API 581 Appendix O

API PUBLICATION 581 – RISK-BASED INSPECTION
BASE RESOURCE DOCUMENT
APPENDIX O – ABOVEGROUND STORAGE TANKS

JUNE 2003
REV. 3
API Publication 581 – Risk-Based Inspection Base Resource Document
Appendix O – Aboveground Storage Tanks
CONTENTS
O.1. GENERAL ......................................................................................................................................................8
O 1.1 Scope .....................................................................................................................................................8
O 1.2 References .............................................................................................................................................8
O 1.3 Definitions .............................................................................................................................................9
O.2. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................................9
O 2.1 RBI Methodology Introduction .............................................................................................................9
O 2.2 Background..........................................................................................................................................13
O 2.3 Generic Failure Frequencies (GFF) – AST Floor and Shell ................................................................14
O.2.3.1 GFF – Floor Failures.......................................................................................................................15
O.2.3.2 GFF – Shell Failure.........................................................................................................................16
O 2.4 Advantages with RBI for AST’s..........................................................................................................16
O 2.5 Limitations, Assumptions, Guidelines and Recommendations............................................................17
O.2.5.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................17
O.2.5.2 Limitations ......................................................................................................................................18
O.2.5.3 Risk Profile Plot..............................................................................................................................18
O.2.5.4 General Guidelines..........................................................................................................................19
O.2.5.5 Conservatism Built into the RBI Methodology ..............................................................................23
O.3. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................25
O.3.1.1 Risk .................................................................................................................................................26
O.3.1.2 Likelihood of Failure ......................................................................................................................26
O.3.1.3 Consequence ...................................................................................................................................26
O.3.1.4 Relative Risk...................................................................................................................................27
O.3.1.5 Total Risk – Tank Specific .............................................................................................................28
O.3.1.6 Risk Limits and Inspection Planning ..............................................................................................29
O.4. TANK BOTTOM – LIKELIHOOD OF FAILURE......................................................................................32
O 4.1 Scope – Leak and Rupture...................................................................................................................32
O 4.2 Methodology Overview – Leak and Rupture ......................................................................................32
O 4.3 Input Data – Leak and Rupture............................................................................................................34
O 4.4 Corrosion Rate Calculation – Leak Failure .........................................................................................37
O.4.4.1 Soil Side Corrosion Rate.................................................................................................................39
O.4.4.2 Product Side Corrosion Rate...........................................................................................................41
O.4.4.3 Determine combined Tank Floor Corrosion Rate ...........................................................................44
O 4.5 Measured Wall Thickness and Corrosion Rate....................................................................................45
O.4.5.1 Re-Set RBI Analysis – New Wall Thickness..................................................................................45
Rev. 3 Page 1 of 124 June 2003

O.4.5.2 Measured Corrosion Rate ...............................................................................................................46

O 4.6 Floor Inspection Effectiveness Table – Leak Failure ..........................................................................46
O.4.6.1 Example – Inspection History – Assigning Effectiveness ..............................................................47
O.4.6.2 Inspection Planning – Guideline .....................................................................................................48
O.4.6.3 Damage Factor (DFar/t) – Leak Failure............................................................................................48
O 4.7 Bottom Leak Failure ............................................................................................................................50
O.4.7.1 Fiberglass Type Liner – Leak Failure .............................................................................................50
O.4.7.2 Liner Factor (MFLiner)......................................................................................................................50
O.4.7.3 Adjust Liner Age after Inspection...................................................................................................52
O 4.8 Rapid Bottom Failure – Rupture Failure .............................................................................................53
O.4.8.1 Tank Design Factor (MFDesign) ........................................................................................................53
O.4.8.2 Corrosion factor for Rupture...........................................................................................................53
O.4.8.3 Tank Settlement ..............................................................................................................................53
O.5. TANK SHELL – LIKELIHOOD OF FAILURE ..........................................................................................54
O 5.1 Tank Shell – RBI Methodology...........................................................................................................54
O 5.2 Required Data and Information ...........................................................................................................55
O 5.3 Shell Failure Modes and Assumptions ................................................................................................59
O.5.3.1 Corrosion Damage – Basic Assumptions........................................................................................60
O 5.4 Screening for Brittle Fracture and Cracking........................................................................................60
O.5.4.1 Brittle Fracture ................................................................................................................................60
O.5.4.2 Shell Cracking Susceptibility..........................................................................................................61
O.5.4.3 Cracking due to operational issues..................................................................................................66
O 5.5 Shell Corrosion Damage – RBI Model................................................................................................66
O.5.5.1 Shell Leak – Distribution of Probability over Height .....................................................................67
O 5.6 Determination of Corrosion Rates .......................................................................................................69
O.5.6.1 Estimating Shell Corrosion Rate (CR)............................................................................................69
O.5.6.2 Calculation of Shell Corrosion Rate (CR) ......................................................................................73
O.5.6.3 Measured Shell Corrosion Rate (CR) .............................................................................................79
O.5.6.4 Combining Internal and External Shell Corrosion..........................................................................79
O 5.7 Tank DF and Likelihood – Shell versus Floor.....................................................................................80
O.5.7.1 DFar/t Table Development................................................................................................................80
O.5.7.2 DFar/t Calculation for Course Two and Up – Relative DF Adjustment Ratio .................................82
O 5.8 Critical Course Calculation..................................................................................................................84
O.5.8.1 Safe Filling Height..........................................................................................................................84
O.5.8.2 Calculated Wall Thickness..............................................................................................................85

O.5.8.3 Minimum Require Shell Course Thickness ....................................................................................85

O 5.9 Shell – Damage Factor (DF) and Likelihood of Failure (LoF)............................................................86
O 5.10 Floor Inspection Effectiveness Table – Leak Failure ..........................................................................86
O.5.10.1 Determination of Number and Rating of Inspections ................................................................86
O 5.11 GFF used to determine Tank Specific Leak Frequencies ....................................................................89
O 5.12 Inspection Planning – Tank Shell ........................................................................................................89
O.6. CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE..................................................................................................................89
O 6.1 Consequence Model.............................................................................................................................89
O 6.2 Representative Fluids...........................................................................................................................90
O.6.2.1 Environmental Clean-Up Cost ........................................................................................................91
O.6.2.2 Environmental Penalties Cost .........................................................................................................94
O.6.2.3 Lost Business Opportunity Cost – Downtime.................................................................................94
O.6.2.4 Repair Costs – Repair, Replacement, and added Downtime...........................................................94
O 6.3 Floor Consequence Calculation Overview ..........................................................................................95
O 6.4 Bottom Failure .....................................................................................................................................99
O.6.4.1 Basis for Bottom Leak Rate and Seepage into Soil ......................................................................100
O.6.4.2 Foundation Conditions..................................................................................................................101
O.6.4.3 Three-Dimensional Flow ..............................................................................................................101
O.6.4.4 Consequence Analysis Methodology............................................................................................102
O.6.4.5 Consequence Factors and Look-up Tables ...................................................................................103
O.6.4.6 Asphalt Releases – Specifically ....................................................................................................107
O 6.5 Shell Failure.......................................................................................................................................107
O.6.5.1 Shell Leak – Basis of Flow Rate of Fluid to Atmosphere.............................................................107
O.6.5.2 Shell Leak Failure .........................................................................................................................109
O 6.6 Tank Rupture Release and Dike Overflow ........................................................................................111
O 6.7 Weighted Consequence of Failure.....................................................................................................112
O.6.7.1 Floor – Weighted Consequence of Failure (CoFFloor) Calculation ................................................112
O.6.7.2 Shell – Weighted Consequence of Failure (CoFShell) Calculation.................................................113
O 6.8 Consequence of Failure (CoF) Category ...........................................................................................115
O.6.8.1 Floor and Shell Consequence – Combined ...................................................................................115
O.7. RISK BASED INSPECTION ANALYSIS.................................................................................................116
O 7.1 Floor Risk Calculation.......................................................................................................................120
O 7.2 Shell Risk Calculation .......................................................................................................................121
O.8. INSPECTION PLANNING ........................................................................................................................122
O.8.1.1 Objective.......................................................................................................................................122

O.8.1.2 Inspection Planning Criteria – DFTarget ..........................................................................................122
FIGURES:
Figure 1: Overview of Main Tasks..............................................................................................................................10
Figure 2: Analysis Calculation Overview....................................................................................................................11
Figure 3: Overview of main methodology elements and related details needed for these. .........................................12
Figure 4: Five-By-Five Risk Matrix ............................................................................................................................27
Figure 5: Risk Matrix Showing Levels of Risk ...........................................................................................................27
Figure 6: Risk Level Calculation.................................................................................................................................28
Figure 7: Risk Rank Matrix (LoF and CoF Categories) and Recommend DFTargets ....................................................30
Figure 8: Risk Target and Inspection Planning ...........................................................................................................31
Figure 9: Likelihood of Failure Calculation for Tank Floor........................................................................................33
Figure 10: Calculation of Corrosion Rate (r) to derive Modification Factor (DFar/t)........................................................38
Figure 11: Revised MFLiner ..........................................................................................................................................51
Figure 12: DF & LoF Calculation for Tank Shell .......................................................................................................55
Figure 13 : Tank Shell CR observed with Shell Height ..............................................................................................67
Figure 14: CR Index Ratio to Course 1 - as a Function of Total Number of Courses.................................................68
Figure 15: Estimated CR in H2S – Air 8, See Reference /7/ .......................................................................................70
Figure 16: Changes in Corrosion Rates with Slow and Rapid Liquid Line Motion....................................................72
Figure 17: Flow Chart to determine estimated corrosion rates for Welded Shells ......................................................74
Figure 18: Climate Map for the United States.............................................................................................................77
Figure 19: Illustration of the calculated Risk Ratio.....................................................................................................83
Figure 20: Overview of Spill Consequence Model .....................................................................................................90
Figure 21: Flowchart for Consequence Model ............................................................................................................93
Figure 22: Environmental Consequence Calculation – Bottom Leak .........................................................................96
Figure 23: Environmental Consequence Calculation – Bottom Rupture.....................................................................97
Figure 24: Direct Financial Consequence Calculation ................................................................................................99
Figure 25: Floor Leakage Illustration..........................................................................................................................99
Figure 26: Flow Out of Tank Hole ............................................................................................................................104
Figure 27: Vertical Fluid Velocity.............................................................................................................................105
Figure 28: Flow Out of RPB .....................................................................................................................................106
Figure 29: Release from Tank Shell ..........................................................................................................................107
Figure 30: CoF Calculation .......................................................................................................................................117
Figure 31: DF Calculation .........................................................................................................................................118
Figure 32: LoF Calculation .......................................................................................................................................119

Figure 33: Risk Calculation.......................................................................................................................................120

Figure 34: Suggested Inspection Planning Targets (DFTarget)....................................................................................122
Figure 35: Development of Target DF for AST Inspection ......................................................................................123
Figure 36: Optional Levels for setting Target DF as function of CoF Category.......................................................123
TABLES:
Table 1: Liquid release scenarios analyzed in the AST RBI methodology .................................................................13
Table 2: Base Leak Frequencies for Tank Floor and Shell .........................................................................................14
Table 3: Summary of Survey Results ..........................................................................................................................15
Table 4: Default – Recommended Inspection Targets.................................................................................................25
Table 5: Input Data Required for Bottom Corrosion Rate Calculation .......................................................................34
Table 6: Input Data Required for DF and Likelihood Calculation ..............................................................................35
Table 7: Input Data Required for Consequence Calculation .......................................................................................36
Table 8: Input Data for Risk evaluation and Inspection Planning..................................................................................37
Table 9: Summary of Conditions for Soil Side Base Corrosion Rate of 5mpy ...........................................................39
Table 10: Soil Resistivity ............................................................................................................................................39
Table 11: Tank Pad Adjustment ..................................................................................................................................40
Table 12: Tank Drainage Adjustment .........................................................................................................................40
Table 13: Adjustment for Cathodic Protection............................................................................................................41
Table 14: Adjustment for Bottom Type.......................................................................................................................41
Table 15: Adjustment for Fluid Temperature..............................................................................................................41
Table 16: Product Side Base Corrosion Rates.............................................................................................................42
Table 17: Summary of Conditions for ‘Base’ Product Side Corrosion Rate...............................................................42
Table 18: Steam Coil Heater Adjustment ....................................................................................................................42
Table 19: Water Draw Adjustment..............................................................................................................................42
Table 20: Internal Coating Needed?............................................................................................................................43
Table 21: Coating Quality ...........................................................................................................................................43
Table 22: Correction Factor (CWT and CCR) for measured Floor thickness readings and CR......................................45
Table 23: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Rating – Tank Bottom ......................................................................47
Table 24: Tank Bottom DFar/t Damage Factors .........................................................................................................49
Table 25: Damage Factor for Tank Design and Maintenance .....................................................................................53
Table 26: Damage Factor for Tank Settlement............................................................................................................54
Table 27: Basic Data Required for Shell RBI Analysis...............................................................................................56
Table 28: Brittle Fracture Susceptibility – Screening Questions.................................................................................61
Table 29: Cracking of Low Alloy Steel and Carbon Steel Tank Shells – Answer Q1 OR Q2....................................63

Table 30: Failure modes and probabilities...................................................................................................................66

Table 31: CR Index Ratio – derived probability of leakage from observed CR..........................................................68
Table 32: Tank Shell Segmenting ...............................................................................................................................71
Table 33: Tank category by Shell size (ft)...................................................................................................................72
Table 34: Tank Shell Base Corrosion Rates ................................................................................................................75
Table 35: Base Corrosion Rates (mpy) for External Shell Corrosion – NOT Insulated..............................................76
Table 36: Base Corrosion Rates (mpy) for External Shell Corrosion – Insulated.......................................................76
Table 37: Adjustment Factor for Quality of Insulation ...............................................................................................77
Table 38: Adjustment factors for quality and age of external coating.........................................................................78
Table 39: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Ratings – Internal Tank Shell Corrosion ..........................................87
Table 40: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Ratings – External Tank Shell Corrosion .........................................88
Table 41 Representative Fluids ...................................................................................................................................91
Table 42: Suggested Clean-up Factors (CUF in $/bbl) ...............................................................................................91
Table 43: Default AST Repair and Replacement Costs .............................................................................................94
Table 44: Material Properties ....................................................................................................................................100
Table 45: Release Rates for Small Bottom Leak (bbl/hr) – Without RPB and ≤0.125 hole .....................................104
Table 46: Downward Fluid Velocity through Soil (ft/day) .......................................................................................105
Table 47: Detection Times ........................................................................................................................................105
Table 48: Release Rates from Small Bottom Leak (bbl/hr) - With RPB and one 1/8 hole .......................................106
Table 49: Calculated Leak Release Rate for Flow to Atmosphere (for all fluid types).............................................108
Table 50: Release rate by hole size and location on Shell.........................................................................................110
Table 51: Rapid Shell or Floor-to-Shell Failure – Dike Overflow ............................................................................111
Table 52: Consequence of Failure Category .............................................................................................................115
EQUATIONS:
Equation 1: Risk Calculation.......................................................................................................................................26
Equation 2: LoF Calculation........................................................................................................................................26
Equation 3: CoF Calculation .......................................................................................................................................26
Equation 4: CUF Caclulation ......................................................................................................................................27
Equation 5: Coating Factor Calculation ......................................................................................................................43
Equation 6; Measured CR adjsutement .......................................................................................................................46
Equation 7: ar/t ............................................................................................................................................................48
Equation 8: Bottom Leak Failure Probability..............................................................................................................50
Equation 9: Liner Modification Factor ........................................................................................................................51
Equation 10: Rapid Bottom Failure Probability ..........................................................................................................53

Equation 11: Adjust for Insulation Quality .................................................................................................................77

Equation 12: Adjustment Factor for External Coating ................................................................................................78
Equation 13: Confidence Adjustment of Measured Corrosion Rate ...........................................................................79
Equation 14: LoF Calculation with MFGFF ..................................................................................................................81
Equation 15 Scaling Factor .........................................................................................................................................81
Equation 16: DF Adjustment Ratio Calculation between Courses..............................................................................82
Equation 17: DF Adjustment.......................................................................................................................................83
Equation 18: Safe Filling Height calculation (HSafe) ...................................................................................................84
Equation 19: Calculation of tCalc ..................................................................................................................................85
Equation 20: Required Wall Thickness (tmin) ..............................................................................................................85
Equation 21: LoFShell Calculaton – Leak and Rupture.................................................................................................86
Equation 22: Representative DFShell ............................................................................................................................86
Equation 23: LoFShell Calculation ................................................................................................................................86
Equation 24: Total CoF Cost .......................................................................................................................................89
Equation 25: Environmental clean-up cost calculation ...............................................................................................92
Equation 26: Downtime Cost Calculation ...................................................................................................................94
Equation 27: Flow Rate as per Giroud and Bonaparte ..............................................................................................102
Equation 28: Fraction Reaching Groundwater ..........................................................................................................106
Equation 29: Release Rate calculation from Shell Leak............................................................................................108
Equation 30: Representative Shell Leak Release Rate (bbl/hr) .................................................................................110
Equation 31: Liquid Height (∆H) calculation ...........................................................................................................111
Equation 32: Weighted CoF for Floor Failures .........................................................................................................112
Equation 33: Shell Leak CoFShell Calculation............................................................................................................113
Equation 34: CoFShell Calculation ..............................................................................................................................113
Equation 35: Shell CoFRupture Calculation..................................................................................................................114
Equation 36: Weighted CoFShell Calculation – Maintained to API 653.....................................................................114
Equation 37: Weighted CoFShell Calculation – Not Maintained to API 653 ..............................................................114
Equation 38: Risk Calculation (Floor Failure) ..........................................................................................................120
Equation 39: Risk Calculation (Welded Tank) – Leak..............................................................................................121
Equation 40: Risk Calculation (Welded Tank) – Rupture.........................................................................................121
Equation 41: Shell Risk Calculation..........................................................................................................................121

O.1. GENERAL
O 1.1 Scope
The scope of this document is to provide a methodology for planning inspection of aboveground storage
tanks (AST) based on environmental risk, and complies with the principles of API 580 in terms of Risk
Based Inspection.
The methodology applies to atmospheric AST’s, designed to API 12D or API 650, and used for storage of
hydrocarbon fluids. The fluid types mainly relate to the consequence calculations1.
A qualitative screening method is provided for brittle fracture assessment and evaluation of potential
cracking damage mechanism on the tank shell. The screening output is a qualitative level of susceptibility
to brittle fracture and cracking, and the mechanisms by which cracking is likely to be driven.
A quantitative method is provided for potential corrosion damage on both the tank shell and the tank
floor. Widespread corrosion and localized corrosion, including pitting and erosion-corrosion, are within
the scope of this methodology, and address internal and external corrosion on both shell and floor
surfaces.
O 1.2 References
The following references material has been used in developing this RBI methodology:
/1/ Aboveground Storage Tank, Risk Assessment Manual (RAM), API Aboveground Storage Tank
Committee, January 2002 (draft Appendix A and B issued for ballot January 2002)
/2/ Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage, API 650, 10th Edition, November 1998, including
Addendum 1 January 2000 and Addendum 2, November 2001.
/3/ Cathodic Protection of Aboveground Petroleum Storage Tanks, API RP 651, 2nd Edition,
November 1997
/4/ Lining of Aboveground Petroleum Storage Tank Bottoms, API RP 652, 2nd Edition, December
1997
/5/ Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction, API 653, 3rd Edition, December 2001
/6/ ASM, Metals Handbook, Ninth Edition, Vol. 13 Corrosion (1987).
/7/ Dr. Richard A. White, Materials Selection for Petroleum Refineries and Gathering Facilities,
NACE International, 1998, Houston, Texas
/8/ Inspection of Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks, API RP 575, 1st Edition, November
1995
/9/ Risk Based Inspection, API RP 580, 1st Edition, May 2002
/10/ Specification for Field Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids, API 12D, 10th Edition,
November 1994
1
The original intent with this document was to address AST’s that are used for storage of hydrocarbon products –
the same as the API RAM document. However, with minor adjustments to some of the elements of the RBI
methodology, other type of fluids can also be considered. This is noted where applicable.

O 1.3 Definitions
*** EXPAND DURING REVIEW ***
O.1.4.1 damage factor (DF): An expression for the condition that a component is expected to be in, i.e.
it determines how close the component is to a theoretical failure. The DF is a function of the components
age (a), rate of corrosion (r), nominal wall thickness (t), and amount of past inspection. The DF is
determined from a look-up table by entering the ar/t value and picked the DF value from the appropriate
inspection effectiveness column. As expected, the variable is age, and the ar/t value is the theoretical
fraction of wall loss at the any given Age.
O.1.4.2 risk profile: The change of risk over time, and is in context of this document understood as the
change in damage factor (DF) over time. The profile can also be expressed in dollars/yr by multiplying
the DF by the probability weighted consequence (which is a fixed dollar value). However, depending on
the consequence, this will just scale up the profile, and with
O.1.4.3 damage factor inspection target (DFTarget): The tolerable limit for the damage factor. Once
the risk profile reaches the DF target an Inspection is recommended. The effectiveness of the inspection
should reduce the damage factor as much as possible, not only below the target, e.g. the highest attainable
inspection effectiveness is always recommended, provided it is practicable and cost effective.
O.2. INTRODUCTION
The objective with this document is to define a methodology for modeling risk associated with
Aboveground Storage tanks (AST’s), and how to apply a Risk Based approach for planning inspection of
AST’s. An ingrained goal is to determine the practical implementation of the RBI approach and to
establish a basis for validating the usage of this methodology in lieu of time based inspection planning
method.
AST inspection intervals can range widely (from a few years up to 20 years), depending on local
jurisdiction and company inspection philosophy. Likewise can the associated cost in terms of monetary
investment and increased hazards for environment and personnel, be significant. This risk prediction
model has been developed in search of the optimum timing for inspection based on the predicted risk, and
at the same time considers the companies (or local jurisdictions) tolerance towards risk. The objective
with this model is also to visualize and portray the risk progression for each AST as a function of time.
The most appropriate time for the next inspection is determined in relation to a defined risk criterion –
representing the risk tolerance. This in principle constitutes the inspection-planning task.
The deliverables for an AST RBI study should enable the owner/operator to present the theory and
practical application of the methodology to the local regulators, and prompt a debate about the basis on
which future AST internal inspections can be determined upon, e.g. RBI versus Time Based Intervals.
This is a local issue that needs to be raised on a case-to-case basis, and does not enter into the details of
this methodology document.
O 2.1 RBI Methodology Introduction
The content of this document is envisaged being used as a reference and guideline, and to ensure a
consistent approach for implementing RBI for AST’s. Unless the outlined methodology is supported by a
fairly rigorous convention for its implementation, in theory the analysis output could be manipulated to
show any desired result, and possibly rendering the methodology deceitful.

As illustrated very simplistically on Figure 1, there are only a few tasks involved in doing the RBI study
for an AST. The majority of the work relates to the data gathering.
Figure 1: Overview of Main Tasks
Collect Tank Data & Info.

Reference Methodology
Report for:
Assess Tank History Data
• Data collection
• Assigning Effectiveness for
past inspections Validate and consolidate data.
• Settings input data for Determine all input “setting”
calculations
• Using analysis results
Perform analyses and generate
• Inspection Planning
Inspection Plan
• (Cost benefit analysis)
(Cost benefit assessment)
The Cost benefit assessment task is added in parenthesis because this can be done in several different
ways and does not constitute an integral part of the RBI methodology. No Cost Benefit Assessment
method has been included in this report.
The detailed steps involved in performing the calculation and analysis are somewhat more complex than
implied on Figure 1. The details of the analysis task are shown on Figure 2.
It is suggested that the RBI program be applied conservatively, in order to align existing procedures and
practices with the RBI methodology, and ultimately become more confident with the whole approach.
Figure 2 provides a coarse overview of the elements of the methodology and the details required when
performing the analysis.
Figure 3 outlines the main elements that enter into the RBI methodology, and its intermediate analysis
steps and results.

Figure 2: Analysis Calculation Overview
Start Analysis
Complete Data Base:

SHELL
FLOOR
Inspection History C
General Data and
Information
CoF for the Floor A CR for the Shell Courses CoF for the Shell B
CoF Category CR for the Floor Damage susceptibility Safe Filling Height CoF Category
assessment for the Shell
(cracking and brittle
Inspection Target fracture)
DF for the Floor
DF for the Shell Courses Inspection Target
Recommended Inspection LoF for the Shell (Max DF

for the Floor LoF for the Floor for the courses) Critical Course
A Risk related to the Floor Total AST Risk (Sum) Risk related to the Shell B
Recommended Inspection or other

action for the Shell
RBI study Report, including

Inspection year and
effectiveness C
(Recommended by RBI)
API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 11 of 124 June 2003

Figure 3: Overview of main methodology elements and related details needed for these.
Star
t
Determine Corrosion Rate: Consequence Calculations:

• Soil side CR – Calculated • Clean-up cost
o Base CR • Fluid Type
o Adjustment factors • Distance to groundwater
Soil resistivity • Estimated time to detect a leak
Tank pad • Soil type, etc.
quality => Inspection Target (Target DF)
CP, etc.
• Product side CR – Calculated
o Base CR Criterion for Inspection Target
o Adjustment factors
• Probability weighted
Coating
consequence
Water draw,
o Ultimate CoF
etc.
o Leak versus Rupture
• External CR – Calculated => Consequence of Failure (CoF)
o Base CR i ( )
o Adjustment factors
Climate
Coating, etc. Risk Calculation
• LoF × CoF
o Floor
o Shell
DF and LoF Calc => Risk Exposure ($/Yr)
• CR, Age, Nominal WT
• Past Inspections
=> DF ar/t Modif. Factor
• Generic Failure Frequency Inspection Planning
• Condition factors • DF
o Liner, o Floor versus Shell
o Maintained to API • Inspection DF Target
653 o Floor versus Shell
o Settlement => Recommended inspection time
• Floor and Shell
Cost Benefit Analysis (example)

• Cost of inspection
• Discount rate
• Interval with versus without
RBI

O 2.2 Background
Since around 1995, API has lead a committee to address issues relating to aboveground storage tanks,
with the objective to establish a recommended practice for risk assessment of AST’s. This has resulted in
a risk assessment manual (RAM), including one main report and two Appendices (‘A’ for Frequency
Analysis, and ‘B’ for Consequence Analysis). A draft of the RAM document was prepared in January
2002 for a formal ballot by the API AST group members. This very version of the RAM document is the
referred document in context of this methodology document (see reference /1/).
The objective with the API RAM project is to enable the user to determine practically all elements of risk
associated with AST operations at any one given point in time. The RAM addresses tank shell, bottom,
auxiliary piping, filling operation, etc. with the purpose of determining potential areas of concern.
Mitigation in context with the RAM could be inspection, improved operating procedures, equipment
layout, emergency response strategies, etc.
The Risk Based Inspection methodology that is defined in this RBI document does to a large extent build
on the principle and details of the API RAM document. The main difference is that the RBI methodology
is focused on inspection planning, by assessing risk as a function of time. Hence, determining an
appropriate time for inspection based on risk. The RBI approach considers risk associated with tank floor
and shell failures as drivers for inspection and or consequence mitigation, ref. Table 1.
Table 1: Liquid release scenarios analyzed in the AST RBI methodology
Release Failure Scenarios Comment

Small bottom leak. Leak may persist for an extended One hole size is considered: small leak (0.125 in. diameter
period, depending on local leak monitoring. hole).
This is the main floor failure scenario that is addressed in
the RBI methodology, and is focused on bottom corrosion.
The likelihood can be influenced by inspection.
Rapid bottom failure (floor-to-shell region), One scenario, catastrophic failure
instantaneous release of tank contents from failure at
Addressed in the RBI methodology through the corrosion
the critical zone.
model and compliance with recognized design and
inspection / maintenance codes. The likelihood is only to a
limited degree influenced by inspection.
Small shell leak. Leak detected visually or by Three hole size scenarios: 0.125 in., 0.5 in. and 2 in.
monitoring. diameter hole.
This is the main shell failure scenario that is addressed in
the RBI methodology, and is focused on shell corrosion.
The likelihood can be influenced by inspection.
Rapid shell failure, instantaneous release of tank One scenario, catastrophic failure.
contents from brittle fracture or large rupture of the
Addressed in the RBI methodology by screening, and is not
tank shell.
influenced by inspection for corrosion.
The risk associated with the relevant failure scenarios in Table 1 is expressed as:
Risk = Likelihood × Consequence
where,

Likelihood = Base Failure Frequency × Damage Factor (DF)

Consequence = Environmental Cost + Business Interruption & Repair Costs
The DF is described further in section O.4.6.3.
All of the failure scenarios need to be assessed and ultimately combined to determine the main driver for
risk, and hence the next inspection.
O 2.3 Generic Failure Frequencies (GFF) – AST Floor and Shell
The base or generic failure frequencies used for this RBI Methodology have been summarized in Table 2.
Further details on the background information are included in section O.2.3.1 and O.2.3.2.
Table 2: Base Leak Frequencies for Tank Floor and Shell
Relative
Total Comparison Frequency
Failure Scenario (Hole Size) Comparison
(Floor & Shells) (per year)
(GFF Relative Ratio)
Floor: 100% 86.78% 7.22 × 10-3
Floor – Leak (≤ 0.5 in.) 99.72% 86.54% 7.2 × 10-3
Floor – Rapid Failure 0.28% 0.24% 2.0 × 10-5
Welded Shell: 100.00% 1.20% 1.00 × 10-4

Shell (Welded) – Leak ( ≥ 0.125 in.) 99.90% 1.20% 1.0 × 10-4
Shell (Welded) – Rapid Failure
– Tanks maintained to API 653 0.10% 0.00% 1.0 × 10-7
Shell (Welded) – Rapid Failure
– Tanks NOT maintained to API 6532 (3.85%) 4.0 × 10-6
Riveted Shell: 100.00% 12.02% 1.00 × 10-3

Shell (Riveted) – Leak ( ≥ 0.125 in.) 100.00% 12.02% 1.0 × 10-3
Shell (Riveted) – Rapid Failure3 0.00% 0.00% 0
Floor + Welded Shell + Riveted Shell Failures: 100% 8.32 × 10-3
The distribution does not consider the relative number of tanks in each group, i.e. welded versus riveted
or maintained to API 653 versus not maintained to API 653.
2
From a statistical standpoint, all tank Shells are initially assumed to have been designed to a recognized code, and
currently maintained to API 653. If not, the likelihood of a rupture failure is assumed a factor of 40 higher.
3
Rapid failures are not considered relevant for riveted tanks.

