Sabrimala 31 Moots Memorial

TEAM CODE: P-31
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF:
CR. APP. NO. – 1028 OF 2018
CBI APPELLANT
KALICHARAN DEFENDANT
(UNDER ARTICLE 134 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
CLUBBED WITH
CP. NO. – 111 OF 2018

KALICHARAN PETITIONER
STATE RESPONDENT
(UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT`

CNLU GENERAL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... ix
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .....................................................................................................xii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... xiii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................... 1
I. That the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner is maintainable. ................................... 1
II. That the accused are guilty of abduction and murder of Reema and Riya, and the High
Court of Arya Pradesh erred in acquitting them. ................................................................... 2
II.A. The Accused Are Guilty Of Offences Under Sec. 364 and 120B Read With Sec. 34
Of IPC ................................................................................................................................ 2
II.A.1. Common intention was established .................................................................... 3
II.B. The Accused Are Guilty Of Offences Under Sec. 302 Read With Sec. 34 Of IPC .. 4
II.B.1. Intention evident from the previous threat to deceased ...................................... 5
II.B.2. The accused had mens rea i.e. intention to kill the deceased ............................. 6
II.B.3. Motive and preparation to commit offence is clear from the lodging of false
FIR of theft of the vehicle used for offence ................................................................... 7
II.B.4. The statement of the witnesses establishes mens rea and actus reus of murder . 8
II.B.5. The Post-Mortem Report and Forensic Report are evidences of actus reus of
murder .......................................................................................................................... 10
II.B.6. The conduct of the accused proves actus reus of murder ................................. 11
II.B.7. Circumstantial evidence is established ............................................................. 11
III. That all accused are guilty for committing rape of Riya. .......................................... 15
III.A. There is medical evidence of rape.......................................................................... 15
i
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
III.B. Actus reus is established as it was against her will ................................................ 15
III.C. There was absence of consent ................................................................................ 16
IV. That the Curative Petition filed by the Petitioner is not maintainable ...................... 17
V. That prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara
Temple is violative of the Fundamental Rights enshrined under the Constitution of Indiana,
and the claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in religious text,
is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and Equality. ..................... 19
V.A. Prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara
Temple is violative of the Fundamental Rights enshrined under the Constitution of
Indiana.............................................................................................................................. 19
V.B. The exclusionary practice which is based upon a biological factor exclusive to the
female gender amounts to "discrimination" and thereby violates the very core of Articles
14, 15 and 17 and not protected by 'morality' as used in Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution ...................................................................................................................... 19
V.B.1. Prohibiting women to enter the Temple is not “essence” of the Hindu religion
...................................................................................................................................... 20
V.B.2. Women have the Right to Equality .................................................................. 20
V.B.3. The exclusionary practice pertaining to women is violative of Art. 21 of the

Constitution .................................................................................................................. 21
V.B.4. Followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination ......... 21
V.C. Enforceability of Fundamental Rights Under Article 25(1) against the Lord
Jogeshwara Temple (Prohibition on Entry of Women) Act, 1985 and the Lord
Jogeshwara Trust ............................................................................................................. 22
V.C.1. Women have Right to Freedom of Religion under Art. 25 of the Constitution
...................................................................................................................................... 22
V.C.2. Exclusionary practice is not an essential practice as per Hindu religion ......... 24
V.C.3. The claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in
religious text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and
Equality ........................................................................................................................ 26
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 28
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
The Constitution of India, 1950
Acts and Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Indian Evidence Act, 1892
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Cases
Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260...........................................................................2
Anant v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500.........................................................................12
Bakshish Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016...........................................................12
Balkar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, Cr. App. No.-206 of 2007 (SC).....................................6
Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, AIR 2002 SC 3164........................................................................12
Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and anr., (2004)
12 SCC 770........................................................................................................................23, 25
Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 133........................................................20
Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., 1994 SCC (2) 220.....................................................12
Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Ors. v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1402........25
Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, (1962) 1 SCR 383.......................................20
E. K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066......................................................3
Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, (1904) AC 515............................................................25
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343.....................................................13
Haughton v. Smith, (1973) 3 All ER 110.................................................................................11
Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. The State of Kerala and Ors., (2006) SCC
373......................................................................................................................................23, 24
iii
John Vallamattom and Anr. v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611..........................................24
Joshi v. Ajit Mills Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 2279...............................................................................8
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1...................21
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883..........................................10
Khacharu Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 546..................................................................3
Krishenlal v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1252...................................................................................16
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413...........................................3
Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430.............................13
Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1995 SC 1387...............................................................12
Laxman v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1974 SC 1803..................................................................6
M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1963 SC 200........................................................12
Mahmood v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 69...........................................................................12
Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1....................................................................21
Maqsoodan v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126.........................................................................4
Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1175.....................................................................8
Nallor Marthandam Vellalar and Ors. v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowment and Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 712...............................................................................22
Nar Hari Shastri and Ors. v. Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, AIR 1952 SC 245..............23
Nar Singh And Another vs The State Of U.P., 1954 AIR 457...................................................1
Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1974 SC 691..................................................11
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 438.................21
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1990 SC 79...........................................................13
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216................................................................3
iv
Parichhat v. State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 535............................................................................3
Prakash v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1474.............................................................13
Premiya v. State of Rajasthan, 2008 (4) RCR (Criminal) 539.................................................15
Prithi Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1989 SC 702...............................................11
Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555............................................................3
Ravindra Shantaram Sawant v. State of Maharashtra, Cr. App. No.- 230 of 1997..................10
Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. State, AIR 1951 SC 204.................................................................8
Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (1977) 1 SCC 677.............................23
Risideo Pande v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 331.....................................................................3
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388...........................................................17
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others, (1983) 1 SCC 51.....................................................21
Sachin Jana And Anr v. State Of West Bengal, Cr. App. No.-176 of 2008 (SC)......................7
Santosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 654...........................................................6
Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1956 SC 54................................................................4
Sharad Birdhich and Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622..........................11, 13
Siddheswar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1958 SC 143..........................................................16
Son Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 1142..............................................................5
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gangula, (1997) 1 SCC 272, 278-279..........................................16
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Digvijay Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1740..............................................8
State of Maharashtra v Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722...............................................8
State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1471..................................................................8
State of Punjab v. Mann Singh, AIR 1983 SC 172....................................................................3
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840.................................................11
v
State of U.P. v. Ballabh Das and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1384.....................................................11
State of U.P. v. Dr. R.P. Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045................................................................12
State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan, AIR 1973 SC 863......................................................................3
State of U.P. v. Pussu @ Ram Kishore, AIR 1983 SC 867.......................................................1
State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418....................................................11
Subedar v. State of UP, AIR 1971 SC 125.................................................................................1
Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502, 511......................................................12
Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 1388..................................................................3
Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 560............................................................15
The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha

Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954] SCR 1005................................................................20, 22
Union of India (UOI) v. Namit Sharma, MANU/SC/0902/2013.............................................18
Vinita Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh SLP(CRL) NO. 9858/2013..........................................13
Virendra Singh v. State of M.P., Cr. App. No.- 1316 of 2002 (SC)..........................................7
Vithal Tukaram More v. State of Maharashtra, Cr. App. No.- 801 of 2001 (SC)....................12
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., MANU/SC/0825/2015........17
Books
JUSTICE SR ROY AND SP SEN GUPTA, CRIMINAL MAJOR ACTS (Kamal Law House), 10th ed.
KD GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE (Lexis Nexis), 6th ed.
P RAMANATHA AIYAR, THE LAW LEXICON (Lexis Nexis), 2nd ed.
RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Lexis Nexis), 20th ed.
RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (Lexis Nexis), 34th ed.
vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
All ER All England Law Reports (United Kingdom)
Anr. Another
AP Arya Pradesh
Art. Article
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
Cr.L.J. Criminal Law Journal
FIR First Information Report
FR Fundamental Rights
Govt. Government
Govt. Government
HC High Court
i.e. That is
Ors. Others
p Page
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Sec. Section
v. Verses
vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018
The counsel representing the appellant herein, CBI, have endorsed their pleadings before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana under Article 134 of the Constitution of India in which
the Hon`ble Court has the appellate jurisdiction in regard to criminal matters.
CP No. 111 of 2018
The counsel representing the respondent herein, State, have endorsed their pleadings before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana under Article 137 of the Constitution of India in which
the Hon`ble Court has the power to review of judgments or orders by the SC.
viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indiana is a country with various religious beliefs. Constitution of Indian protects

