; 137,33
parallagê, continuum, 167,1
paramuthousthai, persuade, 102,24
paraphainein, appear beside, 143,28
paraplêsios, similar, 124,30
paraptein, touch upon, 147,1
parathesis, juxtaposition, 164,2
paratithesthai, mention, 168,14
pareinai, be present, 110,9; 124,7;
137,6
parêkein, omit, 121,24
parelthein, pass, 110,8
parexerkhesthai, sidestep, 122,33
paristanai, support, 102,21
paroimia, proverb, 148,23
parônumazein, name derivatively,
124,5.6
parônumôs, called derivatively,
122,20; 124,5
paskhein, undergo, 104,2; 107,6;
111,2.21; 134,7; 144,6
pathos, effect, property (of
something), 107,5; 170,20;
175,17.22-3; 176,10
pauein, stop check, end, 141,27;
146,19; 146,23
pedan, bind, 146,10
139
pêdan, leap, 148,23
pedê, fetter, 145,14
pêgnunai, freeze, 106,31
peiran, try, 107,1; 139,25
peiras, limit, 145,27; 146,4.15.22;
147,14
peithein, persuade, 135,31; 137,5;
148,2
peithos, persuasion, 116,29
pelazein, get near, 145,26
pelein, be, 117,12; 145,11.19.20;
146,18
pêlikos, of such a size, so large,
168,4-13; 176,7
peperasmenos, limited, finite, 155,2;
157,25; 162,7; 168,31-2; 169,1;
170,6.19-26.35; 171,1-6; 172,28;
174,3.6.18; 178,17-18.27-30
perainein, limit, end, reach a limit,
105,19.20; 106,10.14; 107,24.27;
108,7.11.30; 109,11bis.30;
110,5.8.9; 113,16; 114,28; 115,8;
126,16; 127,10.29; 140,28.31;
141,28; 142,11.13; 172,32
peras, limit, end, edge, 103,29;
105,10.19.20; 106,10; 108,8.20;
121,24; 142,28; 144,22
periagein, cause to rotate, 176,19
peridinein, whirl around, 113,13.15
peridinêsis, revolution, 113,19
periekhein, surround, 155,31-156,1;
157,8
periekhein, embrace, 124,24; 134,23
perigraphein, circumscribe, 136,27
perikhôrein, rotate, 156,22-9
perikhôrêsis, rotation, 156,22-9;
174,22; 176,20; 177,3; 179,1
perilambanein, conceive of, 175,6
perilêpsis, conception, 174,13
periodos, cycle, period, 154,32;
157,26
periousia, (ek), a fortiori, 129,6
peripatein, walk, 124,9.31.33
peripherês, revolving, 113,14
peripiptein, fall into, 134,28.29;
141,16
peritithenai, postulate, 166,10
perix, periphery, 150,31
pêxis, freezing, 106,32bis 107,2.11
pezos, footed, 124,26; 128,7.13.19
phainesthai, be clearly, 107,13;
120,10.12; 128,1; 134,9; 147,17
phainomenon, appearance, 107,29
140 Greek-English Index
phanai, call, say, express, 122,21;
145,8bis; 146,8
phanos, bright, 146,14
phasthai, say, 162,20
phatizein, express, 143,23
phatos, sayable, 162,20
pherein, exist in, 140,27
pheugein, escape, 138,16; 140,16
philanthrôpôs, kindly, 148,12
philia, love, 154,7.13.33; 159,6;
160,13; 161,10; (philotês, 158,7.19;
159,20)
philoponôs, with great care, 129,32
philosophos, philosopher, 120,13;
133,3
phlebs, vein, 153,15-16; 175,7
phônê, sound, 121,19
phôran, detect, 120,4
phoreisthai, be carried, 117,10
phôteinos, illuminated, 106,23
phôtismos, illumination, 107,3
phrazein, declare, tell, 116,31;
117,1.5
phronein, think, 137,6
phronêsis, thought, 137,5
phroudon, gone away, 139,31; 140,3
phthartikos, destructive, 163,32
phthartos, perishable, 160,24;
171,26; 175,5; 178,21
phtheirein, destroy, 178,22
phtheiresthai, be destroyed, pass
away, cease to exist,
103,20.22.23.25; 108,29; 142,31;
156,9; 160,18; 171,26
phthinein, perish, 160,17
phthora, passing away, destruction,
103,15; 157,27; 161,18; 167,24;
178,22
phuein, grow, 145,10
phulassein, keep, 106,4
phulon, tribe, 117,11
phusikos, natural philosopher,
concerning nature, physics,
natural thing, of nature,
103,14.22; 113,29; 114,1.12.19;
115,12; 115,15; 143,8; 148,17;
