PROJECT DEMONSTRATING EXCELLENCE

A Critical Analysis of Richard Paul’s Substantive

Trans-disciplinary Conception of Critical Thinking

by

Enoch Stephen Hale

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Interdisciplinary Studies

with a concentration in Arts and Sciences
and a specialization in
Critical Thinking, Teaching and Learning

October 4, 2008

Core Faculty: Robert McAndrews, Ph.D.

Union Institute & University

Cincinnati, Ohio
 i 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my doctoral supervisors, Dr. Linda Elder,

Dr. Gerald Nosich, Dr. Joel Levine, and Dr. George Nagel, for their support and advice.

I could not have hoped for a better doctoral committee. I most assuredly would not have

been successful without their guidance. I would also like to thank my original committee

core, Dr. Kevin Sharpe, for his excellent guidance in the first two years of my doctoral

program. Many thanks are extended to Dr. Robert McAndrews for his willingness to

assume the role of committee core when Dr. Sharpe was no longer able to do so. I

believe that my committee has been the sole reason for my success.

I am indebted to the Foundation for Critical Thinking for its willingness to host

my doctoral Internship. Its extensive library has been an invaluable resource for my

investigation into the discourse and nature of critical thinking. Furthermore, my weekly

meetings with Dr. Linda Elder, Dr. Richard Paul and Rush Cosgrove were an excellent

training ground for intellectual discipline and scholarly work. I would especially like to

extend my deepest gratitude and admiration to Dr. Richard Paul for his groundbreaking

work on the topic of critical thinking and for his willingness to dialogue with me.

I am also indebted to those scholars who have contributed so much to the

discourse on critical thinking and, therefore, to my dissertation. These scholars belong to

an intellectual tradition that initiated my journey into critical thinking and educational

reform.

I want to extent my thanks and gratitude to my wife who has provided me with

intellectual and moral support during this process. Her patience is a model I seek to

emulate.
 ii 

ABSTRACT

Many significant thinkers throughout history have articulated the importance of

critical thinking in education and life. Since 1980 the topic of critical thinking has been

explicitly explored by scholars specifically as it pertains to educational reform. Richard

Paul’s views of critical thinking have had a significant impact on how critical thinking is

understood today. However, to date there is not a comprehensive analysis of Paul’s

theory of critical thinking – an exegesis that clearly identifies and examines the structural

components of his model and his general pedagogical point of view. The need for a

critical analysis of Paul’s work is significant for three reasons. The first is that Paul’s

work is widely acknowledged within scholarship on the topic of critical thinking,

teaching and learning. Secondly, Paul’s work experiences high visibility in instructional

practices and institutional plans (accreditation reports, mission statements, and general

descriptions of the concept and its importance to learning) throughout the United States

particularly. Thirdly, Paul’s conception of critical thinking is bold given its trans-

disciplinary claims. Specifically, it is a conception that seeks to clarify the essential

conditions of what it means to think critically and infuse these concepts within practical

and pedagogically sound methods for applying critical thinking within and across every

domain of academia and life. The purpose of this dissertation is to conduct the first

comprehensive analysis and evaluation of Richard Paul’s work on critical thinking. This

includes placing Paul’s work in the larger discourse, succinctly describing his model and

suggested applications for teaching, and outlining some of the most significant challenges

facing Paul’s work as an approach for educational reform. Paul’s contribution to the

discourse and development of critical thinking is significant because it is comprehensive

 iii 

and conceptually applicable to all human thinking, yet its very comprehensiveness poses

a challenge. This work argues that the model requires a fresh contextualization when

applied to any given field, which implies a need for professional development. Paul and

his associates have pointed in the direction of those contextualizations, but a tremendous

amount of work must be done for this model to flourish in any discipline and

instructional setting.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments …..…………………………………………………………………………. i
Abstract ………….……………………………………………………………………………... ii
Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………………. iv
Preface…………………………………………………………………………………………... vii
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Part I: Conceptual Analysis: Why Critical Thinking is Important and Significant……………. 7
Chapter 1: Tracing the Intellectual Tradition of Critical Thought………………………… 9
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….. 9
A Community of Critical Thinkers ………………………………………………….. 10
Socrates ……………………………………………………………………………… 16
Francis Bacon ……………………………………………………………………….. 21
John Henry Newman ………………………………………………………………… 27
John Dewey ………………………………………………………………………….. 35
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………............... 42
Chapter 2: What is Critical Thinking? ……………………………………………………. 44
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….. 44
Definitions of Critical Thinking …………………………………………................... 45
Limitations of an Emphasis on One Definition of Critical Thinking ……………….. 51
The Base-line Approach ……………………………………………………............... 55
A Proposed Base-line Conception: Emphasizing Obstacles, Dispositions and
Reasoned Judgment ……………………………………………………………… 62
Chapter Summary …………………………………………………………………….. 93
Chapter 3: Why is Critical Thinking Important? ………………………………………….. 95
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………… 95
Importance of Critical Thinking in One’s Daily Life Decisions ……………………… 96
Importance of Critical Thinking to Democracy ………………………………………. 101
Importance of Critical Thinking in a Rapidly Changing World ……………..……….. 105
A Challenge …………………………………………………………………………… 108
Chapter 4: In Defense of a Substantive Trans-disciplinary Conception of Critical
Thinking Instruction ………………………………………………………………….. 112
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………… 112
Clarifying Concepts: Substantive and Trans-disciplinary ……………………………. 115
Inadequacies of a Skills-only Approach to Critical Thinking Instruction ……………. 117
Inadequacies of a “One of Many” Approach to Critical Thinking Instruction……….. 119
Inadequacies of relying on individual disciplines to teach students to think critically:
a laissez-faire approach to thinking critically ……………………………………. 121
Trans-disciplinary Model as a Substantive Approach to Critical Thinking Instruction …. 135
 Approach to Thinking Critically within the Disciplines: Science as an Example …. 142
Paul’s Work as an Example of a Substantive Trans-disciplinary Approach to
Critical Thinking Instruction ………………………………………………... 153
Chapter Summary………………………………………………………………… 154
Part I Summary ….……..…………………………………………………………….. 156
Part II: Literature Review: ……..…………………………………………………………. 157
Chapter 5: Why Richard Paul’s Conception of Critical Thinking Needs to be
Comprehensively Analyzed ……………….………………………………………… 158
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….. 158
Why Paul? ……………………………………………………………………………. 159
Harvey Siegel on Paul’s Conception of Critical Thinking …………………………… 163
Irene Yuen Yee Fung on Paul’s Conception of Critical Thinking …………………… 176
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………. 186
Chapter 6: Problems with a Postmodern Critique of Critical Thinking: Where Brenner
and Parks Go Wrong …………………………………………………………………. 190
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………… 190
Confusing Concepts with Application ……………………………………………….. 193
Critique of Brenner and Parks’ Argument ……………………………………………. 197
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………. 212
Part II Summary …..……………………………………………………………………….. 215
Part III: Exegesis: To what extent does Paul’s conceptualization represent a substantive approach
to critical thinking and educational reform? ……………………………………………….. 218
Chapter 7: Paul’s Theoretical Point of View and Model of Critical Thinking: A Practical
Epistemology……………………………………………………………..……………. 220
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………. 220
Part I: On Paul’s Theoretical Point of View …………………………………………… 222
Part II: Summary of Paul’s Model ……………………………………………………… 239
Chapter Summary ……………………………………………………………………….. 248
Chapter 8: Summary of Paul’s Approach to Instructional Reform ………………………… 250
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………. 250
Substantive Learning is a Critical Thinking Process ………………………………….. 251
The Problem of Didacticism …………………………………………………………… 254
Paul’s Practical Approach to Critical Teaching and Learning ………………………… 259
Chapter Summary … …………………………………………………………………… 271
Chapter 9: Challenges Facing the Successful Implementation of Paul’s Conception of
Critical Thinking within Education ……………………………………......................... 273
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………. 273
 The Challenge of Intellectual Work …………………………………………………. 275
The Challenge of Understanding the Parts in Relation to the Whole ……………….. 279
Challenges Facing the Contextualization of Paul’s Model ………………………….. 284
The Challenge of Assessment ……………………………………………………….. 290
Chapter Summary ……………………………………………………………………. 297
Part III Summary …………………………………………………………………………. 299
Part IV: Chapter 10: Conclusions ……………………………………………………….……. 301
Overview of the Aims and Conclusions …………………………………………………. 301
Implications of the study ………………………………………………………………… 302
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Study …………………………………..……... 304
References …………………………………………………………………………………….. 309
Appendix ……………………………………………………………………………………… 326
Robert Ennis: Goals for a Critical Thinking/Reasoning Curriculum…………………….. 327
Richard Paul: 35 Dimensions of Critical Thinking …………………………………........ 330
Endnotes ……………………………………………………………………………………… 331
 vii 
 

PREFACE

In my journey for a substantive conception of critical thinking, I found Richard

Paul’s work. I was deeply impressed with the difference between the fullness of his

model and the narrowness of others. I was also struck by the lack of scholarly critiques

of Paul’s work, by the limited number of studies based on Paul’s work, and the ways in

which the work has been at times marginalized or misinterpreted. This led me to

question the substance of Paul’s work and why it has not received appropriate attention

given that Paul is treated throughout the literature as a seminal figure. As a result of my

studies in developing this dissertation, I have come to the conclusion that Paul’s model is

robust because it crosses all disciplines. However, I have found some areas that represent

a challenge for Paulian scholars, and I will detail those areas in this dissertation. I call

upon the reader to recognize that I did not come upon this topic with an indifferent

attitude toward Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking; rather, with a hope that when

deeply probed the model will prove to be what I and others hoped for; a model that is

trans-disciplinary in nature, and focuses on undeniable foundations, practical standards,

and essential intellectual traits. Though I was committed to going the whole nine yards, I

was not and am not now “biased” in a way that has blinded me to what I needed to see.

Furthermore, I analyzed and evaluated Paul’s model from an interdisciplinary perspective

with a focus on the extent to which it is valuable for teaching and learning. Most

assuredly examining it from a specific discipline would alter the analysis.

I consider it important to elaborate on the history of critical thinking beyond that

of what may be expected, demonstrating rich understanding of the discourse on critical

thinking (and therefore Paul’s place within the history of critical thinking). The broader
 viii 
 

perspective has been too often missed by Paul’s critics. Moreover, an examination of

intellectual history sheds light on the misconception that a base-line conception of critical

thinking does not exist. It not only exists, but when substantively conceived is trans-

disciplinary and directly reflected in the work of Richard Paul.

Furthermore, I have paid close attention to the treatment of certain terms within

the body of the work we call “critical thinking.” For this reason, I find it necessary to

briefly clarify what is meant by my use of some of these terms. All terms are used in

accordance with educated interpretation as found in a range of high quality dictionaries

and thereby applied to the discourse on critical thinking as it ranges over the last 38

years.

Stated briefly, I use the term substantive to mean that which identifies, clarifies

and deals with the essential elements relevant to a specific context. In the case of the

discourse on critical thinking, the concept of substantive illuminates those foundational

and essential concepts that characterize a general and robust conception of critical

thinking. The meaning of this term is elaborated in chapter 4.

  The term robust is used throughout this dissertation. By the term robust I mean

that it is “rich and full-bodied” and is “strong enough to withstand or overcome

intellectual challenges or adversity” (Robust, n.d.). In my view, Paul’s conception of

critical thinking is robust because of its clarity, logicalness, significance, because of its

integrated nature and the detail inherent within it. It is powerful in its pedagogical

potential in that it is useful in the analysis and evaluation of all reasoning. This is in

contrast to conceptions and/or models of critical thinking that are either vague,

theoretically unsound, or inconsistent and limited in scope and pedagogical applicability.

 ix 
 

It is necessary to draw a distinction between the terms interdisciplinary and trans-

disciplinary as used within this dissertation. Although the terms often overlap in

common usage, I distinguish between them. The Oxford English Dictionary defines

interdisciplinary as “pertaining to two or more disciplines or branches of learning;

contributing or benefiting from two or more disciplines.” The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language provides further clarification stating that

interdisciplinary is that which relates to or involves “two or more academic disciplines

that are usually considered distinct” (Interdisciplinary, n.d.). From these definitions, I

use the term to characterize an approach to problem solving that involves approaching a

multi-dimensional or complex issue, problem, question, or subject from distinct, but

relevant, disciplinary lenses. Some interdisciplinary problems require a synthesis of

disciplinary insights and research methods that form a new method for settling the issue,

whereas other interdisciplinary problems synthesize disciplinary conclusions without

crossing defined disciplinary boundaries and methods. Regardless of the approach, I

argue, in keeping with Paul’s conception, that establishing a common, non-technical

language serves a significant pedagogical purpose for addressing problems, issues and

questions that are inherently interdisciplinary. A language based on concepts that are

presupposed by and, therefore, implicit within the logic of all disciplines can be the

foundation for such an approach which I term trans-disciplinary.

I interpret and use the term trans-disciplinary to mean those foundational and

general concepts that are present within and across disciplines or specialized fields of

study. Trans-disciplinary concepts are useful when addressing complex or multi-logical

problems, issues and topics that require interdisciplinary analysis and evaluation. Taken
 x 
 

together, substantive trans-disciplinary concepts provide a robust common language that

creates new intellectual pathways, new ways to translate, export and contextualize ideas

as we move from one system of thought to another. Trans-disciplinary thought that is

substantive in nature enables us to think multi-logically, to see in fuller relief the most

significant similarities and differences in the logic of the knowledge we investigate and

acquire. This term is elaborated in chapter 4.

Since the terms model, theory and conceptualization/conception regularly appear

throughout this work, their use requires clarification. There is a sense in which the term

model refers to a prescribed or procedural way of doing things. This is not the sense in

which I use the term when referring to Paul’s work. Paul’s model of critical thinking is

conceptual as opposed to procedural. In other words, one who uses Paul’s work in

analysis, evaluation and/or synthesis of ideas and issues will not find a set of steps to

follow that will undoubtedly lead one to the “correct” conclusion or answer. Such an

approach is antithetical to a substantive trans-disciplinary approach to thinking critically.

I use the term model in reference to Paul’s work to highlight what he has determined to

be the essential concepts necessary for thinking critically. Specifically, model refers to

those aspects of Paul’s theory that are most visible in terms of their practical application.

The elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, the intellectual traits, and the 35

dimensions (or skills and abilities) of critical thinking are the most visible. Other aspects

of the model include the logic of questions, conceptual analysis, specific learning and

instructional strategies including Socratic questioning, and understanding the barriers to

critical thinking.
 xi 
 

There is a sense in which the term theory indicates that a claim, model, or

program needs to be tested in order to determine its validity within a specific context.

This is not the sense in which I use the term when referring to Paul’s conception of

critical thinking. Rather, I use the term to highlight the conceptual and empirical

dimensions of Paul’s work when viewed in its entirety. Specifically, theory refers to

those aspects of Paul’s work that form the background logic to the elements of reasoning,

intellectual standards, intellectual traits and 35 dimensions of critical thinking. Paul’s

theory of critical thinking is best understood as an intimately interconnected group of

concepts, each dependent on the others and clarified by a substantive understanding of

the others. It is in this sense that the term theory is used.

The terms conceptualization/conception are used synonymously and more

frequently than are model and theory. I believe that these terms capture the essence of

Paul’s work in that it focuses on defined groups of concepts, the interconnections

between them, and how these concepts are empirically engaged and applied within

various domains.

Because of my treatment of the terms model, theory and

conceptualization/conception when referring to Paul’s work, the terms are often used

synonymously. However, I clarify this terminology when needed so as not to confuse the

reader. It is necessary that these terms are clearly used when thinking through the

discourse on critical thinking as a whole. I believe that such clarification would do much

to resolve the frequent erroneous interpretations of the various scholarly perspectives

within the discourse. I provide a few examples in chapter four.

 xii 
 

I must clarify here that my use of the term base-line is not tied to any economic

interpretation, agenda or oversight. I use the term base-line to mean foundational and

essential concepts as relevant to clarifying the concept of critical thinking. This

interpretation of the term is common throughout the discourse on critical thinking as a

way to synthesize insights from contributing scholars. My use is not to imply that critical

thinking is a commodity to be bought and sold as a way to “reform” education. It is my

position that such a use of the concept is antithetical to what it means to think critically.

Lastly, I take an interdisciplinary perspective in the analysis and evaluation of

Paul’s work. In doing so, I seek to understand his work in the context of the discourse on

critical thinking. I also recognize the importance of viewing Paul’s work holistically. My

frame of reference illuminates the often incomplete interpretations of his conception of

critical thinking. Almost every discussion of Paul’s work is limited by specialized frames

of reference that by implication highlight certain aspects of his conception and shadows,

ignores, or misinterprets other integral parts. A holistic view of Paul’s work reveals the

interconnections between theoretical components and applied characteristics.

Furthermore, an interdisciplinary interpretation of his work sheds light on his theoretical

and applied purpose and the significance of his work in the discourse and to the future of

educational reform.

 
 1 
 

INTRODUCTION

For more than 20 years critical thinking has been considered an important

educational goal and is currently viewed as an important goal within educational

standards across the world. It is generally agreed that people who can think critically

make good citizens in that they have a greater propensity to contribute to the preservation

and application of important democratic ideals. Furthermore, it is believed that people

who improve their critical thinking skills and abilities will contribute to a country’s

ability to economically and politically survive and thrive within an increasingly complex

and interconnected world (Costa, 2001; Ennis, 1996; Fasko, 2003; Fung 2005; Hare,

1998; Paul, 1995a; Peticolas, 1998; Ruggiero, 2003; Siegel, 1990; Walters 1994).

Scholars generally agree that it is through the educational process that people can best

develop critical thinking skills and abilities. However, despite agreement there is little

consensus among and between disciplines as to what constitutes critical thinking, how it

should be applied within the classroom, and how it can be measured. As a result, it is

often asserted that the discourse on critical thinking is largely fragmented.

Many scholars argue that the lack of consensus is due to the lack of a common

definition (Fung, 2005; Moseley et al., 2005; Siegel, 1990). Others argue that there are

common concepts within most substantive definitions of critical thinking, and that the

problem lies with the various ways in which critical thinking is conceptualized within

specific disciplines. One thing that we know is true is that each discipline tends to

interpret critical thinking according to its field-specific terminology and methodology.

However, a close examination of these subject specific conceptualizations clarifies the

discourse pointing to concepts that are cross-disciplinary (Paul, Elder, & Bartell., 1997;
 2 
 

Walters, 1994). It is my intention to analyze and evaluate the later argument. I argue that

there is ample evidence within the discourse to show that a base-line definition of critical

thinking exists, and that a significant part of the problem lies in subject-specific

interpretations and applications of the idea.

Every academic discipline has significantly contributed to understanding and

solving human problems. Each has developed some technical language and methods to

think critically within its domain. However, specialized language and methods are often

not understandable, applicable, and accessible to people outside the technical discourse.

Furthermore, problems of specialization in academia are similar to problems of

compartmentalization in the individual’s mind. Critical insights from one domain do not

necessarily transfer to other domains in a way that helps one improve his/her thinking in

general. A substantive, trans-disciplinary model of critical thinking offers a way of

approaching thinking so that it works critically within, across and beyond all domains and

is intuitive to educated persons.

Richard Paul has produced what purports to be a substantive, trans-disciplinary

conception of critical thinking. He has developed it through the publication of more than

200 articles, 20 monographs (thinker’s guides), seven books, and many more materials

designed to influence teachers within every field of learning. Still, a comprehensive

analysis and evaluation of Paul’s work does not exist. This dissertation will conduct the

first comprehensive, critical analysis of Paul’s model of critical thinking and his

suggestions for teaching and learning.

I will address the following three questions in the dissertation:

1. Why is critical thinking important and significant to teaching and learning?

 3 
 

2. What constitutes a trans-disciplinary conceptualization of critical thinking as

relevant to teaching and learning?

3. To what extent does Richard Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking

provide a model for thinking critically within and across disciplines?

Answers to these questions ultimately make the case that a trans-disciplinary

conceptualization of critical thinking is needed if the concept is to act as a force for

positive and progressive change within education. This dissertation is organized into

three parts in accord with this line of reasoning.

Part I constitutes the conceptual analysis portion of this dissertation and consists

of the first four chapters. Chapter 1 argues that there is an historical concern to improve

thinking and this concern points to the need for a trans-disciplinary concept of critical

thinking. Many thinkers throughout history have been concerned with the need to

systematically improve the general quality of thinking. They have discussed the

obstacles to disciplined thinking, the role of education in helping people improve the

quality of their thinking, and the socio-ethical implications to skilled reasoning. This

chapter will trace some of the thinkers in Western history who have articulated this need,

and have by implication paved the way for the importance of a contemporary concept of

critical thinking in education that is foundationally relevant to thinking critically within

and across multiple domains of academia and life.

Chapter 2 addresses the question, “What is critical thinking?” This chapter builds

on the first chapter arguing that a substantive, trans-disciplinary concept of critical

thinking is consistent with the history of the idea and discourse of critical thinking as a

pedagogical goal. This point is supported with an explication of various base-line

 4 
 

conceptions of critical thinking that respectively outline foundational and essential

concepts and principles of what it means to think critically. The similarities between the

different base-line conceptions is important in that they (1) reveal that scholars concerned

with a substantive conception of critical thinking recognize the need for an explication of

general, trans-disciplinary concepts and principles, and (2) provide a theoretical

framework which enables educators to rethink their instruction so as to promote greater

critical thought through instruction.

Chapter 3 discusses the question, “Why is critical thinking important?” Although

scholars largely agree that the ability to think critically within a variety of contexts is

valuable and important, one cannot assume that the reasons are clear (Paul, Elder et al.,

1997). This chapter shows how theorists believe that critical thinking skills and

dispositions have significant implications to our daily decisions, to democracy, and for

survival in a rapidly changing world.

Chapter 4 posits a defense of a substantive and general conception of critical

thinking. In doing so, the concepts of substantive and trans-disciplinary are clarified and

used as standards by which various approaches to critical thinking instruction can be

effectively evaluated. I will point out the importance of critical thinking as an effective

impetus for educational reform. This chapter will compare the effectiveness of

specialized conceptualizations of critical thinking with generalized conceptualizations.

The need is for a model that explicitly moves across the disciplines. Richard Paul’s

conception of critical thinking fills this need.

Part II consists of chapters 5 and 6 and forms the literature review portion of this

dissertation. Together, chapters 5 and 6 justify why Richard Paul’s conception of critical
 5 
 

thinking needs to be taken seriously by scholars, theoreticians and academics more

widely. Specifically, Chapter 5 reveals that Paul’s conception of critical thinking has not

been thoroughly and comprehensively analyzed. This is despite the fact that Paul’s work

has been highly visible in the discourse on critical thinking in a multitude of educational

journals and publications and has been utilized and applied within educational mission

statements and policies of numerous national, state/provincial, and local institutions.

Chapter 6 examines a narrow postmodern critique of Paul’s conception that

reflects a mis-interpretation of his work. It is shown that despite the criticism that Paul’s

work furthers Western, patriarchal notions of rationality, Paul’s conception of critical

thinking is sensitive to context and engages foundational and essential critical thinking

concepts accordingly. This chapter illustrates the need to clarify Paul’s theoretical frame

of reference as a practical epistemology. Viewed in this light, his work becomes highly

applicable within and across all domains of thought. Chapter 7 begins this clarification.

Part III begins the formal exegesis of Paul’s conception of critical thinking and

consists of chapters 7, 8, and 9. Chapter 7 offers a brief description of Paul’s model of

critical thinking. Paul’s theoretical frame of reference is clarified and its most

fundamental components are described including his concept of what it means to think

critically and what it means to be a critical thinker. Chapter 8 describes Paul’s approach

to instructional reform. I discuss Paul’s critique of didacticism and his practical approach

to cultivating substantive teaching and learning. In Chapter 9 I discuss some general

obstacles facing the successful implementation of Paul’s model within education. In this

chapter, it will be pointed out that his model must be contextualized to grasp its

usefulness. To embrace Paul’s approach, educators at all instructional levels must engage
 6 
 

in rigorous intellectual work. Furthermore, implementing a robust conception of critical

thinking often proves difficult for faculty trained within specialties. Finally, due to the

conceptual and sometimes complex nature of Paul’s model, assessment must take place

in numerous forms rather than limited to purely quantitative measures which

characterizes one problem of the “standards-based” approach to education now prevalent

in schooling where assessments are expected to fit into neat and tidy, quantitatively-based

rubrics.

Part IV concludes the dissertation. I conclude that Paul’s conception of critical

thinking is consistent with the history of critical thinking as an educational ideal, that it is

both substantive and trans-disciplinary, that his suggestions for restructuring instruction

to promote higher order thinking are practical and feasible, but that his model faces

challenges if it is to be a significant force for educational reform. Furthermore, this

chapter outlines the limitations of this study and explicates areas for further investigation.
 7 
 

PART I

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS: WHY CRITICAL THINKING IS IMPORTANT

AND SIGNIFICANT

The first part of this dissertation addresses four questions each assigned an

independent and respective chapter. The four questions are as follows:

• To what extent is the concept of critical thinking illuminated by those within

intellectual history concerned with improving the general quality of human

thought?

• What is critical thinking?

• Why is critical thinking important?

• What constitutes a substantive approach to critical thinking instruction?

Each question unpacks an important dimension of the concept of critical thinking and

clarifies some of the confusion that scholars have argued characterize the discourse over

the last 30 years.

Chapter 1 contends that the concept of critical thinking is present throughout

intellectual history. An examination of noted intellectuals reveals the presence of

foundational critical thinking concepts, including important obstacles to thinking well,

and links these concepts to the those educational ideals that speak to the need to develop

as intellectually autonomous and socially responsible citizens. Chapter 2 explicitly

analyzes the concept of critical thinking and argues that substantive conceptions of

critical thinking highlight essential principles and concepts that point to a base-line

conception of critical thinking that is trans-disciplinary in nature.

 8 
 

Chapter 3 discusses the importance of the concept of critical thinking to a

substantive education which has implications for living a reflective and ethical life:

individually and socially. The fourth chapter juxtaposes various approaches to critical

thinking instruction. It is argued that when substantively conceived critical thinking

instruction must explicate and critically engage essential principles and concepts.

Together, these chapters constitute the conceptual analysis portion of this dissertation.
 9 
 

CHAPTER 1

TRACING THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION OF

CRITICAL THOUGHT

Abstract
This chapter argues that there is an intellectual tradition on which contemporary
conceptions of critical thinking are founded. An examination of this tradition reveals
canonical principles and concepts that are essential to thinking critically and speak to
their trans-disciplinary nature and application. These principles and concepts include,
but are not limited to, the importance of living an examined life, identifying and
monitoring personal and social obstacles that influence one’s ability to think critically,
the importance of understanding what it means to obtain a liberal education, and why
substantive critical thinking demands instruction that is learner-centered and disciplined
oriented teaching. Each of these points are exemplified throughout intellectual history.
For practical purposes, this study focuses on the figure of Socrates and the works of
Bacon, Newman and Dewey. The work of each intellectual reveals seminal critical
thinking concepts and ideals that are trans-disciplinary in nature and applicable to daily
life.

Introduction

Critical thinking has long been touted as an important intellectual goal. Scholars

concerned with the problematics of human thinking are part of a long intellectual

tradition predicated on the belief that human thinking is often flawed, and that through

rigorous intellectual work the quality of one’s thinking can improve. This tradition

establishes a loosely knit community that crosses disciplines and articulates the personal

and social importance of helping people improve the quality of their thought, thereby

laying the intellectual and pedagogical foundations for what is now termed critical

thinking.

The continuous outcry for the need to think critically has prompted government

agencies around the world to repeatedly extol the importance of critical thinking and “call

for” its implementation within education. However, despite almost universal support for

the need to improve students’ critical thinking skills and abilities at all instructional
 10 
 

levels, there is little consensus on its exact definition let alone its most appropriate

applications within educational settings (Fung, 2005; Moseley et al. 2005; Paul, Elder et

al. 1997; Shahrokh, 1998). This chapter, and the first part of this dissertation, argues that

the emphasis on a single definition is short-sighted. Examining the history of critical

thinking reveals essential principles and concepts that clearly establish a base-line

conception of critical thinking. The desire for a narrow definition works against the

conceptual versatility and flexibility necessary to think critically within and across all

domains of academia and life.

A brief exploration of the history of critical thinking clarifies its need in education

and society and illuminates foundational concepts present within all substantive

definitions and conceptions of critical thinking. The purpose of this chapter is to

highlight some of the essential components of critical thinking inherent within its

intellectual tradition.

The reader will note that this chapter is not organized chronologically. The

discussion begins with a description of what is termed the critical thinking movement

(1980-present). This description is followed by historical sketches of a few significant

intellectuals who are part of a larger intellectual tradition concerned with understanding

and articulating what constitutes skilled reasoning. The purpose for this arrangement is

to (1) outline the current status of the critical thinking discourse, and (2) to show that

trans-disciplinary critical thinking concepts are historically evident within the thinking of

some noted intellectuals throughout history.

 11 
 

A Community of Critical Thinkers.

Reasoning is an innate part of human life, but high quality reasoning must be

cultivated through disciplined intellectual work. As critical thinking theorists Richard

Paul and Linda Elder (2006d) write, “Everyone thinks [reasons]; it is in our nature to do

so. But much of our thinking, left to itself, is biased, distorted, partial, uninformed or

down-right prejudiced…Excellence in thought, however, must be systematically

cultivated” (p. 4). Or, as Cambridge University philosopher A.E. Mander argues,

“Thinking is skilled work. It is not true that we are naturally endowed with the ability to

think clearly and logically-without learning how, or without practicing…” (Mander,

1938, p. vii). Throughout history, theorists concerned with the problematics in human

thinking have argued for the importance of intellectual discipline to high quality thought.

Furthermore, many have sought to unify knowledge with action, theory with practice.

Conceptually speaking, critical thinking dates back to any early society that

recognized the need to work through complex problems; problems that required

information and reasoning within multiple points of view or frames of reference. Scholar

and former university president Clark Kerr (1972) described this tradition as “the

organized intellect,” an informal movement “that has gained extraordinary momentum

since the Greeks got it going 2500 years ago” (p. 123). Early intellectuals recognized the

need to improve the quality of human reasoning and articulated the first criteria and

principles that characterize critical thought as well as some obstacles that prevent its

development. In so doing, they laid the groundwork for what we now term critical

thinking.
 12 
 

In his work, “Critical Thinking as an Aim of Education,” William Hare

illuminates some of the contributions to our conception of critical thinking that can be

documented throughout intellectual history. He argues that accounts of the intellectual

tradition of critical thinking could include “references to Mill on keeping one’s mind

open to criticism, Kant on thinking for oneself, Hume on proportioning belief to the

evidence, Descartes on the need to assess, not simply to be acquainted with, the views of

other philosophers, and on through…in the Western tradition at least, to the Socratic

emphasis on the examined life” (Hare, 1998, p. 39). Furthermore, accounts of scholars

like “Dewey, Russell, Whitehead and many others…pursued these [philosophical]

themes vigorously and developed a concept of education which stressed the importance

of thought, inquiry, and intellectual independence” (Hare, 1998, p. 39). Hare accurately

points out that critical thinking theory, and the intellectual traditions that have developed

and expanded the idea, is embedded in the learning process. To discuss critical thinking

is to discuss teaching and learning.

Given the tumultuous domestic and international affairs of the 1930’s and 1940’s,

works like Edward Glaser’s (1941) An Experiment in the Development of Critical

Thinking explicated the need for critical thinking to become a central goal of educational

curriculum and laid the foundations for a coherent discourse on critical thinking emerged.

Often labeled the “First Wave of the Critical Thinking Movement,” the field of

philosophy spearheaded the theoretical and applied investigation into the concept of

critical thinking as a way to prepare students for the dynamic and often indoctrinating

challenges they face in everyday life (Gibson, 1995; Paul, 1995b; Walters, 1994). With a

focus on informal logic, philosophers sought to outline some of the necessary conditions
 13 
 

of a generalized conception of critical thinking. In other words, they sought to identify

intellectual skills, abilities and dispositions necessary for making informed decisions

about life with an emphasis on seeing through ever present propaganda (Hare, 1998).

In large part, the field of philosophy still dominates much of the discourse on

critical thinking, but following a series of reports and political mandates in the early

1980’s, a second wave of the critical thinking movement emerged spreading critical

thinking across disciplines. For example, the 1980 California Executive Order 338

mandated the instruction of critical thinking throughout the California State University

system (Hare, 1998), and the publication of the 1983 U.S. Government sponsored report,

A Nation at Risk, “voiced an at least decade-long concern shared by both educators and

laypersons that instruction in thinking skills should be emphasized in formal courses of

study at all rungs of the educational ladder” (Walters, 1994b, p. 3). 1 Faced with the need

to articulate and apply critical thinking across the curriculum, those within the fields of

psychology, education, and women’s studies, to name a few, challenged “the

unwarranted assumption that good thinking is reducible to logical thinking” (Walters,

1994b, p. 3). Scholars across academic disciplines began to explicitly contextualize the

concept of critical thinking within their respective disciplines in an attempt to radically

rethink “what it means to be a reasonable, reflective person” (Walters, 1994b, p. 19).

With the rise of the second wave of the critical thinking movement the topic became a

distinctly interdisciplinary concern. However, as Paul (1995b) argues, the diverse

discourse present within the second wave of the critical thinking movement did little to

synthesize disciplinary insights, so a third wave is needed; a movement that embraces the

intellectual focus on analytical and evaluative standards found within the field of
 14 
 

philosophy and the intellectual diversity found within the various disciplines of the

second wave.

Paul writes that, “Those who would contribute significantly to the field of critical

thinking research need to internalize the strengths of the first two waves” because “only

out of a real marriage of first and second wave concerns, only by a deep integration of

insights, can the third wave fully develop” (Paul, 1995b, p. 13). For the first time, the

concept of a third wave in the critical thinking movement was articulated. The

explication of the critical thinking movement having two waves was commonly

accepted. 2 Like Walters and other second wave theorists, Paul critiques the narrow

interpretation of critical thinking as traditionally defined by formal and informal logicians

within the field of philosophy, but Paul was the first to publish an explication of the

theoretical and applied weaknesses and strengths of both first and second wave scholars.

In doing so, he called for an approach to the conceptualization and instruction of critical

thinking that integrated insights from previous waves.

The third wave would be characterized by:

…developing a theory of critical thinking that is rigorous and comprehensive;

explicating intellectual standards that have general application both within and

beyond academic environments; accounting for the appropriate role of emotion

and values in thinking; understanding the leading role of thinking in the shaping

of emotion and behavior; integrating the empirical work of cognitive psychology

into critical thinking theory; establishing common denominator principles and

standards within the field of critical thinking research and practice; developing
 15 
 

effective assessment tools; identifying and critiquing pseudo-critical thinking

models and programs. (Paul, 1995b, p. 13)

The result, Paul argues, would be a critical thinking movement that lives up to its

philosophical foundations and ideological goals: to help people successfully confront the

obstacles that prevent them from developing as fair-minded and intellectually disciplined

thinkers.

Today, the critical thinking community retains its interdisciplinary awareness in

that it continually seeks to clarify canons of high quality thinking drawing on insights

from multiple fields. Scholars like Walters and Paul recognize the potential for a third

wave of the critical thinking movement: one that substantively engages multiple points of

view and is built on base-line concepts common to all intellectual work. The third wave

represents a trans-disciplinary approach to conceptualizing critical thinking as a practical

educational endeavor.

However, this vision has not been fully embraced by academicians. Nonetheless,

the idea of thinking critically within and across disciplines is gaining currency. The

critical thinking movement is the most recent episode in a long tradition of those

concerned with the need to improve the quality of one’s thinking. Intellectuals like

Socrates, Francis Bacon, John Henry Newman, and John Dewey, to name a few, are

important historical examples of this tradition. Each articulates various obstacles to

thinking critically and proposes intellectual principles essential to reasonable living.

What follows is a brief sketch of what each of these thinkers has contributed to

our understanding of critical thinking and its importance to substantive education;

education that promotes fair-minded thought.

 16 
 

Socrates (ca. 479-399 B.C.)

Socrates is an important thinker in intellectual history because of his emphasis on

clarity in thought, on intellectual integrity, and on living an examined life. The life of

Socrates offers two key contributions to critical thinking theory. The first is the need to

live a virtuous and ethical life, which requires an explication of some obstacles to

thinking well. The second is the method of questioning he continually exhibited and

encouraged others to emulate. The Socratic Method was used by Socrates as the primary

method for living an ethical life. Through skilled questioning, Socrates helped people see

inconsistencies and assumptions inherent in their beliefs and reasoning. These important

concepts are summarized by Plato, through the Socratic principles “the unexamined life

is not worth living.” To this end, Socrates makes an important early contribution to a

substantive conception of critical thinking.

One barrier to high quality thought, as Socrates viewed it, was that often “people

could not rationally justify their confident claims to knowledge,” and such

inconsistencies often led to the tendency to compromise ethical and virtuous values (Paul,

Elder et al., 1997, p. 8). He developed and practiced a method of questioning intended to

probe deeper into one’s claims so as to illuminate any logical inconsistencies that may

exist. Socrates’ questioning technique “led students beyond speculation and belief to

understanding and knowledge” (Fasko, 2003b, p. 3). In doing so, Socrates emphasized

the standards of thinking clearly and consistently. He also exemplified the power of

constructing organized and directed questions to facilitate critical thought. The Socratic

Method is directly applicable to modern education across disciplines and has been for

centuries, but just as every intellectual shines as a result of his/her historical context, so
 17 
 

too did the cultural and social climate of classical Greece provide this opportunity for

Socrates.

During Socrates’ life there was an important shift in philosophical thought.

Attention moved away from questions of nature and cosmology and toward the

examination of human thinking and behavior. In other words, Socrates and other

Sophists were more interested in everyday life issues than the “inconsistent

interpretations of nature [that] had been proposed” (Stumpf, 1993, p. 29). The shift was

due in large part to economic and cultural expansion where diverse explanations of

knowledge began to percolate in Greek society. Such diversity prompted philosophical

concern with questions like, “Could there be a universal concept of goodness if men were

incapable of knowing any universal truth?” (Stumpf, 1993, p. 30). This question

stimulated debate across multiple topics, two of which are highly visible today:

Subjective relativism versus universal ethical principles.

Generally, Sophists were harsh skeptics of universal truth, advocating subjective

relativism as the only truth; whereas, thinkers like Socrates and Plato propagated the

importance of common ethical values. However, due to the political climate within

Athens during the 4th and 5th centuries B.C.E., Sophists moved into a specialized niche

that focused on instructing upper class men (the only group that could afford their

services) in the art of rhetoric and persuasion. In his book Socrates to Sartre: A History

of Philosophy, Samuel Stumpf (1993) writes:

The power of persuasion had become a political necessity in the democratic

Athens for anyone who hoped to rise to the level of leadership. Because of their

extensive knowledge of grammar and their fund of information about various

 18 
 

cultures as well as their wide experience derived from their travels and teaching in

many places, the Sophists possessed all that was needed to train the emerging new

Athenian citizen. (p. 31)

The Athenian political climate recognized the power of persuasion as an important

strategy for distinguishing between the just and the unjust. Skilled orators could easily

point out errors and inconsistencies within their opponent’s arguments. However, such

skills were “employed for good or for ill” (Stumpf, 1993, p. 31). When partially and

prejudicially applied, rhetorical skills can work against justice by promoting selfish

interests, the art of which is called sophistry. Socrates recognized the unjust implications

of skilled, but selfish, rhetoric and used similar skills to deconstruct sophistic claims and

agendas.

Socrates adhered to the spirit of skepticism and questioned the Sophists

unmasking their claims to knowledge. However, unlike sophistic skepticism that doubted

all knowledge and, therefore, the existence of any ethical standards, Socrates questioned

in order to “achieve creative concepts of truth and goodness” (Stumpf, 1993, p. 34). In

other words, Socrates did not seek to destroy the pursuit of truth or develop

argumentative skills that could advance political ends or promote subjective relativism.

Rather, he advocated a dialectical mode of reasoning intended to fairly discover new

insights about the world and those who inhabit it so as to live more reflective and rational

lives.

The Socratic attitude is an essential part of an intellectual tradition based on the

assumption that honest inquiry can lead to substantive understanding. “Socrates’ primary

legacy is not a contribution to humanity’s storehouse of knowledge, but a pedagogy; not

 19 
 

substance but process” (Reich, 1998, ¶2). In an essay titled “Critical Thinking: Beyond

Reasoning” Thomas H. Warren (1994) argues that there are three important and

distinctive characteristics to the modern Socratic process. The first is that thinking is

inherently sociable. The sociability of thinking sets the stage for the dialogical nature of

the Socratic Method where people not only agree to cooperatively address a problem or

issue, but they are challenged to confront the socio-centric obstacles to quality thinking

(Warren, 1994). The Socratic process remains significant today because of the

recognition that one’s egocentricity and socio-centricity can be barriers to high quality

thinking. Challenging these barriers is essential for participating in a substantive social

exchange because in order to learn participants must have a sense of intellectual humility

where one is in a process of becoming ever more aware of the limits of his/her knowledge

and claims to “truth.”

The second distinctive characteristic of the Socratic attitude (according to Plato)

is that one should not claim knowledge. Rather, one is to begin with the attitude that

one’s conceptions may be faulty, misinformed, or unjustifiable in context. In all relevant

cases the Socratic Method challenges people to question their claims to knowledge and

understanding. In other words, the Socratic Method challenges people to critically reflect

on their assumptions (Warren, 1994).

The third fundamental feature of the Socratic Method is that substantive

knowledge cannot be passively received or taught. In other words, the thinker must do

the intellectual work necessary to bring knowledge into his/her mind in such a way that

its logic can be explained and its applicability can be exemplified and illustrated (Warren,
 20 
 

1994). Stated differently, one must consciously engage in intellectual work in order to

develop as a skilled reasoner.

These three characteristics of the Socratic Method represent not only important

principles of thinking critically, but are practical in nature. The Socratic process, if taken

seriously, has significant implications for education. Reich (1998) writes, “What the

Socratic Method can do, and do powerfully, is help students learn the critical thinking

skills and habits necessary for political participation in a pluralist democracy. Moreover,

it can instruct them in ways to assess and choose among various conceptions of the good”

(Reich, 1998, Socratic Method Today, ¶ 7). Engaging in Socratic discourse can help

students develop as autonomous reasoners, but it is not enough for students to merely be

skilled in argumentation. They must also be concerned with the ethical dimension in

order to develop a sense of social responsibility.

Socrates had an abiding concern for the problematics in human thinking, and a

concern for a practical approach to thinking clearly. Both concerns are trans-disciplinary

in that they are applicable to people within and across multiple domains. Reich (1998)

states that “the image of Socrates and the Socratic method find contemporary proponents

across many disciplines and across very different philosophical and political views”

(Socratic Paradoxes and Contemporary Invocations of Socrates, ¶ 2). For example, for

educational pedagogue John Dewey “the life of Socrates made sense as a symbol of a life

of openness and curiosity” (Reich, 1998). Within the field of philosophy, Donald

Hatcher (1996) writes, “In the Meno, Socrates is the perfect model of a critical thinker,

showing by example how we might profitably proceed with critical inquiry” (p. 1).

Hatcher (1996) further notes that “it is hard to imagine students carefully going through
 21 
 

this 2500-year-old dialogue without learning a good deal about the skills and dispositions

of a critical thinker in the process” (p. 1). What are these dispositions?

Hatcher (1996) argues that some of the character traits embodied by Socrates in

Plato’s Meno include intellectual honesty, seeking clarity and not accepting unclear

language, confidence that dedication to fair-minded reasoning will shed light on the

reality of the situation, humbling oneself so as to welcome criticism, sense of justice, and

the foresight and ability to “separate persons from the beliefs they hold” so as to be as

fair-minded as possible (pp. 1-3). Each trait is necessary for thinking critically within

any context. Otherwise one may erroneously come to believe in its opposite: Close-

mindedness, intellectual rigidity, and arrogance are desirable problem solving traits.

If education is to be a life changing process, it must embrace the lessons and

concepts embodied in the figure of Socrates. The Socratic approach is both disciplined

and fair. It has the potential to “facilitate the examination of people’s core beliefs that

enables them to avoid living ‘the unexamined life’” when applied within a safe and open

learning environment or social context (Fowler, 1998, p. 9). Interpreted in this way,

Socrates is a major contributor to the development of a trans-disciplinary intellectual

tradition.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626)

The intellectual tradition on which critical thinking is predicated is also found in

the work of Francis Bacon. At the heart of his contribution lies his insistence that people

must question their assumptions, both personal and cultural. Bacon’s examination of

personal presuppositions led him to articulate psychological barriers to thinking well:

Distempers of learning and the four idols. His assessment of the cultural and intellectual
 22 
 

assumptions of his time, primarily that of unquestionably accepting Aristotelian

deductive logic, moved him to articulate the conceptual foundations of the modern

scientific method; a system of thinking dedicated to the discovery of new knowledge and

based on an explicit process that is purposeful, measurable, and verifiable. Bacon

identified general obstacles to thinking critically and developed the framework for a

method to monitor these obstacles when thinking through a problem or issue. His

insistence on questioning the presuppositions that claimed to define knowledge and that

which constitutes clear thinking led him to emphasize the fact that to know an idea well is

to know its opposite well. Bacon’s articulation of the four idols of truth firmly

establishes him as a significant contributor to the intellectual tradition of critical thinking.

Bacon recognized that quality thinking can and must be systematically cultivated,

but humans suffer from innate individual and social pathologies or “diseases” that act as

obstacles to thinking well. In other words, Bacon believed that by virtue of being human

there are innate and social barriers to quality thinking, but critical thought can be

developed if disciplined. Beginning with The Advancement of Learning, Bacon sought to

identify general barriers to thinking well, arguing that the recognition and counteraction

of these obstacles is necessary for substantive learning across all domains of thought.

Contextually, Bacon (1605/1964) argued that “the intellectual life of Europe had

reached a kind of impasse or stand still” due in part to the cultural assumption that

classical works, primarily that of classical scholars (especially Aristotle), were accurate

(Fieser & Dowden, 2006, Advancement of Learning section). Specifically, Bacon

questioned deductive logic as the only valid way knowledge is obtained and validated.

He believed that in order for people to move beyond such stagnation (1) the barriers to
 23 
 

developing critical thought must be explicated, and (2) a system must be in place to move

thinking to a higher level. It is to this multi-layered goal that Bacon dedicated a large

part of his intellectual career. His identification and articulation of the four idols reflect

his belief that all human thinking is regularly fallible. In order to move one’s thinking to

a higher level, one of higher quality, one should approach a problem, issue, or topic

mindful of the obstacles that can prevent clear thinking, and then adhere to a clear and

consistent method for thinking well. This section focuses on Bacon’s explication of the

four idols as barriers to quality thinking. 3

Bacon identified four interconnected “idols” of truth that expose the natural

limitations of human thinking. Each is a metaphor that one can use to monitor the quality

of his/her thinking because each represents a significant stumbling block to substantive

and critical learning (Markku, 1996). Each idol is, to an extent, a consequence of human

nature, either individually or socially. Regardless of this innate condition, however,

Bacon believed that these idols can be monitored and corrected within context. Such

hope points to the potential of human thought and the need for pursuing and promoting

critical thinking. In this sense, each idol is not only a “disease” to conquer, but a concept

that one can use to systematically monitor and improve his/her thinking.

The first obstacle to thinking well is the Idol of the Tribe. The tribe represents the

human race, and the traits that characterize it as such. Fallacious thinking is often a result

of the human tendency to presuppose one’s senses and thinking are correct, and thus

ignore evidence when it does not conform to one’s preconceived notions of reality,

values, or interests. Bacon (1605/1964) writes that “the mind of man is far from the

nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to
 24 
 

their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and

imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced” (p. 132). Bacon correctly believed that, all

too often, quality reasoning is compromised due to the innate tendency to overlook the

natural limitations of one’s senses. The Idol of the Tribe is a metaphor to remind people

that quality reasoning is based on verifiable evidence; where judgments about the world

and reality need to be well founded, rather than based on mere subjective experience.

The second obstacle to thinking critically is the Idol of the Cave. In addition to

overreliance on their physical senses, humans have the tendency to act selfishly. They do

not consider problems that affect the whole society, but focus on those that affect one’s

personal life. Drawing from Plato’s allegory of the cave, Bacon uses the Idol of the Cave

as a metaphor for expressing the erroneous tendency to accept as truth one’s perceptions

of reality as well as the beliefs of one’s culture. He introduces this idea in The

Advancement of Learning stating that, “Our spirits are included in the caves of our own

complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if

they be not recalled to examination” (Bacon, 1605/1964, p. 132). Bacon (1620/1863)

reiterates this point in The New Organon writing that “everyone has a cave or den of his

own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature” (XLII section). People see the

world from a certain point of view. This limited perspective filters what one sees, reads,

gathers in discussion, etc. The unfortunate consequence is that every individual human

mind “is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by

chance.” Substantive learning, substantive understanding, and the substantive

advancement of learning cannot be subject to mere chance; one must be mindful of the

various tendencies that promote poor thinking and critically confront them in such a way
 25 
 

that one’s thinking experiences greater clarity and insight. Bacon’s hope is to “let every

student of nature take this as a rule: that whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with

peculiar satisfaction is to be held in suspicion” (New Organon, LVIII section). Through

the concept of the Idol of the Cave Bacon calls for the need for fair-mindedness and

intellectual humility, both of which are essential in a substantive conception of critical

thinking.

The Idol of the Marketplace represents the misuse of language. It represents

Bacon’s concern that unclear language is one of the primary causes of unclear thinking;

reciprocally, to use language clearly will help one think more clearly. “Because words

govern reason [and] reason governs words,” unclear, inaccurate, and generally

undisciplined language reflects unclear reasoning (Green, 1966, p. 126). Using the

concept of clarity as an organizing standard, Bacon argues that an “ill and unfit choice of

words wonderfully obstructs” understanding, not only in daily social conversations, but

also in scholastic circles (New Organon, LVIII section). He writes in The New Organon

that men are all too often prone to over specialization; the negative consequence of which

is to distort analyses across disciplines. Bacon argues that the clear and precise use of

language exposes specialized use that is often fraught with fallacious assumptions about

knowledge and the natural world. The Idol of the Marketplace is another important

metaphor in the history of critical thinking because it illuminates the need for clarity in

thought.

The fourth obstacle to thinking critically is the Idol of the Theatre where one’s

mind is guided by accepted and often irrational or blindly accepted traditions. To

uncritically accept the authority and validity of an established tradition is to accept its
 26 
 

errors and shortcomings. Furthermore, according to Bacon, uncritical acceptance based

on the word or position of authority is a barrier to sound reasoning. The idol of the

theatre is Bacon’s own critique of the authoritarian world in which he found himself. It

is also his critique of those who hold beliefs out of superstition.

In essence, the idol of the theatre is Bacon’s critique of dogma and the various

cultural, social, institutional, and intellectual systems that perpetuate it. In The New

Organon he writes that this idol represents those dogmas that have uncritically

“immigrated into men’s minds” (XLIV section). Bacon believed that there are three main

systems of thought that characterize this idol: Sophistry, empirical philosophy and

superstition. Sophists do not base their judgments on reality or experience, but seek to

warp truth to serve selfish ends. Citing Aristotle as the example of a Sophist, Bacon

argues, “For he had come to his conclusion before; he did not consult experience, as he

should have done, for the purpose of framing his decisions and axioms, but having first

determined the question according to his will, he then resorts to experience, and bending

her into conformity with his placets, leads her about like a captive in a procession” (New

Organon, LXIII section).

Empiricists are quick to believe or make a “premature hurry of the understanding

to leap or fly to universals and principles of things, great danger may be apprehended

from philosophies of this kind, against which evil we ought even now to prepare” (New

Organon, LXIV section). Finally, Bacon (1620/1863) argues that the fallacy of

superstition “is far more widely spread, and does the greatest harm, whether to entire

systems or to their parts” (New Organon, LXV section). The authorities of superstition

join truth with myth, experiences with fantasy, and mislead by flattery. It is vital, Bacon
 27 
 

argues, that “we be sober-minded, and give to faith that only which is faith's” (LXV

section).

Contextually, the four idols are just as much a general critique of human

reasoning as they are a criticism of the world in which Bacon worked. Both contexts

have important similarities which allow Bacon’s metaphors to be easily generalized as

tools for monitoring the quality of one’s thought. Generally speaking, the four idols

represent significant conceptual markers that can be used to confront the fallibility of

human thinking. A key significance of Bacon’s articulation of the distempers of learning

and the idols of truth lies in the recognition that to think critically is not natural, but takes

mindful, disciplined, intellectual work. He concludes his discussion of these barriers

stating “it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances,

because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the

caution of them, (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) doth extremely import

the true conduct of human judgment” (Bacon, 1605/1964, p. 134). The four idols are a

significant contribution to our contemporary understanding of critical thinking.

Moreover, a substantive understanding of Bacon’s analysis provides important reference

points from which one can consciously monitor the quality of his/her thinking.

John Henry Newman (1801-1890)

John Henry Newman’s unique articulation of the ideal of an educated mind

warrants his inclusion as an important thinker in the history of critical thinking. In his

seminal 1852 lecture series entitled The Idea of a University, Newman details,

exemplifies and illustrates some of the most important dimensions of critical thought. In

doing so, Newman helped establish a language for describing the truly educated person; a
 28 
 

point that Yale historian Frank Turner (1996) emphasizes: “Newman provided the

vocabulary, ideas, and ideals with which to discuss the concerns, character, and purpose

of the university and of higher education generally” (p. 282). Newman helped establish

an intellectual framework that placed into common language those canons of quality

thinking and learning, which consequentially are as relevant today as they were at the

height of the Victorian period.

As with any historical figure, Newman’s thinking was influenced by many forces

prevalent during his lifetime, some of which were antithetical to thinking critically. It is

not the purpose of this chapter to conduct a historical analysis of Newman’s work,

character, religious convictions, or contradictions, nor do I want to present an overly

idealistic interpretation in regards to his influence on educational theory and institutional

structures. Rather, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight Newman’s clarification of

what it means to be an educated person as articulated within his book The Idea of a

University. It will be shown that present within Newman’s concept of education are

essential principles that dovetail with a substantive conception of critical thinking. The

historical context in which Newman lived will be discussed where relevant to

understanding his contributions to the concept of critical thinking.

Newman was educated at Oxford University at a time when intellectual rigidity

dominated instruction and learning. Oxford and Cambridge were religiously exclusive,

only serving the established upper class. Furthermore, socialization was a primary focus

of the university so as to maintain England’s political and economic structures. Historian

Martha McMackin Garland (1996) described the learning environment and instructional

purpose noting that, “Young men of the wealthier classes were sent there to become
 29 
 

acquainted and acquire social skills (aptitude at public debate or talent at recognizing

good port ranked high) and to make connections that would prove laudable in later life,

when they assumed their roles in the leadership elite of their country” (p. 268). As a

result, “there was virtually no useful university instruction at all.” At best,

undergraduates received an introduction to narrow curriculum focused on classical

literature and limited theological readings. “It was therefore quite possible for the senior

members of the college to commit little energy to intellectual activity” (Garland, 1996, p.

267). This rigidity came under heavy critique as industrialism ushered in a growing and

powerful middle class, who demanded entry into these ancient institutions.

“John Henry Newman was one of the university teachers able to see relatively

early some faults in the instructional system of his alma mater” (Garland, 1996, p. 268).

As part of the Oxford Movement, he and his colleagues “pressed for dramatic changes in

the tutorial system” (Turner, 1996, p. 285). However, as is the case with many people

who challenge the status quo, Newman’s “campaign for pedagogical reform eventually

ended with the Provost of Oriel College forbidding him to teach students” (Turner, 1996,

p. 285). When asked to head the creation of a new Catholic university in Ireland,

Newman envisioned a learning environment dramatically different from that of the

English traditions at Oxford and Cambridge. The Idea of a University is, in part, his

articulation of what intellectual engagement looks like in contrast to learning that is

undisciplined, narrow-minded, and over-specialized.

Newman revised the essence of the question Socrates posed to those he

questioned: What does it mean to obtain a liberal education? For this reason Newman’s

work is timeless. What follows is a description of Newman’s interpretation of an

 30 
 

educated person and, reciprocally, the superficial intellect. The relevant organizing idea

for Newman is the term intellectual cultivation.

Newman argued that education substantively conceived is disciplined, open-

minded and practical in that one’s intellectual skills and abilities can be critically engaged

within and transferred across domains. He writes that, “When the intellect has once been

properly trained and formed to have a connected view or grasp of things…it will be a

faculty of entering with comparative ease into any subject of thought, and of taking up

with aptitude any science or profession” (Newman, 1899/1996, pp. 8-9). Furthermore,

the cultivation of the intellect is a life-long process. To be educated is not to obtain a

degree or certificate, but is a process by which one comes to discipline one’s mind

through the critical and deep engagement of content. It is not something to be attained,

but continuously cultivated. Newman writes:

Our desideratum is…[for the intellect to be developed in such a way that] the

force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the versatility of intellect, the

command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass

before us, which sometimes indeed is a natural gift, but commonly is not gained

without much effort and the exercise of years…This is the real cultivation of the

mind. (p. 7)

To cultivate the intellect is a life-long process whereby one “brings the mind into form;”

a form that is disciplined, active and open-minded and capable of generalizing important

insights where appropriate (Newman, 1899/1996, p. 7). Thinking in this way is

contrasted with thinking that is undisciplined, spotty, and compartmentalized. Newman

describes intellectual obstacles to thinking critically as “intellectual infirmities.” These

 31 
 

infirmities are part of an integrated system whereby students do not think critically

because instructors are not clear on the concept of being educated in the strong sense and

they, therefore, do not teach students to think critically.

In his criticism of the Oxford and Cambridge approach to instruction and

learning, he argues that students “have no principles laid down within them as a

foundation for the intellect to build upon; they have no discriminating convictions, and no

grasp of consequences. And therefore they talk at random, if they talk much, and cannot

help being flippant. They are merely dazzled by phenomena, instead of perceiving things

as they are” (Newman, 1899/1996, p. 8). Here Newman makes a connection between

concepts essential to thinking critically and the ability, or lack thereof, to appropriately

apply the concepts. In this case, the concepts include discrimination and consequences,

and the subsequent behavior that follows from a superficial and undisciplined

understanding of those concepts includes the inability to discriminate between points of

view and positions, unconnected and unregulated speech, and being easily impressed.

Elsewhere, Newman points to instructors and university administration as further

obstacles to the substantive cultivation of the intellect.

Newman (1899/1996) argues that a disciplined mind is one that uses concepts

clearly and precisely. It discriminates between concepts and their various uses. When

applied to the concept of education, Newman passionately demands that educators clarify

their use so that their thinking and instructional purposes and approaches are seen for

what they truly are. He writes:

Do not say, the people must be educated when, after all, you only mean, amused,

refreshed, soothed, put into good spirits and good humour, or kept from vicious
 32 
 

excesses. I do not say that such amusements, such occupations of mind, are not a

great gain; but they are not education . . ..Education is a high word; it is the

preparation for knowledge, and it is the imparting of knowledge in proportion to

that preparation. We require intellectual eyes to know withal, as bodily eyes for

sight. We need both objects and organs intellectual; we cannot gain them without

setting about it; we cannot gain them in our sleep, and by haphazard. (p. 104)

Newman directly challenges the way people use concepts arguing that when a concept is

interpreted clearly and applied with intellectual discipline, one is in a position to engage

one’s intellect in a substantive manner. With these obstacles at the forefront of his

thinking, Newman develops his argument for education as a process dedicated to

intellectual cultivation and, in so doing, articulates essential concepts inherent within the

idea of critical thinking.

For example, Newman (1899/1996) writes, “To open the mind, to correct it, to

refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it

power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity,

resource, address, eloquent expression, is an object as intelligible, I say, an object as

intelligible as the cultivation of virtue” (pp. 90-91). Newman (1899/1996) emphasizes

that the purpose of the university should be to cultivate within students important “habits

of mind,” the attributes of which include intellectual autonomy and freedom, empathy,

calmness, equitableness, and wisdom (p. 77). Newman addresses both the nature of

thinking critically and what it means to be a critical thinker; he emphasizes valuable and

necessary intellectual skills and important intellectual dispositions. For Newman, a

major principle of education is to facilitate the development of students who can think
 33 
 

well and apply their skills for practical ends; thus, striking a balance between seeking

knowledge for its own end and putting it to practical use.