O.2.3.1 GFF – Floor Failures

O.2.3.1.1 Leakage
The base failure frequency for the leak of a tank bottom was derived primarily from an analysis of a
portion of the American Petroleum Institute publication A Survey of API Members’ Aboveground Storage
Tank Facilities, which was released by the Health and Environmental Affairs Department, July 1994.
The survey included refining, marketing, and transportation storage tanks each compiled separately.
The survey included the years 1983 to 1993. Table 3 shows the highlights of the survey results. One of
the most significant findings of the survey was that tank bottom leaks contributing to soil contamination
had been cut in half in the last five years compared to the first five years covered by the survey. This was
attributed to an increased awareness of the seriousness of the problem, and to the issuance of the API 653
standard for aboveground storage tank inspection.
Table 3: Summary of Survey Results
Percent with Number with

Number of Bottom Leak Frequency
Population Description Bottom Leaks in Bottom Leaks in Tank Years*
Tanks (1988 – 1993)
Last Five Years Last Five Years
Tanks < 5 years old 466 0.9% 4 2330 1.7 × 10-3
Tanks 6 – 15 years old 628 3.8% 24 3140 7.6 × 10-3
Tanks > 15 years old 9204 3.8% 345 46020 7.5 × 10-3
All tanks in survey 10298 3.6% 373 51490 7.2 × 10-3
* Tank years = number of tanks × average number of years in service
A bottom leak frequency of 7.2 × 10-3 leaks per year was chosen as the base leak frequency by the AST
RBI methodology. Although the leak frequency survey indicates that tanks less than 5 years old have a
much lower leak frequency, it has been decided to use the whole survey population in setting the base
leak frequency. The age of the tank is elsewhere accounted for in the methodology since the percent wall
loss is a function of the tank age, corrosion rate, and original wall thickness. The percent wall loss is the
basis of the modifier on the base leak frequency. Thus a very young tank with minimal corrosion will
have a frequency modifier that does not drive the predicted risk to the point where an inspection is
recommended.
The aforementioned survey did not report the size of leaks, but a survey of the sponsors for the API AST
RAP project indicated that leak sizes of ≤½ in. in diameter would adequately describe the vast majority of
tank bottom leaks.
O.2.3.1.2 Rupture or Rapid Failure

Based on the experience of one of the large operating companies in the US, the base frequency for rapid
bottom failures (or failures at the bottom/shell interface) has been set to 2.0 × 10-5 per year. The
experience consists of 9 rapid bottom failures over 40 years for a tank population of 5,000 tanks. The
failure frequency was then halved based on anecdotal evidence (lack of such incidents) at several smaller
operating companies. This failure rate is then modified by three factors (1) whether the tank is designed,
fabricated, and maintained according to recognized industry standards, (2) the extent of corrosion, and (3)
inspection for and presence of tank settlement.

O.2.3.2 GFF – Shell Failure

O.2.3.2.1 Leak
There appears to be very limited failure data available for relatively insignificant tank shell leakage.
However, based on operators experience in the US, the vast majority of AST shell leaks are only large
enough to wet the shell surface, without the fluid reaching the ground. Although, these leaks would add
value to the leak failure statistics, they are considered relatively insignificant in terms of consequence,
and hence not included in the basis for this RBI methodology. Thus, only two failure categories will be
considered: (1) small shell leaks of 1/8 in. or larger that reach the ground, and (2) rapid shell failures. The
summarized leak frequencies are shown in Table 2. A failure rate for rapid shell failures was determined
separately based on actual incidents, as noted below.
It has been assumed that riveted tanks would leak approximately one order of magnitude more frequently
than welded tanks.
The failure frequencies in Table 2 illustrate the relative leak frequencies for tank shell compared to tank
floors. In reality, there is only limited data available to determine reliable failure rates and the associated
drivers or degradation mechanisms that lead to these failures.
O.2.3.2.2 Rupture
A review of literature produced reports of two rapid shell failures in the petroleum industry in the United
States in the last thirty years:
a. 1971 (location unknown), brittle fracture caused loss of 66,000 bbl crude oil
b. 1988 Ashland Oil, PA, brittle fracture caused loss of 96,000 bbl diesel
One could argue that this set of data may be incomplete. It is difficult to imagine, however, that a
catastrophic failure of a large storage tank could escape the attention of the national news media.
The number of tanks that provided the basis for the two failures was estimated from literature to be about
33,300 large storage tanks. This value was based on a 1989 study carried out for API by Entropy Ltd.
Large, in this case, is defined as having a capacity greater than 10,000 barrels. The number of tanks
represents the total in the Unites States for the refining, marketing, transportation, and production sectors.
Thus, the total number of tank years was found to be approximately 1,000,000.
Dividing the number of failures by the number of tank years yields a rapid shell failure frequency of
2×10-6 per tank year. API Standard 653 requires an evaluation of tanks for susceptibility to brittle fracture.
Hydrostatic testing or re-rating of the tank may be required for continued service. API 653 thus provides
considerable protection against brittle fracture. Assuming one-half of the tanks are maintained to API 653,
then the base leak frequencies for rapid shell failures would be as shown in Table 2.
It has been assumed that rupture failure does not apply for riveted storage tanks.
O 2.4 Advantages with RBI for AST’s
Under normal circumstances the AST operator is faced with two methods or options to plan for internal
AST inspection, e.g. API 653 or a state regulated time based inspection frequency. As per the 1999
addendum to API 653, the code allows the owner-operator to establish internal inspection intervals using
RBI procedures, which in principle introduces a third option.

The application of a RBI program can be argued to introduce a basis for better and more pertinent
planning for AST inspection. A couple of items that are motivated by the implementation of RBI can be
expected to be:
a. Systematic categorization; All tanks are prioritized into formal Risk categories, and modeled as
individual components in the RBI analysis system. This creates a uniform and systematic base for
planning the inspection. The system is based on:
1) Consistent approach for calculating a representative value for tank floor degradation at any given
point in time, i.e. a quantitative assessment of the likelihood of failure.
2) Consistent approach for assessing the consequence of failure (CoF) for each specific tank, and
quantifying the CoF as well as risk in dollars per years.
b. Detailed assessment of all tanks; review of all tank data records, and assessment of inspection results
in context with the risk of failure over long periods of time, is part of the implementation process for
the RBI program.
c. Focus inspection effort to reduce risk; since the operating, maintenance and inspection history are
important inputs for analyzing a tank, RBI motivates a better focus on establishing good inspection
records that address the need for improving the AST model for each tank. This again should improve
the specific scope for each inspection that is planned.
d. Improved record keeping; The program should encourage the owner-operator to accumulate the
operational experience, which in time will prove valuable for enhancing the RBI program, as well as
future analysis work.
e. Enable long term planning and avoiding bottlenecks in terms of reducing inspection today, which
might result in an increased amount of inspection in 10 to 15 years from now.
O 2.5 Limitations, Assumptions, Guidelines and Recommendations

The guidelines and recommendations in this section were developed through a number of case studies
with known inspection histories. It is recommended that each site consider a similar validation effort
using the following as a guideline to develop internal standards for application of the AST RBI tool.
It is also recommended to establish a written procedure for how to apply and implement the AST RBI
Methodology. A software tool or spreadsheet may be necessary to ensure a consistent analysis approach
and achieve reliable results.
The user should review and consider all limitations and assumptions as well as the conservatism that is
built into this approach, and consider these in their written procedure.
The following limitations, assumptions, guidelines and recommendations apply for this technology;
O.2.5.1 Assumptions
a. The approach used for AST’s applies to aboveground storage tanks subject to damage from product
side and soil side corrosion, as well as the external environment. It is assumed for the tank floor that
the product side corrosion can be either generalized or localized, whereas the soil corrosion is always
localized.

b. The damage factor assumes that the thinning mechanism has resulted in a constant rate of
thinning/pitting over the period defined for the analysis. The likelihood of failure is estimated by
examining the possibility that the corrosion rate is greater than expected. The number and type of
inspections that have been performed determine the likelihood of discovering these higher rates. The
more thorough the inspection and the greater the number of inspections, the less likely is the chance
that the corrosion rate is greater than anticipated.
c. Repair of tank floor means restoring the minimum wall thickness to at least 30% of the original wall
thickness.
Assumptions related to specific adjustment factors or details of the methodology are mentioned in that
context.
O.2.5.2 Limitations
a. The module is only applicable for aboveground atmospheric storage tanks constructed in carbon steel
(floor and shell)
b. Consequence does not consider toxicity and fatality issues – only environmental and financial
impacts from failures.
c. Double floor tanks are considered as single bottom with a release prevention barrier. This is probably
too conservative when calculating the consequence of failure.
d. Not considering bottom design (i.e. cone up or cone down or flat bottom). Data is not currently
available to determine the impact of bottom design on failure frequencies (GFF) or corrosion rates.
e. Annular Ring is not considered separately. The ring is seen as an integral part of the floor, and
normally with a larger wall thickness. Based on experience, there is no reason to suppose that the
annular ring will fail, in terms of leakage, more frequently than other parts of the Tank floor.
However, the center section of the floor seems to be somewhat less prone to severe corrosion than
other part of the floor, in particular the floor perimeter.
f. Floor bulging or buckling – due to thermal cycling or varying filling height – is not specifically
modeled. The immediate impact from this scenario is that the Cathodic Protection (CP) system will
become ineffective when the floor is no longer in intimate contact with the pad underneath. Also the
risk of floor weld cracking increases significant if floor plates are overlay welded as oppose to butt-
welded, and the floor bulges due to thermal expansion. For operating temperature <250°F, bulging is
assumed not to be an issue.
O.2.5.3 Risk Profile Plot

The risk profile, which is the calculated DF as function of time, is plotted for each Tank under the given
conditions. The objective is to visualize the incremental risk increase over time as well as documenting
the optimum timing for the next inspection. Where applicable, other means of reducing risk should be
included in the plot – these include CP system, water draw, coating or liner and tank pad sand quality.
a. The risk plot should be built up in appropriate increments (minimum 1 year), and should be re-
produced in either of the following cases;

b. Any major changes such as installing new floor, new sand pad, adding water draw, adding steam coil,
etc.
c. Liner or coating added, or when the liner is inspected and repaired.
d. Change of service.
e. CP system added and proven effective (by inspection).
f. When an inspection is made. The objective is to give credit for individual inspections from the time
they are made, and reflect this on the risk profile. It is optional to reset the analysis (or WT), based on
good measurement results.
O.2.5.4 General Guidelines

The list below should be used in relation to the data input tables, and form part of the guideline for
implementing RBI for AST’s. This is in part to define the methodology, and to ensure a consistent
approach for doing a RBI analysis.
a. Cathodic protection (CP) and corrosion rate; where a measured CR is available and a CP system is
subsequently added, the CR should remain unchanged until proven different (improved) by further
inspection.
b. Cathodic protection; assume all cp systems comply with API RP 651. No credit is given for the cp
system until a highly effective inspection verifies that the system is indeed effective in arresting
corrosion.
c. Corrosion rate – calculated vs. measured; measured rates should be used whenever available,
otherwise the calculated rate should be used. Note, when the measured rates are used, the settings
contributing to a calculated rate (such as soil resistivity, CP system, etc.) Are not taken into account.
As part of the analysis and where relevant, the available measured cr should be compared to the
calculated CR, and in case there is a significant difference (≥25%), the CR should be subject to
further evaluation.
d. Corrosion Rate – measured; In case of hole through; When the CR is calculated from inspection
results for a floor that has holed through, the issue becomes when the floor actually holed through. To
account for this uncertainty, the following should be applied:
1) Add 25% to the measured CR if only a couple of small holes (<1/8 in.) were found.
2) Add 50% to the measured CR if one of the few holes were large (>1/4 in.) or if several smaller
holes were found.
3) In case of no leak, the measured CR should be assigned a confidence factor. See section O.4.5.2.
e. Corrosion type (product side) is set to Generalized if not specifically known to be localized from
previous inspection. Note: Soil Side CR is always localized (setting is not optional).
f. Detection time (see leak detection time).

g. Dike – If installed, it is assumed the dike will retain 50% of the Tank content in case of a rupture, i.e.
50% will be released over the Dike.
h. Environmental sensitivity; unless noted otherwise for the specific tank, use a medium setting for
environmental clean-up cost factors.
i. Penalty cost should be applied where relevant, but should typically not be included in the
consequence of failure calculation. This cost is added directly to the consequence cost value.
j. Inspection history; the effectiveness categories should be assigned based on the inspection technique
and efforts documented in the inspection history files. Where a floor and sand pad are replaced in
kind, the previous inspections can be carried forward with the new floor (as relevant knowledge), but
should be ignored in case the circumstances for some reason do change (operational parameters,
different floor thickness, sand pad quality, etc.).
k. Leak detection time should be set relative to the leak detection methods and test frequencies that are
applied at the facility. The following time intervals are suggested as default settings for leak
detection:
1) Large shell leaks: 1 day.

2) Small shell leaks: 7 days.
3) Floor leaks – tanks on concrete, asphalt or grillage: 7 days.
4) Floor leaks – tanks with RPB or permanent leak detection system: 30 days.
5) Floor leaks – tanks with no RPB or leak detection system: 360 days. This is based on typical
frequency of trace gas testing (once per year). If test frequencies justify a different setting, the
detection time should be updated accordingly.
l. Coating or liner needed; if product or stock side corrosion is measured to more than 2mpy, or if no
inspection is available to determine the corrosion rate, coating is assumed needed.
m. Material of construction; all tank shell and floor materials are assumed to be carbon steel.
n. Native soil resistivity for concrete pad foundation is set to RPB Installed, which gives an adjustment
factor of 1, i.e. no effect of the calculated CR.
o. Operating temperature; for a given range of operating temperatures, the worst case should be selected
for the analysis.
p. Planned inspection; RBI recommended inspection effectiveness for future inspections is always ‘A’.
This is due to the fact that the increase in actual inspection cost by going from a ‘D’ level to an ‘A’
level inspection is minimal compared to having to re-enter the tank five years earlier for the next
inspection.
q. Product-side corrosion rate – when measured and known, the corrosion type should be set to
Localized in order to avoid potentially counting the measured rate twice. The measured Product Side
CR is expected to a large degree to capture the soil side corrosion as well as the product side
corrosion (i.e. where ultrasonic based inspection techniques are applied for WT measurements).

r. Repair of tank floor; when tank floors are repaired, it should in generally be assumed that the
minimum wall thickness is brought up to minimum 30% of the original WT. This only applies for fill
welding of localized pitted area – preferably the minimum WT has been measured. The WT and Age
can be updated for the analysis, in principle considering the floor as a new item with a reduced WT.
See section O 4.5.
s. Soil-side corrosion rate – which inherently is a Localized Corrosion Type, should be calculated unless
specifically measured.
t. Tank design and maintenance codes; all tanks are normally assumed designed to a recognized
industry standard, and maintained according to API 653 or similar code.
u. Tank height and liquid level; it should be assumed that the average Tank have a liquid height
equivalent to 95% of its total Tank height.
v. Tank Pad; New Sand Cushion (sand pads) are assumed to be Native Soil or Construction grade sand
(depending on whether or not sand test data is available from time of installation). This setting is used
until inspection records show that no localized pitting is expected from the soil side. At this point in
time, the sand pad quality should be upgraded accordingly. This conservatism is to take into account
that even High resistivity, low chloride sand can be contaminated with for example lumps of clay
from the time of installation, and hence cause localized corrosion from the soil side. Tanks with
Concrete Pads are modeled for Soil Resistivity as Tank with RPB.
w. Tank-floor replacement or major repairs; the scenario for the RBI analysis significantly changes in
case the floor is replaced or undergoes major repairs or even just has a Liner added after several years
in service. In these cases, if relevant, the Tank should be analyzed for two scenarios, before and after
the changes have taken place.
x. Wet or dry product – i.e. fluid contains water; generally, it is assumed that all gasoline, diesel, fuel oil
and crude tanks contain a wet product, unless specifically noted otherwise.
O.2.5.4.1 General Recommended Practices

Various issues relating to tank operation are discussed in a list of general recommendations – listed
below. Some of the issues are pertinent to practices for tank bottom repair, leak detection, etc. that are
deemed to have a negative effect on the AST operational life. These recommendations can be taken as a
point of discussion as well as a recommended practice.
a. Bulging of floor; tanks that experience thermal cycling or large temperature variations, such as
asphalt tanks, when filling occurs too fast, or tanks that are frequently empty or close to empty, will
tend to bulge on the bottom. The bulged floor areas will have no contact with the sand beneath,
resulting in the CP system becoming ineffective for these locations. This potentially causes an
accelerated corrosion due to corrosion cells in pockets under the tank floor.
b. Consequence calculation; while the CoF category represents a CoF range, and that the CoF is a
product of the Environmental + Financial consequence, one can argue that the Financial consequence
should not necessarily force inspection in the case where the client determines inspection
predominantly driven by regulatory requirements and environmental considerations. Thus, by
omitting the Financial contribution the consequence category potentially becomes lower, allowing a

more optimized utilization of the AST for the specific risk scenario – in this case Environmental Risk.
At the same time, it is understood that the operator accepts the Financial Risk, whatever it might be,
and does not represent a driver for inspection in this context.
c. Cathodic protection; the effectiveness of a CP system highly depends on how it is designed, installed,
monitored and maintained. It can take several years to adjust the system for optimum performance.
Thus, no credit should be given for a CP system, until it is verified by inspection that the system is
indeed effective. The system should be set-up and maintained by qualified personnel and tested in
compliance with an acknowledged standard. A defective CP system can cause extreme rates of wall
thinning, e.g. reversed polarity, defective rectifiers, incorrect voltage or incorrect CP system design
can cause an accelerated rate of wall thinning under circumstances where little or no corrosion would
otherwise be expected. The appearance of this wall depletion would be similar to corrosion of carbon
steel in a moist environment, only at significantly higher rates.
d. External heat sinks for external heat coil can cause an increase in internal shell corrosion at these
locations.
e. Leaks with minimal consequence; for some tanks, where an RPB or concrete / asphalt foundation is
installed, the consequence of a small bottom leak is negligible, and the consequence driver is more the
risk associated to a rupture. In these cases it is appropriate to reassess the inspection target, while
keeping in mind that inspections normally relate to floor thinning and small leaks, and has limited
value for determining degradations leading to rupture.
f. Measured corrosion rate; where a measured CR is derived for a tank floor that is holed through, it is
virtually impossible to determine when hole through actually occurred and as such determine an exact
CR.
g. Moist or wet sand pad; A saturated sand pad (for example by rainwater or deliberate saturation with
soda-ash solution to change pH level), is likely to be more conductive than the native soil beneath.
This will potentially catalyze a high CR. The water is adding oxygen and increasing the O2 level in
the sand pad compared to the native soil. This potentially creates corrosion cell and introduces high
risk of crevice corrosion. It is recommended to maintain the sand pad as dry as possible at all times.
h. Release prevention barrier; the installation of some RPB’s will diminish a CP systems effect. This
should be considered when installing the RPB as well as allowing space for installing CP in between
the tank bottom and the RPB. The underlying assumption for calculating the environmental leak
consequence for tanks with RPB assume that there is a 1/8 in. hole in the RPB and the liquid head is 4
in..
i. Soil resistivity; variation in soil resistivity or sand pad conductivity potentially leads to formation of
macro corrosion cells. This might increase or cause severe soil side corrosion at certain locations
across the tank bottom. It is recommended that Soil Resistivity setting is representative to the Sand
Pad, if possible. In order to consider potential problems in this relation, it is recommended to use
Moderately Corrosive as the default setting for soil resistivity until a high level (A or B) inspection
shows proof of better conditions. This should tie-in to the Tank Pad quality and CP effectiveness
settings, i.e. set these conservatively until proven better by inspection.

j. Stray current; issues related to stray current drainage are addressed under the CP system, and should
be one of the parameters in designing, monitoring and controlling an effective CP system. It is
suggested that testing is done to determine if stray current is a potential problem or not.
k. Tank pad; a clean sand cushion with a high resistivity level and low chloride content will in theory
get contaminated over time by moisture, ionic species, salts and chlorides, etc. from the native soil
beneath. Also, lumps of clay or debris from the floor construction work can contaminate a new tank
pad, and potentially cause localized pitting type corrosion, even with a fairly effective CP system in
place. It is recommended to model a new tank pad fairly conservative (for the CR calculation) until
inspection shows that it is safe to assume that the sand is clean.
l. Leakage without consequence; given the right leak detection system and RPB or concrete / asphalt
foundation, it can for environmentally benign fluids be justified to allow the tank floor to run to
theoretical hole through before inspection, i.e. set the inspection target DF = Max value. This could
be considered, especially given the fairly large degree of conservatism that is built into the
methodology.
O.2.5.5 Conservatism Built into the RBI Methodology

It is important to realize that the calculated risk associated with an AST is intended to be as absolute as
possible, but will always be relative to the accuracy of the input data. The underlying details of the
methodology should be read in context with the elements of conservatism that are built into the approach.
The detailed selection of adjustment factors or settings for the calculations are to a large degree based on
engineering judgment of inspection history records and available test data, such as soil resistivity tests,
soil permeability tests, etc. However, as these records might not always be entirely complete,
unambiguous and flawless, some additional guidelines have been provided to ensure a consistent
approach for the analysis, and to prevent credit being exaggerated for some of the crucial input data.
The following is a summary of the main items that are recommended for the practical application of RBI,
and do introduce a relatively high level of conservatism into the analysis approach.
O.2.5.5.1 Calculated Corrosion Rate (CR):
a. Soil resistivity – default moderately corrosive until proven otherwise by inspection.
b. Tank pad – for sand pads, use native soil if no sand test records are available to document that the
sand quality is high, and use construction grade sand if sand test record is available to document high
quality sand. Use these settings until the pad quality is proven by inspection (a or b level) to be high
quality.
c. CP system – although a CP system is installed and should be working, no credit should give for its
effectiveness until proven by inspection (a or b level).
d. Stored product is assumed wet if in doubt or if the measured cr from previous inspection indicates a
product side CR ≥ 2mpy.
e. Internal tank shell corrosion is determined for each course. Unless inspection data is available, course
1 CR is equal to the highest of calculated and measured bottom product side CR.

f. External tank shell CR is assumed never smaller than 0.5mpy, unless determined specifically through
effective inspections. This can be altered at the user discretion. The main objective with assuming at
least some corrosion is to drive formal inspection recommendations, although corrosion might not be
considered critical.
O.2.5.5.2 Measured Corrosion Rate (CR) and New Wall Thickness (WT)
a. A new floor WT can be calculated based on available inspection results. This new WT is
subsequently adjusted for an intuitive level of confidence in the measured value.
b. Any measured CR is adjusted for a level of Confidence, before applied in the analysis calculations.
c. In addition to the adjustment of the measured CR, the ar/t table is designed conservatively to take into
account the uncertainty about the actual tank floor condition, depending on age and available
inspection that is considered.
d. If the measured CR is derived from data on a floor that has holed through, the following convention is
used to account for the uncertainty of when the initial hole through did occur:
i. In case of only one hole, or a few small holes, multiply the measured CR with 1.25.
ii. In case of several holes or a large hole, multiply the measured CR with 1.5
O.2.5.5.3 Calculate DF and Likelihood

a. A fiberglass type liner cannot eliminate the risk of leakage. The Liner factor can at best reduce the
calculated DF to 20% of its original value, i.e. even with a brand new and good Liner, some leakage
is considered possible in case the metal sheet holes through (from the opposite side of the liner).
b. A Liner that is inspected and found in Good condition triggers an adjustment of the Liner age –
maximum 0.6 time actual age (credit given for max 30years actual age). An old liner can never be
considered the same as a new liner, regardless of inspection and repairs.
c. The analysis can be reset to consider a revised wall thickness (see item 2), that is based on available
minimum measured thickness. This procedure requires data from at least one A or B level inspection.
The New wall thickness is adjusted for confidence level before applied in the analysis. Past
inspections are maintained in the analysis, provided everything else remains the same.
d. The ar/t table is designed to be fairly conservative. Hence, the amount of credit given for a Low Level
inspection (D or even C) is almost negligible. The ar/t table (or damage factor – DF – table) is derived
from a statistical concept, outlined in section O.5.7.2 in this document.
O.2.5.5.4 Consequence of Failure (CoF)

a. As default, it is assumed that 50% of the total tank volume escapes the Dike in the event of a rupture,
resulting in an increased CoF value. Depending on the dike size and construction, this value can be
altered accordingly.
b. Native Soil Type or Soil permeability is taken from the average measured value for hydraulic
conductivity (cm/sec). The most appropriate is to use the lowest representative value, which denotes

the smallest soil particle size and compactness that is found in vertical direction of the tank floor
towards groundwater, and which would represent a continuous layer beneath the tank.
c. The fraction of fluid that is calculated to contaminate the soil and groundwater in case of leakage is
based on volume released through a 1/8 hole, distance to groundwater and vertical flow velocity
through the soil. It is not considered how much of the leaked volume is likely to be absorbed to wet
the soil in horizontal direction.
O.2.5.5.5 Inspection Planning

a. Recommend time for inspection is the year before the target DF is reached
b. Inspection targets are set conservatively. Table 4 gives a suggested set of inspection target values for
the DF. These are developed from a relatively conservative rational. The user is free to set the target
DF to whatever value is found to be appropriate and in line with the company’s inspection and risk
strategies, as long as there is a rational basis for the numbers.
Table 4: Default – Recommended Inspection Targets
CoF Category A B C D E
Max DF 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390
Limit 30% 24% 18% 12% 6%
Recommended
415 335 250 165 85
Inspection Targets
c. Inspection Credit; In general there should be applied a conservative approach for assessing and
interpreting the available inspection and test records. For example, it is recommended not to take
credit for more than a ‘C’ level inspection for a non-destructive soil side inspection dated prior to
1995, as the typically applied techniques were not adequately developed at this point in time. With
better techniques available today, the focus should be turned towards ensuring that high credit is
achieved for future inspection, as suppose to stretching the credit for past inspections and inspection
practices. This might include special qualification programs for the technicians that apply the NDE
techniques that are commonly used.
O.3. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