148,23; 148,25-9; 149,2-4; 154,1
phusiologia, natural philosophy,
177,12
phusiologos, natural philosopher,
151,25
phusis, nature, 122,8.13; 129,10;
132,10.27; 134,23; 135,25L;
138,16; 142,2.17.22.27; 144,14;
148,28-30; 149,12; 151,25-7;
152,3.10; 154,16-21; 162,5; 163,32;
165,31; 166,1; 172,19; 174,5-6;
177,9.29
phuton, plant, 106,26; 152,5;
167,3.30-2; 168 passim; 175,2
pikros, bitter, 155,15
pisteuein, rely on, believe, 102,22;
131,22; 146,12
pistis, confidence, belief, 144,27;
145,12; 146,1
pistos, trustworthy, believable,
146,23; 151,19
pistoun, guarantee, confirm, 102,23;
131,22
pithanôs, persuasively, 116,7
planktos, drifting, 117,10
plasma, style, 147,1
plazein, wander, 117,9; 146,1
pleiôn, several, more, full, 110,8.10;
111,3.8.9; 112,8.12bis.13.14.15;
116,12; 127,1.23
pleiona, more, 172,9
pleonazein, multiply (intr.), 168,15;
predominate, 177,21
plêres, full, 104,10.11.12bis.13;
110,15.16; 111,4.12.13.14bis;
142,12.15
plêthos, number, quantity, plurality,
129,1; 131,33; 132,18; 137,25;
139,30bis; 140,34; 141,14.16;
142,15; 150,19; 153,11;
155,27.30-156,1; 156,7; 164,19.26;
165,1.30; 166,10; 168,9.29; 171,1;
172,3.7; 173,3.21; 174,2-3.10.15;
178,16.29
plinthos, brick, 177,30; 178,3-4
pneumatôdês, breathy, foamy,
153,14
poiein, act, be active, productive,
make, do, 106,7; 154,8-9; 164,4;
174,31; 175,1; 176,18.21; 179,1
poiêsis, poetry, 146,31
poiêtikos, productive, 154,5.9;
163,32; 164,3; 177,13
poion, to, quality, 176,3.10
poios, qualified, quality, 121,7;
130,4; 131,27
poiotês, quality, 112,22; 112,28;
117,24bis.25.28; 121,7; 176,13;
178,2.34; 179,16
polis, city, 157,12
 Greek-English Index
pollakhêi, in many ways, 136,9bis
pollakhôs, with several senses, in
many ways, with many meanings,
109,7; 115,27; 117,16.18.31;
118,27; 120,8; 122,6; 130,2.3.5;
148,7
polloi, many, several, 149,4; 155,1;
156,2; 157,9-10; 164,30; 170,12
polos, pole, 112,22
polukoiraniê, many heads, 148,20
poluônumos, having several names,
123,15
polus, much, 155,31; 156,7
polutimêtos, highly valued, 147,9
polutropos, multiform, 153,1.9-10
posakhôs, in how many ways, 132,16
posos, of such a quantity, so much, so
many, 168,4-11; to poson,
quantity, 122,7; 127,1.4.7; 130,4;
131,27; 140,11; 170,20; 176,3-4.6.11
posotês, quantity, 117,24.25.31
pote, at some time,
109,22.23.25.27.29
pragma, thing, 105,19;
106,2.5.20.25.30; 107,17.22.24.27;
108,10; 109,9; 120,5; 123,2; 144,4
pragmateia, work, subject, treatise,
107,7; 148,23; 151,22
prepein, fit, 147,5
proagein, get far, propose, 116,4;
134,11
proanastellein, prevent, 148,13
proapodeiknunai, demonstrate in
advance, 166,22
prodeiknunai, show before, 105,13;
139,18; 141,1
proêgoumenos, primary, 102,26
proekhein, project, 141,4bis
proektithenai, give before, 113,3
proerkhesthai, proceed, come out,
come forth, 111,11; 132,27; 133,26;
147,10.12
prokeisthai, be assumed, 122,34;
129,12; 142,30
prokheiros, easy, 133,13
prokhôrein, advance, proceed,
141,16; 172,25
prokoptein, advance, 106,33
prolambanein, aim at, assume in
advance, precede, acquire, receive,
102,20; 111,3; 119,11; 143,27;
144,13; 147,11; 148,11
141
prophanôs, open, obviously, 131,31;
132,18
propherein, produce, 117,31
pros hêmas, relative to us, 174,5
prosagein, bring in, 148,7
prosagoreuein, call, 106,10; 123,20;
135,7; 146,29
prosêkein, be appropriate, apply,
belong, be relevant to, 132,7;
144,20; 147,4; 147,9; 148,9
prosekhes, close to, 179,15
prosginesthai, be added, 111,26;
139,11.12.13.14.15
proskrinein, combine, 157,8