As stated earlier, Newman critiqued the instructional norms of his time. For

example, he criticized “education” that posed as mere socialization, “education” that was

intellectually stagnant. Education so conceived produces students who are passively

engaged in the curriculum and in their own thinking. For example, Newman argued

against rote memorization. He wrote that superficial learning occurs when students “are

forced to load their minds with a score of subjects against an examination, who have too

much on their hands to indulge themselves in thinking or investigation, who devour

premises and conclusion together with indiscriminate greediness, who hold whole

sciences on faith, and commit demonstrations to memory” (Newman, 1899/1996, p. 107).

Students learn “not one [thing] well, but many badly” (p. 103). Such an education results

in students who may be able to “dazzle, to amuse, to refute, to perplex, but not to come to

any useful result or any trustworthy conclusion” (p. 94). This type of “education” is

oppressive in that it fails to train and liberate the rational capacities of one’s mind. It

characterizes the mind that “becomes the victim of a train of associations;” undisciplined,

uninterested in intellectual work, and does not advance the health of society (pp. 101,

125).

Newman (1899/1996) argues that “real teaching…tends towards cultivation of the

intellect; it at least recognizes that knowledge is something more than a sort of passive

reception of scraps and details; it is a something, and it does a something” (p. 106). It is

an education that is based on formulating reasoned judgments and part of a larger

intellectual community dedicated to learning from one another (pp. 77, 106). The
 34 
 

purpose of education, substantively conceived, is “to stimulate his powers into action in

every practicable way, and to prevent a merely passive reception of images and ideas

which…are likely to pass out of the mind as soon as they have entered it. Let him once

gain this habit of method, of starting from fixed points, of making his ground good as he

goes, of distinguishing what he knows from what he does not know” (pp. 9-10).

John Henry Newman’s ideas on the concept of education are still highly lauded in

intellectual communities. “No work in the English language has had more influence on

the public ideals of higher education” (Turner, 1996, p. 282). For more than a century

John Henry Newman’s work “has frequently served as a foundational document in

considerations of an ideal framework for higher education” (Garland, 1996, p. 266).

Newman’s clarification of a cultivated intellect clearly outlines some seminal

concepts present within the contemporary discourse on critical thinking including:

Obstacles to thinking critically, open-mindedness, intellectual discipline/work, active

engaged learning, and deep commitment to personal development. Embedded in these

conceptual foundations are important intellectual skills including: Discriminating

between concepts that are often confused with one another, using concepts with

discipline, and thinking within and across domains based on an explicit understanding of

conceptual networks. The conceptual foundations and the intellectual skills Newman

argued for illustrate his conviction that substantive thinking and learning is applicable to

daily life and the development of society. Or as Turner (1996) puts it: “In a very real

manner inherently recognized by Newman, professional education serves the arts and

sciences by nurturing a university environment in which academic pursuits are directly

related to life experiences” (p. 300).

 35 
 

Scholars who study intellectual history see the movement and influence of ideas

from one period to the next. The scholar concerned with the concept of substantive

education recognizes the role of critical thinking in that conception spanning across a

long intellectual tradition. Turner (1996) exemplifies this claim arguing that educational

institutions “must learn once again to value the ordinarily extraordinary achievement of

teaching students to think critically, to speak articulately, and to write clearly. In the

process they should recall that these skills, when joined to those of mathematics, have

stood at the core of intellectual, social, and moral amelioration for the past three

centuries” (p. 301). Accepting Turner’s argument requires that those concerned with

improving the quality of thinking within educational establishments must commit to

explicating the principles and fundamental concepts implicit within all fair-minded

critical thought and work to apply them appropriately. It is to this end that Newman is

included as a major contributor to the contemporary discourse on critical thinking and

educational reform.

John Dewey (1859-1952)

Dewey’s publications relevant to education span over 60 years. His influence on

the American educational system is visible within every succeeding pedagogy, level of

schooling, and type of administrative institution even to the point that “many of his views

concerning education are so widely accepted as to bear no impress of his name” (Price,

1962, p. 461). Given Dewey’s pervasive influence on education, philosophically and

institutionally, one can only highlight a small selection of principles that speak to

Dewey’s impact on the intellectual tradition of critical thinking. Therefore, this

discussion will focus on the interconnection between important dispositions and learner
 36 
 

centered education. In this relationship, Dewey articulates that which constitutes a

critical thinker and an approach for moving students toward that ideal. Placed in

interrogative form the organizing question for this section reads: How does Dewey’s

treatment of the relationship between intellectual dispositions and student centered

instruction illuminate some of the important contributions to a substantive conception of

critical thinking?

Prior to addressing this question it is important to point out that for Dewey the

purpose of education is to empower students to be active, ethical contributors to the

development of democratic society. Moseley et al. (2005) agree, writing that, “In

Dewey’s view the development of reflective thought is the most important goal of

education and enables the individual to take control of and responsibility for their own

thinking in order to participate effectively as a member of a democratic society” (p. 12).

This interpretation of Dewey’s intent is commonly acknowledged. Educational

philosopher and critic Israel Scheffler (1973) writes that, “The power, simplicity, and

sensitivity of Dewey’s thought on social and educational issues is undeniable” (p. 153).

He elaborates writing:

The force of his observations on teaching and learning is immediate, and even

where he may be thought wrong in detail, few will deny the suggestiveness of his

treatments. As to educational liberalism, there is no doubt that his case for the

moral and educational relevance of science and the primacy of critical and

democratic values in education is impressive. His way of looking at things

together which are commonly held apart, of seeing continuities where others take
 37 
 

gaps for granted, must be held a fruitful philosophical approach, justified by its

consequences in his own work. (pp. 153-154)

Dewey’s work is dedicated to those ideals of human capability whereby disciplined

reflective thinking can and will yield autonomous and socially responsible citizens.

However, like all other theorists, his work is not without fault. He wrote within a context

that has its limitations and specific applications. Nonetheless, all must agree that Dewey

was deeply concerned with the problematics in human thinking and actively sought to

find theoretical and practical ways for helping people think more autonomously and

responsibly.

Dewey believed that the purpose of education was to free the mind from the

obstacles that bind it. He confronted individual, social, political and economic barriers,

and integrated intellectual insights from the fields of psychology, philosophy, and science

to create a practical epistemology geared toward the betterment of democratic society.

Historian Kingsley Price (1962) notes that Dewey’s “ultimate interests were primarily

social, not academic, despite his long career in teaching and the ample quantity of his

literary production” (p. 460). For Dewey, education was a process of intellectual

liberation and social development through the systematic engagement of personal

experience. Here is where Dewey’s contributions to critical thinking are most profound.

His emphasis on the need for education to take seriously the cultivation of intellectual

dispositions based on student centered instruction is as relevant today as it was during the

height of the progressive era.

“According to Dewey, education is the process of giving habits to the impulse of

the young” (Price, 1962, p. 475). Two terms must be qualified in Price’s statement.
 38 
 

First, the term giving needs clarification. Dewey did not advocate authoritarian roles for

educators. In other words, students should not be compelled to develop any ethical habit

of mind, but provided with learning environments where they can explore and experience

content for themselves. The teacher does not “give” knowledge to students, but

facilitates the development of knowledge by providing a constructive, safe and

intellectually interesting learning environment. Authoritarian models of education and

learning are not learner centered; such approaches are didactic, narrow-minded, and

subject to unstructured, subjective approaches to instruction, and thus antithetical to

Dewey’s conception of education as a means for intellectual liberation.

Dewey viewed instructors as guides who could facilitate substantive learning, but

could not force it. In Democracy and Education Dewey (1916/1997a) writes, “We can

and do supply ready-made ‘ideas’ by the thousands; we do not usually take much pains to

see that the one learning engages in significant situations where his own activities

generate, support, and clinch ideas…This does not mean that the teacher is to stand off

and look on,” but to participate, guide, and share in the learning activities. “In such

shared activity, the teacher is a learner, and the learner is, without knowing it, a teacher”

(p. 160). In this sense, students and teacher are joined in a learning community where

content is created and discovered by thinking and not passively received.

Secondly, the term impulse of the young refers to Dewey’s acute awareness of

those innate obstacles to thinking critically. In his discussion of human will, Dewey

points out that humans have the tendency to be obstinate and stubborn. He argues that,

“Obstinacy may be mere animal inertia and insensitiveness. A man keeps on doing a

thing just because he has got started, not because of any clearly thought-out purpose”
 39 
 

(Dewey, 1916/1997a, p. 128). He goes on to write that undisciplined, intellectually

stubborn people “always deceive themselves as to the consequences of their acts” (p.

128). Such attitudes and intellectual rigidity are major obstacles to reflective thought,

intellectual work, and responsible action. Dewey’s identification and discussion of those

obstacles to substantive learning, as manifest in instructional environments and human

thought, are significant in that he contrasts them with active learning and critical habits of

mind.

Dewey’s emphasis on the cultivation of intellectual dispositions through student

centered instruction is a significant contribution to the tradition on which the critical

thinking discourse is predicated. The two concepts are intimately interconnected.

Student centered instruction is a necessary condition for developing important habits of

mind. Likewise, teachers must possess or be aware of certain intellectual dispositions for

student centered instruction to be properly cultivated. For example, Dewey (1916/1997a)

argues that substantive student centered instructional methods expressed in terms of traits

include the tendency to explicate straightforward purposes, and imply a “flexible

intellectual interest or open-minded will to learn, integrity of purpose, and acceptance of

responsibility for the consequences of one’s activity” and thoughts (p. 179). A mindful

approach to student centered instruction significantly contributes to the development of

such traits in students.

In his book Democracy and Education, Dewey (1916/1997a) specifically

addresses the intellectual, social and ethical importance of developing habits of mind

such as: Open-mindedness, confidence in the reasoning process, “intellectual integrity,

honesty, and sincerity,” a concern for objectivity, “intellectual responsibility,”

 40 
 

“intellectual thoughtfulness,” sympathetic curiosity, unbiased responsiveness, the

tendency to search for and articulate a direct purpose, and the habit of looking for

complete explanations /answers/ solutions (pp. 50, 173-179). A student-centered method

is based on approaching students as thinkers and view content as a product of thinking

that students must continuously recreate and think into their thinking. In Dewey’s words,

“skill obtained apart from thinking is not connected with any sense of the purposes for

which it is to be used. It consequently leaves a man at the mercy of his routine habits and

of the authoritative control of others” (p. 152). In this sense, knowledge is not inert or

dead; it is not learned through rote memory, but substantively engaged. Instruction that

does not engage the student as a thinker perpetuates what Dewey refers to as those

routine or “fixed habits” of mind.

Substantive intellectual habits are necessary for changing or moderating “fixed

habits” of mind. Dewey (1916/1997a) writes, “Fixity of habit may mean that something

has a fixed hold upon us, instead of our having a free hold upon things.” Dewey

elaborates arguing that a fixed habit refers to “ruts, routine ways, with loss of freshness,

openmindedness, and originality…they put an end to plasticity. They mark the close of

power to vary” (pp. 48-49). Instructors and instructional methods that are not concerned

with and dedicated to the development of students as thinkers capable of identifying and

solving problems, reasoning empathetically, and able to engage in substantive intellectual

work “fall back on mechanical routine and repetition to secure external efficiency of

habit, motor skill without accompanying thought.” Such “short-sighted methods… mark

a deliberate closing in of surroundings upon growth” (Dewey, 1916/1997a, p. 49).

Conversely, intellectually disciplined habits of mind, those habits with an ethical

 41 
 

dimension, are produced by educational environments that directly engage students in the

process of thinking. Consequentially, education becomes an active process “of continual

reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming” (Dewey, 1916/1997a, p. 50).

Although Dewey’s discussion of these specific traits are contextually an analysis

of method as a concept for student centered instruction, he generalizes them as important

characteristics of any critically reflective thinker. He writes, “Education is thus a

fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating process. All of these words mean that it implies

attention to the conditions of growth” (Dewey, 1916/1997a, p. 10). Elsewhere he refers

to intellectual habits as “expressions of growth,” or evidence that one is developing one’s

critical capacities (Dewey, 1916/1997a, p. 46). One’s mind can be its own prison, bound

by undisciplined irrational tendencies. Since authoritative models of education do not

treat students as thinkers capable of reflective critical thought, they do not facilitate the

development of important critical thinking dispositions. If education is to act as a

medium for liberating people from those obstacles that prevent high quality thinking,

then it must “liberate and organize” the intellectual capacities of learners (Dewey,

1916/1997a, p. 108). Thus conceived, “The purpose of school education is to insure the

continuance of education by organizing powers that insure growth” (p. 51).

Scheffler (1973) gives voice to Dewey elaborating on and exemplifying the

concept of intellectual growth and the instructional environment necessary for its

engagement:

The teacher must always remember that learning is not passive reception but

involves, at its best, active participation. This means that the whole environment

of meanings surrounding the lesson is important as potentially contributing to

 42 
 

learning. It means, for example, that the moral atmosphere of the classroom, the

encouragement of curiosity and questioning, the relations among students and

with the teacher are to be considered, not as irrelevant to the curriculum, but as

the very basis of the moral and intellectual learning that goes on in the school

whether we deliberately plan it or not. It means, finally, that every item of subject

matter to be taught must be provided with context in the learner’s perceptions. (p.

153)

As Scheffler points out, one of Dewey’s most significant contributions to the field of

education is his insistence that instruction is student centered and focused on facilitating

the development of important habits of mind. As Dewey (1916/1997a) concludes,

“Unless the learning which accrues in the regular course of study affects character, it is

futile to conceive the moral end as the unifying and culminating end of education” (p.

360). The interconnection between valuable intellectual traits and student centered

learning is foundational in developing students’ critical capacities.

In the end, Dewey firmly believed that reflective critical thought could lead to

“the best individual and the best society:” a goal that permeates the contemporary

discourse on critical thinking (Price, 1962, p. 473).

Conclusion

As I have argued in this chapter, there is an intellectual tradition reaching back to

antiquity upon which contemporary conceptions of critical thinking are founded. In

Plato’s accounts of Socrates and in the work of Bacon, Newman and Dewey (and in the

work of many other thinkers throughout history unmentioned in this chapter) we find

seminal ideas that contribute to a rich conception of critical thinking; a conception that is
 43 
 

trans-disciplinary in nature and applicable to living a rational life. Socrates emphasized

the importance of living an examined life and established a method of questioning still

useful in helping one develop the traits of intellectual humility, integrity and autonomy.

Bacon’s contributions explicated the “idols” of the mind, rich in concepts relevant to any

defensible conception of critical thinking. Newman clarified and elaborated the concept

of an educated person. Dewey explicated the importance of learner centered education

and the cultivation of the intellect for free societies. Each thinker contributed

significantly to our understanding of critical thinking, of its importance in daily life and

of its relevance to teaching and learning. The intellectuals presented here are but a very

small selection of members of this intellectual tradition. Their inclusion in this chapter is

an attempt to exemplify the intellectual tradition of which they are a small part. In other

words, the emphasis is on the intellectual tradition, not necessarily the intellectuals

themselves. An extensive history of critical thinking has to date not been written, but

such a history would undoubtedly include intellectuals throughout history, from Western

as well as non-Western traditions, including thinkers from both genders.

 44 
 

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS CRITICAL THINKING?

Abstract
This chapter argues that inherent within the discourse on critical thinking are
base-line concepts on which the majority of critical thinking scholars agree regardless of
specific disciplinary perspectives. At the foundation of the discourse is a unified notion of
critical thinking based not on limited definitions, but on essential and shared concepts
and principles. These include explicating pervasive obstacles to thinking critically,
articulating and cultivating important intellectual dispositions, and articulating what it
means to make reasoned judgments. This base-line conception implies that foundational
critical thinking concepts and principles should have greater prominence within every
context and subject.

Introduction

Over the last 50 years contemporary scholars have worked to synthesize historical

insights into various theories of critical thinking that aim at improving human thinking.

Definitions of critical thinking have emerged in an attempt to clarify its exact conceptual

perimeters under the assumption that, in doing so, the concept can be more effectively

applied within educational settings. Academic disciplines have brought to this process

unique interpretations, which has served to both expand and limit the general

understanding of the concept itself, especially as it is applied to teaching and learning.

On one hand, such contributions have expanded the discourse beyond that of

philosophical models of formal logic to include a multitude of other disciplines. On the

other hand, discipline and subject-specific agendas have sometimes impeded the

embracing of a substantive conception of critical thinking. 4

Yet, a core conception of critical thinking, with shared foundations, can be

documented when we look closely at the works of scholars who have articulated the

concept. Thus, the purpose of this of chapter is to examine a range of definitions so as to

 45 
 

explicate foundational principles, and to argue that these principles, taken together,

formulate a defensible trans-disciplinary model of critical thinking. The macro-goal of

this investigation is to argue that this base-line conception must be highly visible within

the discourse on teaching and learning. Only to the extent that academics explicitly

acknowledge and engage generalized critical thinking in this way will the cultivation of

the intellect become primary in education.

This chapter is organized into two parts. The first part argues for a base-line

conception of critical thinking extrapolated from definitions and conceptions of critical

thinking as expressed by some of the most noted scholars within the discourse. The

second part elaborates on specific concepts within the proposed base-line conception.

Specifically, the following will be elaborated: intellectual barriers to high quality

thinking, important dispositions that characterize high quality thinking, the process of

making reasoned judgments.

Definitions of Critical Thinking

There are nearly as many definitions of critical thinking as there are publications

on the topic. Indeed, some scholars argue that the failure to foster critical thinking within

education is related, in part, to the lack of consensus in establishing a common definition

(Fasko, 2003b; Fung, 2005; Moseley et al., 2005; Walters, 1999). Yet a brief

examination of the discourse on critical thinking reveals that significant disagreement lies

less with its definitions and more with the way the concept is conceptualized within

specific domains and educational settings. A substantive and robust conception of

critical thinking explicates understandings essential to thinking well within every domain

of human thought and life.

 46 
 

Critical thinking concepts represent intellectual vocabulary or terms. The use of

intellectual terms requires deep understanding and repeated application across a variety

of contexts in order for them to prove themselves useful in developing critical thought. A

cohort of scholars from the fields of psychology and education argue in their book,

Frameworks for Thinking: A Handbook for Teaching and Learning, “Without a

vocabulary to describe aspects of thinking that we believe to be teachable it is hard to

develop teaching approaches or pedagogies that are effective” (Moseley et. al., 2005, p.

8). This position is similarly articulated by Tishman, Perkins and Jay (1995) at Harvard

University’s Project Zero. In their book entitled The Thinking Classroom: Learning and

Teaching in a Culture of Thinking, it is argued that “The language of thinking helps

students organize and communicate their own thinking more precisely and intelligently.”

Furthermore, a rich and robust language that provides students with words to describe

their thinking “communicates and reinforces standards of thinking” well (pp. 12-13). The

language of thinking well is the language of critical thinking, and an examination of the

literature reveals common concepts within the many proposed definitions of critical

thinking.

Each defensible definition of critical thinking illuminates some important and

foundational concepts some of which are shared with other scholars, but not all. Every

definition of critical thinking reflects to some degree a certain disciplinary point of view

more appropriate to particular contexts; each definition contributes interpretations and

insights that others do not necessarily explicate; when examined closely, however,

common principles are present; these common principles form a base-line conception of

critical thinking that works within and moves across disciplinary boundaries; a trans-
 47 
 

disciplinary interpretation of critical thinking is most consistent with the history of the

concept and the ideals of a liberal education. Let us consider some of the more

prominent conceptions of critical thinking, noticing especially how they overlap.

John Dewey (1916/1997a) argues that high quality thinking is “the accurate and

deliberate instituting of connections between what is done and its consequences” (p. 177).

Dewey highlights the idea that thinking of the highest quality is intentional, based on

accepted standards for evaluation, and explores the results of one’s conclusions. For

Dewey, thinking well is a concrete process that requires intellectual work in practical

situations, but not an abstraction that has no applicability to one’s daily life.

Edward Glaser (1941), who is considered the father of the modern critical

thinking movement, defined critical thinking as follows: “The ability to think critically…

involves three things: (1) an attitude of being disposed to consider in a thoughtful way the

problems and subjects that come within the range of one’s experiences (2) knowledge of

the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning, and (3) some skill in applying those

methods” (p. 5). Glaser’s conception, in part, introduces as a necessary condition the

concept of intellectual dispositions, where one exercises a willingness to open-mindedly

investigate problems and issues relevant to one’s life. Like Dewey, Glaser also

emphasizes the need to think with well founded reasons rather than thinking that is

directed, for example, by bias, subjective opinion, and/or social conformity.

Robert Ennis’ (1996) definition is one of the most cited because, in part, it

explicates the practical nature and goals of thinking critically. He writes, “Critical

thinking is a process, the goal of which is to make reasonable decisions about what to

believe and what to do” (p. xvii). Ennis points out that critical thinking is not a thing or a
 48 
 

goal in and of itself; rather, it is a process of making informed decisions that affects the

way one lives his/her life, the ultimate goal of which is to live reasonably in the strong or

ethical sense of the term. It is based on a practical examination of one’s beliefs and

actions as a guide for living an examined life.

In this vein, Paul, Elder and Bartell (1997) write that critical thinking is “the

intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying,

synthesizing, and evaluating information gathered from or generated by observation,

reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action” (p. 4). Beyond

that of explicating specific analytical processes, the idea that critical thinking is a

practical endeavor, and the fact that thinking critically requires rigorous intellectual work,

Paul, Elder and Bartell emphasize the conceptual nature of thinking. All thinking relies

on ideas and the extent to which one has command of the way s/he is using an idea will

reflect the extent to which one’s thinking is of the highest quality.

Carrol Tama (1989) states that, “However defined, critical thinking refers to a

way of reasoning that demands adequate support for one’s beliefs and an unwillingness to

be persuaded unless the support is forthcoming” (p. 1). Tama’s definition emphasizes the

tendency for people to hold unjustified beliefs. Thus, for Tama, thinking critically is

often the exception rather than the norm.

The Foundation for Critical Thinking (FCT) website lists many definitions, one of

which reads:

Critical thinking is that mode of thinking — about any subject, content, or

problem — in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by

skillfully analyzing, assessing, and reconstructing it. Critical thinking is self-

 49 
 

directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking. It

presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and mindful command of

their use. It entails effective communication and problem-solving abilities, as well

as a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism.

(Foundation for Critical Thinking [FCT], 1987, A Definition)

Like Tama, the FCT definition recognizes the innate tendency of the human mind to

make decisions as to what to believe and do based on one’s need for self-validation,

social conformity, and ideological/belief system attachments. The emphasis on the

importance of mindfulness implies that human decisions are largely driven by

unconscious thinking; the quality of which is often questionable. “Mindful command”

represents a conscious process whereby one seeks to think autonomously based on

“rigorous standards” and regular practice.

Bailin, Case, Coombs, and Daniels (1999) emphasize the role of standards and

criteria within their definition, writing that critical thinking as “a normative enterprise

which, to a greater or lesser degree, we apply appropriate criteria and standards to what

we or others say, do, or write” (p. 285). This definition emphasizes contextually relevant

criteria and standards as vital to thinking critically. The quality of one’s thought cannot

be fairly evaluated without appropriate standards like clarity, accuracy, relevance,

validity, organization and/or significance to name a few; standards that intellectuals

regularly, but often intuitively, attempt to meet.

Educational philosopher Matthew Lipman (1991) defines critical thinking as

“skillful and responsible thinking that (1) facilitates judgment because it, (2) relies on

criteria, (3) is self-correcting, and (4) is sensitive to context” (p. 116). Lipman, whose
 50 
 

definition is highly visible within the discourse, not only emphasizes the need for criteria

in evaluating reasoning, but points out that one who thinks well is sensitive to context.

For example, a good thinker is one who understands that evaluative criteria, such as

accuracy, clarity, and relevance, are always present, but the context determines the extent

to which any particular standard requires greater emphasis than another. Furthermore,

thinking of the highest quality is skillful in that it takes regular practice to develop.

Skillful thinking is not to be confused with innate skill or ability to perform a task.

Although it is human nature to think with reason, high quality thinking requires

development. This is the essence of what it means to think skillfully and reasonably.

Daniel Fasko (2003b) offers the following definition which also highlights the

skill involved in thinking critically. He writes, “Critical thinking is the propensity and

skills to engage in activity and ‘mental activity’ with reflective skepticism focused on

deciding what to believe or do, ‘and that can be justified,’” (p. 8). Additionally, Fasko’s

definition points out that “critical thinkers” do not blindly accept conclusions. Rather,

they question when appropriate and seek the best or most reasonable answer, solution or

resolution adhering to accepted standards of analysis and evaluation. Once again, critical

thinking involves a mindful awareness of thinking in which one engages; his/her own and

that of others.

A final definition submitted by Paul (2007 July) speaks to the need for meta-

cognition in the act of thinking critically stating that, “Critical thinking is thinking about

your thinking, while you’re thinking, in order to make your thinking better.” This rather

catchy interpretation summarizes the general goal of what it means to think critically: to

raise thinking to a higher, more sophisticated level. In other words, the goal of thinking
 51 
 

critically is to become more rational in the sense that one is aware of and, to the extent it

is possible, in control of one’s decisions and beliefs with sensitivity to relevant ethical

implications. The inherent assumption is that “the quality of our life and that of what we

produce, make, or build depends precisely on the quality of our thought. Shoddy

thinking is costly, both in money and in quality of life. Excellence in thought, however,

must be systematically cultivated” (Paul & Elder, 2006d, p. 4). In order for one to

improve the quality of his/her thinking in any given context requires meta-cognitive

reflection followed by disciplined action.

Given the complexity of the concept of critical thinking, no single definition will

suffice. Any given definition may highlight certain essential understandings and

processes that others do not. Because of its richness and complexity, even the more

comprehensive definitions may not capture all of what it means to think critically. It may

be argued that the context should, at least in part, determine the thrust of the most

relevant “definition” of critical thinking. For example, in a sociology course one may

need a definition that highlights the problems of socio-centricity and socio-cultural

conditioning. In a rhetoric and/or philosophy course one may want to emphasize the

importance of reasoning to logical conclusions. However, one must guard against

limiting one’s concept of critical thinking to a particular definition for reasons of vested

interest or due to overspecialization. Any defensible conception must ultimately adhere

to the essence of critical thinking as developed throughout its history.

Limitations of an Emphasis on One Definition of Critical Thinking

The argument that the concept of critical thinking should not be confined to a

single definition is well grounded in the discourse. For example, critical thinking
 52 
 

theorists and educators Paul, Elder et al. (1997) argue, “Given the complexity of critical

thinking --its rootedness in 2500 years of intellectual history as well as the wide range of

its application—it is unwise to put too much weight on any one ‘definition’ of critical

thinking. Any brief formulation of critical thinking is bound to have important

limitations” (p. 4). Likewise, in his article entitled “Critical Thinking as an Aim of

Education” educational philosopher William Hare (1998) argues, “We should be wary of

succinct definitions, especially when dealing with a rich and fertile notion… It is

tempting, of course, to try and find one comprehensive formula which captures the

essence of critical thinking, but the chances of success are slim; critical thinking comes

into so many contexts and takes such different forms that it is enormously difficult for

any summary account to do justice to the ramifications of the idea” (p. 40). Furthermore,

not “all conceptions of critical thinking are equally good or defensible” (Bailin et al.,

1999, p. 286). This is especially apparent when examining how different theorists

attempt to apply their definition in an educational environment. The essential idea is that

every definition has strengths and weaknesses; every definition highlights certain

important aspects of what it means to think critically, but each also has certain aspects

more appropriate for certain contexts than others. We must be continually reminded of a

robust conception of critical thinking with its pedagogical and social implications, but

also be able to work within more narrow conceptions relevant to specific contexts and

problems. Thus, we should be able to habitually move between the global picture and the

individual details and back again. William Hare provides an excellent elaboration of this

important distinction.
 53 
 

Hare (1998) analyzes five definitions of critical thinking pointing out the

strengths and limitations of a select few in order to illustrate his point that the discourse

on critical thinking should focus its attention on the foundational concepts and goals of

critical thinking instead of specific definitions which are inherently limited. What is

needed, Hare argues, is a robust conception of critical thinking that is sensitive to context.

For example, Hare (1998) cites a definition that is characteristic of how critical

thinking is often contextualized within the field of philosophy: “Critical thinking is the

conscious, deliberate rational assessment of claims according to clearly identified

standards of proof” (p. 40). 5 Hare (1998) argues that although this definition highlights a

couple of important concepts that point to the ideal of critical thought, it “does not work

well for all branches of philosophy” (p. 40). On one hand, an ideal of critical thinking is

visible within this definition in its emphasis that subjective opinions on an issue do not

constitute proof because all claims need to be justified according to clearly identified

standards of rational assessment. On the other hand, “We recognize critical review

without thinking that anything has to be proven” (Hare, 1998, p. 40). Hare (1998)

correctly points out that all issues do not have a definite conclusion and all contexts do

not call for one. He describes book and film reviews in the newspaper are often “fine

examples of critical thinking” but they do not seek to establish a proof or a refutation of

claims (p. 40). Hare claims that rational assessment of claims according to intellectual

standards is a fundamental part of thinking critically, but when contextualized, as in the

above definition, it is not directly applicable to all contexts where critical thinking is

observed. A similar analysis can be seen with a definition of critical thinking that focuses

on critical theory, the politicized contextualization of critical thinking as a process that

 54 
 

leads one to liberation from the oppressive socio-economic conditions characteristic of

capitalism.

Hare includes a definition of critical thinking from critical thinking theorists and

critical pedagogue Stephen Brookfield. Brookfield defines critical thinking as that which

“involves calling into question the assumptions underlying our customary, habitual ways

of thinking and acting and then being ready to think and act differently on the basis of

this critical questioning” (Hare, 1998, p. 41). Hare does not deny that the ability and skill

to identify, question and examine one’s assumptions, especially those that are deeply

social and cultural, is a necessary condition for thinking critically. Such an emphasis is

especially important, Hare (1998) argues, for educators concerned with the socio-centric

and hegemonic nature of life. However, he correctly points out that “important as this is

it hardly captures the whole of critical thinking” (p. 41).

Thinking critically involves more than questioning one’s hidden assumptions.

The act of questioning, itself, is an art that requires training, the logic of which represents

a study in and of itself. Furthermore, in addition to questioning assumptions one may

seek alternative accounts of an issue or problem, find counter examples, investigate

ambiguities, explicate standards for evaluation, or explore the implications of one’s

decisions or perspectives. In short, Hare (1998) contends that, “Critical thinking takes a

variety of forms; looking for hidden assumptions is just one; albeit rather important, task”

(p. 41). Every definition of critical thinking can be subject to such an analysis

emphasizing the point that every substantive definition contributes some important

insight into what it means to think at the highest quality.

 55 
 

Hare (1998) summarizes his argument stating that “All of these [definitions]

provide some insight into critical thinking; often capturing, in a succinct way, general

ideas which have been in circulation for some time. We can learn from each of these

without feeling we have to decide which one gives us the definition. Critical reflection

might unearth limitations in these very accounts and, at the same time, illustrate certain

aspects of the ideal” (p. 40). From this approach one can begin to construct a base-line

conception of critical thinking that allows for conceptual and contextual versatility, but

retains the essential and necessary conditions of the concept. In other words, the

definition, per se, is not of utmost importance. Rather, what is important is the way in

which critical thinking is conceptualized as a method for approaching the analysis and

assessment of reasoning. When viewed as such, the focus is moved from mere definition

to a robust conception that includes essential elements.

The Base-line Approach

Numerous scholars have synthesized common concepts present within various

definitions of critical thinking in an attempt to clarify the essential characteristics of that

which constitutes critical thought. As noted in the previous section, a survey of the

discourse reveals that the concept of critical thinking does not suffer from lack of

definition or consensus on its fundamental, or base-line, concepts. Or as Paul, Elder et al.

(1997) argue, a review of the various definitions of critical thinking “demonstrates that

despite diversity of expression there is a core of common meaning in the field” (p. 5). As

we shall see, a substantive base-line conception of critical thinking can be formulated in

multiple ways when essential concepts are at its core.

 56 
 

The first essentialist version originates from a 1997 study sponsored and

published by the California Department on Teacher Credentialing. It establishes a clear

and precise synthesis of common concepts inherent within multiple definitions that cross

disciplines. Even those definitions that share little similarity nonetheless reveal (1) the

conceptual breadth of critical thinking as a theoretical and applied concept, and (2) the

range of contexts to which the concept of critical thinking applies, some definitions of

which are more fitting than others. The commission study argues that:

Each of these definitions, as many others in the field, cut in fundamentally the

same direction. All deal with the problem of up-grading the quality of human

thinking by the cultivation of special skills, abilities, and insights that enable the

thinker to take mindful command of his or her thinking. What is most obvious

from a serious examination of these multiple characterizations of critical thinking

is how much they share a common set of concerns and objectives – quite in line

with the history of the concept, with the nature of critical thinking tests, and with

the orientation of this study. (Paul, Elder et al., 1997, p. 7)

Some of the common concerns and objectives characterize critical thinking, at its most

fundamental level, as requiring “the systematic monitoring of thought.” This is

interpreted as the practice of not accepting any proposition or opinion at face value, but

systematically analyzing and assessing thinking using consistent and theoretically sound

standards or criteria.

The commission argues that at a base level analysis and synthesis of any

intellectual or cognitive product requires explication of certain elements such as

identifying, clarifying, interpreting and critiquing the point of view or frame of reference,
 57 
 

the purpose, goal or objective, the information that leads to inferences, conclusions or

solutions, the background logic or assumptions inherent in the thinking, the main

concepts at work, and the implications or consequences. Standards or criteria for the

assessment of thinking include: “clarity, accuracy, relevance, depth, breadth, and

logicalness” (Paul, Elder et al., 1997, p. 11).

Gerald Nosich (2005a) presents the second synthesis arguing that the essence of

critical thinking involves reflection, authenticity, the act of being reasonable, and relies

on evaluative criteria. Nosich’s synthesis is in line with the commission’s interpretation.

In his interpretation, Nosich points out that reflection alone is not desirable. Rather,

reflection should be critical: reflection that is mindful of its quality and is disciplined in

its attempt to improve. One must have an authentic disposition; an attitude whereby one

checks his/her biases and prejudices so as to fairly analyze and evaluate the question or

problem at issue. These two points coupled with the disciplined and explicit use of

accepted criteria for evaluation make up what it means to be reasonable: the ability of one

to make reasoned judgments as to what to believe and do. Irene Yuen Yee Fung presents

a third synthesis that emphasizes and elaborates on context as an important dimension for

a base-line conception of critical thinking.

Fung (2005) advocates the aspect of Matthew Lipman’s conception of critical

thinking that emphasizes context as a necessary condition for any base-line conception of

critical thinking. Lipman (1991) argues that common critical thinking principles include:

reliance on criteria, self-correction, and sensitivity to context. Fung chooses to explicate

context as a part of her synthesis. All thinking exists within a context and must be fully

understood when entering into a problem, issue or point of view. In this sense, critical
 58 
 

thinking is not limited to abstractions, but is based in the practicality of daily life.

Pointing out that sensitivity to context as one of the common ideas among definitions of

critical thinking helps avoid criticisms that the concept and study of critical thinking is a

mere product of Western, Euro-centric belief systems. Furthermore, context defines the

nature and structure of a problem where certain criteria are more applicable than others.

Fung (2005) writes, “By including the requirement of ‘sensitive to context’ in critical

thinking, the tension between the post-modern concern on particularity and the

foundationalist concern of requirement of objectively defensible critical standpoints can

be addressed” (p. 27). Fung’s synthesis is similar to others and provides clear conceptual

organizers that can be effectively used to develop critical thinking skills and abilities.

However, some theorists choose to de-emphasize thinking skills and abilities as part of

their syntheses and focus instead on intellectual resources.

Bailin et al. (1999) provide another interpretation of the foundational ideas for a

comprehensive base-line conception of critical thinking. They argue that a defensible

conception of critical thinking should, at its core, focus on intellectual resources rather

than definitions and un-measurable abstractions. Intellectual resources are concepts,

principles, attitudes and skills one can call upon to monitor and improve the quality of

one’s thinking within a certain context. Intellectual resources include “background

knowledge, knowledge of critical thinking standards, possession of critical concepts,

knowledge of strategies or heuristics useful in thinking critically, and certain habits of

mind” (p. 286). Framing critical thinking, especially its pedagogical applications, as

focused on intellectual resources provides an overall organizing concept that emphasizes

critical thinking as a practical tool that can be used to help one think better. Furthermore,
 59 
 

the emphasis Bailin et al. place on background knowledge, although not new, further

emphasizes the need to be sensitive to context as a one base-line criterion for what it

means to think critically. 6 This is a well articulated synthesis with an organizing idea

that speaks to the comprehensive and practical nature of what it means to think critically,

but is not drastically unlike others.

These syntheses are in large part a product of an expanding discourse on the

concept of critical thinking. Their work provides useful and necessary elaborations on

the core concepts of critical thinking reminding scholars of the need to continually

explicate foundational principles which are all too often implicitly presupposed.

Although all syntheses are fundamentally similar, some explicating that which is implicit

in others, another conception is needed for the purposes of this dissertation; one that uses

broad concepts that encompass the characteristics previously stated. The necessary

conditions that constitute a robust conception of critical thinking warrant that the

conception is comprehensive, practical and trans-disciplinary. Harvey Siegel’s synthesis

suits this purpose in part, but it becomes complete when joined with that of Paul and

Elder.

Siegel (1990) provides a concise summary noting that all theorists agree that at its

essence critical thinking (1) involves important dispositions or attitudes and (2) is a

process of making reasoned judgments and living by, or acting on, those judgments. He

writes, that theorists fundamentally agree that “critical thinking centrally involves reason

assessment and the disposition to engage in it” (p. 30). Numerous concepts and processes

found within various definitions are inherent within the above conceptualization of

critical thinking. These concepts, processes and skills include, but are not limited to, the
 60 
 

following: analyzing, evaluating based on consistent standards or criteria, synthesizing,

the need to be fair and authentic, sensitivity to context, reflective thinking, self-

correction, clarifying purposes and questions, organizing information/data, knowledge of

background logic, questioning assumptions, problem solving, exploring implications and

examining consequences. Reasoned judgment, as conceptualized here, is not limited to

the interpretations of any one discipline, but is used as an organizing idea that speaks to

the goal of what it means to think well. A robust synthesis is achieved by coupling with

Paul and Elder’s emphasis on barriers to thinking well.

Paul and Elder (2004; 2006a; 2006d) include barriers to thinking well as those

essential to articulating and understanding the concept of critical thinking. The broad,

but foundational, barriers include the concepts of egocentricity, socio-centricity, close-

mindedness and intellectual inflexibility. One cannot assume that barriers such as these

and the concepts and strategies that help one confront and manage such barriers are

explicitly clear within one’s mind. Without knowledge and awareness of the barriers to

thinking well and strategies for managing them one’s thinking will be subject to

increased probability of error. Paul and Elder point out the subversive and pervasive

nature of these forces on quality thinking, and in so doing argue that all too often students

learn to think skillfully, but not fairly.

It is not enough to think skillfully, one must think ethically. In a sense, one can

argue that to formulate reasoned judgments implicitly includes fair-minded analysis and

evaluation. However, this is true in theory alone. All too often ethical considerations are

not included, either as a result of ignorance or selfishness. Paul and Elder’s (2006a)

explication of the barriers to high quality thinking uncover the often assumed background
 61 
 

logic to critical thinking theory. These barriers (1) act as important concepts necessary

for the regular monitoring of one’s thinking, and (2) emphasize the ethical dimension of

critical thinking where one is intellectually mandated to engage responsibly in society.

The synthesis of insights from critical thinking definitions used for this

dissertation does not negate any other conception. It is yet another formulation that, due

to the context, is deemed operational. An alternative analysis of different base-line

conceptions of critical thinking may yield a more definitive explication of commonalities.

Section Summary

Critical thinking involves an intimate interplay between cognitive and affective

skills, abilities and dispositions as they exist within and move across specific contexts.

The discourse reflects an attempt to explicate and contextualize these skills, abilities and

dispositions to be of benefit to educators and students. Broadly speaking, the concepts

inherent, in some form, within all substantive definitions of critical thinking speak to its

focus on real problems. Critical thinking, as conceptualized here, suggests that better

thinking is possible for all people and not just the elite. Each definition shares with

others a focus on critical thinking as a practical process, the goal of which is to habitually

make fair-minded reasoned judgments. Stated differently, a powerful similarity among

substantive definitions of critical thinking indicates that critical thinking is a mindful

process whereby one consciously monitors and corrects one’s tendency to succumb to

fallacious thought.

To summarize, a synthesis of numerous robust definitions of critical thinking

include the following interrelated processes: identifying common barriers to the

development of one’s ability to think critically and fairly, developing intellectual

 62 
 

dispositions, formulating reasoned judgments on the bases of intellectual standards. This

base-line interpretation points to the principle that critical thinking is fundamentally

practical and establishes the necessary conditions for any substantive conception of

critical thinking. Each will be discussed in turn.

A Proposed Base-Line Conception: Emphasizing Obstacles, Dispositions and Reasoned

Judgment

Egocentricity as an Obstacle to Thinking Critically

Scholars acknowledged egocentricity as a significant obstacle to thinking

critically. It is defined as a “tendency to view everything in relation to oneself, to

confuse immediate perception (how things seem) with reality: the tendency to be self-

centered, or to consider only oneself and one’s own interests; selfishness” (Paul & Elder,

2006a, p. 484). This definition illuminates the problem that interpreting the world

without fairly taking into consideration other points of view or alternative interpretations

of “reality” is fundamentally irrational. Egocentricity, and in turn ethnocentricity, is the

tendency to define truth according to one’s personal opinion rather than reasoned

judgment.

Critical thinking theorist and professor of education Arthur Costa (2001c)

summarizes the problem of egocentricity as follows: “People become convinced that their

own perspectives on the problem are essentially right and that others have it wrong. But

thinking in this way prevents us from gaining a wider perspective – one that would

enable all of us to determine what we are missing. This egocentric view hinders serious

reflection and honest inquiry” (p. xvii). The negative consequences of unbridled

egocentricity are numerous; from conflicts on the playground to the systematic

 63 
 

exploitation of the environment at the expense of people and other species. Although it is

not the purpose of this section to fully unpack the distinctions between various

manifestations of the unrestrained ego, it is important to note that scholars agree that

egocentricity largely operates at an unconscious level even though there are those who

intentionally seek to manipulate and harm to advance their selfish desires.

For example, critical thinking scholar and practitioner Gerald Nosich (2005a)

identifies egocentrism as a “deeper, more pervasive impediment to critical thinking” (p.

24). In his book, Learning to Think Things Through: A Guide to Critical Thinking

Across the Curriculum, he argues that “Each of us is at the center of our own

experience.” Our experiences can benefit us, but they can also hinder our intellectual

development. In the later case, “people often have a way of thinking that always puts

themselves first” (Nosich, 2005a, p. 24). He writes that egocentricity mostly “operates

far beneath the surface” so people do not regularly notice when their views and agendas

are unjustly placed before others. Furthermore, the ego is self-deceptive, where “It is

easy to delude myself into believing that I am working in the best interests of humanity as

a whole when in fact I am working for my own interests and even against the interests of

humanity;” it can prevent one from differentiating between accurate and inaccurate

claims; it can prevent one from acknowledging information and points of view that “are

opposed to” one’s own (p. 24). One’s egocentric tendencies are pervasive because it

manifests itself in every facet of one’s thinking and life to some degree. At the heart of

it, however, is the psychological tendency to protect or pursue one’s selfish interests.

In his book Democracy and Education, John Dewey (1916/1997a) elaborates on

the pervasive and manipulative qualities of one’s egocentric nature in his discussion of a
 64 
 

type of self-interest that is selfish, undisciplined and unexamined. Dewey’s discussion

presents one’s selfishness as taking an active role to “protect” one’s world view and

belief systems by classifying positions and views that are opposite to one’s own as hostile

and dangerous. As a result, one unjustifiably attacks, often subconsciously, the

opposition. The selfish mind is one that often seeks “revenge, as it were, upon the alien

hostile environment by cultivating contempt for it, by giving it a bad name” (Dewey,

1916/1997a, p. 349). The selfish mind seeks “refuge and consolation within their own

states of mind, their own imaginings and wishes, which they compliment by calling both

more real and more ideal than the despised outer world” (p. 349). Since one’s ego

regularly works to protect one’s interests, it often works to deceive one’s fair assessment

of the world by distorting reality.

Dewey’s assessment of selfishness as a deceptive force is similar to conceptual

process of “Othering,” where people view beliefs, opinions, cultures, etc. other than one’s

own as dangerous threats to the status quo of one’s mind and one’s society. This process

of “othering” is what intellectuals, like Viktor Frankl, argue is what allowed groups like

the Nazi’s to slaughter six million Jews before and during World War II. An ego left

unchecked by standards such as fairness, clarity, breadth and logic results in habits of

mind and action that are unfair, unclear, lack sensitivity to alternative points of view and

often suffer from erroneous logic. The pervasive power of the ego to deceive one’s fair

use of reason, all too often, is the default disposition by which people live and act.

Dewey sees selfishness as a character disposition, one that is undisciplined and

subject to the tendency to “run loose.” He argues that “Instead of its [the mind’s] objects

being checked by conditions with reference to their practicability in execution, they are
 65 
 

allowed to develop because of the immediate emotional satisfaction which they yield”

(Dewey, 1916/1997a, p. 348). Education provides students with the contextual

opportunity to be intellectually responsible for their thinking; to discover their intellectual

weaknesses and correct them accordingly. The student “must toe the mark; he must form

useful habits; he must learn self-control” (p. 350). Egocentricity is a state of mind that

seeks self-validation and self-preservation; it is a disposition that takes intellectual work

to recognize and correct where needed.

Egocentricity is a barrier to thinking well because it prevents one from cultivating

important intellectual dispositions crucial to thinking critically like fair-mindedness,

open-mindedness, empathy, integrity, intellectual flexibility and, even, the need to

persevere through difficult problems. As Nosich (2005a) writes, “One of the most

valuable things to be gained from critical thinking is an ability to see the egocentricity of

our own thinking” (p. 25). On this point, scholars throughout the discourse on critical

thinking agree.

Socio-centricity as an Obstacle to Thinking Critically

Like the concept of egocentricity, socio-centricity is a pervasive obstacle for those

who are not aware of its influence on one’s thinking and who do not have the intellectual

tools in place by which to keep its negative influences in check. There are multiple

dimensions to the concept and manifestations of socio-centricity and the concept is

present within various forms throughout the discourse. Generally defined, socio-

centricity is “The assumption that one’s own social group is inherently and self-evidently

superior to all others” (Paul & Elder, 2006a, p. 498). Like the barrier of egocentricity,

socio-centric thinking is largely unconscious; a result of social conditioning whereby one

 66 
 

is not encouraged to question social and cultural assumptions. In their book Critical

Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Learning and Your Life, Paul and Elder

(2006a) unpack the concept of socio-centricity with related concepts such as

egocentricity, strong sense and weak sense critical thinking, bias, prejudice, social

contradiction, self-deception, self-interest, fair-mindedness, and national bias to name a

few. Related concepts provide the conceptual breadth and depth necessary to understand

socio-centricity as a barrier to developing critical thought.

In the intellectual tradition of Bacon, Paul and Elder (2006a) identify socio-

centricity as an obstacle to thinking critically, and articulate, in four precise statements,

how one’s unconscious mind would articulate the concept: “It’s true if we believe it. It’s

true because we have always believed it. It’s true because we want to believe it. It’s true

if it is in our self-interest to believe it” (p. 213). These statements point to the

subjectively relative nature of socio-centric thought where “truth” is defined by a group,

large and small, rather than by fair-minded critical thought; thought that is verifiable,

transparent, invites critique, and is open to alternative points of view and questions. A.

E. Mander’s classic 1938 book Clearer Thinking: Logic for Everyman explicates a like

interpretation.

In warning his reader of the dangers of accepting ungrounded beliefs, Mander

indirectly unpacks the concepts of egocentricity and socio-centricity. He writes, “Of

course we do not cease, when we cease to be children, to adopt new beliefs on mere

suggestion. We continue doing it, more or less unconsciously, all our lives…

Propositions that are accepted simply because ‘everybody says so,’” (Mander, 1938, p.

27). One’s beliefs are largely a consequence of one’s culture. Although all beliefs and
 67 
 

traditions do not lead to negative consequences, those that do or those that have a greater

potential to cause harm must be critically examined. Otherwise, poor thinking, unethical

thinking is ignorantly propagated and prolonged. There is another dimension of socio-

centricity that, like its egocentric counterpart, is in some way consciously deceptive.

Paul and Elder write that one of the most dangerous forms of socio-centric

thinking is the tendency to intentionally manipulate and deceive others for the

advancement of one’s own groups. They give voice to this position stating, “It is true

because it is in our selfish interest to believe it” (Paul & Elder, 2006a, p. 213). Similar to

Paul and Elder’s statement that socio-centric thinking often manifests itself in the pursuit

of one’s selfish interest, Mander (1938) writes, “Other beliefs are held through self-

interest…We adopt and cling to some beliefs because –or partly because – it ‘pays’ us to

do so;” where the term self-interest can be extended to “cover also his interest in social

position” (p. 30). Examples of such deception include the concepts and phenomena of

jingoism, war, socio-economic suppression, political propaganda, magical thinking,

prejudices and environmental exploitations. Inherent within each concept, and their

concrete manifestations, a dominant ideology is at work; an ideology that the majority of

people on some level conform to because of their participation within that group.

In his book The Power of Critical Theory Stephen Brookfield discusses Eric

Fromm’s notion of automation conformity as essential dimension to the problem of socio-

centric thought. Brookfield (2005) summarizes Fromm’s conceptualization of the

problem writing that “Automation conformity describes the process of social

manipulation that results in the adult striving to be exactly the same as he or she imagines

the majority to be” (p. 169). According to Brookfield (2005), the individual that suffers
 68 
 

from this intellectual barrier is bound by “opinions and reasons [that] mimic dominant

ideology,” and thus engage in “pseudothinking, pseudoreasoning, and the evolution of the

pseudoself” (p. 171). Brookfield provides further depth contextualizing the concept

within critical theory arguing that this type of barrier upon one’s thinking prevents one

from seeking and embracing freedom from socio-economic and socio-cultural forms of

oppression; one develops a fear of freedom or intellectual autonomy and social

responsibility.

If socio-centric thinking is an innate obstacle to thinking critically, then can it be

effectively managed? Although it is widely accepted that socio-centricity is a significant

barrier to the development of one’s critical capacities, it is also widely agreed that the

development of one’s ability to think critically can manage the negative influences of

obstacles like socio-centricity. Pedagogically speaking, one of the most important and

lasting goals of education is to produce better, more ethical thinkers. The discourse on

critical thinking exists, in part, because there is a rational ideal that is viewed as

attainable, but it exists because obstacles to thinking well are forever present. The

concept of socio-centricity has been articulated in many different ways, but is visible and

consistent throughout the intellectual tradition of critical thinking. Its significance to a

robust conceptualization of critical thinking is paramount, and its explication is necessary

if people are to work toward improving the quality of their thought.

Intellectual Inflexibility and Lack of Open-mindedness as Obstacles to Thinking

Critically

A substantive conception of critical thinking is found in its emphasis and

adherence to base-line “fundamental and powerful concepts,” to use Nosich’s phrase.

 69 
 

Fundamental in that these concepts “form the foundation of our understanding” of what it

means to think critically within and across disciplines, and powerful because they are

“useful in understanding a wide range of questions and problems, issues and situations”

(Nosich, 2005a, pp.103-104). The concepts of intellectual flexibility and open-

mindedness are both fundamental and powerful to thinking critically; they are seminal

concepts in the discourse on critical thinking because they are necessary conditions for

thinking at the highest levels. Conversely, the lack of open-mindedness and intellectual

flexibility are considered significant barriers to the development of critical thinking

within any context. This section briefly discusses what selected scholars see as the

importance of thinking flexibly and open-mindedly to the theory and application of

critical thinking, and infer that inflexible and close-minded thought are significant

obstacles to developing thought of the highest quality.

According to “The Delphi Report,” a synthesis of scholarly assessments of what

constitutes critical thinking, the majority of scholars within the discourse agree on sets of

fundamental critical thinking concepts, principles and skills/abilities. Intellectual

flexibility and open-mindedness are two such concepts. Scholars contend that, at its

essence, “flexibility in considering alternatives and opinions” and “open-mindedness

regarding divergent world-views” are necessary conditions for thinking critically.

Furthermore, 83% agreed that intellectual flexibility and open-mindedness are two of

many defining dispositions that characterize what it means to be a critical thinker

(Facione, 1990, p. 13). This report provides one form of verification of what has been

argued throughout this chapter: that the majority of scholars from various fields share

common views on the fundamental concepts that characterize a base-line notion of that
 70 
 

which constitutes critical thought, especially as it relates to teaching and learning. What

follows is a sample of scholars that explicate the concepts of intellectual flexibility and

open-mindedness both as necessary conditions for thinking critically and for a critical

education, and as obstacles to thinking critically when absent from a substantive

conception and the curriculum.

In an article entitled “Habits of Mind,” Arthur Costa (2001b) identifies thinking

flexibly and open-mindedly as part of a list of 16 interconnected dispositions that

characterize what it means to think and act critically. He frames his list arguing that if

educators and theorists are interested in improving the quality of student performance,

then they must create an educational environment that “demands” attention to the

development of intellectual skills and dispositions; one of which is the ability to “draw

upon a repertoire of problem-solving strategies and tailor their style to the situation,

knowing when to be broad and global in their thinking and when to apply detailed

precision” (p. 81). People with a disposition to think flexibly and open-mindedly “are

open to change” because they have, as Paul describes, confidence in reasoning process

even when evidence contradicts their established beliefs (Costa, 2001b, p. 534; Paul,

1995).

When substantively conceived, meaning outside of the narrow interpretation of

reasoning and logic as characteristic of the field of philosophy, confidence in reason

implies an attitude whereby one believes that problems have a structure that can be

unpacked and solved with organization, patience and perseverance. Paul (1995a)

describes that a substantively generalized conception of confidence in reason is

characterized by a process that encourages “people to come to their own conclusions”

 71 
 

through the development of their rational capacities (p. 534). Reason, thus interpreted, is

broadly defined as a process whereby one systematically attempts to figure something

out. Those who develop their rational capacities habitually form justifiable viewpoints,

“draw reasonable conclusions, think coherently and logically, persuade each other by

reason, and become reasonable, despite the deep-seated obstacles in the native character

of the human mind and in society.” Paul argues that confidence in reason helps one

become more aware of the complexities of human experience and belief; that such

complexity can only be approached when one sets aside his/her biases and believes that

“one’s own higher interests and those of humankind at large will be best served by giving

the freest play to reason” (Paul, 1995a, p. 534). Here, a direct link between confidence in

reason, intellectual flexibility and open-mindedness can be seen.

The “freest play to reason” is characterized by one’s ability to fairly and

empathetically think through divergent points of view, look for alternatives, assess the

quality of reasoning using consistent standards, apply concepts and skills to different

situations and problems where appropriate, and think through the implications of one’s

reasoning. In sum, intellectual flexibility and open-mindedness are disciplined reasoning

processes and are necessary for fairly thinking through complex problems and issues.

Confidence in reason gives depth to the concepts of intellectual flexibility and open-

mindedness because it provides purpose. One seeks open-mindedness to better

understand alternative points of view relevant to a question at issue; likewise, one seeks

to be intellectually flexible so as not to blind oneself to alternative ways of approaching

and thinking through a problem. This interpretation is highly visible throughout the

discourse especially as they relate to teaching and learning.

 72 
 

In his article entitled “Thinking About Decisions,” educational philosopher

Robert Swartz (2001) associates the concept of open-mindedness with the practical

process of making good decisions. He writes, “open-mindedness is an important mark of

a good decision maker. Good decision makers always allow for the possibility of

changing their minds when new information comes along that significantly shifts the

balance of pros and cons” (p. 61). Like Paul, Swartz identifies one mark of an open-

minded and intellectually flexible thinker is one who asks questions like “‘What are my

options?’ and ‘What are the consequences of these options?’” (p. 61). Such questions are

intellectual resources characteristic of flexible and open-minded thought. Encouraging

and facilitating the development of critical thinking dispositions, like open-mindedness

and intellectual flexibility, are not only ideals, but are highly practical and attainable

goals.

In this vein, educational scholar and theorist Delores Gallo (1994) argues that

when substantively conceived critical thinking instruction “discourages belief rigidity and

the salience of the perspective of the self and encourages cognitive and personal

flexibility. It practices persistent, probing, engaged examination of an issue in alternation

with flexible relinquishment and reflective distance” (pp. 43-44). The reflective distance

can be characterized by one’s attempt to approach a problem objectively and open to

alternatives all the while aware of the human tendency to maintain one’s biased beliefs

and preconceived notions. The concept of intellectual breadth, or the willingness to think

through various points of view and interpretations to a problem, provides further

clarification as to the nature of flexible thinking and open-mindedness.

 73 
 

Tishman et al. (1995) argue that the “disposition to think broadly and

adventurously” is vitally important for the development of good thinking (p. 42). To

clarify this general disposition, they describe the concept of open-mindedness and

intellectual flexibility as the “impulse to explore alternative points of view…try new

things and ideas” (p. 42). Such an emphasis recognizes that much of human life is very

complex, and only to the extent that one is able to exercise intellectual flexibility and

open-mindedness is one be able to effectively and fairly think through the complexities of

any given problem; to see the problem for what it is and explore various solutions. The

development of one’s critical capacities cannot be left to chance, which is one of the key

reasons critical thinking is at the heart of a substantive education, but all too often such

goals are not met.

Arthur Costa (2001c) argues that “a great problem facing education is caused by

the fragmentation of thinking and acting – a way of thinking that divides and fails to see

the interconnections and coherence of divergent views” (p. xvii). David Perkins (2001)

makes a similar claim stating that because of the general failure of education to facilitate

the development of important intellectual dispositions, students more often than not fail

to identify “alternative options for a decision or look at evidence on both sides of an

issue” (p. 159). Furthermore, he notes that his research shows that although students may

make such intellectual moves when asked, they do not have the disposition or inclination

to make such moves on their own accord. In other words, students regularly perform

tasks when directed, but the general disposition to do so is largely absent. As a result,

open-mindedness and intellectual flexibility are not explicit values within a student’s
 74 
 

mind, thus increasing the probability that innate tendencies to think within limited points

of view and think in fragmented and inflexible ways will dominate the mind.

Nosich (2005a) characterizes the problem as “Developmental Patterns of

Thinking” (p. 25). He sees the inflexible thought and close-mindedness as part of a

larger network of barriers to thinking well which manifest themselves, for example, in the

inability to break long standing thought patterns. Nosich likens such thinking to that of

the simple, or unsophisticated, thought of a child. He writes, “When we feel threatened,

we can easily revert back to a child’s way of thinking. Problems that can be solved may

seem overwhelming” (Nosich, 2005a, p. 25). Stagnant thought patterns can manifest

themselves in numerous ways. For example, one may not be able to see alternative ways

of approaching a problem; one may not be able to generate questions necessary to unpack

a problem; one may not be able to differentiate between how concepts are used, and one

may not be able to see the extent to which one’s group defines the way s/he interprets the

world and the values and belief one holds. This last manifestation of inflexible thought is

often referred to as socio-centricity.

David Perkins closely contextualizes the concept of socio-centricity to critique

social barriers to developing an intellectually flexible mind. He discusses four

interconnected social barriers to critical thinking: doctrine, authoritarianism, prejudice

and subjective relativism. He writes, “Doctrine, authoritarianism, and prejudice all name

social forces that narrow people’s thinking” (Perkins, 2001, p. 160). Furthermore, when

people discover that opinions widely vary and when they confuse opinion with

formulating reasoned judgments, then “they often adopt a relativist stance. Anything
 75 
 

goes. Truth is what you believe” (p. 161). From Perkins statement a clear connection

between the barriers is observed.

