G.R. No. 139868             June 8, 2006
69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey
(Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died,
leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard, who was also designated as executor. 1 The will
was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips
as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his
appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q.
Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena
& Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator. 3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon
(respondent) with whom he has two children, namely,
Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to
probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding
No. 9625.4 As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of
the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in
real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue,
Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00
(Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name
with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares
of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares,
which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to
probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland,
U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as
executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or
any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena &
Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as
Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was
appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986. 8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding
No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of
Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a
project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being
apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and
Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property,
16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in
cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and
approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12,
1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7,
1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel
TCT No.
title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey
(¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest);
directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer
48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and
16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release
the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator
for distribution to the heirs.12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on
June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate
of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special
Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof
were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was
opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law
of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject
of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the
A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided
interest in the Makati property should be given to
respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and
in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the
project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati
property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire
¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to
respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of
the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April
7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully
breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws
of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s
estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that
since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the
Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and
not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire
estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s
allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial
court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and
intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed
that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children
that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their
just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought
to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot
be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision
annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988
and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and
April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a
new one is entered ordering:
 (a) The adjudication of the entire estate of
Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of
W. Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and
the issuance of a new title in the name of the
estate of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely
erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07
APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625
"IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE
OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY
GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING
AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE
BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND
CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING
ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S
ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID
ORDERS.20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no
longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is
"conclusive upon the administration as to all matters
involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for
all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the
proceedings are concerned, all matters therein
determined," and the same has already been executed.21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in
performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He
maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of
partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the
State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in
accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes
knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the
terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he
already apprised respondent of the contents of the will
and how the estate will be divided.22
Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary
duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate
amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent,
petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of
Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of
Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior
partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to
know the relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any
opposition to the project of partition because she was not
a party thereto and she learned of the provision of
Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard
only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of
Richard’s estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.
Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final
decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for
lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v.
Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable
to negligence.26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on
October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment
filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the
judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. 27 For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years
from the discovery of the fraud.29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as
basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February
12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in
respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to
follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s
declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The
CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the
national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence,
petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in
accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found
that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate
in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally
benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had
already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent
was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and
the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the
other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by
saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s
acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No.
9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project
of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her
inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted
to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or
fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of
Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the
fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case,
omission, alleged to have been committed against
respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be
counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of
partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and
the order of the trial court disallowing the project of
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the
assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only
through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to
comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts.
Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the
circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the
action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same
has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic
Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated
that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will
always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par.
(2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which
prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or
from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment
itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that
there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other
words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of
the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud
or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a
compromise; or where the defendant never had any
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts
of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar
cases which show that there has never been a real contest
in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a
new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair
hearing.34
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is
alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate.
As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and
confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable
diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of
that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the
safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet
the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a
person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in
similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by
which his conduct is to be judged.36
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution
of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American
citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate
of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown,
among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was
residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland,
U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972
was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated
and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and
attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was
admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on
September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the
Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s
will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of
Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that
"capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court
on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus
allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or
letters of administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such
estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such
will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons
who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence
the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts,
and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the
same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus,
the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and
totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious
result was that there was no fair submission of the case
before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the
evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was
made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s
protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that
Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of
Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already
brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in
the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent,
petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with
a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal
resources to determine the applicable law. It was
incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary
administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge
the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not,
the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said
law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February
12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as
Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according
to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This
eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her
full successional right to the Makati property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court
held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of
counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid
to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy,
its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of
the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s
estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution
made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over
Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit
from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which
the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and
responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the
principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the
same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in
the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law
(Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending
his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however,
it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his
primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to
distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of
Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle
established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed
domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the
defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent
laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was
made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey
during the proceedings before the court a quo. While
there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject
estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the
defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light
as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of
the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was prompted by
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject
realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle
Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his duties and
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject
estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances,
the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as
well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last
will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount
to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s
omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to
follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the
procurement of the subject orders without a fair
submission of the real issues involved in the
case.41 (Emphasis supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a
result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his
fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure
as to which law should be made applicable under the
circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus
excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property
through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s
omission was beyond her control. She was in no position
to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission
and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse
consequence of the same. The end result was a
miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the
legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who
are deprived of their rights.42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated
Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to
the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass
directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the
legal title for administration and distribution," while
Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary
intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to
the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101,
Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a
personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is
"under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate
of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will
and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with
as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate,
consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in
the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97;
and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to
Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his
will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently
died, the entire Makati property should have then passed
on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition
that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a
legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy,"
was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625.
Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in
view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan. 44 Therein, the
Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935
failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.: Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of
the public domain, and other natural resources of the
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved
the court below and we have found that during the to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them.
hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American
foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada citizens and business enterprises the right in the
Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition,
counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. exploitation, development and utilization of natural
24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was resources of the Philippines, does not include the
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV,
Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by
hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to
a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15,
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator,
Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of
do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of
the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos
the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances,
from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands
we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
of the public domain, except only by way of legal
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without
natural-born citizen.
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and
transaction is considered cured and the title of the
the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888
transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati
appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the
property had already passed on to respondent who is a
proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to
Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the
mention that petitioner or any other interested person for
acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of
inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional
said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
distributed according to their respective wills, and not
achieved.
according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
belongs to respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated
March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in
Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties as an official of the court.
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions
have substantially the same force and effect in the probate
court as if the testator stood before the court in full life No pronouncement as to costs.
making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear
in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the
creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and
the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted
them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably

distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over Audrey’s
and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: 46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey

and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned
real property in the Philippines, although records do not
show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati
property.
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and
appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
J. Salonga and L. M. Abellera for oppositor and appellee.
Carlos Dominguez, Jr. for executor-appellee.
M. R. Sotelo for appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile
in the Philippines, died leaving a will executed on March 5,
1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of
First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954.
In that same decision the court declared that Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen
Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The
declaration was appealed to this Court, and was affirmed
in its decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484).
In another incident relative to the partition of the
deceased's estate, the trial court approved the project
submitted by the executor in accordance with the
provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid
under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from
the order of approval, and this Court, on January 31, 1963,
reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the
provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine
law, and returned the case to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as provided by said
law (G.R. No. L-16749).
On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao
issued an order approving the project of partition
submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein
the properties of the estate were divided equally between
Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as
Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to
as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had expressly
recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen
Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his
death. The said order was based on the proposition that
since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the
institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence
the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased
had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of
certain other persons, which legacies have been duly
approved by the lower court and distributed to the
legatees.
The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by
Lucy Duncan, on the sole question of whether the estate,
after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to
Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance
of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely
reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of
Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate.
The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others,
the following clauses which are pertinent to the issue in
this case:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was
born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, who
is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants,
and no descendants except my above-named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact
that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of
One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now residing, as aforesaid, at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and
which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime; Provided, however, that should the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at anytime prior to
her decease having living issue, then and in that event, the
life interest herein given shall terminate, and if so
terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the
rest, remainder and residue of my property with the same
force and effect as if I had originally so given, devised and
bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should
the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without
living issue, then, and in that event, I give, devise and
bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my
property one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs.
CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124,
Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-
half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH
C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver, of Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond
Christensen, of Manhattan Beach, California, U.S.A., share
and share alike, the share of any of the three above named
who may predecease me, to go in equal parts to the
descendants of the deceased; and, provided further, that
should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton die before my
own decease, then, and in that event, the share of my
estate devised to her herein I give, devise and bequeath to
her children, Elizabeth Borton de Treviño, of Mexico City
Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California,
U.S.A., and Richard Borton, of Bakersfield, California,
U.S.A., or to the heirs of any of them who may die before
my own decease, share and share alike.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that
there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory
heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the
institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a
case of preterition, but is governed by Article 906 of the
Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the
testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied." Appellant also suggests that considering the
provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly
denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a
legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her
legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within
the meaning of Article 918, which reads:
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the
cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is
not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this
Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited; but the devices and
legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid
to such extent as will not impair the legitimate.
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and
918, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not
to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were intestate.
Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish
Civil Code; and Article 906 of Article 815. Commenting on
Article 815, Manresa explains:
Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede
presumirse ignorancia o falta de memoria en el testador;
en el de dejar algo al heredero forzoso no. Este no se
encuentra plivado totalmente de su legitima: ha recibido
por cualquir titulo una porcion de los bienes hereditarios,
porcion que no alcanza a completar la legitima, pero que
influeye poderosamente en el animo del legislador para
decidirle a adoptar una solucion bien diferente de la
señalada para el caso de pretericion.
El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero
forzoso; le ha dejado bienes; pero haciendo un calculo
equivocado, ha repartido en favor de extraños o en favor
de otros legitimarios por via de legado donacion o mejora
mayor cantidad de la que la ley de consentia disponer. El
heredero forzoso no puede perder su legitima, pero
tampoco puede pedir mas que la misma. De aqui su
derecho a reclamar solamente lo que le falta; al
complemento de la porcion que forzosamente la
corresponde.
... Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a