proslambanein, add, 105,8; 106,6
proslêpsis, additional assumption,
107,17; 167,2; 171,22
prosô, to, extremity, 179,5
prosphuês, relevant, 111,17
prosthêkê, addition, 142,14
prostithenai, apply, add, 122,14;
126,30; 129,29; 139,2; 142,2.9;
167,21.26; 171,14
protasis, premise, 103,8.9;
104,24.26.32; 105,8; 107,19.28;
108,30; 114,29.30; 115,6; 116,26;
117,14.31; 118,3.28; 119,15.26;
120,14; 133,31.32; 134,13.14.25.26;
137,22.27
proteros, earlier, previous, 178,22
protithenai, propose, 128,25; 139,2
protithesthai, propose, 149,3
prôtos, first, primary, 155,17
pseudês, false, 103,1.4; 104,26;
105,31; 107,21.28; 114,29; 115,5;
118,3.15; 133,31
pseudesthai, be false, lie, 117,15;
137,20
pseudos, falsity, false, 104,23;
105,31; 117,14; 118,6; 137,19bis
psilês, bare, 136,22
psimuthion, white lead, 119,16
psukhê, soul, 119,32; 123,8; 137,56;
147,4.6.9; 152,17-19; 153,4; 156,21;
157,12; 175,28; 177,2
psukhikos, psychical, having a soul,
mental, 136,31; 143,8.11.17
psukhros, cold, 106,29; 112,29;
146,29; 150,24; 153,2-5; 155,8.23;
156,6.30; 174,23; 176,22
psukhrotês, cold (n.), 155,16; 175,13;
177,14; 179,2-4.10
ptaisma, fault, 104,24
142 Greek-English Index
ptênos, winged, 104,27bis
pukneisthai, become denser, 113,17
puknos, dense, 104,7.9bis; 111,6.7;
112,10.11.12; 149,10-11.22;
150,27-32; 151,1-5; 156,29; 174,23;
176,22.26; 179,2.3
puknôsis, condensation, 150,1-4.10
puknotês, density, 149,24.29;
150,1-3.19
puknoun, condense, 149,30
pumatos, last, final, 146,15; 147,14
punthanesthai, ask about, 117,20
pur, fire, 113,30; 115,25; 121,17;
146,29; 149,7.15-17.20.22;
150,27-30; 151,22; 152,1; 158,17;
159,11; 178,32; 179,17
puramis, pyramid, 179,17
rhêma, verb, 124,20
rhêsis, quotation, 113,3; 135,16.17;
136,10.15
rhis, nose, 123,31; 124,13r.15; 128,15
rhiza, root, 106,13.27
rhusis, flow, 135,8
sarkion, little bit of flesh, 168,30-1;
172,30
sarx, flesh, 162,32; 163,4;
167,7-23.33; 168,27-30; 169,11-21;
170,3-5.31.35; 171,16-26;
172,6-8.17.24; 173,21.31;
174,25.31-3; 175,1; 176,5;
177,23-4.32; 178,1
sathrotês, feebleness, 102,21
selênê, moon, 105,20; 107,22; 156,28;
157,14.22-3
sêma, sign, 142,35; 145,2
sêmainein, mean, signify, have a
sense, 108,10.21; 113,22.24;
116,20.21; 118,29; 122,27.33;
123,12; 125,10.19; 126,2; 127,7;
130,18; 131,25; 134,10; 147,6
sêmeion, indication, sign, evidence,
104,24; 142,32; 152,18; point,
129,3.4; 142,8.9bis.10bis; 152,18
semnos, solemn, 137,7
simos, snub-nosed, 123,28.29;
124,8.13
skaptein, dig trench, 148,23
skelos, leg, 113,6; 124,16
skhêma, figure,shape, 103,1;
104,24.25; 105,10.11; 107,28;
113,14.15; 166,9; 177,14; 179,15-17
skhêmatizein, have a shape, 113,16
skopein, look, investigate, 135,19;
148,28
smikros, small, 156,23; 164,16-26;
166,15
smikrotês, smallness, 142,23.26;
155,27-8; 164,26; 166,18.23-6;
169,10.29; 170,8.12-13; 172,3
sôma, body, 104,13; 106,23; 107,15;
108,2.5.8.19.20.24; 109,4.10; 110,2;
111,2; 113,18; 119,32; 120,30;
121,8; 139,22; 123,7; 127,14;
142,19.23.26; 148,29;
149,12.19-20.26; 150,23; 153,15.19;
167,20-2.28; 169,8; 171,14.21-3;
173,11; 175,26; 179,15.19
sômatikos, corporeal, bodily, 108,1;
121,24; 143,1; 149,6; 154,22
sophistês, sophist, 137,18
sophizein, be a sophistry, 106,2
sophos, clever, 107,30; 142,16; 148,13
spanis, scarcity, 144,28
sperma, seed, 153,13; 156,3-7;
157,10; 167,31-2; 168,1.14-17
sphaira, sphere, 112,22.23; 126,22;
127,31; 137,16; 143,6.7bis;
146,16.30
sphairikos, spherical, 113,14
sphairos, sphere, 154,13
sphallein, go wrong, 112,30