matters of religious belief. In the state Arya Pradesh, 80% people residing are disciples of
Lord Jogeshwara, whose temple is situated in Katra. Pt. Ram Kishan was the pontiff in Lord
Jogeshwara’s temple. The deity is in the form of Nasthik Bramhachari it is therefore believed
that young women between the age of 11 to 51 years should not offer worship in the temple
so that even the slightest deviation from celibacy and austerity observed by the deity is not
caused by the presence of such women.
2. The parliament of Indiana enacted the Lord Jogeshwara Temple (Prohibition on Entry
of Women) Act in 1985 regarding prohibition of the entry of women at Lord Jogeshwara
temple. The said Act was enforced till 2016 as the said resolution of Upper House was
renewed many times till 2016.
3. In 2013, Pt. Ram Kishan died and Pt. Kali Charan, a person of influential character,
was appointed as the new pontiff. Later, he appointed his two sons, Bhanu and Kalu, as
priests in the Temple. On 24.04.2013, Pt. Kali Charan, made a divulgation that women are
not only prohibited to enter in the temple for offering prayers but they are also not allowed to
go to any other land which belongs to Jogeshwara Akhara which was welcomed by majority
of people in Katra.
4. Reema and Riya, the two daughters of Pt. Ram Kishan, along with some other women
of Katra registered an NGO ‘Kadam Ek Pahal’. On 01.05.2013, the sisters filed a PIL before
the Hon’ble SC of Indiana seeking issuance of direction against the Government of AP, Lord
Jogeshwara Trust and District Magistrate of Katra to ensure entry of female devotees
between the age group of 11 to 51 years to Lord Jogeshwara Temple which had been denied
to them on the basis of Lord Jogeshwara Temple (Prohibition on Entry of Women) Act 1985,
customs and usages as unconstitutional being violative of fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution of Indiana and further to pass directions for the safety of women
pilgrims.
5. On 23.12.2016, the Hon’ble SC of Indiana pronounced judgment with 2:1 majority
allowing the petition filed by KADAM and held that “every place of worship shall be open to
all classes and sections of people, women being one of them, irrespective of any custom or
usage to the contrary.” The Court further held that “the practice of prohibiting women of
ix
particular age group to enter in Lord Jogeshwara Temple is violative of Fundamental Rights
enshrined in the Constitution of Indiana.”
6. On 24.12.2016, after receiving a copy of judgment, Reema and Riya with some other
women tried to enter the Temple. On the way, they were stopped by protesters who were
shouting that ‘IF ANY WOMEN WILL STEP INTO THE TEMPLE OF LORD
JOGESHWARA SHE WILL FACE DIRE CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR ENTIRE
FAMILY WILL BE KILLED’. They further indicated Reema and Riya and shouted that they
are trying to become leaders and they are the ones who are responsible for the entire chaos
and Lord Jogeshwara will not condone them for this sinful act and they will die and face
atrocities in hell. Pt. Kali Charan had blocked the gate of the temple with his two sons Bhanu
and Kalu. He directed the other priests Bhawani and Jagga to bring lathis from the temple for
teaching a life lesson to the women, particularly Reema and Riya, who were trying to enter in
the temple and committing a disgraceful and ignominious act.
7. On 30.12.2016 at around 1:00 a.m., Mrs. Radha (mother of the deceased) informed
the police that her daughters have not arrived home and requested police to lodge a missing
complaint. The police denied to lodge FIR but started searching the deceased.
8. While patrolling, the police discovered a suspicious SUV in an abandoned jungle,
near Mohini Bazar. At around 5:30 a.m., Pt. Kali Charan called the police and informed about
a dead body lying near the Sanctum Sanctorum of Lord Jogeshwara temple. Mrs. Radha
identified the body as that of Reema. Then the police lodged FIR against Pt. Kali Charan,
Bhanu, Kalu, Bhawani, and Jagga. The police arrested Pt. Kali Charan and his sons from the
temple but Bhawani and Jagga were missing. The police discovered a dead body from the
jungle near Mohini Bazar on 31.12.2016 which was later identified as that of Riya.
9. On 30.12.2016, Pt. Jagga lodged an FIR for theft of his white SUV car registered AP
05 XS 8K8K which was used in the commission of the offence.
10. On 05.01.2017, the Government of Indiana ordered CBI inquiry into the incident.
During investigation, CBI recovered 3 Daraatis and 2 Lathis. Meanwhile, CBI arrested
Bhawani from his relative’s house outside Katra.
11. The post-mortem report of Reema states the cause of death was slit throat,
multifarious stabbing wounds, battering of face and Intracranial Hematoma. And the post-
mortem report of Riya states that the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of manual
strangulation which is homicidal in nature. The hymen was found to be torn. The nature of
vaginal injuries suggests forceful penetration by more than two persons.
x
12. There are five witnesses PW-1 Mrs. Radha Kishan, PW-2 Mrs. Savita, PW-3 Mr.
Krishan Das, PW-4 Mr. Uday Shetty and PW-5 Mr. Shyam Sundar.
13. The matter was tried by CBI Court and the Court found all the accused guilty of
abduction and murder of Reema, and also for rape of Riya and sentenced them to death. The
accused filed an appeal to the HC of AP, which reversed the order of the Trial Court and
acquitted all the accused. An appeal against the order of HC was filed in the Hon’ble SC as
Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018. After acquittal Pt. Kali Charan filed a Curative Petition in the
name of Lord Jogeshwara Trust against the order of SC passed in year 2016 allowing entry of
women into Lord Jogeshwara Temple as CP. No. 111 of 2018.
xi
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(I)
Whether the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner is maintainable.
(II)
Whether the accused are guilty of abduction and murder of Reema and Riya, and the
High Court of Arya Pradesh erred in acquitting them.
(III)
Whether all accused are guilty for committing rape of Riya.
(IV)
Whether the curative petition is not maintainable.
(V)
Whether prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara
Indiana, and the claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in
relihious text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and
Equality.
xii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
(I) That the Criminal appeal filed by the appellant is maintainable.
The special leave petition filed by the CBI is maintainable in the Supreme Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Article 136 of the Constitution of India is the
residuary power of SC to do justice where the court is satisfied that there is injustice. The
chain of circumstantial evidence is complete as to regarding the point of the guilt of accused
and HC acquitted the accused. Therefore, there has been a grave injustice. The jurisdiction of
SC can always be invoked when a question of law of general public importance arises. In the
present case, the impugned decision was mechanically passed by the HC. And hence, the
judgment is incorrect. Article 136 uses the wording ‘in any cause or matter’. This gives
widest power to this court to deal with any cause or matter, even if it involves question of
fact. Therefore, the present petition is maintainable in the SC.
(II) That the accused are guilty of abduction and murder of Reema and Riya, and the
High Court of Arya Pradesh erred in acquitting them.
The accused are guilty of abduction under sec. 364 and murder under sec. 302 with Sec 34
IPC. In the present case, the deceased were abducted and then murdered by the accused.
There was criminal conspiracy to commit the offence. Therefore, the accused are guilty for
the offences of sec. 364 and 302 IPC read with sec 34 of IPC.
(III) That all accused are guilty for committing rape of Riya.
The accused are guilty for committing rape of Riya under sec. 376D IPC. The deceased was
brutally rape by the five accused and then was killed by them. The post-mortem report proves
the gang rape.
(IV) That the curative petition is not maintainable.
The Curative Petition filed by the petitioner does not fulfil the grounds to file the Curative
Petition. Therefore, the curative petition is not maintainable.
(V) That prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara
Indiana, and the claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded
xiii
in relihious text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and