The methodology for likelihood and consequence are described in separate sections. Also the
methodology description for the tank floor and tank shell has been split. The reason being the drivers and
scenarios are different. However, the principle of the methodology is the same for both the floor and the
shell, which is to combine likelihood of failure (LoF) and consequence of failure (CoF) into risk. The CoF
is calculated only once for each component and stays static unless the scenario changes, whereas the LoF
varies with time. The LoF is a product of the typical failure frequency for the component failure – floor or
shell – and an adjustment factor. The adjustment factor depends on the elements that would typically
influence the frequency of failure (mechanical integrity, operating environment, active degradation
mechanisms and rates, etc.), as well as the certainty or knowledge about these elements. Hence, the basic

concept is to modify a generic failure frequency for the component failures by a factor that is related to
both the potential degradation occurring, and the amount and effectiveness of inspection performed to
reveal the degradation mechanism.
O.3.1.1 Risk
One way to portray risk quantitatively is to produce a point-estimate of risk from the consequence-
frequency data pair. This is usually done by multiplying the likelihood and consequence data points
together to produce a measure with units of consequence per year. The mathematical expression for this
score is as follows:
Equation 1: Risk Calculation
Risk ($/yr) = LoF (events/yr) × CoF ($/event)
Multiplying likelihood and consequence together is convenient because it reduces the risk measure to a
single point. The single risk point is often referred to as the expected value of risk for a scenario, and it
can be thought of as a probability-weighted consequence estimate.
Each type of Risk scenario or event for a given component4, being floor Leak, floor-to-shell Rupture,
constitutes a Risk contribution. Thus, the total risk is the summary of all contributing events. The
calculated total Risk is the expected exposure in relative terms, and does take into account the worst-case
consequence scenarios and probability for each failure scenario. The same applies for the shell
component.
O.3.1.2 Likelihood of Failure
The estimation of a component’s leak frequency is found by using a factor to adjust a base (generic or
typical) failure frequency. This modifier is referred to as the damage factor (DF). The scenarios in the
risk model dictate how to combine failure scenarios for a component.
The likelihood of failure (LoF) is determined as;
Equation 2: LoF Calculation
LoF (events/yr) = Base Failure Frequency (events/yr) × Damage Factor
The Base Failure Frequency is a Generic Failure Frequency (GFF) that has been derived from operator
experience within the petrochemical industry in the US (see Table 2). The damage factor is a reflection of
the condition that the specific Tank component is expected to be in. The damage factor increases as the
related component degradation worsens.
O.3.1.3 Consequence
The consequence of a spill is measured in dollars and consists of environmental clean-up costs,
environmental penalties, repair costs, and lost opportunity costs. The Consequence of Failure (CoF) is
determined as;
Equation 3: CoF Calculation
Total Cost($) = Environmental Clean-up($) + Environmental Penalties($) + Lost Business
Opportunity($) + Repair($)
4
Floor and Shell are considered two separate components in that a Floor might leak at the same time as the Shell
fails. Hence, a Shell failure is an added risk to the Floor failure, and as such not relative to the Floor risk.

The basic approach to estimating the environmental clean-up costs of a scenario is to add the cost for the
various clean-up methods needed to remediate a spill. Each component has a Clean-Up Factor (CUF) that
is based on the location of the spill and the type of material spilled. The unit of measure for the CUF is
dollars per barrel ($/bbl).
In mathematical terms, the cost for each component of the environmental clean-up operation is expressed
as follows:
Equation 4: CUF Caclulation
Environmental Clean-Up Cost = Volume × CUF
The costs for environmental penalties, repair, and lost opportunity are input by the user.
The CoF that determines the consequence category is the probability weighted Consequence (weighted by
GFF for each failure scenario, i.e. for tank bottom this is small leak and rupture).
O.3.1.4 Relative Risk
As a mean to assess and express risk in relative terms, such as a low, medium and high risk, the
qualitative assessments of likelihood and consequence are assigned to categories. A group of risk
categories or squares in a likelihood/consequence matrix make up a Risk Level. As an example, a low
probability is placed in Category 1, and a medium consequence might be assigned Category C. These
values can then be displayed in a matrix.
Figure 4 shows a risk matrix displaying five levels of likelihood and five levels of consequence. Risk
increases from the lower left corner to the upper-right corner of the matrix. So, E-5 would be the highest
risk point on the matrix, and A-1 would be the lowest.
Figure 4: Five-By-Five Risk Matrix
4
LIKELIHOOD
3
Plot of a scenario
2 with a rating of C-1
A B C D E
CONSEQUENCE
Figure 5 provides an example of four risk-levels assigned in a five-by-five matrix. This matrix format is
being used throughout this methodology.
Figure 5: Risk Matrix Showing Levels of Risk

5 Medium-High Risk High Risk
4
LIKELIHOOD
2 Low Risk Medium Risk
A B C D E
CONSEQUENCE
By assigning levels of risk within a matrix format, the relative risk is easily communicated and decisions
can be made regarding the disposition of the various underlying scenarios. It is important to note that
assigning risk-levels in this way should be a reflection of the company’s policies and tolerance to risk
exposure.
O.3.1.5 Total Risk – Tank Specific
The risk is calculated separately for the floor and the shell components, and can be added up or looked at
separately to make up the total risk associated with the tank (expressed in $/year). However, when
concluding the Risk Level for the tank, the Risk Level for the floor and shell should be considered
separately. Hence, the higher Risk Level determines the tank Risk Level as well as the component that
drives the risk, i.e. floor or shell. See the conceptual approach on Figure 6.
Figure 6: Risk Level Calculation

Calculate Tank
Risk Level
Floor Shell
CoF Cat LoF Cat CoF Cat LoF Cat
Risk Level - Floor Risk Level - Shell
(1) Tank Risk Level:

• Max [Floor Risk, Shell Risk]
• Output: Low, Medium, Medium-High, or High
(2) Risk driven by:
• Floor or Shell Failure
O.3.1.6 Risk Limits and Inspection Planning

Tolerable risk for AST operation is not easily expressed in terms of exact risk exposure, and at the same
time the only variable in the risk equation is the damage factor, e.g. the consequence and generic failure
frequency are static. Figure 7 shows the RBI Matrix, which is used to determine the LoF and CoF
categories throughout this methodology document. The matrix also includes inspection targets for the
damage factor.

Figure 7: Risk Rank Matrix (LoF and CoF Categories) and Recommend DFTargets
CONSEQUENCE ($)
$10K $100K $1M $10M
5 415 335 250 165 85

LIKELIHOOD (CATEGORY)
1000
LIKELIHOOD (DF)
4 415 335 250 165 85
100
3 - - - - 85
20
2 - - - - -
2
1 - - - - -
A B C D E
CONSEQUENCE (CATEGORY)
RISK LEVELS:
: Low Risk : Medium-High Risk
: Medium Risk : High Risk
Each field of the risk matrix holds the Inspection target for that CoF Category, and relates to the damage
factor (DF) value only. When Planning Inspection for AST’s the objective is to trigger an inspection
when the target is reached, rather than determining the inspection effectiveness necessary to achieve a
target value.
The set of DF target values suggested in the Inspection Planning Matrix relate to a DF range of 1 through
1390, and reflect a certain level of risk tolerance. See section O.8.1.2 for how the target values were
developed. It is recommended that the user evaluates these targets and determines the most appropriate
values that represent the company’s strategy for risk management.
The risk levels (Low, Medium, Medium-High and High) are not specifically used for inspection planning
in this methodology description. It is however recommended to incorporate the Risk Level classifications
in the mitigation strategy that relates to other means of mitigating risk than inspection. For example, the
tolerable risk increase per year (risk will increase with the DF, that is calculated as function of corrosion
rate and time) might be set low for a Medium-High Risk tank compared to a Medium Risk tank. The main
objective is to draw attention to the relatively high risk tanks before they actually are due for inspection.
Figure 8 illustrates the inspection-planning concept. The tank is assumed analyzed well before it is due
for inspection, and a time for the next inspection is recommended. The analysis also shows the credit that
is gained from an inspection that is performed at a given point in time. The inspection can theoretically be

performed before target, at target or after the inspection target is exceeded. The optimum time for the
inspection is obviously at the time the target is reached.
Figure 8: Risk Target and Inspection Planning
Risk / DF
Inspection Recommended
DF
Target
Inspection
Credit
Predicted Risk
Increase Risk after
Inspection
Time to next inspection
Current time Time
The risk profile is expressed as the DF increases over time. The target is set from the consequence
category only. A tank can be analyzed at any point in time, and the plot can stretch over any length of
time.

O.4. TANK BOTTOM – LIKELIHOOD OF FAILURE

O 4.1 Scope – Leak and Rupture
The methodology applies to atmospheric AST’s, designed to API 12D or API 650, and where the bottom
is subject to damage from both internal and external corrosion. Widespread corrosion and localized
corrosion, including pitting and erosion-corrosion, are within the scope of the module.
O 4.2 Methodology Overview – Leak and Rupture
The Figure 9 illustrates the flow of information through the analysis.
The damage factor (DFar/t) denominator is derived as a function of Age, Corrosion Rate and Nominal
Wall Thickness from Table 24 and relates specifically to floor leakage, for which inspection is most
relevant. Typical floor inspections are assumed less likely to ascertain confidence relating to rupture
probabilities. However, at the same time wall thinning can to some degree also be assumed to increase the
probability of rupture. Thus, RBI can be applied to tanks, by assessing the risk associated with leaks, and
to some degree rupture, and influencing the probability of failure by inspection.
The DFar/t range (Table 24) that is used throughout this methodology has been established based on a GFF
= 7.2×10-4 (or 1/1390 = GFFar/t) and is different from the GFF for any of the scenarios that are actually
assessed. Hence, a scaling factor is needed to align the LoF calculation with the DFar/t values.
For any component that can be related to a damage factor, the DF is indicative of wall loss, and inherently
holds an increased potential of failure as the DF approaches its maximum value. Thus, regardless of the
actual GFF, failure might be imminent once the DF reaches a certain level. At the same time, the GFF
should be taken into account to a certain degree, since historically the component has demonstrated more
or less reliable operation than a GFF = 7.2×10-4 may indicate. The GFF adjustment factor (MFGFF), or
scaling factor, as calculated in Equation 15, has been developed for the purpose of aligning the LoF
calculation to the DFar/t range in Table 24 for any component or failure scenario, and with due
consideration to the relevant GFF (see O 5.7 for more details).
As illustrated on Figure 9, several modification factors are included in the calculation of the final
likelihood of failure value.

Figure 9: Likelihood of Failure Calculation for Tank Floor
Calculate
LoF
Changes in input data:
- New Inspection Records
- Meas. or Est. CR available
- Similar Tank Data
- CP System changed
- Coating or Liner
Any - Repairs (New Age and WT)
changes since - New Floor
original service - etc.
start date? Yes
No Calculate CRFloor
RUPTURE LEAK
The Likelihood is based Calculate DFar/t for Leak failure

on DFar/t for Leak (CR, Age, WT and Inspection)
No Yes
Liner Installed?
Designed Yes Calculate MFLiner:

No
to Code - Liner Type
& maintained to MFLiner = 1.0
- Age
API 653 - Quality
MFDesign = 5.0 MFDesign = 1.0
DFar / t
LoFLeak = GFFLeak × × MFLiner
MFGFF , Leak
DFar / t
LoFRupture = GFFRupture × × MFDesign × MFSettlement LoFFloor = LoFLeak + LoFRupture
MFGFF , Rupture
LoFFloor
&
DFFloor = DFar/t x MFLiner
DFFloor

O 4.3 Input Data – Leak and Rupture

The below tables list all the input date required to model a tank floor following the described
methodology. Some guideline in determining the appropriate setting has been added.
Note that some input data is more sensitive to the analysis results than other. The user should be made
familiar with the most important data, and attempt to establish as accurate data as practicable. Data such
as Fluid Type and Soil Type are sensitive to the Consequence calculation, and hence the inspection
planning.
a. Table 5 contains a list of data required for calculation of soil and product side corrosion rates, and to
determine the ar/t damage factor value (fraction of the consumed wall): DFar/t
b. Table 6 contains a list of data required for the likelihood calculations.
c. Table 7 contains a list of data required for the consequence calculations.
d. Table 8 contains a list of date required for the Risk evaluation and Inspection Planning.
Table 5: Input Data Required for Bottom Corrosion Rate Calculation
Basic Data Comments

Measured or Estimated If measured or confidently estimated corrosion rates are available, these can be manually entered to
Corrosion Rate (mpy) and substitute the calculated rates for Soil and/or Product side Corrosion Rates (see Figure 10). This
Confidence overrides the corrosion rates calculations, i.e. the input data is not needed.
The confidence level in the measured data should be taken into account.
If no or limited measurements are available, calculated CR becomes the default.
Base Corrosion Rate (mpy) Soil side corrosion: 5mpy is used as default base CR. Setting is determined as:
• 5mpy is default
• 10mpy is used for extreme cases. For example where soil side CR
was found to be extremely high, and the soil was not replaced
before floor repair / replacement.
Product side corrosion: 2mpy OR 5mpy – depending on whether or not the product is dry (not
containing water).
Soil Condition (ohm–cm) Soil resistivity of native soil underneath and around the tank or dike area. (A common method of
measuring soil resistivity is described in ASTM G 57.)
Tank Pad The type of material (soil, sand, etc.) upon which the tank rests. In the case of a tank supported on a
ring wall, it is the material used for filling inside the wall.
Tank Drainage The effectiveness with which rainwater is drained away from the tank, and prevented from collecting
under the tank bottom.
Cathodic Protection (CP) The existence of a cathodic protection system for the tank bottom, and the proper installation and
operation of such a system, based on API 651.
Bottom Type Single bottom or bottom with release prevention barrier (RPB). The RPB can be a textile or plastic type
barrier, or a second floor.
Operating Temperature (°F) The highest operating temperature expected during operation (considering both normal and unusual
operating conditions).
Internal Coating or Liner Yes or No. Is internal coating or liner needed to protect the tank bottom and shell from the corrosive
Needed nature of the product?

Basic Data Comments

Internal Coating or Liner ‘None’ (no coating or liner installed), organic coating or liner (FRP / reinforced glass type liner). If a
Applied liner is installed the coating effect is set = 1
Internal Coating Quality5 Quality can be Low, Average and Above Average. A high quality coating is expected to be effective
for ca. 20 year, whereas a Low quality coating is 10 years at the most.
Internal Coating Age (years) Based on the installation date, or the last date of coating rehabilitation. This setting determines the
coating adjustment factor to be used. Credit for coating is a function of coating quality (i.e. coating
product and application) and coating age.
Internal Liner Quality Manual setting for liner quality (low, average, above average). This setting can be based on Inspection
results, or experience with the liner product, the application method, or the contractor. This setting
overrides the coating quality and age setting.
Note: A flood-coated liner should not be considered new or ever better than average.
Internal Liner Age (years) Based on the installation date, or the last date of liner rehabilitation. This setting determines the
adjustment factor to be used.
The liner age can be adjusted based on inspection results and repair work, if any. This should follow
the approach described in section O 4.7.
Tank Steam Coil Heater Yes or No. If a steam coil heater is utilized, the internal corrosion is adjusted upwards slightly due to
extra heat, and the possibility of steam leaks.
Water Draws Water draws when consistently used can greatly reduce the damaging effects of water at the bottom of
the tank.
Corrosion Type Determine whether the product side thinning is generalized or localized. Generalized corrosion is
(Generalized or Localized defined as affecting more than 10% of the surface area and the wall thickness variation is less than 50
Product side corrosion) mils. Localized corrosion is defined as affecting less than 10% of the surface area or a wall thickness
variation greater than 50 mils.
Table 6: Input Data Required for DF and Likelihood Calculation
Basic Data Comments

Service Start Date (Age) The number of years that the equipment has been exposed to the current process conditions and that
produced the same corrosion rate. The default is the equipment age. However, if the corrosion rate
changed significantly, perhaps as a result of changes in the environment or process conditions, the time
period and the thickness should be adjusted accordingly. The time period will be from the time of the
change, and the thickness will be the minimum measured wall thickness also at the time of the change.
Wall Thickness (mils) The actual measured thickness upon being placed in the current service, or the minimum construction
thickness (nominal plate). The thickness used must be the thickness at the beginning of the time in
service. Typically the nominal wall thickness will be used for a tank that is operated in the same service
since installation.
If the analysis is reset on basis of a new measured minimum wall thickness, this should take into
account the level of confidence on which the measurement is based.
Past Inspections (Number and The inspection credit consists of the accumulated Number and Effectiveness of past inspections. This is
Effectiveness) obtained by assigning an effectiveness category for each of the past inspections in line with an
inspection effectiveness Table – see sample on Table 23. The summary of past inspections represents
the inspection credit.
Design and Maintenance to Yes or No to Tank designed according to a recognized industry standard and maintained
Code according to API 653. Typical design codes will be API 650 or 12D.
GFF (Frequency per Year) The default Generic Failure Frequency per year has been determined as per section Table 2.
5
If a Liner is installed the Coating effect is set equal to 1, i.e. no Coating assumed installed and effect considered.

Basic Data Comments

Tank Settlement Tank settlement in conjunction with corrosion at the critical joint can greatly increase the likelihood of
rapid bottom failure. The severity of settlement shall be assessed as per API 653, Appendix B.
Table 7: Input Data Required for Consequence Calculation
Basic Data Comments

Tank Floor Diameter (ft) Size of the tank floor
Tank Height (ft) Tank shell height.
Filling Height (%) Should be representative for to maximum filling height under normal operation - expected to be 90-
100%. Default is set = 95%.
Representative Fluid Assigns type of fluid or group that is representative for the tank content. Fluids that are not on the
specified list can be assigned to a equivalent fluid group, based on the viscosity in centipoise at ca.
75°F (see listed fluids in Table 41).
Native Soil Type Should ideally be determined from hydraulic conductivity or permeability test results. From the test
(Permeability) results, determine the most impermeable soil layer or bed (always assumed to be uniform across the
tank foundation area) that is found before the groundwater, and select a representative Soil Type that is
one step more conservative (more permeable) for the calculations.
Distance to Groundwater (ft) Shortest measured or minimum estimated vertical distance from the tank floor to groundwater.
Detection Time for Floor The maximum time expected before a leak is noticed and mitigated. It might become a controversial
Leaks issue for some operators to determine when a floor leakage in the worst case initially occurred, and
relate this to when it realistically would be mitigated.
Bottom Type Single bottom or bottom with release prevention barrier (RPB). The RPB can be a textile or plastic type
barrier, or a second floor.
Released from Dike (%) In case of a Rupture, what percentage of the released volume would escape the dike area. The
following default values are used for this input:
No Dike installed: 100% Released from Dike
Dike installed: 50% Released from Dike
Normally determined from the tank content volume to dike volume ratio. See section O 6.6.
On Site Soil Contamination Percent of volume that was released from Dike, in case of rupture, that ends up contaminating the on
(%) site soil – within the boundary of the facility. This should be determined from overview drawings or
plot plans of the tank farm / facility.
Off Site Soil Contamination Percent of volume that was released from Dike, in case of rupture, that ends up contaminating the off
(%) site soil – outside the boundary of the facility. This should be determined from overview drawings or
plot plans of the tank farm / facility.
Surface Water Contamination Percent of volume that was released from Dike, in case of rupture, that ends up contaminating surface
(%) water – typically a lake of pond outside the boundary of the facility. This should be determined from
overview drawings or plot plans of the tank farm / facility.
Environmental Sensitivity Low, Medium or High setting. This determines the expected cost factor per barrel of spilled fluid for
environmental clean up in a worst-case scenario. A default set of clean up cost factors (CUF) are given
for each category. These factors are tank specific, and can be customized by the user.
Equipment Outage Cost Lost business opportunity encountered in case of unexpected downtime. Needs to be provided by
($/day) operation.
Downtime (days / event) Downtimes for the various events of failure that cause small repairs, large repairs or floor replacements.
Replace Tank Liner Yes or No; Considers the extra cost related to adding or replacing a FRP type liner in terms of
application cost per ft2 and additional downtime.

Basic Data Comments

Penalty Cost ($) A representative cost for an expected penalty / fine in case of leakage or rupture. As default, this figure
is set to $0.- due to the fact that this value is very case dependent and will most likely distort the
comparison of results from one tank to the other. The setting can be useful for individual tank
assessments.
Include Cost? Select which of the elements contributing to the total consequence should be included in the
calculation. For most operators, only the Environmental Risk is a concern and the main driver for
internal inspection.
Table 8: Input Data for Risk evaluation and Inspection Planning
Basic Data Comments

Plan Ending Date The future date at which the risk shall be analyzed.
Damage Factor Target Values These targets can be customized to represent the preferred inspection strategy. See also Figure 7 . The
(DFTarget) user can also set tank specific inspection target for the DF. A suggested set of DFTarget is given in
section O.8.
Inspection Cost Given as a cost per square foot of tank floor. This is the calculated total cost for taking the tank out of
service, clean it for inspection, do the inspection itself and bring it back into service, under planned
conditions. This would be the total accumulated investment to do a planned internal inspection.
Reference inspection plan Scheduled inspection time, based on other than RBI. This is used to calculate an interval or gap
between scheduled inspection with versus without consideration to RBI, and to calculated the cost
(negative or positive) related to accelerated or deferred planned inspections.
O 4.4 Corrosion Rate Calculation – Leak Failure

Figure 10 shows a flow chart of the steps required to determine the CR that is used in the calculation of
the factor for Damage related to the generic tank bottom leak frequency.

Figure 10: Calculation of Corrosion Rate (r) to derive Modification Factor (DFar/t)
Soil Product
Side Side
- Average time to Establish Base Establish Base - Inspection Data

leakage Corrosion Rate for Corrosion Rate for - BS&W
- Thickness Soil Side Corrosion Internal Bottom - pH, etc.
- "Default" = 5 mpy (5 mpy) Corrosion (2-5 mpy)
Resistivity Adjust for Soil Coating Needed?

Conditions (0.66-1.5) Coating Age
Adjust for Internal Coating Quality
Coating (0.32-2.83) Low
Tank Pad Type Adjust for Tank Pad Average
Material (0.7-1.5) Above Average
(applied according
to API 652)
Water Drainage Adjust for Drainage
(1.0-3.0) Adjust for Operating Bulk Fluid
Temperature Temperature
(1.0-1.4)
Cathodic Protection Adjust for Cathodic
Protection (0.33-1.0)
Adjust for Steam Use of Steam Coil
Coil Heater Heater
Bottom Design Adjust for Bottom
(1.0-1.15)
Type (1.0-1.4)
Bulk Fluid Adjust for Operating Adjust for Water Water Draw
Temperature Temperature Draws (0.7-1.0)
(1.0-1.4)
Calculate Modified Soil Side Calculate Modified Product

Corrosion Rate Side Corrosion Rate
(Always Localized) (Widespread or Localized)
Is Product Side Bottom

Product Side
Product Side Corrosion Widespread
CR Type is
CR Type is or Localized?
Localized
Widespread
Use the Greater of

Sum Corrosion Rates Corrosion Rates
Calculate ‘ar/t’ for looking

up Modifying Factor

O.4.4.1 Soil Side Corrosion Rate

O.4.4.1.1 Base Soil Side Corrosion Rate
The base corrosion rate for soil side corrosion is 5 mpy. The base corrosion rate is the expected or
observed corrosion rate for a typical tank under average conditions, i.e. neither highly susceptible to
corrosion nor especially resistant to corrosion. The base corrosion rate is founded on the conditions stated
in Table 9.
Table 9: Summary of Conditions for Soil Side Base Corrosion Rate of 5mpy
Factor Base Corrosion Rate Conditions

Soil Resistivity Moderately corrosive (1000-2000 ohm-cm)
Tank Pad Material Continuous asphalt or concrete
Tank Drainage Storm water does not collect around base of tank
Cathodic Protection None or not functioning
Bottom Type Single Bottom
Bulk Fluid Temperature Below 75°F
O.4.4.1.2 Adjust for Soil Conditions

The resistivity of the native soil beneath the tank pad can affect the corrosion rate of the tank bottom. The
resistivity of the tank pad material may be higher than the existing surrounding soil. However, corrosive
soil beneath the high resistivity tank pad material may contaminate the tank pad fill by capillary action6.
Thus, resistivity of the surrounding native soil may be used to determine the likelihood of corrosion on
the tank bottom. Table 10 gives corrosion rate adjustment factors for soil resistivities. A common
method of measuring soil resistivity is described in ASTM G 57. If the soil resistivity is not known,
then assume Moderately Corrosive soil (adjustment factor equals 1). An adjustment factor of 1
should be used for tanks with Release prevention Barriers ( RPBs), since RPBs effectively prevent the
contamination of the tank pad material by the native soil.
Table 10: Soil Resistivity
Resistivity (ohm-cm) Potential Corrosion Activity Adjustment Factor

<500 Very Corrosive 1.5
500 – 1000 Corrosive 1.25
1000 – 2000 Moderately Corrosive 1
2000 – 10000 Mildly Corrosive 0.83
>10000 Progressively Less Corrosive 0.66
Tank with RPB 1
6
See API RP 651, 1997 Section 5.3.1

O.4.4.1.3 Adjust for Tank Pad

The type of pad or foundation that the tank rests upon will influence the corrosion rate. The adjustment
factors are assigned in a similar manner to those for the native soil beneath the tank pad. Table 11 gives
corrosion rate adjustment factors for tank pads.
Table 11: Tank Pad Adjustment
Type Adjustment Factor

Soils with high concentrations of salts 1.5
Crushed limestone 1.4
Native soil 1.3
Construction grade sand 1.15
Continuous asphalt 1
Continuous concrete 1
Oil sand 0.7
High resistivity, low chloride sand 0.7
O.4.4.1.4 Adjust for Drainage

Rainwater collecting around the base of the tank can greatly increase corrosion. Table 12 gives corrosion
rate adjustment factors for drainage conditions. The adjustment is made so that storm water collecting
around a tank will cause the base corrosion rate to increase by a factor of 2. If the drainage is so poor that
more than one-third of the circumference of the bottom edge of the tank is underwater for extended
periods of time then the base corrosion rate is increased by a factor of 3. Good drainage is considered
normal, so the multiplier is set to 1 if water does not normally collect around the base of the tank.
Table 12: Tank Drainage Adjustment
Type of Drainage Adjustment Factor

More than one-third of the bottom edge of the tank is
3
frequently under water
Storm water usually collects around the base of the tank 2
Storm water does not usually collect around the base of
1
the tank
O.4.4.1.5 Adjust for Cathodic Protection

Cathodic protection is one of the primary methods used to avoid corrosion of tank bottoms from the soil
side. However, the system must be installed and maintained properly. Table 13 gives corrosion rate
adjustment factors for cathodic protection. The factor is established so that the most credit is given for a
properly functioning cathodic protection (CP) system in accordance with API 651, but no penalty is
assessed for lack of CP. This assumes that the base corrosion rate is for systems without cathodic
protection. Note: Until a High Level inspection can verify that the CP system is effective (verified by
inspection in compliance with NACE RP 0169 or equivalent), no credit is obtained for the CP system.