stasimon, stationary, static 153,2
stasis, rest, staying the same,
stopping, 126,9; 134,15; 147,24;
176,11.13
stênai, stop, 170,33-5; 176,4-9
stereon, solid, 106,12; 140,13
stêthos, heart, 117,10
stigma, point, 106,12; 139,1
stoikheiôdês, elemental, 178,1;
179,13
stoikheion, element, 149,3.7.12.15;
150,31; 151,21; 152,9;
154,7.12.22.33; 155,3-4.7-16;
159,5; 165,12.17; 166,4; 173,13;
174,2.5.10.17; 177,26-31;
178,2.16.24-34; 179,12-16
stokhazesthai, aim at, 107,31
sukhnon, a quantity, 151,5
sullogismos, syllogism, reasoning,
103,7; 104,23.25; 105,8; 129,32;
130,6; 164,6; 166,22
sullogistikos, syllogistic, 120,11
sullogizein, reason (vb.), 171,17
 Greek-English Index
sullogizesthai, argue to, syllogise,
110,5; 116,2; 127,35
sumbainein, happen, come about,
result, 118,18; 122,2-31passim;
123,28; 128,11bis; 141,10; 165,19;
175,15-16
sumbebêkos, accident, 116,1;
119,6.24.28; 120,9.19;
122,1-31passim; 124,2.7; 125,3.9;
126,2; 127,17.19; 128,8.10; 129,21;
133,8.9.10.11.12.22; 131,21.22;
139,7; 144,11; 148,9; attribute,
property, 175,17-19; kata
sumbebêkos, per accidens, 102,27
sumbolikôs, figuratively, 150,13
summeignunai, mix, 136,2
summetros, agreeing with, 142,30
summisgesthai, mix (intr.),
156,18.24; 163,7.20-4; 174,7; 177,3
summixis, mixture, 156,5
sumpêgnunai, construct, 157,11
sumpêgnusthai, coagulate, 179,7-10
sumperainein, complete, be
conclusion, 103,7; 110,23; 111,18;
115,5; 116,1; 118,7; 141,29
sumperasma, conclusion, 103,9;
118,4; 144,17; 164,13
sumplêrôtikos, completive, 123,13;
128,19; 133,19
sumplêroun, complete, 124,23;
128,26
sumplokê, combination, 103,1;
105,31; 134,14
sunagein, add, conclude, deduce,
derive, bring together, 105,4.12.14;
111,4; 115,16; 117,3;
118,16.21.22.29.30; 119,1bis.3;
129,32; 130,10; 131,5; 133,6; 134,2;
165,26; 172,21
sunairein, contain, join together,
136,24; 144,8.13
sunalêtheuein, be true at the same
time, 117,2; 138,13
sunamphoteros, two together,
conjunction of the two, 121,4;
122,31
sunêgoria, support, 138,26
suneisagein, introduce, 121,20;
122,24; 127,16; 131,21.22.33;
137,21.22
suneiserkhesthai, be included,
137,26
sunekheia, continuity, 113,23; 119,15
143
s(x)unekhês, continuous, continuum,
119,12.14.16.17.18; 121,22.23;
135,8; 139,20; 141,23.25; 142,3.5.6;
145,6.26; 168,3
sunekhesthai, hold together, 145,24
sunêmmenon, hypothetical,
conditional (proposition), 104,30;
105,32; 128,2; 130,14; 166,27;
171,21
sunerkhesthai, come together,
104,17; 129,3
sunêtheia, common (usage), 106,18;
113,5; 138,2; 140,28
sunginesthai, come together,
combine, 161,6
sungramma, writing, book, treatise,
103,15; 104,24; 139,5; 140,28;
151,25; 172,2
sungraphê, treatise, 152,20
sunistanai, come together, 139,32;
140,3.4
sunistasthai, be constituted, 152,6
sunkeisthai, be formed, be made out
of, 127,5; 129,20; 142,12
sunkhôrein, agree, reach agreement,
come together, 103,21; 104,26;
108,27.28; 110,7; 115,17; 116,3;
118,10.27; 119,17.18; 120,11;
134,13.17.19.20.25; 137,22; 140,7;
147,28; 179,4
sunkhusis, confusion, 177,9
sunkrima, mixture, 173,11.16.35;
174,11.17
sunkrinein, mix together, 154,12;
156,3; 163,20; 167,3; 173,12.34
sunkrisis, mixture, combination,
154,26.32; 157,26; 161,14.22;
163,11-28; 178,15
sunônumos, synonymous, 123,16
sunoran, see 121,9; 137,25
sunôthein, assimilate, 154,15
suntassein, attach, 110,3
sunteloun, contribute to, 120,5
sunthesis, putting together,
composition, 165,2; 166,30; 167,31;
177,22; 178,2-5
sunthetos, compound, 114,15bis;