For example, the lack of intellectual flexibility is closely linked to the concepts of

egocentricity and socio-centricity as barriers to good thinking. These concepts are

interconnected where, to some degree, the existence of one necessitates the existence of

the others. Costa (2001b) writes, “Students who lack flexibility as a habit of mind

perceive situations from a very ego-centered point of view. They regard their approach

to solving a problem as the only acceptable one” (p. 82). Likewise, Paul and Elder argue

that one’s innate tendency to think egocentrically and socio-centrically regularly, and

subversively, challenge the development of important intellectual dispositions like open-

mindedness and flexibility. This can be seen through a brief conceptual analysis where

the uncritical implementation of one intellectual virtue negatively affects the actualization

of others all of which are closely linked to maintaining the dominance of one’s biased

beliefs over one’s critical capacities (Paul & Elder, 2006a).

The lack of intellectual flexibility and open-mindedness are closely linked with

other unfavorable or pathological dispositions, such as the lack of empathy (selfishness),

the lack of humility (intellectual arrogance), the lack of confidence in the reasoning

process, and the lack of fair-minded thinking (close-mindedness). When one cannot

fairly and accurately place himself within another person’s point of view, then he lacks

the ability to think empathetically, which is necessary for thinking ethically and

expanding his general world view. When one is not able to see alternatives, then one

most likely suffers from a lack of intellectual humility and confidence in reason.

Inflexible thought and close-mindedness are fundamental obstacles to thinking critically

 76 
 

because of the conceptual dispositions with which they are intimately linked. Although

each of these barriers acts largely on a subconscious level, it is possible to bring them to

the forefront of one’s mind as intellectual tools that can be used to monitor the quality of

one’s thinking within context.

It is important to note, that there are barriers to thinking critically that move well

beyond, but remain closely connected with, the concepts of egocentricity, socio-

centricity, close-mindedness and inflexible thought. Students face many social,

economic, political and institutional obstacles; all of which contribute to the problem of

poor motivation. Critical thinking is dedicated to addressing each in context, all the

while maintaining an awareness of the human tendency to distort reality out of ignorance

and/or vested interest. The spirit of critical thought is dedicated to confronting the

obstacles to thinking critically by fostering important intellectual dispositions that foster

reasoned judgments. These concepts are fundamental to the discourse on critical

thinking.

Important Dispositions and Attitudes for Thinking Critically

The question that drives the concept of critical thinking dispositions is: What does

it mean to be a good thinker? This question is one of the foundational questions inherent

within the history of critical thinking and the community of intellectuals that continues to

make it an important and viable goal to be pursued within education and life. This

section briefly addresses how key scholars have articulated important habits of mind as

necessary to a substantive conceptualization of critical thinking, how intellectual

dispositions have been defined, and the types of dispositions considered desirable for

thinking critically.
 77 
 

Virtually all scholars concerned with critical thinking agree that there are

important dispositions characteristic of thinking critically and that these dispositions can

be systematically cultivated. The underlying assumption is that the purpose of

developing one’s critical thinking skills, abilities and dispositions is to live a more

intellectually autonomous and ethical life. For example, in her article entitled “Skills,

Generalizability, and Critical Thinking,” educational philosopher Sharon Bailin (1998)

argues that any robust conceptualization of critical thinking must explicate intellectual

dispositions as necessary conditions for thinking critically. She writes, “Finally, the

master of the other intellectual resources is insufficient if an individual does not have a

basic commitment to rational inquiry which disposes her to deploy the resources and the

attitudes or habits of mind which characterize critical thinking” (Bailin, 1998, An

Alternative to Skill Talk, ¶ 3).

Likewise, in an updated article entitled “Critical Thinking: What it is and Why it

Counts,” Peter Facione summarizes the results of a report by the American Philosophical

Association, entitled Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of

Educational Assessment and Instruction, in their attempt to explicate the meaning of

critical thinking and its valued dispositions. The report argued that “the ideal critical

thinker can be characterized not merely by her or his cognitive skills but also by how she

or he approaches life and living in general” (Facione, 2004). There are important

common dispositions that characterize those concerned with living a better or more

ethically fulfilling life, one based on understanding the way one thinks and the affect of

one’s thinking on others. From this point of view, scholars articulate the nature and
 78 
 

importance of developing certain habits of mind even though their descriptive

terminology often varies.

For example, Edward Glaser (1941) emphasizes the necessity of a critical

attitude. Harvey Siegel (1990) refers to the critical spirit. Robert Ennis (1996) refers to

important dispositions. Art Costa (2001b) argues for facilitating what he calls passions

of mind, and Richard Paul (1995a) uses the term intellectual virtues/ traits. Regardless of

the terminology, to think critically requires that one has a certain attitude or disposition

about oneself that enables him/her to clearly and precisely identify a problem or issue,

engage in deliberate and disciplined intellectual work when addressing the problem or

issue, and accept the results of the reasoning process even if one’s conclusions do not

conform to one’s existing belief or value system.

Tishman et al. (1995) and Richard Paul (1995a) provide working definitions of

that which characterizes a critical thinking disposition in general. Tishman et al. define

dispositions as “1. Inclination and habits of mind that benefit productive thinking. 2.

Ongoing, abiding tendencies in thinking behavior exhibited over time across diverse

thinking situations” (p. 37). Identifying critical thinking dispositions as productive

separates positive and negative dispositions, but both regularly contribute to “overall

thinking performance” of either higher or lower quality. In an article entitled “Thinking

Dispositions: A Review of Current Theories, Practices, and Issues” Tishman and

Andrade argue that a conceptual distinction between positive and negative dispositions is

necessary for facilitating the development of any positive disposition within an

educational setting. They write “on the positive side, one might be disposed toward fair

and open-minded intellectual behavior. On the negative side, one might be disposed
 79 
 

toward biased and one-sided thinking” (Tishman & Andrade, n.d., What Kind of

Thinking Dispositions Are There, ¶ 1). Clear conceptual distinctions can guide the

curriculum so that specific learning tasks can be developed and met. The concepts of

active and cooperative learning are examples of this necessary distinction.

Students regularly engage in active and cooperative learning; it is a natural part of

group behavior. However, without a clear distinction between active and cooperative

learning that is constructive and ethically responsible and active and cooperative learning

that is destructive and ethically irresponsible, the concepts cannot be substantively

applied to meet specific learning objectives. Students actively and cooperatively learn to

manipulate and dominate others. Specifically, they actively and cooperatively learn to be

socio-centric as well as construct and perpetuate stereotypes. This type of dispositional

thinking does not meet the goals of what it means to think critically, and, therefore, a

learning activity that does not clarify the distinction will reduce the probability that the

desirable trait will be targeted and developed. Alternately, a clear distinction between

concepts can target specific intellectual dispositions within the curriculum.

Active and cooperative learning that is engaged critically is characterized by a

conscious awareness of the need to be fair-minded to alternative points of view, to work

well with others to identify and solve problems, address issues, and pose questions.

Thus, active and cooperative learning substantively conceived engages important

dispositions such as intellectual empathy, integrity, humility, and open-mindedness. The

disposition is intellectual because it is behavior that is explicit in one’s mind and it

adheres to the ideals of thinking based on valid reasons. Conceived as such, active and

cooperative learning becomes an empowering concept whereby clear learning activities

 80 
 

can be designed so as to develop important dispositions. The majority of work centered

on the articulation and development of intellectual dispositions largely focuses on the

positive or desirable traits. Paul and Elder make the same conceptual distinction as

Tishman and Andrade, but argue it is much more complicated than juxtaposing positive

and negative traits.

In their book Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Learning and

Your Life Paul and Elder argue that at any given time people are engaged in both positive

and negative behaviors. At best, one can work to move toward practicing positive

dispositions more regularly. The recognition and acceptance of one’s innate irrational

tendencies, like egocentricity, socio-centricity and ethnocentricity, is necessary for the

successful and substantive development of important critical thinking dispositions. In

other words, since it is widely accepted that thinking of the highest quality takes

intellectual discipline and time to cultivate, then one must always work against those

innate forces that often prevent the development of good thinking (Paul & Elder, 2006a).

The assumption is that human thinking is both rational and irrational at times. Where

thinking is flawed, it takes intellectual discipline and training to correct it, the regular

practice of which will develop important and socially responsible habits of mind.

Thinking critically is central in Paul and Elder’s explanation of critical thinking

dispositions.

Paul and Elder conceptualize critical thinking dispositions as important

intellectual virtues. These virtues are a system of interconnected dispositions necessary

for thinking critically in a fair-minded and ethical manner. They define critical thinking

dispositions as “traits of mind and character necessary for right action and thinking; the
 81 
 

traits essential for fair-mindedness. They distinguish the narrow-minded, self-serving

critical thinker from the open-minded, truth-seeking critical thinker” (Paul & Elder,

2006a, p. 490). Critical thinking dispositions, so conceived, are behavior patterns that

work toward fair-minded thinking by regularly confronting psychological and social

obstacles.

Although it is widely acknowledged that intellectual dispositions are intimately

interconnected, scholars explicate certain core dispositions that are present to varying

extents within others. For example, Paul and Elder (2006a) emphasize fair-mindedness

as the overarching trait that, when substantively cultivated, yields other dispositions such

as intellectual autonomy, intellectual civility, intellectual courage, intellectual empathy,

intellectual humility, intellectual integrity, intellectual perseverance, intellectual

responsibility, sense of justice, and confidence in reason.

According to Facione’s (2004) report, dispositions characteristic of critical

thinkers include the tendency to be open-minded, judicious, truth-seeking (intellectually

honest), inquisitive, are systematic and analytic, and have confidence in reason. Bailin

(1998) includes as important critical thinking dispositions “respect for reasons, an

inquiring attitude, open-mindedness, and fair-mindedness” (Alternative to Skills Talk, ¶

3). Costa (2001c) lists intellectually effective and flexible people as interdependent

meaning makers as general dispositions that characterize a critical thinker. Whether

general or specific, in every case scholars articulate the interconnections between

different dispositions.

For example, for one to think empathetically one must first acknowledge the

limits of one’s knowledge which implies a sense of humility. Likewise, to exercise

 82 
 

patience in solving a problem one must have confidence that the reasoning process will

yield the best solution. Yet again, to be intellectually flexible requires a sense of open-

mindedness so that all relevant possibilities, points of view, and solutions can be taken

into consideration. Substantively conceived, critical thinking dispositions common to

thinking critically can be discussed in general and specific terms (Tishman & Andrade,

{n.d.}). Critical thinking dispositions are a network of concepts that are mutually

dependent to varying extents; where the cultivation of one requires or brings about the

cultivation of others. The explication of each, however, provides specific targets that can

guide curriculum design so as not to leave their cultivation to chance.

The intentional attempt to cultivate critical thinking dispositions works toward the

ideals of a liberal education. It is an education that is consistent with the intellectual

tradition of a substantive approach to critical thinking theory and instruction. In order to

cultivate positive dispositions one must mindfully recognize the value of said dispositions

and systematically identify and apply them in one’s daily life choices and decisions. The

critical thinker, then, is one who recognizes the need to improve the general quality of

his/her thought. Costa (2001c) summarizes the importance of teaching critical thinking

and fostering the development of related dispositions writing, “The goal of education

should be to support others and ourselves in liberating, developing, and habituating

greater self-thought and reflection. Thinking about our own thoughtfulness becomes the

force directing us toward becoming increasingly authentic, congruent, and ethical” (p.

xviii). Education, thus conceived, is not limited to institutional settings, but is driven by

the purpose to work toward a more critical and ethical world society. Intellectual

dispositions are the first set of concepts present within this synthesis of scholarly work on
 83 
 

a base-line conception of critical thinking; they are both fundamental and powerful to a

substantive conception of critical thinking. The second concept is that of making

reasoned judgments.

Critical Thinking as a Process of Making Reasoned Judgments

Dispositions that mark a critical thinker are intimately tied to the process of

formulating reasoned judgments. The idea of judging reasonably is to take into

consideration all relevant information and perspectives prior to deciding what to believe

or do. Broadly conceived, reasoning is a process whereby one attempts to figure

something out, and to judge is to use explicit criteria within the analysis and evaluation of

a problem, issue or question (Paul, 1995a). Together, a reasoned judgment is the process

by which one attempts to formulate a conclusion that is based on justifiable criteria;

criteria that is fair and not subject to one’s personal bias and prejudice. Stated

differently, to draw a reasoned judgment, one must examine the problem for what it is;

identify and analyze relevant information with the mind to see make an unbiased

interpretation; use all available resources to draw one’s own conclusions rather than be

subject to the unfounded persuasion of others; take into consideration all domains

relevant to the problem or issue rather than allowing one’s bias to establish the criteria for

inclusion. Reasoned judgments, then, represent a process that facilitates the development

of a fair-minded and autonomous mind; a fundamental and important goal in a liberal

education. What follows is a compendium of scholars who articulate the significance and

characteristics of judging reasonably as a necessary condition of thinking critically. Each

contribution illuminates a different dimension of the concept revealing its robust

structures and applications.

 84 
 

Paul and Elder (2006d) closely link reasoned judgment with intellectual

autonomy. They define the later as:

Having rational control of one’s beliefs, values, and inferences. The ideal of

critical thinking is to learn to think for oneself, to gain command over one’s

thought processes. It entails a commitment to analyzing and evaluating beliefs on

the basis of reason and evidence, to question when it is rational to question, to

believe when it is rational to believe, and to conform when it is rational to

conform. (Paul & Elder, 2006d, p. 16)

To think autonomously is the tendency for one to formulate his/her own ideas,

conclusions and beliefs based on a fair assessment of the evidence inherent within a

problem at issue. Israel Scheffler (1973) frames the ideal of critical thinking to which

Paul and Elder refer in a broader pedagogical category arguing that a substantive

education requires that students and teachers “appreciate fundamental concepts and

alternatives, and are thereby enabled to develop their own free judgment and sense of

intellectual autonomy” (p. 2). Scheffler, like Paul and Elder, highlights the

interconnection between the process of drawing reasoned judgments and the concepts of

autonomy and education. From this, the pedagogy of critical thinking originates as a

product of a liberal education a goal of which is to liberate one from the fetters that bind

them.

Educating students to make reasoned judgments is to work toward the ideals of a

liberal education; an education where students have the intellectual tools necessary to

think well within and across domains thus actively participating in the construction of

his/her decisions and beliefs. Scheffler (1973) speaks to the essence of a liberal
 85 
 

education arguing that the connection between moral, scientific and democratic

educational purposes suggests “that the fundamental trait to be encouraged is that of

reasonableness. To cultivate this trait is to liberate the mind from dogmatic adherence to

prevalent ideological fashions” (p. 142). The tendency of the human mind to blindly

conform to dominant and cultural assumptions is, and always has been, a deep concern of

a liberal education. This tendency narrows one’s view of the world. Without explicating

and applying standards of reasonableness, the intellect will continue to be bound by

ignorance; ignorance that prevents the development and actualization of important

dispositions like intellectual empathy, courage, and open-mindedness.

Critical thinking scholar Peter Facione (2004) posits a like interpretation arguing

that the main purpose of education, especially higher education, is to “achieve what

people have called a ‘liberal education.’ Not liberal in the sense of a smattering of this

and that for no particular purpose except to fulfill the unit requirement. But ‘liberal’ in

the sense of liberating,’” (p. 13). The act of developing one’s ability to draw reasoned

conclusions is an act of liberation where one pursues significant purposes the process by

which the intellect is liberated from stagnation and control. Education, substantively

conceived, is an active process whereby students engage their intellects.

In the introduction to Paulo Freire’s (1970/1998) book Pedagogy of the

Oppressed, Richard Shaull emphasizes education as a liberating process writing that

“there is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education either functions as an

instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic

of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes ‘the practice of

freedom,’ the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality
 86 
 

and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world” (Shaull, 1998, p.

16). Shaull’s words speak to the indoctrinating and socializing affects of non-critical

education. Only to the extent that one takes identifies and takes command of the

structures of his/her thinking will one begin to confront and direct his/her decisions and

world-view. The process of formulating reasoned judgments is integral to this goal

which is repeated throughout the historical discourse on critical thinking because it is

directly relevant to how education should be, in part, conducted; or for that matter, not

conducted.

When applied to teaching and learning, facilitating the development of making

reasoned judgments is in direct contrast to didactic lecture and rote memory. Paul, Elder

et al. (1997) argue that the process of formulating reasoned judgments is in direct

opposition to “1) the mere acquisition and retention of information alone, because it

involves a particular way in which information is sought and treated; 2) the mere

possession of a set of skills, because it involves the continual use of them; and 3) the

mere use of those skills (‘as an exercise’) without acceptance of their results” (p. 4). This

approach to teaching and learning is often referred to as the banking concept of

education.

Paulo Freire (1970/1998) writes that education conceived as such “becomes an act

of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor.

Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the

students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat…the scope of action allowed to the

students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits” (p. 53). In the

banking model of education, the model to which the pedagogy of critical thinking stands
 87 
 

in direct opposition, students are the passive recipients of knowledge rather than active

participants in its construction. The implications of this approach are overwhelmingly

negative. Students merely regurgitate what has been given to them including the

unquestioned assumptions of one’s society and culture.

In the seminal book, How to Read a Book, Adler and Doran (1972) point out that

the packaging of information and points of view, of conclusions and assumptions “is

often done so effectively that the viewer, listener, or reader does not make up his own

mind at all. Instead, he inserts a packaged opinion into his mind, somewhat like inserting

a cassette into a cassette player. He then pushes a button and ‘plays back’ the opinion

whenever it seems appropriate to do so. He has performed acceptably without having

had to think” (p. 4). The process of becoming educated in the strong sense of the term

involves thinking critically about problems, issues and questions so that one can

formulate an autonomously reasoned conclusion; a conclusion that is disciplined because

it adheres to rational criteria, and has entered fairly into all relevant points of view.

Only to the extent to which students identify and take command over the

obstacles to high quality thinking, and only to the extent that instructors guide students

through the process of formulating reasoned judgments based on significant problems

will students begin to think autonomously and begin to see the value in doing so. Only

then will education become a liberating experience. John Dewey speaks to this ideal in

many of his writings.

In Education and Experience Dewey (1938/1997b) writes, “The only freedom

that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of

observation and of judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically

 88 
 

worthwhile” (p. 61). This statement emanates Dewey’s dedication to the scientific

method as a guide for making decisions and directing society; but when broadly

conceived, his point of view reflects his deep desire for people to learn to see a problem

for what it is, without projecting their biases on the process, and making decisions

accordingly. Intellectual freedom becomes actualized when it adheres to the principle of

formulating reasoned judgments directed at significant issues and problems. For Dewey,

this is not a mere abstraction. Rather, he outlines specific perimeters of high quality

thinking similar to others in the discourse on critical thinking and education.

In his book, How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking

to the Reflective Process, Dewey writes of judging reasonably as an important intellectual

process that characterizes one aspect of a base-line notion of what it means to think with

discipline. He writes, “To be genuinely thoughtful, we must be willing to sustain and

protract that state of doubt which is the stimulus to thorough enquiry, so as not to accept

an idea or make a positive assertion of a belief until justifying reasons have been found”

(Dewey, 1910/1933, p. 16). To suspend judgment until one has examined the evidence

and evaluated it using rational criteria are fundamental to formulating reasoned

judgments. This statement remains consistent with contemporary interpretations of what

it means to draw reasoned judgments as a tenet of thinking critically.

For example, educational philosopher Michael Beyer (2001b) speaks to the

essence of what it means to think reasonably as an act of critical thinking that is both

ideal and pragmatic. He writes, “One of the most essential aspects of critical thinking is

critical judgment;” where one has the “inclination to evaluate objectively rather than to

accept blindly” (p. 88). The process of evaluation has many layers when discussed as in
 89 
 

this way; processes that involve skill in the analysis and assessment of a problem or issue.

What follows are a series of statements by prominent theorists of critical thinking

pedagogy that outline some of these processes.

Beyer (2001b) credits philosophers and critical thinking theoreticians Matthew

Lipman, Robert Ennis and Richard Paul for clearly articulating specific skills that

characterize what it means to make reasoned judgments as a part of critical thinking

theory. These include: “Determining the credibility of a source. Distinguishing the

relevant from the irrelevant. Distinguishing facts from value judgments. Identifying and

evaluating unstated assumptions. Identifying bias. Identifying point of view. Evaluating

evidence offered in support of a claim” (p. 88). Each of these skills speak to the fact that

formulating reasoned judgments is not outside of context, and that educators and students

need to be sensitive to context so as to prevent background biases (cultural, social,

personal) from tainting the decision making process. It is in this sense that Fung (2005)

argues that from a theoretical standpoint “sensitivity to context” addresses the post-

modern critique that critical thinking theory does not properly account for the various

cultural dimensions in the reasoning process (p. 28). Likewise, Nosich (2005a)

emphasizes the vital need to be sensitive to context when evaluating any claim, argument

or perspective emphasizing that concepts found within natural languages, like clarity,

accuracy, relevance, depth, breadth, etc., can be powerful cross-cultural evaluation

criteria because they act to slow one’s thinking so as to ensure fair treatment of ideas and

perspectives. Israel Scheffler explicates like elements of reasoned judgment.

In his book Reason and Teaching Scheffler (1973) argues that “In training our

students to reason we train them to be critical. We encourage them to ask questions, to

 90 
 

look for evidence, to seek and scrutinize alternatives, to be critical of their own ideas as

well as those of others…For if they seek reasons, it is their evaluation of such reasons

that will determine what ideas they eventually accept” (p. 143). For Scheffler, the

ultimate goal of seeking reasons for decisions is to help students make up their own

minds as to what to believe. To do so requires an awareness of one’s thinking and the

thinking of others, and a process for assessing the quality of all the thinking that bears on

the problem at issue. All too often, however, one’s decisions and beliefs are a product of

both intentional and unintentional manipulation the only defense of which is the

development of one’s critical faculties. In this vein, educational theorist Robert Swartz

conceptualizes the elements involved in formulating reasoned judgments.

In an article entitled “Teaching for Thinking: A Developmental Model for the

Infusion of Thinking Sills into Mainstream Instruction,” Swartz (1987) argues that “One

must look critically at sources of information, consider specific pieces of evidence and

what likely causes they support, and in general move from speculation to hard-nosed

reasonable judgment” (p. 120). Swartz takes a more defensive approach cautioning

people of the need to be skeptical. Although healthy skepticism is at the heart of the

matter, it is important to have well rounded conceptualization of reasoned judgment as a

part of thinking critically. Educational philosopher Sharon Bailin’s account offers one

such interpretation.

Bailin (1993) writes, “Critical thinking involves judging between conflicting

points of view and adjudicating among competing claims, and this may well lead to the

questioning of assumptions and the redefinition of a problem. Thus arriving at an overall

assessment in any complex circumstance requires constructing a new view derived from
 91 
 

the questioning, weighing, rejecting, reconciling, and integrating of numerous divergent

points of view” (p. 161). To think reasonably, then, is to think with discipline and not

confuse the rational assessment of a problem or issue with mere subjective opinion.

Reasoning based on the skilled use of consistently applied, and accepted, elements and

criteria guide one’s mind so as to insure the fair treatment of all perspectives and

information involved.

Gerald Nosich (2005a) points out that people constantly make judgments, but all

too often such conclusions are unreasonable. For example, it is unreasonable to make

gross generalizations as in the case of stereotypes by placing one’s preconceptions on

another or another group. A judgment is reasonable when one’s thinking “meets high

criteria of reasonableness;” when one thinks through a problem, issue or question

adhering to standards of accuracy, clarity, fairness and sufficiency to name a few

(Nosich, 2005a, p. 13).

Persons educated in the strong sense of the term regularly “examine reasoning to

judge the extent to which it meets accepted standards of reasonableness and logic.” To

formulate reasoned judgments, then, “consists of applying appropriate criteria to any sort

of communication” (Beyer, 2001b, p. 88). The regular awareness, allegiance to, and

mindful application of intellectual standards to the assessment of problems is a necessary

condition of what it means to draw reasoned conclusions as a part of thinking critically.

Another dimension of this process is important to briefly address. Upon revisiting

Dewey’s statement that reasoned judgments involves thinking about something

“inherently worthwhile,” it becomes apparent that he connects the process of judging

based on reasons to the concept of significance, both as a goal in and of itself and as a
 92 
 

process with practical goals that are inherently important. Significance, as

conceptualized here, is a criterion for evaluation that characterizes what it means, in part,

to think critically. As Paul (2007 July) argues, to think critically is “to think well about

something worth thinking about.” When consciously applied, the standard of

significance shows that critical thinking is not a trivial process. Rather, it is a process

that carries with it the commission to take problems, issues and questions seriously; to

approach them with intellectual discipline; to respect the intellectual process and tradition

of what it means to think critically. In this sense, the process of drawing reasoned

judgments is inextricably connected to the practicalities of life. It represents both the

ideal to which people should seek, and the method by which people can work toward the

ideal.

Ennis (2001) reiterates the significance and practicality of drawing reasoned

judgments in his article entitled “Goals for a Critical Thinking Curriculum and its

Assessment.” He argues that at the heart of thinking critically is the ability to make

skilled reasoned judgments because this skill is necessary for “(a) examining the

traditions of good thinking in successful disciplines of inquiry, and (b) seeing how we go

wrong when we attempt to decide what to believe or do” (p. 46). Ennis sees the process

of reasoning as figuring out what others have said as a guide to identifying and correcting

fallacious thought. This is largely a pragmatic endeavor that is directly applicable to how

one lives his/her life.

To summarize, the concept and process of judging according to justified reasons

is a necessary condition of what it means to think critically. It is present throughout all

substantive conceptions of critical thinking, and its related concepts and processes are
 93 
 

well established. For example, scholars connect it to the analysis and evaluation of

arguments, problems, questions and issues according to criteria like fairness and

significance, and to important dispositions like intellectual autonomy. Finally, it is firmly

agreed that, as a process of thinking critically, the ability to formulate reasoned

judgments is an essential goal for a liberal education.

Chapter Summary

When viewed in its entirety, part two of this chapter outlined the fundamental

obstacles and concepts for a base-line conception of critical thinking. There are

indispensable concepts inherent within substantive definitions of critical thinking which

can be synthesized to form an essentialist conception. An essentialist approach to

conceptualizing critical thinking seeks to illuminate the powerful role a deep

understanding of base-line concepts can offer those concerned with improving the quality

of their thinking. Each concept implies other concepts moving one to consider the

relevancy of a broad range of ideas within any context. This chapter argued that

recognizing the pervasive roles egocentricity, socio-centricity, and intellectual

inflexibility and close-mindedness play as obstacles to our thinking is vital for developing

high quality thought. Reciprocally, it is necessary to deeply understand and engage

concepts characteristic of high quality thinking and the behavior that follows from it,

namely: developing important habits of mind and formulating reasoned judgments.

Scholars throughout the discourse engage these fundamental concepts in various

ways and within various contexts. A close observation of any substantive discussion of

critical thinking illuminates the presence of such concepts within and across disciplines.

Moreover, one can easily discern the applicability and significance of these concepts to
 94 
 

the daily lives of all people when placed within the broader goals of critical thinking

theory. Part three elaborates on this trans-disciplinary base-line conception of critical

thinking so as to explicate the importance of critical thinking beyond that of what has

been implicitly discussed.

 95 
 

CHAPTER 3

WHY IS CRITICALTHINKING IMPORTANT?

Abstract
In this chapter, Hale explicates some of the most cited reasons the concept of
critical thinking is considered important. In doing so, he discusses three aspects of
critical thinking that are highly visible within the discourse and have significant
implications to living an intellectually autonomous and social responsible life. (1)
Critical thinking is important to making decisions that guides everyday life. (2) Critical
thinking is important to the preservation of democratic ideals, and (3) critical thinking is
vital for survival in a rapidly changing world.

Introduction

Critical thinking is inseparable from discussions of education. Scholars widely

agree that critical thinking is a product of becoming educated in the strong sense of the

term. The educational system, both formal and informal, provides the platform by which

important critical thinking skills, abilities and dispositions can be developed and applied

to life outside of the classroom. The implications for thinking critically are nothing short

of working toward the development of human societies that promote ethical and fair-

minded thinking. The ideal goals of thinking critically are just that: ideals. There are

more practical implications for fostering critical thinking. Moseley and colleagues

(2005) capture some of the most apparent implications writing that “[critical] thinking

skills (or at least those skilled in thinking) are needed, not only in the worlds of work,

education and training, but in the contexts of family, friendship and community and in the

construction of personal and shared beliefs and values.” Furthermore,

there is good evidence that organizations are more successful the more they

involve their members in the processes of problem-solving and decision-making.

In the ‘information age’ qualities of independence and flexibility are highly

valued and ‘learning to learn’ has become an important goal. A well-functioning

 96 
 

democracy is not only one in which people feel that their views can be freely

expressed and are adequately represented; but one where those views are

informed by reliable information, critical appraisal of ideas, creative thinking and

open debate. (p. 9)

Critical thinking is a process that when substantively conceived and engaged can

infiltrate every aspect of a person’s life making it more fulfilling and rewarding. It is not

a thing or an object to be purely quantified. Rather, thinking critically is a state of mind

that has direct implications to how we live our lives individually and as members of a

world community.

There are three general areas most often cited for the justification of teaching

people to think critically: (1) critical thinking is vital for daily life decisions, (2) critical

thinking is necessary for the survival of democracy as an ideal and, more importantly, as

an applied form of government, (3) critical thinking is necessary for surviving and

thriving in a rapidly changing world. Although all three points are intimately

interrelated, each points to necessity of thinking critically within different practical

dimensions of human life ranging from the social to the deeply personal.

The Importance of Critical Thinking in One’s Daily Life Decisions

Critical thinking is not limited to complex problems or classroom environments.

Rather, critical thinking is applicable to every domain of life to the extent one seeks to

understand his/her actions, beliefs, values and decisions. Intellectuals concerned with the

quality of human thought and action have long insisted on the importance of grounding

abstract theoretical ideas in concrete experiences. Since scholars commonly

acknowledge that critical thinking skills and abilities are best fostered in an instructional
 97 
 

settings and that critical thinking must be transferred from within the classroom to one’s

life outside of the classroom, then critical thinking instruction must be, at its essence,

practical. As psychologist Robert Sternberg (1987) argues, “One must teach for transfer,

rather than merely hoping or even praying that it will occur” (p. 258). He goes on to

argue that any critical thinking program “must cross disciplines, so that students can see

directly the relevance of these [critical thinking] principles across subject-matter areas.

One cannot expect students to transfer unless they are shown just how the principles do

transfer across domains…Principles and rules [for good thinking] should be presented in

contexts that vary from the very abstract to the very concrete..from the academic to the

practical” (p. 258). Critical thinking, as a theory of thinking well, is a practical endeavor

rather than merely an idealistic goal. As critical thinking Facione (2004) argues “Critical

thinking goes way beyond the classroom” (p. 8). In this vein, Gerald Nosich clearly

articulates the need for critical thinking in one’s daily decisions through clear examples

in his text Learning to Think Things Through: A Guide to Critical Thinking Across the

Disciplines.

For example, in the first chapter Nosich (2005a) asks “How deep is our need for

critical thinking” (p. 29)? He addresses this question arguing that it is needed in three

primary areas. Critical thinking is needed (1) at the level of practical decision making,

(2) at the level of meaningfulness, and (3) at the level of concepts. Nosich grounds these

three abstract levels in practical examples that all people experience at some time and to

some degree.

At the level of practical decision making, Nosich (2005a) explains that “critical

thinking helps when we are simply trying to deal with ordinary tasks: how to study more
 98 
 

effectively, find a strategy when stuck in an airport, decide what kind of cloths to buy”

(p. 29). Critical thinking, at this level, is geared toward solving problems and

accomplishing tasks. People can begin to find better solutions to problems and goals

when their thinking is explicit and reflected upon. Furthermore, developing critical

thinking skills helps one see alternatives to choices and actions, discard and reconsider

potentially outdated assumptions, and explore possible positive and negative implications

to a decision or action. Simply stated, critical thinking is practical because it helps one

identify and organize his/her goals so that they are attainable (Nosich, 2005a).

At the level of meaningfulness, Nosich (2005a) argues that “critical thinking frees

people, the way nothing else really can, from habits of thinking they are often ruled by”

(p. 26). Habits of mind often direct the way people construct meaning from their world.

Mental habits operate on various levels and to varying degrees; for good or for ill. The

critical thinker is one who seeks to understand the way his/her habits of thought direct

his/her thinking and belief systems. Nosich (2005a) points out that egocentrism is a

major obstacle to thinking critically because it often prevents one from recognizing

alternative points of view and alternative approaches to solving problems. In such cases,

criticality of thought is compromised as people “revert back to a child’s way of thinking”

(p. 26). One must recognize alternatives in order to begin his/her journey toward

intellectual freedom; a freedom which leaves “people far more fulfilled.”

Meaningfulness, then, is not an unattainable metaphysical state; rather, it is a product of

quality thinking. Critical thinking helps one discover new meaning and usefulness in

his/her ideas and actions. Nosich elaborates the concept of meaningfulness with a
 99 
 

general explication of the need to think critically about the concepts that often govern

daily life and beliefs.

At the level of concepts, Nosich connects the art of thinking critically with the

importance of understanding the concepts people use daily. He writes, “We think in

terms of concepts, and these inevitably shape our life to a considerable degree” (Nosich,

2005a, p. 30). Concepts can be understood either superficially or deeply. At the

superficial level, people’s thinking is governed by concepts that they have accepted

uncritically; such acceptance is more often the case than those held critically. At the deep

or substantive level, concepts are tools governed by one’s thinking that can be used

poorly or profoundly. The extent to which one engages, directs and controls the concepts

he or she uses to interpret and organize questions, issues, problems and content reflects

the extent to which people are active participants in their thinking rather than passive

recipients of beliefs and values imposed upon them by various social and cultural factors.

Nosich (2005a) writes, “We can reach a deep level of critical thinking by examining our

concepts critically, becoming more aware of the way individual concepts help us or hurt

us, limit us or free us” (p. 30). Thinking critically about the concepts one uses and that

society uses is an act of liberation where one takes conscious steps toward thinking for

himself or herself.

To think autonomously is to govern the concepts that engage our thinking. Since,

Nosich argues, that concepts influence desires, emotions, relationships, the way facts,

problems, questions and related ideas are framed and categorized, and even physical

sensations, then one must work to gain an explicit understanding of the concepts with

which one regularly engages. Critical thinking helps one monitor his/her concepts and,
 100 
 

therefore, what one accepts and believes, how one feels, and what one wants. To think

critically, then, is to think about the way ideas are used in daily life.

Nosich’s work is consistent with the intellectual tradition of critical thinking. For

example, the seminal works of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein points to the ever

present need to use language, and therefore the concepts inherent in communication,

clearly and precisely. Similarly, in 1963, philosopher John Wilson of Cambridge

University published an entire volume on the importance and process of analyzing

concepts entitled Thinking with Concepts. In this text he outlines why conceptual

analysis is important to not only academic work, but in thinking critically about one’s

daily life and decisions. John Dewey is another example articulating a similar line of

reasoning in his 1938 book entitled Education & Experience.

Dewey (1938/1997b) argues that educational systems and theories of education

will fail (or continue to fail in his context) unless an “organic connection [is made]

between education and personal experience” (p. 25). He clarifies the concept of personal

experience arguing for an approach to education that encourages critical reflection on

one’s experiences, as opposed to an educational or instructional approach that

conceptualizes experiences superficially. The key idea is that critical thinking involves

the analysis and evaluation of one’s experiences as they pertain to substantively

understanding content and oneself. Nosich, like the intellectuals who preceded him,

correctly sees the direct applicability of critical thinking to personal experiences, and in

fact does not separate the two.

It has been argued that critical thinking is applicable to daily life decisions.

Critical thinking is important to the extent one seeks to understand the thinking in which
 101 
 

s/he engages and the consequences of one’s thinking. For centuries educators have

extolled the importance of teaching students to think well so that they can live better

individual and social lives. Critical thinking instruction must be grounded in students’

everyday experiences so that the abstract is made concrete. As Nosich eloquently points

out, teaching students to think critically should begin with practical examples. Only then

will students begin to recognize the need to improve their thinking and make responsible

decisions necessary for social responsibility and the preservation of the democratic ideal.

The Importance of Critical Thinking to Democracy

Scholars within the intellectual tradition of critical thinking discuss its importance

to democracy, both as an ideal and applied. It is assumed that democracy is a favored

form of government. The democratic ideal explicates within its structures the need to

value, work toward, and preserve the natural and civil rights of its citizenry. At its root,

any democratic project respects the right of self-government and the right of communities

to make group decisions. It is a form of government where the will of the majority

prevails all the while protecting the rights of the minority. Despite its spotty presence in

reality, the democratic ideal rests on the assumption that its citizens are well informed

and can generate reasoned judgments. Specifically, democracy needs an education

system that promotes intellectually autonomous thinkers who will hold government

responsible for preserving the rights and needs of its populous. That is, democracy,

ideally conceived, relies on a substantively educated populous; a populous composed of

people educated in the art of thinking critically and acting responsibly.

In his ground breaking work on critical thinking, An Experiment in the

Development of Critical Thinking, Edward Glaser (1941) began his argument for the
 102 
 

importance of critical thinking by framing it as a necessary democratic condition. He

references key figures in the history of the United States, like Thomas Jefferson and

George Washington, who argued that democratic ideals can only survive and thrive

within the new country if its citizens were educated. As Washington stated in his

Farewell Address, “Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the

general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of government gives force

to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened” (Glaser, 1941,

p. 3). Glaser (1941) echoes Washington’s concern writing that “These men were

convinced that their experiment with free political institutions would fail if the state

neglected to cultivate in youth that degree of social understanding and critical-

mindedness necessary to judge public issues intelligently” (p. 3). An education based on

and dedicated to the facilitation of students’ critical faculties calls “for a conviction of the

worth of democratic values and ideals such as those embodied in the Constitution of the

United States, a kind of conviction which operates to make one willing to put forth

serious effort to preserve and extend those values” (p. 5). As Glaser sees it, critical

thinking and democracy are inseparable.

Brookfield captures the relationship between critical thinking and democracy

well. Like many others within this tradition, he argues that critical thinking is a

necessary condition of any democracy. Brookfield believes that identifying and

scrutinizing assumptions is an essential and foundational part of thinking critically. He

writes:

Critical thinking is… important because of its connection to the democratic

tradition. At the heart of a strong, participatory democracy is citizens’ capacity to

 103 
 

question the actions, justifications, and decisions of political leaders, and their

capacity to imagine alternatives to current structures and moralities that are fairer

and more compassionate. Such capacities are judged by some to develop as we

learn to think critically. Consequently, encouraging critical thinking is often seen

as integral to the democratic project. (Brookfield, 2005, p. 49)

To think critically is to gain control over one’s thinking. In doing so, one begins

to develop a heightened sense of intellectual autonomy necessary for participation within

a democracy. Such autonomy does not stand on its own, but is intimately connected with

the society and world in which one lives. In this sense, to develop one’s ability to think

for oneself is to develop a heightened sense of social responsibility. Democratic

governments, then, desire citizens who are not only intelligent, but can think fairly and

justly.

Harvey Siegel draws an explicit link between democracy as an educational ideal

and critical thinking. He questions the concept of education as it relates to democracy.

Since a “properly functioning democracy requires an educated citizenry,” then “what sort

of education does such a citizenry require?” (Siegel, 1990, p. 60). Siegel argues that

critical thinking is a necessary condition for the democratic ideal to exist. “If the

democratic citizen is not a critical thinker, she is significantly hampered in her ability to

contribute helpfully to public life. Democracies rely for their health and well being on

the intelligence of their citizens. My point is simply that such intelligence, if it is truly to

be of benefit, must consist in part of the skills, attitudes, abilities and traits of the critical

thinker. It is not simply an intelligent citizenry, but a critical one, which democracy
 104 
 

wants” (Siegel, 1990, p. 60). Siegel’s explication speaks to the role and responsibility of

the individual in working toward the group as a whole.

Within a democracy the individual has a social responsibility to the betterment of

the group. John Dewey’s seminal work Democracy in Education is based largely on this

premise. He writes that part of the relationship between the concept of education, in the

strong sense of the term, and democracy is “bound up with the very idea of education as a

freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims. Otherwise

a democratic criterion of education can only be inconsistently applied” (Dewey,

1916/1997a, pp. 98-99). Again he writes, “But if democracy has a moral and ideal

meaning, it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for

development of distinctive capacities be afforded all. The separation of the two aims in

education is fatal to democracy” (p. 122). Richard Paul reiterates the importance of

education for critical thinking and social responsibility.

In an article titled “Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship: Teaching

for the Intellectual Virtues” Paul (1995) argues that teaching students intellectual skills is

not enough. Students must be educated to think critically in the “strong sense” which is

“necessary to moral integrity and responsible citizenship” (p. 257). He writes,

“intellectual skills in and of themselves can be used either for good or ill, to enlighten or

to propagandize, to gain narrow, self-serving ends, or to further the general and public

good.” It is vital, he posits, that education in important virtues is essential for the survival

of democratic ideals and “for future human survival and well-being” (Paul, 1995, pp.

257, 268). Or as Scheffler (1973) writes, “The function of education in a democracy is

rather to liberate the mind, strengthen its critical powers, inform it with knowledge and
 105 
 

the capacity for independent inquiry, engage its human sympathies, and illuminate its

moral and practical choices” (p. 139).

It has been argued that an educated populous is necessary for democracy to

survive; that education as it is relevant to the preservation and extension of democratic

ideals and values must cultivate critical thinking; that critically minded citizens preserve

and extend the democratic ideal through socially responsible actions. Numerous scholars

in the critical thinking community call for the preservation of democratic ideals through

educating its citizens in the art of fair-minded, socially responsible critical thinking.

Education within a democracy must move beyond merely informing its citizens; it must

move toward the creation of a critical society.

The Importance of Critical Thinking in a Rapidly Changing World

The mark of the current world is one of increasing complexity and accelerating

change: economically, environmentally, socially, politically, culturally, and

technologically. The Twentieth Century has experienced more technological

advancements than the whole of human history: from the car to space craft, silent films to

cell phone videos, telephone to the internet, single action rifles to the hydrogen bomb.

The Twentieth Century has also experienced an unprecedented population explosion

where the approximately one billion people who occupied the earth in 1900 have grown

to almost seven billion today, and growing every second. Today’s human atrocities,

although not unique in human history, affect more people and have greater global

implications. Environmental degradation that is a result of human pollution is visible in

the daily loss of increasing numbers of plant and animal species, deforestation, poisoned

aquifers and oceans, contaminated air, and global warming to name a few general
 106 
 

categories. One could argue that, if nothing else, today’s students face greater challenges

in the workplace than earlier generations. Mass communication, outsourcing, and rapid

technological changes challenge every student to be better competitors in today’s

economy. In every case, people must be equipped with the intellectual skills to make

reasoned judgments and act accordingly.

Like every higher order skill, quality thinking must be cultivated. Education is

the process that (ideally) provides the environment for higher order thinking skills to

develop. As a theorist of critical thinking and critical pedagogy, Stephen Brookfield

(2005) points out that critical thinking is pursued as an important educational goal

“because learning to think critically can help students deal with ambiguity and negotiate

the bewildering pace of social and technological change” (p. 49).

In his seminal book Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a

Rapidly Changing World critical thinking theorist and practitioner Richard Paul (1992c)

articulates within the first chapter the meaning and implications of the book’s title. Paul

argues that “The world is swiftly changing” and the “pressure to respond” to such

changes intensifies daily (p. 1). He questions, “Can we deal with incessant and

accelerating change and complexity without revolutionizing our thinking?” (p. 1).

According to Paul, the answer is no. Every facet of human life is changing and will

continue to change at a rapid pace: socially, politically, economically, culturally,

technologically, and environmentally. The quality of human thinking will reflect, and

currently reflects, the quality of human life. Paul argues that all significant human

problems are multi-dimensional, and critical thinking is the only way to deal effectively

with such problems. Furthermore, fostering an education system that facilitates the
 107 
 

development and application of critical thinking is the only way to ensure that students

will be able to deal ethically and effectively with such problems in the future, including

their own economic survival. Paul concludes with a call to action, summarizing the need

for thinking critically within a world of accelerating change. He writes:

We must sooner or later abandon the traditional attempt to teach our fellow

citizens what to think. Such efforts cannot prepare us for the real world we must,

in fact, face. We must concentrate instead on teaching ourselves how to think,

thus freeing us to think for ourselves, critically, fairmindedly, and deeply. We

have no choice, not in the long haul, not in the face of the irrepressibly logic of

accelerating change and increasing complexity. (Paul, 1992c, p. 16)

In the same spirit as Paul, Alder and Doren (1972) write “We must be more than a nation

of functional literates. We must become a nation of truly competent readers, recognizing

all that the word competent implies. Nothing less will satisfy the needs of the world that

is coming” (p. 30). Only by thinking critically can people hope to gain the intellectual

skills necessary for preserving their personal lives, the lives and rights of others, and the

earth’s ecological diversity. Adler and Doren (1972) eloquently summarize the spirit of

critical thinking in a rapidly changing world, writing that critical thinking is “the art that

enables you to elevate yourself by mastering what at first sight seems to be beyond you”

(p. 30). Faced with a rapidly changing and increasingly more interconnected and

complex world, the skill of thinking critically with a disposition to persevere through

life’s difficulties is a condition necessary to meet this challenge.

 108 
 

A Challenge

As argued, to think critically is to have command over one’s thinking; to identify

and solve problems; to recognize the egocentric and socio-centric forces that compromise

quality thinking; to search for alternatives; to accurately identify and fairly assess

assumptions. To think critically is to have the disposition to make reasoned judgments

and live according to the conclusions. Critical thinking is important because the “quality

of our thinking reflects the quality of our lives” (Paul & Elder, 2006d, p. 4). This is true

for survival in a rapidly changing world; for the preservation and extension of democratic

ideals; for making quality decisions in one’s personal life. The challenge, however, is

that to raise one’s thinking to a higher level; to make it clearer, more precise, more

organized, more fair, requires rigorous intellectual engagement.

Critical thinking requires rigorous intellectual work. It is not easy and nor should

it be. Scheffler (1973) writes “To be reasonable is a difficult achievement. The habit of

reasonableness is not an airy abstract entity that can be skimmed off the concrete body of

thought and practice” (p. 144). Furthermore, “Educational skill is not instinctive but

rather the product of training and experience, leading to a mastery of [intellectual] rules”

(Scheffler, 1973, p. 145). Likewise, Dewey (1938/1997b) argues that “there is no

discipline in the world so severe as the discipline of experience subjected to the tests of

intelligent development and direction” (p. 90). Intellectual work is practical; it is

grounded in experience and, thus, applicable to every facet of life to the extent it is

reflected upon. Unfortunately, it can be argued that students, and often instructors, lack a

substantive intellectual work ethic.

 109 
 

Glaser (1941) argues that although education within the United States has

“resulted in a generally literate electorate…public education has not resulted in the

development of a sufficient proportion of citizens who can evaluate critically what they

read” (p. 5). Glaser’s words resonate throughout the intellectual world exemplified by

the call for increased literacy and critical thinking in the educational goals and objectives

in many countries throughout the world. Adler and Doren echo Glaser’s sentiments

arguing that although it is difficult to engage in intellectual work so as to improve the

general quality of one’ thought, it is a worthy and attainable goal. They write, “It is

relatively easy to think of and be conscious of physical acts. It is much harder to think of

mental acts…in a sense, he is thinking about his own thoughts. Most of us are

unaccustomed to doing this. Nevertheless, it can be done, and a person who does it

cannot help learning to read [think] much better” (Adler & Doren, 1972, p. 56).

Regardless of one’s theoretical conceptualization, theorists of critical thinking agree that

critical thinking involves rigorous intellectual work and it requires systematic cultivation.

One cannot expect to improve his/her thinking if s/he is intellectually lazy. Likewise,

people cannot expect to think better without communal guidance and support.

Thinking critically is both an individual and communal enterprise. The individual

is reliant on a community that directs and encourages the need to think critically, but the

community cannot, in the end, think for the individual. Each person is commissioned

with the challenge to monitor his/her own thinking making the concept of self-regulation

is an essential and foundational concept in the process of thinking critically. The

individual and the community are interconnected and interdependent. The community

creates the environment for facilitating the development of critical thought within its
 110 
 

members, and the individual benefits by becoming more intellectually autonomous.

However, with greater intellectual autonomy comes the recognition of one’s

responsibility to the community, ideally speaking, giving back by helping ensure the

continued development of learning environments conducive and dedicated to fostering

critical thought within all of its community members. The individual and the community

share responsibility for engaging in and cultivating critical thinking.

Paul and Elder (2006a) emphasize the importance of intellectual work as a

necessary condition to improving the quality of one’s thought. “To make significant

gains in the quality of your thinking, you will have to engage in a kind of work that most

humans find unpleasant, if not painful: intellectual work” (p. xx). Paul and Elder note

that poor motivation is one of the most significant obstacles to developing as a thinker.

Although one’s community can provide the environment and support conducive to

fostering motivation, ultimately the responsibility to engage in intellectual work rests on

the individual.

As noted earlier in this chapter, self-regulation and self-correction are

fundamental concepts in a substantive conceptualization of critical thinking. Educational

training can provide the environment and introduce the necessary intellectual tools for

thinking critically, but it is the responsibility of the individual student to apply them.

This is not to claim, however, that a learning environment does not share responsibility.

Education, as a formal system, has long been assigned the task of teaching students to

think more critically, but without an explicit understanding of, or focus on a substantive

conception of critical thinking, the community’s ability to systematically cultivate the

need to engage in intellectual work suffers.

 111 
 

In order to foster the development of important critical thinking skills and

abilities, the educational environment must deeply value critical thinking. In this sense, a

community is established where every task in which students engage promotes deep

learning. Tishman et al. (1995) of Project Zero at Harvard University capture this

problem stating:

In recent years there has been lots of talk in education about thinking skills –

critical thinking skills, creative thinking skills, problem-solving skills, and the

like. To be sure, thinking skills are important. Crucial, in fact. But simply having

a skill is no guarantee that you will use it. In order for skills to become part of

day-to-day behavior, they must be cultivated in an environment that values and

sustains them. Just as children’s musical skills will likely lay fallow in an

environment that doesn’t encourage music, learners’ thinking skills tend to

languish in a culture that doesn’t encourage thinking. (pp. 1-2)

The community of which Tishman et al. speak is one that values critical thought at its

core. In order for educational institutions to foster important critical thinking skills and

abilities, the institution must recognize that only through critical thought, and

environment that encourages its development, will learning be substantive, useful,

responsible, and lasting. Critical thinking must be the organizing idea for all curriculum

rather than merely something to be added to it (Nosich, 2005b). In this sense, critical

thinking becomes the foundation by which all learning takes place. Only to the extent

that an educational community values and fosters critical thinking will the individual

benefit in such a way that s/he can give back to his/her community and continue the

intellectual tradition on which the concept is based and thrives.

 112 
 

CHAPTER 4

IN DEFENSE OF A SUBSTANTIVE TRANS-DISCIPLINARY CONCEPTION OF

CRITICAL THINKING INSTRUCTION

Abstract:
In this chapter, Hale builds off of the base-line conception of critical thinking
established in the second chapter arguing that a critical thinking education, substantively
conceived, continually explicates the foundational and essential concepts and principles
of critical thinking within and across every context and domain. In other words, Hale
argues that a trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking is present within the
discourse on critical thinking and when exposed, represents a substantive approach to
critical thinking instruction. In doing so, he defines the concepts substantive and trans-
disciplinary and shows how common approaches to critical thinking instruction are non-
substantive. Placed in the context of the dissertation, this chapter lays the conceptual
groundwork necessary for his argument that Richard Paul’s conception of critical
thinking is both substantive and trans-disciplinary in its theoretical construction and its
approach to instruction.

Introduction

The foundational approach critical thinking discussed in the first chapter outlines

what can be considered widely acknowledged macro goals and characteristics of thinking

critically. However, the application of such ideas requires further development and

contextualization so that theorists, researchers, instructors, and students are not left with

an ambiguous sense of how to engage the concepts within specific contexts in academia

and in life. Each idea present within the base-line conception of critical thinking is

visible and regularly contextualized within specific domains. However, problems of

transfer arise when these base-line concepts are not sufficiently unpacked revealing their

trans-disciplinary application, when educators are not explicitly aware of these canons of

scholarship so that their instruction emphasizes the development of each and,

consequently, when students are not provided with learning experiences that explicate the

manner in which these concepts appear within and across disciplinary contexts. Transfer

is of central importance in working toward the ideal goals of education. A substantive,

 113 
 

trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking is one way to approach the problem of

transfer because it emphasizes and elaborates the necessary conditions of critical thinking

and explicates specific dispositions and abilities that are present within and across

domains. The base-line approach established in the first chapter informs what constitutes

a trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking and how it applies within instruction.

As established in the first chapter, many scholars have conceptualized various

base-line conceptions of what it means to think critically. Every synthesis holds insights

that highlight important aspects of high quality thinking. Moreover, every substantive

synthesis is theoretically and pedagogically similar to others. Such similarity reveals

that, on a fundamental level, critical thinking theorists and pedagogues work toward the

same macro goals; principles that speak to the need to prepare students for coping with a

rapidly changing world and work toward the envisioning critical societies. McPeck

(1992), who is noted for his critique of conceptions that advocate generalized critical

thinking skills and subsequent programs, writes of such agreement:

we agree on ultimate goals and purposes. We all want to produce autonomous

thinkers who are not taken in by faulty argument, weak evidence, or trendy

opinions, and can face life’s problems as people capable of making their own

rational decisions about whatever should confront them…Moreover, we agree that

this capability can and should be taught to students (whenever possible) since they

are not born with the requisite knowledge and skill for attaining this goal. (p. 32)

McPeck’s statement exemplifies the common goals and concepts among all those

concerned with fostering higher order thinking. However, the application of such goals

remains a point of debate.

 114 
 

The purpose of this chapter is to argue that among the different approaches to

critical thinking instruction, a trans-disciplinary conception consistently meets the

minimum criteria for that which constitutes a substantive approach to critical thinking

instruction. In other words, instruction that emphasizes and appropriately contextualizes

ideas that work within, and move across, disciplines is a practical way to work toward the

ideals of education while critically engaging students in the logic of the discipline. In

interrogative form, the organizing question for this chapter is: How does a substantive

base-line approach to conceptualizing critical thinking reveal the need for a trans-

disciplinary conception of critical thinking? To properly settle this question, the

following will be explained.

1. The terms substantive and trans-disciplinary.

2. The inadequacies of a skills-only approach to critical thinking instruction.

3. The inadequacies of a “one of many” approach to critical thinking instruction.

4. The inadequacies of a domain-specific approach to critical thinking instruction.

5. Trans-disciplinary approach to critical thinking instruction is substantive.

6. How a trans-disciplinary approach is contextualized using science education as

an example.

7. Richard Paul’s work as an example of a substantive trans-disciplinary

conception of critical thinking and approach its instruction.

It is concluded that a substantive approach to critical thinking instruction is one

that continually, and appropriately, explicates and seeks to develop general critical

thinking principles, concepts and abilities within and across contexts. Such a conception

works toward the development of general critical thinking skills and abilities as well as
 115 
 

the development of domain specific skills and abilities. The question is not one of

either/or, but of both/and. If education is to work toward its goals of fostering

intellectually autonomous and socially responsible citizens of a global community, then

the explicit development of both general and specific intellectual dispositions and

abilities must be the focus. A trans-disciplinary approach to critical thinking instruction

is the only approach that clearly explicates general critical thinking dispositions and

abilities.

1. Clarifying Concepts: Substantive and Trans-disciplinary

A conceptual analysis of the terms substantive and trans-disciplinary reveals

significant insights into its use as an organizing idea for framing the notion of critical

thinking and its implications for instruction. The purpose of this section is to clarify the

concepts substantive and trans-disciplinary as interpreted within this dissertation so as to

explicate their relevance to critical thinking theory and instruction.

What is meant by ‘substantive?’

The relevant dictionary entry reads “(4a) of, containing, or dealing with the

essential elements; essential; (4b) having direct bearing on a matter” (Agnes & Guralnik,

Eds., 2007). This definition highlights two significant points. The first is that for

something to be substantive it must “deal with” its essential or foundational elements or

structures inherent within its logic. The second point is that the concept of substantive

implies standards of relevance and significance to the topic under question. Framed

within the discourse on critical thinking, substantive emphasizes that every conception

must (1) continually revisit and explicate the macro and micro goals of critical thinking

within subject matter, (2) make important and concrete ties between critical thinking
 116 
 

concepts/skills and the subject matter, and (3) systematically encourage the development

of those dispositions necessary for becoming a fair-minded critical thinker.

It is assumed that in order to effectively teach students the art of thinking

critically, then instruction needs to be based on a robust and substantive model of critical

thinking. The discourse engages a range of disciplines, so insights from each discipline

illuminate various dimensions that otherwise may be overlooked. A substantive

conception of critical thinking focuses on those concepts and goals at the heart of what it

means to think critically and what it means to be a critical thinker. Substantive models of

critical thinking instruction should explicate foundational, or essential, concepts inherent

within content and couple them with pedagogically sound teaching and learning

strategies so that students can begin to make concrete ties between thinking critically and

thinking within the logic of the discipline and their lives.

What is meant by ‘trans-disciplinary?’

The prefix trans means something that moves across, beyond or through another

thing or concept (Agnes & Guralnik, Eds., 2007). The word discipline has multiple

entries, but for the purposes of this dissertation, the word discipline will focus on its

meaning as an attitude of instruction or learning that is “designed to train to proper

conduct or action” in the sense of developing a sense of, and adhering to a set of

principles that characterize scholarly work (Agnes & Guralnik, Eds., 2007). In other

words, the concept of discipline is intended to mean systematically developing skills that

ensure and encourage high quality intellectual work; improving one’s thinking requires

intellectual discipline. The word discipline applies to two dimensions of human thinking

relevant to its use within this dissertation.

 117 
 

The first use of the word discipline is the thinking of the individual in relation to

the improvement of his/her intellectual skills and abilities. The second use refers to the

nature of academic disciplines as products of centuries of intellectual work that attempted

to establish intellectual standards within a specific area of study and the scholarly

community. Both meanings are essential for the development of a substantive

interpretation of the larger notion of trans-disciplinary thinking.

Synthesis

When placed together, the words trans and discipline form a powerful concept

that can be applied to different dimensions of thinking. Trans-disciplinary, then, is the

process by which one engages in the intellectual work necessary to think well within,

across and beyond different academic and personal domains. The underlying assumption

is that there are a minimum set of criteria that govern the quality of thinking common to

all domains of thought. In other words, inherent within a trans-disciplinary notion of

thinking is the idea that there must be fundamental principles, concepts and abilities that

characterize high quality thinking throughout all contexts.

There are four general approaches to critical thinking instruction: skills-only,

subject specific, “one of many,” and explication and infusion. The following sections

briefly discuss the inadequacies of the first three as models for critical thinking

instruction. It is argued that the fourth is sufficient as a substantive approach.

2. Inadequacies of a Skills-only Approach to Critical Thinking

Instruction

One approach to conceptualizing and instructing generic critical thinking skills

and abilities is found among various “skills-only” models of education; approaches that
 118 
 

support the establishment of thinking skills programs devoid of domain specific content

and methods. These models are based on the “assumption that if students master well a

battery of general skills, they will use these skills in other curriculum areas as well as in

the normal course of daily affairs” (Fung, 2005, p. 41). Examples include Reuven

Feurstein’s Instructional Enrichment Program and Edward De Bono’s Cort Thinking

Lessons (Cognitive Research Trust). Repeated studies have shown that such prescriptive

approaches to teaching general critical thinking skills and abilities are largely ineffective

(Fung, 2005; McPeck, 1992; Willingham, 2007). One key problem with this approach is

that of the inability to transfer insights and intellectual skills from one context to another.

David Perkins (1987) discusses the problem inherent in skills-only models in

terms of “problems of disconnected knowledge and teaching thinking out of context” (p.

62). On the one hand, students are inundated with information (knowledge) that is

“disconnected from features that make it understandable and meaningful” (Perkins, 1987,

p. 63). General critical thinking concepts and skills require contextualization. They are

meaningless abstractions unless grounded in concrete domain specific and life examples.

Furthermore, it is only through the metacognitive awareness of the thinking in which one

engages and the ability to apply that thinking across contexts is it said that a person

develops as a critical thinker.