Table 13: Adjustment for Cathodic Protection
Functional Cathodic Protection in Place? Adjustment Factor

NO 1
YES (not per API 651) 0.66
YES (installed and maintained per API 651) 0.33
O.4.4.1.6 Adjust for Bottom Type, Single or RPB

Tanks with properly installed release prevention barriers (RPB) tend to have bottom corrosion rates
comparable to those with a single bottom. Both tanks with a single bottom and those with RPB installed
according to API 650 have an adjustment factor of 1 while a tank with a non-API 650 RPB is given an
adjustment factor of 1.4. Adjustments for bottom type are provided in Table 14.
Table 14: Adjustment for Bottom Type
Bottom Type Adjustment Factor

RPB (not per API 650) 1.4
RPB (designed and maintained per API 650) 1
Single bottom 1
O.4.4.1.7 Adjustment for Operating Temperature

The operating temperature of the tank may influence external corrosion. Below 75°F, the factor is neutral
(1). For average annual operating temperatures between 75°F and 150°F, the factor is 1.1. If the average
operating temperature is between 150°F and 200°F, the factor is 1.3. For temperatures between 200°F
and 250°F, the factor is 1.4. Above 250°F the factor returns to 1. Table 15 gives corrosion rate
adjustment factors for bulk fluid temperatures.
Table 15: Adjustment for Fluid Temperature
Bulk Fluid Temperature (°F) Adjustment Factor

≤ 75 1
76 – 150 1.1
151 – 200 1.3
201 – 250 1.4
>250 1
O.4.4.2 Product Side Corrosion Rate

O.4.4.2.1 Base Product Side Corrosion Rate
Tank bottoms can corrode from the inside of the tank as well as the outside. Base corrosion rates for
product side corrosion can be obtained from previous internal inspection data, or may be assumed to
approximate the corrosion in the lower inch or two of the shell, if significant bottom sediments and water
(BS&W) are present. For dry product tanks, the internal corrosion can be insignificant. Table 16 shows
the suggested base corrosion rates.

Table 16: Product Side Base Corrosion Rates
Product Condition Base Corrosion

Rate (mpy)
Dry 2
Wet 5
A summary of the conditions assumed for the product side base corrosion rate are given in Table 17.
Table 17: Summary of Conditions for Base Product Side Corrosion Rate
Factor Base Corrosion Rate Conditions

Internal Coating Internal coating not needed for corrosion protection and none
applied
Bulk fluid temperature Below 75°F
Steam coil heater No
Water draws No (Water draws conducted neither weekly nor after every
receipt)
O.4.4.2.2 Adjust for Operating Temperature

Similarly to the Soil Side Corrosion the Product Side Corrosion is expected influenced by the operating
temperature. Table 15 gives the corrosion rate adjustment factors for bulk fluid temperatures.
O.4.4.2.3 Adjust Steam Coil Heater
If a steam coil heater is present, the internal corrosion rate is adjusted upwards slightly due to extra heat,
and the possibility of steam leaks from the internal coil. Table 18 gives corrosion rate adjustment factors
for steam coil heaters.
Table 18: Steam Coil Heater Adjustment
Does tank have a steam coil heater? Adjustment Factor

YES 1.15
NO 1
O.4.4.2.4 Adjust for Water Draws

Water draws, when consistently used, can greatly reduce the damaging effects of water at the bottom of
the tank. To receive the full benefit, water must be drawn weekly or after every receipt. Table 19 shows
the adjustment factors for water draws.
Table 19: Water Draw Adjustment
Are water draws conducted either weekly Adjustment Factor

or after every receipt?
NO 1
YES 0.7

O.4.4.2.5 Adjust for Internal Coating and Fiberglass Liner

O.4.4.2.5.1 Coating
The coating modification factor (MFCoating) only influences the product side corrosion rate. The MFCoating
is a function of three variables, coating needed (i.e. needed due to a possibly corrosive environment),
coating age (based on the year that the coating was installation) and coating quality. The coating quality is
estimated from the owner/operators knowledge about the performance of the coating product in same or
similar environments, and the ability or records for the contractor that was used for coating application.
See Table 20 and Table 21.
Table 20: Internal Coating Needed?
Is internal lining needed for corrosion protection? Adjustment Factor (FNeed)

Yes – Some corrosives are expected in the local environment. 1.5
No – No corrosive is expected in the local environment 1.0
* To determine the need for internal bottom lining, see API Recommended Practice 652.
Table 21: Coating Quality
Quality of the applied Comments YQuality

coating
[Min; Max]
Low Expected effective life ca. 5 years (0.60; 1.5)
There is little or no information about the coating, OR previous
inspections (perhaps from other tanks) indicate a short effective
life for this type of coating.
Average Expected effective life ca. 10 years (0.40; 1.5)
Commonly used, and verified to be fairly effective in the
particular service.
Above Average Expected effective life ca. 15 years (0.25; 1.5)
Documented experience from previous inspections suggests a
long effective life in the particular service.
The Coating Age is basically used to indicate whether or not coating is applied at all. If no coating is
applied, the Age is left blank and the adjustment factor for coating quality (Yquality) = 1.0.
It is assumed that none of the typically used coating applications are 100% effective in preventing
corrosion, hence the MFCoating factors do not start at a ‘0’ value.
The following equations are used to calculate MFCoating.
Equation 5: Coating Factor Calculation
[
MFCoating = MIN (YQuality )
FNeed
, FNeed ]
Where YQuality is a function of time and calculated as:

1 1 1
YLow = Age 3 ÷ Age 2 + Age + 0.55
90 30 20
1 1 1
Y Average = Age 3 ÷ Age 2 + Age + 0.4
1200 200 25
1 1 1
Y Above Average = Age 3 ÷ Age 2 + Age + 0.25
2000 170 30
The formulae are derived from plotting practical experience, which is gathered from a population of
approximately 50 tanks containing a range of different products.
The objective with the coating factor is to take the coating film degradation over time into account. The
formulas are empirically derived from the assumption that a coating film can have a 5, 10 or 15year useful
life, which is rated in terms of quality: Low, Average and Above Average.
The coating film may during inspection be found only partly degraded, resulting in repairs as oppose to
full re-application. For these cases it is suggested that a repaired coating film is not considered as good as
a new film, and the coating quality should be reduced one setting downwards from the initial setting.
Note: In case a Fiberglass type liner is applied, the coating factor, MFCoating = 1, regardless whether or not
coating is needed.
As suggested in the calculation of the coating factor, coating that is degraded and is not reapplied,
potentially cause a more severe corrosion rate in the exposed areas than if no coating was applied on the
entire floor.
O.4.4.2.5.2 Fiberglass Liner (FRP Type)
Apart from setting MFCoating = 1, a Fiberglass or FRP type liner does theoretically not influence the
corrosion rate. This needs to be taken into account when setting the Base corrosion rate for Product Side
corrosion. The liner, however, does directly affect the calculated DF (see Figure 9). Also see section O
4.7 for details on the modification factor for liners (MFLiner).
O.4.4.3 Determine combined Tank Floor Corrosion Rate
O.4.4.3.1 Estimate Internal and External Corrosion Rates
The internal and external corrosion rates are estimated by multiplying the base corrosion rate by the
respective adjustment factors. This will produce two separate corrosion rates that are combined as
described below. It is assumed that the soil side corrosion will be localized in nature while the product
side corrosion will be either generalized or localized.
O.4.4.3.2 Combine Corrosion Rates
a. Option 1: If the internal corrosion is generalized in nature, the corrosion areas will likely overlap
such that the bottom thickness is simultaneously reduced by both internal and external influences. In
this case, the internal and external rates are additive.
b. Option 2: For pitting and localized corrosion, the chances are low that internal and external rates can
combine to produce an additive effect on wall loss. In this case, the user chooses the greater of the
two corrosion rates as the governing rate for the proceeding step.

Note: In order to avoid understating the risk, it is recommended that the combined corrosion
rate should not be set lower than 2 mpy.
O 4.5 Measured Wall Thickness and Corrosion Rate

Several scenarios may induce the need for an adjustment of the minimum bottom wall thickness. For
example, inspection methods have improved over time, the tolerance on nominal wall thickness is not
taken into account, and the conservatism in the RBI predicated damage factor accumulates over long
periods of time, sometimes indicating that a component should leak although it clearly does not leak. All
this may introduce a need for re-setting the analysis.
This adjustment should only be based on documented inspections and wall thickness measurements, and
should be related to the level of confidence that is reasonable for obtaining and relying on the measured
representative value. The confidence level is derived from measurement technique and tools,
measurement location and probability of detecting the minimum wall, and other relevant circumstances.
If available, the measured corrosion rate should be used for the Likelihood calculations. The calculated
rate should be used in lieu of the measured rate, only if the confidence in the measured rate is low. In this
case the calculated rate should be evaluated and compared to the measured.
O.4.5.1 Re-Set RBI Analysis – New Wall Thickness
The original floor wall thickness (WTnom) might have to be adjusted for several reasons. This could be
motivated by results from a thorough inspection, change of service or the operating environment (added
liner, CP system, etc), or in relation to bottom repairs. If sections of the tank bottom are repaired or
replaced then the model must be re-calibrated to account for this.
A New WT (WTNew) is set in the model by:
a. Resetting the tank floor age zero, i.e. a = 1
b. Determine the minimum measured thickness of the tank bottom, WTMin, Measured
c. Calculate a new original thickness (t) as:
WTNew = WTMin, Measured × CWT
d. In case of repairs: It is assumed a corroded tank floor is always restored to 30% of its original
thickness, as a minimum. Thus, when calculating a New WT – with no inspection data, use:
WTNew = WTnom × CWT, Where CWT is equal 0.3

Option d above is used only if the driving damage mechanism is internal corrosion and the nature of
repairs is filling pits and patching small isolated corroded areas, and the user is confident that the repair
procedure calls for complete filling patching of all pits / corroded locations.
Wall thickness readings that are representative for the minimum thickness of a corroded and possibly
repaired floor might or might not be available and possibly come in varying accuracy. All this should be
taken into account when determining the new/revised tank floor thickness WTNew. The values in Table 22
are used as CWT factors.
Table 22: Correction Factor (CWT and CCR) for measured Floor thickness readings and CR

CWT and CCR CWT

Wall Thickness reading Confidence in available Correction factor for Fraction of original
available thickness reading available thickness thickness
reading (Only for CWT)
Yes Exact 1.0 -
Yes High 0.9 -
Yes Fair 0.7 -
Yes Low 0.5 -
No - - 0.37
O.4.5.2 Measured Corrosion Rate

The same approach, as applied for setting a New WT, should be used to take the confidence level into
account when determining a measured CR to use (CRMeasured, Used).
The CRMeasured, Used that is used as the measured and adjusted corrosion is calculated as:
Equation 6; Measured CR adjsutement
CRMeasured
CRMeasured , Used =
C CR
The corrosion rate confidence factor CCR is selected between the same range of values as the CWT, see
Table 22.
The confidence leve (High, Fair or Low) can be determined from inconsistent inspection results,
inaccurate inspection method, low inspection area coverage, change in operating environment, or just
intuitively assessed by a competent person.
O 4.6 Floor Inspection Effectiveness Table – Leak Failure
Table 23 is a suggested guideline for assigning effectiveness (Inspection Rating Category) to various
inspection efforts in terms of locating Thinning of storage tank floors.
7
Factor is based on the assumed minimum level of restoration.

Table 23: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Rating – Tank Bottom

Inspection
Rating Soil Side Product Side
Category
A a. Floor scan 90+% & UT follow-up a. Commercial blast
b. Include welds if warranted from the b. Effective supplementary light
results on the plate scanning c. Visual 100% (API 653)
c. Hand scan of the critical zone d. Pit depth gauge
e. 100% vacuum box testing of suspect
welded joints
Coating or Liner:
a. Sponge test 100%
b. Adhesion test
c. Scrape test
B a. Floor scan 50+% & UT follow-up a. Brush blast
OR b. Effective supplementary light
b. EVA or other statistical method with c. Visual 100% (API 653)
Floor scan follow-up if warranted by the d. Pit depth gauge
result Coating or Liner:
a. Sponge test >75%
b. Adhesion test
c. Scrape test
C a. Floor scan 5-10+% plates; supplement a. Broom swept
with scanning near shell & UT follow- b. Effective supplementary light
up; Scan circle and X pattern c. Visual 100%
b. Progressively increase if damage found d. Pit depth gauge
during scanning Coating or Liner:
c. Helium/Argon test a. Sponge test 50 – 75%
d. Hammer test b. Adhesion test
e. Cut coupons c. Scrape test
D a. Spot UT a. Broom swept
b. Flood test b. No effective supplementary lighting
c. Visual 25-50%
Coating or Liner:
a. Sponge test <50
E None None
* The methods listed in this table should be applied in accordance with API Standard 653 under the direction of an
API 653 certified inspector.
O.4.6.1 Example – Inspection History – Assigning Effectiveness

When multiple inspections with different effectiveness category are summarized, the following principles
are applied:
1 A inspection = 2 B inspections
1 B inspection = 2 C inspections
1 C inspection = 2 D inspections
The effectiveness denominator can only be the highest inspection effectiveness actually performed, i.e.
two ‘B’ level inspections do not make one ‘A’ level in the calculations.

For example, given three inspections where one of the three inspections is rated ‘A’, while the second and
third inspections are rated ‘B’ and ‘C’ respectively. This would result in a combined number and
effectiveness of 1.75A inspections.
The DF is derived from interpolation between the 1A Column and 2A Column in the ar/t table, using the
corresponding ar/t value.
Note: Maximums of four equivalent inspections in the same category are considered in total.
O.4.6.2 Inspection Planning – Guideline
Inspection Planning is described in more detail in section O.8.
As a general guideline, an RBI recommended inspection is always assumed to be a level ‘A’ effectiveness
inspection. The reason being, that the added cost for an inspection with high effectiveness level,
compared to a less effective inspection, is minimal once the tank has been brought out of service and
cleaned for inspection.
O.4.6.3 Damage Factor (DFar/t) – Leak Failure
To determine the final damage factor for the tank bottom, a dimensionless quantity, known as the ar/t
value is estimated, and a table is consulted to look up the damage factor for the generic failure frequency.
The ar/t is found as follows:
Equation 7: ar/t
ar/t = (age × rate) / thickness,
Where ‘a’ is the age of the equipment, in years; ‘r’ is the maximum corrosion rate in mpy; and ‘t’ is the
original thickness of the tank bottom, in mils. The ar/t method assumes that the corrosion rate r is
constant over the life of the tank. The value, ar/t, is actually the fraction of the original tank bottom that
has been lost due to corrosion.
The calculated ar/t, and the combined number and rating of inspections, are used to determine the damage
factor DFar/t from Table 24.
Note that DFar/t should be interpolated vertically and horizontally in the table. The ar/t table was
developed based on engineering expertise and experience in the field of atmospheric storage tank failures
and corrosion. The theoretical basis in developing the ar/t table is included in section O.5.7.2.
The DF for shell is derived from the same table as the DF for the floor. See section O 5.7 for more details.

Table 24: Tank Bottom DFar/t Damage Factors
Number of Inspections and combined credit

0 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
ar/t E A B C D
0.05 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.10 14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1
0.15 32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 8 4 2 1
0.20 56 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 6 2 1 1 18 10 6 3
0.25 87 3 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 11 4 2 1 32 19 11 7
0.30 125 6 1 1 1 9 3 1 1 21 9 4 2 53 33 21 14
0.35 170 12 1 1 1 16 5 2 1 36 16 8 4 80 54 36 24
0.40 222 21 3 1 1 29 10 4 2 57 29 14 7 115 81 57 40
0.45 281 36 6 1 1 47 19 8 3 86 47 26 14 158 117 86 63
0.50 347 58 12 3 1 73 33 15 7 124 73 43 26 211 162 124 95
0.55 420 89 23 6 2 109 55 28 14 173 109 69 44 273 217 173 138
0.60 500 133 41 13 4 158 88 49 28 234 158 107 73 346 285 234 192
0.65 587 192 71 27 10 222 136 83 51 309 222 160 115 430 365 309 262
0.70 681 270 119 53 23 305 202 134 89 401 305 232 177 527 459 401 349
0.75 782 370 191 99 51 409 294 211 152 510 409 328 263 635 569 510 456
0.80 890 498 298 179 107 538 416 322 249 638 538 453 382 757 695 638 586
0.85 1005 658 453 312 215 696 578 479 397 789 696 615 543 893 839 789 741
0.90 1126 856 672 527 414 888 787 697 617 963 888 819 756 1044 1002 963 925
0.95 1255 1098 976 867 771 1118 1054 993 936 1163 1118 1075 1033 1209 1186 1163 1140
1.00 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390
A, B, C, and D refers to the effectiveness of inspections. E indicates no credit for inspection. The range of factors is
derived from the generic failure frequency (GFF = 7.2×10-4), such that 1/GFF = 1390, which equates to hole-
through. Note however, that this table was originally developed for the API RBI Software (October 2001), which
for inspection planning only can handle integer type data. Thus, each value has been multiplied by a factor of 10,
and subsequently rounded up to the nearest integer. The GFF correction factor (GFFScale) is taken into account in the
likelihood of failure calculation. The lowest factor of 1 indicates that even under the best conditions, a tank is not
assumed better than 10% of the average population. However, that is not interesting in the context of inspection
planning. A target DF will simulate actual tolerable risk and drive an inspection. Tanks that do not reach the
inspection target level are not subject to further assessment, i.e. the DFar/t is skewed towards higher risk. Hence, the
damage factor should not be summed up for a tank population to express the accumulated risk for a tank farm. This
would result in a exaggerated risk value.

O 4.7 Bottom Leak Failure

Bottom leak failures (due to corrosion) have a base frequency of 7.20 × 10-3 per yea (see Table 2). In
addition to adjustment for the GFF being different than what the DFar/t is based on, this failure rate in
modified by one additional factor only, namely MFLiner. The calculation to determine the frequency for
bottom leak failures is shown in the following equation:
Equation 8: Bottom Leak Failure Probability
DFar / t
LoFLeak = 7.2 × 10 −3 / Year × × MFLiner
MFGFF , Leak
O.4.7.1 Fiberglass Type Liner – Leak Failure
Internal liners (e.g. fiberglass or FRP type liners) can prevent leaks, even if there is a hole in the floor
itself. A properly installed liner within its warranted life can be assumed to reduce the leak frequency by
a factor of 5, i.e. the liner modification factor MFLiner = 0.2, which is the maximum credit given if a FRP
type liner is installed. The adjustment factor varies with liner age and quality.
As indicated on Figure 9 the liner is modeled to influence only the DF. As far as to arrest internal
corrosion, the liner only causes the coating factor to be set equal to 1 (MFCoating = 1.0).
MFLiner is calculated based on two variables, e.g. liner auality and liner age. A liner might be inspected
and found in say Fair condition. Before being brought back into service, the liner might be repaired and
flood coated. Although the repaired liner is not as good as new, this warrants for some credit. Hence, an
Age adjustment factor has been introduced to take this into account (see section O.4.7.3).
O.4.7.2 Liner Factor (MFLiner)
Operating experience has shown that a FRP type liner typically will last for somewhere between 15 and
30 years, to a large degree depending on the quality of the initial application. The following approach is
recommended to calculate the MFLiner. The lower the MFLiner value the higher credit and more effective is
the liner considered to be. However, the maximum credit that is obtained is still 0.2, indicating that a
leakage theoretically can still occur even with a new liner in place. With MFLiner = 1, the liner has no
longer any effect on potential leakage.

Figure 11: Revised MFLiner
Liner Modification Factor, F(Quality, Age)

1.20
Good Liner Condition
Poor Liner Condition

1.00
Average Liner Condition
0.80
MF,Liner
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Liner Age (Yr)
Each of the curves on the graph in Figure 11 are calculated using the following equation, which ensures
that the liner factor ranges from 0.2 to 1.0:
Equation 9: Liner Modification Factor
MFLiner = Min (1, Max (0.2, MFLiner Quality ))
Where the calculated liner factor varies with the quality of the liner, such that for:
a. Low Liner Quality:
1 1
MFLow = × Age 2 − × Age + 0.2
250 70
b. Average Liner Quality:
1 1 1
MFAvgerage = × Age 3 − × Age 2 + × Age − 0.85
1600 48 4
c. Above Average Liner Quality:
1 1
MFAbove Average = × Age 2 − × Age + 0.2
800 80
The graphs in Figure 11 should be used as follows:

1) As default the liner is assumed in Average Condition. The assessment needs to be based on the
liner product, suitability for service, and quality of application work (i.e. experience with the
contractor).
2) Depending on Inspection results, the MFLiner factor is taken from the curve that best corresponds
to the condition of the liner. Note that a Low liner quality can move from Average to Low after
only 4 years in service, whereas a liner can not move from Average to Above Average until ca.
10 – 12 years in service. The maximum expected life for any given liner is 30 years and minimum
15 years (unless the credit factor is entirely eliminated).
O.4.7.3 Adjust Liner Age after Inspection

tank floor liners might become less adhesive or even degrade within a fairly short period of time. Even if
a FRP liner is inspected and repaired, and considered to be in good condition, say after 12 years in
service, the liner is most likely not as effective as a new liner.
To take liner repairs into account it is suggested to make the following adjustments for the MFLiner age
calculation and quality setting, based on inspection and repairs.
a. Determine age of liner at time of inspection.
b. Make the following adjusts to the liner age based on the inspection results, given that the liner was
found to be in following conditions at the time of restarting service:
i. Good Condition: AgeNew = Age × 0.4 (If Age exceeds 30years, no credit
should be given, i.e. factor forced to 1.0)
ii. Fair Condition: AgeNew = Age × 0.6 (If Age exceeds 30years, no credit
should be given, i.e. factor forced to 1.0)
iii. Poor Condition: No adjustment. (Factor = 1.0)
Round down AgeNew to nearest integer.
Example: A liner is installed in 1986, inspection and flood coated during inspection in 1997, at
which point it was considered in good condition. The new liner age (AgeNew) is calculated
as:
Actual Age = 1997 – 1986 = 11 years
Good condition; Correction factor = 0.4
AgeNew = 11 years × 0.4 = 4.4 years (round off to 4 years)
Thus, the assumed New installation data is 1997 – 4 years = 1993.
It is assumed that for any liner, that all bad areas are repaired before the tank is brought back into service,
in particular for the low quality liners.

O 4.8 Rapid Bottom Failure – Rupture Failure

Rapid bottom failures (or failures at the bottom/shell interface) have a base frequency of 2.0 × 10-5 per
year8 (see Table 2). In addition to adjustment for the different GFF than what the DFar/t is based on, this
failure rate in then modified by three factors; (1) whether the tank is designed, fabricated, and maintained
according to recognized industry standards, (2) the extent of corrosion – considered part of the DFar/t for
leakage, and (3) inspection for and presence of tank settlement. The calculation to determine the
frequency for rapid bottom failures is shown in the following equation:
Equation 10: Rapid Bottom Failure Probability
DFar / t
LoFRupture = 2 × 10 −5 / Year × × MFDesign × MFSettlement
MFGFF , Rupture
O.4.8.1 Tank Design Factor (MFDesign)

If the AST is designed and maintained according to recognized industry standards it will be less likely to
encounter a rapid bottom failure. Table 25 show the damage factors for those tanks which have been
designed and fabricated according to recognized industry standards and maintained according to API
Standard 653.
Table 25: Damage Factor for Tank Design and Maintenance
Is the tank designed according to a MFDesign

recognized industry standard and
maintained according to API 653?
NO 5.0
YES 1.0
O.4.8.2 Corrosion factor for Rupture

The effects of corrosion on the critical bottom/shell interface are considered similar to the effects of
corrosion on the tank bottom – although adjusted by the MFGFF. The damage factor for tank bottom
corrosion (DFar/t) that is determined for leakage, is used to determine the likelihood for rapid bottom
failures. See Equation 10.
O.4.8.3 Tank Settlement
Rigid body tilting, out-of-plane settlement, and edge settlement can all induce additional stresses at the
critical bottom/shell interface. API 653 recommends inspecting for tank settlement as part of the routine
in-service inspection. These stresses (especially in conjunction with corrosion at the critical joint) increase
the likelihood of a rapid bottom failure.
8
The base frequency for rapid bottom failures of 2.0×10-5 is based on the experience of one of the large operating
companies. They experienced 9 rapid bottom failures over 40 years for a tank population of 5,000 tanks. The
failure frequency was then halved based on anecdotal evidence (lack of such incidents) at several smaller operating
companies.

Depending on the foundation type, settlement might be more or less likely. Table 26 shows the
adjustment factors for likely settlements:
Table 26: Damage Factor for Tank Settlement
Foundation Type OR Settlement Inspection Factor

API 653 Settlement Evalution / Inspection – Settlement outside API 2
653 criteria
API 653 Settlement Evaluation / Inspection – Settlement within API 1
653 criteria
No Settlement Inspection has be done 1.5
Concrete ring wall – Settlement survey not found necessary 1
It is assumed that if a tank settlement is visible, a survey will be carried out, i.e. if no survey is done, there
is a possibility for an edge settlement that is not noticeable. The factors larger than 1.0 are meant to
encourage a survey.
O.5. TANK SHELL – LIKELIHOOD OF FAILURE

The main objective with RBI on AST shells is to determine the appropriate time for the next inspection
based on risk associated with a failure.
The inspection can be external or internal, and be more appropriate at certain elevations on the shell than
others. In some cases internal inspection of the shell is not absolutely necessary, but could be beneficial,
for example for localized or pitting type internal liquid line corrosion, etc. To a large degree the issue is a
matter of selecting the most appropriate inspection technique and apply it at the most appropriate location
on the tank. Specific inspection issues are addressed under the Inspection Planning section. Although
specific techniques, scope and specifications are considered outside the scope of this project, the
suggested inspection location on the Tanks shell (by course or ring number) is given.
O 5.1 Tank Shell – RBI Methodology

The conceptual method is the same as for tank floors, the objective is to derive a damage factor (DF) for
the damage mechanisms that drive an inspection, hence using a base (or generic) failure frequency, which
is adjusted for the degree of damage that is predicted for the tank shell at a certain point in time. Unlike
the tank floor, the shell can be prone to failures relating to material cracking and brittle fracture. The latter
two damage mechanisms are not considered for inspection planning, but rather to what degree the shell
material is susceptible to such failure mechanisms. Hence, susceptibility to brittle fracture and cracking is
just flagged as a potential concern. The appropriate action, which may be a fitness-for-service assessment,
is not covered under this RBI methodology.
The DF is calculated purely on basis of corrosion damage, and is derived for each shell course, based on
course age, representative corrosion rate, and accumulated credit from past inspections.
A calculation overview is given on Figure 2, which includes floor and shell calculations. Figure 12
illustrates the method of screening the tank shell for brittle fracture and cracking susceptibility, and
calculating a DF for a given corrosion rate. The DF is used for the future inspection planning.