disponer en testamento por titulo de herencia legado o
mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de alguna cantidad o
porcion de bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la
misma. Tal sentido, que es el mas proprio en al articulo
815, no pugna tampoco con la doctrina de la ley. Cuando
en el testamento se deja algo al heredero forzoso, la
pretericion es incompleta: es mas formularia que real.
Cuando en el testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay
verdadera pretericion. (6 Manresa, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)
On the difference between preterition of a compulsory
heir and the right to ask for completion of his legitime,
Sanchez Roman says:
La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la
pretericion puede serlo pero se presume involuntaria la
omision en que consiste en cuanto olvida o no atiende el
testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion del derecho a
la legitima del heredero forzoso preterido, prescindiendo
absoluta y totalmente de el y no mencionandole en
ninguna de sus disposiciones testamentarias, o no
instituyendole en parte alguna de la herencia, ni por titulo
de heredero ni por el de legatar o aunque le mencionara o
nombrara sin dejarle mas o menos bienes. Si le dejara
algunos, por pocos que sean e insuficientes para cubrir su
legitima, ya no seria caso de pretericion, sino de
complemento de aquella. El primer supuesto o de
pretericion se regula por el articulo 814, y produce accion
de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o
de complemento de legitima por el 815 y solo original la
accion ad suplementum, para completar la legitima.
(Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2, p. 1131.)
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in
the will, either by not naming him at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him
as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning
to him some part of the properties. Manresa continues:
Se necesita pues (a) Que la omision se refiera a un
heredero forzoso; (b) Que la omision sea completa; que el
heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.1äwphï1.ñët
xxx xxx xxx
B. Que la omision sea completa — Esta condicion se
deduce del mismo Articulo 814 y resulta con evidencia al
relacionar este articulo con el 815. El heredero forzoso a
quien el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su
testamento, no se halla propiamente omitido pues se le
nombra y se le reconoce participacion en los bienes
hereditarios. Podria discutirse en el Articulo 814 si era o no
necesario que se reconociese el derecho del heredero
como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta
duda. Aquel se ocupa de privacion completa o total, tacita
este, de la privacion parcial. Los efectos deben ser y son,
como veremos completamente distintos (6 Manresa, p.
428.)
La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial.
Privar totalmente de la legitima es negarla en absoluto al
legitimario, despojarle de ella por completo. A este caso se
refiere el articulo 814. Privar parcialmente de la legitima,
es menguarla o reducirla dejar al legitimario una porcion,
menor que la que le corresponde. A este caso se refiere el
articulo 815. El 813 sienta, pues, una regla general, y las
consecuencias del que brantamiento de esta regla se
determina en los articulos 814 y 815. (6 Manresa p. 418.)
Again Sanchez Roman:
QUE LA OMISSION SEA TOTAL. — Aunque el articulo 814
no consigna de modo expreso esta circunstancia de que la
pretericion o falta de mencion e institucion o disposicion
testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa y absoluta,
asi se deduce de no hacer distincion o salvedad alguna
empleandola en terminos generales; pero sirve a
confirmarlo de un modo indudable el siguiente articulo
815, al decir que el heredero forzoso a quien el testador
haya dejado por cualquier titulo, menos de la legitima que
la corresponda, podria pedir el complemento de la misma,
lo cual ya no son el caso ni los efectos de la pretericion,
que anula la institucion, sino simplemente los del
suplemento necesario para cubrir su legitima. (Sanchez
Roman — Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 1133.)
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a
forced heir may be limited only to the completion of his
legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of
heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the
will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his
capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In other
words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will as
heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not
mentioned as an heir — indeed her status as such is
denied — but is given a legacy of P3,600.00.
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave
an affirmative answer to the question, according to both
Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436) and Sanchez Roman
(Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937), that view was changed by
Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851," later on
copied in Article 906 of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in
the citation given above, comments as follows:
RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA. — Se
inspira el Codigo en esta materia en la doctrina clasica del
Derecho romano y patrio (2); pero con alguna racional
modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedentes legales al
heredero forzoso, a quien no se le dejaba por titulo de tal
el completo de su legitima, la accion para invalidar la
institucion hecha en el testamento y reclamar y obtener
aquella mediante el ejercicio de la querella de inoficioso, y
aun cuando resultara favorecido como donotario, por otro
titulo que no fuera el de heredero, sino al honor de que se
le privaba no dandole este caracter, y solo cuando era
instituido heredero en parte o cantidad inferior a lo que le
correspondiera por legitima, era cuando bastaba el
ejercicio de la accion ad suplementum para completarla,
sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones de heredero
o demas disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.
El Articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se
ajusta a la unica necesidad que le inspira cual es la de que
se complete la legitima del heredero forzoso, a quien por
cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le
corresponda, y se le otorga tan solo el derecho de pedir el
complemento de la misma sin necesidad de que se anulen
las disposiciones testamentarias, que se reduciran en lo
que sean inoficiosas conforme al articulo 817, cuya
interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su apoyo la sancion
de la jurisprudencia (3); siendo condicion precisa que lo
que se hubiere dejado de menos de la legitima al heredero
forzoso, lo haya sido en el testamento, o sea por
disposicion del testador, segun lo revela el texto del
articulo, "el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya
dejado, etc., esto es por titulo de legado o donacion mortis
causa en el testamento y, no fuera de al. (Sanchez Roman,
Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937.)
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain dated January 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and
April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the
testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth
less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee
as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the
estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815
applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of
heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be
completed. (6 Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with
the expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as