Perkins (1987) summarizes the inadequacy of a skills-only approach to critical

thinking instruction writing:

“Placing all our bets on stand-alone thinking courses entails certain risks and

misses certain opportunities. The principal risk is the problem of transfer.

 119 
 

Contemporary research shows that instruction offered in one context often does

not transfer to other contexts, so that thinking skills taught out of contexts of

subject matter instruction may well have little impact on performance in

the subject areas.” (p. 63)

More importantly, however, is that rigid mental compartmentalization that is not only

common to human thinking, but reinforced by skills-only models of critical thinking

instruction do not empower one’s intellect to see the relevance of critical thinking skills

to one’s daily experiences and beliefs (Nickerson, 1987). A substantive conception of

critical thinking recognizes that although general critical thinking principles, concepts

and abilities exist, thinking is always about some topic and within some context; such

“skills-only” models fail to meet this level of substance.

3. Inadequacies of a “One of Many” Approach to Critical Thinking

Instruction

The “one of many” approach to critical thinking instruction treats critical thinking

as a completely separate content area that is added to the curriculum, rather than

embedded within it. A common consequence is that students compartmentalize

instructional content (including critical thinking) in such a way that important

connections are not established. Unless critical thinking is embedded into the logic of the

curriculum in such a way that students create the content in their own minds, students

will not develop vital critical thinking skills, abilities and insights.

Gerald Nosich critiques this method to critical thinking instruction in an article

entitled “Problems with Two Standard Models for Teaching Critical Thinking.” He

argues that this approach is “perhaps the most common method of teaching for critical
 120 
 

thinking” (Nosich, 2005b, p. 60). In this model of teaching, Nosich (2005b) describes,

“critical thinking is only one method among many for helping students learn the subject

matter” (p. 60). He cites a study of 24 major textbooks commonly used in community

college courses, concluding that their very structure “dramatically illustrates massive

emphasis on rote learning” (Nosich, 2005b, p. 60). This is exemplified in the fact that

critical thinking is sanctioned to a small section of questions found within chapter

reviews. Nosich emphasizes that such a model promotes recall rather than deep

understanding.

“The ‘one of many model’ makes the assumption that there are other viable,

effective ways for students to learn the material besides learning to think their way

through it. This assumption does not do justice to the centrality of critical thinking in all

genuine learning” (Nosich, 2005b, p. 60). In another related article Nosich (1996) again

emphasizes that those who advocate, or blindly follow, the “one of many” model are

terribly misguided in their assumption that deep learning can take place “without having

students think through,” the content critically (p. 58). A substantive conception of

critical thinking instruction recognizes that “all content ‘lives’ in the form of thinking,”

and that “only through thinking can students ‘take possession’ of content and make it

theirs” (FCT, 1999, pp. 2-6). A substantive approach to critical thinking instruction

recognizes (1) the inseparable relationship between content and the thinking, and (2) the

need for students to build substantive knowledge by engaging the content critically;

points a “one of many” model fails to meet.

 121 
 

4. Inadequacies of Relying on Individual Disciplines to Teach Students

to Think Critically: A Laissez-faire Approach to Thinking Critically 7

Significant attention is dedicated to the inadequacies of this frame of reference

because it represents the dominant approach to critical thinking instruction across

educational settings (Adler, n.d.; Paul, 1995c, 1995d; Perkins, 1987). Domain-specific

approaches to critical thinking instruction refers, largely, to a laissez-faire attitude toward

critical thinking theory and its role in education. This attitude infers that students learn to

think critically through enrollment in academic courses, and that exposure to and

participation in a variety of courses will result in more intellectually autonomous and

socially responsible citizens. A passive approach to critical thinking instruction is widely

critiqued by the majority of scholars within the discourse that advocate direct instruction

in general critical thinking principles, concepts and skills. Few scholars, if any, argue

that critical thinking principles, concepts and skills do not need explication within

educational settings.

A laissez-faire approach to critical thinking instruction does not advance the

development of critically minded students, and, therefore, does not advance those

educational ideals that value intellectually autonomous and socially responsible citizens

of a global community. This instructional orientation is often a product of institutional

structures (Kerr, 1972), which makes instruction prone to didacticism (Paul, 1995). One

cannot assume that a substantive conception of critical thinking is explicit in the minds of

institutional organizers or instructors. The purpose here is not to oversimplify the

multiple reasons for embracing such an orientation, but to point out some of the
 122 
 

foundational inadequacies of this orientation, conscious or unconscious, as a mode of

critical thinking instruction.

Reliance on individual instructors to teach students to think critically is

inadequate for the primary reason that it, inadvertently, reinforces intellectual

fragmentation. Institutional organization and poor teacher training in the art of

instruction, and that which constitutes critical thought, are two causes associated with this

problem. 8 Nonetheless, there are two clear consequences of intellectual fragmentation:

(1) students do not learn to think of the content or domain as a mode of thinking, and (2)

students on the whole do not transfer general insights and skills from one domain to the

next. In both cases those principles and goals that represent the ideal of what it means to

be an educated person or a critical thinker are set aside, deemphasized, or silently implied

making instruction largely inapplicable to cultivating intellectually autonomous and

responsible citizens of a global community.

Since the world’s most significant problems require interdisciplinary exegesis,

then it is necessary that students receive explicit instruction into the nature of what it

means to engage in substantive intellectual work within and across academic domains.

Students must be equipped with critical thinking concepts and skills that facilitate the

cultivation of important intellectual dispositions. To work toward those educational

ideals that value intellectual independence and a commitment to one’s community

requires a systematic approach to facilitating the development of important intellectual

dispositions: another foundational goal that a domain-specific approach to critical

thinking instruction fails to explicate and cultivate. Intellectual fragmentation and the

lack of transfer are two interconnected symptoms of a larger pedagogical problem

 123 
 

associated with a laissez-faire and domain-specific interpretation of critical thinking

instruction. Both points will be addressed in turn.

Intellectual Fragmentation does not Encourage Understanding Content as a System of

Thinking

One of the inadequacies of relying on specific domains to foster general and

transferable critical thinking dispositions and abilities is the tendency for students to

compartmentalize subject matter rather than seeing the subject as a system of thought.

This is not a problem with the domain itself. It is a problem with reliance on instructors

to make critical thinking explicit within the logic of the subject. Such reliance is a

symptom of the didactic tradition and institutional structures that consequently promote

departmental isolationism and is short sighted. 9

As noted in chapter one, although the majority of instructors claim they know

what critical thinking is, claim it is important to education, and claim that they regularly

foster it within their instruction, the opposite is true (Paul, Elder et al., 1997). It is not

enough to passively rely on the, often uncultivated, pedagogical skills of lone instructors

to promote critical thought. Furthermore, it is not enough to assume that, by virtue of

taking a course, students will intuitively identify and develop critical thinking skills.

Higher order thinking must be explicitly cultivated; a first step so is to recognize that

every domain represents a system of thought that must be substantively created within

students’ minds in order for knowledge to be substantively understood to be applied.

In an article entitled “Infusing Thinking in History and the Social Sciences,”

pedagogue Barry Beyer (2001a) writes that intellectual skills must be explicated so that

students can consciously understand a domain as a logical system. He argues that “the
 124 
 

bodies of knowledge that constitute each of these disciplines have been and continue to

be produced” by cognitive skills that characterize what it means to think critically (p.

317). One cannot substantively think within the logic of a discipline without consciously

engaging higher order thinking skills; “skills that range from simple recall to more

complex and rigorous reasoning, critical evaluation, inference making, and other higher-

order thinking operations” (Beyer, 2001a, p. 317).

Like so many scholars who argue for conceptions of critical thinking that promote

the development of generalized skills and abilities, Nosich returns to the organizing idea

that content is created by thinking, and only to the extent that one thinks through content

critically will one begin to understand the interconnectedness of principles, ideas, and

methods within a field or domain. A section of his book, Learning to Think Things

Through: A Guide to Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum, is dedicated to

understanding “The Concept of the Logic of a Field.” He writes that students can “learn

parts of a subject with no idea of how those parts fit into the whole;” a tendency that

didactic instruction unintentionally propagates. He cites the fields of mathematics and

history as examples (Nosich, 2005a, p. 96).

In the case of a course in algebra he writes that “very few students finish a course

in algebra with an idea of what the whole of algebra is….[Students] can learn how to

solve quadratic equations by factoring, by completing the square, or by applying a

theorem for solving radical equations, and not have any idea of how these methods fit

together – or even that they do fit together.” Likewise, in the field of history, students

look at the subject as largely fragmented. In other words, students learn lists of events,

people, dates, and some relations between them, “but with very little idea of what the
 125 
 

history of that time and place was as a whole” (Nosich, 2005a, p. 96). Clarifying

concepts and making substantive and significant connections between them is necessary

for thinking within the logic of the field: thinking like a historian, mathematician,

physicist, chemist, or scientist in general. Although academics, especially those within

higher education, do critically engage their respective domains, it does not follow that the

intellectual skills (the ability to critically analyze and evaluate information, come to

reasoned judgments, identify problems, question sources, etc.) they intuitively engage

will be transferred to students through instruction. Critical thinking must be made

explicit.

Laissez-faire conceptions of critical thinking are inadequate because of the failure

to teach explicit, general critical thinking concepts and abilities implicit within the logic

of the domain itself. As a result, student knowledge and intellectual skills become

fragmented. Students are largely unable to identify foundational critical thinking

concepts that can be applied for purposes of analysis and evaluation within and across

disciplines and, consequently, as conceptual tools for metacognition. Costa (2001a)

eloquently summarizes an important goal of critical thinking pedagogy writing, “The core

of our curriculum must focus on such processes as learning to learn, knowledge

production, metacognition, transference, decision making, creativity, and group problem

solving…Content, judiciously selected for its rich contributions to thinking and learning,

become the vehicle to carry the learning process. The focus is on learning from the

objectives instead of learning of the objectives” (p. 246). Likewise, Beyer (2001a)

reminds us that critical thinking, in essence, “is a sort of quality control for thinking as

well as for the knowledge claims produced by thinking” (p. 319). Unfortunately,
 126 
 

domain-specific conceptions of critical thinking do not explicate the Beyer’s position,

and thus students are left without explicit intellectual resources needed for substantive

critical thought capable of being transferred across domains.

Intellectual Fragmentation does not Sufficiently Address the Problem of Transfer

The problem of transfer can be thought of as the inability to apply insights,

principles, concepts and skills from one domain to other domains. This problem, is

largely, the result of instruction that promotes intellectual fragmentation: the inability to

recognize that all domains are systems of interconnected meanings and, therefore, cannot

recognize relevant conceptual and methodological connections between domains. This

sub-section will emphasize two points in its critique of domain-specific approaches to

critical thinking instruction. The first is that research indicates that transfer of insights

and skills do not necessarily transfer from one academic domain to the next: for example,

from biology to history, from literary criticism to psychology, from chemistry to

mathematics. Secondly, there is no evidence indicating that insights and skills

emphasized within a specific academic domain successfully transfers to one’s personal

life in such a way that the ideals of education are advanced. Each point highlights the

inadequacy of domain-specific approaches to critical thinking instruction.

(1) In an article entitled “Why Teach Thinking?” Raymond Nickerson (1987)

writes that “There is little evidence that students acquire good thinking skills simply as a

consequence of studying conventional course materials. Although domain-specific

knowledge is essential to good thinking within a domain, it is not sufficient to assure that

good thinking will occur” (p. 28). Nickerson cites Glaser who writes of the same

problem:
 127 
 

A student does not tend ‘naturally’ to develop a general disposition to consider

thoughtfully the subjects and problems that come within the range of his or her

experience; nor is he or she likely to acquire knowledge of the methods of logical

inquiry and reasoning and skill in applying these methods, simply as a result of

having studied this subject or that. There is little evidence that students acquire

skill in critical thinking as a necessary byproduct of the study of any given

subject. (pp. 28-29)

One of the causes for this problem is that traditional domain-specific approaches to

critical thinking instruction take a laissez-faire approach to developing intellectual skills:

in general and within specific disciplines. To think critically requires metacognitive

awareness of the quality of one’s intellectual moves, and such awareness is not innate but

must be cultivated. One is reminded of Paul’s playful definition of critical thinking cited

in the first chapter, “Critical thinking is thinking about your thinking, while you’re

thinking, in order to make your thinking better.” Metacognition is a necessary condition

of thinking critically, and Paul’s definition illuminates two dimensions of metacognition

as a tenet of critical thinking instruction.

Metacognition must take place in two settings relevant to critical thinking

education. The first is within instructional design, and the second is within the students’

minds. In other words, instructors must have a clear understanding of those critical

thinking concepts and skills that are to be taught, how those concepts and skills are

embedded within the logic of the content, how to assess the extent to which students

think critically within the content, and how to assess the extent to which students are

aware of the intellectual moves they or others make when thinking through the content.
 128 
 

Unfortunately, metacognition is not typically encouraged by laissez-faire, domain-

specific approaches to critical thinking instruction.

Nickerson (1987) writes “if students are to acquire good thinking skills in the

classroom, explicit attention will have to be given to that objective; it is not likely to be

realized spontaneously or as an incidental consequence of attempts to accomplish other

goals” (p. 29). This inference is commonly held throughout the discourse. For example,

in a critique of domain-specific models of critical thinking Ennis (1992) writes that

“Simple transfer of critical thinking dispositions and abilities from one domain to another

domain is unlikely. However, transfer becomes likely if, but only if, there is sufficient

practice in a variety of domains and there is instruction that focuses on transfer” (p. 10).

Nickerson and Ennis highlight two important inadequacies of subject-specific models.

The first is that transfer must be practiced within concrete contexts, which implies that

there are concepts and skills that do transfer across domains. Secondly, Ennis shows us

that instruction must have a metacognitive component where generalized concepts and

skills are made explicit within the minds of students who reflect on their general thinking

process and its relevance to other domains.

Daniel Willingham’s (2007) article “Critical Thinking: Why is it so Hard to

Teach” argues that compartmentalization and lack of metacognition are two significant

factors in the prevention of transfer of general critical thinking skills. Although

Willingham accurately posits that transfer is a complex problem, traditional laissez-faire

approaches to critical thinking instruction do not contribute to its resolution. He suggests

that critical thinking instruction needs to be embedded in the content because the content

is a product of critical thought, and that general critical thinking strategies need to be
 129 
 

made explicit and regularly practiced in order for transfer to substantively occur

(Willingham, 2007). Similarly, David Perkins directly addresses the problem of transfer

in an article entitled “Teaching for Transfer.”

Perkins (2001) argues that “transfer does not take care of itself, and conventional

schooling pays little heed to the problem” (p. 370). “Conventional schooling,” according

to Perkins, is that process that relies on traditional disciplines and traditional instructional

methods to promote the development, and transfer, of vital critical thinking skills and

abilities. He writes that substantive instruction in general critical thinking skills should

“yield cognitive gains on a number of fronts,” not just within limited domains. He argues

that unfortunately such instruction is not the norm (Perkins, 2001, p. 370). Research

indicates that traditional, didactic instruction does not result in the transfer of important

general higher order thinking concepts and skills.

Perkins (2001) humorously terms laissez-faire approaches to education as the Bo

Peep theory of transfer: “Leave them alone and they’ll come home, wagging their tails

behind them” (p. 371). He continues writing, “Unfortunately, considerable research and

everyday experience testify that the Bo Peep theory is inordinately optimistic” (Perkins,

2001, p. 371). One of the major problems inherent within a laissez-faire approach is the

assumption that knowledge is substantively learning, when in fact “a great deal of the

knowledge students acquire is inert or passive” (Perkins, 2001, p. 371). In other words,

as Paul and Elder (2006a) argue, the knowledge is dead; implying that it is unusable, or

incapable of being usefully applied to problems within the subject area and within life.

Content knowledge, substantively conceived, must be brought into existence by

the mind that engages it; furthermore, instruction that emphasizes general concepts and
 130 
 

explicates how such concepts apply to other domains will increase the opportunities for

students to make such connections themselves, and thus provides an opportunity for

education to be a life-changing experience. The next section discusses a second

inadequacy of laissez-faire, domain-specific approaches to critical thinking instruction;

failure to make education a life-changing process by which students develop important

intellectual dispositions.

(2) A second consequence of intellectual fragmentation is the failure to transfer

domain-specific insights to one’s personal life in such a way that students develop

important intellectual dispositions such as humility, empathy, flexibility and fair-

mindedness. Richard Paul constructs an often cited critique of laissez-faire approaches to

critical thinking instruction likening the orientation to skills-only attempts at fostering

critical thinking. He argues that approaches to teaching critical thinking that do not

expose those general characteristics of intellectual work inherent within all disciplines, at

best promote the development of isolated skills that can be used for good or for ill within

one’s personal life. In other words, Paul insists that if education is to adhere to the

conviction that learning should be a positive life changing experience, then the work of

every domain must be explicitly connected to students’ lives and world views.

Glaser and Nickerson, quoted in the previous section, discuss the problem of

laissez-faire conceptions of critical thinking, but assume critical thinking in the “strong

sense:” thinking that is intellectually disciplined, flexible and fair-minded. Paul makes

this distinction in his critique of didactic modes of instruction that, he argues, dominate

instructional practices across the disciplines. Paul’s analysis of didacticism can be

compared to Paulo Freire’s (1970/1998) critique of the banking concept of education

 131 
 

where students are viewed as empty receptacles for the instructor to deposit and withdraw

information at will without consideration for one’s need to critically build the information

into one’s consciousness so that it becomes ethically useful and life changing.

Paul (1995a) writes that didactic, laissez-faire conceptions of education is based

on the view that the “fundamental need of students is to be taught more or less what to

think, not how to think” (p. 459). Substantive learning, according to Paul, provides

students with a learning environment that engages the reasoning process where

instruction raises “live issues that stimulate students to gather, analyze, and assess”

content in a fair-minded way (p. 459). If students are not substantively engaged, then

many students “will simply make the transition from uncritical thought to weak sense

critical thought:” thought that is skillful, but dominated by egocentric agendas and

narrow-mindedness (Paul, 1995a, p. 459). Students must develop intellectual skills that

enable them to connect significant and relevant insights between domains and expand

their world views. However, this is not possible if instruction does not help students

think through complex and multi-disciplinary problems.

Paul and Elder (2006a) argue that the majority of life’s problems require

reasoning within and across multiple domains. For example, the question “What is the

most effective and efficient way to solve the homelessness problem in the United

States?” requires one to reason through domains including, but not limited to, politics,

economics, health and medicine, psychology, sociology, ethics, and history. It is a

complex problem that requires interdisciplinary reasoning. Specifically, such problems

require general critical thinking abilities that include the tendency to analyze and evaluate

the logic of questions so as to properly identify and approach the conditions necessary to
 132 
 

settle the question. In other words, critical thinkers have command over the concept

questioning. Paul and Elder (2006c) write of one of their texts entitled The Miniature

Guide to the Art of Asking Essential Questions that the purpose of the guide is to

“introduce essential questions as indispensable intellectual tools” because “it is not

possible to be a good thinker and a poor questioner” (p. 3). Unfortunately, however,

students are not regularly taught how to substantively question and look for opportunities

to connect insights from different subject matter.

For example, Perkins and Salomon (2001) argue that “literature is a subject to

study, life a ‘subject’ to live. Yet plainly most literature treats fundamental themes of

concern in life – love, birth, death, acquisition and defense of property, and so on. The

relationship between literature and life offers an arena for reflection upon both, and for

transport of, ideas from one to the other and back again” (p. 376). From this example,

one can see the importance of conceptual analysis as a general critical thinking skill able

to be transferred across domains; a skill that didactic, laissez-faire conceptions of critical

thinking assume students will, by chance, acquire in the process of attending courses.

If students do not have explicit within their minds intellectual resources that

empower them to think critically about significant and complex life-problems, then the

potential that the majority of students will skillfully and successfully address such

problems is dramatically reduced. It can be argued that a substantive conception of

critical thinking does not leave the solution to the world’s most significant problems to

chance. In order for thought to be critical, it must be transparent, intentional, and

disciplined. A laissez-faire conception of critical thinking does not adhere to this canon.
 133 
 

The essential point of critique is that it is short sighted and inadequate to believe

that approaches to critical thinking instruction that passively rely on specific domains to

educate students in such a way that they gain command over general critical thinking

concepts and skills necessary to transfer insights between domains and to their personal

life. As Sternberg (1987) writes, “One must teach for transfer, rather than merely hoping

or even praying that it will occur” (p. 258).

There are many causes for the inadequacies of domain-specific approaches to

critical thinking instruction. One of the most visible involves the organization of learning

institutions. Teachers isolated from substantive communication with colleagues,

especially across domains, increased departmental specialization, poor training in

instructional practices characterized by didacticism, and poor funding for professional

development all contribute to fragmented learning. In a critique of California’s approach

to critical thinking instruction and assessment, Richard Paul (1995a) argues that over-

bureaucratization encourages “a high degree of narrow specialization” (p. 82). Such

specialization, when not grounded in a substantive base-line conception of critical

thinking that emphasizes generalized intellectual principles, concepts and skills, “tends to

bring fragmentation, narrowness of vision, politicization, and self-deception” to the

academic world and, thus, to the thinking of those whom education is supposed to

prepare for survival in a rapidly changing world (Paul, 1995a, p. 82). What is needed,

then, is a conception of education that confronts intellectual fragmentation with a

conception of critical thinking that continually revisits fundamental concepts implicit

within all intellectual traditions: a substantive conception of critical thinking.

 134 
 

Arthur Costa (2001a) provides some concluding remarks that summarize the

problem of domain-specific approaches to critical thinking instruction. He reminds

educators of the need to revisit the goals of what it means to be a critical thinker.

Furthermore, he reminds educators to rethink “content information” as a primary goal of

discipline specific instruction where the quality of student thinking is measured by the

amount of facts one can regurgitate. He writes:

Traditionally, school curriculum has been built upon content from the ‘scholarly

disciplines”: history, mathematics, biology, economics, and literacy. Yet, every

significant statement of the goals and outcomes of education has been expressed

in terms of desired characteristics of the student – effective problem solver,

responsible citizen, complex thinker, competent learner, and effective

communicator. We are interested in focusing on student performance under

challenging conditions that demand strategic reasoning, insightfulness,

perseverance, creativity, and precision to resolve a complex problem...We must

finally admit that process is the content. If we want students to develop certain

behavioral characteristics – taking a critical stance with their work, inquiring,

thinking flexibly, learning from another person’s perspective – then we should

start with those attributes and focus the entire curriculum on achieving them…As

our paradigm shifts, we will need to let go of our obsession with acquiring content

knowledge as an end in itself and make room for viewing content as a vehicle for

developing broader, more pervasive, and complex goals such as students’

personal efficacy, flexibility, craftsmanship, consciousness, and interdependence.

(Costa, 2001a, p. 246)

 135 
 

Costa, like so many others concerned with traditional didactic approaches to education

and narrow conceptions of critical thinking, argues that theorists and educators alike

move toward explication and integration of a substantive, general conception of critical

thinking inherent within the logic of every academic domain; a move that will inevitably

take place because of the growing awareness that significant issues and problems are

inevitably cross-disciplinary, that students need general critical thinking skills to

successfully think through the interconnections inherent within such issues and problems,

and that these general skills will help students survive and thrive in this increasingly

complex world. Domain-specific conceptions to critical thinking instruction are not

sufficient for the development of general critical thinking skills because of their passive

approach to transfer and de-emphasis of the interconnection between content and

thinking.

5. Trans-disciplinary Model as a Substantive Approach to Critical

Thinking Instruction

A substantive conception of critical thinking must continually move back and

forth between an explication of general critical thinking principles, concepts and skills

and the application of these principles, concepts and skills within specific contexts with

the goal of working toward those ideals of education that value intellectual autonomy and

social responsibility. A trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking is based on the

idea that certain concepts and skills exist within, and move between, all disciplines.

Thus, a substantive conception of critical thinking based on a trans-disciplinary model

should explicate foundational and essential concepts inherent within all disciplines,

appropriately apply these concepts within specific contexts, and work toward the ideals
 136 
 

of what it means to be a fair-minded critical thinker. This section will (1) first cite

support for a trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking as present within the

discourse then it will (2) outline two interpretations of what constitutes trans-disciplinary

concepts and skills.

(1) Many scholars advocate the creation of a trans-disciplinary approach to

critical thinking theory and instruction. However, discussions are generally framed

within the debate between generalized and specialized approaches to critical thinking

instruction. For example, Edys Quellmalz (1987), a professor of education, proposes:

that we abandon polarizing debates and focus instead on identifying a manageable

framework of common skills that clearly generalize across academic and practical

areas. If we hope to teach students to develop generalized and specialized

reasoning strategies, we must provide them with a coherent skills framework that

will help them understand how these general and specific strategies relate to each

other and how they can be brought to bear upon academic, life, and novel tasks.

(pp. 90-91)

Likewise, Sternberg (1987) argues that thinking skills and the examples that ground them

in content and life experience “must cross-disciplines, so that students can see directly the

relevance of these principles across subject-matter areas. One cannot expect students to

transfer unless they are shown just how the principles do transfer across domains” (p.

258).

Willingham describes the often confused difference between generalized and

specialized conceptualizations of critical thinking as a false dichotomy. He argues that it

 137 
 

is fallacious to think of intellectual skills as either generalized or specialized when both

clearly exist. He writes:

Virtually everyone would agree that a primary, yet insufficiently met, goal of

schooling is to enable students to think critically… critical thinking consists of

seeing both sides of an issue, being open to new evidence that disconfirms your

ideas, reasoning dispassionately, demanding that claims be backed by evidence,

deducing and inferring conclusions from available facts, solving problems, and so

forth. Then too, there are specific types of critical thinking that are characteristic

of different subject matter: That’s what we mean when we refer to “thinking like a

scientist” or “thinking like a historian.” (Willingham, 2007, p. 8)

Willingham (2007) is one of many who have pointed out it is erroneous to think of skills

as either generalized or specialized when it is clear that the question under investigation

defines the intellectual tasks needed to settle it. When applied to critical thinking theory,

general skills represent a framework on which specialized skills are built, but are only

effectively applied according to the context that defines their manifestation. Sternberg

(1987) succinctly states this point arguing that general “principles and rules of thinking

must be presented in the context of a variety of academic disciplines” (p. 258). The

question becomes, what constitutes trans-disciplinary concepts and skills?

(2) A foundational conception of critical thinking, like that presented in chapter

one, only clarifies the most general categories that characterize what it means to think

critically within any domain. Lists of specific trans-disciplinary concepts and skills are

needed for appropriate application within and across contexts. Robert Ennis (2001) and a

cohort consisting of Paul, Binker, Martin and Adamson (2008) have constructed such
 138 
 

lists which are widely cited throughout the discourse (Baron & Sternberg, 1987; Costa,

2001a; Fung, 2005; Moseley et. al., 2005; Nosich, 2005a).

Ennis developed a taxonomy of general critical thinking dispositions and abilities

which has undergone multiple versions over the last two decades. His original 1987

version contains more complex and lengthy lists of dispositions and abilities divided into

varieties of sub-categories. 10 This version leans heavily toward traditional notions of

rationality as characterized by formal and informal logic, but still maintains its focus on

general critical thinking dispositions and abilities. The 1998 version places greater

emphasis on trans-disciplinary concepts that when consistently and appropriately applied

result in the eventual development of general critical thinking dispositions and abilities.

In both cases, Ennis (2001) argues that his taxonomy lays the groundwork for explicating

essential or “constitutive” dispositions and abilities for thinking critically as well as major

“correlative” or “auxiliary” dispositions and abilities. Ennis also notes that his taxonomy

is not exhaustive, but foundational (pp. 44-46).

For example, broad dispositions that constitute an ideal critical thinker include (1)

the tendency to “care that their beliefs be true and their decisions justified,” and (2) the

tendency to care about presenting a position honestly and clearly, whether theirs or

another’s.” Ennis breaks down these two general dispositions including the tendency to

seek reasons, clarify statements, theses or questions, look for alternatives, remain relevant

to the main point, and open-minded, which involves fairly considering points of view

other than one’s own. Like Paul, Ennis emphasizes the fundamental importance of

developing dialogical reasoning. Correlative dispositions are those that are not integral to

thinking critically, but are desirable “whose absence would make critical thinking less
 139 
 

valuable, or even dangerous” (Ennis, 2001, p. 44). Ennis description of the dangers of

selfish critical thinking parallels Paul’s distinction between strong sense, fair-minded

critical thinkers and weak sense, selfish critical thinkers. Correlative dispositions

incorporate the ethical dimension where one values and has concern for the “dignity and

worth of every person” (Ennis, 2001, p. 44). Both constitutive and correlative

dispositions rely on the regular practice of general critical thinking skills.

Ennis’s taxonomy of critical thinking abilities includes, for example, focusing on

and clarifying the question at issue, analyzing arguments by identifying reasons,

conclusions and handling irrelevance, judging the credibility of one’s sources, and

inducing and judging whether or not an argument is valid. In his more recent taxonomy,

Ennis (2001) includes the auxiliary ability to identify and correct common rhetorical

fallacies and the ability to be sensitive to “the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of

sophistication of others” (p. 46). Ennis’s taxonomy has had considerable influence on

critical thinking instructional design and assessment. It is well thought out and explicates

those general canons of quality scholarship that are necessary for raising the quality of

one’s thinking and the general ability to think well within and across domains. Paul,

Binker, Martin et al. (2008) include a similar list of trans-disciplinary dispositions and

abilities.

Paul, Binker, Martin et al. (2008) compiled a list of “35 Dimensions of Critical

Thought” that include both cognitive and affective domains (p. 56). The 35 dimensions

are a list of general critical thinking skills and abilities that are necessary for high quality

thinking within any domain. This list has also been presented as a strategy list instructors

can use to focus their curriculum for the purposes of assessing the extent to which
 140 
 

students think critically within specific contexts. 11 The list includes important

dispositions reflecting affective attitudes and behaviors that characterize fair-minded

critical thinkers, and micro and macro cognitive skills and abilities that must be

substantively and regularly engaged when working through any problem or issue. 12

For example, the affective dimension explicates specific critical thinking

dispositions characteristic of fair-minded thought. These include developing insight into

egocentricity and socio-centricity and exercising fair-mindedness, thinking

independently, “exploring thoughts underlying feelings and the feelings underlying

thought,” “developing intellectual humility and suspending judgment,” developing

confidence in reason, and intellectual perseverance. Cognitive dimensions are divided

into two groups: micro-skills and macro-abilities. Micro-skills include “refining

generalizations and avoiding oversimplification, comparing analogous situations:

transferring insights to new contexts…clarifying issues, conclusions, or beliefs, clarifying

and analyzing the meanings of words or phrases…listening critically…and reasoning

dialogically and dialectically.” Macro-abilities represent those tendencies for one to

consistently apply specific micro-skills across domains and contexts. They include

“comparing and contrasting ideals with actual practice…noting significant similarities

and differences, examining or evaluating assumptions…making plausible inferences,

predictions, or interpretations…and exploring implications and consequences” (Paul,

Binker, Martin et al., 2008, p. 56). Like Ennis, the work of Paul and his colleagues has

contributed significantly to the understanding of critical thinking theory and its role in

teaching and learning.

 141 
 

The purpose of including these two lists is to simply illustrate that (1) some of the

most influential scholars within the discourse agree that trans-disciplinary skills and

abilities exist, and (2) much intellectual work has been invested in articulating these skills

and abilities. It is no longer a question whether or not general skills and abilities exist or

whether or not skills and abilities only make sense within specialized contexts. General

skills are developed when explicitly practiced within and across specific contexts.

Instructors must clarify what generalized skills and abilities look like within specific

contexts and how they can be transferred across domains when and where appropriate.

Intellectual skills must be explicit within the mind that seeks to develop higher order

thinking skills. This is true for both the instructor and the student.

Both lists must be understood not as they appear in list form, but in their

explanation and elaboration. Both share a deep commitment to explicating the necessary

conditions of critical thinking because they are often merely taken for granted. Educators

have the additional responsibility to make visible the canons of scholarship because one

cannot assume students will come to know them through quiet exposure. Critical

thinking involves metacognition; a process that applies to both student and teacher, and is

the basis for a trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking instruction.

A trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking that emphasizes the mastery of

foundational concepts inherent within all high quality thinking is by implication

substantive. The challenge is properly contextualizing such concepts so that students

gain skill in thinking within the logic of a specific discipline and transferring insights and

skills to other domains. When substantively conceived, a trans-disciplinary conception of

 142 
 

critical thinking works toward important educational principles through the direct and

explicit engagement of ideas that exist within and move across various contexts.

6. Approach to Thinking Critically within the Disciplines: Science as an

Example

When substantively conceived, trans-disciplinary concepts and abilities are

illuminated in science education. Scholars throughout the discourse on critical thinking

and higher order thinking continually call for the reformulation of science instruction

whereby teaching becomes learner centered rather than didactic and, consequently,

intellectually stagnant and even oppressive. Science is an applied field, but instruction

continues to be dominated by didactic methods. One cannot assume students will begin

to think scientifically (begin to critically engage scientific concepts and methods) by

virtue of completing didactic course work. Scientific thinking requires critical thinking;

thinking that consciously and systematically analyzes and evaluates problems and issues

based on general canons of scholarship characteristic of a substantive, trans-disciplinary

conception of critical thinking. What follows is a brief conception of the need to

approach science education from a substantive, trans-disciplinary frame of reference.

Steven Schafersman (1997), a professor of science at Miami University, links

general critical thinking skills with what it means to think critically within the domain of

science. He writes:

Critical thinking is thinking correctly for oneself that successfully leads to the

most reliable answers to questions and solutions to problems. In other words,

critical thinking gives you reliable knowledge about all aspects of your life and

society, and is not restricted to the formal study of nature. Scientific thinking is
 143 
 

identical in theory and practice, but the term would be used to describe the

method that gives you reliable knowledge about the natural world. (p. 1)

Schafersman makes an important conceptual link between critical thinking and scientific

thinking. He recognizes that high quality scientific thinking does not exist without

critical thinking. In fact, scientific thinking is critical thought within a specific context.

In this sense, critical thinking is not something that should be merely added to science

curriculum, but it constitutes the basis of what it means to think within the domain.

Science educators are thus challenged to explicate what it means to think like a scientist,

which, by implication, requires that they explicate some of the fundamental tenets of

critical thinking; principles, concepts and dispositions that apply within and across all

domains.

For example, some of the most fundamental general principles implicit within

scientific thinking include:

ƒ Incorporation of intellectual standards of judgment.

ƒ Highlighting foundational critical thinking concepts like purposes, questions,

hypotheses, problems, concepts (model and contrary), reasons/causation,

inferences, consequences, and types of and methods for gathering

information/data.

ƒ Emphasize important dispositions necessary for fair-minded scientific

thinking: open-mindedness, intellectual curiosity, intellectual patience,

intellectual humility, and confidence in reason.

As stated in chapter one, critical thinking involves the fair-minded analysis and

assessment of thinking the explication and practice of which leads to the development of
 144 
 

important intellectual abilities. Because these categories are consistent with a base-line

conception of critical thinking they can be identified throughout the discourse. Each

presence of each point within the discourse will be briefly discussed.

Trans-Disciplinary Evaluation Standards and Scientific Thinking

In an article entitled “Teaching Thinking in Science,” Swartz and Fischer (2001)

explicate the importance of science education where students work to substantively

understand and apply important trans-disciplinary standards for assessment. For

example, they argue that important standards of judgment must be explicated so that one

can properly assess the merit of inferences. To do so is an “important critical thinking

skill.” All those involved in scientific reasoning must, for example, “determine the

accuracy of an observation,” and question the extent to which observations are reliable

(Swartz & Fischer, 2001, pp. 303-304). The standards of accuracy and reliability are not

only necessary in the evaluation of scientific reasoning and in the evaluation of reasoning

in general, but such standards must be explicit within students’ minds so that they can

develop scientific reasoning skills.

Trans-Disciplinary Concepts for the Analysis and Synthesis of Thinking within Scientific

Reasoning

The substantive analysis of scientific reasoning involves the conscious and

consistent application of a minimum set of trans-disciplinary concepts. Individual

scholars highlight certain concepts over others, but many emphasize the disciplined use

of concepts in the analysis and synthesis of scientific content. For example, David

Perkins explicates the central role concepts like purpose, structure, model cases and

arguments play in gaining deep understanding of subject matter within and across
 145 
 

domains. Similarly, Daniel Willingham emphasizes the idea of a concept and the need

for students to substantively and systematically build scientific concepts into their minds.

In an article entitled “Knowledge as Design: Teaching Thinking Through

Content,” David Perkins (1987) argues that deep understanding results when a minimum

set of trans-disciplinary concepts implicit within the analysis of any reasoning product are

appropriately contextualized and persistently practiced. He places the concepts into

interrogative form so that they can act as guides toward thinking critically. The questions

are to be applied to any object or claim and are as follows: What is its purpose (or

purposes – there may be more than one)? What is its structure? What are model cases?

What arguments explain and evaluate the object (Perkins, 1987)? Perkins cites many

examples of the trans-disciplinary relevance of each concept, but his essential point is

that “the more deeply a learner explores these four questions, the better the

understanding,” regardless of the domain (Perkins, 1987, pp. 66).

For example, he questions whether it is appropriate and meaningful to ask about

the purpose, structure, model cases, and arguments for a political system like democracy

as well as for a scientific theory like Newton’s laws. He concludes that sound intellectual

work adheres to general canons of scholarship, four of which are those concepts he

explicates. A substantive approach to critical thinking instruction exposes the trans-

disciplinary canons of scholarship inherent within the logic of the content and necessary

for deeply understanding the content in question. Scientific approaches from a trans-

disciplinary perspective engage students in scientific thinking and increase the probability

that the general skills they develop will transfer to other domains because the tenets of

high quality thinking are explicit within their minds. The same emphasis on trans-
 146 
 

disciplinary concepts is implicit within Willingham’s argument regarding the difficulties

of teaching critical thinking.

Willingham points out two general characteristics necessary to scientific thinking.

The first is the acquisition of scientific concepts. The very idea of a concept exists in all

human thought and the disciplined use and interpretation of concepts is necessary for

high quality thinking within any domain. For example, students substantively acquire

scientific concepts when they replace “naïve conceptions of motion and replace them

with an understanding of physics” (Willingham, 2007, p. 14). Motion is a concept that

can be naïvely or substantively understood. Building insights from the field of physics

into student thinking helps them critically engage the concept of motion so that it can be

appropriately interpreted and applied across various contexts.

The second characteristic of scientific thinking is understanding and practice in

“the mental procedures by which science is conducted: developing a model, deriving a

hypothesis from the model, designing an experiment to test the hypothesis, gathering data

from the experiment, interpreting the data in light of the model, and so forth.” Since

“most researchers believe that scientific thinking is really a subset of reasoning that is not

different in kind from other types of reasoning,” then that which makes thinking scientific

is a metacognitive awareness knowing when to engage scientific concepts and methods

(Willingham, 2007, p. 14). Willingham’s description of scientific thinking moves

between generalized and specialized conceptions of critical thinking, thus exemplifying

the necessary unity between the two. From a critical thinking standpoint it is necessary

for instructors to design courses so that students continually move between metacognitive

awareness of broad critical thinking concepts and skills and their application within
 147 
 

specific disciplinary contexts. Take, for example, the general skill of identifying and

assessing one’s assumptions, point of view, and background logic concerning the origin

of one’s beliefs.

General tenets of critical thinking compel one to check one’s assumptions, point

of view, and background logic prior to the analysis and evaluation of any data, argument,

situation or problem. The human tendency to interpret things according one’s innate

biases is a common obstacle to thinking critically and, thus, exceptionally difficult to

effectively monitor. Willingham writes of this problem that “even trained scientists are

open to pitfalls in reasoning about conditional probabilities (as well as other types of

reasoning)” (Willingham, 2007, p. 14). For example, “physicians are known to discount

or misinterpret new patient data that conflict with a diagnosis they have in mind, and

Ph.D.-level scientists are prey to faulty reasoning when faced with a problem embedded

in an unfamiliar context” (Willingham, 2007, p. 14). Such tendencies represent some of

the more pervasive obstacles to thinking critically. A substantive understanding and

disciplined use of trans-disciplinary, critical thinking concepts act as guides that monitor

the quality of one’s thinking so as to directly confront intellectual mistakes. However, a

weak understanding of seminal critical thinking concepts propagates intellectual errors.

Another obstacle is intellectual rigidity whereby one does not critically engage

appropriate methodologies when addressing scientific problems.

A substantive understanding of trans-disciplinary concepts results in the

recognition that questions define the appropriate method by which to address the problem

or issue. Placed within the domain of science, intellectual flexibility ensures that

scientists do not robotically follow the scientific method. Intellectual tasks are
 148 
 

determined by the question at issue. Every question determines the conditions needed to

settle it. Willingham points out that “people’s success in thinking [critically and

scientifically] depends on the particulars of how the question is presented” (Willingham,

2007, p. 14). Placed within the context of science education, Paul and Binker (1995a)

argue that typical instruction in science, including science texts, paint a misleading

picture that science is a merely a procedure and that students are not explicitly taught, in

large, to ask scientific questions, pursue scientific purposes, contemplate and apply

scientific concepts, and work to understand scientific reasoning. Such instruction suffers

“from serious flaws which give students false and misleading ideas about science.” For

example:

Many texts also treat the concept of the ‘the scientific method’ in a misleading

way. Scientific thinking is not a matter of running through a set of steps once.

Rather, it is a kind of thinking in which we continually move back and forth

between questions we ask about the world and observations we make and

experiments we devise to test out various hypotheses, guesses, hunches, and

models…[Scientific thinking requires that] we ask clear and precise questions in

order to devise experiments that can give us clear and precise answers. (Paul &

Binker, 1995a, p. 503)

What Paul and Binker refer to as continually moving “back and forth” between questions

and methods for addressing the questions exemplifies the dynamic nature of scientific

thinking; thinking that appropriately applies foundational critical thinking concepts to

problems and issues within specific contexts.

 149 
 

Scientific thinking engages trans-disciplinary concepts in the analysis of scientific

questions, problems and issues. A deep understanding of trans-disciplinary concepts

empowers learners with general intellectual tools that must be appropriately applied.

General concepts such as purpose, question, and structure/method to name a few, when

substantively understood, act as guides for successful scientific thinking. A consistent

critical interpretation and application of such concepts, then, builds important

dispositions necessary for deep scientific thinking.

Trans-Disciplinary Critical Thinking Dispositions Implicit within Scientific Thinking

A base-line conception of critical thinking is substantive in that it continually

emphasizes important dispositions within its very theoretical structure. Important

dispositions, such as open-mindedness and humility, are trans-disciplinary; they are

prerequisites for high quality thinking within any field. A primary goal of critical

thinking instruction within any subject area is the cultivation of intellectual character

traits that directly confront our egocentric and socio-centric tendencies. The field of

science is no exception.

To support this point, Willingham (2007) writes that “Good, persistent scientific

practice often involves overall attitudes and mental dispositions toward gaining

knowledge about the world as well” (p. 14). Swartz and Fischer (2001) exemplify

Willingham’s conviction writing that “Good scientific thinking requires that we

acknowledge the sometimes humbling fact that we could be wrong even in our most basic

scientific beliefs, and that evidence might come along that shows this….Open-

mindedness respects this possibility” (p. 305). Inherent within this statement is not only

the explication of open-mindedness as an important disposition for quality scientific

 150 
 

thinking, but also the need to recognize the limits of one’s knowledge and the reliance on

the reasoning process as an acceptable guide to formulating decisions. Paul and Elder

(2003) label these two dispositions intellectual humility and confidence in reason

respectively.

Critical thinking dispositions are necessary conditions of high quality thinking.

They not only characterize the ideal of what it means to think and act critically within a

specific context, but they also represent important principles of what it means to be a fair-

minded critical thinker, and, thus, an ethically responsible thinker. Fostering the

development of such virtues, or as Costa refers to them passions of the mind, is

challenging. What it true, however, is that unless they are explicit within instruction,

then they will not be conscious intellectual resources students can use to monitor the

quality of their own thinking and behavior.

High quality scientific thinking requires explicit command of general critical

thinking principles and concepts, and the various modes by which these principles and

concepts are communicated. “It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence

and mindful command of their use. It entails effective communication and problem

solving abilities as well as a commitment to developing scientific skills, abilities, and

dispositions” (Paul & Elder, 2003, p. 2). Scientific thinking is consciously systematic,

whereby one seeks to improve the quality of one’s thinking through skillful analysis and

evaluation of specific problems, issues and questions.

There is a necessary relationship between general trans-disciplinary concepts

inherent within scientific thinking and the general ability to apply such concepts, when
 151 
 

substantively developed, to scientific problems where methodological expertise may not

exist. For example:

“The scientifically literate person – a person who has a basic understanding of the

concepts and ideas of modern science and knows how to get scientific

information, how to certify that it is accurate and reliable, and then how to use it

to solve problems well – can be engaging in quite respectable scientific problem

solving even though he or she may not have and practice the technical and

experimental skills of the research scientist.” (Swartz & Fischer, 2001, p. 305)

In other words, substantive command over general critical thinking concepts arm one

with intellectual skills that enable him/her to effectively approach a scientific problem

regardless of his/her level of technical expertise. This is, in fact, the very basis of

scientific instruction at the non-specialist level. In other words, the educational

establishment expects students to engage the logic of scientific problems that are very

often highly complex, but only to the extent that instruction fosters the development of

general critical thinking skills based on the substantive application of trans-disciplinary

concepts will students be able to begin to successfully reason through such complexities.

Teachers who take scientific thinking seriously do not restrict instruction to

limited isolated contexts and skills, but make explicit connections between content and

science as a mode of critical thought. Approaches to instruction that do not make such

important connections fall victim to the same problems of intellectual fragmentation and

compartmentalization that characterize non-substantive approaches to critical thinking

instruction. “Just giving students narrow, well-defined, quantitative ‘problems’ to solve

in science classes is not enough; nor is adding on instruction in which students

 152 
 

occasionally are asked to develop and test hypotheses in the name of the scientific

method. Rather, educators must teach the full range of types of skillful thinking needed

to engage in this enterprise. The best way to do this is by infusing such instruction into

standard content teaching in science” (Swartz & Fischer, 2001, p. 305). This is the

essence of the problem-based learner; a curricular configuration that is based on gaining

substantive knowledge and skills (Swartz & Fischer, 2001).

Although Swartz and Fischer are accurate for emphasizing an infusion approach

to teaching thinking skills within the curriculum, it needs to be noted that foundational

critical thinking concepts are presupposed within scientific thinking; they are not

something to be added to existing curriculum. Rather, such concepts need to be

uncovered, explicated, highlighted, reinforced, and continually emphasized so that

students notice (1) critical thinking is a necessary condition of effective scientific

thinking, and (2) that foundational critical thinking concepts and skills are presupposed

within the logic of all disciplines and, therefore, can be transferred from one context to

the other. When these two points are explicated and practiced within various contexts

students have a greater potential to develop as fair-minded critical thinkers equipped with

explicit conceptual tools that they can use in academia and in life. A trans-disciplinary

conception of critical thinking is a realistic and pragmatic way to promote important

connections between content and the intellectual resources needed to substantively

engage the content.

 153 
 

7. Paul’s work as an example of a substantive trans-disciplinary

conception of critical thinking

Richard Paul purports to have created a substantive trans-disciplinary conception

of critical thinking. Revisiting the definitions of substantive and trans-disciplinary, one

can argue that any such claim must continually seek the essence of ‘things’ and

continually explicate that essence within its structures. Furthermore, any substantive

approach to critical thinking instruction must minimally meet the following conditions:

(1) continually revisit and explicate the macro and micro goals of critical thinking within

subject matter, (2) make important and concrete ties between critical thinking

concepts/skills and the subject matter, and (3) systematically encourage the development

of those dispositions necessary for becoming a fair-minded critical thinker. Paul’s work

meets these criteria. However, Paul’s work is not without weakness.

The remainder of this dissertation is dedicated to evaluating the extent to which

Paul’s conception of critical thinking meets the stated criteria both in terms of its theory

and application to instruction. Chapter three is a literature review that describes Paul’s

place within the discourse and validates his conception as worthy of study. Chapter four

is the first comprehensive description of his work. Chapters five and six are an analysis

of the most significant criticisms of his conception of critical thinking. Chapters seven,

eight and nine are a formal exegesis of his conception. Chapter ten concludes the

dissertation arguing that Paul’s model is indeed both substantive and trans-disciplinary,

but faces many challenges in order for it to be a force for educational and social reform.
 154 
 

Chapter Summary

Daniel Flage (2001), a professor of philosophy, writes, “Regardless of our

discipline, we all claim to teach critical thinking. Yet sometimes disputes arise among

disciplines regarding what counts as critical thinking and who is ‘really’ teaching it” (p.

13). Flage succinctly captures the conundrum that has long faced the development of a

substantive conception of critical thinking. From Socrates to the present, different

domains have long contributed significant insights into that which constitutes high

quality thought. However, specialized interpretations have also contributed to the

misconception that critical thinking concepts and abilities are not capable of working

within and transferring across multiple domains. One consequence of this misconception

has been the failure of individual disciplines to integrate important trans-disciplinary

insights into instruction at all academic levels; thus, continuing the long tradition of

didactic instruction.

Adler (n.d.) offers a precise summary of the ideal of critical thinking education

arguing that the responsibility of every educator regardless of his/her domain is “To turn

out thoughtful citizens and learners—persons are able to think well and critically in

everything they do…” (¶ 16). For this to come to fruition, students develop trans-

disciplinary intellectual skills and abilities. History has shown that anything less than a

substantive, trans-disciplinary of high quality thinking is not sufficient for cultivating

critical thinkers within, across and beyond the disciplines.

This chapter argued that inherent within the discourse on critical thinking are

building blocks for a substantive, trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking.

These building blocks represent seminal critical thinking principles, concepts and skills
 155 
 

that are present within the logic of every domain and must be explicated in order for them

to become valuable intellectual resources students can call upon when thinking critically

within and across any domain. Examples of inadequate approaches to critical thinking

instruction were cited illustrating the need for a robust and substantive conception of

critical thinking and its application within education. Finally, it was posited that Richard

Paul has purported to have developed a comprehensive and substantive approach based

on the explication of trans-disciplinary principles, concepts and skills within education.

The next chapter is a literature review framing Richard Paul’s work within the discourse

on critical thinking and showing that his work is worthy of deep investigation beyond that

of which has been conducted up to this point.

 156 
 

SUMMARY OF PART I

Part one of this dissertation addressed four questions each assigned a specific

chapter. Chapter one dealt with the question: To what extent does is the concept of

critical thinking articulated by an examination of intellectual history? Chapter two

addressed the question: What is critical thinking? Chapter three asked: Why is critical

thinking important? Chapter four questioned: What is a substantive conception of critical

thinking and what are its implications to instruction? Together these questions represent

various dimensions involved in a conceptual analysis of critical thinking.

As part of the analysis, the concept of critical thinking was traced through

intellectual history, it was defined emphasizing those defining concepts essential to a

substantive trans-disciplinary conception, its importance and implications to education,

individual autonomy and social responsibility were discussed, and its various

instructional interpretations were juxtaposed. The analysis revealed that trans-

disciplinary principles and concepts are inherent within the idea of critical thinking and

that these principles and concepts are essential to a substantive interpretation of the

concept.

Part two is a literature review that justifies Richard Paul’s work as a subject

worthy of academic investigation.

 157 
 

PART II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Part two of this dissertation is a literature review consisting of two chapters.

Chapter five establishes a clear justification for the formal analysis of Richard Paul’s

work. Chapter six furthers the discussion pointing to the problem that Paul’s work has

been largely mis-interpreted and, therefore, erroneously categorized as a limited

interpretation of critical thinking.

Chapter five has two primary objectives. The first explains that Paul’s work is

highly visible within the discourse on critical thinking, and that he is widely considered

one of the most significant contributors to the development and application of the idea.

The second reveals that Paul’s work has not been comprehensively analyzed despite his

pervasive influence. Two scholars within the discourse are cited as examples of critiques

that fall short of a comprehensive exegesis: Harvey Siegel and Irene Yuen Yee Fung.

Chapter six addresses a particular post-modern critique of Paul’s work showing

that it too falls short of its goal to critique Paul’s conception of critical thinking.

Together, chapters five and six constitute the literature review portion of this dissertation.
 158 
 

CHAPTER 5

WHY RICHARD PAUL’S CONCPETION OF CRITICAL THINKING NEEDS

TO BE COMPREHENSIVELY ANALYZED

Abstract
This chapter argues that Paul’s work is under-analyzed despite its highly visible
presence throughout the discourse. Paul is regularly cited as one of the leaders in the
critical thinking movement over the last 30 years. However, significant attention has not
been given to the exegesis of his work as a comprehensive whole. The works of Harvey
Siegel and Irene Yuen Yee Fung are respectively cited as the most thorough and
significant analyses and evaluations of Paul’s work, but both fail to address the
multifaceted and interconnected nature of his theory and suggestions for implementation.
Since Paul’s work continues to be implemented at all academic levels and in government
agencies/programs, then it demands a comprehensive exegesis so that his work will not
be misinterpreted and superficially or erroneously applied.

Introduction

Richard Paul is widely considered an authority within the discourse on critical

thinking. His research and theory on the topic of critical thinking is incorporated across

the disciplines and is experiencing greater visibility in the mission statements and

institutional structures of numerous primary, secondary and post-secondary institutions.

Despite its presence, a review of the larger discourse reveals little substantive analysis

and evaluation of Paul’s conceptualization as a whole. Instead, the majority of

noteworthy critiques deal with his early work ranging between 1980 and 1995 and focus

on specific isolated conceptual claims without contextualizing them within the larger

theoretical framework. The literature does not paint a complete picture of Paul’s

approach to critical thinking and the instructional methods that stem from it. The purpose

of this chapter is to explicate the clearest and most significant critiques of Paul’s work

and comment on where these criticisms fall short of a comprehensive exegesis; a goal

that this dissertation seeks to achieve.

 159 
 

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first justifies Richard Paul as a source

for critical examination. The second section is a discussion of two critical thinking

theorists who critique Paul’s work: Harvey Siegel and Irene Yuen Yee Fung. The

critiques put forth by these two scholars are sufficient representative samples for other

critiques within the discourse because additional critiques do not go beyond that of which

Siegel and Fung respectively elaborate. It is concluded that Paul’s work has not been

thoroughly analyzed and evaluated, even though he is widely considered one of the

foremost authorities on the topic.

Why Paul?

There is little debate as to the pedagogical significance of Paul’s contributions to

the discourse on critical thinking, but any recognized work needs to be given fair and

thorough evaluation. Paul is considered an authority on the grounds that, in the last 27

years, his more than 200 articles and eight books on the subject of critical thinking have

been and, continue to be, regularly cited. His writing is aimed at both academic

specialists and general readership. Paul’s work has been canvassed in publications such

as The New York Times, Education Week, The Chronicle of Higher Education, American

Teacher, Reader’s Digest, Educational Leadership, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World

Report. Paul has presented at hundreds of professional events on the subject, many

authors cite him as a leader in the critical thinking movement, and multiple academic

institutions and professional organizations have adopted his model. Such

acknowledgement illuminates the significance and applicability of his work, but more

importantly, Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking has taken, albeit slowly, its

place within the history and philosophy of education.

 160 
 

Daniel Fasko (2003b) is one of many scholars who recognize Paul as a significant

and influential theorist of critical thinking. Fasko states that his book, Critical Thinking

and Reasoning: Current Research, Theory, and Practice, “includes a brief history of the

critical thinking movement from the early philosophers such as Plato through the seminal

work of Richard Paul” (back cover). Clearly he cites Paul in the company of Plato as an

incentive for the browser to buy the book. If Paul had no cache he would not be so used.

Nonetheless, Fasko sees Paul as a part of a long tradition of intellectuals who have sought

to clarify the concept of critical thinking and its obstacles. Others have also commented

on Paul’s place within this tradition.

In an article titled “Bertrand Russell and Critical Thinking,” David Hitchcock

relates Paul’s conceptualizations of critical thinking to those of noted philosopher

Bertrand Russell. Hitchcock (2002) states “Russell’s advocacy of a habit of impersonal

thinking which enables one to view the belief of oneself and one’s groups with

detachment corresponds to the advocacy by noted critical thinking theorist Richard Paul

of what he calls ‘strong-sense’ critical thinking, i.e. critical thinking which is not

egocentric or socio-centric” (p. 3). Many theorists agree that some of Richard Paul’s

most significant contributions to critical thinking are his distinctions between strong-

sense and weak-sense critical thinking coupled with his emphasis on the egocentric and

socio-centric forces that influence fair-minded thinking.

Numerous scholars have referenced, and continue to reference, Paul’s work on

critical thinking, and many have published critiques in the peer review process; yet none

of the reviews deal with Paul’s conceptualization as a whole, and significant critiques of

his post-1995 work do not exist within the discourse. Rather, one finds multiple citations
 161 
 

and applications of his model following 1995, but without significant critique. The

majority of peer reviews were in response to Paul’s book Critical Thinking: What Every

Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World first published in 1990 during the

height of the critical thinking movement. This text is still widely cited, especially Paul’s

distinction between strong and weak sense critical thinking, but even though the text is

full of rich theory, it is an anthology of related, but not synthesized, articles.

The book does not construct a clear and coherent conceptualization or model of

critical thinking. This text represents Paul’s earliest work and although his model was

theoretically established, it was not structurally organized in the form it is today. As a

result, Paul’s first book serves multiple purposes, the chapters of which reflect its eclectic

nature.

In 1991 Alec Fisher published the most thorough review of Paul’s first edition

arguing that “the book should not be read as a systematic treatise on critical thinking,

from cover to cover, but as a source book showing how Paul’s ideas and the critical

thinking movement have developed in the past decade” (p. 114). Likewise, Corrine

Bedecarre (1994)argues in her dissertation, entitled Toward a Feminist Account of

Strong-Sense Critical Thinking, that within this first text “there is no general synthesis of

analyses, no prioritizing of results, no coherent relationship among the techniques – just a

toolbox assortment” (p. 8). Fisher and Bedecarre capture one important reason why

Paul’s work has been largely left unanalyzed: his early work presents a collection of

theoretical and practical approaches to critical thinking, rather than a cohesive and

comprehensive model. However, Paul and his closest colleagues have significantly
 162 
 

expanded the work outlined in the anthology developing it into a clear model that

delineates fundamental conceptual sets necessary for thinking critically.

Although a comprehensive critical analysis of Paul’s current model does not exist,

scholars like Harvey Siegel and Yuen Yee Fung have commented on key claims

foundational to Paul’s theory and its application. Furthermore, despite their lack of

substantive development, Siegel and Fung respectively present analyses that are better

developed than others. Thus, their critiques are adequate representations for other

critiques placed in response to Paul’s theory of critical thinking. The critiques of each

scholar reflect different dimensions of Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking:

Siegel theoretical, Fung practical.

Siegel presents one of the most noted critiques of Paul’s theory of critical

thinking; an argument on which later theoretical critiques are based. Siegel questions

Paul’s use of the term world-view and challenges Paul to provide empirical evidence to

support his emphasis on the roles of egocentricity and socio-centricity as barriers to

developing critical thought. Where Siegel’s critique is primarily theoretical, Fung’s

critique is practical.

Fung elaborates on Paul’s emphasis that egocentricity and socio-centricity are

psychological and sociological barriers to critical thought. She cites historical and

psychological research to support the central role each barrier plays within Paul’s

distinction between strong sense and weak sense critical thinking instruction. In this

sense, Fung addresses some of Siegel’s criticisms of Paul theory. She uses Paul’s work

as a theoretical foundation to measure the feasibility of teaching critical thinking to

students in pre-college classrooms. Her emphasis on a skill-plus-dispositions approach to

 163 
 

critical thinking education is an attempt to critique and expand the practical work of

remodeling lesson plans to promote critical thinking by Paul et al. 13

For the purposes of this literature review, the analyses of Siegel and that of Fung

will be discussed because they address both theoretical and practical dimensions of Paul’s

work, but are also representative samples of other critiques levied in response to Paul’s

conceptualization of critical thinking. The critiques of Siegel and Fung will be analyzed

to the extent that they meet this chapter’s goal: to show that Paul’s work has been

inadequately analyzed despite his prominent presence within the discourse.