Equality.
Prohibiting women from entering the Temple is violative of Fundamental rights. The
exclusionary practice based upon a biological factor amounts to discrimination and violates
Art. 14, 15 and 17 of the Constitution. Prohibiting women to enter the Temple is not essence
of Hindu religion. Therefore, women should be allowed to enter the Temple.
xiv
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. THAT THE CRIMINAL APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS MAINTAINABLE.
1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the decision of the HC to acquit
the accused and set aside the conviction is unjustifiable. Therefore, the appellant has filed a
criminal appeal under Art. 134 of the Constitution before the Hon’ble Court for justice.
2. This Court has general powers of judicial superintendence over all Courts in India and
is the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution. It has a duty to see that its
provisions are faithfully observed and, where necessary, to expound them.1
3. There was miscarriage of justice by the order of acquittal of the accused by the HC.
4. Miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from
conviction of the innocent; although ordinarily SC should not interfere with the judgements
of acquittal of a mere appreciation of evidence, but if there are glaring infirmities in the
judgement of HC resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice, it is the duty of SC to interfere. 2
5. When the judgement has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by some
misapprehension or mistake in the reading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence then
the SC is not only empowered but is expected to interfere to promote case of justice.3
6. The appellant humbly submits that there is a miscarriage of justice with the deceased.
Both Reema and Riya were brutally murdered and Riya was gruesomely raped by the
accused. There is miscarriage of justice by the HC, therefore the appellant submits that the
accused should be punished for the offence of murder and rape.
1
Nar Singh And Another v. The State Of U.P., 1954 AIR 457.
2
State of U.P. v. Pussu @ Ram Kishore, AIR 1983 SC 867.
3
Subedar v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 125.
1
II. THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF ABDUCTION AND MURDER OF REEMA AND
RIYA, AND THE HIGH COURT OF ARYA PRADESH ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM.
7. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the decision of the HC to acquit
the accused and set aside conviction is unjustifiable. Firstly, the accused Pt. Kali Charan, Pt.
Bhanu, Pt. Kalu, Pt. Bhawani and Pt. Jagga are guilty of offences charged under sec. 364 and
sec. 120B read with sec. 34 of IPC [A] & sec. 302 read with sec. 34 of IPC [B]. And the
chain of circumstantial evidence is clearly established and there exist a reasonable doubt.
Hence, they should be convicted.
8. The Appellants humbly contends that both, the actus reus & the mens rea of the crime
are established in the instant matter. Actus reus is any wrongful act.4 Thus, in a case of
murder, actus reus would be the physical conduct of the accused that causes death of the
victim. In the instant case, the actus reus is established by way of witness statements, forensic
report and conduct of accused.
II.A. THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCES UNDER SEC. 364 AND 120B READ WITH
SEC. 34 OF IPC
9. Sec. 120B provides for the punishment for the crime of criminal conspiracy. As per
sec.120A of the IPC, two or more people are guilty of criminal conspiracy when they agree to
do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The provisions do not require that each and
every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some overt act towards the fulfilment
of the object of conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement between the
conspirators to commit the crime and if these requirements and ingredients are established,
the act would fall within the trapping of the provisions contained in sec. 120B.5
10. It is not necessary that there should be an express proof of the agreement for from the
facts and conduct of the parties, the agreement can be inferred.6 It is not even necessary to
establish by direct evidence that the accused person did enter into such an agreement. 7 It is
generally a matter of inference deduced from certain special acts of the accused, done in
pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them.8 The evidence of
4
AIYAR, P RAMANATHA, THE LAW LEXICON 49 (Lexis Nexis), 2nd ed.
5
KD GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE 303 (Lexis Nexis), 6th ed.
6
RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 466, (Lexis Nexis), 34th ed.
7
Ibid.
8
Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260.
2
transition of thoughts and the sharing of the unlawful design need only be proved. 9 In the
present case, the deceased were protesting against Pt. Kali Charan and other priests of the
Temple to implement the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 23.12.2016 (KADAM EK
PAHAL v. Union of Indiana). The accused were against the aforesaid judgment of the
Hon’ble SC. As per the statement of PW-2, Mrs. Savita, W/o Pt. Bhawani (accused no.-4),
her husband after coming back to home on 29.12.2016 at around 3:00 p.m. told her that a
sinful act had been committed by him and God will never forgive him for that act, which he
had committed because Pt. Kali Charan had brain-washed him and instigated him by saying
wrong things about the sisters. It makes it clear that there was criminal conspiracy for the
abduction and murder of the deceased as there was transition of thoughts.
II.A.1. Common intention was established

11. It is not necessary to prove an overt act by a particular person in order to convict the
person. Criminal act done by all or one of them in furtherance of the common intention of all
would suffice to convict all the people.10
12. Sec 34. Is not attracted unless, first, it is established that a crime has been committed
by several persons, second, that there was a common intention and pre-arranged plan to
commit an offence, and, third, that there was a participation in the commission of the offence
in furtherance of that common intension.11 Accepting the legal position that common
intention may develop at the spot the Hon’ble SC held; “Common Intention” under sec. 34
presupposes a prior concert that is prior meetings of the minds, such pre-concert can develop
on the spot and without any log interval of time between it and the doing of the act commonly
intended.12
13. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act in point of
13
time. Therefore, there need be a prior plan to commit a crime. This pre-arranged plan
14
however need not be an elaborative one. A mere existence of a pre-arranged plan that the
offence be conducted is enough to satisfy this element. In most circumstances, proof on
common intention has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances
9
E. K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066.
10
State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan, AIR 1973 SC 863; Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 1388; State of
Punjab v. Mann Singh, AIR 1983 SC 172.
11
Parichhat v. State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 535.
12
Risideo Pande v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 331; Khacharu Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 546;
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413.
13
Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555.
14
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216.
3
of the case at hand.15 The statement of the accused no. 4, Pt. Bhawani to his wife PW-2 states
that there was common intention.
14. The evidence on record showed that all the accused participated in commission of
offence in one or the other way along with accused who did the principal act. 16 If seen
otherwise also, the number and nature of injuries on the person of victim clearly indicated
that without assistance of the other accused such severe injuries could not be inflicted.17
15. In the present case, PW-3 in his statement has stated that four men were dragging two
girls in the SUV car wearing saffron dhotis. Also, the post-mortem report of Riya clearly
states the presence of more than two persons as in the vaginal examination it was found that
there was forceful penetration by more than two persons. The pre-planning of filing the FIR
for theft of the SUV car bearing registration no. AP 05 XS 8K 8K also shows that there a pre-
arranged plan to abduct the deceased.
II.B. THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCES UNDER SEC. 302 READ WITH SEC. 34 OF
IPC
16. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused are guilty for
committing the offence of murder under Sec. 302 of IPC. Sec. 302 prescribes the punishment
for committing murder. Sec. 300 of IPC elucidates the essentials of murder. Under sec.
300(2), a person is guilty of committing murder if he acts with the intention of causing such
bodily injury which he knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom such
harm is caused. It is the felonious killing of another human being with malice aforethought.18
And to prove murder it is essential that culpable homicide is caused and further it is essential
for the prosecution to prove that the act by which the death is caused –
i. is done with the intention of causing death, or
ii. is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows
to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the offence is caused, or
iii. is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily
injury intended to be inflected is in ordinary course of nature is sufficient to cause
death, or
15
Maqsoodan v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1956 SC 54.
4
iv. is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability cause death or

such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury.
II.B.1. Intention evident from the previous threat to deceased