165,28; 177,22; 178,34; 179,7-8
suntithenai, put together, add,
make up, compose, 103,4; 108,8;
127,5; 129,2; 142,14; 165,17;
166,28; 167,3.9.19; 168,1.9.27;
177,25; 178,33
144 Greek-English Index
sunuparkhein, hold together, 116,22
sunuphistanai, share a hypostasis
with, coexist with, 119,31; 144,16
sustellein, contract, 104,7
suzugia, combination, 105,10
tarassein, disturb, worry, 111,29;
119,28; 141,32
taxis, order, position, arrangement,
103,8; 106,13; 154,25; 174,12
tekhnê, art, 160,2
teleôs, completely, 147,18
telethein, be complete, 143,10;
146,15; 147,15
teleutaios, final, 107,9
teleutan, have an end, 109,22.23.27
teleutê, end, 103,26.27; 108,14.18;
109,16.21.22.24
telikos, final, 177,15-17
telos, purpose, end, 106,9; 108,24;
109,2.12.14; 110,3,13; 131,3
temnein, divide, 139,28
thalassa, sea, 159,12; 160,29
thaptein, be dazed, 117,11
thaumastos, wonderful, surprising,
120,3; 148,4
thaumazein, be surprised, 146,31
theasthai, observe, 109,10; 136,34;
148,22
themelios, foundation, 106,27
themis, lawful, 146,5
theologikos, divine, 148,24
theôrein, study, observe, think,
consider, 116,2; 120,11; 136,22;
160,12
theôrêtos, theoretical, 170,27
theos, god, 152,24 (conj.); 159,23;
160,8.11.25
thermon, to, heat, 146,29
thermos, hot, 106,23bis; 112,29;
150,24; 153,1.4-6; 155,8; 156,6.30;
174,23; 175,13-14.24; 176,22;
179,2-5
thermotês, heat, 155,16; 177,14
thesis, suggestion, position, 133,2;
151,1
thnêtos, mortal, 105,17.18; 109,1bis;
123,19.20; 124,26; 158,3
thorubeisthai, be disturbed, 138,7
thrix, hair, 111,23; 113,8
tithenai, tithesthai, put, assume,
suggest, suppose, posit, set out,
104,26; 109,10; 142,32; 154,5-7;
162,4-7; 163,31; 165,22
tmêtos, fissile, 140,11
to ex hou, that from which, source,
149,3
tolman, dare, 135,27.29; 136,13;
147,33
tomê, (a) cutting, division, 139,22;
140,14; 142,19; 176,9
topos, space, place, 110,21; 111,5bis;
112,17.24ter.33; 113,2.13.15;
129,32; 146,14
tropos, mood, 103,7; sense, way,
form, kind, 106,14.17; 115,2;
117,17; 121,18; 123,16; 127,19;
148,25; 149,5.28; 150,18-20;
152,26; 154,1; 172,20; 175,4; 178,14
tukhon, (something) occurring by
chance, 174,21-4
tuphlos, blind, 117,11
xêros, dry, 150,24; 153,2; 155,8;
156,6; 157,1; 174,24; 175,27; 176,23
xêrotês, dryness, 155,17; 179,3-5
zên, live (vb.), 137,6; 152,19; 153,12
zêtein, enquire into, investigate,
133,25; 149,3
zêtêsis, enquiry, 147,32
zôê, life, 137,5
zôion, animal, 105,1.3.17; 106,26;
108,32; 109,1; 114,5; 115,20bis;
119,23; 123,20.21; 124,6.26.28.29;
128,6.7.12.18.20.21; 131,24bis;
152,5.15.19; 153,4-6.10.14; 157,11;
167,3.8-9; 168,3.10.18-31; 175,2
zopheros, dark, 156,7.30; 174,23;
176,23; 179,2-4
 Subject Index
accident 33, 34, 36
Adrastus
on substrate and accidents 34-6
Alexander 5, 8, 10, 11, 23, 24, 27, 38,
39, 40, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48, 59, 64,
70, 73, 75, 76, 77, 80, 85, 102,
104, 107-8, 109, 110, 111
attacks hypothesis that Being is
one 15
attacks Melissus for bad logic and
false premises 15
on starting-points 18
on change and time 19
on species and matter 25-6
analysis of the all 40
formal arguments about being 41-2
on being as genus 42-3
on Plato on Being 45-6
Anaxagoras 6-11, 63-6, 69-70, 71-87,
102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110
Mind 8, 10-11, 63-4, 65, 72, 81-2,
83-4, 105, 107
homoiomeries 63-4, 65, 69, 70, 71-3,
74-6, 79-80, 83-4, 104, 106, 109-10
plural worlds 66, 105
Anaximander 5-6, 59, 102, 103
to apeiron 103
Anaximenes 6, 59, 61, 70