may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his
will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his
natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of
P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared
judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume
that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime
his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone
any change and that he would have willed his estate
equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was
expressly recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil.
185, is cited by appellees in support of their theory of
preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it
referred to a will where "the testator left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by
his first marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some
of them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely
omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy
of P3,600.00.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death
consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the Christensen
Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. One-
fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as
her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as
of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774,
777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a corresponding portion
of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently
accruing. These include the stock dividends on the
corporate holdings. The contention of Lucy Duncan that all
such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the
will cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the
right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her
legitime.
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no
reference to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-
appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the
estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should
die without living issue. This substitution results in effect
from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is
entitled only to the income from said estate, unless prior
to her decease she should have living issue, in which event
she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the
property will go to the other relatives of the testator
named in the will. Without deciding this, point, since it is
not one of the issues raised before us, we might call
attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind
of substitution, particularly that which says that it can
never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which
means that the legitime must descend to the heir
concerned in fee simple.
Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29,
1964, approving the project of partition as submitted by
the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is
remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary
estate anew as indicated in this decision, that is, by giving
to oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no
more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime,
equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate,
after deducting all debts and charges, which shall not
include those imposed in the will of the decedent, in
accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs against
appellees in this instance.
326 Phil. 601
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-
square meter residential lot (identified to be Lot No. 529,
Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, located along Magallanes
Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City). Private
respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to
exercise a right of legal redemption over the subject
property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her
mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the
first with Angel Burdeos and the second, following the
latter's death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own
death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos
and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos)
Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the
second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales,
Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who
himself, some time after Macaria's death, died intestate
without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon
Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and
children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima
Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for
the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale,
dated 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that
the lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained
that the second deed was intended merely to save on the
tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she
was at the City Treasurer's Office. On 31 March 1987, she
sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa of
Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the
property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima.
The latter refused to accept the amount for being much
less than the lot's current value of P80,000.00. No
settlement having been reached before the Lupong
Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October 1987,
initiated against petitioner an action for "Legal
Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the
trial court handed down its decision holding, in fine, that
private respondents' right to redeem the property had
already lapsed.
An appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed by
private respondents. the appellate court, in its decision of
22 April 1993, reversed the court a quo; thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment
appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new one is
accordingly entered declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro
C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art.
1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the
Heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the
Butuan Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS
from finality hereon, unless written notice of the sale and
its terms are received in the interim, under the same
terms and conditions appearing under Exhibit 'J' and after
returning the purchase price of P23,000.00 within the
foregoing period. No cost."[1]
In her recourse to this Court, petitioner assigned the
following "errors:" That -
"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Socorro C. Rosales is entitled to redeem the inheritance
rights (Article 1088, NCC) or pro-indiviso share (Article
1620, NCC) of the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529,
Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, for being contrary to law
and evidence.
"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the
peculiar circumstance, in that, the respondents' actual
knowledge, as a factor in the delay constitutes laches.
"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
Socorro C. Rosales, in effect, timely exercised the right of
legal redemption when referral to Barangay by respondent
signifies bonafide intention to redeem and; that,
redemption is properly made even if there is no offer of
redemption in legal tender.
"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
running of the statutory redemption period is stayed upon
commencement of Barangay proceedings."[2]
Still, the thrust of the petition before us is the alleged
incapacity of private respondent Socorro C. Rosales to
redeem the property, she being merely the spouse of
David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir
herself in the intestate estate of Macaria.