17. Mens rea is considered as guilty intention which is proved or inferred from the acts of
the accused. Sec. 8 of the Evidence Act stipulates that any fact is relevant which shows or
constitutes motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. Thus, previous threats
or altercations between parties are admitted to show motive.19
18. On 01.05.2013 Reema and Riya, in the name of their registered NGO, filed a PIL
before the Hon’ble SC of Indiana seeking issuance of direction against the Government of
AP, Lord Jogeshwara Trust and District Magistrate of Katra to ensure the entry of female
devotees between the age goup of 11 to 51 years to Lord Jogeshwara Temple at Katra. 20 On
23.12.2016, Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana pronounced judgment with 2:1 majority
allowing the petition filed by the NGO.21 On 24.12.2016, after receiving a copy of judgment,
Reema and Riya with some other women tried to enter Lord Jogeshawara Temple for offering
their prayers.22 While trying to enter the Temple, the protestors were shouting that ‘IF ANY
WOMEN WILL STEP INTO THE TEMPLE OF LORD JOGESHWARA SHE WILL FACE
DIRE CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR ENTIRE FAMILY WILL BE KILLED’. 23 They
further indicated Reema and Riya and shouted that they are trying to become leaders and they
are the ones who are responsible for the entire chaos and Lord Jogeshwara will not condone
them for this sinful act and they will die and face atrocities in hell.24 When the sisters tried to
enter the Temple, Pt. Kali Charan, along with his sons Pt. Bhanu (accused no.-2) and Pt. Kalu
(accused no.-3) blocked the gate of the Temple and directed Pt. Bhawani (accused no.-4) and
Pt. Jagga (accused no.-5) to bring lathis from the temple to teach the deceased a life lesson
for committing a disgraceful and ignominious act.
19. Further, Pt. Kali Charan (accused no.-1) in his statement has stated that the deceased
have been punished by Lord Jogeshwara for their sinful acts and the same will be done
against any other person who will raise voice against the Lord. Pt. Bhawani (accused no.-4)
has stated in his statement that Lord Jogeshwara has punished them. This shows that he is
19
Son Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 1142.
20
Moot Proposition, ¶8.
21
22
23
24
Moot Proposition, ¶10
5
satisfied with the incident that occurred with the deceased. But God himself is not there to
punish. This statement shows that he was in support of what happened with the girls was
good and if any other person will do the same that person will also be punished in the same
way.
20. Therefore, the intention of the accused to kill the deceased is clear from the above
facts.
II.B.2. The accused had mens rea i.e. intention to kill the deceased
21. The accused had the common intention to kill the twin sisters to teach them a life
lesson for entering the Temple which was a disgraceful and ignominious act. Mrs. Savita,
PW-2, in her statement has mentioned that her husband Mr. Bhawani told her that he had
committed a sinful act because Pt. Kali Charan had brain-washed him. Pt. Kali Charan had
the intention to kill the sisters that is why he had brain-washed Pt. Bhawani.
22. Every sane person intends the result that his action normally produces and if a person
hits another on a vulnerable part of the body, and death occurs as a result, the intention of the
accused can be no other than to take the life of the victim and the offence committed amounts
to murder.25 Moreover, the intention to kill is not required in every case, mere knowledge that
natural and probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice for a conviction
under sec. 302 of IPC.26 The intention to kill can be inferred from the murder and nature of
the injuries caused to the victim.27
23. In the present case, as per the post-mortem report, death of Reema was caused by slit
throat, multifarious stabbing wounds, battering of face and intracranial hematoma and death
of Riya was caused by asphyxia as a result of manual strangulation which is homicidal in
nature which comes under the death by doing an act with the intention of causing death. The
nature of injuries as per the post-mortem report of Reema are wounds (injecting scars on left
forearm, deep cut in midline of throat, multifarious stab wounds in chest and stomach),
bruises (multiple bruises marks on neck, left hand, stomach and right leg), permanent
privation of eyes (posturing out of pupil) and fracture/dislocation (mandibular fracture,
multiple fracture on both the arms, intracranial Hematoma). The nature of injuries as per the
post-mortem report of Riya are vaginal injuries (forceful penetration by more than two
persons), nail abrasion marks, bruises marks (on right side of the neck) and strangulation
25
Balkar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, Cr. App. No.-206 of 2007 (SC).
26
Santosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 654.
27
Laxman v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1974 SC 1803.
6
marks of manual nature. The injuries sustained by the deceased makes it clear that the
accused had the intention to kill her.
II.B.3. Motive and preparation to commit offence is clear from the lodging of false FIR
of theft of the vehicle used for offence
24. It is humbly submitted that accused are guilty of offence charged under sec. 302 read
with sec. 34. Sec. 34 elucidates that when a criminal act is done by several persons, in
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if it were done by him alone. Sec. 8 of the Evidence Act stipulates that any
fact is relevant which shows or constitutes motive or preparation for any fact in issue or
relevant fact. It is further pertinent to note that if there is motive in doing an act, then the
adequacy of that motive is not in all cases necessary.
25. This section is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish
between the acts of the individual members of a party or to prove what part was exactly part
was exactly taken by each of them in furtherance of the common intention of all.28 To
constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them was known
to the rest of them & was shared by them.29
26. It is also pertinent to note that sec. 34 is the rule of evidence. Two elements are
required to fulfill the requirements of S. 34. One is that the person must be present on the
scene of occurrence & the second is that there must be a prior concert or a pre-arranged
plan.30 In the present case both requirements are fulfilled. As per the statement of PW-3, Mr.
Krishna Das, at around 11:30 p.m. on 29.12.2016 the accused people were present at the
place of occurrence wearing saffron dhotis. The accused lodged a false FIR regarding theft of
the SUV car bearing registration number AP 05 XS 8K8K on 27.12.2016 and used the same
SUV for the abduction of the deceased on 29.12.2016. Therefore, false FIR for theft of the
SUV car bearing registration no.- AP 05 XS 8K8K shows the pre-arranged planning for
murder.
Arguendo, Absence of motive is irrelevant
27. Assuming for the sake of argument that the accused had no motive, it is humbly
contended that absence of motive is no ground for dismissing the case. Motive is immaterial
28
Sachin Jana And Anr v. State Of West Bengal, Cr. App. No.-176 of 2008 (SC).
29
RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 463, (Lexis Nexis), 34th ed.
30
Virendra Singh v. State of M.P., Cr. App. No.- 1316 of 2002.
7
so far as the offence is concerned, and need not be established31 as the mere existence of
motive is by itself, not an incriminating circumstance and cannot take the place of a proof.32
28. Therefore, absence of proof of motive does not break the link in the chain of
circumstances connecting the accused with the crime, nor militates against the prosecution
case and is not fatal as a matter of law.33 When the circumstantial evidence on record is
sufficient to prove beyond any doubt to prove that it was the accused and no one else, who
intentionally caused the death of the accused then, motive of the crime need not be proved 34,
as in the current case.
II.B.4. The statement of the witnesses establishes mens rea and actus reus of murder
29. It is humbly submitted before this Honourable Court that the testimony of the
witnesses is reliable and enforce the guilt of the accused. There is a presumption that mens
rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient
in every offence.35 Mens rea is considered as guilty intention, which is proved or inferred
from the acts of the accused.36 It is the conduct that constitutes a particular crime. On
01.05.2013 Reema and Riya, in the name of their registered NGO, filed a PIL before the
Hon’ble SC of Indiana seeking issuance of direction against the Government of AP, Lord
Jogeshwara Trust and District Magistrate of Katra to ensure the entry of female devotees
between the age goup of 11 to 51 years to Lord Jogeshwara Temple at Katra. 37 On
23.12.2016, Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana pronounced judgment with 2:1 majority
allowing the petition filed by the NGO.38 On 24.12.2016, after receiving a copy of judgment,
Reema and Riya with some other women tried to enter Lord Jogeshawara Temple for offering
their prayers.39 Mrs. Radha Krishan, PW-1, mother of the deceased, has stated that the priests
were very jealous of her daughter because the both were protesting against the ancient
practice. They were also being threatened by the priests. While trying to enter the Temple, the
protestors were shouting that ‘IF ANY WOMEN WILL STEP INTO THE TEMPLE OF
LORD JOGESHWARA SHE WILL FACE DIRE CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR ENTIRE
31
RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 466 (Lexis Nexis), 33rd ed.
32
State of Punjab v Sucha Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1471.
33
Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1175.
34
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Digvijay Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1740.
35
Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. State, AIR 1951 SC 204; State of Maharashtra v. M. H. George, AIR 1965 SC
722; Joshi v. Ajit Mills Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 2279.
36
State of Maharashtra v Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722
37
38
39
8
FAMILY WILL BE KILLED’.40 They further indicated Reema and Riya and shouted that
they are trying to become leaders and they are the ones who are responsible for the entire
chaos and Lord Jogeshwara will not condone them for this sinful act and they will die and
face atrocities in hell.41 Pt. Kali Charan (accused no.-1), being the supporter of restriction on
entry of women of particular age in the Temple, was against the deceased twin sisters as they
raised question to his belief. He had an intention to teach them a lesson for what they did.
When the sisters tried to enter the Temple, Pt. Kali Charan, along with his sons Pt. Bhanu
(accused no.-2) and Pt. Kalu (accused no.-3) blocked the gate of the Temple and directed Pt.
Bhawani (accused no.-4) and Pt. Jagga (accused no.-5) to bring lathis from the temple to
teach the deceased a life lesson for committing a disgraceful and ignominious act.
30. Mrs. Savita, w/o Bhawani, PW-2, has stated that on the night of 29.12.2016, her
husband Pt Bhawani came home at around 3:00 a.m. When she asked him from where he was
coming from so late at night, he didn’t reply. After continuous questioning, he asked her to
pack the bags and said that they were going somewhere out for few days. When she asked
him the reason for the same, he answered that a sinful act had been committed by him and
God will never forgive him for that act, which he had committed because Pt. Kali Charan had
brain-washed him and instigated him by saying wrong things about the sisters. On the very
next day they went to their relative’s house outside Katra. If there was no offence committed
by Pt. Bhawani (accused no.-4), then why did he decide to go away from his own house. This
clearly shows the commission of offence by him.
31. The fact that Pt. Bhawani was not at his home on 29.12.2016 till 03:00 a.m. is also
evident by the statement of Mr. Shyam Sunder, PW-5, the watchman of the Green Avenue
Colony where the family of Pt. Bhawani resides.
32. Pt. Jagga, s/o Shri Ramesh Chandra Shukla, (accused no. 5) charged an FIR at around
11:45 p.m. on 27.12.2016 in the Disawar Police Station for the theft of his white SUV car
registered AP 05 XS 8K8K. In the FIR he has mentioned that his co-priests Pt. Bhanu and Pt.
Kalu had the duplicate key of his car, but in the FIR he has not mentioned the name of Pt.
Bhanu and Pt. Kalu as the suspected accused. This makes it clear that they had a pre-planning
of this all and to divert the police they had lodged the FIR for the theft of the car.
33. Mr. Krishna Das, PW-3, heard two girls screaming at around 11:30 p.m. on
29.12.2016 when he was walking on the road near Mohini Bazar. He saw four men wearing
saffron dhotis dragging two girls into an SUV car.
40
41
Moot Proposition, ¶10
9
34. Mr. Uday Shetty, PW-4, has stated in his statement that Pt. Kali Charan went away at
around 12 o’clock at night of 29.12.2016.
35. In the CBI Investigation Report the car found at the place of occurrence (jungle, near
Mohini Bazar) where the dead body of Riya was found, had the registration number AP 05
XS 8K8K under the name of Jagga Ram Mohan Shukla (accused no.-4).
36. At around 01:00 a.m. on 30.12.2018, Mrs. Radha Krishan (mother of the deceased)
went to the police station to lodge missing complaint, but they filed the FIR at 07:30 a.m.
after finding the dead body of Reema.
37. On the basis of these facts, on 27.12.2016 the false FIR for the theft of the SUV car
bearing registration no. AP 05 XS 8K8K was lodged and was used on 29.12.2016 for the
abduction of the twin sisters. This proves the actus reus of the accused.
II.B.5. The Post-Mortem Report and Forensic Report are evidences of actus reus of
murder
38. The post mortem report becomes important in cases where the cause of death is to be
established & is a matter of controversy.42 Moreover, it is not possible for the Appellant to
explain each & every injury suffered by the witnesses.43
39. Mr. Krishna Das heard the voice of screaming of two girls on 29.12.2016 at around
11:30 p.m. and the post-mortem report of Reema states that the expected time of her death is
3:00 a.m.-4:00 a.m. on 30.12.2016 and the post-mortem report of Riya states that the
expected time of her death is 29.12.2016 or 30.12.2016. The time as stated by PW-3 and
forensic report are the same.
40. The forensic report states that the two daraatis recovered from the temple premises
were sharp and sufficient in nature to cut a soft object like skin. The cut on the victim’s neck
measuring of 1.5 inches is possible to be caused by the weapons recovered. The third daraati
which was recovered from the house of the Accused no.1 was very blunt in nature.
41. The Lathis which were recovered from the car having blood stains were examined.
The examination reveals that the blood stains found on the lathis matches with those of the
deceased.
42. In the present case, death of Reema was caused by slit throat, multifarious stabbing
wounds, battering of face and intracranial hematoma and death of Riya was caused by
42
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883.
43
Ravindra Shantaram Sawant v. State of Maharashtra, Cr. App. No.- 230 of 1997.
10
asphyxia as a result of manual strangulation which is homicidal in nature which comes under
the death by doing an act with the intention of causing death.
43. It is humbly submitted that as per sec. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, Evidence
includes all documents produced for the inspection of the Court.44 These documents are
admissible in court as expert opinion under sec. 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is
respectfully submitted that the post mortem report submitted by the doctor conducting
autopsy of the dead body is admissible in evidence even without examining the doctor in
court.45 The Apex Court has admitted as evidence and relied on post mortem reports in a
catena of cases.46
II.B.6. The conduct of the accused proves actus reus of murder