spoke of air 25
Aristotle
attacks view that Being is one 15,
17, 30
criticises Melissus’ argument 15
gives Melissus’ arguments 16
on starting-points 18-19
on movement on the spot 24
on being as one in species 25
criticises Parmenides 28
being does not have size 37-8
in other works takes the
just-existent as genus 44
on Parmenides and Zeno 45
see also Index of Passages
Aspasius 42
atomism 8, 73
Being, arguments about 15, 16, 22, 23,
26, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 47, 48
combination and separation 5-6,
59-60, 63, 70, 76-8, 79, 82, 85, 86,
102
condensation and rarefaction 5,
59-60, 102
Democritus 63, 70, 72-3, 86, 87
dichotomy 48, 49
Diogenes of Apollonia 5-6, 59, 61-2,
102, 104
division, theoretical and actual 8, 10
to infinity 74-5, 78, 83
elements 5-6, 8, 11, 58-9, 61, 86, 102,
103, 104
air 5, 6, 59, 60, 61-2, 65, 66-7, 86,
101, 102
earth 6, 59, 60, 61, 64, 66-7, 86-7
fire 5, 6, 59, 60, 61, 66-7, 86, 101,
102
water 5, 6, 59, 61, 64, 66-7, 86-7,
101, 102
aithêr 65, 86
Empedocles 6-7, 11, 63-4, 70, 86-7,
102, 104, 106, 107
elements in 6, 64, 66, 86-7, 104, 106
Love and Strife 6, 63-4, 66-7, 68,
104, 105-6
(Aphrodite (= Love)) 66, 68
cosmic cycle 64, 66-7, 68, 105
Eudemus 11, 18, 22, 23, 27, 29, 31,
32, 44
on Melissus’ arguments 18
146 Subject Index
on coming to be 21 opposites 5-6, 7, 11, 59-60, 64-5, 71,
on what is infinite 22 84, 102, 104
on Parmenides 27, 29, 53
on Zeno on the One 49 Parmenides 7, 15, 20, 26, 27, 28, 30,
31, 36, 43, 45, 46, 69, 106
Forms, Platonic 6 puts premises in order 16
being is finite 26
genus 42, 43, 44, 47 directly quoted 28, 53-4, 55-6
great and small 5-6, 59-60 on the One 31-2
on Being 53
Heraclitus 59 Plato 6, 59-60, 69, 87, 104, 106
spoke of fire 25 Timaeus 20, 46, 48
Hippasus 59 ‘in two ways’ 27, 31
Hippon 59 on genera 43
spoke of water 25 Sophist 45, 46, 47, 48
Hypostasis 31, 32 lecture on the Good 60, 103
Porphyry 5, 8, 19, 27, 34, 46, 48, 59,
indefinite dyad 6, 60 61, 72-3, 102
infinity, the infinite 9-10, 63, 69, on timeless alteration 19
71-3, 76-8, 79-80, 81-2, 86, 110 sympathetic account of Parmenides
27
just-existent 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, records Adrastus 34-6
44, 48 on Plato on not-being 48
on Parmenides’ supposed
Leucippus 72-3 dichotomy argument 50
on division to infinity 52
matter 6, 11, 59-60, 61 principle 5, 58-9, 61, 63, 69, 103
and form 11, 59-60, 87 Pythagoreanism 60, 87
Megarians 31
Melissus 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, Simplicius, see Index of Passages
26, 69, 106 Socrates 84-5
arguments about Being 16-17, 23 on Zeno and Parmenides 15
invalid arguments 17 soul 61-2
took Being to be incorporeal 20, 22 Speusippus 60
on starting-points 20 stars 65
being is motionless 20 substrate 6, 58-9, 61, 63, 102
every body has a limited beginning sun 65, 66, 67, 68, 106
in time 21
on coming to be 21-2 Thales 59
takes One strictly 25 spoke of water 25
on Being as species 26 Themistius 77, 109
being is infinite 26 on Zeno 50
Metrodorus 72 Theophrastus 19, 27, 29, 45, 59, 63,
mixture 63-5, 71, 80-1, 102, 107 102-3
monism 5, 101 on time and change 19
moon 65, 66 on Parmenides 27, 29, 45

Neoplatonist language 54, 55, 56 Xenocrates 60

Nicolaus of Damascus 5, 59, 61, 102 indivisible lines 51-3

One, unity 5-6, 60, 67 Zeno 15,45,48,49

kinds of 25, 30, 32 helps Parmenides 48
and size 37 on the One 49-50, 55
 Index of Passages
References to the pages of this book are in bold type.