Figure 12: DF & LoF Calculation for Tank Shell
3
No
Start
Maint to
Screening Code 4
Yes
Questions
For each Course:
Welded CR (Est, Calc or Meas)
Brittle Calculate DF Insp. Credit
Fracture Constr. for Course [1, Course Age
Method 6] Course t,nom
=> ar/t Table
1 Susceptible
Riveted
Adjusted DF
Course [1, 6] Risk Ratio
Cracking for Course [1,
based on tmin relations
Mechanisms 6]
DFTarget – The Inspection

LoFLeak = 1.0×10-3 Target is Generic for
2 Susceptibility (No DF Adj.) Inspection Course [1, 6]
Plan for
Course [1, 6]
4 LoFRupt = 1.0×10-7 Critical Course(s) based
on Safe Filling Height
Max LoFLeak for
-6 Course [1, 6] =
3 LoFRupt = 4.0×10 1 2
LoFShell
CoFLeak Total Risk = LoFShell × CoFW Analysis Output / Report:

&
CoFRupt Where, - Brittle Fracture susceptibility (Y/N)
& - Cracking susceptibility & mechanism(s)
GFFR GFFL - Recommended Inspection Year
CoFCat CoFW = × CoFR + × CoFL
& GFFR + GFFL GFFR + GFFL - Which course(s) are “Critical”
InspTarget - Risk per Course & Total Risk
O 5.2 Required Data and Information

The basic data listed in Table 27 are the minimum required to determine a DF for each course when a
corrosion rate has not been established by one or more effective inspections.
The reader is encouraged to use measured corrosion rates if available over the calculated CR. The coarse
grouping of data in Table 27 is just to provide a better overview of the needed information, and is not used
in the analysis as such. Some data does sort under more than one group, and is listed under the group it is
mostly associated with.

Table 27: Basic Data Required for Shell RBI Analysis
Basic Data Comments
General Tank Data and information
Screening See Table 28 for Brittle Fracture and Cracking susceptibility assessment.
Tank ID Unique Tank number
Installed – Age (Year) Age or number of years that the equipment has been exposed to the current process
conditions that produced the Measured corrosion rate. The default is the equipment
age. However, if the corrosion rate changed significantly, perhaps as a result of
changes in process conditions, the time period and the thickness should be adjusted
accordingly. The time period will be from the time of the change, and the thickness
will be the minimum wall thickness at the time of the change.
The Age calculation is based on Course 1, and can be repeated for course (2;6), if no
replacements or significant repairs have been done on any of the courses.
Diameter – D (ft) Shell diameter
Height (ft) Total tank height
Filling Height (ft) Maximum allowable filling height that is used.
Course height (ft) Course specific – Height of each course
No Courses Number of shell courses in total
Nominal Thickness of Course specific – The actual measured thickness upon being placed in the current
each course - tnom service, or the minimum construction thickness. The thickness used must be the
(inch) thickness at the beginning of the time in service. Nominal thickness is needed for
each shell course.
Weld joints – E Weld joint efficiency (E). As default E is set to 0.7, but can be changed in line with
the design code.
Material Stress Course specific – Material and grade with allowable stress for each course. As
Allowable – S (Psi) default, all courses are assumed to be equivalent to A283 Gr. C material with YS of
30ksi and TS of 55ksi. Allowable stress should be calculated as per API 653.
Consequence - Data related to the CoF calculation
Fluid Type Representative fluid type or name. This is based on a list of generic fluid groups or
types.
Gravity (G) Fluid Specific gravity input can be entered on three different level of detail.
• Specific gravity (fluid density (lbs/ft3) relative to density of water (62.43

lbs/ft3)
• API Number
• Largest gravity from the selected Fluid Type

Default setting is 1.0.
Detection Time (Hrs) Expected time to detect and mitigate a leak failure.
Default is 72 hours

Basic Data Comments
Spill Distribution (%) Based on plot plans and land surveys, estimate how the fluid volume in the event of
a large leak would potentially distribute between the Dike area, Onsite area outside
the dike, Offsite area (outside the premises), and offsite Surface Water.
It is assumed that no or very limited amount of fluid will seep into the ground, and
the groundwater contamination is not likely to occur.
In case a Dike is installed, 100% of the leaked volume is expected to be contained in
the dike area.
CR Index Ratio Use one of the following two options as basis for the consequence calculations:
1. Only Course 1 leakage
2. Distributed probability of leakage over the shell height
Option (1) is somewhat more conservative.
Inspection Target – Manual setting of maximum acceptable damage factor (DF). This is only entered if
DFTarget the automated Inspection Planning option shall be overridden.
Inspection History – Information typically related to the inspection records – see also CR Calc.
Last Insp. Year Course specific – Year that the last inspection was done, and during which fairly
reliable tmm were obtained.
Use last inspection year for Course 1, if information is not available for the other
courses.
tmm Course specific – Minimum measured wall thickness (during the last inspection
year) for each shell course. If not available, tnom will be used. Note that Measured
CR can not be used unless tmm is available.
Inspection Course specific – The rating category of each inspection (internal and external) that
Effectiveness has been performed on the equipment during the time period (specified above).
Separate evaluations are required for internal and external shell CR, but need to
relate to the driver of the combined CR for the purpose of the analysis.
Inspection Count Course specific – The number of inspections on each course (both internal and
external) that have been performed, and that correspond to the effectiveness count.
CR Calculation – Information needed to calculated a CR in the model
Internal CR (mpy) Measured internal CR for Course 1 only. Assuming inadequate data is available to
determine CR for Course (2;6), the CR for Course 1 is just a input for a generic
distribution of CR across the shell height.
If adequate data is available to determine CR for Course (1;6), these should be used
as Estimated CR.
Confidence in Confidence in the measured internal Course 1 CR – using Low/Medium/High/Very

Internal CR High (L/M/H/VH)
Internal / External For both internal and external corrosion, indicate whether corrosion would be
Corrosion Type generalized or localized.

Basic Data Comments
Internal Liner or Indicate if a internal liner (FRP type) or coating (epoxy or similar) has been
Coating, Quality, and installed, what year it was applied, and expected quality of application (low/below
Year Installed average, average or above average). The quality setting should be based on
experience with the liner or coating product in the relevant service and application
contractor. The year installed should be based on original installation date, or the last
date of liner / coating rehabilitation.
Shell Internal Base The expected or observed internal corrosion rate on the shell of the tank. Similar to
Corrosion Rate (mpy) the floor assessment, the CR = 5mpy if the product is considered wet (containing
water) and 2mpy if it is dry.
Internal Lining Yes or No. Is a liner or coating needed to protect the tank bottom and shell from the
Needed? corrosive nature of the product?
Temperature Operating Temperature.
Steam Coil Indicate if steam coil is installed and used.
External CR (mpy) Representative measured external CR for the shell – all courses.
Confidence in Confidence in the measured external CR – using Low/Medium/High/Very High

external CR (L/M/H/VH)
Climate Type of climate is used as a parameter to estimate external corrosion rate of the
(marine/temperate/ari shell, if a measured or estimated CR is not available.
d)
External Coating and Same as for internal coating.

quality of application
The quality setting can be updated/upgraded if coating is found in good condition, if
predicted
High, medium, or low/none, and inspection date.
Insulation and Quality Is Insulation installed (Y/N) and what is the current quality of it. Once insulation has
been installed at a given quality level – in terms of water and weather protection – it
is assumed that repairs, rehabilitation or replaced is made in case the insulation
quality significantly degrades.
DF Calculation – Data specifically needed to complete the DF calculation
Estimated CR Course specific – Combined Internal and external corrosion rate (CR) for each
course. This is derived from the inspection records and is entered as the estimated
CR for each course.
The estimated CR are manually assigned, and can be a combination of measured,
calculated and assumed rated. These should be assigned by a subject matter expert.
CR Basis Select if the CR applied in the DF calculations should be based on:
• Calculated CR (Default)
• Measured CR, or
• Estimated CR
Insp. Planning
Analyze Year Year for which the DF is calculated. This is the same as the RBI Analysis Year. By
calculating the DF for each year in a selected range, the risk profile is expressed as
the DF plot over time (Year)

Basic Data Comments
Baseline WT Select whether to use tnom or tmm as basis for the calculation of remaining wall and
Critical Course numbers.
tmm should not be used unless at least one A level inspection is available to support
the tmm. Default is to use tnom.
Summary – Input Data for Critical Course Calculation
HF (ft) Filling Height – Maximum filling height that the operator is certain to stay within.
There should be a control measure available to ensure this maximum filling height.
S (Psi) Allowable stress for each course. Determined from yield and tensile stress for the
Material of Construction – for each course, as per API 653. If the MoC is not
known, default values are assumed equivalent to A-283 Gr. C, i.e. YS = 30ksi and
TS = 55ksi.
E Weld Joint Efficiency factor (E) – if not known, E = 0.7 is used as default.
HC (ft) Course Height – assuming all courses are the same height. If not, than indicate the
average height of each tank segment to consider. Course 1 is at the ground level.
Note that the corresponding nominal wall thickness (tnom) needs to be updated
accordingly.
D (ft) Tank shell diameter.
G Specific Gravity of the stored fluid. If not known, G = 1.0 is used. This is reasonable
for most hydrocarbon fluids, although it should be noted that the Sp. Gr. can be
much higher for other fluids. For example Sulfuric Acid can have a Sp. Gr. of
approximately 1.7.
Age (Years) Use Installed Year for each course as basis for Age. Some of the upper courses
might have been replaced. This should be taken into account in the analysis.
tnom (in) Nominal wall thickness (tnom) for each shell course (or segment)
tmm (in) Minimum Measured wall thickness (tmm) from the last inspection, for each course –
if available.
Inspection Year Year of the last inspection where good information on wall thickness measurements
was obtained – i.e. year where the tmm was recorded.
CR (mpy) Corrosion Rate – If not using the calculated CR, then enter Measured (only Course 1
CR, based on analyzed inspection results) or / and Estimated CR for each course,
and select which set of CR’s to use – Estimated or Measured (or Calculated).
O 5.3 Shell Failure Modes and Assumptions

There are two expected failure scenarios related to the tank shell structure – leak and rupture, where the
main focus from a RBI standpoint, is leakage due to corrosion. General thinning of the wall and
potentially leading to collapse of the shell is assumed covered under the leak scenario, such that wall
thinning beyond the minimum required wall thickness is flagged in relation to the safe filling height
calculation.
As see from Table 2, corrosion related degradation is by far the most likely degradation mechanism in
AST shells for hydrocarbon storage. There is, however, a remote probability of shell cracking, caused by

either environmental cracking or material stress related cracking. Combined with material embrittlement
this can lead to shell fracture and severe failures. Material embrittlement and fractures are much more
difficult to determine and mitigate from an inspection perspective than corrosion phenomena’s. Hence, for
the purpose of this module, cracking has been modeled as a random type failure with a couple of defined
indictors for susceptibility, but without time dependence. The RBI output in that respect is a basis for
further analysis or expert evaluation. Exercises such as determination of Leak Before Break (LBB)
criterion is not part of the RBI analysis, but more so an element of the add-on fitness-for-service scope
which should be initiated once the tank is found susceptible to cracking and critical to fracture.
The rupture scenario is assumed to be associated with a brittle fracture type failure, and is also assumed
mitigated in cases where compliance with the Brittle Fraction Considerations of API 653 is ensured. A
rupture failure can be initiated at a locally stressed area (due to wall thinning) or at a crack like flaw.
Material cracking is considered a separate issue, for which another screening process is applied.
The safe filling height, susceptibility of cracking, and the predicted probability of leakage are determined
as output from the RBI analysis. The probability of leakage is the main driver for future inspections,
whereas the safe filling height and cracking susceptibility should initially lead to more detailed analysis,
and possibly recommended inspections. With low cracking susceptibility, it is assumed that leakage will
occur before rupture, both for the wall thinning and material cracking cases.
O.5.3.1 Corrosion Damage – Basic Assumptions
It is generally assumed that the thinning mechanisms will resulted in an average rate of thinning/pitting
over the time period defined in the basic data. The likelihood of failure is estimated by examining the
possibility that the corrosion rate is greater than expected. The likelihood of discovering these higher
rates is determined by the number and type of inspections that have been performed. The more thorough
the inspection, and the greater the number of inspections, the less likely it is that the corrosion rate is
greater than anticipated.
It is assumed that corrosion would eventually result in failure by total consumption of the shell thickness.
The approach also assumes that internal and external corrosion are additive except when both are
localized in nature. For those cases where localized corrosion or pitting are the dominant contributors to
both the internal and external corrosion then the corrosion is not additive.
O 5.4 Screening for Brittle Fracture and Cracking
Brittle fracture and environmental cracking of the tank shell material has not been considered in detail
with the objective to determine a time for inspection. However, under certain circumstances the shell
might be susceptible to these types of failure modes. In order to evaluate the likelihood of these types of
failures, a screening method is applied to ascertain the level of susceptibility to brittle fracture and / or
cracking.
In case a tank shell is found to be susceptible to brittle fracture and / or cracking, the user needs to initiate
a further analysis of the relevant aspects of the driver for the particular failure modes. This is not covered
under the scope of this RBI model.
O.5.4.1 Brittle Fracture
Based on the requirements of API 650 and API 653 (see section 5 specifically), the following questions
are used to determine susceptibility to Brittle Fracture, and thus indicating if further assessment is needed.
The answers should relate to the lower 3 courses of the tank, as brittle fracture is not considered likely for
course 4 and above.

Table 28: Brittle Fracture Susceptibility – Screening Questions
Screening Question (Q#) Susceptible (Yes/No) – Comments

1. Tank meets requirements of API 650 (7th Yes – Basically not susceptible to brittle fracture, and no further
edition or later) checking is required.
No – Some susceptibility can be expected. Questions No. 2
through 7 should be completed.
2. Hydrotest done to demonstrate fitness for To be answered only if Q1 = No.
continued service
3. Tank thickness <= 0.5in To be answered only if Q1 = No.
4. Operates at temperature above 60degF To be answered only if Q1 = No.
5. Membrane stress below 7ksi; To be answered only if Q1 = No. Relevant for Course 1, 2 and 3
S(H)=2.6[(H-1)×D×G]/(E×t) [Psi] only
6. Exempt from impact testing (API 650 fig To be answered only if Q1 = No.
2-1 OR API 653 fig 5-2)
7. Tank full at lowest day temp (Ref. API To be answered only if Q1 = No.
650 fig 2-2)
Total Score of Yes and No To be answered only if Q1 = No, and only count Q2 through Q7.
No-Score = 0 Low Susceptibility; The susceptibility is
considered very low, and no further
assessment is required.
No-Score = (1;4) Medium Susceptibility; All questions
answered No need to be assessed in further
detail.
No-Score = (5;6) High Susceptibility; A global fitness for
service assessment is required.
The appropriate action in response to a Medium or High brittle fracture susceptibility is beyond the scope
of this document. However, the following is a proposed output for the screening activity:
Low Susceptibility: No further action required
Medium Susceptibility: Further assessment is recommended
High Susceptibility: Further assessment is required
For example; A further assessment may entail a more thorough engineering evaluation of the relevant
aspects, with the outcome that precautionary operations constraints are introduced, etc.
O.5.4.2 Shell Cracking Susceptibility

Similar to the Brittle Fracture susceptibility screening, susceptibility to Cracking induced by the operating
environment and stress regime is addressed through a screening process.
The objective with the screening method is to define a coarse methodology that can be easily applied with
reasonable accuracy to determine the susceptibility for environmental cracking in a tank shell. For the
purpose of this methodology, the cracking susceptibility has not been considered as a function of time.

Environmental cracking is crack growth caused by simultaneous action of corrosion and tensile stress. It
comprises the anodic process of stress-corrosion cracking (SCC), the cathodic process of hydrogen-
assisted cracking (HAC) and liquid metal cracking (LMC). LMC is not considered for the purpose of this
methodology. Environmentally induced hydrogen cracking has been known by many names, including
hydrogen-assisted cracking (HAC), hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC), sulfide stress-cracking (SSC) and
hydrogen stress cracking (HSC).
Given the diversity and circumstances under which environmental cracking occurs; it is unreasonable to
expect any single mechanistic theory to explain environmental cracking in all environment-alloy
combinations. When the theoretical approach in any field is ambiguous, the practicing engineer must use
the empirical approach, turning to the large volume of field experience and laboratory data that has been
generated over the years. From an engineering standpoint, an understanding of the empirical observations
of the boundary conditions within which cracking occurs, can reduce the need for satisfactory theoretical
explanations, in that, a particular cracking mechanism can be controlled by controlling these conditions.
In general environmental cracking occurs when a critical combination of temperature, tensile stress,
metallurgical structure and environmental conditions coincide. For any given alloy-environmental system,
the engineering parameters of concern are as follows:
a. Threshold stresses above which cracking is likely to occur.
b. Metallurgical variables (heat treatment, type of structure, cold work, etc.) which render the allowable
susceptible.
c. Environmental boundary conditions for cracking, such as temperature, solution composition, pH,
electrode potential, necessary impurities, etc.
For the purpose of this model, only tanks that are designed to API 12D or API 650 are considered.
The detailed questions in Table 29 will point out the most likely cracking mechanisms that the shell
material is susceptible to, if any at all. The user also has the option to override this screening exercise
altogether based on expert opinion. In order to consider the shell susceptibility to cracking from a certain
mechanism, all the detailed questions associated to that mechanism need to be answered Yes.
The conclusion from the exercise in Table 29 is a list of cracking mechanisms to which the shell material
potentially is susceptible. The follow-up action might be a more detailed assessment and possibly a
fitness-for-service assessment to ensure that the potential risk is appropriately managed.

Table 29: Cracking of Low Alloy Steel and Carbon Steel Tank Shells – Answer Q1 OR Q2.
Q1: Susceptible to any Environmental Cracking

Susceptible
Mechanism Q2: Detailed Questions for Screening / Assessment of Cracking
Y/N9
Susceptibility
Q1. Susceptible to active Cracking Mechanisms (estimated by Expert)
Mechanism only considered if all of its associated questions are answered Yes – except for Fatigue (S),
where any Yes introduces susceptibility.
Q2.
Results – 10Susceptible to Cracking by Mechanisms:
C, I, J, N, R, S (Sample)
Q2, A Amine Cracking 3
Carbon or low alloy steel Y
Exposed to Lean Amine - Acid gas treating amines (MEA, DEA, DIPA,
N
MDEA, etc.)
Temperature can exceed 100°F Y
High residual stress level (Cold formed components and welds are not heat
Y
treated/PWHT)
Q2, B Carbonate/Bicarbonate (CO3/HCO3) Cracking 4
Carbon steel Y
Water or moisture is present Y
Carbonate ion concentration exceeds 2.5 %wt with bicarbonate present N
Environment is at pH range 8 to 10.5 Y
Y
treated/PWHT)
Q2, C Carbonate (CO3) Cracking 5
Carbon steel Y
Environment contains sour water at pH > 7.5? Y
Exposed to H2S concentration > 50ppm Y
Y
treated/PWHT)
Q2, D Caustic Stress Cracking - Carbon Steel (Includes NaOH, KOH, Ca(OH)2, etc) 2
Caustic can concentrate to levels > 5%wt NaOH N
Y
treated/PWHT) - OR Temperature can exceed 130°F
Caustic Stress Cracking - Austenitic Stainless Steel (Includes NaOH, KOH,
Q2, E 1
Ca(OH)2, etc)
Austenitic stainless steel Y
Caustic can concentrate to levels > 20 %wt NaOH (in cases such as
N
liquid/vapor interface, under deposit, etc.)
Temperature can exceed 210°F N
9
Sample entries have been made for illustration purposes in this column.
10
If Q1 is not answered, all questions for each cracking mechanism should be sought answered.


Susceptible
Y/N9
Susceptibility
Q2, F Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking - CSCC (Also for Bromides) 3
Austenitic Stainless Steel N
Chloride ions can concentrate to levels >300ppm (in cases such as
N
liquid/vapor interface, under deposit, etc.)
Temperature can exceed 130°F Y
Low pH (< 7) OR presence of dissolved Oxygen (> 7ppm) Y
Q2, G Hydrofluoric Acid Stress Cracking (HSC-HF, HIC/SOHIC-HF) 2
Low Sulfur content (< 0.01% S) N
Exposed to hydrofluoric acid N
Y
treated/PWHT)
Hardness >230 BHN (22 HRC) N
Q2, H Sulfide Stress Cracking - SSC 4
Temperature < 220°F Y
Y
treated/PWHT)
Hydrogen Induced Cracking and Stress Oriendted HIC in H2S Service -
Q2, I 5
HIC/SOHIC-H2S
Carbon Steel Y
High sulfur content (>0.01% S) Y
Y
treated/PWHT)
Q2, J Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking (NH3 SCC) 5
Carbon steel or low alloy steel Y
Temperature > 32°F (0°C) Y
Air, oxygen and/or carbon dioxide is present Y
Less than 0.2% water Y
Y
treated/PWHT)
Q2, K Carbon monoxide + carbon dioxide (CO/CO2/H2O) 2
Carbon steel & low alloy steels with less than 7 % Cr Y
Partical Pressure (CO) + Partical Pressure (CO2) > 1.5 psi N
Q2, L Cyanides - Hydrogen Cyanide - HCN 1
pH is less than 7 N
Environment contains water and HCN N


Susceptible
Y/N9
Susceptibility
Q2, M Nitrates, aqueous 3
Carbon steel or low alloy steel Y
pH is between 2 and 12 Y
Nitrate concentration is or can become 85 ppm molar or higher N
Q2, N Hydrogen Blistering 3
Carbon Steel Y
Exposure to wet hydrogen sulfide, HCN or HF environments or
Y
concentrated sulfuric acid
Hardness <230 BHN (22 HRC) Y
Q2, O Sulfides + Chlorides 2
Austentic Stainless Steels N
Chloride ions >2ppm N
Q2, P H2 Embrittlement 1
Carbon or low alloy steels Y
pH is less than 7 N
Q2, Q Methanol / Ethanol 2
Water between trace amounts & 1.0 % N
Organic acid present N
High resudual stress level (Cold formed components and welds are not heat
Y
treated/PWHT)
Q2, R Bacteria (anaerobic or aerobic) 4
Carbon, low alloy & stainless steels Y
Temperature between 32°F (0°C) and 212°F (100°C) Y
Stagnent water without biocide Y
IF the water contains sulfur compounds and the material is carbon or low
Y
alloy steels GO TO Items H & I
IF the water contains chlorine compounds and the material is austentic
N
stainless steels GO TO Items F & P
Q2, S Fatigue (NOTE: Any question answered Yes will make the tank susceptible) 2
S1 Strong Windload N
S2 Vibration affecting tank nozzles and attachements (from pumps, etc.) Y
S3 Thermal cycling (>30°F per day) Y
Load cycling - frequent filling and emptying (liquid level varies >30% of
S4 N
tank heigh daily)
The Screening table for Cracking is applied such that the user answers all the questions, and for the
mechanisms where the underlying questions are all Yes (with the exception of Fatigue) will be listed as
potential cracking mechanisms which should be addressed or assessed in greater detail. Any Yes under
Fatigue will induce susceptibility for the Fatigue cracking mechanism. The evaluation beyond this

screening process is not considered part of the RBI study, which merely points out the potential areas of
concern.
O.5.4.3 Cracking due to operational issues

Operational aspects of tank failures have not been specifically addressed in this model. However, the
relevant precautions are assumed taken by the operator to avoid introduction damage to the tank. Potential
issues could be:
O.5.4.3.1 Shell Cracking

Shell cracking can occur if loading / filling takes place at very cold metal temperatures (sub design) and
crack like flaws are present at relatively high stress areas.
O.5.4.3.2 Floor Cracking

A tank floor is assumed not likely to crack during operation unless it is subjected to thermal cycling or
expansion when receiving high-temperature product (>250°F) at high rates. This is predominantly related
to heavy product services such as asphalt and heavy clarified. If the loading rate is not restricted, the floor
will bulge and ultimately crack.
O 5.5 Shell Corrosion Damage – RBI Model

The failure types considered for this module include both leakage and rupture. Leakage is obviously
likely to occur from varying hole sizes, which for practical purposes has been translated into three hole-
sizes categories. The rupture scenario, on the other hand, is considered as one instantaneous release of the
entire tank volume. The volume at time of rupture is assumed to be based on maximum fill height. The
failure modes and probability distributions that are considered in this module are summarized in Table 30.
Table 30: Failure modes and probabilities
Failure Mode (Based on welded tank. Maintained to API 653) GFF Relative probability
distribution
Leak due to corrosion 1.0 × 10-4 98.04%
• Small leak (equivalent to a 1/8 in. hole size) 70%
• Medium size leak (equivalent to a 1/2 in. hole size) 25%
• Large leak (equivalent to a 2 in. hole size) 5%
Rupture due to fracture (material embrittlement and cracking) 1.0 × 10-7 1.96%
• Rupture release of total tank volume (failure of lower 3 courses) 100%
Riveted Tanks are assumed to leak about one order of magnitude more often that welded tanks, i.e.
GFFLeak = 1.0×10-3, whereas a rapid failure or rupture of a riveted tank is consider unlikely.
Welded tanks that are NOT maintained to API 653 are considered to be about 40 time more likely to have
a rapid failure than tanks maintained to API 653, i.e. GFFRupture = 4.0×10-6.

O.5.5.1 Shell Leak – Distribution of Probability over Height

In this calculation model, the number of courses is set between 1 and 6. For the purpose of determining
generic volumetric leakage rates for a given set of leak scenarios, it should be kept in mind that the upper
courses (course 5 and 6 in particular) is relatively insignificant and negligible in terms of leak
consequence, in that a release high up on the tank shell can be quickly mitigated. Hence, even though 7
courses are sometime seen on storage tanks, only 6 courses have been considered.
The probability of a given leak occurring on course number 1, 2,… or 6 will vary with the shell height, as
indicated on Figure 13. For this model, the distribution is based on the inspection records for ca. 140
tanks at one refinery in the northern the USA. The distribution is only used for the corrosion rate
prediction calculations, and can be overridden by expert estimate for each individual course. Ideally, the
suggested distribution shown as the CR Index Ratio in Table 31 should be assessed by several more cases,
and possibly altered to account for further supporting information that becomes available. The CR Index
Ratio is considered a variable in the calculations for each tank shell.
Figure 13 : Tank Shell CR observed with Shell Height
CR (mpy) as function of H (ft)

Tank Level
52'
44'
36'
28'
20'
12'
4'
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50
The initial set of CR Index Ratios in Table 31 has been derived for tanks with 6 courses. Some tanks have
fewer courses, but will experience similar distribution of CR over the shell height due to liquid level
variations. Since this module in principle only considered the shell by number of courses, the CR
distribution becomes coarser with the decrease in number of shell course. This is somewhat reflected in
the CR Index Ratios for tanks with fewer than 6 courses (see Figure 14).