44. The word "actus reus" connotes an overt act. This is a physical result of human
conduct, and therefore, an event which is distinguished from the conduct which produced the
result. In a murder case, it is the victim's death which is an event and, therefore, is an actus
reus.47
45. Pt. Bhawani (accused no.-4) was caught from his relative’s house outside Katra in the
state of absconding. If he would not have committed the crime, there was no need to
absconder. On the commission of crime only he fled away from his house as stated by PW-2.
Also, Pr. Bhawani (accused no.-5) has fled away and no evidences were recovered of hi
whereabouts. This shows that they have committed the crime.
II.B.7. Circumstantial evidence is established

46. The circumstantial evidence in a case where there is a link of causation, if established,
proves that the act was committed by the person so accused.48 Bearing in mind that it is not
for the prosecution to meet any and every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever
extravagant and fanciful it might be49, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that
44
"Evidence" means and includes-- (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it
by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all
documents produced for the inspection of the Court; such documents are called documentary evidence.
45
State of U.P. v. Ballabh Das and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1384.
46
State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418; Prithi Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR
1989 SC 702.
47
Haughton vs Smith (1973) 3 All ER 110
48
Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1974 SC 691; Sharad Birdhich and Sarda v.
State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622.
49
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840.
11
the circumstantial evidence in the instant matter shows that within all human probability, the
act must have been done by the accused.50
47. Essential ingredients to prove guilt by circumstantial evidence are:
(1) Circumstances from which conclusion is drawn should be fully proved.
(2) Circumstances should be conclusive.
(3) All facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt and
inconsistent with innocence of the accused.
(4) Circumstances should exclude the possibility of guilt of a person other than the accused.51
48. The SC, in Bodh Raj v. State of J&K52, added one more point to the above four, viz.,
there nust be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused. These conditions being satisfied
circumstantial evidence can be the sole basis for conviction.
49. It is a well-established rule in criminal jurisprudence that circumstantial evidence can
be reasonably made the basis of an accused person’s conviction, if it is of such a character
that it is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his
guilt.53
50. Justice Hidayatullah observed "Circumstantial evidence in this context means a
combination of facts creating a net-work through which there is no escape for the accused,
because the facts taken as a whole do not admit of any inference but of his guilt."54
51. When attempting to convict on circumstantial evidence alone the Court must be
firmly satisfied of the following three things55:
i. The circumstances from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must have
fully been established by unimpeachable evidence beyond a shadow of doubt.
ii. The circumstances are of determinative tendency, unerringly pointing towards the
guilt of the accused.
50
Bakshish Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016.
51
State of U.P. v. Dr. R.P. Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045; Vithal Tukaram More v. State of Maharashtra, Cr. App.
No.- 801 of 2001.
52
Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, AIR 2002 SC 3164; Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., 1994 SCC (2) 220;
Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502, 511.
53
M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1963 SC 200.
54
Anant v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500. Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1995 SC 1387.
55
Mahmood v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 69.
12
iii. The circumstances taken collectively, are incapable of explanation on any

reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt sought to be proved against him.
52. In Prakash v. State of Rajasthan 56, Justice P. Sathasivam has laid down the
following five golden principles of standard of proof required in a case sought to be
established on the basis of circumstantial evidence otherwise said to constitute the panchsheel
of the proof of a cased based on circumstantial evidence:
a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established.57
b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of
the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty.58
c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.59
d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved60, and
e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
53. In the instant matter, all the circumstances relied on by the prosecution is forming a
complete chain and at the same are closely connected with the principal fact i.e., death of the
deceased. The circumstances as illustrated in the facts in record, conceives a complete chain
which would ultimately lead to the inference that the accused had caused the death of the
deceased. Those circumstances are:
a. Threatening the deceased while entering into the Temple on 24.12.2016
b. Lodging false FIR on 27.12.2016 regarding theft of the SUV car used for the offence
c. Abducting the deceased using the same SUV car.
54. In the light of the facts in record of the instant matter, it is humbly submitted that the chain of
circumstances when knitted together, give rise to merely only conclusion that it is the accused
who has committed the murder of the deceased.
55. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that all the incidences cited by
the facts in record, gives birth to a chain of circumstances, which leads to a conclusive proof
56
AIR 2013 SC 1474.
57
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343.
58
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622.
59
Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; Padala Veera Reddy v. State of
A.P., AIR 1990 SC 79.
60
Vinita Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh SLP(CRL) NO. 9858/2013.
13
that the death of the deceased was caused by the appellant and there lies no suspicion that
appellant was not the one who caused the death.
14
III. THAT ALL ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR COMMITTING RAPE OF RIYA.
56. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused had committed rape
of Riya and are punishable under sec. 376D for the commission of gang rape.
57. The SC in the case Premiya v. State of Rajasthan61, Justice Arijit Pasayat laid down:
“The offence of rape in its simplest term is `the ravishment of a woman, without her consent,
by force, fear or fraud', or as `the carnal knowledge of a woman by force against her will'.
`Rape' or `Raptus' is when a man hath carnal knowledge of a woman by force and against her
will (Co. Litt. 123-b); or as expressed more fully,' rape is the carnal knowledge of any
woman, above the age of particular years, against her will; or of a woman child, under that
age, with or against her will' (Hale PC 628). The essential words in an indictment for rape are
rapuit and carnaliter cognovit; but carnaliter cognovit, nor any other circumlocution without
the word rapuit, are not sufficient in a legal sense to express rape; 1 Hon.6, 1a, 9 Edw. 4, 26 a
(Hale PC 628). In the crime of rape, `carnal knowledge' means the penetration to any the
slightest degree of the organ alleged to have been carnally known by the male organ of
generation (Stephen's "Criminal Law" 9th Ed. p.262). In `Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice'
(Volume 4, page 1356) it is stated "...even slight penetration is sufficient and emission is
unnecessary". In Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales (Fourth Edition) Volume 12, it is
stated that even the slightest degree of penetration is sufficient to prove sexual intercourse. It
is violation with violence of the private person of a woman-an-outrage by all means. By the
very nature of the offence it is an obnoxious act of the highest order.”
III.A. THERE IS MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF RAPE

58. In order to constitute rape, what sec. 375 IPC requires is medical evidence of
penetration.62 In the present case, as per the post-mortem report of Riya, the nature of vaginal
injuries suggests forceful penetration by more than two persons.
III.B. ACTUS REUS IS ESTABLISHED AS IT WAS AGAINST HER WILL

59. Actus reus in rape cases is linked with the consent of the victim and it is discovered
by examining it in relation to the state of the mind of the victim.63 To come under the first
61
2008 (4) RCR (Criminal) 539.
62
Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 560.
15
clause of rape ‘against her will’, the act must be committed against her will at the time of
occurrence.64
60. Taylor has observed that rape is not a medical diagnosis but a legal definition. No
doctor can be expected to give an opinion regarding consent, for consent or the lack of it does
not leaves physical signs on medical examination; all that can be expected from the
examining doctor are the results of his medical findings as to signs of general injury,
intoxication, patient demeanour and general findings as to penetration.65 The injury on the
person of the victim, especially her private parts, has corroborative values.66
III.C. THERE WAS ABSENCE OF CONSENT

61. Absence of consent of prosecutrix in a rape case can be determined by practical
circumstance, such as,67-
i. Written communication of the deceased victim,
ii. Extrajudicial confession of the accused that he took the victim girl by force,
iii. Injury indicating forcible intercourse,
iv. Sign of struggle or vehement resistance offered by the victim.
As the victim was abducted it is clear that she did not give consent. As per the post-mortem
report of Riya, in the vaginal examination, it is found that the nature of vaginal injuries
suggests forceful penetration by more than two persons. This indicates forcible intercourse,
i.e., the third criteria. Also, as per the post-mortem report of Riya, the injuries she suffered
are nail abrasion, bruises over right side of the neck, strangulation marks, ligature marks.
Mucosa of the stomach, small intestine and large intestine were found congested. 20 cm of
cylindrical rod has been inserted into it, which caused hymnal tear. These show the absence
of consent of the victim, i.e. the fourth criteria.
Therefore, the accused are guilty for the offences under sec. 376D read with sec. 34 of IPC.
63
Siddheswar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1958 SC 143.
64
JUSTICE SC ROY AND SP SEN GUPTA, CRIMINAL MAJOR ACTS 447 (Kamal Law House), 10th ed.
65
JUSTICE SC ROY AND SP SEN GUPTA, CRIMINAL MAJOR ACTS 450 (Kamal Law House), 10th ed.
66
Krishenlal v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1252.
67
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gangula, (1997) 1 SCC 272, 278-279.
16
IV. THAT THE CURATIVE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE
62. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Curative Petition filed by the
petitioner in the name of Lord Jogeshwara Trust against the order of Supreme Court passed in
year 2016 allowing entry of women into Lord Jogeshwara Temple, is not maintainable in the
court of law, as this case is unable to fulfill the grounds on which a curative petition can be
filed in court of law.
63. The Order XLVIII of the SC Rules states when can a Curative Petition be filed which
is after the dismissal of a case in exercise of review jurisdiction under Article 137 of the
Constitution, by way of circulation, a curative petition can be filed under the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court to prevent abuse of its process and cure gross miscarriage of justice,
as per the law laid down in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr. 68
However, the facts and circumstances of the present case do not fall under any ground on
which the curative petition can be accepted in the court of law.
64. Curative Petitions ought to be treated as a rarity rather than regular and the
appreciation of the Court shall have to be upon proper circumspection having regard to the
three basic features of our justice delivery system to wit, the order being in contravention of
the doctrine of natural justice or without jurisdiction or in the event of there is even a
likelihood of public confidence being shaken by reason of the association or closeness of a
judge with the subject matter in dispute.69 However, in the present case, the curative petition
filed by the petitioner is does not fulfill any condition mentioned above.
65. A curative petition is evolved in exercise of power under Art. 142 of the Constitution
of India to avoid miscarriage of justice and to see that in the highest Court there is no
violation of principle of natural justice, and bias does not creep in which is also
fundamentally a facet of natural justice in a different way. The principle of review as is
known is to re-look or re-examine the principal judgment. It is not a virgin ground as has
been held by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sow Chandra Kante and Anr. v. Sheikh Habib.70 However,
such petitions may be treated as rarest of the rare to maintain the trust and credibility, people
of the country look up to from the Apex court of the country and thus curative petition filed
by the petitioner in the present case should be disposed off by the court of law.
68
Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388.
69
Ibid.
70
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (29.07.2015 - SC) : MANU/SC/0825/2015.
17
66. The petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he establishes (1) violation of
principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgement adversely
affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the
proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice and (2) where in the proceedings a
learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving
scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the petitioner.71
However, the present case doesn’t fall under any of the grounds mentioned. The women have
the right to equality. Being deprived of entering into the Temple is violation of Right to
Equality. Thus, this curative petition is not maintainable in the court of law.
67. The respondent humbly submits before the court of law that the Curative Petition filed
by the petitioner in the name of Lord Jogeshwara Trust against the order of Supreme Court
passed in year 2016 allowing entry of women into Lord Jogeshwara Temple, (CP. No. 111 of
2018) is not maintainable in the court of law. Therefore, the respondent on the basis of above
laid down conditions submits before the Hon’ble Court to dispose off the Curative petition
filed by the petitioner.
71
Union of India (UOI) vs. Namit Sharma, (03.09.2013 - SC) : MANU/SC/0902/2013.
18
V. THAT PROHIBITING WOMEN OF A PARTICULAR AGE GROUP FROM ENTERING LORD

JOGESHWARA TEMPLE IS VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENSHRINED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA, AND THE CLAIM FOR THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM
RELIGIOUS WORSHIP FOUNDED IN RELIGIOUS TEXT, IS SUBORDINATE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES OF LIBERTY, DIGNITY AND EQUALITY.
V.A. PROHIBITING WOMEN OF A PARTICULAR AGE GROUP FROM ENTERING LORD