ADRASTUS
sole fragment, 34-6
ALEXANDER
In Metaph. 56, 33-5, 103
In Phys., 38-9, 42-4, 45-6
ANAXAGORAS
DK 59B1, 64, 72, 106; 59B1,1-12, 79;
59B2, 64; 59B3, 72, 74; 59B4,
1-4, 64-5; 59B4,2-4, 66;
59B4,13-18, 64-5; 59B5, 65;
59b5,5-10, 66; 59B6, 72; 59B8,
83, 84; 59B11, 72, 79; 59B12, 65;
59B12,1-2, 72; 59B12,1-3, 84;
59B12,9-19, 84; 59B12,15-19, 73;
59B12,21-5, 82, 84, 86;
59B12,26-7, 83, 84; 59B12,28,
72; 59B12, 29-30, 72; 59B14,
65-6; 59B15, 86; 59B16, 64, 86;
59B17, 70, 107
ARISTOTLE
Cael. 303b22ff., 103; 303b26-7, 103;
Cat . 1a20, 95; 1b25-2a4, 105;
10a20-2, 103; GC 314a13, 70;
314a13-15, 106-7; 328b35, 102;
332a20, 102; 332a21, 102;
Metaph. 985a24-7, 105-6;
986b19, 20, 91; 987a14-988a15,
103; 989a14, 102; 998a30, 102;
1057b8, 94; 1076a4, 58
Phys. 183b19, 96; 184a12-14, 73;
184b22-4, 101; 185a20, 95;
185b7, 97; 185b7-9, 92; 185b25-6,
99; 186a2-3, 99; 186a4-13, 15;
186a13-16, 16; 186a16, 92;
186a16-18, 22, 90, 92; 186a17,
92; 186a18, 23, 92; 186a19-22,
25; 186a22-4, 26; 186a24,5, 27;
186a25-32, 30; 186a30-2, 95;
186a32-b12, 32; 186a34, 97;
186a34-5, 95; 186b4, 95, 97, 98;
186b6, 98; 186b9, 95; 186b12, 32;
186b12-13, 96; 186b12-14, 37;
186b13-14, 96; 186b14-15, 96;
186b14-35, 38; 186b16-19, 95;
186b17, 97; 186b23, 96;
186b23-7, 96; 186b33-4, 96;
186b34-5, 96; 186b35, 96;
187a1-11, 45; 187a5, 98; 187a5-6,
99; 187a8-9, 97; 187a12-21, 5,
58; 187a12-26, 102; 187a13-15,
59, 102; 187a15-16, 59;
187a17-18, 59, 86; 187a20-1, 59;
187a21-6, 6, 62-3; 187a25-6, 64;
187a26-31, 68-9; 187a26-b7, 7;
187a27-9, 69, 97, 106;
187a29-32, 106; 187a30, 70;
187a31-b7, 71; 187b7-13, 7-8, 71;
187b7-188a18, 7-11; 187b11-13,
73; 187b12-188a2, 107;
187b13-21, 8-9, 73-4, 108;
187b13-188a2, 109; 187b16-21
(alternative version), 107;
187b19, 75; 187b22, 64;
187b22-34, 9, 76; 187b25-6, 108;
187b27ff., 109; 187b29-30, 76,
77, 78, 108-9; 187b30, 77;
187b33-4, 77, 109; 187b35-6,
109; 187b35-188a2, 9, 78;
188a2-5, 10, 79; 188a3-4, 80;
188a5-13, 10-11, 82-3; 188a9-10,
84; 188a13-14, 111; 188a13-17,
11, 85; 188a20, 101; 189b3, 102;
194b24-5a3, 90; 203a18, 102;
148 Index of Passages
204a34-205b1, 91; 205a27, 102;
213a12-217b28, 92; 236a27, 19,
90; 239b17, 99; 253b23-6, 19, 90;
253b23-6, 90; 1.5-7, 103
Post. An. 1 22 83a30, 97
Soph. El. 181a23, 91
Topics 3.1 116a23, 97
DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA
DK 64B1,104; 64B2, 61; 64B3, 61-2;
64B4, 62, 104; 64B5, 62; 64B7,
62; 64B8, 62
DIOGENES LAERTIUS
V.46, 103; V.48, 103
EMPEDOCLES
DK 31B8,3, 68; 31B16, 106; 31B17,
66-7; 31B17,1-2, 68; 31B17,12-13
(= 31B26,11-12), 68; 31B21, 67,
106; 31B26,1-2, 68
EUDEMUS
Fr.43 Wehrli, 26-7; Fr.44 Wehrli, 44;
Fr. 46 Wehrli, 83
T8 Baltussen, 29; T9 Baltussen, 31;
T10 Baltussen, 32; T11
Baltussen, 49
MELISSUS