Harvey Siegel on Paul’s Conception of Critical Thinking

Harvey Siegel constructs an evaluation of Paul’s conceptualization of critical

thinking that is representative of many others within the discourse for two related

reasons. The first is that Siegel clearly outlines what some believe to be two areas of

theoretical concern, Paul’s use of the terms world view and egocentrism, but does not

attempt to explain how Paul clarifies his use of the terms within his conceptualization as

a whole. The second is that, like most exegeses of Paul’s work, Siegel’s is limited to an

extremely small sample of Paul’s writings on the topic; one article in Siegel’s case. The

limitations of each point will be discussed to show that Paul’s work needs a well-rounded

and robust exegesis because existing analyses and evaluations are incomplete. It is

important to reiterate that the purpose of this chapter is to reveal a hole in the discourse

regarding the analyses of Paul’s work. Siegel’s critique will be analyzed to the extent

that this goal is sufficiently met; however, chapter four provides an analysis of Siegel’s

deeper theoretical concerns.

 164 
 

At the time of its publication, Siegel based his evaluation on what many believe to

be one of Paul’s most important articles: “Teaching Critical Thinking in the ‘Strong’

Sense: A Focus on Self-Deception, World Views, and a Dialectical Mode of Analysis”

(Paul, 1982). In this article, Paul argues that traditional didactic forms of instruction

coupled with teaching critical thinking as a set of atomistic skills and abilities does not

help students think fair-mindedly through the logic of points of view that are not in line

or consistent with the way the students see the world. As a result, students become

skilled at criticizing their opponents’ arguments without identifying the weaknesses in

their own, and thus their world views are left largely undisturbed. Paul argues that

people are inherently biased because all thinking exists within a certain personal, social

and cultural frame of reference. The best an instructor can do is move increasingly

toward objective analysis and evaluation of arguments. To do this one must always

revisit his/her assumptions, beliefs and point of view (Paul, 1982).

In this article Paul draws an important and lasting differentiation between the

weak sense and strong sense critical thinker. The weak sense critical thinker is one who

is skilled at reasoning but uses rational tools selectively to meet his/her selfish interests.

The strong sense critical thinker is one who is also skilled at reasoning but uses rational

tools to fairly and objectively solve a problem and address a complex issue. Stated

differently, “strong sense critical thinking possesses a disciplined, fair-minded,

multilogical perspective on an issue or problem so that the reasoned is not trapped by

egocentricity or self-deception” (Gibson, 1995, Review of Critical Thinking Theory, ¶

5). The strong sense critical thinker is one who habitually enters into the logic of

alternative points of view, justified or unjustified, so as to recognize strengths and

 165 
 

weaknesses in his or her own perspective and the perspective of another. Paul argues that

strong sense critical thinking is, pedagogically speaking, vital for teaching students how

to reason fairly.

One consequence of teaching students to think critically, in the strong sense, is

that education becomes a process that lives up to its pedagogical ideals to provide a

liberal education where one’s limited world view and, therefore, biases are challenged in

light of thinking through alternative perspectives and arguments (Paul, 1995). Siegel

acknowledges the importance of the strong sense and weak sense distinction and posits a

critique with the intention of moving the discourse forward.

Siegel (1990) states that “His [Paul’s] insistence on, and success at, bringing the

ramifications of critical thinking theory to the practical world of education may well be

his most important contribution to the critical thinking movement” (p. 13). Siegel (1990)

argues that Paul’s distinction between strong sense and weak sense critical thinking is,

theoretically and pedagogically, important because it emphasizes the “necessity of

utilizing one’s critical thinking skills on oneself,” which can facilitate the transfer of

general critical thinking skills from “egocentrically neutral” to “egocentrically charged”

contexts in insightful and meaningful ways (p. 13). Siegel claims that there is much

merit in Paul’s articulation of strong sense critical thinking. He writes:

Perhaps most importantly, it [strong sense critical thinking] emphasizes the very

feature missing from the “pure skills” conception, namely that the critical thinker

not simply master a set of atomic “moves” or skills, but that she utilize such

skills. Indeed Paul takes this feature one step further than we have taken it so far,

emphasizing as he does the necessity of utilizing one’s critical thinking skills on

 166 
 

oneself, of challenging one’s own fundamental beliefs and attitudes and not

simply those of one’s opponents or the newspaper editorialist. (Siegel, 1990, p.

13)

Siegel not only acknowledges Paul’s important theoretical contribution in explicating the

notion of strong sense critical thinking, but acknowledges the purpose of Paul’s article.

Paul’s article is, primarily, a critique of tendency to teach critical thinking courses

as a set of atomic skills; as in fallacy identification. In doing so, Paul distinguishes

between strong sense and weak sense critical thinking. Paul argues that it is impossible

to teach a student to think critically with one class especially when the class does not

systematically encourage students to look for the fallacies in their own positions. All too

often students leave such classes with “critical thinking skills” that are applied to others,

but never directed within. Paul suggests that (1) courses explicate and embrace the

notion of strong sense critical thinking where students systematically and fairly critique

various points of view including their own, and (2) critical thinking courses should

extend throughout a student’s academic career and be incorporated into every discipline.

Only then will students have the “skills” to successfully think dialogically and

dialectically (Paul, 1992, pp. 465-474). Even though Siegel acknowledges the

importance of Paul’s contribution to critical thinking theory, especially its pedagogical

implications, it is interesting that Siegel limits his analysis to one article. Viewed in this

light, Siegel’s critique is really a critique of two concepts within one article rather than a

substantive critique of Paul’s theory of strong sense critical thinking as a whole.

Siegel challenges Paul to clarify the relationship between the concepts of world

view, egocentricity /socio-centricity and the processes of dialogical and dialectical

 167 
 

reasoning, especially within the “strong sense” paradigm. In other words, Siegel’s

general argument claims that Paul’s concept of strong sense critical thinking is

pedagogically important, but that Paul’s emphasis on the concept of world views and

egocentricity/socio-centricity as barriers to thinking fair-mindedly are problematic due to

Paul’s unclear treatment of the ideas.

Critique of Paul’s Description of “World-View”

Siegel (1990) criticizes Paul’s use of the general term “world view” as it relates to

Paul’s conception of strong sense critical thinking as a dialogical and dialectical process

stating that it “raises (in my view unnecessary) difficulties” (p. 14). Siegel (1990) states,

“There are troubling aspects to Paul’s conception of ‘strong sense’ critical thinking as

‘dialectical/dialogical,’ according to which critical thinkers transcend atomistic analysis

and endeavor to comprehend the issue at hand from the point of view, the ‘world view,’

of their ‘opponents,’” (p. 13). He argues that since Paul does not properly clarify the way

the word is to be interpreted he makes himself prey to the concept of subjective

relativism. Siegel’s argument is as follows (pp. 14-15):

1. There are two possible interpretations of Paul’s use of the term “world

view” as it relates to the dialogical/dialectical process.

a. World view can be interpreted as a rational appraisal where “a

critical thinker is sensitive to the give-and-take and development of extended

arguments,” and examines his own assumptions and point of view so as to see the

truth within any problem. This interpretation is not controversial and should be

embraced.
 168 
 

b. World view can be interpreted as subjectively relative where

“whether or not a given bit of reasoning is fallacious depends on the world-view

from which one address the issue at hand,” and not on established rational and

objective standards of evaluation. This interpretation should rejected.

2. Paul’s use of the term is unclear.

3. Lack of clarity weakens Paul’s conception of strong sense critical thinking

and his critique of atomistic analysis found in the fields of formal and

informal logic.

Since, as Siegel (1990) argues, Paul couches strong sense critical thinking as a

dialectical/dialogical dynamic in the term “world views,” it “raises difficulties” (p. 14).

Any world view can define standards to evaluate rationality regardless of its merit or

ethics; or as Siegel (1990) describes it, Paul’s “idea… is that whether or not a given bit of

reasoning is fallacious, for example, depends on the world-view from which one

addresses the issue at hand; what is question-begging (say) for the proponent of one

world view is not for the proponent of another” (p. 14). Siegel maintains that within

Paul’s article the concept of “world view” is not sufficiently clarified as it relates to

dialogical and dialectical reasoning, which subjects Paul’s notion of strong sense critical

thinking to the criticism that it (indirectly) allows for subjective relativistic reasoning to

be logically valid. Although he strongly supports Paul’s distinction between strong-sense

and weak-sense critical thinking, Siegel argues that it is not necessary for Paul to include

the term “world-view” for the distinction between strong sense and weak sense critical

thinking to be justified.
 169 
 

Paul’s use of the term “world-view” is the first area Siegel argues needs

clarification. There is, however, another point of contention that Siegel develops. Siegel

argues that Paul fails to provide sufficient empirical evidence in his explanation that

egocentricity and socio-centricity act as barriers to developing strong sense critical

thinking.

The Need to Clarify Barriers to Thinking Critically: Egocentric and Socio-centric

Thinking

Siegel presents an articulate, yet underdeveloped, critique of Paul’s discussion of

the egocentric and socio-centric impediments to strong-sense critical thinking. Siegel

(1990) acknowledges that “Paul’s insight into the psychological difficulty of overcoming

the ‘deep seated tendencies of the human mind’” is “an enormously important practical

and pedagogical one” (pp. 15, 17). However, he argues that Paul undesirably skews the

theoretical constructs of critical thinking by emphasizing issues that are not consistent

with accepted philosophical traditions and are not sufficiently clarified.

Siegel (1990) challenges Paul to “clarify in print his stands on the relationship

between psychology and epistemology in the theory of critical thinking” (p. 144). He

argues that if Paul is to cite the pathological forces of egocentric and socio-centric

inhibitors to strong sense critical thinking, then he needs cite specific examples where

each negatively influences opposing points of view on a specific issue, or examples that

show that self-deceptive tendencies are just as germane to one issue as another (Siegel,

1990). Siegel challenges Paul to cite empirical evidence to support the inclusion and

emphasis on the roles egocentricity and socio-centricity play in directing one’s reasoning
 170 
 

and in the process of analyzing and evaluating arguments. In short, Siegel believes that

Paul does not clarify his use and application of the terms.

If Paul contends, Siegel (1990) posits, that “Critical thinking is most difficult…in

just those areas in which these ‘deep seated tendencies in the human mind’ are most

deep; and ‘strong sense’ critical thinking must focus on just those areas in order to

counteract those deep tendencies,” then Paul must ground his theory with conceptual

clarity and empirical evidence (p. 19). Corrine Bedecarre reiterates Siegel’s criticism,

although not attributing it to him directly, citing Paul’s (1992) work Critical Thinking:

What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World. The article Siegel

analyzes is found within this anthology.

Bedecarre (1994) argues that since Paul uses the term “egocentricity” technically,

it needs to be “given more analysis than” it has (p. 69). For example, she claims that the

definition Paul uses to clarify the concept of “egocentricity” confuses philosophical

interpretations with psychological interpretations. Specifically, cognitive processes are

confused with behavioral tendencies. Bedecarre posits that blurring the line between

processes and tendencies creates epistemological confusion because standards for

evaluation can be interpreted as subjectively relative. She writes, “These tendencies,

processes and standards are stated as if they are embellishments of a single idea…The

definition has several significant epistemological aspects which would benefit from

separate rather than collective analysis” (Bedecarre, 1004, pp. 69-70). Bedecarre, like

Siegel, thinks that Paul’s conceptualization for strong sense critical thinking would

benefit from further conceptual and empirical clarification. However, like Siegel,

Bedecarre does not investigate the rich conceptual and empirical depth of Paul’s use of
 171 
 

the concept of egocentricity. Had she read broadly across Paul’s work, Bedecarre would

see that Paul uses the concept contextually, elaborating and clarifying where needed.

This point is addressed in the next section.

In short, Siegel and Bedecarre contend that although Paul’s conceptualization of

strong sense and weak sense critical thinking is pedagogically and philosophically

important, it needs further clarification if it is to be considered theoretically sound and,

therefore, used as a model for reforming education.

Significance of Siegel’s Critique to this Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to reveal that Paul’s work is inadequately analyzed

within the discourse on critical thinking. Siegel’s critique of Paul’s conceptualization of

critical thinking is significant for three reasons. The first is that Siegel recognizes that

Paul’s conceptualization has important and lasting implications to the philosophy and

practice of education. This is significant because there is a community of thinkers who

are concerned with improving human thinking and society. Viewed this way, critique

can improve a theory by clarifying it.

The second point of significance is found in the importance Siegel places on

clarifying Paul’s use of concepts, namely world view and egocentricity. Siegel does not

conduct a proper investigation of Paul’s use of these concepts. Had Siegel performed a

substantive analysis of these concepts, he would have found that Paul clarifies each

concept with other concepts within the article in question and within other publications.

For example, as previously outlined Siegel critiques Paul’s use of the terms world

view and egocentricity claiming that the terms are vague within the context of the article

he analyzes. Had Siegel consulted additional articles published throughout the decade
 172 
 

preceding his analysis, he would have noticed Paul’s concepts of egocentrism and world

view are, like all of his fundamental concepts, richly-defined. They are two in a network

of concepts that are all individually illuminated by exploring their relationship to most of

the others. The majority of Paul’s concepts, in other words, shed light on the others.

Such practice is common in quality scholarship. As Tishman et al. (1995) claim, “When

a phenomenon is complex, it tends to have many words to describe it… Having lots of

words to describe precise differences in kinds of thinking makes it possible to think more

precisely” (pp. 7-8). One cannot expect to properly analyze a fundamental theoretical

concept without first analyzing associated concepts because each concept provides a

layer of meaning that can be added to other relevant concepts all of which clarify the

original idea (Wilson, 1978).

For example, Paul unpacks the term world view with concepts including frame of

reference and point of view, which he elaborates extensively. Furthermore, Paul provides

clarification with elaborations of concepts such as cultural assumption and national bias.

He clarifies the concept of egocentricity with elaborations on concepts such as

selfishness, bias, irrationality, reciprocity, self-deception, and prejudice. He joins the

concepts of world view and egocentricity by discussing additional concepts: socio-

centricity, ethnocentricity, strong-sense critical thinking, weak-sense critical thinking,

dialectical and dialogical reasoning, and multi-logical and monological questions, issues

and problems. Each concept has some, direct or indirect, relationship to the concepts of

egocentricity and world view, and adds layers of specificity to each. Paul’s use of the

terms egocentricity and world view must be understood as a network of interconnected

concepts illuminating the depth and breadth of each within the context of his theory as a
 173 
 

whole. In this sense, the terms are far from vague; rather, they are richly specific, richly

defined and multi-layered.

One cannot take a concept out of context. To do so will result in its appearance as

vague and underdeveloped. A critical read of Paul’s work reveals that he links what he

means by world view and egocentricity to concepts defined elsewhere in his writings. In

other words, Paul interweaves concepts so that they explain each other and this is present

within and across his writings. In Siegel’s case, such an insight would be explicitly clear

if he had expanded his analysis beyond that of merely one of Paul’s articles.

For example, in an article entitled “Dialogical Thinking: Essential to the

Acquisition of Rational Knowledge,” Paul (1987) writes that people need “extensive and

systematic practice” to develop their “capacity to function rationally” (p. 130). Relating

this need to the concepts of world view and egocentricity Paul (1992) writes “People

from different ethnic groups, religions, social classes, and cultural allegiances tend to

form different but equally egocentric belief systems and use them equally

unmindfully…[people] don’t how we internalize and construct a logic, a point of view,

an organized way of experiencing, reasoning, and judging…How we see things simply

seems the correct way to see them. How others see them simply seems wrong or

prejudiced” (p. 275). Paul concludes arguing that people need to think through different

world views, or points of view, because problems that inflict humanity are multi-logical

in nature and require fair-minded reasoning across domains; not to justify one’s position,

but to see the situation for what it is.

Paul posits that reasoning fair-mindedly through various world views and frames

of reference is an exercise necessary for confronting one’s innate egocentricity; the

 174 
 

tendency to view one’s beliefs as the correct and ethical way of looking at the world.

People should “do this to discover, not that everything is relative and arbitrary, or a

matter of opinion, but that all beliefs and points of view are subject to rational analysis

and assessment” (Paul, 1987, p. 141). This statement, written prior to the publication of

Siegel’s book, is one example of Paul’s clarification of the concepts world view and

egocentricity, but it also contradicts Siegel’s claim that Paul’s use of the term world view

supports evaluation that is subjectively relative. Had Siegel familiarized himself with

Paul’s further publications, he may have provided a more substantive analysis.

Bedecarre, on the other hand, did not utilize available resources in her analysis.

Take, for example, Paul’s use of the glossary to illuminate the theoretical breadth and

depth of the concept of egocentricity. In general, egocentrism is understood by Paul as a

self-centered state of mind. When one is egocentrically self-centered, one does not give

due consideration to the rights, needs and perspectives of others. One’s orientation to

evidence and reasoning is one-sided. The concept of ethnocentrism is cited as one of

many further conceptual references under the entry for egocentricity as a way to guide the

reader to seek further clarification and contextualization (Paul, 1992).

Paul (1992) writes that “Ethnocentrism is a form of egocentrism extended from

the self to the group. Much uncritical or selfish critical thinking is either egocentric or

ethnocentric in nature” (p. 646). Paul then relates the concept of ethnocentricity to one’s

world view to reveal the interconnectedness of each within his conceptualization of

critical thinking. He writes, “The ‘cure’ for ethnocentrism or sociocentrism is empathic

thought within the perspective of opposing groups and cultures” (Paul, 1992, p. 646).

These concepts explain and clarify each other, revealing their conceptual depth and
 175 
 

breadth and relationships to Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking as a whole.

Paul’s writing provides a rich arena for conceptual analysis.

Even a rudimentary conceptual analysis will reveal that the tendencies Paul

identifies as egocentric are part of the same underlying phenomenon. If one posits one of

the characteristics, one can deduce the others from it. Siegel and Bedecarre did not

complete adequate analyses of Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking, specifically

his explanation of world view and egocentricity. Although Siegel evaluates Paul’s theory

from a traditional philosophical perspective, his critique is consistent with Paul’s

insistence that intellectual standards, such as clarity and precision, should guide

intellectual discourse; a consistency Siegel unfortunately overlooks. In this sense,

Siegel’s critique is extremely limited and is, thus, a poor comment on the entirety of

Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking. Unfortunately, Siegel’s critique is a

representative sample many other critiques of Paul’s work, pointing to the need for a

substantive exegesis of Paul’s theory.

The third reason Siegel’s analysis is important to this literature review is that it is

also a representative sample of most analyses that focus on Paul’s early work and thus

analysis is limited to a very small sample of Paul’s publications on the subject. As noted

earlier, Paul has published over 200 articles many of which were available at the time

Siegel wrote his book. Criticism takes many forms, and serves many purposes, but

substantive criticism must adhere to canons of scholarship one of which is to base

analysis on a representative sample of relevant work. Siegel, like many others, failed to

present an analysis and evaluation of Paul’s work that can be considered well-rounded,

thorough and substantive.

 176 
 

Harvey Siegel’s book is still considered a paramount work on the theory of

critical thinking and its importance as an educational goal. It continues to be cited

throughout the discourse on critical thinking. Although much of Paul’s theoretical work

had been formulated and published by the time Siegel published his text in 1988, Paul has

since written much more that has expanded his conceptualization of critical thinking and

has further solidified the ties between theory and practice. Since Siegel’s book, Paul has

published four editions of his anthology, co-authored four textbooks, 21 monographs, and

numerous articles. Such a body of work needs to be subjected to current critique since he

continues to be cited as one of the, if not the most significant, authorities in the discourse

on critical thinking.

Each part of Paul’s model is necessary to understand his conceptualization of

critical thinking, so an analysis of one or two of the parts is not sufficient to understand

the theory’s processes or implications to education and society. For this reason a current

comprehensive analysis of Richard Paul’s work needs to be carried out.

Irene Yuen Yee Fung on Paul’s Conception of Critical Thinking

In 2005, Fung completed a dissertation evaluating the feasibility of Paul’s critical

thinking model in classroom instruction for the University of Auckland, New Zealand. In

evaluating Paul’s model, Fung defends Paul’s theoretical distinction between strong

sense and weak sense critical thinking arguing that there is ample evidence to prove the

existence and influence of egocentrism and socio-centrism as barriers to developing

critical thinking. Fung claims that the main goal of critical thinking theorists has been to

develop good reasoning skills and abilities, and that the most pedagogically significant

debate in the critical thinking movement involves finding effective methods for teaching
 177 
 

and assessing reasoning in order to make it better. Like Paul, her analysis concludes that

teaching critical thinking skills and abilities is necessary, but not sufficient. Critical

thinking instruction should include the development of important dispositions such as

such as intellectual empathy, open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, and humility to name a

few. Fung argues that Paul’s concept of strong sense critical thinking sets a sound

theoretical foundation for a skills-plus-dispositions approach.

Fung discusses the importance of Paul’s differentiation between strong sense and

weak sense critical thinking arguing that this distinction establishes the basis for a skills-

plus-dispositions approach to critical thinking instruction. Fung contends that strong

sense critical thinking explicates the importance of fostering important behavioral

dispositions concluding that critical thinking is most effectively applied to instruction and

learning when interpreted through a skills-plus-dispositions theoretical framework.

A skills-plus-dispositions approach to instruction is based on the premise that

students need to learn both important intellectual skills and behaviors in order to facilitate

the development of critical thinking. She goes on to say that Paul’s differentiation

between strong sense and weak sense critical thinking is vital to this discussion and to the

proper theory needed to formulate effective instructional strategies. After surveying

multiple approaches to critical thinking instruction, she concluded that Paul’s

conceptualization of critical thinking was pedagogically sound and pragmatically capable

of having the most success compared with other models, but, she contends, his work on

lesson plan remodeling needs to be expanded so that it can be effectively used for teacher

education (Fung, 2005).

 178 
 

Based on the theoretical work of Paul and practical works of Paul, Binker and

Weil (1995), Paul, Binker, Jensen and Kreklau (1997), Paul, Binker, Martin, Vetrano and

Kreklau (1995), and Paul, Binker, Martin et al. (2008), Fung claims to have developed an

explicit skills-plus-dispositions approach to critical thinking instruction entitled

Collaborative Reasoning. The majority of her dissertation is a report on her experiment.

The significance of Fung’s work to this dissertation lies in her analysis of Paul’s theory

and the critique of his work on lesson plan remodeling as a guide to critical thinking

education.

Given Fung’s purpose, her analysis of Paul’s differentiation of strong and weak

sense critical thinking is satisfactory. Her analysis of Paul’s theory reaffirms Siegel’s

emphasis that such issues are pedagogically significant and necessary for critical thinking

instruction, although she does not directly engage Siegel’s criticisms. Instead, she argues

Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking is consistent with an intellectual tradition and

research on the topic especially as it relates to the concepts of egocentricity and socio-

centricity as intellectual barriers to developing critical thought.

Obstacles to Thinking Critically and the Need for a Strong Sense Approach: Bacon and

Simon

Fung frames Paul’s discussion of egocentric and socio-centric barriers to strong

sense critical thinking in a history of intellectual discussion on this issue. She compared

Bacon’s comments on the pathologies of poor thinking with Paul’s characterization of the

egocentric and socio-centric inhibitors to developing strong sense critical thinking skills,

abilities and dispositions. She cites Francis Bacon’s identification of the “Four Idols of
 179 
 

Truth” as representations of “potential sources of thinking errors that all humans tend to

have” (Fung, 2005, p. 7). Fung’s interpretation of Bacon’s work is in line with Paul’s.

Paul and Elder (n.d.) argue that Bacon “was explicitly concerned with the way we

misuse our minds in seeking knowledge. He recognized that the mind cannot safely be

left to its natural tendencies” (A Brief History of the Idea of Critical Thinking, para 7).

Paul and Elder (n.d.) go on to write that Bacon “also called attention to the fact that most

people, if left to their own devices, develop bad habits of thought (which he called

‘idols’) that lead them to believe what is false or misleading” (A Brief History of the Idea

of Critical Thinking, ¶ 7). The emphasis on those “habits of thought” that act as barriers

to the development of substantive and fair-minded critical thought reveal not only Paul’s

theoretical assumptions regarding the nature and need for teaching critical thinking, but

Fung’s as well. Both argue that to teach critical thinking without important ethical

intellectual dispositions is to, at best, facilitate the development of weak sense critical

thinkers. Both argue that such thinking is antithetical to many established pedagogical

ideals which emphasize the importance of leading a reflective and ethical life. In this

sense, identifying and expounding on barriers to thinking critically is vital for the

establishment of strong sense critical thinking as a theoretical platform by which

application can be evaluated. Since Fung supports Paul’s concept of strong senses

critical thinking, her analysis of the concept parallels Paul’s. She develops her support

for Paul’s concept of strong sense critical thinking citing psychologist Herbert Simon’s

theory of bounded rationality as a set of barriers to substantive and critical intellectual

development.
 180 
 

Fung argues that although Simon’s theories do not go beyond that of Bacon’s

Four Idols of the Truth, they are further evidence that there are consistent sets of

psychological barriers to developing what Paul calls strong sense critical thinking (Fung,

2005). According to Fung (2005), Simon’s theory challenges the traditional concept of

human rationality as it is conceived in the West, postulating that “humans are not capable

of considering all possible alternatives in decision-making situations.” Instead of looking

for the best solution, humans often “accept the first choice that is ‘good enough,’” (p. 9).

Fung develops these examples in a successful attempt to ground Paul’s emphasis on the

importance of teaching for critical thinking in the strong sense. In doing so, Fung

indirectly addresses some of Siegel’s criticisms; primarily those of Paul’s discussion of

egocentricity and socio-centricity as barriers to critical thought. As a thorough

theoretical analysis, however, Fung’s articulation of the depth of Paul’s distinction is

lacking.

Although it is not Fung’s purpose to complete an in-depth exegesis of Paul’s

conceptualization of critical thinking, her analysis of egocentricity and socio-centricity as

barriers to quality thought exemplifies an examination that others merely criticize. On

one hand, Fung’s work is a representative sample of many critiques of Paul’s work. On

the other hand, her work is more thorough. In either case, however, a comprehensive

analysis and evaluation of Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking is left wanting.

For example, Fung did not address Paul’s emphasis on the primacy of natural

languages as fundamental to any substantive conceptualization of critical thinking. Fung

incorporates Paul’s emphasis that a substantive, generalized notion of critical thinking is

necessary for the successful integration of critical thinking into the curriculum. From this
 181 
 

vantage point, Fung argues against overly specialized approaches to infusing critical

thinking into the curriculum as manifest in “skills only” critical thinking instructional

models. If, however, Fung’s analysis of Paul’s theory was complete, she would have had

to discuss the extent to which Paul emphasizes importance of natural language over

technical language in any substantive conceptualization of critical thinking (Paul, 1992).

For Paul, natural language provides the practical link between theory and practice.

Paul argues that critical thinking instruction must be based on natural languages,

such as English, French, German, Mandarin, etc. in order for students to learn to

systematically correct and improve their thinking and transfer insights from one domain

to another. In Paul’s view, natural language is a necessary condition for a substantive

model of critical thinking because significant human problems are multi-logical in nature

and require reasoned judgment to properly address them. He argues that natural or non-

technical languages have “excellent conceptual resources” for thinking through the

multiple dimensions of complex problems enabling people to think with greater empathy,

humility and integrity. Technical languages, Paul claims, do not have the flexibility to

help one think critically through multi-logical problems. Paul’s insistence on a theory of

critical thinking that is based on educated use of natural languages is fundamentally

connected to not only his discussion of dialogical and dialectical reasoning as modes of

critical thinking, but to his explication of the elements of reasoning, intellectual traits, and

the intellectual standards of which Fung utilizes as the conceptual and practical basis for

her study.

Based on the existing critiques of Paul’s work it can be argued that many scholars

and educators who utilize or reject Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking, in its
 182 
 

entirety or in part, do so without explicitly unpacking its conceptual depth and breadth.

Despite her purpose, Fung did not provide the proper theoretical backing to unpack

Paul’s rationale. One would hope that those, like Fung, who apply Paul’s work would at

least implicitly understand the implications of his theoretical claims.

Following in the tradition of those concerned with improving the quality of

human thought, Fung argues that thinking can be systematically improved if disciplined.

To exemplify this claim, she analyzes and evaluates the method of remodeling lesson

plans as articulated in a series of four instructional handbooks Paul et al published in the

mid 1990’s.

Fung’s Critique of Remodeled Critical Thinking Lessons

The primary purpose of Fung’s work is to develop an approach to critical thinking

instruction that fuses different theoretical perspectives. She uses both theoretical and

applied aspects of Paul’s conceptualization as a foundation for her model. Paul’s

distinction between strong sense and weak sense critical thinking provides much of the

theoretical basis by which Fung’s skills-plus-dispositions model is developed arguing that

teaching critical thinking skills alone will not facilitate transfer of such skills to the

analysis and evaluation of content nor to other subject areas. Fung argues that two

factors need to be present for substantive critical thinking instruction to take place. The

first is an approach to critical thinking instruction that fuses critical thinking with the

content whereby the content becomes a mode of thinking, much like thinking like a

scientist, mathematician, historian, etc. The second is to facilitate the development of

necessary dispositions that serve to motive students to improve their thinking. Such

dispositions include a general critical spirit which is involves developing and exercising,
 183 
 

for example, intellectual humility, respect for truth, open-mindedness and independence

(Paul, 1992). Fung uses the critical thinking handbook series published by the

Foundation for Critical Thinking as the primary approach to critical thinking instruction

as defined by her skills-plus-dispositions model.

Fung argues that the handbook series, intended for primary and secondary

educators, is a strong resource for helping individual teachers develop a working

understanding of generalized critical thinking theory and a system for remodeling

existing lessons to make critical thinking the organizing idea of the curriculum rather

than something merely added.

Fung explicates two criticisms of the critical thinking handbook series. The first

is that the proposals of Paul and his various coauthors “places strong emphasis on the

teacher’s planning but far less emphasis on the teacher’s evaluation of the remodeled

curriculum/lesson plans” (Fung, 2005, p. 92). Although Fung (2005) acknowledges that

Paul suggest that lesson remodeling is a process that needs to be constantly revisited,

evaluated and revised, she argues that “consideration of the effectiveness of the

remodeled curriculum/lesson plans as reflected in the evidence of student performance is

left out in the subsequent remodeling process” (p. 92). This evidence, Fung contends,

may act as an important factor in convincing instructors to take progressive steps toward

remodeling their lessons based on a substantive notion of critical thinking.

Fung’s (2005) second criticism claims that Paul, Binker and Weil’s (1995)

approach “relied too heavily on the individual teacher’s commitment to self-direct

development of critical thinking in terms of its application to classroom practice” (p. 93).

Fung argues that Paul and his coauthors need to explicate a more thorough plan for
 184 
 

developing a support community that systematically plans, implements and assesses

teacher lessons and student performance. She claims that “Paul et al. have not much to

say with regard as to what teachers could/should do in order to create such an

environment within their classrooms or schools so that both student development and

staff development can be enhanced” (Fung, 2005, 93). Although Fung’s claim is accurate

when limited to the lesson plan remodeling as articulated in the foundation’s critical

thinking and instructional handbook series, it is not accurate when examining the same

institution’s post-1995 instructional and administrative suggestions as headed by Paul and

Elder. A brief analysis of the foundation’s website reveals extensive suggestions for

professional development (Elder, n.d.). Although Fung’s analysis is limited to the Paul et

al. critical thinking handbook series, it is not a thorough survey of the current literature

associated with Paul’s conceptualization.

The purpose of this literature review is to show that Paul’s conceptualization of

critical thinking, both as a theoretical construct and a method for guiding instruction, has

not been thoroughly analyzed and evaluated. Fung’s research is commendable on

multiple counts; however, her work is representative of the many evaluations of Paul’s

work that do not address its theoretical and practical nature.

Significance of Fung’s Analysis to this Literature Review

Fung’s purpose is to set the stage for measuring the feasibility of teaching critical

thinking from a skills-plus-dispositions approach based significantly on Paul’s

conceptualization. Fung’s analysis of Paul’s work is significant in that she places Paul’s

work within the larger discourse on critical thinking emphasizing its practical and

theoretical dimensions. Concerning the instructional usability of Paul’s work, Fung

 185 
 

addressed some of the significant challenges Paul’s conception faces. Yet Fung utilized

instructional models and suggestions that did not take into consideration many post-1995

developments leaving a significant portion of Paul’s work left unanalyzed.

For example, Paul’s current approach to instructional reform takes two forms,

only one of which Fung analyzes. Redesigning instruction can focus on individual

lessons or the strategies one uses on a typical instructional day. Paul’s early work

focused on the former, while his post-1995 work explicitly developed the latter. The

answer to teaching critical thinking and instructional reform, Paul argues, is in a

combination of the two (Paul, 1995a).

In a chapter entitled “The Art of Redesigning Instruction” Paul (1995a) outlines

the two front approach to lesson redesign. Paul discusses lesson redesign and general

lesson design schema, as well as providing tactical recommendations that enhance

learning on any day of instruction. Fung has access to both approaches, yet she did not

incorporate Paul’s suggestions for aiding teachers re-think how they foster critical

thinking on a typical day of class. In other words, Fung’s criticism did not account for

the daily strategies Paul suggests are needed for any substantive redesign of instruction.

Fung’s study of a skills-plus-dispositions approach to critical thinking instruction would

have been augmented had she made and embraced the same distinction for which Paul

and others clearly argue (Costa, 2001a; Paul, 1995; Paul & Elder, 2002; Paul & Hiler,

2002; Tishman et al., 1995).

Regarding theory, Fung created a well constructed argument in favor of

confronting intellectual barriers to critical thinking using Paul’s concept of strong sense

critical thinking. However, from a theoretical point of view, Fung did not fully evaluate
 186 
 

the conceptual depth behind the distinction between strong sense and weak sense critical

thinking or the implications and consequences of weak sense critical thinking in theory or

in instruction; principally the primacy of natural languages, the logic of questions and her

discussion of Paul’s articulation of the essential understandings for critical thinking:

elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, and intellectual traits. As a result, Fung’s

work is underdeveloped as a substantive interpretation and analysis of Paul’s conception

of critical thinking.

Although her work is a strong argument for teaching critical thinking in the strong

sense, it does not reveal the theoretical depth and breadth of Paul’s work. Fung (2005)

agrees with McPeck that the discourse on critical thinking is “paradoxically both

overworked and under-analyzed,” but does not sufficiently address the problem as it

relates to Paul’s work which she utilizes for her research (p. 1).

Conclusion

As Siegel and Fung exemplify, the whole of Paul’s work has never been analyzed

and evaluated. Parts of his work have been given significant evaluation, but these parts

are not the whole and are theoretically significant only when examining Paul’s

conceptualization in its entirety. Siegel’s and Fung’s focus on Paul’s articulation of

strong sense and weak sense critical thinking drives at the heart of Paul’s

conceptualization; however, the discourse on critical thinking would benefit from a

substantive evaluation of how Paul’s conceptualization works together as an ideal and

pragmatic approach to educational and social reform. Otherwise, people may accept

assumptions that they might not completely understand. My analysis of Richard Paul’s

approach to critical thinking will contribute a needed analysis of Paul’s conceptualization

 187 
 

of critical thinking and evaluate its theoretical depth and its feasibility for successful

application within educational settings.

Current developments in critical thinking theory have begun to recognize the

pedagogical and epistemological strength of Paul’s conceptualization. Craig Gibson

(1995) states, “If we take Paul’s conception of critical thinking seriously…we will see the

need for a combination of generic and discipline-specific critical thinking” (point #4).

Weinstein (2003) reiterates this point of view writing “But whatever the particulars, all

theorists agree on the centrality of autonomous judgment as the goal of critical thinking

education, and are increasingly joining with Richard Paul on the need to apply critical

thinking to the biasing assumptions of the critical thinker him or herself, as well as to the

views of others” (p. 276). Weinstein goes on to say that Paul’s approach to critical

thinking has significant importance to maintaining a democracy. He states that Paul’s

conceptualization accounts for “an analysis of multilogical issues, issues whose internal

complexity requires a variety of disciplinary and extradisciplinary points of view,” and

that this conceptual approach is “essential because it transcends the limited perspectives

of any given discipline and requires the ability to synthesize and apply a variety of kinds

of information and principles” necessary to educating competent citizens (Weinstein, pp.

277-278).

Richard Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking is best understood as an

attempt to unite theory with practice to promote educational and social reform. It is from

this perspective that his work should be evaluated. Siegel (1990) states that Richard

Paul’s work “relates, better than any other discussion I am aware of, theoretical work on

the nature of critical thinking to the practical world of education” (p. 18). Siegel makes it
 188 
 

very clear that there needs to be further analysis of Paul’s work in order to understand its

implications to the philosophy of education.

Richard Paul’s views have had a significant impact on how critical thinking is

understood today. He has persuaded many people of the significance of this concept,

because he developed a paradigm in understanding the concept and its application.

Furthermore, he has challenged people to create an academic field dedicated to the study

and extension of critical thinking. Critical thinking is an interdisciplinary subject that

authors throughout history have articulated in different ways, and Paul’s contribution is

significant because it is comprehensive and practical. Yet its comprehensiveness poses a

challenge; Paul’s model requires a fresh contextualization when applied to any given

field. Paul and his associates have pointed in the direction of those contextualizations,

but a tremendous amount of work must be done for this model to flourish in any

discipline or experience.

The purpose of this literature review was to show that, although Richard Paul is a

recognized leader in the critical thinking movement, his work has not been sufficiently

evaluated. This is significant because Paul’s approach to critical thinking is trans-

disciplinary in nature and is based on uniting theory with practice, and it is consistently

used throughout the world as a pragmatic conceptualization of critical thinking that seeks

to fulfill the ideals of education. Parts of his work have received thorough attention, but

the whole has yet to be substantially critiqued. The goal of this dissertation is to conduct

the first in-depth analysis and evaluation of Richard Paul’s critical thinking model as it

presently exists.
 189 
 

The next chapter comments on a particular post-modern critique of Paul’s

conception of critical thinking that, it is argued, fails to highlight significant theoretical

weaknesses. Chapter six represents the last chapter in the literature review portion of this

dissertation.  
 190 
 

CHAPTER 6

PROBLEMS WITH A POSTMODERN CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL THINKING:

WHERE BRENNER AND PARKS GO WRONG

Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss one post-modern critique of critical
thinking focusing on the extent to which the criticism highlights problems within Richard
Paul’s conception of critical thinking. It is concluded that the critique posited by
Brenner and Parks is inadequate as a post-modern criticism of both the concept of
critical thinking and Paul’s conception.

Introduction

Postmodernism poses some of the most significant criticisms of critical thinking

theory and its various conceptualizations. Postmodern and deconstructionist arguments,

like the discourse on critical thinking, come in many forms and exist within many frames

of reference. Generally speaking, postmodern critiques of critical thinking argue that one

cannot justifiably claim that there are universal concepts and processes that apply to

reasoning within all cultures, and those philosophers who conform to such ideas should

give up searching for “Truth” because it is culturally relative. In other words, universals

do not exist. Conversely, traditional Western philosophy heralds rationality as the ideal

goal of human development and argues that there are universal, rational principles and

methods for evaluating the consistency and validity of reasoning (Paul & Elder, 2006a;

Siegel, 1993). However, postmodernists would argue that such a goal is ethnocentric and

cannot be justifiably generalized to non-Western cultures. In essence, postmodernism

questions “the legitimacy of the fundamental assumptions of the modern West and of the

elites who insist on these assumptions” (Harding, 1989, p. 24e). Post-modernism is an

 191 
 

attempt to challenge the intellectual traditions that govern the way people come to know

and think critically about something.

One way to frame general postmodern criticisms of critical thinking is to consider

how critical thinking is culturally interpreted and applied. In interrogative form, how and

to what extent do definitions and applications of critical thinking vary across cultures? In

other words, assuming awareness of the Western intellectual tradition, “What counts as

good or effective critical thinking in solving problems or decision making in non-western

countries?” (Brenner & Parks, 2001, p. 216). A question of application reads, “How can

educators use awareness of good thinking in various cultures to improve all students’

thinking and learning?” (Brenner & Parks, 2001, p. 216). Stated slightly differently, how

can one adjust the educational system and mindset within Western countries to account

for culturally diverse epistemological structures so as to improve the quality of all

students’ thinking?

These types of questions have been addressed by many scholars concerned with

narrow epistemological interpretations of rationality and their associated educational

practices. For example, the field of philosophy has long been criticized for its narrow

interpretation of critical thinking. The field, it is claimed, has traditionally focused

critical thinking theory and instruction on formal and informal logic, which are direct

descendants of Western ways of thinking and knowing. The traditional philosophical

approach to critical thinking has received criticism for its emphasis on the form of

arguments rather than their substance. Critiques within the discourse on critical thinking

label the philosophical approach the “first wave” of the critical thinking movement and

argue that “mainstream analyses of critical thinking and pedagogical applications often
 192 
 

fashioned there (first wave mentality) as consisting of an unjustifiable and at times

dangerous veneration of rationality and the normative methodological standards of

universality, objectivity, and abstraction…[which] can only lead to totalization,

desubjectification, and decontextualization” (McLaren, 1994, p. vix). Furthermore, these

critiques argue that “the sanctification of inferential procedures rules out the more

creative modes of intelligibility, empathy, visceral or bodily knowledge, and an

understanding of and tolerance for contingency and ambiguity” (McLaren, 1994, p. vix).

Conceptions of critical thinking that are narrowly defined by Eurocentric conceptions and

traditions of rationality are deterministic, impersonal, and procedurally narrow. What

needs to be present, then, within any conception of critical thinking, is sensitivity to

context where instructor and students understand that “thinking is not detachable from the

context” (McLaren, 1994, p. vix). A substantive conception of critical thinking satisfies

this requirement because it does not limit its analysis to argument forms apart from the

context and background logic on which the argument is based.

Unfortunately, many critics of critical thinking do not engage substantive

conceptions, but conveniently limit their analyses to first wave approaches. In doing so,

they commit the same mistake they criticize; they do not take into consideration the

multiplicity of points of view within the discourse on critical thinking. A consequence of

this is often found in the misinterpretation of any one theorist’s conception, projecting

their own agenda and point of view on the analyses instead of framing it within a larger

discourse. Richard Paul’s work is often victim to such short sightedness and obvious

interpretive bias.
 193 
 

In an article titled “Cultural Influences on Critical Thinking and Problem

Solving,” Douglas Brenner and Sandra Parks attempt to address post-modern questions

facing critical thinking theory and in doing so erroneously critique theorists like Richard

Paul for maintaining and championing oppressive Western models of rationality. The

purpose of this chapter is to analyze and evaluate the extent to which (1) Brenner and

Parks’ argument is conclusive as a critique of Western conceptions of critical thinking

and theorists like Richard Paul, and (2) if their interpretation of critical thinking is more

useful for instructional design. It will be argued that although the distinction between

Western and Eastern cultures is reasonable, their criticism of Western conceptions of

critical thinking is poorly developed because they confuse the existence of cross-cultural

critical thinking concepts with the application of those concepts. Often the examples the

authors cite contradict their claims. Furthermore, Brenner and Parks fail to differentiate

between the concept of critical thinking, and its application, within education causing

them to erroneously categorize Paul’s work as characteristic of formal logicians. This

reveals their poor understanding of Paul’s work, the discourse as a whole, and a

substantive conception of critical thinking. In the end, Brenner and Parks provide only

cursory insights that do not challenge cross-cultural conceptualizations of critical

thinking in any significant way.

Confusing Concepts with Application

Summary of Brenner and Parks’ Argument

To summarize Brenner and Parks’ argument, Western conceptualizations of

critical thinking have created an intellectual tradition, both theoretical and applied, that

suppresses non-Western conceptualizations from substantively entering into education.

 194 
 

In other words, Brenner and Parks claim that a survey of critical thinking definitions

reveals that the concept of critical thinking is dominated by traditional Western reasoning

that is inherently oppressive of non-Western epistemologies due to the fact that non-

Western conceptualizations are not allowed to enter educational institutions in a

significant and inclusive way. Scholar and pedagogue bell hooks (1994) [lower case

spelling intentional] summarizes the general critique of Western epistemology and

pedagogy stating:

If we examine critically the traditional role of the university in the pursuit of truth

and the sharing of knowledge and information, it is painfully clear that biases that

uphold and maintain white supremacy, imperialism, sexism, and racism have

distorted education so that it is no longer about the practice of freedom. The call

for a recognition of cultural diversity, a rethinking of ways of knowing, a

deconstruction of old epistemologies, and the concomitant demand that there be a

transformation in our classrooms, in how we teach and what we teach, has been a

necessary revolution – one that seeks to restore life to a corrupt and dying

academy. (pp. 29-30)

hooks expresses, in one form, post-modernism’s frustrations with the way education is

conceptualized and conducted in the West; that the history of Western civilization is

largely oppressive of non-white male groups. It is claimed that those in power,

consciously and unconsciously, have created social, political and academic institutions

that reflect the dominant cultures’ values and, therefore, oppressive tendencies. Each

generation is indoctrinated into the dominant system’s way of thinking perpetuating the

cycle of oppression. Brenner and Parks critique Western notions of critical thinking from
 195 
 

this frame of reference focusing on the differences between the ways individualistic and

communal cultures conceptualize the topic.

Brenner and Parks attribute much of the problem of critical thinking in education

to the different ways Western and Eastern cultures approach thinking and learning.

Teaching and learning in Western countries focuses on the individual while Eastern

cultures focus on the collective. They go on to argue that it is possible to correct or alter

the traditional approach to critical thinking epistemology. To overcome this oppressive

tradition, Brenner and Parks suggest constructing an educational mindset, or pedagogy,

that treats non-Western epistemologies as valid and equal to that of Eastern

conceptualizations. Furthermore, they provide instructional suggestions for promoting

sensitivity to non-Western ways of knowing into the Western classroom.

The authors’ argument can be summarized as follows (Brenner & Parks, 2001, pp.

216-217):

Claim 1: Thinking (cognitive schema) is determined by context.

Claim 2: Western societies (USA and much of Europe) typically emphasize

individual intellectual development and Eastern societies (primarily Asia, southern Asia

and Africa) typically emphasize collective intellectual development.

Claim 3: Critical thinking and problem solving theories and epistemologies

typically follow Western definitions that “favor masculine, instrumental, logical-rational,

linear, objective, deductive, and Eurocentric viewpoints.”

Claim 4: Unlike Western societies, Eastern ways of knowing are based on “(a)

supremacy of the community; (b) sanctity of authority and hierarchy; (c) usefulness of

the individual; (d) respect for the elderly; and (e) religion as a way of life.”
 196 
 

Claim 5: “Standards of effective thinking expressed in Western habits of mind

and construction of knowledge greatly influence curriculum design and instructional

methodology.”

Claim 6: It is possible that “Western epistemology creates cultural biases that

limit some students’ understanding and achievement.” Thinking schemas of collectivistic

societies are typically ignored, so Western thinkers are generally ignorant of insights

from non-Western ways of knowing (or alternative epistemological schemas).

Claim 7: The effects of Western epistemological influences are remediable.

Therefore: Conceptualizations of critical thinking and problem solving need to

incorporate insights from both Western and Eastern points of view or cognitive schemas.

“Expanding our knowledge of cultural perspectives enriches our understanding of the

complex of traits, skills, habits, values, and abilities that individuals bring to the process

of problem solving… what may be accepted as effective critical thinking may not be

judged similarly in another culture.”

Implication: If “we can enlarge our understanding of the cognitive perspectives

that students bring as members of their cultural or ethnic groups,” then we can “adapt our

teaching practices and create classroom communities where students feel supported.”

Brenner and Parks take on a very complex, debatable issue, and bring attention to

the importance of incorporating non-Western approaches to thinking about issues and

problems in teaching students to reason through problems and issues. The challenge is,

however, that their analysis of Western ways of knowing is incomplete and unclear,

resulting in suggestions for remodeling instruction for greater cultural sensitivity that are

not uniquely different from the Western paradigm they critique.

 197 
 

Critique of Brenner and Parks Argument

My critique of Brenner and Parks’ article focuses on the apparent contradictions

between the examples they use to support their argument and the claims inherent within

the argument. Specifically, it will be argued that (1) the authors do not have an adequate

concept of critical thinking standards as articulated by Richard Paul and colleagues

because they regularly confuse the question that explores the existence of common

evaluation standards with the question that explores the contextual application of

evaluation standards, (2) their explanation of Western and Eastern approaches to problem

solving is poorly developed because it does not draw clear distinctions between the two

cultural groups, and (3) their negative view of Western critical thinking epistemology

prevents them from recognizing the concepts of open-mindedness, fair-mindedness and

intellectual flexibility as tenets of the critical thinking that exist within Western pedagogy

resulting in a very narrow view of what constitutes critical thinking as a conceptual

system and educational goal. Each of these points will be addressed in turn.

Intellectual Standards

In essence, Brenner and Parks confuse questions. The question, to what extent are

there consistent standards for evaluating the quality of thinking throughout the world is

confused with the question, how are evaluation standards contextually applied within

different cultures? Brenner and Parks move between critiquing the concept of cross-

cultural intellectual standards and acknowledging them as important for evaluating the

quality of thinking. For example, Brenner and Parks inconsistently interpret two

evaluation standards: clarity and accuracy.

 198 
 

Brenner and Parks present a foggy interpretation of clarity as a concept, confusing

it as a cross-cultural standard on one hand, with its application within context specific

situations on the other. In discussing the idea of clarity they fail to define their

interpretation. Generally speaking, when one seeks to clarify an issue, comment,

question, problem, piece of information, etc. then one is trying to understand the situation

for what it is without unfairly misrepresenting it or falsely judging it (Paul & Elder,

2006a). When applied to instruction, clarifying of intellectual tasks and expectations is

necessary for students to know what to do and what intellectual work in which to engage.

Brenner and Parks (2001) make a conceptually similar claim stating that

“enhancing critical thinking and problem solving across cultures requires educators to

understand standards of good thinking, to clarify them for themselves and for students,

and to practice sound thinking in the classroom, in one’s personal experiences, and in the

culture of the school. Teachers and students must evaluate the quality of thinking and

acknowledge good thinking whenever it is demonstrated” (pp. 219-220). Based on this

statement, it is apparent that Brenner and Parks see the need for clarifying standards,

expectations and tasks within instructional settings. However, while they implicitly use

concept of clarity as a standard for evaluating instructional goals and processes, they

critique the West’s tendency to universalize the concept arguing that it is not applicable

across cultural contexts. Unfortunately for instructors, Brenner and Parks implicit use of

the concept of clarity confuses their critique making it difficult for one to explicitly

determine when clarity is an appropriate evaluation standard.

For example, Brenner and Parks (2001) critique the 1997 study directed by Paul,

Elder et al. for the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing which states that
 199 
 

clarity is “a fundamental criterion to facilitate critical thinking” (p. 218). Brenner and

Parks (2001) claim that the concept of clarity as an evaluation standard cannot be cross-

culturally applicable to thinking critically because “communal cultures, in which saving

face is paramount, find ambiguity and indirection essential to maintaining harmonious

relationships” (p. 218). This example suggests that in many communal contexts people

think critically without valuing, emphasizing, or recognizing clarity as a standard for

evaluating reasoning. That is, people in communal based societies often use other criteria

for reasoning through problems or issues not typically present within individualistic

societies. Their argument is inconsistent because they confuse the existence of the

concept with its application.

The existence of clarity as a cross-cultural standard and its application are two

different issues. Placed in interrogative form, to what extent is the concept of clarity a

universal intellectual standard, and in what circumstances is it inappropriate to evaluate a

line of reasoning for the standard of clarity? Brenner and Parks’ argument would be

clearer and more consistent if they had differentiated these two questions rather than

confuse them. For example, if Brenner and Parks’ argument was consistent with its

critique of Western notions of critical thinking it would have had to address the first

question by citing examples of cultures where the concept of clarity did not implicitly

and explicitly exist. By doing so, they would be better able to support the argument that

since some concepts, like clarity, do not exist within a culture’s collective mind they are

not conceptually transferable across cultures. Furthermore, the example Brenner and

Parks argument does not legitimately critique the existence of clarity as a cross-cultural

evaluation standard because in societies where “saving face” and “ambiguity” are valued
 200 
 

one can infer that those involved have clearly identified the cultural mores and

procedures concluding not to question authority or explicitly ask for clarification. In this

sense, the standard still exists. The question at issue (“Should I ask for clarification or

accept ambiguity?”), either consciously or unconsciously, dictates the action.

Unfortunately, Brenner and Parks’ work does not explicitly explore such interpretations

or cases revealing that they do not have a clear understanding of the concept of clarity as

a cross-cultural evaluation standard.

What may explain why the concept of clarity is misinterpreted within Brenner and

Parks’ work? Confusion is due in large part to (1) their general misunderstanding of the

concept of clarity and its role in critical thinking, and (2) their attempt to maintain a post-

modern critique of “universals” that Western epistemology promotes. Had Brenner and

Parks’ argument included similar critiques of other theorists within the discourse the

confusion may had been prevented. For example, Henry Giroux provides a clear critique

of the standard of clarity as a dominated by Western interpretations.

In his book entitled Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of

Learning, Henry Giroux (1988) argues that, when superficially used, the concept of

clarity can propagate oppressive power structures that work against the liberation of

one’s thinking and, therefore, democratic life. His critique of the concept is in response

to narrowly conceived conceptions of critical thinking, specifically that of formal and

informal logic. He writes that language superficially used or language that is devoid of

substantive conceptual distinctions and contextualizations “prevents educators [and

students] from critically examining the ideological assumptions embedded in their own

language and the schooling experiences that they help to structure” (Giroux, 1998, p. 2).
 201 
 

For example, Giroux argues language is generally evaluated “according to whether it is

simple or complex, clear or vague, concrete or abstract” (p. 2). Such an orientation is

simplistic and “reduces language to a technical issue” because it is limited to specialized

contexts that do not help students understand the logic behind statements, problems,

issues and questions.

When substantively understood, the concept of clarity as a standard for evaluation

draws on additional dimensions of the word. For example, to be clear is also to be

transparent. In other words, one’s reasoning is open and visible for examination. This

interpretation of the concept of clarity is present within the concept of fair-mindedness

and what is often referred to as the scientific spirit or spirit of scientific inquiry.

Although Giroux does not articulate the different uses of the term clarity, it is implied in

his critique of critical thinking as formal and informal logic. This is where Paul’s work

becomes very useful.

Richard Paul (1995a) argues for a similar approach to thinking critically, not only

in his critique of critical thinking as limited to instruction in formal and informal logic,

but in his construction of critical thinking theory. Like Giroux, Paul (1995a) argues that

“Our basic ways of knowing are inseparable from our basic ways of being. How we

think reflects who we are” (p. 259). Each person, and thus every argument, belief, value

and action, carries with it a host of background assumptions and inferences many of

which are uncritically held. For Paul, the concept of clarity as an evaluation standard is

substantively applied when one is able to unpack various dimensions of a problem so that

one can see it for what it is, including its background logic and implications. To do so

requires that one engage a network of concepts: concepts that establish frames of
 202 
 

reference to guide the application of the evaluation standard. For example, the concept of

clarity is substantively applied when one guides his/her questions with other foundational

critical thinking concepts like: purpose, question, assumptions, point(s) of view,

inferences/conclusions/solutions, information/data/experiences, implications, and even

the idea of a concept (Paul & Binker, 1995b).

Brenner and Parks’ work does not show a deep understanding of the way concepts

work within contexts and how they are interpreted within the discourse on critical

thinking. As a result, Paul’s work and the work of those whom they intend to critique are

mis-interpreted. The same confusions are found in their interpretation of accuracy as an

intellectual standard.

Brenner and Parks (2001) argue “because our habits of mind are influenced by

our cultural and historical circumstances, the decision-making strategies that we seek to

promote in students reflect our own culture… [and] are not necessarily universal models

that apply across all ethnic and cultural groups” (p. 216). The exact interpretation of this

statement is unclear due to the term model. Pedagogical models are conceptual by nature.

Models use general concepts to guide learning and, therefore, must be contextualized.

Brenner and Parks unclearly fuse a critique of concepts as they exist across cultures with

how concepts are applied within cultural contexts.

For example, Brenner and Parks (2001) criticize the claim made by authors such

as Paul, Elder, Costa and Kallick that accuracy is a universal intellectual standard for

thinking critically (p. 218). Brenner and Parks argue that accuracy is not a necessary or

sufficient condition for thinking critically and solving problems across cultures. They

state that in individualistic cultures “accuracy is espoused as a standard to assess and

 203 
 

uphold the value of critical thinking. Yet accuracy or eliminating errors may enjoy less

currency in those communal cultures where maintaining social harmony and respecting

the wisdom of the group or elders is valued more highly” (Brenner & Parks, 2001, p.

218). The emphasis on the accuracy of the information as a process of evaluation is

overridden within communal societies by the desire to maintain existing social structures

that traditionally guide the group’s decisions. In other words, communal cultures may

not regard accurate information or conclusions as important as avoiding social conflict.

Stated differently, since one’s context defines how one solves problems and draws

inferences, then the context is not always conducive to the thinking about accuracy as an

concept for facilitating and monitoring the decision making process. Once again, in their

attempt to redefine critical thinking, Brenner and Parks confuse questions: What

constitutes critical thinking across cultures? with How is critical thinking applied or

interpreted across cultures?

Statements such as “enjoy less currency” speak to the contextual dependency of

cross-cultural critical thinking concepts. However, this statement contradicts Brenner

and Parks’ (2001) critique of the existence of cross-cultural, or universal, concepts like

clarity and accuracy (p. 218). Recognizing that cross-cultural critical thinking concepts

do or do not exist is different from describing or critiquing the application of such

common concepts. Since Brenner and Parks confuse the two issues, one may infer that

they do not have a clear understanding of the nature of concepts essential and

fundamental to the critical thinking process. This is apparent in their treatment of the

concept of information as it relates to their article as whole.

 204 
 

Unlike their discussion of clarity and accuracy as critical thinking evaluation

standards, Brenner and Parks clearly state the universal presence of information as part of

the critical thinking process. “All cultures rely upon information” (Brenner & Parks,

2001, p. 219). This is a statement that clearly makes a cross-cultural, or universal, claim.

However, unlike their analysis of evaluation standards, Brenner and Parks clearly

differentiate the presence of information with its application. They write, “but data and

credible sources may defined differently” according to the context (Brenner & Parks,

2001, p. 219). This is a good example of how Brenner and Parks have thought through

the concept of information differentiating between its cross-cultural existence and its

contextual application. Unfortunately for the reader, such clarity is not consistent

throughout the text, seen not only in Brenner and Parks’ interpretation of critical thinking

concepts, but problem solving as well.

Since Brenner and Parks’ argument misunderstands the relationship between the

existence, or presence, of concepts and the application of concepts within specific

contexts, their work mis-categorizes Richard Paul’s work associating it with or limiting it

to Western philosophical models that advocate highly specialized interpretations of

critical thinking based on formal logic. This is not the case of Paul’s work. Had they

consulted any edition of his seminal work Critical Thinking: How to Prepare Students for

a Rapidly Changing World, they would have recognized that Paul critiques conceptions

of critical thinking that emphasize form over substance. 14 Confusing concepts with

applications reveals many problematic dimensions within Brenner and Parks’ critique of

Western conceptions of critical thinking. Their interpretation of problem solving is no

exception.
 205 
 

Problem Solving

Brenner and Parks’ article is useful to the extent that one recognizes the need to

provide students from various cultural backgrounds the opportunity to reason through a

problem or issue in a variety of ways. However, the article is not a useful guide to re-

conceptualizing one’s curriculum given the often confusing generalizations Brenner and

Parks rely on to make their case. For example, Brenner and Parks (2001) argue that

collectivistic cultures do not think through a problem or examine the evidence relevant to

a problem in a “step-wise, organized strategy” (p. 218). Rather, groups evaluate evidence

by considering the issue carefully, framing the question, approaching an elder or

authority figure for advice, and pondering the problem before making a thoughtful choice

(Brenner & Parks, 2001). This distinction is unclear for two reasons.

First, Brenner and Parks’ work does not elaborate on the non-systematic approach

to thinking critically about a problem beyond that of general behavior patterns that are

common within individualistic societies. Where, exactly, do the differences lie? It is

difficult to imagine that serious scholars would disagree with the need to evaluate

evidence by considering the issue carefully, frame the question, approach an authority for

advice, and contemplate the problem before making a thoughtful choice.