We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a
daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by
affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;[3]
however, Socorro' s right to the property is not because
she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but
that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part
of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's
death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate
passed on to her surviving children, among them David
Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the
property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own
estate, which included his undivided interest over the
property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow
Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on
succession.
"ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
"xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half."[4]
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-
heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of
the property that originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the
Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in
favor of private respondents; thus:
"ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be
subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires
a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous
title."
"ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right
of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-
owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one."
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised
by private respondents. Concededly, no written notice of
the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the
co-owners[5] required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code
"
"ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to
commence when private respondent Rosales sought to
exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day
after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated,
on 16 October 1987, before the trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has
long established the rule that notwithstanding actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a
written notice from the selling co-owner in order to
remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.[6]
Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[7] relied
upon by petitioner in contending that actual knowledge
should be an equivalent to a written notice of sale, the
Court made it clear that it was not reversing the prevailing
jurisprudence; said the Court:
"We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are
deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the
respondent court understandably applied pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it
had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by
this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should
be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the
De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing
simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view
of the peculiar circumstances of this case."[8]
In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked
several years, notjust days or months, after the
consummation of the contracts of sale. The complaint for
legal redemption itself was there filed more than thirteen
years after the sales were concluded.

Relative to the question posed by petitioner on private

respondents' tender of payment, it is enough that we
quote, with approval, the appellate court; viz:

"In contrast, records clearly show that an amount was

offered, as required in Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1
and Daza vs. Tomacruz, 58 Phil. 414, by the redemptioner-
appellant during the barangay conciliation proceedings
(Answer, par. 8) but was flatly rejected by the appellee,
not on the ground that it was not the purchase price
(though it appeared on the face of the deed of sale, Exh. 'J-
1'), nor that it was offered as partial payment thereof, but
rather that it was 'unconscionable' based upon its 'present
value.' (Answer, par. 8)."[9]

All given, we find no error in the appellate court's finding

that private respondents are entitled to the redemption of
the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4133. May 13, 1952.]
AGUSTINA DE GUZMAN VDA. DE CARRILLO,
(deceased) substituted by PRIMA
CARRILLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCISCA
SALAK DE PAZ, ET ALS., Defendants-
Appellees.
Francisco M. Ramos for Appellant.
Tomas Besa for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR;
REGISTRATION OF LAND; EFFECT OF
UNRECORDED SALE OF REGISTERED LAND;
FAILURE TO FILE CLAIM IN INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS. — Although the sale of an
undivided interest in the property has not been
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds,
nor annotated on the Torrens title covering it,
such technical defficiency merely renders the
transaction not binding against a third person
because, being a registered land, the operative
act to bind the land is the act of registration (Act
496, sec. 50). Said transaction however is valid
and binding between the parties and can serve as
basis to compel the register of deeds to make the
necessary registration. It is error to say that the
purchaser of such undivided interest should have
filed her claim in the intestate proceedings of the
deceased registered owner. If she wants to
protect her interest in the land and to make the
transaction binding between the parties thereto,
she can press her claim against the heirs of the
deceased in an ordinary civil action. The heirs
cannot escape the legal consequence of the
transaction because they have inherited the
property subject to the liability affecting their
common ancestor. And the fact that one of the
heirs bought the shares of his co-heirs in said
property is of no moment.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action filed by the plaintiff against the
defendant in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
seeking the reconveyance to the plaintiff of one-
half (1/2) portion of lot No. 221 originally
belonging to the spouses Severino Salak and
Petra Garcia, the cancellation of the lease
executed on said lot in favor of the spouses
Gabino de Leon and Asuncion Reyes as well as
the mortgage executed thereon by the lessees in
favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
and the payment of damages suffered by the
plaintiff.
The facts alleged in the complaint are: lot No. 221
was originally owned by the spouses Severino
Salak and Petra Garcia, their title thereto being
evidence by original Certificate of Title No. 41453
of the register’s office of Tarlac; on December 20,
1939, said spouses mortgaged said lot for the
sum of P1,200 to spouses Pedro Magat and
Filomena Silva, the mortgage having been
registered in accordance with law; on May 22,
1943, Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva assigned
their mortgage rights to Honoria Salak for the
sum of P1,632 with the consent of the surviving
debtor Severino Salak, his wife having already
died; on August 16, 1943, Severino Salak
transferred his 1/2 interest in the property to
Honoria Salak for the sum of P612, representing
1/2 of the consideration paid by her to the
mortgagees Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva; this
transaction, as well as the assignment of the
mortgage credit, were never registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds, nor annotated on
the certificate of title No. 41453; Severino Salak
died on December 5, 1944, while Honoria Salak
died on January 13, 1945; intestate proceedings
were instituted for the settlement and distribution
of the estate of the deceased Severino Salak and
Petra Garcia, including lot No. 221, and after
proper proceedings, said lot was adjudicated to
Ernesto Bautista, Aurea Sahagun, Rita Sahagun
and Francisca Salak in the proportion of 1/4
interest each; Francisca Salak acquired later the
shares of the other heirs in said lot by virtue of
which transfer certificate of title No. 970 was
issued in her name; Honoria Salak died single
leaving as sole heir Agustina de Guzman, plaintiff
herein.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a cause
of action, which motion the court granted in an
order which reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Acting on the motions to dismiss dated
November 16, 1948, and November 27, 1948,
filed by defendant Francisca Salak de Paz and
defendant-spouses Gabino de Leon and Asuncion
Reyes, respectively, the Court finds the grounds
of said motions well-taken.
"Besides, judging from the facts alleged in the
complaint, the action filed by plaintiff would call
necessarily for the undoing of all the proceedings
taken in Special Proceedings No. 3, intestado de
los finados Severino Salak y Petra Garcia, an
expediente now closed more than two years ago.
This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any
collateral attack in the present action against the
proceedings taken in the said Special Proceeding
No. 3.
"It is admitted in the complaint that the property
sought to be recovered by plaintiff from
defendants in this present case had regularly
been adjudicated by the Court in favor of the
latter as heirs of the deceased Severino Salak and
Petra Garcia after compliance with all the steps
and proceedings established in the Rules of Court
for the settlement of the estates of deceased.
This means that the property now sought to be
recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in
their favor after all claims, indebtedness and
obligations chargeable against the intestate
estate of the deceased Severino Salak and Petra
Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of
the estate of the deceased; so that, in the eyes of
the law, the properties now in the hands of the
defendants are presumed to be free from all
claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set
up in the complaint should have been interposed
during the pendency and progress of Special
Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done
so, she can not now bring this action against the
defendants, for it is clear that there exists no
privity of contract between plaintiff and
defendants upon which plaintiff can predicate her
action against the present defendants.
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
dismisses the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff."
with costs against the appellees. Let this case be
remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.