DK 30B1, 69; 30B2, 21; 30B3, 21, 22;
30B4, 22; 30B5, 22; 30B7, 23;
30B9, 22; 30B10, 22
PARMENIDES
DK28B8, 16, 28, 95; DK28B8,6-10,
69
PLATO
Crat. 413A8-9, 101
Parm. 128A-B, 89; 128C7-D2, 98;
128D5-6, 98
Phd. 98B-C, 111
Soph. 239D3, 99; 242A, 100; 248E6,
48, 99; 250Aff., 95, 98; 257B3-4,
98; 258C-59B, 46-7, 98; 258D,
93; 259A4-6, 97
Theat. 183E, 101
Tim. 27C-53C, 111; 27D, 46, 48, 91,
98; 28B, 91; 52A5-7, 103-4; 52B2,
103-4; 55D-56C, 111; 61D-62B,
111; 67DE, 94
PORPHYRY
Phys.?, 27-8
SEXTUS
M. 9.10, 105
SIMPLICIUS
In De Caelo 556,16, 91
In Phys. 23,14-16,102; 23,21-9, 102;
23,33-24,12, 102; 24,13-16, 103;
24,26-25,8, 102; 24,29-31, 102;
25,8-9, 102; 25,11-12, 102;
25,29-30, 105; 27,17-23, 104;
31,2-3, 106; 31,8-12, 106;
31,18-26, 106; 32,3-4, 106;
33,10-17, 106; 34,18-35,21, 105;
34,20, 104; 34,21-5, 104;
34,29-35,3, 104; 34,29-35,12, 105;
35,22-3, 111; 38,6-9, 101; 78,5,
100; 108,22, 91; 112,32-113,2, 92;
113,23-4, 94; 113,27-8, 92;
115,11-13, 93; 115,17, 103;
115,21-5, 93, 95; 115,25-116,4,
94; 116,2, 94; 118,11-13, 93;
120,3-4, 94; 120,27-8, 94; 120,10,
93; 121,13-16, 94; 122,14, 99;
123,13, 98; 123,23-6, 94; 126,11,
95; 126,22-3, 96; 127,1-2, 96;
127,36, 96; 128,19, 98; 129,31,
96; 132,18-19, 98; 132,27-8, 97;
133,20, 97; 133,24-5, 93;
135,27-136,2, 101; 135,29, 98;
137,33, 97; 138,5-6, 99; 138,32-3,
100; 143,4, 98; 143,26-7, 101;
144,15, 99; 145,1-2, 100; 145,23,
100; 146,7-9, 100; 146,11, 100;
147,13, 101; 147,15-17, 95, 100;
147,16, 101; 148,9-11, 101;
148,11-16, 106; 148,28, 106;
149,4-11, 102; 149,5, 102;
149,7-8, 5, 102; 149,11-13, 5;
149,13-18, 5; 149,13-27, 6;
149,21-2, 102; 150,4-11, 6;
150,9-25, 102; 150,15-18, 6;
150,20-4, 102; 150,22-3, 5;
151,6-11, 6; 151,12-19, 6; 151,25,
101; 151,31-153,22, 6; 154,9-14,
6; 154,14-23, 6; 154,17, 103;
155,1-20, 6; 155,7-9, 104;
155,10-13, 104; 155,13-18, 104;
155,18-20, 104; 155-7, 6; 156,26,
105; 157,5-24, 7; 158-61, 7;
160,22-6, 7; 161,23-163,8, 7;
 Index of Passages
163,35-164,2, 7; 164,11-165,8, 8;
165,8-166,6, 8; 165,30-166,2, 8,
111; 165,33, 105; 166,7-12, 8;
167,12-26, 8; 167,30-168,1, 8;
168,25-169,2, 9; 169,5-24, 9;
169,25-170,7, 9; 170,7-13, 9;
171,12-28, 9; 172,11-14, 10;
172,13-20, 10; 172,14-16, 10;
172,20-31, 10; 172,27-9, 110;
172,31-173,3, 10; 173,8-28, 10;
173,29-174,8, 10; 174,4-18, 111;
174,8-9, 105; 174,19-175,5, 10;
174,30-1, 111; 175,11-21, 11;
175,21-33, 11; 175,33-177,8, 11;
177,4-5, 105; 177,20-178,8, 11;
149
178,8-11, 11; 178,14-28, 11;
178,28-30, 11; 178,33-179,12, 11;
179,12-19, 11; 186,4, 100; 226,26,
94; 238,23, 93; 243,1-3, 93;
461,10-11, 90; 487,18-19, 90
THEMISTIUS
In Phys. 14,1-3, 107; 16, 109
THEOPHRASTUS
FHSG 155C, 90; 228B, 63; 234, 27,
29, 93; 234app., 98; 235, 74
ZENO
DK29, 51