For example, Richard Paul and Linda Elder, whose work Brenner and Parks

criticize, explicitly argue that in every context and with every complex issue it is

important to clearly, accurately, and precisely state the question and pre-think the

problem or issue. This involves determining the accuracy and validity of one’s sources,

and identifying and analyzing the structure of the problem and/or question. Doing so

helps one better understand the significance of the question and/or problem (Paul &
 206 
 

Elder, 2004; Paul & Elder, 2006a; Paul & Elder, 2006c). Similarly, Gerald Nosich

articulates an important checklist for reasoning through a problem or issue that includes

distinguishing from relevant and irrelevant questions, clarifying and precisely stating

one’s purpose and the question at issue, and checking the accuracy and reliability of

one’s sources (Nosich, 2005a).

Secondly, Brenner and Parks do not offer clear and concrete examples to support

the claim that individual and communal cultures approach problem solving differently.

As a result, the point is lost as a practical insight for redesigning instruction. How can

one expect an instructor to effectively use the differentiation between the epistemologies

of Western and Eastern cultures without specific case examples? Without specific

examples, cultural differences remain abstract and increase the probability that the

differentiation cannot be effectively utilized in the classroom. This problem is

augmented when placed within the broader post-modern critique of Western

epistemology, which claims that Western thinking attempts to be calculated, verifiable,

emotionless, objective, unambiguous, and linear, controlling, masculine, and oppressive.

Western Conception of Critical Thinking as Inherently Oppressive

Brenner and Parks (2001) state that Western critical thinking epistemologies

“favor masculine, instrumental, logical-rational, linear, objective, deductive, and

Eurocentric viewpoints,” and focuses on dominating and controlling perspectives other

than its own (pp. 216, 218). Their fundamental premise is that Western epistemology is

intrinsically and systematically oppressive of non-Western cultures and of non-white

male peoples. This negative view contradicts their conclusion that critical thinking

instruction should balance Western and Eastern perspectives, and contributes to the fact
 207 
 

that they confuse the idea of critical thinking with how it has been traditionally applied

within the educational system. Together, these points reveal their poor understanding of

the breadth of critical thinking conceptualizations within the Western discourse by

treating them as a unitary whole.

To conclude that a balance between Western and Eastern approaches to critical

thinking education is needed while arguing that one is inherently oppressive of the other

is contradictory and confusing. Brenner and Parks attempt to take essential and

significant concepts that they claim are unique to or emphasized within (their

differentiation is unclear) either individualistic cultures or communal cultures and use

them to foster a critical multi-cultural classroom curriculum. They write, “We are

challenged to foster in students the traits we admire from communal cultures – humility,

listening and silence, reflective thinking, responsibility, civility, respect, holistic and

intuitive thinking – while at the same time honoring Western intellectual standards of

accuracy, clarity, and rationality” (Brenner & Parks, 2001, p. 218). This conclusion is

confusing because it is unclear and inconclusive within the context of their argument. In

other words, this inference is fallacious because it is too simplistic; it presents complex

cultural differences and corresponding pedagogical discourses as polar opposites,

subjugating their conclusion to the same linear tradition they critique. However, even if

one accepts this cultural differentiation, Brenner and Parks negative view of Western

conceptions of critical thinking contradicts the claim.

On one hand Brenner and Parks argue for a balance between Western and Eastern

interpretations and applications of critical thinking. On the other hand they also argue

that Western conceptualizations of critical thinking are inherently dominating, male

 208 
 

centered, and controlling (Brenner & Parks, 2001). Based on this line of thinking, one

can infer that domination, misogyny, and control are acceptable concepts for helping

students reason critically, develop autonomously, and think empathetically. Since

Brenner and Parks attempt to argue for a more culturally inclusive classroom

environment, their negative critique of Western critical thinking epistemology does not

advance their purpose. However, if they were to focus on concepts and values common

to both individualistic and communal cultures, Brenner and Parks would avoid over

simplification and help instructors see the applicability of the applying critical thinking

within the culturally diverse classroom.

Each of the concepts or traits that Brenner and Parks associate with communal

societies is present within the Western pedagogy of critical thinking and education. For

example, throughout the discourse, historical and contemporary, the concepts of

intellectual flexibility, open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, and the need for cross-

disciplinary application are present as organizing ideas for any substantive conception of

critical thinking (Baron, 2001; Berman, 2001; Ennis, 2001; Paul & Elder 2006a; Perkins,

2001; Siegel, 1990). It is doubtful that a reasonable pedagogue within the Western

tradition would argue that humility is not important to substantive learning. The concept

of “humility” is present in various forms within the discourse and always thought of as an

essential condition for thinking critically; Siegel calls it the “critical spirit,” Ennis calls

for a willingness to learn, Paul calls is “intellectual humility” (Ennis, 2001; Paul 1995a;

Siegel, 1990). Brenner and Parks’ negative and narrow interpretation of Western

intellectual traditions prevents the above concepts from substantively entering into their
 209 
 

argument. This is consistent with the fact that they regularly confuse the concept of

critical thinking with its various cultural and academic applications.

The way the concepts are applied and even emphasized varies across cultural

landscapes. As it has been argued, Brenner and Parks do not clearly differentiate

between the existence (or lack thereof) of critical thinking concepts within a culture and

the way these concepts are applied within and across different cultural contexts. This

problem is a result of Brenner and Parks’ interpretation of Western conceptualizations of

critical thinking as imperialistic, white, patriarchal, oppressive constructions.

For example, Brenner and Parks (2001) associate the critical thinking standard of

accuracy within individualistic cultures as “utilitarian, focusing on dominating,

controlling and computing information while seeking definite, unambiguous, and

objective results and knowledge” (p. 218). However, a dominant intellectual or social

system is oppressive to the extent that it does not question itself, does not allow for

dissent, and does not encourage one to engage in autonomous, intellectual work. The

concept of accuracy does not inherently imply cultural value, in and of, itself. The ways

concepts are contextualized and interpreted reflect the values and biases of specific

groups. There is little question that certain intellectual traditions have been misused to

suppress certain perspectives. Human history attests to this fact: communism equated

with totalitarianism, liberty equated with patriotism, informal logic equated with critical

thinking. However, the presence (or existence) of concepts and the applications of

concepts are two different issues that Brenner and Parks do not clearly differentiate.

Clearly distinguishing between the application of a concept and its presence

within and across cultures would alleviate some of the confusion regarding how different
 210 
 

cultures interpret critical thinking. Such clarification would be beneficial for Western

educators in developing multi-cultural instructional strategies without forcing students to

uncritically conform to a dominant epistemology. Furthermore, identifying general

critical thinking concepts can help guide reasoning within various epistemological

frameworks. When treated as cross-cultural concepts, evaluation standards like clarity

and accuracy, reasoning elements like information or dispositions like open-mindedness

can create a base-line for thinking critically which can establish an intellectual

community among students.

Claiming that certain intellectual concepts do not exist within one culture but exist

within another can perpetuate cultural isolation. In her book, Teaching to Transgress:

Education as the Practice of Freedom, bell hooks (1994) argues that pedagogy must

unify itself around the common concepts, like open-mindedness, the desire to learn, and

points of view so as to build substantive learning communities where ideas and cultural

differences are respected and explored with discipline. The superficial application of

such concepts can lead to cultural tokenism. She writes, “Often, if there is one lone

person of color in the classroom she or he is objectified by others and forced to assume

the role of ‘native informant.’ For example, a novel is read by a Korean American author.

White students turn to the one student from a Korean background to explain what they do

not understand. This places an unfair responsibility onto that student” (hooks, 1994, p.

43). Organizing learning communities within multi-cultural classrooms based on

common base-line concepts while allowing for the exploration of those ideas within

varying contexts can create a platform for individual expression, facilitate critical
 211 
 

thinking, and promote understanding of cultural differences. hooks articulates what

Brenner and Parks unsuccessfully attempt, but intuitively imply.

Brenner and Parks (2001) recognize in the opening paragraphs that “Critical

thinking is an essential aspect of moral reasoning and is employed in conflict resolution

and interpersonal problem solving…and includes dispositions or critical attitudes” (p.

216). Students need a learning environment that is based on common concepts that

govern quality thinking while allowing for individual processing, and expression, of

those ideas. However, in their attempt to encourage multi-cultural awareness and the

need to adjust stagnant approaches to education, Brenner and Parks undermine their

dedication to critical thinking by confusing the existence of common critical thinking

concepts with contextual applications of the concepts.

Brenner and Parks (2001) conclude that in order for instruction to be fair and

inclusive to the various ways non-Western cultures think about and approach issues and

problems, it must fuse Western and Eastern “ways of knowing” (p. 219). They write,

“Expanding our knowledge of cultural perspectives enriches our understanding of the

complex of traits, skills, habits, values, and abilities that individuals bring to the process

of problem solving. It may also uncover the partiality or limits of any one perspective”

(Brenner & Parks, 2001, p. 216). This is a reasonable conclusion with which many

interdisciplinary approaches to critical thinking would agree, especially in a time where

multi-cultural education is necessary to understand and cope with increasing complexities

and interconnections of globalization. However, the logic and validity of Brenner and

Parks’ conclusion is compromised due to their negative and myopic conceptualization of

Western critical thinking epistemology.

 212 
 

Although their critique of Western epistemology is consistent with many post-

modern conceptualizations, Brenner and Parks conveniently ignore Western theoretical

traditions that explicitly advocate intellectual flexibility and fair-mindedness as integral

to the critical thinking process. Instead, they treat all formulations of critical thinking

within individualistic cultures as a unitary whole. Grouping all conceptualizations as such

prevents existing insights from materializing within their argument. One can argue that

Brenner and Parks commit the fallacy of overgeneralization which reflects their limited

understanding of the discourse on critical thinking. Their negative view of Western

epistemology results in an inconclusive and contradictory argument which is not a useful

guide for helping educators to foster critical thinking abilities among students.

Conclusion

The goals set forth in this paper were to decide (1) if Brenner and Parks’

argument is conclusive as a Post-Modern critique of Western critical thinking

epistemology and of critical thinking theorists like Richard Paul, and (2) if their

interpretation of critical thinking is more useful for instructional design. Both points are

closely related in that failure of the first compromises the second. The lack of clear and

logical conclusions within Brenner and Parks’ argument compromises its usefulness for

teachers. It was argued that confusing the existence of cross-cultural critical thinking

concepts with the application of those concepts within different cultural contexts was the

most significant barrier to a clear and logical argument.

Like many post-modern interpretations of Western thinking, Brenner and Parks

suggest that critical thinking pedagogy become comfortable with a certain amount of

ambiguity. Due to the vast array of cultures present within today’s classroom, education
 213 
 

needs to become open to alternative ways of learning and understanding content and

solving problems. It is reasonable to claim that few critical thinking theorists would

disagree with Brenner and Parks’ point that education needs to be a place where students

can explore various ideas and methods for gaining content understanding and solving

problems. In other words, students need to be able to intellectually struggle; do the

intellectual work necessary to find solutions to problems. There are multiple ways to

approach a problem or issue; however, Brenner and Parks’ approach is insufficient.

Their argument would be clearer (1) if they did not call on teachers to be both clear and

accept ambiguity as it pertains to learning tasks and goals, and (2) if they focused either

on whether or not cross-cultural critical thinking concepts exist, or how cultures with

individualistic or collectivistic tendencies apply critical thinking concepts within different

contexts. Confusing the two questions reveals the poor understanding of what critical

thinking is and how it is applied.

The educational system(s) within the West, especially the United States, are

fraught with problems. To an extent, the system of educating follows a tradition of

Enlightenment philosophy that values reason as a primary way of generating

understanding. However, educational practice does not, on the whole, adhere to the

philosophical traditions of good thinking. Regularly, fundamental concepts such as open-

mindedness, empathy, integrity and accuracy are ignored or lack emphasis. Conversely,

however, a conceptual approach to thinking critically based on foundational concepts of

reasoning allows for “other ways of knowing” to enter the discourse and the classroom.

Brenner and Parks confuse Western pedagogy and epistemology with its application in

the classroom. Although related, practice does not accurately follow from the
 214 
 

philosophy. Rather than focusing on the differences between individualistic and

collective cultures, the educational system would be better served if it focused on its

existing pedagogical commission to be open-minded.

 215 
 

SUMMARY OF PART II

Part two, chapters five and six, of this dissertation reviewed literature pertaining

to holes within the discourse on critical thinking that justified an in-depth analysis of

Richard Paul’s work. Chapter five focused on two criticisms of Paul’s conception of

critical thinking that, I argued, were incomplete given the fact that his publications over

the last decade were not addressed or, in Fung’s case, not comprehensively considered.

Chapter six focused on a particular post-modern critique showing that Paul’s work, in this

case, was misinterpreted and, therefore, mis-categorized. I argue that Paul’s work is

often mis-categorized, which acts as an obstacle to embracing the model’s trans-

disciplinary nature and goals.

One must have a working understanding of the various frames of reference or

theoretical perspectives from which scholars interpret the concept of critical thinking in

order to locate Paul’s conception within the discourse. Paul’s work is clearly placed

within the third wave of the critical thinking movement. This is understandable given the

fact that Paul’s (1995a) analysis of the first two waves critical thinking movement lead to

his call for, and articulation of, a third wave. His conception of critical thinking is an

attempt to fuse those substantive insights from the first wave with those from the second

wave. As a result, parts of his work are often critiqued, usually superficially so, by those

from both groups. Take the concept of intellectual standards as a brief example.

On the one hand, scholars within the logical-philosophical tradition, like Harvey

Siegel, critique that Paul’s concept of standards lacks a formal method for evaluation and

is, therefore, vulnerable to subjective relativistic interpretation. This is what Yoram

Harpaz (n.d.), the Director of the Mandel School for Educational Leadership in
 216 
 

Jerusalem, refers to as the “translation fallacy.” On the other hand, those within the

second wave of the critical thinking movement, like Brenner and Parks, argue that Paul’s

concept of intellectual standards is too rigid and euro-centric. This is the perspective

behind Giroux’s (1988) critique of the concept of clarity as a normative standard for

evaluation. Unfortunately, both groups do not engage Paul’s work as a comprehensive

whole. As a result, not one area of Paul’s conception is thoroughly understood.

Paul does not subscribe to a specific methodological structure in the analysis and

evaluation of arguments, problems, or questions; nor does he subscribe to a specific

school of thought. Rather, he argues that there are seminal concepts characteristic of good

thinking, that these concepts exist and work within and across domains and cultures, and

that the context or conditions necessary to settle the question(s) at issue define the

process and procedure by which the concepts are applied. Furthermore, Paul asserts that

it is necessary for these concepts to be substantively and appropriately engaged within

specific contexts in order for people to develop critical thinking abilities and dispositions.

Paul’s articulation of critical thinking is based on his purpose to establish a practical

approach to improving thinking within and across disciplines. Such an approach

continually incorporates relevant insights from all domains so as to advance toward those

ideals of education that value the development of intellectually autonomous and socially

responsible citizens of a global community. Some recognize, although not necessarily

explicitly so, Paul’s perspective as characteristic of a new paradigm within the discourse

on critical thinking.

For example, Craig Gibson (1995) notes the third wave status of Paul’s work

writing that “Paul’s combination of the exemplary forms of critical thinking with the
 217 
 

disciplinary modes of reasoning model, although an imperfect synthesis, is the most

complete current explanation of how critical thinking should operate across disciplines

and within them, and of how it should manifest itself in both academic study and

everyday reasoning” (Review of Critical Thinking Theory, ¶ 7). Barbara Thayer-Bacon,

a staunch critic of the critical thinking movement, finds Paul’s work applicable (in

specific ways) to her feminist and constructivist conception of critical thinking. She

writes “Of all these current theories in critical thinking, Richard Paul’s comes closest to

bringing out the qualities I am focusing on as I strive to bring a feminist perspective to

critical thinking” (Thayer-Bacon, 2000, p. 62). Elsewhere she writes, “One can find the

potential of a constructive thinking perspective in Paul’s critical thinking theory”

(Thayer-Bacon, 2000, p. 62). Scholars on all sides of the discourse cite Paul’s work as

support for their conceptions of critical thinking, but one will also find critiques as well.

His work is highly visible, conceptually powerful, and practical. However, Paul’s work

is not without challenges especially when considering its role in educational reform.

Part three is the formal exegesis of Paul’s work. Chapter seven is a

comprehensive description of Paul’s conception of critical thinking including an

explanation of his theoretical frame of reference, a summary of his current model of

critical thinking, and a discussion of some of the theoretical underpinnings of his

conception. This is followed in chapter eight with a description of Paul’s suggestion for

redesigning instruction based on cultivating higher order thinking. Chapter nine

explicates some of the most significant challenges facing the successful implementation

of Paul’s conception within education.

 218 
 

PART III

EXEGESIS: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES PAUL’S CONCEPTUALIZATION

REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO CRITICALTHINKING AND

EDUCATIONAL REFORM?

The purpose of the third part of this dissertation is to address the question: To

what extent does Paul’s conceptualization represent a substantive approach to critical

thinking and educational reform? It is concluded that Paul’s model of critical thinking, is

indeed, substantive due to the fact that fundamental and essential critical thinking

concepts and principles are explicitly present throughout every dimension of his work.

However, the model faces significant challenges as a force for educational reform. These

challenges are not necessarily unique to Paul’s model, but challenge any substantive

theory of critical thinking.

Chapter seven explicates Paul’s theoretical point of view and that which can be

considered his model of critical thinking. It is shown that Paul’s work not only

incorporates foundational and essential critical thinking concepts and principles, but

provides greater clarification than those general concepts present with the base-line

conception outlined in chapter two.

Chapter eight is a summary of Paul’s approach to instructional reform. It is

argued that Paul takes a practical approach to redesigning instruction to combat the

current didactic paradigm that is an obstacle to the cultivation of critical minded students.

Both theoretical and practical dimensions of Paul’s approach to instructional reform are

addressed.
 219 
 

Chapter nine addresses the challenges facing the successful implementation of

Paul’s model of critical thinking. Principally, Paul’s model requires ever fresh

contextualization due to its non-procedural nature. The related implications are discussed

in detail ranging from the teacher training to assessment.

 220 
 

CHAPTER 7

PAUL’S THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW AND MODEL OF CRITICAL

THINKING: A PRACTICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first objective is to provide a concise
summary of the theoretical frame of reference from which Richard Paul constructs his
conception of critical thinking. In doing so, Paul’s use of language in the construction
and expression of his theory of critical thinking is clarified, and it is argued that his
conception of critical thinking cannot be limited to any one particular discipline or
theoretical framework due to its trans-disciplinary nature and practical purposes. The
second objective is to concisely summarize what can be considered Paul’s model of
critical thinking. The elements of reasoning and the intellectual standards are
conceptual sets representing that which characterizes the essential components of critical
thinking. When contextualized and strategically applied, these conceptual sets produce
critical thinking skills and abilities. Paul’s description of the intellectual traits
represents what it means to be a critical thinker. Together, these four dimensions
constitute Paul’s model of critical thinking.

Introduction

Richard Paul’s conception of critical thinking is often misinterpreted due, in part,

to the specialized frames of reference from which theorists write. On the one hand, first

wave philosophers often critique Paul’s work for moving away from narrow

interpretations of critical thinking as formal logic and argue that his conception lacks

intellectual method and is, thus, subject to subjective relativism (Harpaz, n.d.; McPeck,

1992; Siegel, 1990). On the other hand, second wave theorists critique Paul’s work as

firmly rooted in rigid philosophical formalism and fails to leave room for subjective

insights into the nature of thinking critically (Bedecarre, 1994; Brenner & Parks, 2001;

Thayer-Bacon, 2000). It is often overlooked that Paul explicitly calls for a third wave in

the critical thinking movement (1995b). This next phase embraces the theoretical

strengths of both groups: intellectual rigor based on a consistent use of intellectual

standards from the first wave and sensitivity to context and cultural variation as
 221 
 

explicated by second wave theorists. Paul’s work represents this synthesis. Paul’s work

takes on the direct goal of being trans-disciplinary.

To meet this goal, Paul articulates a model of critical thinking that does not stray

from foundational and essential critical thinking concepts and principles. Furthermore,

his work is based on command of natural language so as to create a common language for

trans-disciplinary communication. Paul’s work must be understood in light of his

pedagogical and social goals. He embraces a practical epistemology that seeks to engage

critical thinking in every domain of academia and life. Paul does not believe critical

thinking belongs to any one discipline, but the context that defines the problem, issue, or

question (personal communication, February 28, 2006).

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part clarifies Paul’s theoretical

point of view so that others can fairly analyze and evaluate his model. Paul’s use of

language is clarified exemplified by three terms found throughout his work: logic, and

intellectual, and universal. It is also argued that Paul’s conception of critical thinking

cannot be limited to any one theoretical frame of reference, but must be understood for its

practical educational purposes. The second part summarizes the most visible

characteristics of Paul’s model: the elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, critical

thinking abilities, and intellectual traits. The first three explicate that which constitutes

critical thought, while the third characterizes what it means to be a critical thinker. A

substantive analysis of Paul’s work is impossible without a clear understanding of these

theoretical dimensions. Furthermore, Paul’s model of critical thinking cannot be

substantively applied as a force for educational reform without a clear and deep

understanding of each dimension and their necessary interconnections.

 222 
 

Part I: On Paul’s Theoretical Point of View

One cannot fully understand, properly contextualize or apply Paul’s

conceptualization of critical thinking without first understanding the frame of reference

from which he writes. Specifically, Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking cannot

be separated from its pedagogical orientation and goals. One must recognize Paul’s

perception of, and dedication to, long standing educational ideals directed toward living

an intellectually autonomous and socially responsible life in order to accurately analyze

and assess his model of critical thinking.

This section is divided into three parts. The first part provides a brief and general

descriptive overview of Paul’s theoretical frame of reference. The second and third parts

highlight specific dimensions. The second part discusses his approach to language use

within his conception of critical thinking focusing on three specific terms as examples:

logic, intellectual, and universal. The third part describes how Paul’s theoretical

perspective is trans-disciplinary. The present clarification is needed because those within

the discourse often mis-interpret and, therefore, mis-analyze Paul’s frame of reference

regarding the concept and practice of critical thinking.

General Overview

Paul is a realistic idealist with a practical epistemology. He is pragmatic in that

his model is designed for practical purposes; he is an idealist in that the model does not

stray from the belief that human thinking can improve and that over time and with proper

cultivation critical societies can emerge. His theory of critical thinking is based on the

claim that the quality of one’s thought largely determines the quality of one’s life, and

that to achieve thinking of the highest quality it must be systematically cultivated. Paul’s
 223 
 

conceptualization of critical thinking is constructed as a practical guide intended to help

people think well so that they can hopefully work toward living a more autonomous and

ethical life. As he sees it, institutional education, despite its faults, is currently the most

accessible and realistic environment for facilitating the development of critical thought

within society as a whole; a position held by the majority of critical thinking pedagogues.

Institutional education can, and on rare occasions does, provide an enriching

environment for the cultivation of higher order thinking skills, abilities, and dispositions.

To do so, however, academic institutions and/or individual instructors must explicitly

recognize and work to engage those educational ideals that value the need for intellectual

liberation and responsibility. Paul’s conceptualization of critical thinking, as exemplified

within all his publications, professes the importance of this need. He argues that learning

environments, to be considered a practical life changing and liberating process for the

individual and society, must embody particular educational ideals. With the goal clearly

outlined, Paul then moves to practical methods for reforming education so that the

objectives can be met. The relationship and movement between the practical and ideal

establishes the frame of reference best suited to interpret Paul’s work: specifically his

focus on the minimum conditions that characterize high quality thinking within and

across any domain.

Many theorists have constructed base-line approaches to defining critical

thinking, and Paul is no exception. 15 What separates Paul from his contemporaries is his

robust synthesis of the minimum elements necessary for substantive analysis, the

explication of assessment standards others often presuppose, the detailed articulation of

important dispositions that characterize the ideal of which education works toward, and a
 224 
 

comprehensive list of intellectual skills and abilities in both the cognitive and affective

domains into one interconnected network of ideas and strategies. Furthermore, Paul’s

conception of critical thinking is unique due to its unrelenting insistence on the regular,

systematic, and disciplined use of trans-disciplinary concepts (found in non-specialized

or natural languages) as a way to improve the quality of one’s thought. Craig Gibson

(1995), associate director of information services at George Mason University, writes that

Paul’s conception of critical thinking offers a robust and substantive model “because it

elaborates critical thinking abilities in normative terms that can be applied in any domain,

set of skills, or knowledge base- while acknowledging the domain-specific features of

good thinking within specific disciplines” (Implications for Instruction, ¶ 7). In this vein,

Paul argues that in developing their critical capacities “people should focus on using a

few general ideas well, rather than many ideas poorly” (personal communication, January

8, 2008).

Stated differently, Paul based his model of critical thinking on the following

question: What concepts characterize substantive intellectual work throughout the ages,

and do these concepts point to a robust and useful conception of critical thinking? Paul’s

model is his synthesis. He intentionally takes an essentialist approach focusing on those

ideas that are unquestionable because, he argues, they are presupposed within every

domain. In other words, Paul’s work explicates what others assume. He does not

discount other ways of knowing, such as intuition, but he argues that at the base of all

substantive critical thought, as far as communication and instruction are concerned, the

concepts he identifies are present to some degree. 16

 225 
 

Paul argues that in order for critical thinking to emerge those minimum sets of

concepts and principles present in, and common among, all intellectual traditions need to

be explicitly used in intellectually disciplined ways in all facets of life. In other words,

foundational concepts coupled with pedagogically sound learning strategies produce

substantive intellectual tools that can be applied to any domain, problem, or situation

where one’s purpose is to figure something out. From this standpoint one can see that

Paul’s theory of critical thinking is not intended to be a grand explanation of the human

mind and how it constructs knowledge, nor is it a prescriptive approach to thinking

critically or reforming education. The model does not have “rules, procedures, or steps to

follow” (Moseley et al., 2005, p. 169). Rather, Paul’s theory of critical thinking is based

on the disciplined use of concepts that all high quality thinking implicitly engages. He

couples these concepts with time tested learning strategies the fusion of which produce

substantive intellectual development. Paul has a pedagogical orientation, the goal of

which is to establish a practical approach to thinking well.

To summarize, the underlying central purpose of Paul’s work is to understand the

essential nature of critical thinking as a set of concepts and strategies that enable an

interested person to improve his/her thinking, to some extent, in an unlimited way. In

doing so, Paul’s work seeks to expose mental pathologies: mistakes, errors, deception,

illusions, prejudices, trickery, dishonesty, bigotry, misapprehensions, delusions,

chauvinism, intolerance, narrow-mindedness, injustice, deceit, fraud, duplicity,

hypocrisy, and inconsistency to name a few. Stated differently, the primary goal of

Paul’s work is to help people learn to improve the quality of their thinking by learning

how to learn and, therefore, learning how to correct what one has mis-learned; to build on
 226 
 

what one has properly learned in order to substantively construct knowledge and insight

and, thus, avoid prejudice, bias, and narrow-mindedness. That is, in essence, the agenda

and the theoretical place from which he constructs his model of critical thinking.

Paul’s Approach to Language Use within His Conceptualization of Critical Thinking

The purpose of this sub-section is to clarify Paul’s general approach to language

use as an integral part of his conceptualization to critical thinking. This sub-section

should be beneficial to those scholars who erroneously critique Paul’s use of specific

terms due to their own highly technical or specialized use. This clarification, then,

should help guide those interested in further analysis of his work, making sure to critique

language from the perspective in which it is intentionally interpreted, rather than from a

perspective incongruent with its intended meaning. For example, the use of terms like

logic, reasoning, and universal can be perceived as problematic due to their technical use

within various fields of academia and their association with Western, Anglo-male

ideology. The following elaboration clarifies Paul’s use of these terms as examples that

illustrate his approach to language and its relationship with critical thinking theory as a

practical method for thinking through interdisciplinary and multi-dimensional problems

and working toward those educational ideals that value intellectual autonomy and social

responsibility.

Paul’s use of terms reflects his practical goal to help the any motivated person

improve the quality of his/her thinking. He identifies and uses terms according to two

principles. First, Paul does not use technical terms characteristic of specialized academic

disciplines. Rather, he uses terms that can be found within natural languages such as

English, French, German, Greek, Japanese, etc., arguing that a focus on natural language
 227 
 

highlights culturally common concepts that can be used to guide the analysis and

evaluation of thinking regardless of context. Secondly, he adheres to the educated usage

of each term as can be found within quality dictionaries. Paul does not advocate a

haphazard interpretation of language, in fact he critiques such usage; nor does he limit his

identification or use of terms to over-specialized interpretations that are beyond the

understanding of the average person. In order for a generalized theory of critical thinking

to substantively exist it must advocate the use of language that is applicable to multiple

domains of academia and life and is accessible to the average person (Brookfield, 2005;

hooks 1994; Johnson 1996; Mander 1938; Minnich 2005; Perkins 2001; Scheffler 1973).

These criteria are at the core of Paul’s theory of critical thinking as found within all his

publications.

An Educated Use of Terms: Three Examples

The glossary found within the 1995 edition of his book Critical Thinking: How to

Prepare Students for a Rapidly Changing World provides extensive elaborations as to his

use of each of the major concepts present within his theory of critical thinking. The three

terms, logic, intellectual and universal, were selected as examples for clarification and

exemplification of his two goals for language use due to their high visibility within the

discourse on critical thinking. Furthermore, it is my position that Paul’s work has largely

been mis-interpreted due to an unclear understanding of his use of language, although

being little fault of his own.

Logic

Simply put, Paul interprets this term as that which has structure or organization,

albeit accurate or inaccurate, justified or unjustified, clear or unclear, explicit or implicit.

 228 
 

All reasoning has a system to it that must be uncovered in order for it to be properly

analyzed and evaluated. Often the logic lay hidden in subconscious and unquestioned

assumptions and beliefs that characterize the world-view or general perspective of

oneself and others. The relevant glossary entry defines logic as “The system of

principles, concepts, and assumptions that underlie any discipline, activity, or practice”

(Paul, 1995a, p. 540). He elaborates writing:

The word “logic” covers a range of related concerns all bearing upon the question

of rational justification and explanation. All human thought and behavior is to

some extent based on logic rather than instinct. Humans try to figure things out

using ideas, meanings, and thought. Such intellectual behavior inevitably

involves ‘logic’ or considerations of a logical sort: some sense of what is relevant

or irrelevant, of what supports and what counts against a belief, of what we should

and should not assume, of what is and is not implied, of what does and does not

contradict, of what we should or should not do or believe… logic we use is often

implicit, unexpressed, and sometimes contradictory. (Paul, 1995a, p. 540)

Elsewhere he writes:

Thought is logical. That which is logical has logical components, logical

relations, and logical direction. For example, one cannot think without beginning

one’s thought “somewhere,” that is, by setting off from premises that embody

assumptions. Secondly, having “begun somewhere,” thought proceeds in some

directions and for some purpose, leaving a trail of logical connections and

relations. (Paul, 1992a, p. 61)

 229 
 

From these explanations, Paul applies the word logic to every thought, situation, action,

or structure that can be analyzed. He terms this approach as the “logic of X.” For

example, Paul (1995a) writes that concepts have a logic because when one’s purpose is to

analyze the use of concepts one investigates the conditions under which they “do and do

not apply, of what is relevant or irrelevant to them, of what they do or don’t imply, etc”

(p. 540). Likewise, questions have a logic in that there one can explore the conditions

under which it can be validated and settled. Language has a logic in that “for language to

exist and be learned by persons from a variety of cultures [and within a group], it is

necessary that words have definite uses and defined concepts” (Paul, 1995a, p. 541).

When applied to education it is clear that disciplines have a logic.

Paul (1995a) argues that every discipline “have purposes and a set of logical

structures that bear upon those purposes: assumptions, concepts, issues, data, theories,

claims, implications, consequences, etc” (pp. 541-542). Viewed this way, individual

disciplines exist because they interpret the world in ways that are different from other

disciplines. When students study a discipline, they study the rational structures of that

domain; a lens by which one can question the world from that perspective. Paul’s use of

the term logic is intended to highlight the fact that all reasoning has a rationale behind it

and exists within a context. Through disciplined investigation that rationale can be

exposed and evaluated so that one is aware of the underlying structure of claims and

beliefs that are implied by the structure in itself.

Paul’s identification of the elements of reasoning represent the minimum

necessary concepts needed to analyze any logic; from highly technical systems to

common emotions like fear, anger and love. The extent to which one seeks to
 230 
 

substantively analyze and understand why something is, reflects the extent to which one

critically engages each element in their investigation. Paul’s use of the term logic is

intended to be generalized; thus, it is not limited to technical use as, for example, in the

field of philosophy.

Intellectual

Paul uses the term intellectual in two ways. The first highlights the educated

usage of the term as a process of mental discipline and excellence. The second use is a

product of the first, and emphasizes a specialized interpretation that critiques those that

use their mental powers to unjustly manipulate and control others. What follows is a

brief description of each use as Paul intends it to be interpreted.

Intellectual in the first sense implies a mental discipline. Paul regularly refers to

scholarly standards for evaluation as “intellectual standards.” He also dubs the desirable

dispositions as “intellectual traits” and “intellectual virtues.” Paul’s primary use of the

adjective is to highlight the conscious and disciplined thinking as opposed to thinking

that is spotty, unpredictable, biased, disorganized, prejudiced, distorted, and

manipulative.

Paul’s interpretation adheres to its educated usage which, he argues, can be found

within a high quality dictionary. For example, the relevant entries for the term

intellectual read as follows: “guided by the intellect rather than by feelings; having

superior reasoning powers; a person engaged in intellectual work” (Agnes & Guralnik,

2007). The term intellect provides further clarification: “the ability to reason or

understand or to perceive relationships, differences, etc; power of thought; mind” (Agnes

 231 
 

& Guralnik, 2007). These definitions largely explain Paul’s inclusion of the term in his

model.

Mental discipline is an intentional and explicit process. For Paul, the purpose of

critical thinking is to become mentally (intellectually) disciplined. Without mental

discipline the probability that one will distort truth and seek unjust selfish ends is much

greater. Only to the extent that one will substantively engage his/her thinking, will one

begin to improve its quality and the quality of life for himself/herself and those with

whom s/he is directly or indirectly involved. Critical thinking provides the concepts and

strategies for explicitly and systematically improving the quality of one’s thinking. The

concept of intellectual, then, brings this purpose to the surface of the discourse.

The term is not applied to the elements of reasoning because, Paul argues, the

elements always exist within reasoning regardless of one’s awareness of them. However,

the intellectual standards and intellectual traits are not always present. The critical mind

invites intellectual standards and traits into one’s thinking so as to monitor its quality.

The second sense in which Paul uses the term intellectual is found in his

articulation of intellectual pathologies. These pathologies include: “distrust in reason and

evidence, intellectual laziness, intellectual cowardice, intellectual conformity, intellectual

hypocrisy, intellectual close-mindedness, and intellectual arrogance” (Paul & Elder,

2006a, p. 5). Paul links each pathology to the organizing concepts of egocentricity and

socio-centricity. This link, then, highlights different manifestations of what Paul

identifies as the weak-sense critical thinker.

The weak sense critical thinker is a highly skilled but selfishly motivated pseudo-

intellectual who works for his/her personal gain regardless of the ethical consequences
 232 
 

and implications. S/he does not seek the conclusions of sound reasoning, is quick to take

intellectual short cuts when problems become difficult, will often refuse to challenge the

status quo when ethically necessary and thus conforms to the thinking of others, often

contradicts his/her statements and beliefs so as to dominate others, will not fairly enter

into the thinking of different points of view so as to see a problem from a different

perspective, and deeply maintains that his/her thinking is correct regardless of the

evidence against. Paul’s use of intellectual reveals a sophisticated, but pathological side

of human thinking.

The concept of intellectual, like most of Paul’s concepts, is dynamic and holistic.

They are intended to move between different domains and contexts as mental

benchmarks by which one can continually revisit and apply so as to improve the quality

of thinking in question.

Universal

This term is practically taboo in contemporary scholarship, and rightfully so given

its place within “intellectual” history. The term has been associated with the abuse of

power, specifically Western, white patriarchy; manifest in the form of forcing alternative

and dissenting points of view into a narrow ethnocentric and sexist perspective. Despite

the term’s oppressive history, insight can be gained from an educated use. For example,

the United Nations declaration of universal human rights and the right to universal

suffrage can be considered appropriate uses. Paul uses the term in the educated sense.

Paul refers to the elements of reasoning and the intellectual standards as universal

in nature. His use is based on his synthesis of the minimum concepts that define critical

thinking. He does not claim that his list of concepts is exhaustive, and that every concept
 233 
 

applies equally in every context. Those concepts deemed universal are found, Paul

argues, in all reasoning and in every evaluation of reasoning to varying degrees

depending on the context.

For example, Paul argues that the elements of reasoning are always present

wherever reasoning is taking place, consciously and subconsciously. Likewise, what is

certain is that intellectual standards are present in every substantive evaluation. To

justify his position, Paul challenges critics to think of situations where in any critical

analysis or evaluation, common elements of reasoning and intellectual standards are not

present.

To elaborate one could ask if it is possible for one to conduct a substantive

analysis where identifying the purpose, or question at issue, or supporting information are

not important. Is it possible to have a line of reasoning or a situation where concepts are

not engaged, and where one’s point of view or perspective are non-existent. Furthermore,

consider the possibility of a claim that is not based on assumptions which have

implications. To remove any one of the elements from a critical analysis is to ignore its

role in the reasoning process. Another example involves evaluation.

Paul explicitly uses the term universal in his articulation of universal intellectual

standards. The standards include, but are not limited to: clarity, accuracy, precision,

relevance, depth, breadth, significance, fairness, credibility, sufficiency, reliability,

practicality, validity and completeness. Standards are universal in that they must exist in

the evaluation of reasoning. In other words, in order to conduct a critical evaluation of

any product of the intellect one must explicate standards by which the reasoning will be

judged. Paul and Elder (2006d) write, “Universal intellectual standards are standards
 234 
 

which must be applied to thinking whenever one is interested in checking the quality of

reasoning about a problem, issue, or situation. To think critically entails having

command of these standards” (p. 10). Intellectual standards as listed above represent

concepts that are highly visible within all scholarly work and substantive evaluations,

although they are often implicitly assumed.

Paul’s use of the term universal is guided by what he argues are the essential

conditions necessary for critical thought. Wherever intellectual work is observed, the

elements of reasoning and the intellectual standards are present in some form. It is from

this vantage point that Paul’s work is not limited to any one disciplinary theory or lens;

an insight the vast majority of critiques have failed to recognize and/or accurately

describe.

Paul’s Work Is Not Limited to Any One Disciplinary Theory or Lens

In her dissertation, Toward a Feminist Account of Strong Sense Critical Thinking,

Corrinne Bedecarre (1994) fairly accurately accounts for one reason Paul does not

explicitly adhere to or “build on preexisting frameworks or continue their [specific] ideas

in a new domain” (p. 26). She correctly writes that Paul “incorporates general principles

and the gestalt of their work free from the restraints of original intent” (Bedecarre, 1994,

p. 10). For example, Paul explicitly draws on the work of psychologists, sociologists,

and philosophers like Freud, Piaget, Sumner, Marx and Wittgenstein utilizing insights

where appropriate, but not limiting his perspective to the structures of any one theorist.

In doing so, he extracts concepts and insights capable of substantive generalization across

domains.
 235 
 

For example, from Freud, Paul uses concepts of the unconscious and conscious

mind and the relationship between the ego and one’s rationality as ideas one can use to

check one’s selfish thoughts and actions. From Piaget, Paul emphasizes the innate

tendency of human thinking to be egocentric and generalizes Piaget’s assessment of the

presence of egocentricity in childhood to adulthood. From Sumner, Paul recognizes the

need to identify and question one’s socio-centrism which is closely linked to the concept

of ethnocentrism. Drawing from Marx, Paul suggests that critical thinking can help one

question the assumptions and actions associated with socio-economic class identities and

oppression. Wittgenstein offers the concepts of natural language, language games, the

clarification of concepts by understanding the context in which a word or idea is used,

and the need, therefore, to use terms with discipline. In every case, Paul takes a holistic

approach toward the construction of his theory of critical thinking and is more interested

in the way widely acknowledged concepts can act as conceptual tools for guiding one’s

intellectual development than in providing a theory of critical thinking that is limited to

or interpreted through one specific theoretical perspective.

As Bedecarre (1994) argues, “The principles that he does depend upon are those

global insights which have now become, if not generally accepted, then generally

recognizable to philosophers” (p. 27). Such an approach lays the theoretical framework

for a robust and trans-disciplinary theory of critical thinking; one that many scholars

within the discourse of critical thinking acknowledge as important to the implementation

of critical thinking within education. Stephen Brookfield provides a clear explication for

critical thinking theory to focus on general principles rather than over-specialized,

discipline specific theories.

 236 
 

In his article entitled “On Ideology, Pillage, Language and Risk: Critical Thinking

and the Tensions of Critical Practice” Brookfield (1991) addresses criticisms that his

work on critical thinking does not have proper theoretical grounding or definition. He

writes:

Those who see themselves as guardians of intellectual traditions such as critical

social theory, psychoanalysis, and analytic philosophy argue that proponents of

critical thinking, myself included, raid these traditions, abscond with ideas central

to them, and then proceed to distort and decontextualize them in their own

analyses. To those who regard themselves as schooled in Freudian

psychoanalysis, analytic philosophy or the Frankfurt school of critical social

theory, elaborations of critical thinking can seem appallingly ill-informed if they

do not pay sufficient attention to the intellectual debt they owe to these traditions.

(p. 6)

For Brookfield, the theoretical development of critical thinking as a specific topic

necessarily builds on the work of others, but it does not need to be grounded in only one

tradition. This is especially important when explicating the role of critical thinking in

pedagogy. Brookfield, like Paul, believes that critical thinking theory should call upon

all available intellectual traditions so as to maximize its general applicability across

disciplines.

The tendency of academic departments or schools of thought to “lay claim” to the

concept of critical thinking poses a real problem to the development of a robust and

generalized conception of critical thinking. Such behavior does more to limit the concept

than it does to promote its theoretical and instructional development. For one discipline
 237 
 

to claim critical thinking as its own is to remove it from the general discourse of other

disciplines and may increase the probability that it will become a mere educational /

theoretical fad, empty of meaning, and resented by those who are forced to engage it

within their classroom. Furthermore, limiting critical thinking to one intellectual

tradition or disciplinary interpretation contradicts the pedagogical goals of teaching and

learning because it alienates those outside of, unfamiliar with, or in opposition to that

tradition. Again, Brookfield (1991) provides a clear articulation of this problem:

The primary duty of educators, their Hippocratic oath of practice, must be to

connect with learners in terms which mean something to them. To restrict our

understanding of critical thinking, or its facilitation, to one analytical perspective

makes it impossible for us to fulfill this oath. Claiming that interpretations of

critical thinking must be firmly and exclusively locked within a single intellectual

tradition renders this process irrelevant to the majority of those outside that

tradition. (p. 7)

When one grounds his/her conception of critical thinking in a rich, substantively robust

conception of education, one that seeks to develop intellectually autonomous and socially

responsible citizens, then critical thinking theory cannot be limited to merely one

disciplinary interpretation.

When substantively conceived, “Nothing is immune from critical thought.

Everything that you believe or want to do is a candidate for critical thought” (Benderson,

1984, p. 18). When substantively conceived, critical thinking works within, across and

beyond disciplinary boundaries and limited theoretical frameworks; it applies to all

students in all contexts; its insights and intellectual skills are capable of transfer across
 238 
 

domains requiring continually fresh contextualization based on fundamental and general

principles of high quality thinking. Brookfield (1991) summarizes this approach in a

final response to his critics, “So what from the academic or formal theoretical viewpoint

seems an example of intellectual dilettantism – a readiness to draw from a number of

traditions but to be confined by none – can be interpreted from the viewpoint of someone

developing a situated, practical theory of critical thinking as a matter of tactics and

strategy” (p. 7). Brookfield, like Paul, recognizes the practical nature of critical thinking

theory and sees the theoretical traditions on which such an approach is based to serve

practical purposes. 17

Brookfield’s response to critics of a generalized approach to critical thinking

remains relevant today; not necessarily within the discourse of critical thinking, but in the

continuing failure of critical thinking to become a trans-disciplinary enterprise.

Furthermore, Brookfield’s comments accurately state Paul’s interpretation of critical

thinking theory and its role in teaching and learning. To understand Paul is to see that his

minimalist approach to conceptualizing critical thinking based on the educated and trans-

disciplinary/trans-cultural use of natural languages reflects his belief that only a

generalized theory of critical thinking can transform education and lives. Any attempt to

analyze Paul’s work from a specific theoretical position without accurately recognizing

his theoretical point of view will ultimately fall short of a substantive exegesis.

Summary of Paul’s Theoretical Frame of Reference

Failure to recognize the point of view from which Paul constructs his

conceptualization of critical thinking will undoubtedly result in an incomplete and

 239 
 

inaccurate assessment of his work. Recognizing the perspective from which Paul writes

is a necessary condition for any substantive exegesis.

This section emphasized three main points. First, Paul writes from a pedagogical

frame of reference whereby education represents the most visible and practical method

for improving thinking so as to improve society. Second, Paul’s conception of critical

thinking is based on the disciplined use of non-technical languages. Third, his

conception of critical thinking is trans-disciplinary in nature. Together, these three points

constitute what can be labeled his approach to critical thinking instruction and

educational reform. The next section is a summary of the structural components of

Paul’s model of critical thinking.

Part II: Summary of Paul’s Model

The purpose of this section is to provide a summary of the most visible parts of

Paul’s contemporary conception of critical thinking. It is important to state it as precisely

as possible for it is easy to lose the whole for its parts. Such loss is conceivable because

the complete model is explained throughout different texts, and is, therefore, best

observed in an examination of his complete scholarly compositions.

Like all substantive theories, Paul’s has evolved over time. However, the driving

purpose, mission, and conceptual essence of his approach to critical thinking theory have

remained consistent. The purpose of Paul’s work has always been to develop a

substantive and robust conception of critical thinking that is conceptually flexible enough

to be contextualized across every domain with the goal to improve the general quality of

life for the individual and human society. In doing so, Paul’s work continually seeks out

the essence of a problem, issue, or topic. In this sense, his work is largely an explication
 240 
 

of that which others presuppose. He argues that if people reason to the root of that which

constitutes critical thought, then there are sets of concepts that work within, across and

beyond the disciplines which can act as guides for a common approach to

conceptualizing and teaching critical thinking; the mission of which is the creation of a

rational and ethical world.

A world that genuinely values ethics above oppressive power, for example, can

only be accomplished, Paul argues, through the development of critical societies: groups

that hold the ideals of thinking critically as foundational goals for social organization

(Paul, 1995; Paul & Elder, 2008). Critical societies can emerge through the disciplined

use of the sets of concepts that constitute the minimum conditions of what it means to be

a critical thinker. The result is the concept of a fair-minded critical thinker as opposed to

one who utilizes the tools of critical thinking for his/her selfish gain. Based on this

approach to conceptualizing critical thinking, Paul’s current model of critical thinking has

four basic parts, the theoretical basis of which is rich and deep. These four parts include

the elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, intellectual skills and abilities, and

intellectual traits/virtues.

The first three categories represent that which is essential to any substantive

theory of critical thinking, and the fourth dimension “focuses on what it is to be a critical

thinker” (Moseley et al. 2005, p. 164). Central to Paul’s model is that critical thinking “is

incorporated in a family of interrelated [general and specific] modes of thinking” (Paul,

1995a, p. 111). General modes include reading critically, writing critically, speaking

critically, listening critically, and acting critically. Specific modes are represented by

individual (academic and secular) domains among them are scientific thinking, historical
 241 
 

thinking, mathematical thinking, anthropological thinking, sociological thinking,

psychological thinking, mechanical thinking, artistic thinking, athletic thinking, etc. In

this sense, every mode or system of thought reflects a domain that the four dimensions of

Paul’s model can analyze, evaluate and work to critically apply. In fact, Paul argues,

modes of academic thought presuppose the four dimensions.

Foundational Concepts as Necessary Conditions of Thinking Critically

Elements of Reasoning

Paul explains the elements of reasoning as that which makes up the fundamental

structures of human thought. For this reason the elements of reasoning are often referred

to as the elements of thought. The elements, as a group, represent concepts essential for a

substantive analysis of any claim, problem, question or issue. Since the elements

represent general analytical concepts, they are flexible enough to be applied to any

context. In other words, the elements of reasoning are concepts present wherever

reasoning exists. They are: purpose, question, information, concepts, assumptions,

conclusions/inferences, point of view, and implications/consequences. The elements are

always present in all thinking, albeit subconscious or conscious, and each concept is

interrelated with the others.

Paul and Elder (2006a) summarize the interrelated elements as follows:

Whenever you reason, you do so in some circumstances, making some inferences

(that have some implications and consequences) based on some reasons or

information (and assumptions) using some concepts, in trying to settle some

question (or solve some problem) for some purpose within some point of view. (p.

57)
 242 
 

Paul and Elder (2006a) maintain that “the ability to recognize these elements of reasoning

is essential to critical thinking” (p. 164). The following statement reflects the

relationship between the elements and critical thinking:

All thought has a universal set of elements, each which can be monitored for

possible problems: Are we clear about our purpose or goal? about the problem or

question at issue? About our point of view or frame of reference? about our

assumptions? about the claims we are making? about the reasons or evidence

upon which we are basing our claims? about our inferences and line of reasoning?

about the implications and consequences that follow from our reasoning? Critical

thinkers develop skills of identifying and assessing these elements in their

thinking and in the thinking of others. (Paul, 1995a, p. 529)

Paul posits that because the elements of thought are present within all thinking, the eight

concepts can be used to analyze one’s thinking as present within any given context. As

Nosich (2005a) writes, “At its root, analysis is going around the circle of elements [of

thought]” (p. 175). Furthermore, although each concept is inherently linked to the others,

each can be a point of focus thereby providing greater analytical depth. Or as Nosich

(2005a) writes, “the act of simply identifying a single element can be a deep insight in

your critical thinking” (p. 177). Paul maintains that the elements of thought, as a set of

concepts, is a system that unpacks systems. However, analysis alone is not enough;

evaluation standards must be explicated and critically applied to any substantive analysis.

Intellectual Standards

The analysis of reasoning implies or presupposes evaluation standards. However,

one cannot assume that the standards used to assess the quality of one’s reasoning are
 243 
 

explicitly conscious. If the assessment standards are not explicit, intentionally used, and

rationally justifiable, then the probability that one’s assessment may lack consistency,

validity, and reliability may increase. In other words, unless one can clearly explain the

standards in use, then there is reason to question the quality of the evaluation and the

quality of any application that follows from the evaluation. It is due to these reasons that

Paul argues that explicit standards, those that represent established and time tested canons

of scholarship (intellectual standards), are necessary conditions for any substantive

concept of critical thinking. He defines intellectual standards as follows:

Intellectual standards: principles by which reasoning can be judged; requirements

of quality reasoning. Intellectual standards are a pervasive part of critical

thinking. Thinking that qualifies as critical thinking is clear, accurate, relevant to

the question at issue, fair, precise, specific, plausible, consistent, logical, deep,

broad, complete, [fair], and significant. Such standards are implicit in all aspects

of critical thinking: where standards are not explicitly stated, they are

presupposed. (For example, the critical thinker does not merely identify

assumptions, but accurately identifies significant assumptions). (Paul, 1995a, p.

536)

Paul focuses on standards that are trans-disciplinary in nature: standards that apply within

and across all domains of thought. They are based in natural language so that they can be

understood by students in all academic levels, and so that insights regarding their use can

be transferred across domains. Paul does not claim that his list is exhaustive; rather, the

standards he cites throughout all of his work are merely the most visible in substantive

evaluation. In other words, they cannot be ignored. The intellectual standards, like the
 244 
 

elements of thought, represent an essentialist approach to conceptualizing evaluation so

that its ability to be generalized is maximized.

Intellectual Skills and Abilities

Intellectual skills and abilities represent the applied aspect of Paul’s model. They

are the concrete manifestations of what it means to think critically. Generally speaking,

intellectual skills are intellectual “moves based on [critical thinking] principles that

learners must practice in settings that enable them to assess the effectiveness of their

performance” (Paul, 1995a, p. 308). When grounded in “a thorough familiarity with the

elements of thought,” they “are the activities we actually use to perform our higher order

thinking…They are the means whereby decisions are to be made, problems are to be

solved, thinking in the work-place is to be strengthened, and understanding of rights and

responsibilities deepened” (Paul, 1995a, p. 135). From this general conception, Paul

makes two significant and necessary points regarding the nature and development of

critical thinking skills.

The first is that skills and abilities are “intellectual” or characteristic of critical

thought when they become explicit and disciplined. The second is a theoretical formula

that Paul uses to identify and characterize critical thinking skills and abilities. Abilities

are composed of a process, an object and a standard. For example, one can throw

(process) a ball (object) well (standard); or one can explicate an author’s point of view

(process) in a book (object) clearly (standard). It is the interconnection between process,

object and standard that defines abilities. It is the mindful application and development

of the ability that characterizes it as higher order thinking.

 245 
 

One of the most valuable parts of Paul’s model is his list of 35 dimensions of

critical thinking skills and abilities. The list is divided into cognitive and affective

domains each with micro and macro dimensions. 18 Critical thinking abilities “play a

central role in a rich and substantive conception of critical thinking. They are essential to

approaching actual issues, problems, and situations rationally.” In Paul’s model, critical

thinking abilities presuppose command over the elements of reasoning and the

intellectual standards the mindful interaction of which develops important intellectual

dispositions.

Characteristics of a Critical Thinker: Intellectual Traits/Virtues

The intellectual traits characterize dispositions of a critical mind. They are often

referred to as intellectual virtues and intellectual dispositions. The traits of mind

represent the ideal attitudes and behaviors of those who think critically. They are those

characteristics that are the fundamental aim of critical thinking and education. Paul

(1995a) defines them in the following way:

Intellectual virtues: The traits of mind and character necessary for right action and

thinking; the traits of mind and character essential for fair-minded rationality; the

traits that distinguish the narrow-minded, self-serving critical thinker from the

open-minded, truth-seeking critical thinker. These intellectual traits are

interdependent. Each is best developed while developing the others as well.

They cannot be imposed from without; they must be cultivated by encouragement

and example. People can come to deeply understand and accept these principles

by analyzing their experiences of them: learning from an unfamiliar perspective,

discovering you don’t know as much as you thought, and so on. They include:
 246 
 

intellectual sense of justice, intellectual perseverance, intellectual integrity,

intellectual humility, intellectual empathy, intellectual courage, (intellectual)

confidence in reason, and intellectual autonomy. (p. 537)

The traits of a disciplined mind are independent and interconnected. For example, to

develop intellectual humility one must have the courage to face the limits of one’s

ignorance and prejudice. To recognize and confront prejudice, one must empathize and

reason within perspectives toward which one is hostile, in disagreement, or unfamiliar.

Substantively considering and reasoning within alternative points of view takes

perseverance and patience. This effort is for naught unless one has a sense of confidence

in the reasoning process coupled with a global idea that all view-points deserve fair

attention: a sense of intellectual justice (Paul, Binker, Martin et al., 2008). Each virtue

works in concert with others yet maintains an independent character.

Paul argues that the intellectual virtues are necessary for the substantive

development of affective dimensions of one’s person because the concepts inherent

within each point to the ethical goals of thinking critically whereby in the process of self-

discovery one develops a deep concern for his/her interaction with others and the

implications that follow from that interaction. To clarify this point, Paul contrasts these

important dispositions with some psychological obstacles to thinking critically.

The intellectual traits represent the area of Paul’s model that exposes the

pervasive, pathological obstacles to thinking critically: namely egocentricity and socio-

centricity. The concept of intellectual integrity provides a good example. Intellectual

integrity is difficult to develop because of the mind’s natural tendency to selectively use

evaluation standards that agree with one’s point of view. “Our egocentric and socio-
 247 
 

centric tendencies make us ready to believe positive information about those we like, and

negative information about those we dislike. We are likewise strongly inclined to believe

what serves to justify our vested interest or validate our strongest desires” (Paul, Binker,

Martin et al., 2008, p. 54). According to Paul, people innately use double standards.

However, the human ego hides the truth thereby distorting reality so that the double

standard is justified and maintained. The study of logical fallacies within the fields of

philosophy and rhetoric is based on this tendency. It is the work of one’s ability to reason

clearly and accurately that counteracts these pathological forces allowing intellectual

integrity to develop.

Section Summary

Paul’s model of critical thinking has four fundamental parts that can be grouped

into two categories: those that characterize what it means to think critically and that

which characterizes what it means to be a critical thinker. The first group involves the

analysis and evaluation of reasoning as manifest through intellectual skills and abilities.

The elements of reasoning constitute the essential concepts necessary for any substantive

analysis. The intellectual standards constitute the essential criteria necessary for any

substantive evaluation. Intellectual skills and abilities are those micro and macro

cognitive and affective behaviors that characterize high quality thinking. The intellectual

traits/virtues comprise the second category and represent the ideal attitudes and behaviors

of one who habitually thinks critically. Furthermore, the intellectual virtues illuminate

the pervasive pathological tendencies that corrupt substantive critical thought. Together,

the elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, critical thinking skills and abilities, and

the intellectual traits/virtues establish a base-line conception of critical thinking that is

 248 
 

conceptually applicable to every domain of life and academia. Often presupposed, but

always present, they are the essence from which substantive knowledge and socially

responsible behavior are built.

Each area of Paul’s model of critical thinking is rich in theory and grounded in

empirical work and the experiences of everyday life. A significant strength of Paul’s

work is that it is conceptual, as opposed to a model that directs thinking in a procedural or

step-by-step manner (Moseley et al., 2005). This is, however, also the greatest challenge

to the model; it requires continual re-contextualization the intellectual work of which is

difficult for educators to embrace, especially within the primary and secondary levels.

Paul’s work challenges the current didactic, teacher-centered paradigm. In doing so, it

challenges educators to substantively engage trans-disciplinary concepts so that those

educational ideals that value the mass development of citizens who are intellectually

autonomous and ethically responsible may be advanced.

Chapter Summary

This chapter clarified two aspects of Paul’s work. The first was a summary of the

theoretical frame of reference from which Paul constructs his conception of critical

thinking. The second was a summary of those aspects that characterize what can be

considered his model of critical thinking. It was argued that Paul’s work is best

understood and analyzed when his pedagogical goals are taken into consideration; to do

so clarifies his language use and reveals the trans-disciplinary nature of his model. The

conceptual nature of Paul’s model was also explicated. Paul’s work is not procedural in

that it does not follow a step-by-step program for thinking critically. In fact, such an

approach to critical thinking is antithetical to the intellectual flexibility for thinking

 249 
 

critically within and across all domains of life. Through his conception of critical

thinking, Paul argues that substantive learning is a creative process whereby one critically

and actively builds meanings and insights into one’s consciousness as opposed to passive

learning characterized, for example, by rote processes. The conceptual approach makes

Paul’s work robust and powerful for those who wish to engage in the intellectual work

necessary to substantively apply foundational, and essential, critical thinking concepts

implicit within high quality reasoning.

Together, these two parts illuminate the practical epistemological goals of Paul’s

work. When one clearly recognizes Paul’s pedagogical orientation, one is better

positioned to substantively embrace and apply his conceptual approach to thinking

critically; it is a model that that does not subscribe to a rigid procedure for thinking

critically. Such clarification is necessary if one is to use Paul’s model as a guide for

instructional and educational reform. The next chapter is a description of Paul’s

suggestions for instructional reform.

 250 
 

CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY OF PAUL’S APPROACH TO INSTRUCTIONAL REFORM

Abstract
In this chapter, Hale summarizes Paul’s approach to redesigning instruction.
Paul seeks to move away from the current didactic, teacher-centered paradigm and
toward a paradigm of substantive teaching and learning where students systematically
develop critical thinking abilities and dispositions. Three dimensions of Paul’s work are
emphasized, all of which are based on the explicit, consistent and strategic application of
essential and foundational critical thinking concepts and principles: the elements of
reasoning, intellectual standards, and the intellectual traits. (1) Substantive education
helps students see disciplinary content as a mode of thinking that must be critically
engaged in order to be understood, applied and transferred. (2) Substantive education
seeks to combat didactic instruction. (3) Substantive education regularly analyzes and
evaluates instructional practices. This chapter addresses Paul’s approach to these three
dimensions of instructional reform.