Table 31: CR Index Ratio – derived probability of leakage from observed CR
Relative Corrosion Rate per Shell Course CR Index Ratio for tanks with five or less
Based (6 Courses) Course
Course Avg. CR CR Ratio CR Index Ratio11

5 4 3 2 1
No. (mpy) of 100% to Course 1
1 1.42 10% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 1.87 13% 1.32 1.52 1.70 1.90 1.90
3 2.9 21% 2.04 2.02 2.00 1.85
4 2.85 21% 2.01 1.90 1.80
5 2.46 18% 1.73 1.70
6/712 2.37 17% 1.67
Figure 14: CR Index Ratio to Course 1 - as a Function of Total Number of Courses
CR Index Ratio to Course 1 - as function of total Number of Courses
2.20
2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
1 2 3 4 5 6
11
The Corrosion Rate Index is used for extrapolating the CR from course one to course two and above – the index
is derived from the graph on Figure 13.
12
There are some tanks with 7 courses, but these do not represent the typical tank and as such the 7th course is
covered under course 6 for this model.

O 5.6 Determination of Corrosion Rates

The approach used for AST’s applies to aboveground storage tanks subject to damage from both internal and
external corrosion. Both widespread corrosion and localized corrosion (which includes pitting and erosion-
corrosion) are within the scope of the module.
A corrosion rate (CR) shall be determined for each shell course, as the CR can vary significantly with the
height of the shell. The rates can be selected by the user as:
a. Estimated; CR is assigned by an expert, and can be a combination of calculated and measurement

data.
b. Calculated; CR is calculated by the RBI model, using Course 1 CR and the CT Index Ratio for
Course (2, 6).
c. Measured; CR as measured during past inspection, based on tmm and tnom – these should be adjusted
by an appropriate confidence factor.
If possible, measured corrosion rates should be used in lieu of the calculated or purely estimated rate, all
depending on the available inspection data and confidence in the inspection results. The CR can be
measured for some courses and estimated or calculated for others.
Once the CR is determined, it is subsequently applied to derive a DF for the tank shells.
O.5.6.1 Estimating Shell Corrosion Rate (CR)

When making a CR estimate all relevant aspects should be considered, including the corrosion
mechanism and its severity. Sample factors that generally influence the degradation of tank shells when
estimating or adjusting internal shell corrosion rates:are discussed in the following sections.
O.5.6.1.1 Fluid Velocity

High fluid velocity is expected to increase corrosion/erosion. High velocity will in particular be a problem
at injection points and bottom filled tanks. However, this problem can be rather complex and depends on
the local scenario and should be addressed in any manual assessment where this type of corrosion can be
expected.
O.5.6.1.2 Under Deposit Corrosion

Under deposit corrosion is expected predominantly on the shell side wall at the liquid line and vapor
space interface, where the surface is wetted and dried frequently, resulting in an increased amount of
deposits.
O.5.6.1.3 Water
Water content will either way increase the potential corrosion of the shell. Where the specific gravity (G)
is larger than 1, the corrosion area will be at the liquid line, and where G < 1, the corrosion is expected on
the lower section of course 1. Water can always be expected to be present to some degree, regardless of
water draw practices. Water can enter the tank with the stored fluid, condensation in the vapor space or
ingression of rainwater (depends on roof type and condition).

O.5.6.1.4 Organic Acid Corrosion

Organic acid corrosion can be expected where oxygen, H2S, or other contaminants are present. It can
generally be assumed that oxygen is present in the vapor space of a tank, whereas most other
contaminants flow with the storage medium in to the tank. The correlation between H2S content and shell
corrosion is given in Figure 15:
Figure 15: Estimated CR in H2S – Air 8, See Reference /7/
There are obviously several more damage mechanisms and corrosion aspects that need to be considered,
and it is assumed that the final estimates made by the expert takes all relevant aspects into account.
O.5.6.1.5 Microbiological Induced Corrosion

Microbiological induced corrosion by sulfur reducing or other bacteriological corrosion, being aerobic or
anaerobic should be considered where suspected relevant by experts. mic needs to be addressed as a
separate issue, but should be considered for the scope of internal inspection.
O.5.6.1.6 Other Related Issues

There are additional tank shell corrosion and operational aspects should be considered when assigning an
estimated CR. Not all of these concerns are specifically taken into consideration for the CR calculation in
the shell model – which on the other hand is rather conservative. the general concerns should also be
considered when determining the detailed inspection scope:
a. Cone roof type tanks have typically a larger vapor space, and hence more generalized corrosion at the
top half of the shell.

b. Potential shell wall corrosion can be split into three main areas of concern:
i. Vapor space corrosion – typically generalized corrosion, with some tendency of pitting,
depending on the stored liquid type. The problem is confined to the shell area from mid tank
height and up to the top, and is more pronounced for cone roof tanks.
ii. Liquid line corrosion – typically minimal or low pitting type corrosion (depending on stored fluid
type). The problem is found in the range of the fluctuating liquid line.
iii. Liquid phase corrosion – typically minimal corrosion, depending on the stored fluid, found in the
tank section that is continuously in liquid.
iv. Lower Heel corrosion – typically fairly high pitting type corrosion driven by the water content at
the bottom 3-6 in. of the tank. Often the corrosion is prevented by liner application
The following guideline can be used for vertical segmenting the tank shell:
Table 32: Tank Shell Segmenting
Tank Shell Segment Elevation as % of H Height Range (ft)
Vapor Space ≥ 85% 38 ft. – 48 ft.+

Liquid Line 10% - 85% 19 ft. – 38 ft.
Liquid Heel ≤ 10% 0 ft. – 19 ft.
13
Water Line ≤ 2% 0 ft. – 2.5 ft.
c. Rate of filling and emptying storage tanks (i.e. the liquid line motion) has some effect on the
corrosion rate. Figure 5.27 from /7/ the NACE Materials Selection for Petroleum Refineries and
Gathering Facilities handbook strongly indicates this issue being true. See Figure 16.
13
Only if water can be expected in the fluid and specific gravity (G) is ≤ 1. Water is assumed to be present for all
tanks storing fluids with a specific gravity of 1.0 or less.

Figure 16: Changes in Corrosion Rates with Slow and Rapid Liquid Line Motion
It can be assumed that the tank volume does to a certain degree determine the range and frequency of
liquid line motion. The following is a suggested categorization of tanks on diameter and height. See Table
33.
Table 33: Tank category by Shell size (ft)
Tank Shell Category Diameter (ft) Height (ft)

Large > 40 > 40
Medium 20 - 40 30 - 40
Small < 20 < 30
The above suggests that generically Small tanks will have a relative higher corrosion rate at the liquid line
range than Medium and Large tanks. In estimating the corrosion rate, other relevant factors should be
taken into account, such factor could for example be:
a. Information and knowledge found through past inspections
b. Process monitoring data – pH measurements, contaminants, etc.
c. Due to increased oxygen solubility, corrosion rates are likely to increase with decreased fluid density,
particularly for Light fluids (API 50 or lighter).

d. Shell wall without internal coating most likely have higher corrosion rates at the liquid line range than
internally coated shells.
e. Large vapor space might increase corrosion. Hence, cone roof tanks (large vapor space – varies with
liquid level) are likely to have more corrosion at the top courses than internal floating roof tanks
(small vapor space). Note that it can always be assumed that oxygen enters the tank (via the seal,
small holes in the roof, lack of purging from last entry, or via the fluid stream). It is not realistic to
exclude presence of air in the vapor space.
f. Vapor space corrosion is likely to be generalized in nature, whereas Liquid line, Liquid heel and
water level are all likely to be localized in nature (pitting type corrosion). Particularly, the vapor
space corrosion is bad if H2S is presence, i.e. Air and hydrogen Sulfide.
Typically a tank has up to 6 and sometime 7 courses (rings or stacks). The typical width of the course
plates is 8 feet. For smaller tanks 10ft plates are sometimes used. Each course might have different wall
thickness (WT) since the WT is determined by the fill height. Since the WT is normally decreasing with
increasing shell height location, the time to leakage due to corrosion can be expected to by highest at the
to of the liquid line range. Conversely, the consequence of a leakage located at the top of the tank shell is
relatively small, compared to the lower shell courses, where the membrane stresses are much higher. This
also supports the postulate that the main concern in relation to catastrophic failures (shell rupture) is
confined to the lower 3 courses.
O.5.6.2 Calculation of Shell Corrosion Rate (CR)

Figure 17 contains a flow chart of the steps required to calculate a combined (Internal and External)
corrosion rate for the shell. This shell CR is used to derive a damage factor for the shell leakage (DFShell
Leak).
This DF approach is only applicable for small leaks from welded shells. Frequencies for small leaks
from riveted shells and rapid shell failures are as shown in Table 2 and are not modified further.

Figure 17: Flow Chart to determine estimated corrosion rates for Welded Shells
Product
External
Side
Establish Base Establish Base Inspection Data

- Climate Corrosion Rate for Corrosion Rate for BS&W
- OP Temp External Shell Internal Bottom pH, etc.
- Insulation Corrosion (5 mpy) Corrosion (2-5 mpy)
Coating Needed?
Coating Age
Insulation Quality Adjust for Internal Coating Quality
and Age Adjust for Insulation Coating. Low
If Liner (FRP type) Average
is installed, set Above Average
factor = 1.0 (applied according
to API 652)
Coating Quality
and Age Adjust for coating
Adjust for Operating Bulk Fluid

Temperature Temperature
Adjust for Steam Use of Steam Coil

Coil Heater Heater
Calculate Modified Product

Side Corrosion Rate for Course 1
Calculate CR
Calculate Modified External for Course 2 CR Index Ratio
Corrosion Rate
and up
Is both Internal and

External Corrosion
No Localized? Yes
Use the Greater of

Add Corrosion Rates Corrosion Rates
Calculate ‘ar/t for looking

up Modifying Factor

O.5.6.2.1 Internal Corrosion Rate

O.5.6.2.1.1 Establish Base Corrosion Rate for Shell Internal Corrosion
Tank shells can corrode from the inside of the tank as well as the outside. Base corrosion rates for
internal corrosion can be obtained from previous internal inspection data, or may be assumed to
approximate the corrosion in the lower part of the shell if significant bottom sediments and water
(BS&W) are present. For dry product tanks, the internal corrosion can be insignificant.
Under normal circumstances and for the purpose of this assessment the base internal corrosion rate is set
to 2 mpy for dry products. However, if significant bottom sediments and/or water are present, the base
corrosion rate is set to 5 mpy. Table 34 shows the suggested base corrosion rates.
Table 34: Tank Shell Base Corrosion Rates
Product Condition Base Corrosion Rate

(mpy)
Dry 2
Wet 5
Except for adjustment for Water Draw (not applicable), the adjustment factors for internal shell side
corrosion are the same as for the product side of the floor. See section O.4.4.2 for details.
The CR is only calculated for Course 1, and subsequently extrapolated as per the CR Index Ratio (see
Table 31) for Course 2 and up. Any one of these calculated CR can be overridden by an estimated value.
O.5.6.2.2 External Corrosion Rate

O.5.6.2.2.1 Establish Base Corrosion Rate for Shell External Corrosion
Shell external corrosion for carbon and low alloy steels is calculated based on the type of climate and the
average annual operating temperature. Three types of climates were considered – marine, temperate, and
arid.
Dependant on whether or not the shell is insulated, the corrosion rate could increase for certain
temperature ranges. Thus, the base corrosion rate is determined accordingly. The quality of the insulation
is taken into account by a separate adjustment factor.
Table 35 presents ranges of bulk fluid temperatures and corresponding corrosion rates for each climate,
with no shell insulation.

Table 35: Base Corrosion Rates (mpy) for External Shell Corrosion – NOT Insulated
Bulk Fluid Climate

Temperature (°F) Marine / Cooling Temperate Arid / Dry
Tower Drift Area
≤ 10 0 0 0
10 – 60 5 3 1
60 – 120 2 1 0
120 – 200 5 2 1
200 – 250 1 0 0
> 250 0 0 0
Table 36 presents ranges of bulk fluid temperatures and corresponding corrosion rates for each climate,
for insulated tank shells.
Table 36: Base Corrosion Rates (mpy) for External Shell Corrosion – Insulated
Bulk Fluid Climate

Temperature (°F) Marine / Cooling Temperate Arid / Dry
Tower Drift Area
≤ 10 0 0 0
10 – 60 5 3 1
60 – 120 2 1 0
120 – 200 10 5 2
200 – 250 2 1 0
> 250 0 0 0
Figure 18 shows the locations for the three climate types in the continental United States. Locations with
a marine climate receive more than 40 in. of precipitation per year or have an average chloride
concentration in rainwater of at least 1.0 mg/l. Locations with temperate climates are assumed to receive
20 in. – 40 in. of precipitation per year. Arid climates exist in those areas receiving less than 20 inches of
precipitation per year.

Figure 18: Climate Map for the United States
O.5.6.2.2.2 Adjust for Insulation Quality

The base CR from Table 36 is adjusted for the quality of the insulation. The quality is determined as an
overall rating over time, i.e. suitability of insulation type for climate, installation work in general,
inspection results, maintenance program and compliance, etc. The credit given for the estimated
insulation quality is calculated as:
Equation 11: Adjust for Insulation Quality
CR = CRBase × FInsulaton Quality
The adjustment factors are selected from Table 37.
Table 37: Adjustment Factor for Quality of Insulation
Quality of Insulation Adjustment Factor

(FInsulation Quality)
Low 1.00
Average 0.50
Above Average 0.25

Insulation is assumed to be repaired or replaced when it appears damaged or ineffective, and as such does
not degrade significantly over time, in terms of insulating effect. This should be taken into account when
determining the Insulation Quality.
O.5.6.2.2.3 Adjust for External Coating

To account for the benefits of an external coating, it is assumed that no or negligible external corrosion
takes place during the first few years after the tank is coated, depending on the quality of the coat system.
The adjustment factor is calculated on the bases of the coating age (i.e. year installed) and coating quality,
using a beta distribution function, where the adjustment factor for external coating (FExt,Coat) can be
calculated as
Equation 12: Adjustment Factor for External Coating
FExt,Coat = MIN(1, BETADIST(Age, 4, 1, 0, Quality))
The factor can also be looked up in Table 38. The lower the factor is the more credit is given. A factor of
1 is equal to no credit.
Table 38: Adjustment factors for quality and age of external coating
Age Coating Quality

Years Low (5 Yr) Average (10 Yr) Above Average (15 Yr)
1 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.03 0.00 0.00
3 0.13 0.01 0.00
4 0.41 0.03 0.01
5 1.00 0.06 0.01
6 1.00 0.13 0.03
7 1.00 0.24 0.05
8 1.00 0.41 0.08
9 1.00 0.66 0.13
10 1.00 1.00 0.20
11 1.00 1.00 0.29
12 1.00 1.00 0.41
13 1.00 1.00 0.56
14 1.00 1.00 0.76
15 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: If the external shell is pitted, no credit should be given for coating the tank.
The coating quality is categorized as Low (good for up to 5 years), Average (good for up to 10 years) and
Above Average (good for up to 15 years). The quality setting should take in to account past experience
with the coating program for the given environment, contractors workmanship, etc.

For the cases where a continual coating program is enforced and the external corrosion rate is kept at a
negligible level, a measured or estimated corrosion rate should be assigned (0.5mpy generalized is
suggested).
O.5.6.3 Measured Shell Corrosion Rate (CR)

When measured CR is derived from inspection records, the level of confidence in the inspection results
should be taken into account. This includes assessment of the inspection technique, contractor and
technician, any unfavorable circumstance that the inspection was carried out under, etc. The following is a
suggested adjustment of measured corrosion rate, depending on the inspection credit level:
Equation 13: Confidence Adjustment of Measured Corrosion Rate
CRMeasured
CR Adjusted =
InspConfidence
Where the InspConfidence is the level of confidence in the particular CR that is derived from the past
inspection records.
InspConfidence :
a. 100%: No Adjustment – Two or more A-level inspections have been performed, and inspection
results have been analyzed to derive an accurate CR.
b. 90%: High Confidence – Minimum one A or B level inspection has been made and the results
have been analyzed to derive the most appropriate CR.
c. 70%: Medium Confidence – Minimum one C level inspection has been made, with a simple
review to derive a representative CR.
d. 50%: Low Confidence – Minimum one D level inspection has been made with a simple review
to derive a representative CR.
O.5.6.4 Combining Internal and External Shell Corrosion

The calculated internal and external corrosion rates are determined by multiplying the base corrosion rate
by the respective adjustment factors. This results in the following CR’s:
a. Calculated Internal CR: Only applicable for course 1. The CR Index Ratio is used to determine
the corresponding Internal CR for Course 2 and up. The adjustments are done before comparing the
Internal CR with the External CR.
b. Calculated External CR: Applicable for all Shell courses.
The higher of the two CR is considered the critical CR and driver for inspection.
The final CR for Internal CR and External CR, for each course, can be based on the calculated, estimated
or measured rates, or be a combination of all.

This will produce two separate corrosion rates that are combined, for each course, as described below.
O.5.6.4.1 Combine Corrosion Rates

Both the internal and external corrosion can be localized or generalized / widespread in nature. Depending
on the expected or experienced type of corrosion on either side, one of the following options can be
applied to determine the governing corrosion rate.
a. Option 1 – add corrosion rates: If the internal or external corrosion is generalized or widespread in
nature, the corrosion areas will likely overlap such that the wall thickness is simultaneously reduced
by both internal and external influences. In this case, the internal and external rates are added.
b. Option 2 – use highest corrosion rate: For pitting or localized corrosion on both the internal and
external surface, the chances are low that the internal and external rates can combine to produce an
additive effect on wall loss. In this case, use the greater of the two corrosion rates as the governing
corrosion rate.
Note: In order to avoid understating the risk, it is recommended that the combined corrosion rate
should not be set lower than 2 mils per year.
O 5.7 Tank DF and Likelihood – Shell versus Floor

For the purpose of this model, the approach that was developed for the floor failures is applied in a
relative form for the shell failures, such that the predicted degradation level for the floor and the shell
become comparable in terms of what drives the future internal inspections.
The ar/t table that was originally developed (see section O.5.7.1) is base on a GFF equal to 7.2×10-3,
which equates to a DFar/t range from less than 1 through 139. It was deemed that integers were more
practical to use than decimal numbers, and a new table was made with a DF range of (1;1390), i.e.
numbers were scaled one order of magnitude and rounded up to nearest integer. This would be equivalent
to creating a table based on a GFF one order of magnitude smaller, i.e. 7.2×10-4.
O.5.7.1 DFar/t Table Development

The original ar/t table from the API RAM study (see reference /1/) only takes one inspection into account,
which can be credited as a 1D (poor), 1C, 1B or a 1A (very good) inspection. Basically, the table has four
degradation profiles that range from a poor inspection to one very high level inspection.
To make a simplistic extrapolation of these four DFar/t risk profiles to consider up to a total of ‘4A’
inspection effectiveness as well as no inspection, the existing curves have been used to model a Beta
Distribution function, which changes with level of inspection credit.
It is assumed that the Beta Function curves are fairly conservative, and that any corrosion driven
degradation profile will fall within the profile of these curves. By using this Beta Function, any range of
DFar/t can be developed and correlated to a specific GFF. The underlying assumption remains that the plot
profile and relation between A, B, C and D inspection effectiveness is the same. Thus, Table 24 which is
based on GFF = 1/1390 contains one reference plot for each level of inspection effectiveness from no
inspection (E) through the maximum inspection credit (4A), i.e. 17 risk profile curves in total. This DFar/t
is derived directly for inspection purposes, and is comparable for any component – shell (courses) or
floor.

However, in order to calculate the LoF that is comparable between any of the DFar/t–adjusted GFF values,
the LoF calculations based on the DFar/t from Table 24 need to be adjusted relative to the GFF = 7.2×10-4,
which is the basis for the DFar/t table
Instead of using different ar/t look-up tables for each component (floor and shell) and failure scenarios
(leak and rupture), a relative scaling factor (MFGFF) has been developed (see Equation 14). The objective
with the formula is to align the LoF’s calculated for different GFF values using the same DFar/t reference.
As mentioned, the DFar/t table has been developed for a certain GFF value (7.2×10-4), e.g. for which case
the adjustment should be approximately 1. The GFF scaling factor is applied to the LoF calculation as
shown in Equation 15.
Equation 14: LoF Calculation with MFGFF
GFFc × DFar / t
LoFc =
MFGFFc
Where the subscript ‘c’ denotes that the calculation is GFF specific (component or failure scenario)
Note that the MFGFF is used for the Likelihood calculations only, whereas the unadjusted DFar/t is used as
basis for the inspection planning. Relative to Table 24, the calculated DF for the floor is 10 times larger
than actual and the calculated DF for shell is about 7.2 times smaller than actual. This is taken account
for in the LoF calculations.
All mentioned DFar/t refer to Table 24, and their adjustment for the LoF contribution from each
component and failure scenario is calculated as per Equation 14 and Equation 15.
Equation 15 Scaling Factor

−2
 GFFar / t 
MFGFFc = 13× LOG 2


 GFFc 
The underlying assumption for comparing the floor and shell DFar/t is that the prior distribution function
for tank leakage is relatively the same for the tank shell and floor (same DF profile over time). This is
practical in terms of inspection planning, thus applying the DF range in Table 24 for both the floor and
shell inspection planning purposes – un-scaled, and handling the scaling in the DF calculation for each
component when the LoF calculation is made.
Each shell Course is in principle considered as separate component, and as the CR may vary significantly
with the vertical location on the shell, this method will drive inspection towards to location (Course
number) that is most likely to leak.
This approach might appear conservative for inspection planning of the shell. However, the lower
probability of failure for the shell compared to the floor is assumed taken somewhat into account by an
expected lower corrosion rate on the shell wall. As mentioned, the DF is a function of the age (a),
corrosion rate (r), nominal wall thickness (t), and the combined credit for past inspections.
In summary; For the shell assessment, the following steps are made for DF calculations:

a. One DF value is derived for each shell course – from Table 24. These are adjusted with a DF
Adjustment Ratio for Course 2 and up (see Equation 16 in section O.5.7.2) – the DF Adjustment
Ratio for Course 1 = 1.0, i.e. no adjustment.
b. For inspection planning, the adjusted DF (by DFAdjustment, i as per Equation 16) for each Course is used
directly for inspection planning purposes. Any mitigation in terms of refined calculation or added
inspections will target to reduce the DF factors that exceed the DFTarget.
c. The LoF is calculated as a sum of the LoF for each Course (see Equation 23), using the relevant
scaling factor.
O.5.7.2 DFar/t Calculation for Course Two and Up – Relative DF Adjustment Ratio
Assessment of the tank shell is primarily related to, or based on, the lowest course (course 1). However,
the relative risk associated with a shell leak is expected to change with the vertical location of the hole,
such that the consequence from a leak on the lowest course will be relatively much higher than the
consequence from a leak on the highest Shell course.
Furthermore, a tank may have a reduced nominal wall thickness for course 2 and above, compared to
course 1. This means that for a given corrosion rate that the ar/t value will approach 1 (which theoretically
equals a hole through) much more rapidly for the upper most courses than for course 1, and hence
recommending inspection too early and at the wrong location on the shell. This is taken into account by
the following adjustment factor to the DF for each course above course 1. This DF Adjustment Ratio
calculation is used for all courses as relative basis for distributing the one GFF for the shell over the
existing number of courses (see section O 5.9).
Equation 16: DF Adjustment Ratio Calculation between Courses
  t min, Course i  
3
DFAdjustment , i 
= Min1, 0.3 +   
 
 t  
 min, Course 1
The calculated DFAdjustment Ratio is illustrated on Figure 19 relative to the shell height (Course number),
nominal and minimum required wall thicknesses. The risk ratio is used for adjusting the DF for each of
the shell courses – the adjustment is relative to course one. The graphs on the figure are based on a typical
example of a shell with 6 courses and varying wall thickness. The corresponding tmin is also calculated
and plotted. The lower the Risk Ratio factor, the higher level of risk is acceptable – in relative terms to
course number one.
The Risk Ratio curve shows that for the upper courses a relatively higher level of risk of leakage, or
uncertainty about wall thickness, is acceptable. This is based on the presumption that the higher the
location of the leak, inherently the lower the consequence will be.
The underlying assumption for the DFAdjustment is that each course has been correctly design, with a
proportional corrosion allowance and safety margin relative to course one, and that the Inspection Target
(DFTarget) is < 30% of the maximum DF.

Figure 19: Illustration of the calculated Risk Ratio
TMSF Ratio with varying WT

1.2 1.2
1 1
0.8 0.8
Risk Ratio
Inch
0.6 0.6
0.4 0.4
0.2 Tnom 0.2

Tmin
Risk Ration
0 0
Course 6 Course 5 Course 4 Course 3 Course 2 Course 1
The DF for a given course is calculated as:
Equation 17: DF Adjustment
DFCourse i = DFCourse i (un-adjusted) × DFAdjustment Course i
Where, the DFAdjustment Course 1 = 1.0
Thus, the higher the DFAdjustment factor, the less tolerable the associated level of risk is.
The Critical Course Calculation in section O 5.8 shall be considered an added criterion for the RBI
planning.
Note: shell rupture is considered unlikely above half the shell height. A shell rupture failure is also
assumed to cause a total release of the tank volume – in every case. As such, rupture LoF can practically
not be related to a specific course in terms of varying LoF from one course to the other. Thus, the
LoFRupture is considered non-related to DF and only changes generically by whether or not the tank is
designed and maintained to a recognized code, i.e. the LoFRupture is set static at 1×10-7 and 4×10-6
respectively.

O 5.8 Critical Course Calculation

The following is a method for determining the critical course based on Safe Filling Height calculations
and minimum required wall thickness. The calculations are based on API 653. The Safe Filling Height
relates to the overall integrity of the shell rather than the DF, which relates more to a shell leak failure.
The objective with the critical course calculation is to ensure that the Safe Filling Height criterion is
specifically addressed for each course, and that the RBI recommended inspection scope is focused
towards the most appropriate shell course(s). The situation is likely to occur where the DF for one course
exceeds the DFTarget, and another course is actually more critical as far as Safe Filling Height is concerned,
or that the Safe Filling Height is exceeded before an inspection is recommended from the RBI analysis.
Based on the input information listed in the Critical Course Calculation in Table 27, the following
assessment is performed (see API 653 for reference).
With a given tmm at the last inspection year, a selected CR and a Maximum Filling Height calculate the
point in time where the Maximum Filling Height becomes smaller than the Safe Filling Height – or the
predicted wall thickness becomes smaller than the required wall thickness. The course, for which this is
first through, is the most Critical Course.
Hence, a Course is Critical if:
HF < HSafe or
tCalc < tmin or
tCalc < 1/16 in.14
Where.
HF = Maximum Filling Height (ft)
HSafe = Calculated Safe Filling Height (ft) – see section O.5.8.2.
tCalc = Calculated wall thickness (in) at a given year
tmin = Minimum required wall thickness (in)
O.5.8.1 Safe Filling Height

HSafe is calculated at the bottom of each shell course as per Equation 18, and compared to the maximum
allowable filling height.
Equation 18: Safe Filling Height Calculation (HSafe)
14
This could be true in case the maximum filling height is actually below the course itself. For example if course 6
is never expected to see liquid, tmin and tCalc could both be about 0.00. This is in reality not acceptable. Also see
section O.5.8.3.1.