The case is now before this Court on appeal taken

by the plaintiff imputing five errors to the court a
quo.

One of the grounds which was considered by the

lower court in dismissing the complaint is the fact
that the property in question has already been
the subject of adjudication in the intestate
proceedings instituted for the settlement and
distribution of the estate of the deceased
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia, and the Court a
quo entertains the view that, having said property
been duly adjudicated in said intestate
proceedings, and having all the claims filed
therein, as well as all obligations charged against
the estate, being considered, passed upon, and
settled, and said proceedings closed and
terminated, the property now in question can no
longer be reached by the plaintiff upon the theory
that it has been adjudicated to the heirs free from
all lien or claim whatsoever. The Court further
holds that the claim of the plaintiff should have
been filed in said proceedings within the period
prescribed by the Rules of Court, and having
failed to do so, her claim is now barred and
cannot be entertained.

We do not subscribe to these findings of the court

a quo. While we admit that the sale made by
Severino Salak of his 1/2 undivided interest in the
property to Honoria Salak, predecessor in interest
of the plaintiff, has not been registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds, nor annotated on
the torrens title covering it, such technical
defficiency does not render the transaction
ineffective, nor does it convert it into a mere
monetary obligation, but it simply renders the
transaction not binding against a third person
because, being a registered land, the operative
act to bind the land is the act of registration
(section 50, Act No. 496). Said transaction
however is valid and binding between the parties
and can serve as basis to compel the register of
deeds to make the necessary registration (id.) .
Such being the case, it is error to say that
plaintiff should have filed her claim in the
intestate proceedings of the late Severino Salak if
she wanted to protect her interest in the land for,
the transaction being binding between the
parties, the same can still be invoked against
them or their privies. This means that plaintiff can
still press her claim against the heirs of the
deceased Severino Salak who were made parties-
defendants in this case. These heirs cannot
escape the legal consequence of this transaction
because they have inherited the property subject
to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
The fact that Francisca Salak bought the shares of
her co-heirs in said property is of no moment
because in so far as the portion of the land
acquired by Honoria Salak is concerned, Francisca
Salak can recoup what she has parted with from
her co-heirs when the time for readjustment
comes. This matter can be threshed out when the
case is decided on the merits. For the present
suffice it to state that the lower court erred in
dismissing the complaint for the reasons set forth
in its order subject of the present appeal.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed,

 HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO, and
DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, Petitioners, v.
HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL
ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, NAPOLEON
ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA
ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA
PING, Respondents.
Herminio L. Ruiz, for Petitioners.
Vicente D. Millora for Private Respondents.
Romero A. Yu for respondent Yu Hua Ping.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDING; SALE
OF PROPERTY OF DECEDENT; JURISDICTION OF
PROBATE COURT TO APPROVE THEREOF BEFORE
FINAL ADJUDICATION. — In the case of Dillena v.
Court of Appeals (163 SCRA 30 (1988), this Court
made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the
sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence,
it is error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action. The Court
further elaborated that although the Rules of
Court do not specifically state that the sale of an
immovable property belonging to an estate of a
decedent, in a special proceeding, should be
made with the approval of the court, this
authority is necessarily included in its capacity as
a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the
probate court in the case at bar, acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the
Deed of Conditional Sale.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT’S APPROVAL, NECESSARY
FOR THE VALIDITY OF ANY DISPOSITION OF
DECEDENT’S ESTATE; EFFECT OF ABSENCE
THEREOF TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF
HEIRS. — Petitioners herein anchor their claim on
Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. It is
settled that court approval is necessary for the
validity of any disposition of the decedent’s
estate. However, reference to judicial approval
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of
the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-
heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs.
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is
no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest, or participation he may have in the
property under administration. This is a matter
which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate
court.
3. CIVIL LAW; POSSESSION; POSSESSION OF
HEREDITARY PROPERTY; WHEN DEEMED
ACQUIRED; RULE. — The right of an heir to
dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the
same is under administration, is based on the
Civil Code provision stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of
the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance
is accepted. Where there are however, two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs.
4. ID.; CO-OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF A CO-OWNER
TO SELL, ALIENATE OR MORTGAGE HIS SHARE IN
THE PROPERTY HELD IN COMMON. — The Civil
Code, under the provisions on co-ownership,
further qualifies this right. Although it is
mandated that each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. In other words, the law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in
common. As early as 1942, this Court has
recognized said right of an heir to dispose of
property under administration. In the case of
Teves de Jakosalem v. Rafols, Et Al., (73 Phil. 628
[1942]) it was said that the sale made by an heir
of his share in an inheritance, subject to the
result of the pending administration, in no wise,
stands in the way of such administration. The
Court then relied on the provision of the Old Civil
Code, Article 440 and Article 399 which are still in
force as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively,
in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the
words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the
death of a person, each of his heirs ‘becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with
respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership
being thus formed among the co-owners of the
estate which remains undivided.’"
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
The lower court’s jurisdiction in approving a Deed
of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs
and ordering herein administrator-petitioner
Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions
of said properties, despite the absence of its prior
approval as a probate court, is being challenged
in the case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of
several real estate properties located in Quezon
City and Caloocan City, with a conservative
estimated value of about P30 million. Said estate
allegedly has only the following unsettled
claims:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate
taxes due Quezon City;
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due
Caloocan City;
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former
Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and the incumbent
Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net
estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two
of whom are the petitioner herein, and the others
are the private respondents.
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before
the respondent Court for sixteen years,
respondent-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of
Sale", on October 4, 1989. The said sale involved
the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all
of which are registered in Quezon City, and form
part of the estate. The consideration for said lots
was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time,
they already had a buyer. It was further stated in
said Motion that respondent-heirs have already
received their proportionate share of the six (6)
million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as
earnest money; that the balance of
P6,000,000.00 is more than enough to pay the
unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to direct the administrator,
Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-
administrator hereafter): chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the
claims against the Estate; and
3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in
final settlement of the Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-
administrator interposed an "Opposition to
Approval of Sale", to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That he has learned that some of the heirs
herein have sold some real estate property of the
Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City,
without the knowledge of the herein
administrator, without the approval of this
Honorable Court and of some heirs, and at a
shockingly low price;
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his
vehement objection to the approval of the sale,
perpetrated in a manner which can even render
the proponents of the sale liable for punishment
for contempt of this Honorable Court;
3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays
this Honorable Court to authorize the sale of the
above mentioned property of the Estate to
generate funds to pay certain liabilities of the
Estate and with the approval of this Honorable
Court if warranted, to give the heirs some
advances chargeable against theirs (sic)
respective shares, and, for the purpose to
authorize the herein Administrator, and the other
heirs to help the Administrator personally or
through a broker, to look for a buyer for the
highest obtainable price, subject always to the
approval of this Honorable Court." 1
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to
be given a period of forty-five (45) days within
which to look for a buyer who will be willing to
buy the properties at a price higher than
P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15,
1989. However, by said date, petitioners have not
found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they
asked the Court, on February 8, 1990, for an
inextendible period of thirty days to look for a
buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of a public document
against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio
Obon on February 26, 1990. He initiated this
complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping
who caused the notarization of the Deed of
Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-
administrator’s signature was made to appear. He
also learned that after he confronted the notary
public of the questioned document, the latter
revoked his notarial act on the same. chanrobles law library
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed
the civil action to secure the declaration by the
Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional
Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having
lapsed without having found a buyer, petitioner
Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the
Orders granting them several periods within
which to look for a better buyer. Respondents
filed a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer,
after seven long months, petitioner-administrator
filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale",
dated May 10, 1990, maintaining that the sale
should wait for the country to recover from the
effects of the coup d’etat attempts, otherwise, the
properties should be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for
Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of
the Properties of the Estate." To this Motion,
respondents filed an Opposition on the following
grounds: that the motion is not proper because of
the pending motion to approve the sale of the
same properties; that said conditional sale was
initiated by petitioner-administrator who had
earlier signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as
earnest money; that the approval of the sale
would mean Yu Hwa Ping’s assumption of
payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has
no further debts and thus, the intestate
administrator may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an
Order, the dispositive portion of which, stated,
among others, to wit: 2
"b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated
October 4, 1989, praying that the new
administrator be directed to sell the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145 and
18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied;
and
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave
to mortgage some properties of the estate at a
just and reasonable amount, subject to the
approval of the Court." cralaw virtua1aw library
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge
issued an order resolving to call the parties to a
conference on December 17, 1990. The
conference was held, but still the parties were
unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on January
4, 1991, it was continued, wherein the parties
actually agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell
their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for
the price already agreed upon, while herein
petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu
Hwa Ping. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental
Opposition" to the approval of the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued
the challenged Order, the dispositive portion of
which states, to wit:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is
hereby lifted, reconsidered and set aside, and
another one is hereby issued as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated
September 10, 1989, executed by the heirs-
movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to
their respective shares in the properties covered
by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo
to sell the remaining portions of the said
properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the
same price as the sale executed by the herein
heirs-movants;
3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court
the total remaining balance of the purchase price
for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS from
notice hereof; 4. The motion to cite former
administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of
court, resulting from his failure to submit the
owner’s copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and 120145 is
hereby denied." 3
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the
remaining balance of the purchase price for the
properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale
in the amount of P6,500,000.00.
Petitioners herein received the questioned Order
on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21) days
thereafter, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, praying that the Court reinstate
its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private
respondents filed their Opposition. 4
Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The
motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners
were denied by the respondent Court on August
23, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, hoping for the
last time that they would be able to convince the
Court that its Order dated March 29, 1991 in
effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous
and beyond its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court
denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration for
"lack of merit"
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a
Motion for Execution of the Order dated March 29,
1991. This was pending resolution when the
petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves
around one question: Is it within the jurisdiction
of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to
issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional
Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior
court approval and to order herein Administrator
to sell the remaining portion of said properties?
We answer in the positive.
In the case of Dillena v. Court of Appeals, 5 this
Court made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the
sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence,
it is error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the
Rules of Court do not specifically state that the
sale of an immovable property belonging to an
estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding,
should be made with the approval of the court,
this authority is necessarily included in its
capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear
that the probate court in the case at bar, acted
within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
We cannot countenance the position maintained
by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is
null and void for lack of prior court approval. The
sale precisely was made conditional, the condition
being that the same should first be approved by
the probate court.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7,
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent’s estate. However,
reference to judicial approval cannot adversely
affect the substantive rights of the heirs to
dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship
and/or co-ownership among the heirs. 7
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is
no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest, or participation he may have in the
property under administration. This is a matter
which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate
court. 8
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s
property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code
provision 9 stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of
the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance
is accepted. Where there are however, two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition , owned in common by such
heirs. 10
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-
ownership, further qualifies this right. 11
Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus
may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. 12 In other words, the law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in
common. 13
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said
right of an heir to dispose of property under
administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem
v. Rafols, Et Al., 14 it was said that the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject
to the result of the pending administration, in no
wise, stands in the way of such administration.
The Court then relied on the provision of the Old
Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 399 which are
still in force as Article 533 and Article 493,
respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also
cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa:
"Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs
‘becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate
left with respect to the part or portion which
might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-
owners of the estate which remains
undivided’." chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Private respondents having secured the approval

of the probate court, a matter which is
unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having
established private respondents’ right to alienate
the decedent’s property subject of administration,
this Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby

DISMISSED. With Costs.

SO ORDERED.