Introduction

If the grand purpose of education is to cultivate the development of critically

minded people, then instruction should work toward this goal in every course, unit,

lesson, and learning activity. Paul’s fundamental educational claim is if teaching and

learning explicitly, consistently, and strategically expose and apply essential critical

thinking concepts and principles across contexts and domains, then the probability that

students will develop valuable and important intellectual insights, abilities and

dispositions will increase leading to more critically minded and, therefore, ethical

societies. To work toward this goal, instructors and educational institutions must

continually think through a minimum of three interconnected dimensions of teaching and

learning using essential critical thinking concepts: what it means to think critically about

subject content, the nature and prevalence of didacticism as an obstacle to facilitating

critical thought, and the logic of instructional practices (Paul, 1995a). Understanding the
 251 
 

extent to which each dimension bears on student learning better positions one to design

instruction to facilitate higher order thinking.

Substantive Learning is a Critical Thinking Process

It is important to briefly describe Paul’s theoretical approach to teaching and

learning in order to understand the contrast between didacticism and student-centered

critical thinking instruction. Paul (1995a) begins his defense based on the premise that

“The human mind naturally and inevitably constructs meaning” (p. 62). In this sense,

learning is the process whereby students construct meaning, and instruction is the process

that directs the construction of meaning. However, “The mere fact that students construct

meanings tells us nothing about the quality of those constructs” (Paul, 1995a, p. 62). It is

here that Paul points to a false dichotomy prevalent in education. He argues that one

does not need to choose between instructional approaches that emphasize the need for

students to obtain factual knowledge or instruction that fosters critical thinking.

“If we properly understand the ‘dual’ character of ‘meaning construction,’ we will

immediately recognize the need to focus on the ‘reasoned’ and ‘reasonable’ construction

of meaning, and not indiscriminately credit any construction of meaning” (Paul, 1995a, p.

62). Content can only be substantively understood if students do the intellectual work

necessary to build its logic/meaning into their existing mental frameworks and altering

their existing mental constructs where necessary. When applied to curriculum design,

critical thinking is not something merely added to the curriculum. Likewise, when

substantively conceived thinking critically is the only means by which the curriculum is

deeply understood and applied.

 252 
 

Paul does not consider it useful to treat critical thinking as a process that is not

implicit within other intellectual activities. To do so suggests, for example, that

complex/multi-dimensional problems can be solved without thinking critically, or that

students can substantively imagine and create new approaches, interpretations or

representations of ideas, problems, principles, and/or beliefs without virtue of thinking

critically about them. Paul’s interpretation of critical thinking reflects his belief in the

pervasive role that it plays within all substantive and meaningful learning. Critical

thinking is an active process by which students become active participants in the

construction of knowledge rather than passive recipients. His theoretical position can be

summarized in the five following statements:

1. “All content lives in the form of thinking.”

2. “Only those who can ‘think’ through the content, have it.”

3. “All content dies when one tries to learn content without thinking it through.”

4. “Only through thinking can students ‘take possession’ of content & make it theirs.”

5. “Only to the extent that a student asks genuine questions and seeks answers to

them, is a student taking content seriously and thinking it through!”

(FCT, 1999, p. 2-6).

To summarize the above statements, all subject matter has “a logic” or a system

of interconnected meanings that are products of reasoning. The concepts and principles

that establish the logic of disciplinary content are, at their essence, the same concepts and

principles that guide all high quality thought. Paul argues that the elements of reasoning,

intellectual standards and intellectual dispositions represent those fundamental canons of

reasoning essential for fair-minded critical thought and high quality scholarship. The
 253 
 

extent to which instructors and students deeply engage the elements of reasoning,

intellectual standards, and intellectual dispositions reflects the extent to which students by

and large will substantively understand and be better able to apply content insights and

information, thus developing intellectual skills and abilities.

Viewed as such, content is approached as a “mode of thinking” (FCT, 1999, p. 2-

2). Every academic discipline represents a system of thought that the “tools” (concepts

and principles) of critical thinking unpack and evaluate so as to lead to substantive

understanding. Instruction, then, is best designed when the opportunities for students to

“figure out” content are maximized. This is what Paul (1995a) refers to when he argues

that instruction should cultivate students who think economically, historically,

anthropologically, scientifically, biologically, mathematically, artistically, and so on.

Paul and his colleagues at the Foundation for Critical Thinking (1999) write

“Since we are approaching all content as a way of thinking, each of the concepts

[essential to thinking critically]…has an important relation to our content and hence to

how we structure our courses” (p. 2-2). Failure to explicate the pervasive and important

role of fundamental critical thinking concepts inherent within the logic of the content

coupled with the failure to substantively use essential critical thinking concepts as a way

for students to enter the logic of content lends itself to didactic teaching. Students either

critically engage the content in a transformative way, or they become passive recipients

of information the significance of which they do not deeply understand and, thus, do not

deeply apply.
 254 
 

The Problem of Didacticism

Didactic instruction is a general term Paul uses to characterize any form of

instruction that does not directly engage students in critical thought. As discussed in

chapter two, Paul equates didacticism with what Freire defines as the banking concept of

education. Paul (1993) writes that didacticism is a mode of teaching and learning

whereby “the direct transmission of beliefs taken to be true, is accepted as the

transmission of knowledge itself, and rote recall accepted as proof of knowledge

acquisition” (p. 248). “Whether in or out of school, the dominant mode of social learning

is didactic, dogmatic, fragmented, and uncondusive to independent critical thought. The

belief that knowledge can be directly transmitted by simple statement and memorization

is so embedded in the public and academic mind that instruction in this mode is a virtual

addiction” (Paul, 1993, p. 248). In this sense, “When knowledge is separated from

thinking and presented as a thing in itself, it ceases to be knowledge” (Paul, 1993, p.

248). In other words, the didactic paradigm treats knowledge as a commodity, rather

than something to be substantively discovered and critically engaged.

Consequently, “Students do not learn to think in critically reflective and fair-

minded ways precisely because it is not taught, encouraged, or modeled in their

instruction” (Paul, 1993, p. 251). Elsewhere Paul (1992a) argues that “People leave

school with few of the skills necessary to plumb the background logic of their own

beliefs and thought, and so with few convictions, and little sense of the many

contradictions that underlie their thoughts, words, and deeds” (p. 63). Specifically,

students lack the intellectual skills necessary to “strip off surface language and consider

alternative ways to talk; little sense of what it would be to question and consider
 255 
 

alternative ways to talk; little sense of what it would be to question basic labels and

categories on the basis of which inferences and meanings are multiplied” (Paul, 1992, p.

63). There are two important distinctions present within the above statements both of

which directly correlate with Paul’s conception of the human mind and the construction

of knowledge.

As noted above, didactic instruction results in the development of thinkers who

lack important intellectual skills and dispositions. Paul uses the concepts of the uncritical

thinker and the weak-sense critical thinker to point out some of the consequences of

didactic instruction. In both cases, students lack the intellectual skills or disposition

necessary to enter fairly into alternative points of view, and integrate insights resulting

from deeply questioning their assumptions, inferences, and concepts. The uncritical

thinker is naive and does not substantively possess important critical thinking skills and

abilities; whereas the weak-sense critical thinker is often highly skilled but uses those

skills selectively so as to pursue unjust and selfish ends (Elder & Paul, 2004; Paul, 1995a;

Paul, Binker & Weil, 1995). Instruction that does not cultivate important strong sense

critical thinking skills and dispositions among its students does little to undermine

prejudices and misconceptions. What is the alternative?

Paul argues for the implementation of an educational system that is based on a

substantive, trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking knowing that such a process

requires long-term transformation. He writes, “A shift in classroom procedure from a

didactic mode to a dialogical mode of teaching, where student questions, objections, and

opinions can be freely and comfortably expressed, will of course take time, as teachers

will need to learn new strategies, a new conception of knowledge and learning, and new
 256 
 

habits of classroom response” (Paul, 1993, p. 252). Students must get into the habit of

critically and fair-mindedly “reflecting upon the logic of what one learns” (Paul 1993, p.

252). In this sense, only to the extent that students critically engage in dialectical and

dialogical reasoning are students thinking critically within, across and beyond the

content.

Dialogical and Dialectical Reasoning: Keys to Substantive Critical Thinking Teaching

and Learning

If didacticism is a mode of teaching and learning that does not cultivate fair-

minded critical thinkers, then dialogical and dialectical reasoning is the mode by which

students become fair-minded critical thinkers. Student-centered instruction directly

engages learners in the active construction of knowledge whereby critical thinking

abilities and dispositions are cultivated through participation in learning communities;

students regularly reason through the content using fundamental and essential critical

thinking concepts and principles, so as to discover its logic as a system of interconnected

meanings. Richard Paul’s conception of critical thinking education is built on this

interpretation which, he argues, involves maximizing both dialogical and dialectical

learning opportunities.

Paul (1995) defines dialogical thinking as that process which “involves a dialogue

or extended exchange between different points of view or frames of reference” (p. 528).

Applied to student learning, Paul (1995) writes, “Students learn best in dialogical

situations, in circumstances in which they continually express their views to others and

try to fit other’s views into their own” (p. 528). Thayer-Bacon agrees writing:
 257 
 

Most critical thinking theorists also embrace the value of a dialogical approach to

teaching…a dialogical approach helps students learn how to ask and answer

questions, analyze arguments, define terms, and clarify and challenge positions.

A dialogical style of teaching encourages students to develop logical reasoning as

well as a critical spirit… [It also] helps students learn how to express their

personal voices and it helps students develop their abilities to communicate with,

and relate to, each other. (p. 134)

Dialogical thinking and instruction is a social process, the mode of which can take

numerous forms. For example, both Paul and Elder (2006e) and Adler and Van Doren

(1972) argue that when reading critically requires one to enter into a dialogue with the

author, to speak to the author’s point of view as fairly as possible. Likewise, in the

classroom students must be able to enter into a constructive and fair-minded dialogue

with other students and with the instructor. In doing so, students develop the ability to

speak fairly and clearly to opposing points of view, hypotheses or claims so as to better

understand complex problems, issues, or questions. Dialogical instruction leads to the

development of important intellectual dispositions when substantively conceived and

applied. The very nature of the process itself is an exercise in intellectual humility,

empathy and confidence in reason. The same is true for fair-minded dialectical thinking

and instruction.

Paul (1995a) defines dialectical thinking as the process by which “reasoners pit

two or more opposing points of view in competition with each other, developing each by

providing support, raising objections, countering those objections, raising further

objections, and so on” (p. 527). Paul argues that dialectical reasoning can be improperly
 258 
 

facilitated if students seek to “win” an argument or dominate an “opponent” without

regard to the fair assessment of the issue. This is characteristic of weak sense critical

thinking and perpetuates the didactic paradigm. On the other hand, fair-minded

dialectical instruction is concerned with helping students recognize and accept the need to

concede when one’s points “don’t stand up to critique” (Paul, 1995a, p. 527). When fair-

mindedly approached students try to “integrate or incorporate strong points found in other

views, and [use] critical insight to develop a fuller and more accurate view” (Paul, 1995a,

p. 527). When joined with his insistence on fair-minded critical thinking, dialogical and

dialectical modes of teaching and learning become powerful frames of reference

necessary for the design of learning objectives.

Paul argues:

Education for critical thought produces higher order learning by helping students

actively think their way to conclusions; discuss their thinking with other students

and the teacher; entertain a variety of points of view; analyze concepts, theories,

and explanations in their own terms; actively question the meaning and

implications of what they learn; compare what they learn to what they have

experienced; take what they read and write seriously; solve non-routine problems;

examine assumptions; and gather and assess evidence. Students should learn each

subject by engaging in thought within that subject. (Paul, 1995a, p. 532)

Such intellectual expectations are especially significant when courses examine complex

social issues and the prejudices that often accompany them because “Coming to

conclusions is more than an overt logical process. Beyond the procedural aspects of

thinking are practical issues where a well thought out world view [background logic] is
 259 
 

crucial. If one is unaware of the influence it has on decision making, then poor thinking

is more likely” (Peterson, 1991, p. 11). Substantive critical thinking instruction

constantly challenges students’ views of the world and content in that they are required to

give reasons for the beliefs held and conclusions they reach.

Paul posits that instructors who clearly understand the conceptual differences

between didacticism and dialogical and dialectical reasoning will better positioned to

construct learning opportunities that help students critically engage the content and

expand their personal points of view. He views instruction, then, as a continually

evolving process that requires intellectual work on the part of teachers and students to

figure things out.

Paul’s Practical Approach to Critical Teaching and Learning

As stated in the introduction, Paul’s fundamental pedagogical claim is that

students have a greater probability of developing important critical thinking skills and

abilities if students are expected to consistently and metacognitively apply the elements

of reasoning in the analysis of content and the intellectual standards in the evaluation of

reasoning whether one’s own or that of another. His approach to teaching and learning

reflects this claim. This section synthesizes two dimensions of Paul’s approach to fair-

minded critical thinking instruction. The first is his concept of substantive learning as

manifest in different modes of thinking: reading, writing, listening, speaking,

acting/illustrating. The second addresses his two general approaches to instructional

redesign: reworking individual lessons, and instructional schemas and tactics that help

one rethink and/or develop a substantive pattern for instruction focused on the typical day

of class. Both dimensions are intimately interconnected and work together in every
 260 
 

instructional context. Paul believes that moving education away from the didactic

paradigm requires a combination of both approaches where foundational and essential

critical thinking concepts and dispositions are the intellectual resources students use to

think critically within the curriculum and in their own lives.

Modes of Thinking

The fourth chapter of this dissertation argues that substantive approaches to

critical thinking instruction should continually highlight foundational critical thinking

concepts and principles within and across domains and contexts. Paul’s work provides

further clarification and detail as to how a substantive conception looks within

educational settings. Paul argues that substantive learning is enacted when foundational

critical thinking concepts and principles are applied to different modes of expression as

manifest within specific contexts. In other words, students substantively learn content

whenever they clearly apply the elements of reasoning, the intellectual standards and the

intellectual traits to their reading, writing, speaking, listening and acting relative to

domain specific thinking. Teachers must design instruction with the purpose to

maximize the opportunities for students to think through content using critical thinking

concepts and principles in every mode of expression so as to develop critical thinking

abilities and dispositions.

Paul (1995a) writes “It is important to understand our minds as a potential

repository of intellectual skills and abilities, of capacities that can be disciplined by

critical thinking principles, strategies, and moves, and to begin to see why the mastery of

reasoning is intrinsic to the task of taking charge of our mind and thus taking personal

responsibility for the quality of our thinking” in our personal lives and as engaged in
 261 
 

academic content (p. 310). From this Paul (1995a) argues that “all of the many

component abilities of critical thinking…can be orchestrated in a number of basic ways,”

including reading, writing, speaking and listening (p. 312).

For example, when reading students can use the elements of reasoning as

conceptual guides in the analysis of the text. Specifically, students “might begin…by

trying to figure out the author’s purpose in writing the book.” The concept of purpose

opens numerous analytical possibilities where students might make any of the following

intellectual moves: “What does the title of the book tell me about the purpose? What can

I learn from the preface and introduction?” What does the table of contents reveal about

the author’s purpose? (Paul, 1995a, p. 312). When substantively conceived, the concept

of purpose becomes a dynamic intellectual resource that students can engage in the

process of formulating reasoned judgments.

The intellectual standards represent another essential conceptual set of thinking

critically, and when used deeply they too become conceptual tools students can use to

focus assess their reasoning and the reasoning of others. Paul and Elder apply the

standard of clarity, for example, to the modes of listening and speaking to illustrate the

intimate interconnection between essential critical thinking concepts and modes of

application. They urge instructors to assess and have students assess the extent to which

they understand each other in discussion by stating or “summarizing in their own words

what the teacher or a student has said;” “elaborate on what has been said” in different

words, but in such a way that one’s explication does not detract or add to the meaning of

the original statement; “give examples to clarify or support what they have said;”
 262 
 

illustrate the meaning of a statement by forming an analogy, metaphor, chart, graph, or

drawing (Paul & Elder, 2007b, p. 35).

When foundational and essential critical thinking concepts and principles are

applied to different modes of thinking students develop intellectual skills characterized

by listening critically, speaking critically, reading critically, writing critically, and acting

critically. Take the concept of critical listening, as an example. Paul (1995a) writes that

critical listening is “a mode of monitoring how we are listening so as to maximize our

accurate understanding of what another person is saying…critical thinkers can listen so as

to enter sympathetically and analytically into the perspective of others” (p. 525).

Likewise, critical reading:

is an active, intellectually engaged process in which the reader participates in an

inner dialogue with the writer…A critical reader realizes the way in which

reading, by its very nature, means entering into a point of view other than our

own, the point of view of the writer. A critical reader actively looks for

assumptions, key concepts and ideas, reasons and justifications, supporting

examples, parallel experiences, implications and consequences, and any other

structural features of the written text, to interpret and assess it accurately and

fairly. (Paul, 1995a, p. 525)

Paul’s explication of the intimate interconnection between the modes of thinking and

essential critical thinking concepts highlights not only important skills that instruction

should target, but it emphasizes the dispositional goals of critical thinking education.

When substantively conceived the processes of listening, reading, speaking, and writing

critically engage students by implication in thinking that is intellectually empathic, fair-

 263 
 

minded, flexible, open-minded, and humble. From Paul’s perspective, instruction that

works to foster higher order thinking skills and dispositions explicitly, systematically and

consistently exposes and applies foundational critical thinking concepts in every mode of

thinking within the content.

When substantively applied to the elements of reasoning and intellectual

standards modes of thinking establish conceptual frameworks necessary for constructing

critical thinking learning outcomes. Paul argues that educators have an obligation to

work to improve the fair-minded thinking of every student. To do so requires an explicit

understanding of the fundamental and essential concepts and principles of critical thought

and an understanding of how these concepts and principles interact with modes of

thinking to facilitate the development of fair-minded intellectual skills and abilities in the

classroom. The next section focuses on Paul’s general approaches to instructional design

and redesign.

Instructional Design: Two General Approaches

The above sections posited that instruction fosters higher order thinking when it

helps students recognize that content is substantively understood when the logic of the

content is worked into their thinking. It also claimed that instruction must recognize that

the current didactic paradigm is an obstacle to the cultivation of critical thought. When

students are directly engaged in the reasoning process as manifested across various

modes of expression, then they begin to critically engage their minds in such a way that

they become active participants in their thinking rather than passive recipients of

“knowledge.” Instruction that fosters critical thought, then, is a process of becoming

where student thinking is transformed from a passive state of thinking to an actively

 264 
 

critical state. However, instructors face the ever present challenge of placing the

transformative process into concrete lessons and practices.

Over the last 20 years, Paul and his colleagues have taken a multi-faceted

approach to this challenge two of the most visible are the focus of this section: lesson

plan remodeling and schema for guiding a typical day of instruction. In both approaches,

Paul exposes and applies the elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, intellectual

abilities, and intellectual traits to pedagogically sound instructional strategies and tactics.

It is on this foundation that Paul and his colleagues provide suggestions and guidance for

instructional reform.

First Approach: Remodeling Individual Content Lessons

The first approach to instructional reform focuses on remodeling individual

content lessons. Paul and his colleagues have produced four handbooks for redesigning

lessons that facilitate critical thought. The handbooks include lessons in all major subject

areas for grades kindergarten through high school (Paul, Binker et al., 1997; Paul, Binker,

Martin et al., 2008; Paul, Binker, Martin et al. 1995; Paul, Binker & Weil, 1995). All the

lessons heavily emphasize Socratic discussion and learning activities that encourage

students to reason through problems, issues, and questions. Their structural rationale is

simple in that it begins with “an original lesson plan which is transformed via critique

into a remodeled lesson plan based on integrating one or more critical thinking strategies

derived from critical thinking principles which reinforce a unified [trans-disciplinary]

concept of critical thinking” (Paul, Binker, & Weil, 1995, p. 17). They acknowledge the

fact that substantive teaching cannot follow a stagnant procedure, so their remodeled

lessons are guides or models, not purely reproducible or scripted lessons. They write:
 265 
 

There are no algorithms or recipes for understanding or teaching critical thinking.

Although we separate aspects of critical thinking, the global concept of the truly

reasonable person is behind each aspect, and each aspect relates both to it and to

other dimensions. Thus, to develop critical thought, one must continually move

back and forth between the global ideal of the rational and fair-minded thinker

and the details describing such a thinker…The purposes of the [proposed

remodeled lessons] is not to simply give you lesson ideas, but to encourage you to

develop your own. (p. 13)

Although the examples of remodeled lessons are guides and their implementation is a

flexible process, instructors must have a firm understanding of the theoretical concepts,

principles and goals inherent in critical thinking pedagogy. Paul and his colleagues

explicate and infuse critical thinking insights into each lesson so as to help instructors

develop a greater understanding of this rich and robust approach to cultivating a learning

environment of critical thought.

In every handbook Paul and colleagues dedicate a significant portion of the text to

the discussion of four important and interrelated critical thinking insights: (1) Socratic

questioning, (2) conceptual analysis, (3) dramatization of three modes of mental

organization (three types of thinkers), and (4) 35 explicit dimensions of critical thought

presented as instructional strategies. Each insight is explicitly infused into every lesson

to model substantive instructional design and learning outcomes.

For example, in the Critical Thinking Handbook: K-3rd Grades, Paul, Binker and

Weil (1995) explain and model how to use concepts as intellectual resources for

substantive teaching and learning. The authors take a standard entitled “Friends” from a
 266 
 

third grade lesson and rewrite it after posing a critique of the standard lesson. In doing

so, they explicate specific strategies as learning objectives including: “generating or

assessing solutions, thinking independently, developing criteria for evaluation: clarifying

values and standards, making interdisciplinary connections” (p. 150). The strategies are

applied through Socratic dialogue focused on analyzing the concept of a friend. Model

questions include “Why is this a ‘good friend’ quality? Why is this one undesirable? Do

people, like the animals in the story, need to spend all their time together to be good or

best friends? Why or why not?” (Paul, Binker & Weil, 1995, p. 151). Students are

challenged to make reasoned judgments as to the nature of a friend citing examples from

the text and from their life experiences. Furthermore, intellectual independence is further

cultivated when students are asked to role play the three types of thinkers (modes of

mental organization).

Paul (1995a) and Paul and Elder (2006a) posit that concepts such as the

unreflective thinker, the weak-sense critical thinker, and the strong-sense critical thinker

are valuable intellectual frames of reference people can use to analyze and evaluate the

quality of their thinking. Paul, Binker and Weil (1995) and Paul and Elder (2006a)

contextualize the three types of thinkers as three characters useful, they argue, for guiding

students to deeper insights into the nature of and obstacles to thinking well. Paul, Binker

and Weil label this approach as “Using Dramatization to Foster Critical Thinking

Intuitions: The Power of the Dramatic.” They write, “The world that is most real to us in

the world of actual persons dreaming, hoping, planning, acting out their lives, facing

conflicts and problems, struggling to find happiness, success, and meaning. Abstract

concepts become much more meaningful to us when we relate them directly to a

 267 
 

dramatized world” (p. 21). Role-play becomes a substantive teaching and learning

strategy that, when used well, provides the opportunity for students to think about their

thinking and behavior, the thinking and behavior of others, and the extent to which one’s

thinking positively or negatively affects others. The three types of thinkers become

concrete concepts when embodied in specific characters: Naïve Nancy, Selfish Sam, and

Fairminded Fran.

Naïve Nancy represents the uncritical person who has not developed important

intellectual skills characteristic of thinking independently and responsibly. A student

role-playing Nancy may say something like, “I don’t need to think!...I just do whatever

occurs to me to do.” Selfish Sam is the weak sense critical thinker who is skilled at

thinking, but uses the skills to manipulate and control others to serve his selfish desires.

A student role-playing Selfish Sam may say, “I think a lot! It helps me trick people and

get what I want. I believe whatever I want to believe, whatever gets me what I want.”

Lastly, Fair-minded Fran embodies the strong sense critical thinker. A student who gives

voice to Fran may say, “I think a lot. It helps me to learn. It helps me to figure things out.

I want to understand my parents and my playmates…and myself… I want to be fair to

others because I expect everyone to be fair to me” (Paul, Binker & Weil, 1995, pp. 23-

25).

The three types of thinkers and their associated characters expose the abilities and

affective dimensions of thinking critically or lack thereof. Each character exists within

every person at various times and to various extents. Paul and his colleagues argue that

having students explicate the type of thinking in which they are engaged at any given

time is useful to expose their thinking for what it is so that it can be analyzed, evaluated
 268 
 

and hopefully corrected or built upon. The three characters are symbols that provide

instructors with concrete manifestations of abstract concepts that are useful for

facilitating deeper and more reflective thought.

The interconnection between specific critical thinking strategies empowered

through substantive and disciplined conceptual analysis, dramatization, Socratic dialogue

are necessary for shifting instruction away from the didactic paradigm and is present

throughout every remodeled lesson. Paul and his colleagues’ remodeled lessons are

excellent guides for cultivating fair-minded critical thinkers. However, being the realist,

Paul understands that such lessons only constitute one characteristic of instructional

reform. Paul’s second approach is to rethink how one teaches on a typical day.

Second Approach: Rethinking the Typical Day of Instruction

The second approach to instructional reform involves suggestions for rethinking

one’s typical day of instruction. Paul (1995a) argues that “every teacher teaches in a

patterned way, though few teachers are explicitly aware of the patterns implicit in their

teaching” (p. 327). Just as one cannot assume students critically construct content

knowledge, so too, one cannot assume that instructional patterns are well thought out and

facilitate higher order thinking. “For many teachers the pattern consists in nothing more

than this: lecture, lecture, lecture, quiz; lecture, lecture, lecture, quiz…with occasional

question and answer periods focused on recall with respect to lectures and the textbook”

(Paul, 1995a, p. 327). Paul (1995a) argues that in order to cultivate higher order thinking

skills and dispositions, instructors at all levels must “begin to develop a sense of the

patterns implicit in their own instruction, to critique those patterns, and to begin to

experiment with patterns that enable them more readily to cultivate the critical thinking
 269 
 

of their students” (p. 327). He offers four general schemas as variations of what

instruction for critical thinking on a typical day of class could look like all of which are

based on the disciplined use of the elements of reasoning, intellectual standards and

Socratic discussions.

The first schema is patterned as follows: start-up - diversification – reconciliation

- reconciliation and further diversification - final reconciliation. The second is a

simplified version that focuses on modeling and individual or group practice: start-up –

modeling – performance. The third schema is as follows: start-up – performance –

analysis – assessment. The final instructional schema seeks to synthesize insights gained

from large group work, individual analysis and small group work: start-up –

diversification (large group) – diversification (individual writing) – development (small

group) – assessment and further development (individual writing). The start-up and large

group discussions are based on Socratic discussions where the instructor models good

thinking for students while providing the opportunity for them to speak and listen

critically (Paul, 1995a). Furthermore, in every case the analysis and assessment of

content (thought) is based on the disciplined use of the elements of reasoning and the

intellectual standards. Each schema is an alternative to didactic instruction. Each

proposed instructional pattern is a guideline for facilitating critical thought through

student-centered teaching and learning.

Take the first instructional schema as an example for elaboration (start-up -

diversification – reconciliation - reconciliation and further diversification - final

reconciliation). Start-up may begin with a whole class Socratic discussion where the key

question, problem or concept is used to stimulate student interest and thinking. This is
 270 
 

followed by diversification where students engage in student-centered learning activities

like small group speaking and listening. Paul notes that disciplined small group work

helps students reason cooperatively, assess reasoning using intellectual standards, and

apply what they have learned from the start-up activity and from their peers.

Reconciliation rejoins the class as a whole in a Socratic discussion where students

“review and assess small group work” and new questions for further thought are

introduced. The lesson then moves to the third stage of reconciliation and further

diversification as manifested through the mode of critical writing. The purpose is to have

students “independently synthesize previous group work and come to reasoned

conclusions about the subject matter” in question. The instructor then moves toward final

reconciliation where small groups of students critically listen and speak with one another

so as to “assess individual student writing and to clarify both what has been figured out

and what directions for further study remain” (Paul, 1995a, p. 329).

When substantively applied instructional schemas are guidelines that are sensitive

to context, but provide teachers with student-centered instructional patterns to which they

can begin to discipline their own instructional habits. Furthermore, the instructional

schemas are only substantively applied when teachers combine them with pedagogically

sound teaching and learning tactics. For example, Paul and Elder (2007b) encourage

instructors to “use the following tactics during class to ensure that students are actively

engaged in thinking about the content,” their thinking and the thinking of others (p. 35).

Teachers can routinely call upon students to “state the question at issue…make

connections between related concepts…describe to what extent their point of view on the

issue is different from or similar to the point of view of the instructor, other students, the
 271 
 

author, etc.” (Paul & Elder, 2007b, p. 35). These suggestions are but a very small portion

of the numerous tactical recommendations Paul and Elder articulate.

The key point underlying Paul and colleagues’ suggestions for creating learning

opportunities that foster critical thought is that the process of redesigning teaching and

learning must take place on a minimum of three fronts: (1) Educators must recognize

“what is wrong with didactic instruction” (2) educators must understand the significance

of, and work to maximize the opportunities for students to substantively engage various

modes of thinking and expression, and (3) educators must consistently and substantively

employ “pedagogical strategies that can be used to effectively integrate” fundamental and

essential critical thinking concepts and principles into instruction (Paul, 1995a, p. 334).

Chapter Summary

Paul’s insistence on exposing the robust nature and power of fundamental and

essential critical thinking concepts is consistent throughout his numerous suggestions for

instructional reform. He calls for nothing short of a paradigm change: a movement away

from teacher-centered didacticism and toward student-centered instruction that directly

engages students in the reasoning process. Gibson (1995) claims, “The critical thinking

movement, and the key ideas of Paul, offers a new paradigm for our instruction

programs. Developing the curricular content and structure, and all the related

implementation issues, are large issues that should be widely discussed and debated as we

move into the next century and an almost certain era of more complexity, ambiguity, and

information superabundance” (Implications for Instruction, ¶ 12). The juxtaposition

between the didactic paradigm and the critical thinking paradigm is the stage on which
 272 
 

Paul presents his approach to instruction that cultivates intellectually autonomous and

socially responsible citizens.

There is a sense in which instructors must deeply understand foundational and

essential critical thinking concepts and principles prior to designing instruction that

facilitates the development of what Paul terms activated knowledge: genuine knowledge

the logic of which is understood on various levels and can be appropriately applied to

various contexts (Paul, 1995a, 539-540). This is a challenge facing the successful

implementation of Paul’s conception of critical thinking and is discussed in chapter nine.

Nonetheless, if the dominant didactic instructional paradigm is to be successfully

confronted, then instructors must do the intellectual work necessary to regularly rethink

their content and instruction.

Paul’s conception of instructional reform is best understood when his work is

examined comprehensively. Each of Paul’s publications highlights a unique dimension

or approach to rethinking curriculum and instruction so as to have the broadest appeal.

This chapter synthesized Paul’s work to reveal the robust and comprehensive nature of

his model as it applies to educational reform. The next chapter discusses the most

significant challenges facing the successful implementation of Paul’s trans-disciplinary

model of critical thinking in education.

 273 
 

CHAPTER 9

CHALLENGES FACING THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF

PAUL’S CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING WITHIN EDUCATION

Abstract
In this chapter, Hale points out some of the most significant challenges facing the
implementation of Paul’s conception of critical thinking for educational reform efforts.
The most significant challenge is that its non-procedural nature requires rigorous
intellectual work to substantively interpret and apply those essential and foundational
concepts on which Paul’s model is built. Specifically, educators are challenged to
continually re-contextualize Paul’s conception of critical thinking which may require a
reorientation toward embracing a trans-disciplinary approach to critical thinking theory
and instruction. To make this possible, Paul and his colleagues must provide further
contextual examples that highlight the intimate interconnections between those concepts
and principles that guide substantive analysis and evaluation of problems, questions and
issues.

Introduction

The strengths and weaknesses of Paul’s conception of critical thinking are a

matter of degree. The extent to which the foundational concepts upon which Paul’s

model is built and are substantively engaged will reflect the extent to which they are

powerful and useful. If the concepts are partially or superficially engaged, the conceptual

applications will be weak. If the concepts are contextualized deeply and widely, then

they will be useful and applicable to improving thinking. Paul’s model is challenged by

the degree to which it has not been substantively contextualized. Reciprocally, Paul’s

work is powerful by the degree to which it has been substantively contextualized.

Furthermore, the process of contextualizing the theory challenges educators and scholars

to do what most fields do not require of them: To think beyond disciplinary specialization

toward interdisciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity. Unfortunately, content

compartmentalization, departmental fragmentation, and domain overspecialization are the

educational norm. Paul’s model is fundamentally an interdisciplinary and trans-

 274 
 

disciplinary project. It seeks to establish a common mode of disciplined communication

that individuals and groups can systematically employ so as to improve the general

quality of their thinking and lives. This chapter highlights some of the most significant

challenges the substantive implementation of Paul’s conception faces as a force for

paradigmatic change.

The most significant challenge facing the practical application of Paul’s

conception of critical thinking is that it requires rigorous intellectual work to be

comprehensively understood and contextually applied. Three dimensions of this

requirement will be discussed. First, one must understand Paul’s work as a

comprehensive whole in order for it to be substantively applied. Secondly, educators are

challenged to contextualize and continually re-contextualize those essential critical

thinking concepts Paul succinctly articulates. As noted in the first part of the chapter,

concepts have meaning within contexts and thus needs fresh application and continual re-

examination to be deeply applicable to improving thinking. Thirdly, approaches to

assessment under the current didactic paradigm pose challenges to the successful

implementation of a substantive, trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking

because they tend to focus on one, or at best two, quantifiable tests rather than

recognizing the fact that critical thinking assessment requires numerous evaluation

systems. In every case, educators at every level are challenged to engage in the

intellectual work necessary to rethink the current didactic paradigm under which the vast

majority operates. Each of these points will be addressed in turn.

 275 
 

The Challenge of Intellectual Work

Scholars and educators are not naive to the difficulties associated with motivating

and training people to engage in substantive intellectual work. The concept itself

challenges the roles of teachers and students, repositioning all those involved in the

investigation, contemplation, and expression of knowledge as learners. In this sense, the

concepts of fair-minded critical thinking and substantive intellectual work are

synonymous. To think critically is to engage in rigorous, disciplined thought whereby

one analyzes and evaluates an issue, problem, question, claim or phenomenon with the

goal to understand content and to improve one’s thinking in such a way that insights and

skills can be transferred to other domains. One cannot think critically without

substantively engaging one’s intellect. If critical thinking is to be a valued educational

goal, then intellectual work must be at the heart of its conception and application.

Critical thinking substantively conceived must be thoroughly thought through if it

is to manifest itself constructively within education. Paul (1993b) argues for nothing

short of a paradigmatic shift in the way instructors and administrators think about

education. Consequently, those who embrace Paul’s conception of critical thinking are

faced with identifying and rethinking the current didactic paradigm and the extent to

which one’s instruction perpetuates it. This requires rigorous intellectual work. Paul

(1996) writes that, “We must come to recognize...that education requires doing

intellectual work, developing intellectually, achieving intellectual quality, and having

intellectual standards. These are ideas we must deeply re-discover, if we are truly

concerned with substantive educational change” (¶ 2). The challenge then is to

 276 
 

understand that which constitutes intellectual work and the extent to which professional

development opportunities can help instructors move toward paradigmatic change.

Intellectual work begins with a general inquiry into the nature of critical thinking

and its relationship to instructional practices. William Hare (1996) argues that, “Teachers

need to think through their aims in education to see how the ideas implicit in the general

ideal of critical thinking may capture important aspects of their overall objective. Most

important of all, they need to ask what it would mean to teach in a critical way, and to

find ways of expressing the ideal in classroom practice” (p. 48). What Hare identifies as

needs are all too often overlooked, assumed, or quietly ignored. Likewise Paul (1995a)

argues that, “It is important for teachers who aspire to take command of their teaching to

foster higher order learning to begin to develop a sense of the patterns implicit in their

own instruction, to critique those patterns, and to begin to experiment with patterns that

enable them more readily to cultivate the critical thinking of their students” (p. 327).

Both Hare and Paul emphasize the importance of questioning one’s pedagogical

assumptions as an initial step toward redirecting didactic modes of instruction. One of

these assumptions, however, is one’s perception of intellectual work.

Paul does not assume that instructors, at all educational levels, have an explicit

command over that which constitutes intellectual work. He asks:

But, consider, what does this word “intellectual” really convey to most classroom

teachers? Is it a word they are comfortable with? Do they think of themselves as

being “intellectual?” And what would it take for the “average” teacher to develop

a realistic vision of “intellectual work” and of “intellectual quality” in either

student work or pedagogy? Make no mistake; this is not a matter of giving

 277 
 

teachers sample lessons to emulate. It is not a matter of giving teachers some new

definitions of terms. This is a matter that goes directly to how deeply teachers

view education and to their own most deep-seated habits of thought. (Paul, 1996,

¶ 4)

Furthermore, one cannot articulate the concept of intellectual work or develop his/her

ability to engage in it without understanding the relationship between intellectual work

and thinking critically, or as Paul (1996) writes:

To understand intellectual work, it is essential to understand reasoning as an

intellectual process. To understand reasoning, in turn, it is essential to understand

basic structures integral to it — for example, assumptions, inferences, and

implications. And to understand these structures, it is essential to understand

intellectual criteria crucial to the assessment of these structures in action. Finally,

one understands all of this only by becoming intellectually disciplined oneself.

This is not, of course, a matter of becoming an ‘intellectual’ in some snobbish

sense of the word. (¶7)

Unfortunately, many educators do not have an explicit command over what it means to

think critically (Paul, Elder et al., 1997). If they cannot explicate those intellectual moves

essential for thinking critically, then one may question the probability that they can teach

students by and large to think critically within and across domains of academic and

personal life. This is evidenced by the fact that the majority of instructors within the

United States largely teach like they were taught, thus perpetuating a didactic, teacher-

centered paradigm.
 278 
 

In an article entitled “How Teachers Learn and Develop” Hammerness et al.

(2005) attest to this trend writing: “Learning to teach requires that new teachers come to

think about (and understand) teaching in ways quite different from what they have

learned from their own experience as students…They need to develop metacognitive

habits of mind that can guide decisions and reflection on practice in support of continual

improvement” (p. 359). The concept of intellectual work must be brought into one’s

conscious mind so that it can become an intellectual resource to rethink instruction. A

substantive conception of critical thinking will not be successfully implemented as a

force for educational reform unless the concept of intellectual work is both explicitly

understood and applied within and across learning environments.

Paul (1996) argues that “’intellectuality’ and its significance to learning and

instruction cannot easily or briefly be understood or transmitted. There is a

developmental process necessary here” (¶ 7). In defense of increasing professional

development opportunities and in primary and secondary education Sternberg (1987)

notes that, “One cannot expect all teachers to be experts on thinking skills, any more than

they are all experts on science or social studies or mathematics” (p. 255). Sternberg

(1987) points out that it cannot be assumed that instructors have a working knowledge of

that which constitutes a substantive conception of critical thinking or what it means to

think critically within a discipline, so teachers must become students of their content

areas and the art of instruction. In other words, teachers must become life-long learners

who do the intellectual work necessary to address the multi-dimensional nature of

educational reform.
 279 
 

It is clear that the scholarly community agrees that professional development, or

teacher education, must take place on multiple fronts. For example, educating teachers

requires that, on a base level, teachers critically work through the logic of student

thinking, understand content systems, gain a deep knowledge of instruction and

substantive methodological practices, understand the complexities of the teaching

profession, and deeply grasp the significance of substantive learning to democracy

(Darling-Hammond & Bransford, 2005). Similarly, Horowitz et al. (2005) argue that,

“Effective teachers are able to figure out not only what they want to teach, but also how

to do so in a way that students can understand and use the new information and skills” (p.

88). Paul and his colleagues have addressed the challenge of engaging instructors across

educational levels in the intellectual work necessary for facilitating the development of

fair-minded critical thinking within and across the disciplines. Nonetheless, Paul’s

conception of critical thinking can only be substantively applied when one has a deep

understanding of the network of principles and concepts that establish the background

logic of Paul’s work. The next section discusses the challenge facing the successful

implementation of Paul’s conception of critical thinking when pieces are taken without

knowledge or explication of the whole.

The Challenge of Understanding the Parts in Relation to the Whole

As noted earlier, Paul argues that in order to shift a paradigm one must be able to

identify the dominant way of thinking and knowing in which one is passively assimilated.

Once identified, however, the work of changing one’s paradigmatic framework begins.

Paul and his colleagues take a multi-faceted approach to cultivating a habit of intellectual

work among teachers at all levels of academia. The Foundation for Critical Thinking
 280 
 

offers regular professional development opportunities including annual conferences and

academies, on-line courses, institutional consultations, and printed literature. Taken

holistically Paul and his colleagues have made great strides toward educational reform,

but when considered separately, any one approach or suggestion is not sufficient for

implementing a substantive conception of critical thinking within any academic setting.

For example, Irene Yuen Yee Fung’s study utilized the Foundation’s remodeled lesson

plans as a basis for helping primary educators in New Zealand to increase students’

critical thinking skills and dispositions. The challenges Fung faced were in part due to

the limited resources she used, which if coupled with other instructional guides may have

addressed some of the problems she faced.

Fung agrees with Paul’s identification, analysis and assessment of the current

educational paradigm, but she believes his suggestions for lesson plan redesign are

insufficient as guides for redirecting instruction to cultivate higher order thinking skills

and dispositions. Fung’s claim needs to be understood in context. She originally used

Paul’s work in an attempt to help teachers learn to redesign their curriculum, but found

that teachers needed more direct guidance. Consequently, Fung’s (2005) study

concluded that Paul’s remodeled lesson plans 19 were not enough to move instructors

toward teaching under a new student-centered paradigm that uses critical thinking as the

basis by which knowledge is acquired and understood. It is important to note that Fung’s

work was limited to the remodeled lesson plans and did not incorporate Paul’s later work

on instructional redesign. However, her work highlights the requirement of intellectual

work on the part of instructors interested in changing the dominant instructional paradigm

as a significant challenge to the successful implementation of Paul’s conception of

 281 
 

critical thinking due to the fact that a precise synthesis of approaches and guides to

professional development and instructional redesign is not clearly visible.

Fung critiques the Paul et al. remodeled lesson plan design on two counts. First,

the remodeled lessons expect too much of teachers (Fung, 2005). She found that the

remodeled lesson structure “relied too heavily on the individual teacher’s commitment to

self-directed development of critical thinking in terms of application to classroom

practice” (Fung, 2005, p. 93). In other words, the remodeled lesson approach constructed

by Paul et al. “places strong emphasis on the teachers’ planning but far less emphasis on

the teacher’s evaluation of the remodeled curriculum/lesson plans” (Fung, 2005, p. 93).

Secondly, Fung (2005) posits that the suggestions for remodeling lessons lacks “evidence

of student performance” which “might convince the teachers that it is a ‘better’ solution

in terms of curriculum learning” ( p. 92).

Although Paul et al. acknowledge that the remodeled lesson approach to fostering

critical thinking and learning will not work if teachers are complacent or cynical, “lack a

strong command of critical thinking skills and self-esteem,” are not motivated due to

‘burn-out’, and/or desire a “quick and easy solution” based on a prescribed procedure or

formula; they do not provide useful suggestions within the text for addressing these ever

present challenges (Fung, 2005, p. 92). However, when placed within the context of

Paul’s accumulative work it becomes clear that Paul does indeed substantively address

each. Fung (2005) acknowledges and utilizes Paul’s approach to remodeling lessons

arguing that “the remodeling approach respects the autonomy and ‘professionality’ of

teachers. It is a long-term solution that transforms teaching by degrees as teachers’

 282 
 

critical insights and skills develop and mature” (p. 92). However, she posits that its

challenges outweigh its ability to promote substantive change.

Fung’s claim is correct if one was to limit one’s analysis to this one approach to

professional development, but Paul’s work does addresses many of her concerns and

accounts for many of her solutions when considered holistically. Nonetheless, any one

area is incomplete without understanding the whole. Paul’s work would be clarified and

have a greater probability of being successfully embraced, and implemented, if the

various approaches to professional development and instructional redesign were

synthesized in some form. Without such a synthesis Paul’s work will continue to be

viewed in fragmented pieces rather than understood in the context of the comprehensive

whole. 20

Take the Foundation’s Thinker’s Guide Series, for example. Although every

guide is based on the same critical thinking concepts, any particular guide is best

understood in relation to the others because each guide illuminates a specific aspect or

contextualization of the essential understandings of critical thinking. For example, the

Miniature Guide to Analytical Thinking focuses on the concepts of analysis and

evaluation. A person reading this guide without knowledge of the others within the series

will most assuredly have an incomplete view of the role the intellectual traits play within

the logic of a trans-disciplinary conception of thinking critically. The guide is best

understood when joined with the Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking: Concepts and

Tools.

Likewise, the brevity of the Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and

Tools poses a problem when used independently because it is an overview of the essential
 283 
 

conceptual sets of thinking critically. The guide does not, however, include the list of

critical thinking skills and abilities that are so valuable for contextualizing Paul’s

conception for the purposes of constructing learning objectives. Thus the Miniature

Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools is augmented when joined with the A

Guide for Educators to Guide to Critical Thinking Competency Standards: Standards,

Principles, Performance Indicators, and Outcomes with a Critical Thinking Master

Rubric. A final example unifies the more complex theoretical components of Paul’s

work with application within instruction.

The A Miniature Guide for Those Who Teach on How to Improve Student

Learning: 30 Practical Ideas is an excellent guide for rethinking one’s approach to

curriculum design and daily presentation. The very nature of its form limits the extent to

which the monograph can elaborate on some of its suggestions. For example, “Idea 30:

Systematically question students using a Socratic approach” provides a good general

suggestion and explanation of Socratic discussions. It defines the approach and lists

concepts that teachers can use to guide or focus their questions. However, the

explanation is insufficient for developing one’s Socratic skills and designing Socratic

discussions. Idea 30 and the guide itself are best used in conjunction with at least two

other guides that focus on questioning: The Thinker’s Guide to Analytic Thinking, and

The Thinker’s Guide to the Art of Socratic Questioning.

Furthermore, the Thinker’s Guide Series is only deeply understood when one

intellectually engages other titles such as: Critical Thinking: How to Prepare Students for

a Rapidly Changing World, and Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your

Learning and Your Life. The point is that Paul’s conception of critical thinking can only
 284 
 

be deeply understood when one examines his work as a whole. Unfortunately, this

proves to be a daunting task for any educator concerned with using Paul’s conception to

improve the general quality of his students’ critical thinking skills and dispositions.

Given the fact that Paul has published and co-published over 200 articles, nine books, 20

monographs, and over 28 videos, the challenge for any one teacher is overwhelming.

Paul and his colleagues are continually contextualizing the conceptual sets

essential to fair-minded critical thinking. However, much work needs to be done for

Paul’s model to successfully act as a force for positive and progressive educational

reform. A succinct publication that briefly comments on all of the major theoretical

points and the various ways these points manifest themselves in instruction would help.

Instructors must always engage in the intellectual work necessary to properly

contextualize the concepts and suggestions. This is not a weakness of Paul’s conception;

rather, it is a strength because anything less would contradict the very nature of what it

means to think critically. Paul and his colleagues continue to pave the way toward

substantive teaching and learning, but the challenge of context will always remain.

Challenges Facing the Contextualization of Paul’s Model

If Paul’s conception of critical thinking is to be substantively implemented within

education, then it will require educating instructors to think in terms of generalized trans-

disciplinary concepts. Students must be able to intentionally move in between the micro

and macro analysis and evaluation of problems, issues and questions using base-line

critical thinking concepts in order for them to develop the skills necessary to think well

within and across disciplines and to develop important intellectual dispositions. This will

require a reorientation of an educational paradigm that is plagued by teacher-centered

 285 
 

instruction, content compartmentalization, departmental fragmentation, and

overspecialization. To address this challenge, Paul and his colleagues continually seek

examples that accurately and deeply engage essential concepts of thinking critically.

However, more context examples are needed as guides for reorientation. Paul’s

conception of critical thinking must be thoughtfully applied in every context in which its

application is relevant. Application cannot be mindlessly automated. It is experience in

contextualization, and only such experience, that builds breadth of insight in the thinker

and breadth of application in the thinker’s command of content.

When substantively applied, foundational critical thinking concepts represent a

way of entering into the macro and micro logic of problems and issues. Specifically, the

elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, intellectual traits/dispositions, and

intellectual skills and abilities are presupposed in the very fabric of the disciplines, but

too often they are implicitly used rather than explicitly used as intellectual tools. Just as

students need training to recognize and identify conceptual and empirical connections

within a domain and between them, instructors also need training in helping students

develop the general intellectual abilities to make these vital cross-disciplinary

connections. One cannot leave the cultivation of sound intellectual judgment up to

chance and passive assimilation. Unfortunately, the educational trend, in the United

States at least, has long been characterized by didactic instructional practices and

overspecialized, technical knowledge rather than cultivating substantive knowledge of

those trans-disciplinary principles and concepts necessary for tackling the world’s most

significant problems.
 286 
 

Just as Newman critiqued instruction and learning that was overspecialized and

disconnected, former university professor and president Clark Kerr discusses the

problems of teacher-centered instruction, intellectual fragmentation and

overspecialization in his book entitled The Uses of the University. The book is a result of

a 1963 Harvard University lecture series that addresses the changing nature of the

university. Kerr posits that the modern university must become a multi-university that

prepares students with the general intellectual concepts and skills necessary to address

complex interdisciplinary problems and issues. In doing so, Kerr argues against

educational systems that compartmentalize knowledge and favor research in place of

student-centered instruction. The modern “multiversity” must account for specialized

knowledge and research and for the substantive instruction of its students in general

concepts and skills.

Kerr comments on a trend that by and large continues to this day. He writes, “The

intellectual world has been fractionalized as interests have become much more diverse”

(Kerr, 1972, p. 43). He continues writing, “Knowledge is now in so many bits and

pieces” (Kerr, 1972, p. 101). As a result, universities often succumb to “The choice of

faculty members based on research accomplishments rather than instructional capacity,

the fragmentation of knowledge into endless subdivisions,” where the “big state

universities are most vulnerable to charges of neglect of students” (Kerr, 1972, p. 103-

104). There is a need to “bridge the growing chasm between the department that does the

teaching and the institute that does the research, with the faculty member torn between”

(Kerr, 1972, p. 109).

 287 
 

The multiversity must directly confront:

the improvement of undergraduate instruction in the university. It will require the

solution of many sub-problems: how to give adequate recognition to the teaching

skill as well as to the research performance of the faculty; how to create a

curriculum that serves the needs of the student as well as the research interests of

the teacher; how to prepare the generalist as well as the specialist in an age of

specialization looking for better generalizations; how to treat the individual

student as a unique human being in the mass student body; how to make the

university seem smaller even as it grows larger; how to establish a range of

contact between faculty and students broader than the one-way route across the

lectern or through the television screen; how to raise educational policy again to

the forefront of faculty concerns.”…There is a need to “create a more unified

intellectual world. We need to make contact between the two, the three, the many

cultures; to open channels of intelligent conversation across the disciplines and

divisions..to answer fragmentation with general theories and sensitivities. (Kerr,

1972, p. 118)

Kerr recognizes that education in a rapidly changing world must substantively cultivate

general trans-disciplinary intellectual skills and dispositions while simultaneously

addressing the needs for specialized knowledge and skills. The two are not mutually

exclusive. One approach to this problem is “…the introduction of interdisciplinary

studies” into the university system that addresses the growing “…need to create ‘a more

unified intellectual world’ that looks at society broadly, rather than through the eyes of

the narrow specialist” (p. 105). Kerr (1972) argues that such is now the “…insistent
 288 
 

demand of students for relevance” (pp. 132-133). Critical thinking theorists and

professional development facilitator Linda Elder argues that foundational critical thinking

concepts and principles not only provide intellectual resources for making important

connections between one’s life and the content, but they also provide a framework from

which one can work through the complexities of interdisciplinary problems and issues.

In an article entitled “Diversity: Making Sense of It Through Critical Thinking,”

Linda Elder (2004) analyzes the concept of diversity to address the fundamental

conceptual link between general critical thinking concepts and specialized frames of

reference. In doing so, she argues against the tendency to address a multi-logical issue in

a fragmented or compartmentalized manner. She writes,

“The importance of teaching students to reason through complex issues of

diversity cannot be underestimated. Yet the best approach to a well-thought-through

diversity curriculum is not one that results in further fragmentation along the lines of

multiple ‘diversities.’ The curriculum cannot successfully jump from race to

multiculturalism to feminism to gender issues to learning styles to student preferences to

musical and artistic talent to mathematical-logical skills to this and that and this and that

and this. Critical thinking makes an integrated approach to instruction possible. The

focus is on developing reasoning abilities in general, on teaching students how to

evaluate any form of reasoning, whether their own or someone else’s, whether it is

articulated verbally or expressed in written form. Students learn to think through

complex issues in a complex way within any domain” (Elder, 2004, ¶ 26).

Instruction that is teacher-centered, fragmented, rigid, and compartmentalized

works against the cultivation of active knowledge and important intellectual dispositions.
 289 
 

Yet the problem of didactic instruction continues to define the current educational

paradigm. Educators themselves must reorient their thinking so as to deeply understand

and apply trans-disciplinary concepts essential to thinking critically. Content examples

can help instructors rethink their conception of critical thinking education to focus on

substantive trans-disciplinary concepts and principles. However, it takes intellectual

work for instructors to reorient their frame of reference.

Empirically, Paul and his colleagues have produced the following

contextualizations of a substantive trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking.

ƒ A total of remodeled lessons for grades K-12 in the fields of language

arts/literature, social studies, math, science and other subjects. (Grades K-3 =

69 lessons; Grades 4-6 = 52; Grades 6-9 = 37; High school = 64)

ƒ A total of 20 monographs in the Thinker’s Guide Series each focusing on a

specific mode of thinking.

ƒ Three text books on how to think critically within and across disciplines.

ƒ Over 32 videos that explicate how essential critical thinking concepts unpack

a variety of social and technical issues ranging from practical strategies for

teaching students, to analyze the logic of any system, to identifying media bias

and propaganda within the news, to thinking critically within technical

domains such as medical care and mathematics.

ƒ Elementary resources that include character masks for role playing general

types of thinking: Naïve Nancy as the uncritical/naïve thinker, Selfish Sam as

the skilled but egocentric thinker, and Fair-minded Fran as the skilled,

ethically minded thinker.

 290 
 

Furthermore, their examples address a wide range of audiences: Teachers,

students, scholars, and the average community member. Within every contextual

example, Paul and his colleagues provide graphical illustrations that capture the essence

of the subject in question. When viewed comprehensively, they have produced a very

large body of resources that are intended to be guides for rethinking the dominant

didactic paradigm. Every resource engages the essential concepts of thinking critically

showing that it is possible to use a few ideas in robust and powerful ways.

Although Paul and his colleagues point the direction toward paradigm change by

explicating a substantive conception of critical thinking, provide numerous examples of

what a substantive conception looks like within specific domains, and present numerous

suggestions for instructional implementation, much work needs to be done. If critical

thinking theory is to act as a guide for what to believe and what to do, then instruction

must always frame specialized interpretations within a larger trans-disciplinary

perspective. This requires intellectual work and time. Educators are challenged to re-

orient their thinking so that all content is entered into critically rather than merely treating

critical thinking as a one-of-many approach. In essence, educational reform requires a

paradigmatic shift in one’s thinking in order for student thinking to be substantively

corrected.

The Challenge of Assessment

To what extent have Paul and his colleagues produced sufficient tests for

assessing the development of substantive critical thinking skills and abilities? To

properly address this question one must first differentiate between types of critical

thinking assessment. As any instructor would attest, assessing learning and thinking is a
 291 
 

process that manifests itself in formal institutional tests, course content tests, and within

the daily interaction between students and teacher, between peers, and as individual

students themselves. Any substantive analysis of the extent to which students can think

critically must incorporate various modes of assessment. Failure to do so will,

undoubtedly, result in a limited scope of students’ ability to think critically within and

across domains and within their interaction within and outside of the course and/or

classroom.

Furthermore, the question cannot be settled until that which constitutes sufficient

is clarified. Sufficiency can be a misleading concept when it comes to the assessment of

critical thinking skills, abilities and dispositions. Although sufficiency is highly valued

and assumed by those who desire quick, easy and cheap assessment tools, not any one or

even two tests can properly assess students’ ability and disposition to think critically.

Paul and his colleagues recognize this dilemma and point the way to substantive and

comprehensive assessment, but critical thinking will never be sufficiency assessed by

formal exam. Critical thinking assessment must take place wherever one has the

opportunity to correct erroneous thinking.

Assessment must be flexible so as to account for the various contexts in which

students are expected to critically engage. As previously argued, instructors cannot

expect to substantively reform education if critical thinking instruction follows a stagnant

procedure or step-by-step plan. However, an approach to critical thinking assessment

that utilizes multiple assessment systems, rather than limiting it to one quantifiable exam,

is a step toward fostering critical thought. Craig Gibson (1995) argues that, “Assessment

will remain a challenge because of the multifaceted nature of critical thinking itself”
 292 
 

(Critical Thinking and the Reform Movement, ¶ 3). Institutions that “measure critical

thinking” with one exam miss the mark. Every assessment tool addresses a specific

purpose, exists within a specific frame of reference, is best applied within specific

contexts, and focuses on specific learning measures.

For example, the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal Test is a multiple

choice exam that is given to individuals within a regulated setting and assesses the extent

to which students can draw logical inferences. The exam does not assess the extent to

which students can make interdisciplinary connections, evaluate the quality of their own

thinking using explicit intellectual standards, empathize with positions contrary to those

they personally hold, and assess the credibility of an author or speaker, to name a few.

The Watson-Glaser exam serves a specific purpose which is valid in its specific context,

but it is not sufficient in measuring the extent to which a student can think critically

within and across domains.

The California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory (CCTDI) is another

example of a critical thinking exam. This is a timed multiple choice test (15-20 minutes),

intended for high school, college and adult learners, and “the CCTDI Total Score targets

the consistent internal motivation toward critical thinking. That is the disposition to use

or not to use one's reasoning and reflective judgment when solving problems and making

decisions” (Facione & Facione, 1992, Construct & Content Validity). Unfortunately, a

multiple choice exam cannot assess the extent to which a student is predisposed to

substantively engage fundamental critical thinking concepts in the analysis, evaluation

and synthesis of arguments and problems as guides to making reflective decisions.

 293 
 

Formal critical thinking tests such as the two aforementioned are not sufficient for

the assessment of a substantive trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking skills

and abilities for the singular reason that each is limited to those characteristics mentioned

above. This is not the fault of the exams in so far as they do not claim to assess more

than their respective tests actually can measure. A significant problem in the assessment

of critical thinking lies in the assumption that one type of test is sufficient. Paul and his

colleagues recognize the fact that critical thinking is a process that requires both long-

term qualitative and quantitative assessments in order to accurately determine the extent

students have command of essential critical thinking concepts, can accurately apply those

concepts within a variety of contexts, and the extent to which their work displays a

developed sense of intellectual dispositions over time.

In a study for the United States Department of Education entitled “A Model for

the National Assessment of Higher Order Thinking,” Paul and Nosich argued that if

critical thinking is to be assessed, any measurement system must be based on a

substantive conception of critical thinking. They begin their inquiry asking, “What

should be the main objectives of a process to assess higher order thinking?” (Paul &

Nosich, 1995 p. 107). This leads them to outline 21 criteria for that which constitutes a

substantive assessment of critical thinking, and provide “recommendations regarding how

to assess the various domains of critical thinking, test strategies that may be used, the

value of the proposed strategy for the reform of education, and suggestions [for the]

implementation of the proposal” (Paul & Nosich, 1995, p. 103). A substantive

conception of critical thinking is not limited to one or two assessment systems given the

fact that any assessment system is inherently designed for specific purposes. Paul and
 294 
 

Nosich argue that critical thinking skills and abilities can be assessed when based on a

substantive trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking and when applied to various

contexts associated with specific modes of thinking.