JOGESHWARA TEMPLE IS VIOLATIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENSHRINED UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
68. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that prohibiting women of a
particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara Temple is violative of the Fundamental
Rights enshrined under the Constitution of Indiana. The judgment pronounced by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Indiana with the majority of 2:1 allowing the petition filed by KADAM is
totally justifiable, as it held that “every place of worship shall be open to all classes and
sections of people, women being one of them, irrespective of any custom or usage to the
contrary.” The Court further held that “the practice of prohibiting women of particular age
group to enter in Lord Jogeshwara Temple is violative of Fundamental Rights enshrined in
the Constitution of Indiana.”72
69. The exclusion of women from religious worship founded in religious text, is
subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and Equality as the customs and
usages are unconstitutional being violative of fundamentals rights guaranteed under the
constitution of Indiana under Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution of India.73
V.B. THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED UPON A BIOLOGICAL FACTOR
EXCLUSIVE TO THE FEMALE GENDER AMOUNTS TO "DISCRIMINATION" AND THEREBY
VIOLATES THE VERY CORE OF ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 17 AND NOT PROTECTED BY
'MORALITY' AS USED IN ARTICLES 25 AND 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION
72
73
19
V.B.1. Prohibiting women to enter the Temple is not “essence” of the Hindu religion
70. In the Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra
Thritha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt74 the Hon’ble Court held that while giving freedom
under Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 2675, made it clear that what is protected is only the
'essential part' of religion or, in other words, the essence of 'practice' practised by a religious
denomination and, therefore, the petitioners submit that before any religious practice is
examined on the touchstone of constitutional principles, it has to be ascertained positively
whether the said practice is, in pith and substance, really the 'essence' of the said religion.
71. In the case of Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, it was held that Clauses
(c) and (d) do not create any new right in favour of religious denominations but only
safeguard their rights. Similarly, in matters of religious affairs, it is observed that the same is
also not sacrosanct as there may be many ill-practices like superstitions which may, in due
course of time, become mere accretions to the basic theme of that religious denomination.76
Therefore, the respondent submits that even if any accretion added for any historical reason
has become an essence of the said religious denomination, the same shall not be protected
Under Art. 26(b) if it is so abhorring and is against the basic concept of our Constitution.
V.B.2. Women have the Right to Equality

72. The council submits that the freedom of conscience and the right to practise and
profess their religion which is recognized Under Article 25(1)77 of the Constitution of India
encompasses the liberty of belief, faith and worship, pithily declared as a constitutional vision
in the Preamble to the Constitution of India. Article 25 pertinently declares that all persons
are 'equally' entitled to freely practise religion. This implies not just inter-faith but intra-faith
parity. Therefore, the primary right Under Article 25(1) is a non-discriminatory right and is,
thus, available to men and women professing the same faith.78
74
The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar of Sri
Shirur Mutt, [1954] SCR 1005.
75
Freedom to manage religious affairs Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law
76
Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, (1962) 1 SCR 383,
77
Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally
entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion,
78
Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 133.
20
V.B.3. The exclusionary practice pertaining to women is violative of Art. 21 of the

Constitution
73. The council submits that the exclusionary practice in its implementation results in
involuntary disclosure by women of both their menstrual status and age which amounts to
forced disclosure that consequently violates the right to dignity and privacy embedded in Art.
2179 of the Constitution of India.
74. As held by the Hon’ble Court in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India
and Ors.80 and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India 81 that the exclusionary
practice pertaining to women is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution as it impacts the
ovulating and menstruating women to have a normal social day to day rendezvous with the
society including their family members and, thus, undermines their dignity by violating
Article 21 of the Constitution.
75. The council submits that the exclusionary practice in the present case cannot be
justified either on the grounds of health, public order or morality for the term 'morality' used
in Article 2582 or Article 2683 is not an individualized or sectionalized sense of morality
subject to varying practices and ideals of every religion but it is the morality informed by the
constitutional vision. The judgments of this Court in Manoj Narula v. Union of India 84 and
National Legal Services Authority (supra) states that any subjective reading of the term
'morality' in the context of Article 25 would make the liberty of faith and worship otiose and
the exclusion of women as in the present case is a matter of institutional practice and not
morality.
V.B.4. Followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination

76. The Hon’ble Court in the case of S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others 85 reiterated
and concurred with the definition of 'religious denomination' which was also accepted in The
Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thritha Swaminar
79
Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.
80
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Ors.(2014) 5 SCC 438.
81
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1.
82
Ibid at 77.
83
Ibid at 75.
84
Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1.
85
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and ors, (1983) 1 SCC 51.
21
of Sri Shirur Mutt86 and observed as : The words 'religious denomination' in Art. 2687 of the
Constitution must take their colour from the word 'religion' and if this be so, the expression
'religious denomination' must also satisfy three conditions:
i. It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which
they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
ii. common organisation, and
iii. designation by a distinctive name.
Coming to the first and the most important condition for a religious denomination, i.e., the
collection of individuals ought to have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as
conducive to their spiritual well-being, there is nothing on record to show that the devotees of
Lord Jogeshwara have any common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they
regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the
Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Jogeshwara are just Hindus and do not
constitute a separate religious denomination. For a religious denomination, there must be new
methodology provided for a religion. Mere observance of certain practices, even though from
a long time, does not make it a distinct religion on that account.88 Lord Jogeshwara Temple
has no denominational character and it is not permissible on the part of a 'religious
denomination' to indulge in such practices violating constitutional principles/morality
embedded in Articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A(e). Therefore, hence it is proved that Lord
Jogeshwara do not constitute a religious denomination.
V.C. ENFORCEABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) AGAINST THE
LORD JOGESHWARA TEMPLE (PROHIBITION ON ENTRY OF WOMEN) ACT, 1985 AND THE
LORD JOGESHWARA TRUST
V.C.1. Women have Right to Freedom of Religion under Art. 25 of the Constitution
77. The council in the above argument stated that the devotees of Lord Jogeshwara do not
constitute a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 and that Lord
Jogeshwara Temple is a public temple by virtue of that resultantly fundamental rights
86
Ibid 74.
87
Ibid 75.
88
Nallor Marthandam Vellalar and Ors. v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment and
Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 712.
22
including those guaranteed Under Article 25(1) are enforceable against the Lord Jogeshwara
Temple (Prohibition on Entry of Women) Act, 1985 and the Lord Jogeshwara Trust.
Article 26 is 'establishment of a religious institution' so as to acclaim the status of religious
denomination. Whereas, Article 25(1) guarantees the right to practise religion to every
individual and the act of practice is concerned, primarily, with religious worship, rituals and
observations as held in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.89
The right guaranteed Under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter,
certain physiological factors, specifically attributable to women. Women of any age group
have as much a right as men to visit and enter a temple in order to freely practise a religion as
guaranteed Under Article 25(1).90
78. The Supreme Court in Nar Hari Shastri and Ors. v. Shri Badrinath Temple
Committee91 held that : It seems to us that the approach of the court below to this aspect of
the case has not been quite proper, and, to avoid any possible misconception, we would desire
to state succinctly what the correct legal position is. Once it is admitted, as in fact has been
admitted in the present case, that the temple is a public place of worship of the Hindus, the
right of entrance into the temple for purposes of 'darshan' or worship is a right which flows
from the nature of the institution itself, and for the acquisition of such rights, no custom or
immemorial usage need be asserted or proved.
79. The Hon’ble Court had pronounced in regard to the freedom to practise a religion
freely without any fictitious and vague constraint is the case of Commissioner of Police and
others v Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Anr.92, wherein the Court observed thus:
The full concept and scope of religious freedom is that there are no restraints upon the free
exercise of religion according to the dictates of one's conscience or upon the right freely to
profess, practice and propagate religion save those imposed under the police power of the
State and the other provisions of Part II of the Constitution. This means the right to worship
God according to the dictates of one's conscience. Man's relation to his God is made no
concern for the State. Freedom of conscience and religious belief cannot, however, be, set up
to avoid those duties which every citizen owes to the nation; e.g. to receive military training,
to take an oath expressing willingness to perform military service and so on.
80. Therefore, it can be said without any hesitation or reservation that the impugned
prohibition Act, 1985 that stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 11 to 51
89
Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., (1977) 1 SCC 677.
90
Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. The State of Kerala and Ors., (2006) SCC 373.
91
Nar Hari Shastri and Ors. v. Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, AIR 1952 SC 245.
92
Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and anr., (2004) 12 SCC 770.
23
years, is a clear violation of the right of such women to practise their religious belief which,
in consequence, makes their fundamental right Under Article 25(1) a dead letter. It is clear as
crystal that as long as the devotees, irrespective of their gender and/or age group, seeking
entry to a temple of any caste are Hindus, it is their legal right to enter into a temple and offer
prayers. The women, in the case at hand, are also Hindus and so, there is neither any viable
nor any legal limitation on their right to enter into the Lord Jogeshwara as devotees of Lord
Jogeshwara and offer their prayers to the deity.
81. The right guaranteed Under Article 25(1) has been made subject to, by the opening
words of the Article itself, public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III of
the Constitution. All the three words, that is, order, morality and health are qualified by the
word 'public'. Neither public order nor public health will be at peril by allowing entry of
women devotees of the age group of 11 to 51 years into the Lord Jogeshwara temple for
offering their prayers. As regards public morality, we must make it absolutely clear that since
the Constitution was not shoved, by any external force, upon the people of this country but
was rather adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public
morality has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality. 93
V.C.2. Exclusionary practice is not an essential practice as per Hindu religion