SEt Calc
H Safe = +1+ H0
2.6 DG
Where,
S = Min[0.80YS, 0.429TS] for Course 1 & 2, and Min[0.88YS, 0.472TS] for all other
Courses. S is measured in Psi.
H0 = the distance from the ground to the bottom weld on the course (ft).
tCalc = calculated thickness at the year that the Tank is being analyzed (in)
O.5.8.2 Calculated Wall Thickness

The predicted wall thickness at any given point in time (tCalc) is calculated as per
Equation 19: Calculation of tCalc
t Calc = t Start − (∆ Year × CR )
Where,
tStart = starting wall thickness, which can be either tnom (if installation year is used) OR tmm (if
inspection year is used)
∆Year = time in years between the year associated with tStart and the year for which the tank shell
is being analyzed.
O.5.8.3 Minimum Require Shell Course Thickness

The required wall thickness tmin is calculated as per API 653, using the equation for locally thinned areas.
Equation 20: Required Wall Thickness (tmin)
(H F − H 0 )DG
t min = 2.6
SE
Where the liquid column used is from the bottom of the course to the maximum filling height.
O.5.8.3.1 Added Criterion – Minimum Wall Thickness

The limiting wall thickness for any measured minimum (tmm) = 0.6 × tmin.
The absolute minimum wall thickness for any shell course area is 1/16 in.. This is mostly relevant above
the liquid level.
In the event these added requirements are exceed, the tanks shell should be made subject to a more
detailed assessment immediately.

O 5.9 Shell – Damage Factor (DF) and Likelihood of Failure (LoF)

The total LoFShell is a product of leak and rupture, as expressed below.
Equation 21: LoFShell Calculaton – Leak and Rupture
LoFShell = LoFShell , Leak + LoFShell , Rupture
However, the LoF contribution from shell rupture is equal to the generic GFFRupture, and only depends on
compliance with design and maintenance codes. Thus, the LoFShell varies with the LoFShell, Leak only. The
LoFShell, Leak is a production of the shell corrosion rate(s).
The LoFShell, Leak is calculated based on the course that has the highest adjusted DF. The representative
shell DF is calculated as
Equation 22: Representative DFShell
DFShell = Max (DFar / t , Course i × DFAdjustment , Course i ); i = (1; 6)
The Generic Failure Frequency for the shell leak (GFFLeak) needs to be scaled in order to align it with the
GFF used as basis for the DFar/t factor development. Hence, the LoF for a shell is calculated as per
Equation 23.
Equation 23: LoFShell Calculation
 GFFShell , Leak 
LoFShell =  × Max (DFCourse i )× DFAdjustment , i  + GFFShell , Rupture
 MFGFF , Shell Leak 
 
O 5.10 Floor Inspection Effectiveness Table – Leak Failure

Inspections are rated according to their expected effectiveness at detecting corrosion and correctly predicting
the rate of corrosion. The actual rating of a given inspection technique depends on the characteristics of the
corrosion, (i.e. whether it is widespread or localized).
O.5.10.1 Determination of Number and Rating of Inspections

The rating of each inspection performed within the designated time period must be characterized in
accordance with Table 39 and Table 40. The number of highest rated inspections will be used to
determine the DF. If multiple inspections of a lower rating have been conducted during the designated
time period, these can for practical purposes be equated to an equivalent higher rated inspection in
accordance with the following relationships:
1 A inspection = 2 B inspections
1 B inspection = 2 C inspections
1 C inspection = 2 D inspections

The inspections need to be assigned in relation to the governing corrosion, i.e. this being internal
or external corrosion.
Table 39: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Ratings – Internal Tank Shell Corrosion
Inspection
Rating Internal Corrosion
Category
a. Intrusive inspection – good visual inspection with pit depth gage
measurements at suspect locations.
A
b. UT scanning follow up on suspect location and as general confirmation of
wall thickness
a. External spot UT scanning based on visual information from previous

internal inspection of this tank or similar service tanks.
B
b. Internal video survey with external UT follow-up.
a. External spot UT scanning based at suspect locations without benefit of any

C
internal inspection information on tank type or service.
a. External spot UT based at suspect locations without benefit of any internal

D
inspection information on tank type or service.
E No inspection

Table 40: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Ratings – External Tank Shell Corrosion
Inspection
Rating External Corrosion
Category
a. Insulated – >95% external visual inspection prior to removal of insulation
b. Remove >90% of insulation at suspect locations, OR >90% pulse eddy
current inspection.
A c. Visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT or pit
gauge as required.
a. Non-Insulated - >95% visual inspection of the exposed surface area with
follow-up by UT or pit gauge as required.
current inspection.
B c. Visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT or pit
gauge as required.
current inspection.
C c. Visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT or pit
gauge as required.
b. Remove >5% of insulation at suspect locations, OR >5% pulse eddy current
inspection.
D c. Visual inspection of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT or pit
gauge as required.
a. Insulated – No visual inspection of insulation surface area or removal of
E insulation.
a. Non-Insulated - <5% visual of the exposed surface area

O 5.11 GFF used to determine Tank Specific Leak Frequencies

The LoF for a shell is calculated as per section O 5.9. The GFF that is used in the calculation also relates
to the failure type. Thus,
a. Small Leak Frequency: The small leak frequency for a specific tank is obtained by multiplying the base
leak frequency for small (welded) shell leaks (Table 2) by the adjusted DF.
b. Rapid Shell Failure and Small Leaks: The frequencies for rapid shell failures and small leaks for riveted
tanks are as shown in Table 2 and are not influenced by the damage factor.
O 5.12 Inspection Planning – Tank Shell

As mentioned under section O 5.7, the planning of tank shell inspection is based on the same DF range as the
tank floor. This is to ensure that the values are comparable. Thus, when deriving the DF value for inspection
planning purposes, the values in Table 24 are used directly, and adjusted with the scaling factor for shell
(GFFShell Scale).
O.6. CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE

In general, the consequence of failure for a given component can be categorized under financial, health
and safety, and environmental consequence. The methodology described in this document considers the
main drivers for performing future inspection, which are mainly related to direct financial / business cost
and environmental cost. The health and safety aspects should not be trivialized, but can be considered
secondary when future inspection aim at preventing primarily small leak in the tank floor and shell to the
surrounding environment.
O 6.1 Consequence Model

The scope of this methodology document is limited to assessing risks associated with potential releases of
liquids. The liquid release scenarios that are considered are summarized in Table 1. Figure 20 illustrates
the areas that might be impacted by any of the potential release scenarios. It shows that releases could:
a. Impact soils both on-site and off-site
b. Impact surface water
c. Impact groundwater
d. Result in essentially no impact since the spilled liquids are contained inside the dike area
surrounding a storage tank.
In order to provide a quantitative estimate of Consequence, a Clean Up Factor (CUF) has been identified
for each impact type that could be affected by a liquid release. See Table 42.
Thus, the consequence of a spill is measured in dollars and consists of environmental clean-up costs,
environmental penalties, repair costs, and lost opportunity costs, such that the total consequence cost is
calculated as shown in Equation 24: Total CoF Cost.
Equation 24: Total CoF Cost

Total Cost = Environmental Clean-up + Environmental Penalties + lost Business + Repairs

Where the Environmental Clean-up Cost + Environmental Penalties are considered Environmental
Consequence, and Lost Business and Downtime costs + Repairs costs are considered Financial
Consequence.
The costs for environmental penalties and lost business opportunity costs are input by the user. The
environmental and repair costs can be included or excluded at user discretion.
Figure 20: Overview of Spill Consequence Model
AST Consequence Analysis

Overview of Leak Scenarios
dike / RPB/catch basin

1 2
surface water 3
onsite
6 offsite
subsurface soil 4
5
ground water
O 6.2 Representative Fluids

The AST’s that are considered for this methodology are assumed predominantly to store liquid
hydrocarbon products (gasoline, diesel oil, crude oil, fuel oil, etc.). The following stored fluid types are
considered for this methodology:

Table 41 Representative Fluids
RBI Fluid Group Fluid Description Additional fluid types that can be included – based on equivalent
grouping
C6-C8 Gasoline Gasoline, Naphtha, Heavy Naphtha, Light Straight Run, Heptane
*EE; HF; PO; EEA; Methanol; Styrene; Aromatics
C9-C12 and C13-C16 Diesel Oil Diesel, Kerosene
C17-C25 Fuel and Crude Oil Jet Fuel, Atmospheric Gas Oil, Typical Crude, Vacuum Column
Top, Light Vacuum Gas Oil
*Acid (Low, Med and High)
C25+ Asphalt Residuum, Heavy Crude, Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil
*EG; EO
*Fluids are set to an equivalent HC fluid with similar viscosity in centipoise at 75°F
In case of other fluids than hydrocarbons, the user can model the fluid with an equivalent setting from
Table 41, and adjust the clean-up cost factor accordingly.
O.6.2.1 Environmental Clean-Up Cost

The basic approach to estimating the environmental clean-up costs of a scenario is to add the cost for the
various clean-up methods needed to remediate a spill. For instance, if a spill leads to groundwater
contamination, the components of the cleanup may consist of soil remediation onsite, soil remediation
offsite, and groundwater clean up. Each component has a Clean-Up Factor (CUF) that is based on the
location of the spill and the type of material spilled. The CUF encompass the most common clean-up
methods, such as physically cleaning the soil, vapor emission recovery, water well pumping, etc.
The suggested default values are listed in Table 42. The user is free to alter these suggested numbers,
based on past experience and knowledge of local conditions.
Table 42: Suggested Clean-up Factors (CUF in $/bbl)
Floor Failure Shell Failure Environmental Sensitivity ($ / bbl)

Contaminated Area
Scenario Scenario Low Medium High
Leak - Subsurface Soil 500 1,500 3,000
Leak - Groundwater 1,000 5,000 10,000
Rupture Leak / Rupture Dike Area 10 10 10
Rupture Rupture On Site Surface Soil 50 50 50
Rupture Rupture Off Site Surface Soil 100 250 500
Rupture Rupture Surface Water 500 1,500 5,000
Due to the inherent inaccuracies in calculating costs related to a given leak, the CUF should be considered
as an indexing score as opposed to an absolute cost value. The CUF represents the relative magnitude of
different consequences that would result if a barrel of oil were released into one impact type as compared
to another. The unit of measure is USD per barrel ($/bbl), which allows for a realistic update of the

relative costs, depending on local conditions, costs and environmental issues. The total environmental
clean-up cost is calculated as:
Equation 25: Environmental clean-up cost calculation

6
Environmental CleanUp Cost = ∑Volume
Area =1
Area × CUFArea
Where Area is referring to the locations illustrated on Figure 20.
The CUF’s listed in Table 42 have been based on actual operator experience relating cleanup/remediation
of petroleum spillage. The score range (low, medium, high) that may be selected, is taking into account
that site-specific conditions could significantly influence the consequence. Therefore, the ranges are
intended to allow the user to adjust the CUF score up or down based on product type, surrounding
community and local conditions and/or regulatory requirements. For example, spills of diesel might be at
the lower end of the CUF range and spills containing MTBE would be at the higher end.
NOTE: Spillage of other fluids than hydrocarbon liquids should be assessed as a separate issue, and a
revised set of CUF’s should be applied. The same applies for adverse local conditions that fall outside the
default CUF range (low, medium and high).
All of the consequence assessment methods follow the same format.
Step 1: Identify applicable leakage release scenarios
Step 2: Estimate the volumes that might be released into each impact type.
Step 3: Identify the appropriate CUF
Step 4: Perform calculations: Consequence = Volume x CUF
Figure 21 illustrates how the methods are to be applied. The figure illustrates the relationship between
release types (tank bottom and shell) and potentially affected areas (contained in dike, groundwater, etc.).

Figure 21: Flowchart for Consequence Model
Environmental Impact range:
CUF = $100 low
CUF = $5,000 medium
CUF = $10,000 high
CUF = $500 low
Yes
CUF = $1,500 medium
Bottom Reaches
Groundwater?
CUF = $3,000 high
Leak
No
CUF = $500 low
CUF = $1,500 medium
Yes CUF = $5,000 high
Reaches No
Surface CUF = $100 low
Water?
CUF = $250 medium

Shell
Leak
Yes
CUF = $500 high
No No
Contained Travel
CUF = $50
in Dike? Offsite?
Yes
Rapid Floor/
Shell Failure
CUF = $10
Notes: The impact range should take into account the amount of time it takes to clean up the spill and to mitigate the impact. For
example, a spill that is isolated within minutes may still reach groundwater if the spill is not cleaned up. Contained in dike?
means that the spill does not have the possibility or is given the time to migrate to other areas. For example, it does not reach
surface water or ground water before it is cleaned up.

O.6.2.2 Environmental Penalties Cost

This cost is a direct user input, and is most likely very difficult to predict. Past experience and
information might lead to approximate setting, depending on tank location, stored fluid, various
jurisdictional compliance issues, etc. However, for inspection planning purposes, and in order to enable a
reasonable comparison between the analyzed tanks, the user might want to set this cost to zero. Although,
in case the penalty cost is actually quantifiable (based on fluid type, tank location, etc.) the value should
be entered.
O.6.2.3 Lost Business Opportunity Cost – Downtime

The downtime cost relates to the cost of lost business in case the tank is abruptly taken out of service. The
cost is a tank specific user input value, and needs to reflect an average cost impact that can be expected,
well realizing that the cost might vary over the year, with seasonal product demands, etc.
The cost associated to downtime or business interruption is:
Equation 26: Downtime Cost Calculation
Downtime Cost = Outage Days × $Cost/Day
The number of outage days should include time to blind off the tank and preparation for inspection, tank
cleaning, waste or sludge disposal, blasting, actual inspection work and bringing the tank back into
service.
The cost per day should take costs associated to these activities into account as well. These costs will vary
with the tank size, stored fluid, etc. and as such will have differing contribution to the overall risk.
O.6.2.4 Repair Costs – Repair, Replacement, and added Downtime

Aside from the environmental cost issue, the cost of inspections and possible repairs can hardly be
considered a driver for inspection in it self. One might argue that the longer an inspection can be pushed
off, the lesser the final direct cost will be. On the other hand, given that the cost of a major repair (partly
or complete floor replacement) is much more expensive than what a minor repair and a liner applications
for example is. This increase in potential cost should be considered an added risk associated with failures.
This is particularly true where a floor leakage is detected early, i.e. minimal risk of contaminating the
environment.
This aspect has only been addressed for tank floors, as the outage time can vary significantly depending
on the scope of repair work.
The cost and duration of tank repair work is dependent on the size and age of the tank, type of foundation,
type of product (crude oil vs. refined product), etc. The contribution to consequence by repair and
replacement cost is determined from Table 43, which contains a set of suggested default settings.
Table 43: Default AST Repair and Replacement Costs
Downtime (Lost opportunity

Repair Cost
cost)
Minor bottom repairs $5,000 5 days

Downtime (Lost opportunity

Repair Cost
cost)
Major bottom repairs (*) $10/ sq. ft. 20 days
Bottom replacement (*) $20/ sq. ft 37 days
Rapid bottom failure (*) $15/ sq. ft. 37 days
Hydro-test -- 7 days
Install internal Coating – Epoxy type $4/ sq. ft. 7 days
Install internal Liner – FRP type $7/ sq. ft. 14 days
Liner repair cost (Flood-caoting) $1/ sq. ft. 4 days
Rapid shell failure (cost based on floor size) $15/ sq. ft. 50 days
Shell leak repair Negligible 0 days
*Hydro-test is normally required in relation to repair work. This has been included in downtime for the denoted items.
50% of Major repairs can be expected to require Hydro-testing
The following is the assumed distribution of repair efforts for the average case where leakage is found:
a. 25% of all potential bottom leaks will cause Minor bottom repairs, which include floor pick-ups (fill
welding pits).
b. 50% of all potential bottom leaks will cause Major bottom repairs, which includes extensive pit
welding, partly replacement of annular ring or replacement of floor plate sections.
c. 25% of all potential bottom leaks will cause bottom replacement
For bottom leak or rupture events, the probability of having to add or install a floor liner or
coating is:
a. 5% for liner – if liner was not installed before the leak and coating is not assessed to be needed
b. 80% for coating or liner – if coating is assessed to be needed and no coating or liner was previously
applied
c. 100% for coating or liner – if coating or liner was installed prior to the leak, i.e. there is a 100%
probability of replacement, extensive repair or flood coating.
O 6.3 Floor Consequence Calculation Overview

The flow charts on Figure 22, Figure 24: and Figure 30 illustrates the sequence of task to calculate the
consequence costs.

Figure 22: Environmental Consequence Calculation – Bottom Leak
Environmental
CoF
Bottom Leak
Fluid Type
RPB,
No Double Floor, No Yes
Fluid type Release Volume is
Asphalt or
is Asphalt set = 0
Concrete
pad
Yes No Environmental
Clean-up Cost
Release Rate Release Rate with from Leak
without RPB RPB CoFLeak = 0
(bbl/hr) (bbl/hr)
Total Volume Leak detection and

Released (bbl)
remediation time
t (days)
Vertical Velocity,
i.e. vertical flow
Soil Type into the soil
(ft/day).
Distance to
Groundwater D (ft)
Penalty Cost
Time to reach
Environmental Groundwater
Sensitivity tgr (days)
Total Environmental Cost by Leak

Fraction (Fgr) of Total =
Clean-up Cost
Volume that contaminates Env, CoFLeak = Soil Clean-up Cost
Factor for Groundwater
Groundwater +
Groundwater Clean-up Cost ($)
Fgr = (t-tgr)/D Groundwater Clean-up Cost
(CUF)
(bbl) +
Penalty Cost
Fraction of Total Volume

Clean-up Cost that contaminates the
Factor for subsurface soil underneath Subsurface Soil
Subsurface Soil the Tank Floor Clean-up Cost ($) CoFLeak
(CUF) (Total - Vol, Gr.Water)
(bbl)

Figure 23: Environmental Consequence Calculation – Bottom Rupture

Environmental
CoF
Bottom Rupture
Tank Volume
(total stored volume) Tank Size and Max
(bbl) Filling Height
(default = 95%)
No Yes
Fluid type
CUF = $10/bbl
is Asphalt
% of Tank Vol
Yes released outside % of Tank Vol
Dike installed
Dike area retained in Dike
(default 50%)
No
Volume Release
=100% of Tank Vol
% of release
Clean-up Cost Factor contaminating
Onsite Soil Onsite Soil Onsite Soil
Onsite Soil
contamination clean-up cost
Environmental contamination
(bbl) ($)
Sensitivity (default CUF=$50/bbl)
% of release
Clean-up Cost Factor contaminating
Offsite Soil Offsite Soil Offsite Soil
Offsite Soil
contamination
(bbl) ($)
(CUF)
% of release
contaminating
Clean-up Cost Factor Surface Water
Surface Water Surface Water
Surface Water
contamination
(bbl) ($)
(CUF)
Environmental Cost for Rupture:
Env, CoFRupture = Onsite Soil Clean-up Cost

+
Offsite Soil Clean-up Cost
Penalty Cost +
Surface Water Clean-up Cost
+
Penalty Cost
CoFRupture

Figure 24: Direct Financial Consequence Calculation
Financial CoF
Bottom Leak &
Rupture
Probability distribution of
Input Date:
repair events - for cost Calculate Cost for:
- Floor diameter
calculation: - Repair
- Liner / coating
25%: Minor floor repair - Liner / Coating application
- Outage cost per day
50%: Major floor repair - Outage time
- What to include in the
25%: Floor replacement
CoF calculation
- Repair cost table
Total cost related to Leak Total cost related to Rupture

(Fin, CoFLeak) (Fin, CoFRupture)
Total Financial CoF = Fin, CoFLeak+ Fin, CoFRupture
O 6.4 Bottom Failure

Reference is made to Figure 25 for an illustration of the aspects that enter into the calculations of fluid
release rate from the tank and subsequent vertical flow into the subsurface soil.
Figure 25: Floor Leakage Illustration
Course 6
Course 5 1/8” hole (leakage)
Course 4
Course 3 Dike Wall
30ft
Course 2
CP
Course 1
Dike Liner
RPB
Subsurface Soil Sand Pad (min. 4”)

O.6.4.1 Basis for Bottom Leak Rate and Seepage into Soil
The following section is a brief summary of the approach and technology applied to calculate the
consequence of failure for the relevant tank failure scenarios.
O.6.4.1.1 Material Properties

Figure 26 and Figure 27 present flow rate and vertical fluid velocity curves for Gasoline, Diesel Oil/Light
Fuel Oil, and Crude Oil/Heavy Fuel Oil. The assumed properties for those products are shown in Table
44.
Table 44: Material Properties
Product Density (lb/ft3) Viscosity (lb-sec/ft2)

Gasoline 45.0 9.0 × 10-6 (0.42 cp)
Diesel oil/ light fuel oil 53.7 3.9 × 10-5 (1.81 cp)
Crude oil/heavy fuel oil 59.2 2.0 × 10-3 (93 cp)
O.6.4.1.2 Head
The storage tank is assumed to have a fluid level of 30 feet. This is viewed as an average head since for
many tanks the level can vary between 0 and 60 feet. Since the flow out of the tank into the subsoil is
through small holes, the 30-ft fluid level is assumed to be constant.
O.6.4.1.3 Hydraulic Conductivity

The assumption regarding the soils present at the site range from Clay to Coarse Sand. This resulted in
assumptions in hydraulic conductivity ranging from 1 × 10 -8 cm/sec for clay to 0.1 cm/sec for Coarse
Sand. The hydraulic conductivity values in this report are those based on water.
Hydraulic conductivity is also impacted by whether the soil is saturated and by the soil capillary capacity.
The effects of soil suction capacity have been researched and can be significant but have been ignored for
this analysis because making general assumptions about soil suction forces would be unreliable.
O.6.4.1.4 Hydraulic Gradient

The hydraulic gradient, defined as the change in head divided by the length of travel perpendicular to the
flow path, is necessary to determine the flow rate in the sub-layer. For downward gravitational flow, the
hydraulic gradient is 1.0. Since the head in the sand pad was assumed to be four inches, the hydraulic
gradient in the sub-layer would be greater than 1.0. However, the hydraulic gradient will rapidly
approach 1.0 within a few feet of the top of the sublayer. Therefore, this analysis was performed using a
hydraulic gradient of 1.0.
O.6.4.1.5 Flow From Hole in Storage Tank

The results for calculations of flow from the tank into the soil are given in Figure 26 using the equation
developed by Bonaparte and Giroud (1989). These results are based on the assumption of a constant 30-ft
head from a petroleum-based fluid in the tank. The contact coefficient was 0.21 since the contact between
the tank and the soil is subject to substantial overburden pressure and therefore is likely to be very good.
The flow, in barrels per hour, is shown as a relationship with soil hydraulic conductivity
O.6.4.1.6 Downward Velocity in Sub-Layer

The results of the downward vertical fluid velocity calculations are shown in Figure 27 for flow from the
tank hole, through the sand pad, and into the subsoil assuming one-dimensional flow conditions. These
results are based on the assumption that the hydraulic gradient is 1.0, which is generally met. Also, in
order to determine the velocity, the soil porosity was assumed to be 0.35. The resulting flow rates range
from 0.0001 ft/day in Clay to 400 ft/day in Coarse Sand.
O.6.4.1.7 Flow From Hole in RPB

The calculations of flow through the RPB are based on the three-dimensional flow solution described in
section O.6.4.3. Tanks with RPB also typically have at least four 1 in. drain pipes to evacuate the sand
pad. Thus the full head of the tank will not be brought to bear on the 1/8 in. hole in the liner. A 4 in. head
(from the sand pad) is assumed in Figure 28 which shows the flow rate from the RPB. Since the
hydraulic head is only four inches, the flow rates through the liner are much less than the flow rates
through holes in the tank bottom. The flow rates through the liner range from about 1 × 10-6 barrels per
hour in Clay to over 0.1 barrels per hour in Coarse Sand. The only hole diameter considered was 1/8 in.
since larger holes in the RPB are not likely.
Note: If the user wants to assume that there are several 1/8 in. holes in the RPB then the flow rate can be
scaled up accordingly.
O.6.4.1.8 Downward Velocity in Soil Below RPB

The fluid velocity in the soil beneath the RPB will initially be dictated by the flow rate out of the hole in
the liner. After the fluid is forced through the hole, the flow velocity will transition from being controlled
by fluid pressure to being controlled by gravitational forces. The resulting equilibrium downward vertical
velocity is as shown in Figure 27.
O.6.4.2 Foundation Conditions

The foundation designs for petroleum and product storage tanks are governed by API Standard 650.
Appendix B of API 650 addresses foundation conditions for the ringwall as well as for the earth grade
supporting the tank bottom.
The API code also provides several designs for leak detection that inhibit fluids from penetrating the earth
grade supporting the tank. The analysis here is for those cases where leaks result in fluids entering the
soil beneath the storage tank.
O.6.4.3 Three-Dimensional Flow

The analysis of flow into the underlying soils depends upon the soil layer under consideration. When the
flow is from a hole in the tank bottom into the sand pad and the soil sublayer, the flow is three-
dimensional. Flow is also three-dimensional when it results from a small hole in the RPB.
Three-dimensional flow conditions were analyzed using a relationship that was developed for estimating
the flow from leaks in flexible membrane liners into underlying soils. This empirical relationship was
developed by Giroud and Bonaparte (1989) in SI units:
Equation 27: Flow Rate as per Giroud and Bonaparte
q = C × h 0.9 × a 0.1 × k 0.74
Where:
q = flow rate, (m 3 /sec)
C = adjustment factor for degree of contact with soil: 0.21 for good contact, 1.15 for poor contact
h = depth of liquid (m)
a = area of hole (m2 )
k = hydraulic conductivity of soil (m/sec)
This relationship was used for estimating flow from holes in the base of tanks into the sand pad and the
soil beneath it and for estimating the flow through the liner into the soil beneath it. This flow rate is
limited to the maximum flow rate from the tank into the open atmosphere which is described below.
O.6.4.4 Consequence Analysis Methodology

If the tank has a single floor, the consequence model determines if some portion of the leak can reach
groundwater. The portion that reaches groundwater is assigned a different CUF from the portion that
simply seeps into the ground.
To determine the portion that reaches groundwater, the analyst must first determine the type of soil below
the tank pad and the vertical distance to groundwater directly below the tank. Knowing the type of soil
under the tank, the analyst goes to Figure 26 and uses an appropriate hydraulic conductivity and hole size
to determine the flow from the tank.
Again knowing the hydraulic conductivity, the downward vertical velocity in feet per day is found from
Figure 27 15 . The time to reach groundwater (days) is calculated by dividing the vertical distance to
groundwater (ft) by the downward vertical velocity (ft/day). (It should be noted that the downward
velocity model, as represented in Figure 27, tends to be conservative as it assumes that there is enough
product being released to wet all of the soil/sand surfaces as the spill travels downward).
Knowing the time to reach groundwater, the total leak time is used to determine if the groundwater is
affected and, if so, how much hydrocarbon fluid that has accumulated in the groundwater. If the duration
of the leak is shorter than the time to reach groundwater, then the spill is assumed not to affect
groundwater. The volume that leaks from the tank is found by multiplying the leak rate (Figure 26) by
the duration of the leak. The user can utilise their own estimate of leak duration or use the values shown
in Table 47.
15
If there are multiple soil layers then the characteristics (thickness and hydraulic conductivity) of the most
impermeable layer may be used; particularly if this is also the thickest layer. In other cases this may be inaccurate
and a more detailed analysis may be required.
If the spill can reach groundwater, the volume that affects groundwater is found by estimating the total
spill using the leak rate and leak duration time, and then multiplying by the Fraction Contaminating
Groundwater as calculated in Table 46. The remainder of the total spill volume would be assumed to
contaminate the subsurface soil.
For a more simplified approach to the release rate from a tank and its downward velocity, Table 45 and
Table 46 can be used instead of Figure 26 and Figure 27.
O.6.4.4.1 Release from Tank with RPB