For example, a comprehensive assessment of critical thinking should: Recognize

the “need for interdisciplinary integration,” “account for the integration of

communication skills and problem solving,” “concentrate on assessing the fundamental

cognitive structures of communication,” including the ability to “create an accurate

interpretation, assess the author’s or speaker’s purpose, accurately identify the question-

at-issue or problem being discussed…see significant implications of the advocated

position…recognize evidence, arguments, inferences in oral and written

presentations...accurately grasp the point of view of the author or speaker,” and be able to

“empathetically reason within the point of view of the author or speaker” (Paul & Nosich,

1995, p. 108). In regards to writing and speaking, Paul and Nosich (1995) argue that

substantive critical thinking tests should assess the extent to which students have the

ability to “identify and explicate one’s own point of view and its implications…be clear

about what one is assuming, presupposing, or taking for granted, present one’s position

precisely, accurately, completely, and give relevant, logical, and fair arguments for it,

[and] cite relevant evidence and experiences to support one’s position,” to name a few

(pp. 108-109).

Furthermore, Paul and Nosich argue that at the very least critical thinking

assessment systems should follow a multiple rating system where students have to “ask

questions where any number of answers from a provided list may be correct, or incorrect.

It further allows students to rank, from a number of possibilities” (Paul & Nosich, pp.
 295 
 

139-140). Such a structure is in contrast to a standard multiple choice test because a

multiple rating system allows one to test students on their “ability to arrange items on a

continuum of reasonability” (Paul & Nosich, pp. 139-140). Paul and Nosich clearly

argue that critical thinking can only be substantively assessed when exams cover a wide

range of skills, abilities, attitudes, and modes of thinking all of which are required

multiple exams within multiple contexts. Paul’s contemporary work adheres to this same

conviction and commitment.

Paul is currently the head of research at the Foundation for Critical Thinking. He

and his colleagues encourage the development and use of numerous assessment tools

when evaluating students’ critical thinking knowledge, skills, abilities and dispositions

within a variety of contexts. As noted at the beginning of this section, critical thinking

substantively conceived evaluates student thinking within and across instructional

contexts, academic domains, and cognitive modes. Based on Paul’s work over the last

three decades, the Foundation publishes assessment suggestions for informal and formal

use.

For example, the Foundation’s publications outline numerous strategies teachers

and students can use to assess various modes of thinking critically including: critical

reading, critical writing, critical listening, role-play, and critical speaking (Paul & Elder,

2002). The Foundation also offers nine formal assessment tools. 21 For example, the

Foundation offers tests, some of which are free on their website, that include multiple

choice, short answer and essay exams. The assessments range from course evaluation

forms, basic knowledge of fundamental critical thinking concepts, to an international

critical thinking essay exam.

 296 
 

Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to comment on each assessment

construct, the number and variety of assessment systems offered by the Foundation

supports the claims that (1) assessment of critical thinking should not be limited to one

test, and (2) that Paul and his colleagues have created a variety of assessment tools that, if

employed along with instruction in a substantive conception of critical thinking, will

yield a broader scope of data regarding students’ critical thinking knowledge, skills and

abilities.

Paul and his colleagues point in the direction for a substantive assessment of

critical thinking. They provide numerous evaluation systems based on foundational

critical thinking concepts that work within and move across disciplines. However,

despite their multiple-front approach to assessment, their work will need to continuously

expand and evolve so as to account for the numerous contexts in which critical thinking

skills and abilities manifest themselves. Gibson (1995) writes that although the work of

Paul and Nosich for the Schools 2000 project is a multipronged approach to assessment,

their work is “one of a range of possibilities” (Critical Thinking and the Reform

Movement, ¶ 3). He notes that Halpern, for example, has identified some of the key

unresolved questions regarding the assessment of critical thinking. “These include the

extent to which critical thinking skills change over the course of the individual’s life

span, the patterns of curricula most helpful in developing critical thinking, the extent to

which individual learning styles and preferences influence the development of critical

thinking, and what specific teaching techniques and learning environments provide the

best enabling conditions for critical thinking” (Gibson, 1995, Critical Thinking and the

Reform Movement, ¶ 3). Critical thinking assessment should not be limited to one or
 297 
 

two tests. Rather, critical thinking can only be substantively assessed when a minimum

of two conditions are met.

First, assessment requires a network of evaluation tools. Secondly, in order to

assess the extent to which students think critically requires that evaluation systems are

based on an explicit substantive conception of critical thinking. Critical thinking is not

limited to any one domain; it is a process by which people make reasonable decisions as

to what to believe and what to do. A robust, substantive, trans-disciplinary conception of

critical thinking consistently explicates, contextualizes and assesses those concepts

essential to thinking critically. Paul’s conception of critical thinking does not abandon,

nor quietly assume, critical thinking fundamentals. As a result, the assessment systems

Paul and his colleagues have created are substantive when used holistically.

Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the most prominent strengths of Paul’s conception of

critical thinking and some of the most significant challenges facing its substantive

implementation within education. Of the many strengths, its conceptual framework as a

practical approach to educational reform was considered. Of the many challenges, those

addressed here focused on the need for holistic thinking, ever evolving contextual

examples of Paul’s conception of critical thinking, and a comprehensive approach to

critical thinking assessment. It was argued that these challenges are less unique to Paul’s

conception as they are characteristic of the successful implementation of any substantive

conception of critical thinking.

An argument running throughout this work posits that if the concept of critical

thinking is to be a force for educational reform, then it must be substantively conceived.

 298 
 

A substantive conception of critical thinking explicates and applies essential principles

and concepts within and across every domain. Furthermore, critical thinking education is

such that student-centered learning is the mode by which substantive learning takes place

whereby instructors join students in the learning process so as to systematically develop

general intellectual skills and dispositions. Only to the extent that educational systems

embrace a substantive, robust, trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking will they

work toward the ideals of what it means to be an intellectually autonomous and socially

responsible critical thinker. Richard Paul’s conception of critical thinking is built on the

explication and systematic implementation of foundational critical thinking concepts and,

therefore, directly challenges the current didactic paradigm. As Gibson (1995) posits,

“The critical thinking movement, and the key ideas of Paul, offer a new paradigm for our

instruction programs” (Implications for Instruction, ¶ 11). Or, as Alec Fisher (1991)

writes, “Paul not only theorizes, he also wants to change the educational world. He is

both an evangelist for critical thinking, and an educational revolutionary; he has both

faith and organizational drive!” (p. 114). Paul’s work has largely articulated a

substantive conception of critical thinking and how it manifests itself in learning

environments. However, as with any substantive conception of critical thinking, his work

faces significant paradigmatic and practical challenges if it is to be substantively

implemented within education.

The next chapter concludes this study commenting on its implications, limitations

and areas for further study.

 299 
 

SUMMARY OF PART III

Part three consisted of chapters 7, 8, and 9 and constituted the exegesis portion of

this dissertation. Dimensions of Paul’s work were pointed out that demonstrated its

substantive trans-disciplinary nature. Chapter 7 clarified Paul’s theoretical frame of

reference and summarized what can be considered his current model of critical thinking.

It was argued that Paul’s work can only be substantively understood and applied in light

of his pedagogical purposes and the intimate interconnectedness of each of the conceptual

sets that articulate and elaborate on a base-line conception of critical thinking. Paul’s

model of critical thinking gives greater clarity to what it means to think critically by

following the pedagogical implications of those concepts constituting an essentialist

conception of critical thinking.

Chapter 8 explicated Paul’s approach to educational reform as applied to teaching

and learning. Paul argues that the elements of reasoning, intellectual standards,

intellectual abilities, and intellectual dispositions must be explicitly present in

redesigning instruction the logic of which involves an examination of three

interconnected factors: content as mode of thinking, didacticism as a barrier to facilitating

critical thinking instruction, and that which constitutes substantive student-centered

instruction. Taken together, the foundational and essential critical thinking concepts

characteristic of Paul’s model are contextualized, and become powerful conceptual and

strategic tools teachers and students can use to improve the quality of their thinking

within the content and within their lives.

Chapter 9 discussed the most significant challenges facing the successful

implementation of Paul’s conception of critical thinking in education. The most

 300 
 

significant challenge is that of intellectual work. Instructors must continually

contextualize the concepts and principles explicated within Paul’s model. Such

contextualization is especially challenging for those without training in thinking in a

generalized or interdisciplinary manner. Paul’s work also faces the challenge of

assessment, especially given the pragmatic concerns pressuring institutions and

instructors to produce quantitative results. Critical thinking is best assessed with multiple

qualitative and quantitative assessment tools, which is a challenge for any substantive

model of critical thinking. The challenges Paul’s work faces are less unique to his model

as they are endemic of the assessment of critical thinking skills and abilities in general.

Nonetheless, Paul and his colleagues at the Foundation for Critical Thinking and at the

Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique must continually exemplify what a

substantive trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking looks like within

instructional environments in order for his work to significantly contribute to educational

reform.

The next chapter concludes this study. The chapter begins with an overview of

this dissertation’s aims and conclusions. It is followed by a discussion regarding the

implications and limitations of this work and suggests areas for further study.
 301 
 

PART IV: CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

Overview of the Aims and Conclusions

There were two main goals set out at the beginning of this dissertation. The first

was to show that there are essential and fundamental concepts and principles that

characterize what it means to think and act critically and that critical thinking is

intimately connected with teaching and learning. It was argued that these concepts and

principles are present within the history of critical thinking and within contemporary

definitions. Furthermore, these concepts and principles clearly represent a base-line

conception of critical thinking regardless of claims that there is no single definition of

critical thinking. Finally, an essentialist approach to critical thinking points to a

substantive, trans-disciplinary conception that can be generalized across domains in order

to improve the quality of student thinking and behavior.

The second goal was to provide evidence that Richard Paul has constructed a

substantive, trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking. His work is highly cited

throughout the discourse both in reference to his theoretical contributions and his

suggestions for classroom applications. I argued that although Paul’s work is highly

visible within the discourse on critical thinking and within numerous educational

publications and settings, it is under-analyzed. As a result, I sought to provide the first

comprehensive description of Paul’s work and the first exegesis that takes a

comprehensive view of Paul’s work. In doing so, I pointed out strengths of his model

and some of the most significant challenges it faces as a model for educational reform.
 302 
 

It was concluded that Paul has indeed constructed a substantive, trans-disciplinary

conception of critical thinking, but due to its conceptual nature, the model requires

contextualization and continual re-contextualization in order for its theoretical potential

to be realized and its instructional suggestions to be properly applied. This leads to three

interrelated challenges: (1) Individual instructors must do the intellectual work necessary

for re-thinking and redesigning existing approaches to content organization and

presentation; (2) Paul’s work needs more content examples as guides for instructional

design; and (3) it faces the challenge of constructing reliable and meaningful assessment

tools for both daily instruction and institutional purposes across disciplines. However, all

three challenges are characteristics of any substantive conception of critical thinking

because thinking critically takes intellectual work.

Implications of the Study

Conceptually: A conceptual approach to critical thinking, like Richard Paul’s,

requires deep insight into the ideas educators and non-educators, alike, use and the

contexts in which they use them. A substantive approach to critical thinking must

continually explicate and engage foundational concepts within and across contexts so that

students can come to understand and differentiate between the various ways concepts are

interpreted and applied. If critical thinking is to have significant meaning within

education, then it must recognize the fallibility of human thinking, engage practical

methods for correcting thinking, and emphasize the importance of constructive

participation within a learning community (Fung, 2005).

Empirically: If one accepts the evidence put forth in support of a substantive,

trans-disciplinary conception of critical thinking, and that Paul’s conception is both

 303 
 

substantive and trans-disciplinary, then one would acknowledge that it is in the best

interest of our students to help them gain a deep understanding of the concept of critical

thinking and its role within domain specific studies. Paul’s work has significant

implications for future research across all levels of education. This includes potential

studies regarding the extent to which substantive education in trans-disciplinary ideas

facilitates deeper understanding of a specific domain, but also the extent to which

students can engage the concepts so as to transfer intellectual skills and insights across

domains. Finally, there are great implications relevant to teacher education so as to

challenge the trend whereby teachers teach the way they were taught.

Pedagogically: This work clarified the minimum conditions of that which

constitutes a substantive conception of critical thinking. In doing so, it argued that

Richard Paul’s work meets those conditions and, in fact, clarifies them with his

articulation of the elements of reasoning, intellectual standards, intellectual traits, and

intellectual abilities. The implications for education, both in theory and practice, are

wide reaching. Multiple schools and educators purport to engage Paul’s conception of

critical thinking, but few do so deeply. Paul’s work is not a random set of concepts to be

plugged into a learning objective to meet accreditation requirements. Those who take

Paul’s conception seriously understand that it is based on the disciplined use of

foundational concepts within and across all contexts. They also understand that

intellectual work yields intellectual skills that can be life changing. Finally, they

understand the ethical imperative inherent within Paul’s conception which mandates that

learning be a transformative process by which one begins to develop one’s ability to think
 304 
 

autonomously and responsibly. The clarification of Paul’s work contributes to these

ends.

Limitations and Suggestions for Further Study

There are seven primary limitations of this study each of which correlates with an

area for further study. First, this work was dedicated to the analysis of Richard Paul’s

conception of critical thinking. There are numerous interpretations of critical thinking

and its application within educational settings. Each interpretation has strengths and

weaknesses, just as each is valuable within specific contexts. My perspective is such that

I believe if education is to promote substantive change in the quality of student thinking

and, thus, in the quality of peoples’ lives, then a robust, trans-disciplinary conception

must be present within every school, department, and classroom. Undoubtedly, there are

theorists and practitioners that will disagree.

Secondly, this work only addressed Paul’s work as one example of a substantive

trans-disciplinary conception. Other trans-disciplinary conceptions need to be identified

and evaluated. It is in the best interest of advancing the goals of critical thinking that

other conceptions are analyzed and, if appropriate, incorporated into a unified conception

that can serve the educational community.

Thirdly, this study provided a comprehensive analysis and assessment of Paul’s

work. Any one concept within Paul’s conception can be analyzed and evaluated more

deeply than it is discussed here. Nosich (2005) recognizes the power of understanding

foundational concepts deeply, writing that “we can focus more directly on certain of the

elements [of reasoning] in particular as giving a deeper insight into how to reason about

and through a discipline” (p. 88). Dewey (1938/1997b) exemplified the potential for
 305 
 

deep understanding of a single foundational concept in his book Experience & Education

where he dedicated an entire chapter to the analysis of purpose as a concept necessary for

thinking critically. One is reminded of John Henry Newman’s (1899/1996) critique of

instruction that perpetuates and values rote memory arguing that students should learn

one thing well rather than many poorly. Likewise, it was Socrates who challenged others

to deeply understand the concepts they use and the values they profess. It is with this

attitude that Paul has constructed his work, and it is with this attitude that one should

deeply analyze individual concepts within his model.

Fourthly, it was not the purpose of this study to quantifiably assess the various

evaluation schema and tests Paul and his colleagues have constructed. Richard Paul is

currently the head of research at the Foundation for Critical Thinking. As discussed in

the previous chapter, the Foundation currently offers nine critical thinking assessment

tools. The assessment schema do not measure the extent to which a student thinks

critically, but assess the extent to which students, for example, (1) have command over

essential critical thinking concepts and/or (2) can engage essential concepts within

specific reading and writing analyses. Longitudinal studies regarding the extent to which

the assessment tools effectively measure the development of critical thinking skills and

abilities are necessary for the long-term development and implementation of Paul’s trans-

disciplinary conception within teaching and learning.

Fifthly, this study did not address the empirical studies regarding the extent to

which Paul’s model has been successful in promoting critical thinking abilities and

dispositions in various educational environments. Such studies exist. For example, in

1998 Jenny Reed evaluated the extent to which Paul’s model of critical thinking
 306 
 

improved reason skills and facilitated the development of intellectual dispositions within

a college history course; in 2006 J. Stephen Scanlan assessed the extent to which the

infusion and enculturation of Paul’s model within a twelfth grade rhetoric and

composition course improved reading comprehension and composition skills; between

2003-2006 Dr. John Crook assessed the extent to which Paul’s model improved ACT and

SAT scores at the high school level; in 2006 Debra Connerly analyzed the affect of

Paul’s model on increasing critical thinking skills among fourth grade gifted and talented

students (Connerly, 2006; Crook, 2006; Reed, 1998; Scanlan, 2006). I originally claimed

that Paul’s conception of critical thinking cannot be effectively applied or studied until a

comprehensive exegesis of his work was created. To do so presupposes a deep

understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of Paul’s conception and the discourse in

general. Although I did not attempt to incorporate these studies into the body of this text,

I believe that an analysis of each study’s interpretation of Paul’s conception must precede

any conclusion regarding the extent to which Paul’s work does or does not promote

higher order thinking skills and/or dispositions.

Sixthly, while it was argued that educators at all levels of instruction need to

reorient their thinking so as to embrace a substantive, trans-disciplinary conception of

critical thinking, the numerous and various political, economic, and social obstacles

teachers face on a daily basis were not discussed in any detail. Changing the intellectual

paradigm under which one operates requires intense intellectual work which, in turn,

requires time. Although thinking critically and teaching criticality is an ever evolving,

life-long process, substantive change assumes a safe and supportive working environment

where instructors are part of an intellectual community that regularly and systematically
 307 
 

addresses and manages the pragmatics of change. The unfortunate reality is that

educators are over-worked, underpaid, and are required to meet unrealistic national, state,

institutional and social expectations. Research addressing the various obstacles

instructors face is readily available (Alexander & Potter, 2005; Darling-Hammond and

Bransford, 2005; Pushkin, 2001; Troen & Boles, 2003), but in order for Paul’s

conception of critical thinking to play a significant part in education’s progressive

evolution it must be explicitly contextualized as a way of thinking through these

problems. The challenge of such contextualization represents an additional area for

future research.

Lastly, it would be in the best interest of Paul’s work and education if specific

disciplines contextualized Paul’s model. The true test of the power and validity of Paul’s

project must be seen in the extent to which his suggestions are substantively and fairly

applied across contexts. Paul has pointed in this direction with multiple joint

publications. His contextualizations act as models for beginning to think critically within

the logic of various domains. These domains include: strategic thinking for the

individual and group, critical and creative thinking, scientific thinking, thinking critically

about the media, logical fallacies, reading and writing critically, critical thinking in

nursing, active and cooperative learning, practical ways to improve student learning and

instruction, ethical reasoning, and thinking critically about educational fads. Others who

have embraced Paul’s approach have published and co-published contextualizations like

Elder’s (2006) critical thinking for children, Paul, Niewoehner, and Elder’s (2006)

engineering reasoning, and Moore’s (2007) thinking critically within the government
 308 
 

intelligence communities. Further contextualizations are needed in order for instructors

and students to recognize that knowing a few ideas well is powerful and empowering.

If education is to act as a force for positive individual and social change, then

critical thinking must be at the core of the curriculum; the underlying concept on which

learning is constructed as opposed to something merely added to the existing curriculum.

In order for this to happen, however, networks of people concerned with the problematics

of human thinking and practical ways to improve it must exist. Researchers,

practitioners, and administrators must find common ground on which to rethink

approaches to teaching and learning. I believe that a conception of critical thinking that

is based on the consistent explication and application of essential concepts that work

within and move across disciplines, coupled with the consistent use of minimum sets of

time-tested teaching and learning strategies, is a necessary first step toward improving the

general quality of our thinking and lives.

 309 
 

REFERENCES

Adler, M. (n.d.). Critical thinking programs: Why they won’t work. Retrieved April 2,

2008, from Radical Academy Web site: http://radicalacademy.com/adlercritthink

ingpro.htm

Adler, M., & Van Doren, C. (1972). How to read a book. New York: Simon and

Schuster.

Agnes, M., & Guralnik, D. (Eds.). (2007). Websters new world dictionary (4th ed.).

Cleveland, OH: Wiley.

Alexander, T., & Potter, J. (Eds.). (2005). Education for a change: Transforming the way

we teach our children. New York: Routledge Falmer.

Anderson, F. H. (1971). The philosophy of Francis Bacon. New York: Octagon Books.

Bacon, F. (1964). The advancement of learning. London: Dent. (Original work

published 1605)

Bacon, F. (1863). The new organon or the new directions concerning the interpretation

of nature. (R. L. Ellis & D. D. Heath, Trans.). Retrieved January 20, 2008, from

http://www.constitution.org/bacon/nov_org.htm (Original work published 1620)

Bailin, S. (1993). Epilogue: Problems in conceptualizing good thinking. American

Behavioral Scientist, 37(1), 156-164.

Bailin, S. (1998). Skills generalizability and critical thinking. Philosophy of education

society of Great Britain: Conference papers 1998 (pp. 259-267). Retrieved

March 2, 2006, from http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducBail.htm

Bailin, S., Case, R., Coombs, J. R., & Daniels, L. B. (1999). Conceptualizing critical

thinking. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 31, 285-302.

Baron, J. (2001). Actively open-minded thinking. Developing minds: A resource book for

teaching thinking (3rd ed.). Virginia: ASCD.

 310 
 

Baron, J., & Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.). (1987). Teaching thinking skills: Theory and

practice. USA: W.H. Freeman and Co.

Bedecarre, C. (1994). Toward a feminist account of strong sense critical thinking.

Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minnesota.

Benderson, A. (1984). Critical thinking. Focus: Educational Testing Service, 15, 1-24.

Berman, S. (2001). Thinking in context: Teaching for open-mindedness and critical

understanding. In A. L. Costa (Ed.), Developing minds: A resource book for

teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 11-17). Virginia: ASCD.

Beyer, B. K. (2001a). Infusing thinking in history and the social sciences. In A. L. Costa

(Ed.), Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 317

325). Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Beyer, B.K. (2001b). What philosophy offers to the teaching of thinking. In A. L. Costa

(Ed.), Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 87

91). Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Bleedorn, B. (1993). Introduction. American Behavioral Scientist, 37(1), 10-20.

Brenner, D. & Parks, S. (2001). Cultural influences on critical thinking and problem

solving. In A. L. Costa (Ed.), Developing minds: A resource book for teaching

thinking (3rd ed., pp. 216-221). Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Brookfield, S. (1991). On ideology, pillage, language and risk: Critical thinking

and the tensions of critical practice. Studies in Continuing Education, 13(1), 1-14.

Brookfield, S. (2005). The power of critical theory: Liberating adult learning and

teaching. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Cannistraro, P. & Reich, J. (1999). The western perspective: A history of civilization in

the west. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace.

Connerly, D. (2006). Teaching critical thinking skills to fourth grade students identified
 311 
 

as gifted and talented. Unpublished master’s thesis. Graceland University, IA.

Costa, A. L. (Ed.). (2001a). Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking

(3rd ed.). Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Costa, A. L. (2001b). Habits of mind. In A. L. Costa (Ed.), Developing minds: A resource

book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 80-86). Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Costa, A.L. (2001c). Introduction: The vision. In A. L. Costa (Ed.), Developing minds: A

resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. xv-xviii). Alexandria, VA:

ASCD.

Crook, J. (2006). NCA final documentation report. Unpublished report, West Side

High School, NE.

Daniel, M. F. & Pallascio, R. (1997). Community of inquiry and community of

philosophical inquiry. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 17(1),

51-66.

Darling-Hammond, L. & Bransford, J. (Eds.). (2005). Preparing teachers for a changing

world: What teachers should learn and be able to do. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Deakin-Crick, R. (2005). Learner-centered teachers. In T. Alexander & J. Potter (Eds.),

Education for a change: Transforming the way we teach our children (pp. 159-

166). New York: Routledge Falmer.

Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the

reflective process. Lexington, KY: Health. (Original work published 1910)

Dewey, J. (1997a). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of

education. New York: Simon & Schuster. (Original work published 1916)

Dewey, J. (1997b). Experience and education. New York: Free Press. (Original work

published 1938)

Elder, L. (n.d.). A professional development model for K-12 schools: Critical thinking as
 312 
 

the key to substantive learning. Retrieved April 21, 2008, from Foundation for

Critical Thinking Web site: http://www.criticalthinking.org/professionalDev

/modelfor-k-12.cfm

Elder, L. (2004). Diversity: Making sense of it through critical thinking. Retrieved April

22, 2008, from Foundation for Critical Thinking Web site: http://www.criticalthin

king.org/page.cfm?PageID=489&CategoryID=73

Elder, L. (2006). The miniature guide to critical thinking for children (2nd ed.). Dillon

Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Elder, L., & Paul, R. (2004). The miniature guide to the human mind: How it learns, how

it mislearns (2nd ed.). Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Endres, B. (2005). Habermas and critical thinking. Philosophy of Education. Retrieved

November 14, 2005, from www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/96_ docs

/endres.html

Ennis, R. H. (1987). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J.

Baron & R. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice (pp.

9-26). New York: W. H. Freeman.

Ennis, R. (1992). Conflicting views on teaching critical reasoning. In R. A. Talaska (Ed.),

Critical reasoning in contemporary culture (pp. 5-27). Albany: State University

of New York.

Ennis, R. (1996). Critical thinking. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Ennis, R. (2001). Goals for a critical thinking curriculum and its assessment. In A. L.

Costa (Ed.), Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp.

44-46). Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Facione, P. A. (1990). The delphi report. Critical thinking: A statement of expert

consensus for purposes of educational assessment and instruction: Executive

 313 
 

summary. Millbrae, CA: California Academic Press.

Facione, P. (2004). Critical thinking: What it is and why it counts. Retrieved October 1,

2006, from Insight Assessment Web site: http://www.insightassessment.com

/9dex.html

Facione, P., & Facione, N. (n.d.). California critical thinking dispositions inventory.

Retrieved April 28, 2008, from Insight Assessment Web site: http://www.insight

assessment.com/test-cctdi.html

Fasko, D. (Ed). (2003a). Critical thinking and reasoning: Current research, theory, and

practice. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Fasko, D. (2003b). Critical thinking: Origins, historical development, future directions. In

D. Fasko (Ed.), Critical thinking and reasoning: Current research, theory, and

practice (pp. 3-18). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Fieser, J. & Dowden, B. (Eds.). (2006). Francis Bacon. The internet encyclopedia of

philosophy. Retrieved October 23, 2007, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/b/

bacon.htom#top

Fisher, A. (1991). Critical thinking by Richard Paul. Informal Logic, 8, 113-123.

Flage, D. (2001). Critical thinking: A verbal dispute? Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across

the Disciplines, 20, 13-18.

Foundation for Critical Thinking. (n.d.). Testing and assessment. Retrieved April 24,

2008, from http://www.criticalthinking.org/resources/assessment/index.cfm

Foundation for Critical Thinking. (1987). Defining critical thinking. Retrieved October

18, 2007, from http://www.criticalthinking.org/aboutCT/definecritical

thinking.cfm

Foundation for Critical Thinking. (1999). Critical thinking: Basic theory and

instructional structures. Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

 314 
 

Freire, P. (1998). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum. (Original work

published 1970)

Fung, I. Y. (2005). Collaborative reasoning: Critical thinking based learning and

instruction. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Auckland, New

Zealand.

Gallo, D. (1994). Educating for empathy, reason, and imagination. In K. S. Walters (Ed.),

Re-thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking (pp. 52-69). Albany:

University of New York Press.

Garland, M. M. (1996). Newman in his own day. In F. M. Turner (Ed.), The idea of a

university (pp. 265-281). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Gibson, C. (1995). Critical thinking: Implications for instruction. Reference & User

Services Quarterly, 35, 27-35. Retrieved on December 10, 2006, from

http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/rusa/archive/rusaawards/rspawardwinning/19

71/1997.cfm

Giroux, H. (1988). Teachers as intellectuals: Toward a critical pedagogy of learning.

Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.

Glaser, E. (1941). An experiment in the development of critical thinking. New York:

Teachers College Columbia Uni.

Green, A. W. (1966). Sir Francis Bacon. New York: Twayne.

Hammerness, K., Darling-Hammond, L., Bransford, J., Berliner, D., Cochran-Smith, M.,

McDonald, M., et al. How teachers learn and develop. In L. Darling-Hammond

& J. Bransford (Eds.), Preparing teachers for a changing world: What teachers

should learn and be able to do (pp. 358-389). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Harding, S. (1989, October 22). Ideas & trends; Does ideology stop at the laboratory

door. A debate on science and the real world. New York Times. Retrieved
 315 
 

March 14, 2008, from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE5

DE1E3AF931A15753CA96F948260

Hare, W. (1998). Critical thinking as an aim of education. Inquiry: Critical Thinking

Across the Disciplines, 18(2), 38-51.

Harpaz, Y. (n.d.). Conflicting Logics in the Education to Critical Thinking. Retrieved

December 10, 2007, from Mandel School of Education leadership Web site:
http://www.learningtolearn.sa.edu.au/Colleagues/files/links/Conflicting_Logics

_n_Educ.rtf

Hatcher, D. (1996). Landmarks in critical thinking series: Plato’s ‘Meno’: A model for

critical thinkers. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 16, 1-8.

Hatcher, D. (2000). Arguments for another definition of critical thinking. Inquiry:

Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 20(1), 3-8.

Hitchcock, D. (2002). Bertrand Russell and critical thinking. Inquiry: Critical Thinking

Across the Disciplines, 20(2), 3-50.

hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress: Education as the practice of freedom. New

York: Routledge. [lower case spelling of author’s name is intentional]

Horowitz, F. D., Darling-Hammond, L., Bransford, J., Comer, J., Rosebrock, K., Austin,

K., et al. (2005). Educating teachers for developmentally appropriate practice. In

L. Darling-Hammond & J. Bransford (Eds.), Preparing teachers for a changing

world: What teachers should learn and be able to do (pp. 88-125). San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass.

Interdisciplinary. (n.d.). The American heritage® dictionary of the English language, (4th

ed.). Retrieved October 08, 2008, from Dictionary.com Web site: http://dictionary

reference.com/browse/interdisciplinary

Interdisciplinary. (1993). Oxford English dictionary unabridged (2nd ed.). Oxford:

 316 
 

Oxford University Press.

Johnson, R. (1996). Critical thinking and command of language. Inquiry: Critical

Thinking Across the Disciplines, 16(2), 78-92.

Kerr, C. (1972). The uses of the university (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.

Lipman, M. (1991). Thinking in education. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University

Press.

Mander, A. E. (1938). Clearer thinking: Logic for everyman (2nd ed.). London: Watts &

Co.

McLaren, P. L. (1994). Forward: Critical thinking as a political project. In K. S. Walters

(Ed.), Re-thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking (pp. ix-xv). New

York: State University of New York Press.

McPeck, J. E. (1992). Teaching critical reasoning through the disciplines: Content versus

process. In R. A. Talaska (Ed.), Critical reasoning in contemporary culture (pp.

31-50). Albany, NY: State University of New York.

Minnich, E. (2005). Transforming knowledge (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: Temple University

Press.

Morse, J. F. (1998). Socratic dialectic for the twenty-first century. Inquiry: Critical

Thinking Across the Disciplines, 18(2), 9-23.

Moore, D. T. (2007). Critical thinking and intelligence analysis. Washington, DC:

NDIC Press.

Moseley, D., Baumfield, V., Elliott, J., Gregson, M., Higgins, S., Miller, J. et al. (2005).

Frameworks for thinking: A handbook for teaching and learning. Cambridge,

MA: Cambridge University Press.

Newman, J.H. (1996). The idea of a university. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
 317 
 

(Original work published 1899)

Nickerson, R. S. (1987). Why teach thinking? In J. B. Baron & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.),

Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice (pp. 27-38). New York: W.H.

Freeman.

Nosich, G. (1996). The need for comprehensiveness in critical thinking instruction.

Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 26(2), 50-66.

Nosich, G. (2005a). Learning to think things through: A guide to critical thinking

across the curriculum (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall.

Nosich, G. (2005b). Problems with two standard models for teaching critical thinking.

New Directions for Community Colleges, 130(1), 59-68.

Paul, R. (1982). Teaching critical thinking in the strong sense: A focus on self-deception,

world views, and a dialectical mode of analysis. Informal Logic: Critical Thinking

Across the Curriculum, 4(2), 2-7.

Paul, R. (1987). Dialogical thinking: Critical thought essential to the acquisition of

rational knowledge and passions. In J. Baron and R. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching

thinking skills: Theory and practice (pp. 127-148). New York: W.H. Freeman.

Paul, R. (1992a). Background logic, critical thinking, and irrational language games.

Critical thinking: What every person needs to survive in a rapidly changing world

(2nd ed., pp. 59-78). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1992b). Critical thinking and general semantics: On the primacy of natural

languages. Critical thinking: What every person needs to survive in a rapidly

changing world (2nd ed., pp. 534-543). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical

Thinking.

Paul, R. (1992c). Critical thinking: What every person needs to survive in a rapidly

changing world (2nd ed.). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.
 318 
 

Paul, R. (1993a). Critical thinking: What every person needs to survive in a rapidly

changing world (3rd ed.). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1993b). How to teach students to seek the logic of things: To dissolve wholes

into parts, unite parts into wholes. [Video Tape Proceedings of the International

Conference on Critical Thinking & Educational Reform]. Dillon Beach, CA:

Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1995a). Critical thinking: How to prepare students for a rapidly changing

world (4th ed.). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1995b). Critical thinking, the state of education today, and the goals of the 15th

International Conference. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual International

Conference on Critical Thinking and Educational Reform: Three waves of

research and practice (pp. 4-14). Cotati: Center for Critical Thinking and Moral

Critique.

Paul, R. (1995c). Pseudo critical thinking in the educational establishment. Critical

thinking: How to prepare students for a rapidly changing world (4th ed., pp. 47-

90). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1995d). Teaching critical thinking in the strong sense: A focus on self-

deception, world views, and a dialectical mode of analysis. Critical thinking: How

to prepare students for a rapidly changing world (4th ed., pp. 383-386). Santa

Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1995e). The art of redesigning instruction. Critical thinking: How to prepare

students for a rapidly changing world (4th ed., pp. 303-334). Santa Rosa, CA:

Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1995f). The contributions of philosophy to thinking. Critical thinking: How to

prepare students for a rapidly Changing World (4th ed., pp. 435-473). Santa Rosa:
 319 
 

CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (1996). Intellectual foundations: The key missing piece in school restructuring.

Retrieved April 20, 2008, from Foundation for Critical Thinking Web site:

http://www.criticalthinking.org/page.cfm?PageID=500&CategoryID=69

Paul, R. (1999). Critical thinking: Basic theory and instructional structures. Dillon

Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. (2007, July). Key note address. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the

Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique, Berkeley, CA.

Paul, R., & Binker, A. J. A. (1995a). Critical thinking and science. In A. J. A. Binker & J.

Willsen (Eds.), Critical thinking: How to prepare students for a rapidly changing

world (4th ed., pp. 501-508). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Binker, A. J. A. (1995b). Socratic questioning. In R. Paul, Critical thinking:

How to prepare students for a rapidly changing world (4th ed., pp. 335-365).

Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R., Binker, A. J .A., & Weil, D. (1995). Critical thinking handbook: K-3rd grades:
A guide for remodeling lesson plans in language, social studies & science. Santa

Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R., Binker, A. J. A., Martin, D., Vetrano, C., & Kreklau, H. (1995). Critical

thinking handbook: 6th-9th grades: A guide for remodeling lesson plans in

language, social studies & science. Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical

Thinking.

Paul, R., Binker, A. J. A., Jensen, K., & Kreklau, H. (1997). Critical thinking handbook:

4th-6th grades: A guide for remodeling lesson plans in language, social studies &

science. Rohnert Park, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R., Binker, A. J. A., Martin, D., & Andamson, K. (2008). Critical thinking
 320 
 

handbook: High school (3rded.). Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical

Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (n.d.). A brief history of the idea of critical thinking. Retrieved

September 9, 2007, from Foundation for Critical Thinking Web site: http://

www.criticalthinking.org/page.cfm?PageID=408&CategoryID=51

Paul, R., & Elder, L. (2002). The miniature guide to how to improve student learning.

Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2003). A miniature guide to scientific thinking. Dillon Beach, CA:

Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2004a). The thinker’s guide to fallacies: The art of mental trickery

and manipulation. Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2004b). The thinker’s guide to the nature and functions of critical &

creative thinking. Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2006a). Critical thinking: Tools for taking charge of your learning

and your life (2nded.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2006b). A guide for educators to guide to critical thinking

competency standards: Standards, principles, performance indicators, and

outcomes with a critical thinking master rubric (2nd ed.). Dillon Beach, CA:

Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2006c). The miniature guide to the art of asking essential questions

(4th ed.). Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2006d). The miniature guide to critical thinking concepts and tools

(4th ed.). Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2006e). The miniature guide to how to read a paragraph: The art of

close reading (2nd ed.). Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.
 321 
 

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2007a). A critical thinker’s guide to educational fads: How to get

beyond educational glitz and glitter. Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical

Thinking.

Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2007b). Miniature guide for those who teach on how to improve

student learning: 30 practical ideas. Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical

Thinking.

Paul, R., Elder, L., & Bartell, T. (1997). California teacher preparation for instruction in

critical thinking: Research findings and policy recommendations. Sacramento,

CA: California Commission on Teacher Credentialing.

Paul, R., & Hiler, W. (2002). The miniature guide to active and cooperative learning.

Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R., Niewoehner, R., & Elder, L. (2006). The thinker’s guide to engineering

reasoning. Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Paul, R., & Nosich, G. (1995). A model for the national assessment of higher order

thinking. Critical thinking: How to prepare students for a rapidly changing world

(4th ed., pp. 103-152). Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Peltonen, M. (Ed.). (1996). The Cambridge companion to Bacon. Cambridge, MA:

Cambridge University Press.

Perkins, D. (1987). Knowledge as design: Teaching thinking through content. In J. B.

Baron & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice

(pp. 62-85). USA: W.H. Freeman and Co.

Perkins, D. (2001). The social side of thinking. In A. L. Costa (Ed.), Developing minds: A

resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 158-163). Alexandria, VA:

ASCD.

Perkins, D., & Salomon, G. (2001). Teaching for transfer. In A. L. Costa (Ed.),
 322 
 

Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 370-378).

Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Peterson, D. S. (1991). Richard Paul’s strong sense critical thinking. Unpublished thesis,

San Francisco State University, California.

Peticolas, A. P. (1998). The necessity of a critical, dialogic framework for teaching.

Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 18(2), 24-37.

Price, K. (1962). Education and philosophical thought. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Pushkin, D. (2001). Teacher training: A reference handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-

CLIO.

Quellmalz, E. S. (1987). Developing reasoning skills. In J. B. Baron & R. J. Sternberg

(Eds.), Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice (pp. 86-105). New York:

W.H. Freeman.

Reed, J. (1998). Effect of a model for critical thinking on student achievement in primary

source document analysis and interpretation, argumentative reasoning, critical

thinking dispositions, and history content in a community college history course.

Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL.

Reich, R. (1998). Confusion about the Socratic method: Socratic paradoxes and

contemporary invocations of Socrates. Retrieved January 21, 2005, from Stanford

University, PES Yearbook Web site: www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook / 1998

/reich.html

Robust. (n.d.). The American heritage® dictionary of the English language (4th ed.).

Retrieved October 08, 2008, from Dictionary.com Web site: http://dictionary

.reference.com/browse/robust

Robust. (n.d.). Dictionary.com unabridged. Retrieved October 08, 2008, from

Dictionary.com Web site: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/robust

 323 
 

Ruggiero, V. R. (2003). Neglected issues in the field of critical thinking. In D. Fasko

(Ed.), Critical thinking and reasoning: Current research, theory, and practice

(pp. 369-380). New Jersey: Hampton Press.

Scanlan, S. (2006). The effect of Richard Paul’s universal elements and standards of

reasoning on twelfth grade composition. Unpublished master’s thesis. Alliant

International University, CA.

Schafersman, S. (1997). An introduction to science: Scientific thinking and the scientific

method (pp. 1-7). Retrieved March 10, 2008, from University of Miami Web site:

http://geoweb.tamu.edu/courses/geol641/docs/ScientificMethod.pdf

Scheffler, I. (1973). Reason and teaching. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company.

Scriven, M., & Paul, R. (n.d.). Defining critical thinking. National Council for Excellence

in Critical Thinking Instruction. Retrieved December 8, 2007, from Foundation

for Critical Thinking Web site: http://www.criticalthinking.org/aboutCT/define

_critical_thinking.cfm

Shahrokh, R. (1998). Development of high-order thinking skills in students. Inquiry:

Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 18(2), 52-64.

Shaull, R. (1998). Introduction. Pedagogy of the oppressed (3rd ed.). New York:

Continuum.

Siegel, H. (1990). Educating reason: Rationality, critical thinking and education. New

York: Routledge.

Siegel, H. (1993). Gimme that old-time enlightenment meta-narrative. Philosophy of

Education. Retrieved May 14, 2006, from http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-

Yearbook/93_docs/SIEGEL.HTM

Spielvogel, J. (1997). Western civilization: Volume 1 to 1715 (3rd ed.). St. Paul, MN:

West.
 324 
 

Sternberg, R. (1987). Questions and answers about the nature and teaching of thinking

skills. In J. Baron & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Teaching thinking skills: Theory and

practice (pp. 251-259). New York: W.H. Freeman and Co.

Stumpf, S. E. (1993). Socrates to Sartre: A history of philosophy (5th ed.). San Francisco:

McGraw-Hill.

Swartz, R. (1987). Teaching for thinking: A developmental model for the infusion of

thinking skills into mainstream instruction. In J. Baron & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.),

Teaching thinking skills: Theory and practice (pp. 106-126). New York: W.H.

Freeman.

Swartz, R. (2001). Thinking about decisions. In A. L. Costa (Ed.), Developing minds: A

resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 58-66). Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Swartz, R., & Fischer, S.D. (2001). Teaching thinking in science. In A. L. Costa (Ed.),

Developing minds: A resource book for teaching thinking (3rd ed., pp. 303-309).

Alexandria, VA: ASCD.

Talaska, R. (Ed.). (1992). Critical reasoning in contemporary culture. Albany: State

University of New York.

Tama, M. C. (1989). Critical Thinking: Promoting It in the Classroom. (ERIC Document

Reproduction Service No. ED306554). Retrieved from ERIC database.

Thayer-Bacon, B. J. (1992, April). Richard Paul’s strong sense critical thinking and

procedural knowing: A comparison. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the

American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA.

Thayer-Bacon, B. J. (2000). Transforming critical thinking: Thinking constructively. New

York: Teachers College.

Tishman, S. & Andrade, A. (n.d.). Thinking dispositions: A review of current theories,

practices, and issues. Retrieved February 2, 2005, from http://learnweb.harvard.

 325 
 

edu/alps/thinking/docs/Dispositions.htm

Tishman, S., Perkins, D., & Jay, E. (1995). The thinking classroom: Learning and

teaching in a culture of thinking. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Troen, V., & Boles, K. C. (2003). Who’s teaching your children? Why the teacher crisis

is worse than you think and what can be done about it. New Haven, CT: Yale

University.

Turner, F. M. (1996). Newman’s university and ours. In F. M. Turner (Ed.), The idea of a

university (pp. 282-301). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Walters, K. S. (Ed.). (1994a). Re-thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking.

Albany: State University of New York Press.

Walters, K. S. (1994b). Introduction: Beyond logicism in critical thinking. In K. S.

Walters (Ed.), Re-thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking

(pp. 1-22). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Warren, T. H. (1994). Critical thinking beyond reasoning. In K. S. Walters (Ed.), Re

thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking (pp. 221-231). Albany:

State University of New York Press.

Weinstein, M. (1996). Decentering and reasoning. Philosophy of Education. Retrieved

May 6, 2005, from www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/96_docs/weinstein.html

Weinstein, M. (2003). Some foundational thoughts on critical thinking practice. In D.

Fasko (Ed.), Critical thinking and reasoning: Current research, theory, and

practice (pp. 273-289). Cresskill: Hampton.

Willingham, D. T. (2007). Critical thinking: Why is it so hard to teach? American

Educator, 31(2), 8-19.

Wilson, J. (1963). Thinking with concepts. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
 326 
 

APPENDIX

1. Robert Ennis: Goals for a Critical Thinking/Reasoning Curriculum

2. Richard Paul: 35 Dimensions of Critical Thinking

 327 
 

Appendix 1: Robert Ennis: Goals for a Critical Thinking/Reasoning Curriculum

I. Working definition: Critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on

deciding what to believe or do.
II. Critical thinking so defined involves both dispositions and abilities:
A. Dispositions
1. Seek a clear statement of thesis or question
2. Seek reasons
3. Try to be well informed
4. Use and mention credible sources
5. Take into account the total situation
6. Try to remain relevant to the main point
7. Keep in mind the original and/or basic concern
8. Look for alternatives
9. Be open-minded
a) Consider seriously other points of view than one’s own (dialogical thinking)
b) Reason from premises with which one disagrees – without letting the
disagreement interfere with one’s reasoning (suppositional thinking)
c) Withhold judgment when the evidence and reasons are insufficient
10. Take a position (and change a position) when the evidence and reasons are sufficient to do so
11. Seek as much precision as the subject permits
12. Deal in an orderly manner with the parts of a complex whole
13. Use one’s critical thinking abilities
14. Be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of sophistication
of others
B. Abilities
1. Focusing on a question
a) Identifying or formulating a question
b) Identifying or formulating criteria for judging possible answers
c) Keeping the situation in mind
2. Analyzing arguments
a) Identifying conclusions
b) Identifying stated reasons
c) Identifying unstated reasons
d) Seeing similarities and differences
e) Identifying and handling irrelevance
f) Seeing the structure of an argument
g) Summarizing
3. Asking and answering questions of clarification and/or challenge, for
example:
a) Why?
b) What is your main point?
c) What do you mean by “ “?
d) What would be an example?
e) What would not be an example (though close to being one)?
f) How does that apply to this case (describe a counterexample)?
g) What difference does it make?
h) What are the facts?
i) Is this what you are saying: “ “?
j) Would you say some more about that?
4. Judging the credibility of a source
a) Expertise
b) Lack of conflict of interest
c) Agreement among sources
d) Reputation
e) Use of established procedures
 328 
 
f) Known risk to reputation
g) Ability to give reasons
h) Careful habits
5. Observing and judging observation reports; criteria:
a) Minimal inferring involved
b) Short time interval between observation and report
c) Report by observer, rather than someone else (i.e. not hearsay)
d) Records are generally desirable; if report is based on a record, it is generally best that
1. The record was close in time to the observation
2. The record was made by the observer
3. The record was made by the reporter
4. The statement was believed by the reporter, either because of a prior belief
in its correctness or because of a belief that the observer was habitually
correct
e) Corroboration
f) Possibility of corroboration
g) Conditions of good access
h) Competent employment of technology, if technology is useful
i) Satisfaction by observer (and reporter, if a different person) of credibility criteria
(item B4)
6. Deducing and judging deductions
a) Class logic
b) Conditional logic
c) Interpretation of statements
1. Double negation
2. Necessary and sufficient conditions
3. Other logical words and phrases: only, if and only if, or, some, unless, not, not
both, etc.
7. Inducing and judging inductions
a) Generalizing
1. Typicality of data
2. Limitation of coverage
3. sampling
b) Inferring explanatory conclusions and hypotheses
1. Types of explanatory conclusions and hypotheses
a) Causal claims
b) Claims about the beliefs and attitudes of people
c) Interpretations of authors’ intended meanings
d) Historical claims that certain things happened
e) Reported definitions
f) Claims that something is an unstated reason or unstated conclusion
2. Investigating
a) Designing experiments, including planning to control variables
b) Seeking evidence and counterevidence
c) Seeking other possible explanations
3. Criteria: Given reasonable assumptions
a) The proposed conclusion would explain the evidence (essential)
b) The proposed conclusion is consistent with known facts (essential)
c) Competitive alternative conclusions are inconsistent with known facts
(essential)
d) The proposed conclusion seems plausible (desirable)
8. Making value judgments
a) Background facts
b) Consequences
c) Prima facie application of acceptable principles
d) Considering alternatives
 329 
 
e) Balancing, weighing, and deciding
9. Defining terms, and judging definitions in three dimensions
a) Form
1. Synonym
2. Classification
3. Range
4. Equivalent expression
5. Operational
6. Example – nonexample
b) Definitional strategy
1. Acts
a) Report a meaning (reported definition)
b) Stipulate a meaning (stipulative definition)
c) Express a position on an issue (positional, including
programmatic and persuasive definition)
2. Identifying and handling equivocation
a) Attention to the context
b) Possible types of response
1. The simplest response: “The definition is just
wrong.”
2. Reduction to absurdity: “According to that
definition, there is an outlandish result.”
3. Considering alternative interpretations: “On this
interpretation, there is this problem; on that
interpretation there is that problem.”
4. Establishing that there are two meanings of key
term and a shift in meaning from one to other
5. Swallowing the idiosyncratic definition
c) Content
10. Identifying assumptions
a) Unstated reasons
b) Needed assumptions; argument reconstruction
11. Deciding on an action
a) Define the problem
b) Select criteria to judge possible solutions
c) Formulate alternative solutions
d) Tentatively decide what to do
e) Review, taking into account the total situation, and decide
f) Monitor the implication
12. Interacting with others
a) Employing and reacting to fallacy labels (list not given here)
b) Logical strategies
c) Rhetorical strategies
d) Argumentation; Presenting a position, oral or written
1. Aiming at a particular audience and keeping it in mind
2. Organizing (common type: main point; clarification; reasons; alternatives;
attempt to rebut prospective challenges; summary, including repeat of
main point)

“This is only an overall content outline. It does not incorporate suggestions for level, sequence, repetition in
greater depth, emphasis, or infusion in subject matter area (which might be either exclusive or overlapping).”

Ennis, R.H. (1987). A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions and abilities. In J. Baron & R. Sternberg
(Eds.), Teaching Thinking Skills: Theory and Practice (pp. 9-26). New York: W.H. Freeman.  

 
 330 
 

Appendix 2: Richard Paul: 35 Dimensions of Critical Thought

A. Affective Strategies

• thinking independently
• developing insight into egocentricity or sociocentricity
• exercising fairmindedness
• exploring thoughts underlying feelings and feelings underlying thoughts
• developing intellectual humility and suspending judgment
• developing intellectual courage
• developing intellectual good faith or integrity
• developing intellectual perseverance
• developing confidence in reason

B. Cognitive Strategies - Macro-Abilities

• refining generalizations and avoiding oversimplifications

• comparing analogous situations: transferring insights to new contexts
• developing one’s perspective: creating or exploring beliefs,
arguments, or theories
• clarifying issues, conclusions, or beliefs
• clarifying and analyzing the meanings of words or phrases
• developing criteria for evaluation: clarifying values and standards
• evaluating the credibility of sources of information
• questioning deeply: raising and pursuing root or significant questions
• analyzing or evaluating arguments, interpretations, beliefs, or theories
• generating or assessing solutions
• analyzing or evaluating actions or policies
• reading critically: clarifying or critiquing texts
• listening critically: the art of silent dialogue
• making interdisciplinary connections
• practicing Socratic discussion: clarifying and questioning beliefs, theories, or
perspectives
• reasoning dialogically: comparing perspectives, interpretations, or theories
• reasoning dialectically: evaluating perspectives, interpretations, or theories

C. Cognitive Strategies - Micro-Skills

• comparing and contrasting ideals with actual practice

• thinking precisely about thinking: using critical vocabulary
• noting significant similarities and differences
• examining or evaluating assumptions
• distinguishing relevant from irrelevant facts
• making plausible inferences, predictions, or interpretations
• giving reasons and evaluating evidence and alleged facts
• recognizing contradictions
• exploring implications and consequences

Foundation for Critical Thinking (1995). 35 Dimensions of Critical Thought. Dillon Beach:
Foundation for Critical Thinking.
 331 
 

                                                            
End Notes
1
 Walters, Kerry S. “Introduction: Beyond Logicism in Critical Thinking.” Re‐Thinking Reason: New 
Perspectives in Critical Thinking. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1993, 3; The original report 
was produced by the National Assessment of Educational Progress. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reforms. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1983.   
2
 In addition to Paul’s article in the fifteenth annual conference proceedings, Kerry S. Walters unpacks the 
differences between the first and second waves the book Re‐thinking Reason: New Perspectives in Critical 
Thinking. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1994. 1‐22.  
3
 Although Bacon’s contributions to the establishment of the scientific method are also a significant 
contribution to critical thinking especially as a practical approach to discovery of knowledge, this 
treatment of Bacon focuses on the fallible nature of human thinking.  An analysis of Bacon’s contribution 
to the establishment of the scientific method is well beyond the scope of this chapter and will not 
significantly augment the chapter’s argument.  
4
 The purpose of this section is to explore the conceptual commonalities between various definitions of 
critical thinking, while the differences between various approaches to critical thinking instruction will be 
the focus of chapter four.  
5
 Hare credits Douglas J Soccio’s introduction to philosophy book for the definition of critical thinking, 
How to Get the Most Out of Philosophy. Belmont: Wadsworth. 1992. 37. 
6
 In his book and all subsequent editions, Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a 
Rapidly Changing World, Richard Paul explicates and emphasizes the important role of indentifying and 
understanding the background logic of any problem, issue, topic, emotion, thought, etc. as a fundamental 
aspect of what it means to think critically.  Furthermore, the concept of background knowledge is very 
close to the almost universal claim that to think critically involves clearly identifying and understanding 
one’s assumptions of which background knowledge can be one significant part.  
7
 There are three primary perspectives of domain‐specific approaches to critical thinking instruction 
within the discourse on critical thinking.  The first group consists of those who explicitly advocate critical 
thinking instruction as defined by the thinking within specific academic domains.  This position maintains 
that there are no general critical thinking abilities, only abilities that are a result of domain‐specific 
thought and methods.  John McPeck and E.D. Hirsch are the most visible proponents of this position.  
Secondly, there are those that limit their analyses of critical thinking to specific domains, but often make 
sweeping statements that their field represents what it means to think critically.  Critical thinking 
conceived as formal and informal logic is one such group.  Irene Yuen Yee Fung makes an excellent 
summary and analysis of the inadequacies of conceiving critical thinking as formal and/or informal logic in 
her dissertation entitled Collaborative Reasoning: Critical Thinking Based Learning and Instruction.  
Thirdly, there are those instructors who are ignorant of the discourse on critical thinking, but are critiqued 
for maintaining traditional didactic teaching practices that perpetuate intellectual fragmentation among 
students.  This group is represented by the average instructor who claims critical thinking is an important 
part of his/her instruction, but does not participate in the general discourse.  I assume the existence of 
general concepts and skills characteristic of critical thought.  This assumption is well founded.  I do not 
engage the debate between “specialized” and “generalized” conceptions of critical thinking because the 
 332 
 

                                                                                                                                                                                 
majority of scholars agree it that general critical thinking concepts and skills exist, but must be developed 
through intellectual engagement within specific contexts and the thinking characteristic of a particular 
domain.  I believe a larger problem quietly dominates critical thinking instruction, and that problem is 
defined by a laissez‐faire reliance on the mere exposure to courses to sufficiently develop students’ 
abilities to think and behave critically.   
8
 The problem of poor knowledge as to that which constitutes critical thought is discussed in chapter one 
drawn from the research by the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing.   

9
 For a developed argument of these problems, see Clark Kerr’s lecture series entitled The Uses of the 
University. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1972.  
 
10
 See Appendix 314 
11
 Paul, Binker, Martin, and Adamson, 2008; Paul, Binker, and Weil, 1995; Paul and Elder, 2nd Ed. 2006: 
Paul, 4th ed 1995, outlines an earlier version of the “35 Dimensions of Critical Thought.”  Like Ennis, Paul’s 
work evolved, but its focus and conceptual essence remained consistent with later versions.   
12
 See Appendix 317 for the complete list.  
13
 Paul, Richard, et al. Critical Thinking Handbook Series [k‐3, 4‐6, 6‐9, High School]. Santa Rosa: 
Foundation for Critical Thinking. 1995, 2008.  

14
 Paul, Richard. Critical Thinking: How to Prepare Students for a Rapidly Changing World. 4th ed. Santa 
Rosa: Foundation for Critical Thinking. 1995.  The roots of Paul’s critique of conceptions of critical thinking 
that are limited to highly specialized domains are first present in his dissertation critiquing formal logic as 
a way of educating students to develop deep insight into their thinking, behaviors and lives.   
 
15
 See discussion in Chapter 1. Pages 64‐71. 

16
 Paul (1995), Paul, Binker and Weil (1995), and Paul and Elder (2004) outline the theoretical relationship 
between critical and creative thinking. The analyses in these works are illuminating in that they challenge 
the “common misunderstanding” (Paul and Elder, 2004, p. 3) that critical thinking and creative thinking 
are fundamentally different and mutually exclusive.  Paul and Elder argue that the misconception is 
largely due to specialized interpretations of critical thinking as limited to Western notions of analytical 
philosophy. Approached holistically and conceptually, according to Paul and Elder (2004), the concepts 
are closely related and have significant pedagogical implications. 
  Using a range of dictionaries for the root of their analysis, Paul and Elder (2004) point out that 
creativity is a process by which people produce an intellectual and/or tangible product, and criticality is 
the process by which people apply standards to assess the quality of a product.  They conclude that 
“When engaged in high‐quality thought, the mind must simultaneously produce and assess, both 
generate and judge the products it fabricates.  In short, sound thinking requires both imagination and 
intellectual standards” (p. 4).  When applied to teaching and learning, according to Paul and Elder (2004), 
instructors should help students understand the intimate relationship between critical and creative 
thought, namely, that criticality without creativity is mere cynicism, void of useful ideas for improvement.  
Creativity without criticality is mere novelty.  The creation of useful ideas and practical innovations 
requires a marriage between criticality and creativity. 
  Throughout his work, Paul argues for the importance of creativity in critical thought.  Paul, Binker and 
Weil (1995) point out that imagination can take many forms; brainstorming, personal expressions, artistic 
 333 
 

                                                                                                                                                                                 
projects, papers, role play, etc. Whenever an assessment is an integral part of any academic task, 
assessment standards must be present.  Critical and creative thought are thus fused when one measures 
the quality (applicability, relevance, depth, breadth, appropriateness, validity, consistency, or accuracy) of 
a project.  Paul, Binker and Weil (1995) write, “Whenever we think about abstract meanings, whenever 
we try to understand or assess a statement or belief, whenever we attempt to predict a consequence, or 
determine the implications of an action, we need to use our imaginations effectively” (p. 35).  Instructors 
should challenge their students to focus their imaginations by creating applicable, clear and accurate 
examples, explore implications, look for alternatives, synthesize insights between concepts and content, 
between content ideas and personal experience (Paul, Binker, & Weil, 1995, p. 36).  In short, there is a 
rich and extensive discourse on the relationship between critical thinking and creative thinking 
throughout Paul’s work.   
 
17
 Corrinne Bedecarre receives credit for the identification of Brookfield’s article and the assessment of his 
response to discipline specific critiques. Although Bedecarre cites similar quotes from Brookfield’s article, 
her inclusion ultimately served a different purpose in her dissertation.  Nonetheless, she deserves 
acknowledgement for its inclusion in this dissertation.  Brookfield’s work cited here was taken from the 
primary source.   
18
 See Appendix 2.  
19
 Paul and numerous colleagues produced a set of four handbooks for grades K‐3, 4‐6, 6‐9, and 9‐12 
respectively.  Each handbook defined critical thinking and its role in instruction and remodeled lesson 
plans for each grade in the disciplines of language arts, social studies and science.  The handbooks were 
originally published between 1991 and 1995.   
20
 It should be noted that Fung posits a second critique of the Paul et al. remodeled lesson plans.  She 
argues that Paul and his colleagues do not provide statistical evidence that the remodeled lessons actually 
change student thinking for the better.  Such evidence, she argues, is needed to convince teachers that it 
is worth the intellectual investment needed to assess and redesign their curriculum and instruction; 
evidence she argues her CR‐CT program does provide.  I believe that this point of critique is short cited in 
that Fung does not fully grasp the conceptual nature of Paul’s work, but interprets procedurally which it is 
not.  Paul and colleagues would respond arguing that (1) the lessons are suggestions, and that (2) one 
merely needs to contrast the original lessons with the remodeled lessons to see the superiority of the 
later in terms of facilitating student centered learning environments that promote critical thinking. 
21
 A complete list of the nine assessment tools can be viewed on the foundation for critical thinking 
website: http://www.criticalthinking.org/resources/assessment/index.cfm