82. The council in the earlier part of this memorial, determined that the devotees of Lord
Jogeshwara, who though claim to be a separate religious denomination, do not, as per the
tests laid down by this Court in several decisions, most prominent of them being S.P. Mittal
(supra), constitute a separate religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the
Constitution. This leads us to a mathematical certainty that the devotees of Lord Jogeshwara
are the followers of Hindu religion. Now, what remains to be seen is whether the exclusion of
women of the age group of 11 to 51 years is an essential practice under the Hindu religion in
the backdrop of the peculiar attending circumstances attributable to the Lord Jogeshwara
temple.
83. Article 25 merely protects the freedom to practise rituals, ceremonies, etc. which are
an integral part of a religion as observed by this Court in John Vallamattom and Anr. v.
Union of India.94 While saying so, the Court ruled that a disposition towards making gift for
93
Ibid at 90.
94
John Vallamattom and Anr. v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611.
24
charitable or religious purpose can be designated as a pious act of a person, but the same
cannot be said to be an integral part of any religion.
84. The role of essential practices to a particular religion has been well demonstrated by
Lord Halsbury in Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun wherein it was observed:
In the absence of conformity to essentials, the denomination would not be an entity cemented
into solidity by harmonious uniformity of opinion, it would be a mere incongruous heap of,
as it were, grains of sand, thrown together without being united, each of these intellectual and
isolated grains differing from every other, and the whole forming a but nominally united
while really unconnected mass; fraught with nothing but internal dissimilitude, and mutual
and reciprocal contradiction and dissension.95
85. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Ors. v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors. 96, the Court,
although speaking in the context of Article 26, warned that some practices, though religious,
may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may, in that sense, be extraneous and
unessential accretions to religion itself and unless such practices are found to constitute an
essential and integral part of a religion, their claim for protection as essential practices may
have to be carefully scrutinized; in other words, the protection must be confined to such
religious practices as are an essential and an integral part of the religion and no other.
The protection guaranteed Under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is not confined to
matters of doctrine or belief but extends to acts done in pursuance of religion and, therefore,
contains a guarantee for rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are
essential or integral part of religion. What constitutes an integral or essential part of religion
has to be determined with reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background
etc. of the given religion.97
86. However, in this present case prohibition of women of a particular age group is not
the essential practice; it means those practices are not fundamental to follow a religious belief
without which, a religion will be no religion.
Therefore, the council submits before the Hon’ble Court that by allowing women to enter into
the Lord Jogeshwara temple for offering prayers, cannot alter or chang the nature of Hindu
religion in any manner. Therefore, the exclusionary practice, which has been abolished by
Hon’ble Court of Indiana in the judgment of 2016, is totally justifiable and as this
exclusionary practice is neither an essential nor an integral part of the Hindu religion without
95
Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, (1904) AC 515.
96
Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Ors. v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1402.
97
Ibid at 92.
25
which Hindu religion, of which the devotees of Lord Jogeshwara are followers, will not
survive.
V.C.3. The claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in
religious text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and
Equality
87. In the light of the above authorities, it has to be determined whether the practice of
exclusion of women of the age group of 11 to 51 years is equivalent to a doctrine of Hindu
religion or a practice that could be regarded as an essential part of the Hindu religion and
whether the nature of Hindu religion would be altered without the said exclusionary practice.
The Hon’ble SC in the case of Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. vs. The State of
Kerala and Ors.98 Held that : In no scenario, it can be said that exclusion of women of any
age group could be regarded as an essential practice of Hindu religion and on the contrary, it
is an essential part of the Hindu religion to allow Hindu women to enter into a temple as
devotees and followers of Hindu religion and offer their prayers to the deity. In the absence
of any scriptural or textual evidence, we cannot accord to the exclusionary practice followed
at the temple the status of an essential practice of Hindu religion.
88. Therefore, by allowing women to enter into the Lord Jogeshwara temple for offering
prayers, it cannot be imagined that the nature of Hindu religion would be fundamentally
altered or changed in any manner. Therefore, the exclusionary practice, is neither an essential
nor an integral part of the Hindu religion without which Hindu religion, of which the
devotees of Lord Jogeshwara are followers, will not survive.
89. A claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship, even if it be founded in
religious text, is subordinate to the constitutional values of liberty, dignity and equality.
Exclusionary practices are contrary to constitutional morality.99
90. Reference is required to be made to the doctrines and tenets of a religion, its historical
background, and the scriptural texts to ascertain the ‘essentiality’ of religious practises. The
‘essential practises test’ in its application would have to be determined by the tenets of the
religion itself. The practises and beliefs which are considered to be integral by the religious
community are to be regarded as “essential”, and afforded protection under Article 25.100
98
Ibid at 90.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
26
91. The prohibition of women to enter the Temple if violative to the Fundamental Right
of Right to Equality as enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the counsel
submits before the Hon’ble Court that the previous judgment passed on 23.12.2016 by the SC
with the majority of 2:1 should not be altered and to give Right to Equality to the women they
should be allowed to enter the Temple.
27
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly requested that this Honourable Court may be pleased to adjudge and
declare:
1. That the criminal appeal filed by the appellant is maintainable.

2. That the accused are guilty of abduction under section 364 of IPC and murder of
Reema and Riya under section 302 of IPC, and the High Court of Arya Pradesh erred
in acquitting them.
3. That all accused are guilty for committing rape of Riya under section 376D.
4. That the curative petition is not maintainable.
5. That prohibiting women of a particular age group from entering Lord Jogeshwara
Indiana, and the claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship founded in
relihious text, is subordinate to the Constitutional values of Liberty, Dignity and
Equality.
And pass any such order or direction as the Honourable Court deems fit and proper, for this
the Appellants shall duty bound pray.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS
28

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TEAM CODE: P-31

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF:

CR. APP. NO. – 1028 OF 2018

(UNDER ARTICLE 134 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

CP. NO. – 111 OF 2018

(UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT`

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................... iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................vii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... ix

STATEMENT OF ISSUES .....................................................................................................xii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... xiii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................... 1

I. That the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner is maintainable. ................................... 1

II.A.1. Common intention was established .................................................................... 3

II.B.1. Intention evident from the previous threat to deceased ...................................... 5

II.B.7. Circumstantial evidence is established ............................................................. 11

III.A. There is medical evidence of rape.......................................................................... 15

III.B. Actus reus is established as it was against her will ................................................ 15

III.C. There was absence of consent ................................................................................ 16

V.B.2. Women have the Right to Equality .................................................................. 20

V.B.3. The exclusionary practice pertaining to women is violative of Art. 21 of the

V.B.4. Followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination ......... 21

Acts and Statutes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Indian Evidence Act, 1892

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260...........................................................................2

Anant v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500.........................................................................12

Bakshish Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016...........................................................12

Balkar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, Cr. App. No.-206 of 2007 (SC).....................................6

Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, AIR 2002 SC 3164........................................................................12

Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 133........................................................20

Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., 1994 SCC (2) 220.....................................................12

Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, (1962) 1 SCR 383.......................................20

E. K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066......................................................3

Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, (1904) AC 515............................................................25

Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343.....................................................13

Haughton v. Smith, (1973) 3 All ER 110.................................................................................11

John Vallamattom and Anr. v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611..........................................24

Joshi v. Ajit Mills Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 2279...............................................................................8

Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883..........................................10

Khacharu Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 546..................................................................3

Krishenlal v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1252...................................................................................16

Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413...........................................3

Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430.............................13

Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1995 SC 1387...............................................................12

Laxman v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1974 SC 1803..................................................................6

M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1963 SC 200........................................................12

Mahmood v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 69...........................................................................12

Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1....................................................................21

Maqsoodan v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126.........................................................................4

Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1175.....................................................................8

Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1974 SC 691..................................................11

Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1990 SC 79...........................................................13

Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216................................................................3

Parichhat v. State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 535............................................................................3

Prakash v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1474.............................................................13

Premiya v. State of Rajasthan, 2008 (4) RCR (Criminal) 539.................................................15

Prithi Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1989 SC 702...............................................11