In the event of a release in a tank with a release prevention barrier (RPB), the full hydrostatic head of the
tank will not be brought to bear on the liner. Additionally, tanks with RPB typically have at least four 1
in. drain pipes to evacuate the sand pad. For the purposes of this model, it is assumed that if a release
occurs, a 1/8 in. hole with a 4 in. head (from the sand pad) exists. Figure 28 and Table 48 show the flow
rate from the RPB. The vertical fluid velocity from the hole in the liner can be determined from Figure
28. Knowing the downward velocity, leak duration time, and distance to groundwater it can be
ascertained how much if any of the release will reach groundwater. The amount of the release that (1) is
contained within the RPB, (2) contaminates the subsurface soil, and (3) reaches the groundwater can then
be determined. The cost is found by multiplying the volume in each of the three categories by the
appropriate CUF as shown in Table 42.
O.6.4.5 Consequence Factors and Look-up Tables

The following figures and look-up tables are considered for the Consequence calculations.
Figure 26: Flow Out of Tank Hole
Flow Out of Tank Hole
Clay Sandy Clay Silt Very Fine Sand Fine Sand

1.E+01
1.E+00
1.E-01 Head = 30 Ft
1.E-02
1.E-03 Gasoline
Diesel Oil,
1.E-04 Light Fuel Oil
Crude Oil,
1.E-05 Heavy Fuel Oil
1.E-06
1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02
Hydraulic Conductivity of Soil Beneath Tank Pad, cm/sec
Table 45: Release Rates for Small Bottom Leak (bbl/hr) – Without RPB and ≤0.125 in. hole
Soil Type Hydraulic Gasoline Diesel Oil Heavy Fuel Oil

Conductivity of Soil Light Fuel Oil Crude Oil
(cm/sec)
Coarse Sand 1×10-1 – 1×10-2 5 2 0.15
-2 -3
Fine Sand 1×10 – 1×10 1 0.5 0.03
-3 -5
Very Fine Sand 1×10 – 1×10 0.08 0.03 0.002
-5 -6
Silt 1×10 – 1×10 0.006 0.003 0.0002
-6 -7
Sandy Clay 1×10 – 1×10 0.001 0.0005 0.00003
-7 -8
Clay 1×10 – 1×10 0.0002 0.00008 0.000005
Figure 27: Vertical Fluid Velocity
Vertical Fluid Velocity
1.E+03 Clay Sandy Clay Silt Very Fine Sand Fine Sand
1.E+02
1.E+01
1.E+00 Gasoline
1.E-01 Diesel Oil,

Light Fuel Oil
1.E-02
Crude Oil,
Heavy Fuel Oil
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02
Table 46: Downward Fluid Velocity through Soil (ft/day)

(cm/sec)
Coarse Sand 1×10-1 – 1×10-2 400 100 3
-2 -3
Fine Sand 1×10 – 1×10 40 10 0.3
-3 -5
Very Fine Sand 1×10 – 1×10 1 0.3 0.01
-5 -6
Silt 1×10 – 1×10 0.04 0.01 0.0003
-6 -7
Sandy Clay 1×10 – 1×10 0.004 0.001 0.00003
-7 -8
Clay 1×10 – 1×10 0.0004 0.0001 0.000003
Table 47: Detection Times
Scenario Detection Time

(Suggested Default)
Small bottom leak (no RPB) 360 days(*)
Small bottom leak (RPB) 30 days
Small shell leak 7 days
Large shell leak 1 days
(*)
See section O.2.5.4, item k
Equation 28: Fraction Reaching Groundwater
Detection Time − Time to Groundwater

Fraction Contam. Groundwater =
Detection Time
Figure 28: Flow Out of RPB
Flow Out of RPB
Clay Sandy Clay Silt Very Fine Sand Fine Sand

1.E-01
1.E-02
Head = 4 Inches
Hole Diameter = 1/8 inch
1.E-03
1.E-04
Gasoline
1.E-05
Diesel Oil,
Light Fuel Oil
Crude Oil,
Heavy Fuel Oil
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-06 1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02
Table 48: Release Rates from Small Bottom Leak (bbl/hr) - With RPB and one 1/8 in. hole

(cm/sec)
Coarse Sand 1×10-1 – 1×10-2 0.1 0.04 0.002
-2 -3
Fine Sand 1×10 – 1×10 0.02 0.006 0.0004
-3 -5
Very Fine Sand 1×10 – 1×10 0.001 0.0005 Negligible
-5 -6
Silt 1×10 – 1×10 0.0001 Negligible Negligible
-6 -7
Sandy Clay 1×10 – 1×10 Negligible Negligible Negligible
-7 -8
Clay 1×10 – 1×10 Negligible Negligible Negligible
O.6.4.6 Asphalt Releases – Specifically

Asphalt releases are assumed to be similar to liquid releases contained in a dike. The environmental
clean-up cost for such releases is $10/bbl. In case of leakage, the asphalt is assumed to solidify within a
short distance into the ground. Hence, asphalt releases are only considered for rupture failures, and repair
and outage costs in relation to leakage.
O 6.5 Shell Failure

If a leak occurs in a part of the AST that is aboveground, a different approach is used to estimate the spill
size.
O.6.5.1 Shell Leak – Basis of Flow Rate of Fluid to Atmosphere

For small shell leaks, the release occurs through a hole in the shell of the tank – as illustrated on Figure
29. The drop in pressure from tank to the atmosphere drives the fluid through the hole. These release rates
are modeled using Equation 29 for liquid discharge to atmosphere through an orifice driven by tank head.
The results of this calculation are given in Table 49 for different values of tank head, and are applicable
for all typical liquid petroleum products.
Figure 29: Release from Tank Shell
∆Hi
P=atm
H0,i = H-∆Hi ; Course i
P=ρg∆H
Rr
H0 =0; Course 1
The leak scenarios and leak rates shown in Table 49 are based on 95% filling height of a 48ft shell, with
each course height being 8ft. The leak rates are calculated at the bottom of each shell course.
Table 49: Calculated Leak Release Rate for Flow to Atmosphere (for all fluid types)
Hole Size (d) 1

/8 in. ½ in. 2 in.
Weighted 70% 25% 5%

Height
Course # Probability: (p)
H0(ft)
Liquid Head ∆Hi (ft) Rr - Release Rate
(bbl/hr)
6 40 5.6 0.63 10.1 162
5 32 13.6 0.99 15.8 252
4 24 21.6 1.24 19.9 318
3 16 29.6 1.45 23.3 372
2 8 37.6 1.64 26.2 420
1 0 45.6 1.81 28.9 462
The probability distribution for hole sizes over the tank wall height or courses is based on actual
measured corrosion rates at a site with approximately 140 tanks. The trend of this information is
supported by reference /7/, Dr. Richard A. White, Materials Selection for Petroleum Refineries and
Gathering Facilities, NACE International, 1998, Houston, Texas (see Figure 16).
The volumetric release rates (Rr) are determined as function of ∆H (liquid height above the discharge
hole) – assuming the hole occurs at the lower weld on each course.
Equation 29: Release Rate calculation from Shell Leak
πd 2
Rr = C d 2 g∆H × 4.45
4
Where,
Rr : Volumetric Flow Rate (bbl / hour), calculates a jet velocity × cross sectional
area of the hole.
Cd = 0.61 : Discharge coefficient (calculated as Cv × Cc) takes into account fluid friction
and jet stream contraction at the release orifice.
Cv = 0.98 : Velocity coefficient
Cv relates to the friction at the edge of the hole. The velocity (Vjet) without friction loss: Vjet
= (2g∆h)½. The actual velocity (Vact) is calculated a Cv×Vact, where Cv is set between 0.90
and 0.99. For a fairly sharp edged hole which can be expected in the case of a tank shell leak,
the factor Cv is set to 0.98.
Cc = 0.62 : Contraction coefficient
The fluid velocity will reduce the flow of mechanical energy, converting it into heat within the
boundary layers hugging the spout wall. Hence, the fluid jet beyond the wall will have a slightly
smaller diameter than that of the spout. The cross sectional area used for the release rate
calculation is this smaller area of the jet stream a short distance from the orifice (sometime
referred to as vena contracta). The difference or ratio between the orifice area and vena contracta
is taken into account with the Cc value, such that AVena Contracta = Cc × AOrifice. The discharge
contraction coefficient (Cv) depends on the Reynolds number, but is typically set at 0.62 for most
fluids.
d : Hole diameter (inch)
g : Gravity (32.2 ft/sec2 or 9.81 m/sec2)
∆H : Liquid head at the leak (ft)
4.45 : Combined conversion from ft3/sec to bbl/hr and in2 to ft2.
1 bbl oil = 5.61 ft3 and 1 ft3/sec leak = 15388.5 bbl/day = 641.19 bbl/hr. 1 ft2 = 144 in2.
Hence, 641.19/144 = 4.4527.
In case the filling height is different than 95%, this becomes a significant variable. The lower the level
becomes, the lower the release rate can be assumed.
O.6.5.2 Shell Leak Failure

To estimate the spill volume of an aboveground leak, first find the leak rate from Table 49 and multiply
the rate by the leak duration time (hours). The probability of a given leak size is distributed such that a
0.125 in. leak will occur in 70% of the case, a 0.5 in. will occur in 25% of the cases, and a 2 in. leak will
occur in 5% of the cases.
If the leak will be contained in a dike, the volume of the spill is simply multiplied by the clean-up cost
factor (CUF) to calculate the cost.
Based on the design of the dike (or lack thereof) and the estimated volume released, determine if surface
water or offsite clean up may be a major concern. If the spill can reach surface water, multiply the total
volume of the spill by the appropriate CUF to determine the cost.
If a spill does not reach surface water and is detected quickly, it is assumed that no seepage into the
ground occurs and that a surface clean up is sufficient. If a surface cleanup is not sufficient, the
consequence models further discern whether or not the spill can go offsite. If it can travel offsite, higher
CUFs are used in the cost calculation.
It can in most cases be assumed that the leak duration will not occur unnoticed long enough for the fluid
to seep into the ground and contaminate sub-surface soil or groundwater.
O.6.5.2.1 Shell Leak – Predicted Release Volume

In order to determine the total volume released from one given shell leak failure, the potential release
volume is calculated for each course and weighted by the probability in the summed volume for all the
courses. The weighted probability of leak is assumed equal to the relative average corrosion rate for each
course. Hence, the consequence model does in reality ignore the driving mechanism for corrosion, and is
at the same time not considering that typically the lower courses have thicker wall than the upper courses
– i.e. this being modeled relatively more conservative for the lower and more critical courses. One could
say that the lower courses have a higher minimum required wall thickness, and as such balancing out the
conservatism.
The theoretical leak location on each course is assumed at the lower course weld seam with the associated
liquid head. For the default scenario, the values in Table 50 would be the total release volumes. The
values in Table 50 can be used as a generic scenario only adjusted for Leak Detection Time and actual
tanks shell height.
Table 50: Release rate by hole size and location on Shell
Hole Size (d) 1

/8 in. ½ in. 2 in. Prob. Ratio
Release for Weighted Release – by
Height Weighted Weighted Weighing location
Course # 70% 25% 5%
H0(ft) Probability (p) by hole size of leak
(bbl/hr) location
Liquid Head
Rr – Release Rate (bbl/hr) (Table 31) (bbl/hr) (bbl/day)
∆Hi (ft)
6 40 5.6 0.63 10.1 162 11.1 0.10 1.1 26.6
5 32 13.6 0.99 15.8 252 17.3 0.13 2.2 53.8
4 24 21.6 1.24 19.9 318 21.7 0.21 4.6 109.6
3 16 29.6 1.45 23.3 372 25.5 0.21 5.3 128.3
2 8 37.6 1.64 26.2 420 28.7 0.18 5.2 123.9
1 0 45.6 1.81 28.9 462 31.6 0.17 5.4 128.9
Total: 1.00 23.8 571.1
The representative release rate (Rr) weighted by hole size for each shell course is calculated as per
Equation 30 as function of hole diameter (d) and course/segment liquid height, ∆Hi (see Table 49). The
CoFLeak for the shell is weighted on the release volume calculation for each course, using the CR Ration in
Table 31.
Equation 30: Representative Shell Leak Release Rate (bbl/hr)

6
π
Rr , i = ∑ ( p I d I + p II d II + p III d III ) × C d 2 g∆H i × 4.45
i =1 4
Where, d and p are taken from Table 49, i.e.
pI dI = 0.125 in. × 0.7
pII dII = 0.5 in. × 0.25
pIII dIII = 2 in. × 0.05
The release rate calculation can be modeled with any number of segments, regardless of the actual
number of courses on the tank. There is no restriction on tank or individual course/segment height as
such, but given that the liquid head (∆H) determines the leak rates, all calculations are geared towards that
and need to be adjusted accordingly if input parameters change. In that case, Equation 31 is applied in the
release rate calculation for liquid height for each of the segments.
Equation 31: Liquid Height (∆H) calculation
∆H ' (n) = ∆H Course1 − H 0, n
Where,
∆H’(n) = Liquid Head (ft) for the lowest line of each segment – for n segments
∆HCourse 1 = Max filling height (ft)
The pre-assigned leak probability distribution or Index Ratio mentioned in Table 31 is applied for 6
segments, and needs to be adjusted in case the number of segments / courses changes.
In case adequate information and knowledge is available to determine a different CR Index Ratio, this can
be applied and the consequence calculations (based on release volumes) will reflect this change.
O 6.6 Tank Rupture Release and Dike Overflow

The consequence related to a rapid release is assumed the same whether the release originates from the
floor-to-shell area or purely from the shell. The consequence from a rupture is calculated proportional to
the leak failures, and weighted as part of the total consequence calculation.
The consequences of the instantaneous loss of the tank volume will result in a wave of product, most
likely partly overflowing the dike wall. This type of release is typically caused by a brittle fracture failure
similar to the Ashland tank failure in Floreffe, Pennsylvania in 1988. The following analysis assumes that
the dike walls are not washed out by the release.
A storage tank is often surrounded by a dike that is designed such that the volume of the dike will hold
110% of the volume of the biggest tank in the dike. However, there are theoretical and experimental
evidence to suggest that this design strategy will not completely contain the spill resulting from a rapid
release of the tank volume. An attempt has been made to develop a model that will provide a rough
estimate of the amount of liquid that overflows the dike. The model is based on predictions made using
computational fluid dynamics.
Table 51 presents the fraction of the tank contents that would be expected to overflow the dike subsequent
to a rapid shell or floor-to-shell failure.
Table 51: Rapid Shell or Floor-to-Shell Failure – Dike Overflow
VTank Contents / VDike Fraction of Tank Contents

Overflowing Dike
0.4 0.05
0.5 0.2
0.6 0.35
0.7 0.5
0.8 0.6
0.9 0.7
For practical purposes a default value of 50% of the total tank volume is suggested to overflow the dike.
Thus, the cost of an instantaneous release will be 50% times the CUF for dike clean-up and 50%
distributed to areas outside the dike.
O 6.7 Weighted Consequence of Failure

The representative CoF for a given tank failure is a product of floor leak and rupture plus shell leak and
rupture. The rational is that a floor can be leaking while a shell starts leaking. At the same time it is
assumed that no more than one shell course will leak at any given time. Thus, the consequence model is
set-up such that a relative proportion is taken into account for each component (floor and each of the shell
courses)
The available GFF’s are used to weigh the CoF between leak and rupture. However, for a tank shell with
several courses and one combined GFF for leakage, the corrosion rate Index Ratio (see Figure 13 and
Table 31) is used to relatively proportion the CoF contribution from each course to the overall CoFShell,
Leak.
O.6.7.1 Floor – Weighted Consequence of Failure (CoFFloor) Calculation

The consequence calculations are in effect split into Environmental Consequence and Financial
Consequence for each failure scenario (leak and rupture). The steps to calculate each of these four
consequence elements are illustrated on Figure 22, Figure 24: and Figure 30. Once the consequence
elements are calculated, the Probability Weight Consequence of Failure for the floor (CoFFloor) is
calculated as a function of Environmental and Financial Consequence, and expressed as follow:
Equation 32: Weighted CoF for Floor Failures
GFFLeak GFFRupture
CoFFloor = × ∑ CoF ' Leak + × ∑ CoF ' Rupture
GFFLeak + GFFRupture GFFLeak + GFFRupture
Where, CoF denotes Environmental or Financial Consequence.
The CoFFloor is a fixed number and a characteristic for the specific tank. This CoFFloor is used as the floor
contribution for determining the Consequence Category for the Tank, and as such largely discriminates
the High risk tanks from the Low risk Tanks. The floor consequence category is used to determine the
DFTarget for the floor.
The Consequence Category is determined from the Consequence range on the Risk Matrix (see Figure 7).
O.6.7.2 Shell – Weighted Consequence of Failure (CoFShell) Calculation

The CoFShell for a tank shell is calculated as a summary of the relative CoFLeak for each shell course plus
CoFRupture, proportionally weighted by their respective GFF. The CoFShell is used as the shell contribution
for determining the Tank CoF Category and hence the Inspection damage factor Target (DFTarget) for the
shell.
O.6.7.2.1 Shell Leak

As mentioned in section O.6.5.2, for calculation purposes a given shell leak can be one of three sizes in
hole-diameter, each with an estimation of it relative probability of occurrence.
The CoFShell, Leak is expressed in terms of Clean-Up Cost Factors (CUF), exactly the same as for the floor
failures. The CoFShell, Leak is a function of the volume released (VolReleased) and how this volume is likely to
distribute over the area around the tank, e.g. varying clean-up cost factors (CUF).
The total VolReleased is weighted on the release volume calculation for each course, using the CR Ration in
Table 31. The total volume release in case of a leak is calculated as per Equation 33.
Equation 33: Shell Leak CoFShell Calculation
Vol Re leased = Rtime × ∑ (Rr ,i × FCR Ratio , i )

6
i =1
Where,
Rtime = Release time, or time that is expected before the release is mitigated.
Rr, i = Release rates for each shell course
FCR Ratio, i = CR Ratio adjustment factor (ref. Table 31)
The CoFShell, Leak ($)is then calculated as per Equation 34.
Equation 34: CoFShell Calculation

IV
CoF Shell , Leak = ∑ Vol Re lased × Location Fraction j × CUFLocation j
j=I
Where,
VolReleased = Total volume released by leakage
LocationFraction j = Fraction of VolReleased that is released to Location j.
CUFLocation, j = Clean-up cost factor (CUF) for Location j. The four Locations around the tank
are: I = Onsite; II = Offsite; III = Surface Water; IV = Dike Area.
Please note that in case a Dike is installed, a Leak is assumed not to reach beyond the Dike area, i.e.
CoFShell, Leak = VolReleased×CUFDike Area.
O.6.7.2.2 Shell Rupture

The CoFShell, Rupture for Rapid or Rupture Failure is calculated as shown is Equation 35 .
Equation 35: Shell CoFRupture Calculation

IV
CoF Shell , Rupture = ∑ VolTank × Location j , Fraction × CUFLocation j
j=I
Where,
VolTank = Total tank liquid volume that will be released in case of a rupture
O.6.7.2.3 Welded Shell – Weighted CoFShell

The weighted CoFShell for a welded shell is based on the GFF for shell Leak and shell Rupture (see Table
2) respectively, and is calculated as per Equation 36.
Equation 36: Weighted CoFShell Calculation – Maintained to API 653
CoFShell = 0.999 × CoFShell , Leak + 0.001 × CoFShell , Rupture
O.6.7.2.3.1 Not Maintained to API 653

If the Tank has not been designed to a recognized code and/or is not being maintained to API 653 or
another recognized code or recommended practice, the weighted CoFShell is calculated as:
Equation 37: Weighted CoFShell Calculation – Not Maintained to API 653
CoFShell = 0.9615 × CoFShell , Leak + 0.0385 × CoFShell , Rupture
The GFF is a factor of 40 larger for a tank not maintained to API 653.
O.6.7.2.4 Riveted Shell – Weighted CoFShell

Based on the assumption that a riveted tank will not experience a rapid / rupture failure, the CoFShell is
equal to the CoFShell, Leak. As shown on Figure 12 no adjustment is made to the GFF for Riveted tanks. The
rational is that most likely leakage will occur at a rivet or part of the seal, which is not influenced by
inspection similar to the corrosion failures, i.e. the DFar/t is not relevant for riveted tanks. The distribution
of leaks over the shell courses could be assumed the same as for a welded tank, but for the case of
simplicity, the VolReleased is calculated based on leaks at Course 1 only, i.e. use delta H = 30ft in Equation
30 and FCR ration, I = 1 in Equation 33 for the VolRelease calculation. The distribution and cost of leakage
(CoFShell, Leak) is calculated the same as for welded tanks, i.e. as per Equation 34.
O 6.8 Consequence of Failure (CoF) Category

Each CoF value is associated with a Consequence Category, which is based on the matrix shown in
Figure 7, or as shown in Table 52.
Table 52: Consequence of Failure Category
Weighted CoF ($) CoF Category

<10,000 A
100,000 B
1,000,000 C
10,000,000 D
>10,000,000 E
The contributors to the CoF value are ultimately defined by the user, and may include CoFFloor or CoFShell,
or both, and the CoFFloor may include Environmental CoF or additionally Financial CoF. However, it is
recommended that the floor & shell are assessed separately, such that only the relevant aspects will drive
the RBI recommended inspections.
O.6.8.1 Floor and Shell Consequence – Combined

The calculated and probability weighted CoF for the floor (CoFFloor) and shell (CoFShell) are comparable
but should not be considered additive. Thus, only the respective Consequence Category is considered
when the risk assessment is made for the floor or shell. That category determines the inspection target that
applies.
O.7. RISK BASED INSPECTION ANALYSIS

This section summarizes and consolidates the information in the previous section into the final risk
calculation. As shown in the following charts, the risk is calculated separately for the floor and shell
components, but is comparable.
The following steps are recommended in performing the RBI analysis:
A. Determine CoF with DTTargets for shell and floor (separate target values).
B. Determine DF for shell and floor, and derive RBI recommended year for inspection.
C. Complete the final LoF calculation
D. Complete the final Risk calculation
Figure 30 illustrates how the CoF Category is derived to establish an inspection target (DFTarget).
Figure 30: CoF Calculation

Legend:
DFar/t - Factor derived from Table 24
L = Leak
R = Rupture
Determine CoF
F = Floor
for Risk
S = Shell
Calculation
W = Weighted
Env. = Environmental
Fin. = Financial
Fin. CoFF, L Env. CoFS, L Probability Weighing:
Fin. CoFF, R Env. CoFS, R GFFR

PoFR =
(Clean-up cost for Determine CUF
Release Volume
Env. CoFF, L GFFR + GFFL
For Leak and
spills to Soil,
Rupture and for
Groundwater and (Figure 21) Env. CoFF, R GFFL
surrounding
Shell and Floor PoFL =
Surface Area) (Busness impact, GFFR + GFFL
Repair and
Inspection Costs)
FLOOR
COFw, F = PoFL × (Env.CoFF , L + FinCoFF , L ) + PoFR × (Env.CoFF , R + FinCoFF , R )
SHELL
COFw, S = PoFL × Env.CoFS , L + PoFR × Env.CoFS , R
Inspection Target
DFTarget
CoFF Category CoFS Category
Separate for Shell
and Floor
Tank Representative CoF:

MAX (CoFF , CoFS)
Figure 31: DF Calculation

Legend:
L = Leak
Determine RBI R = Rupture
Recommended F = Floor
Inspection Year S = Shell
W = Weighted
Fin. = Financial
DFar/t, S, L
DFar/t, F, L
Course (1,6)
LoFF Category Recommended Adjust DFar/t, S, L for

LoFS Category
Inspection Year is Course (1,6)
(Based on max
when DFar/t, F, L
DF)
reaches DFTarget (Equation 16)
Recommended Recommended
Floor Inspection Inspection Year is
Year when the max Safe Filling Height
adjusted DFar/t, F, L compared to
reaches DFTarget Operational Filling
OR Height
Operating fill height is
critical
Determine
Inspection time Recommended
and scope Shell Course
Inspection Year
Figure 32: LoF Calculation

Legend:
L = Leak
R = Rupture
Determine LoF F = Floor
for Risk S = Shell
Calculation W = Weighted
Fin. = Financial
LoFF, L LoFF, R Tank construction,

Inspection and
(Equation 9) (Equation 10) Maintenance
(see Figure 12)
LoFF = LoFF, L + LoFF, R LoFS, L

Based on course
with Max DF LoFS, R
(Equation 23)
Likelihood for a Tank Failure

LoFS = LoFS, L + LoFS, R
LoFTank = LoFS + LoFF
Figure 33: Risk Calculation

Legend:
L = Leak
R = Rupture
Determine CoF F = Floor
for Risk S = Shell
Calculation W = Weighted
Fin. = Financial
LoFS X CoFW, S LoFF X CoFW, F
Shell Risk ($/Year) + Floor Risk ($/Year)
Total Tank Risk ($/Year)
O 7.1 Floor Risk Calculation

The Risk ($/yr) associated with the floor is derived as the sum of contributions from Environmental and
Financial risks, each relative to leak and rupture failure scenarios. Mathematically, this can be expressed
as:
Equation 38: Risk Calculation (Floor Failure)
Risk ($ / yr ) = LoFLeak ( Env. CoFLeak + Fin. CoFLeak ) + LoFRupt ( Env. CoFRupt + Fin. CoFRupt )
The user can include either the Environmental or the Financial risk contribution, or both in the calculation
for the tank floor.
O 7.2 Shell Risk Calculation

The shell risk does only consider Environmental Risk, not Financial risk. The Risk ($/yr) associated with
the shell is calculated as per Equation 39, Equation 40 and Equation 41.
Equation 39: Risk Calculation (Welded Tank) – Leak
Risk Leak ($ / Yr ) = LoFShell , Leak × CoFWeighted , Shell
The shell rupture risk does not relate directly to the DF. The LoF part of the risk of shell rupture is equal
to the GFFShell, Rupture. The clean-up cost factor (CUF) has been derived for the total CoF calculation and
the proportional contribution is determined by GFFRelative Ration in Table 2.
Equation 40: Risk Calculation (Welded Tank) – Rupture
( Yr ) = GFF
Risk Rupture $ Re lative Ratio (GFF Rupture × CUF × VolTank )
The risk associated with a rupture is not related to a DFar/t or other adjustment factors. However, it is
assumed that the screening for brittle fracture and cracking both indicate low susceptibility.
The total risk related to a given shell failure is calculated as:
Equation 41: Shell Risk Calculation
( Yr ) = Risk
Risk Shell $ Leak + Risk Rupture
Note that riveted tanks are assumed to have no contribution from the Rupture scenario.
O.8. INSPECTION PLANNING

O.8.1.1 Objective
The objective is to determine the most appropriate time and level of inspection to be performed while
maintaining the risk associated with the tank operation at an acceptable level. The inspection planning
process is combined with other risk mitigation efforts such as installing a liner or CP system. The
inspection planning process is iterated until an acceptable level of risk or situation is achieved.
O.8.1.2 Inspection Planning Criteria – DFTarget

The inspection planning is based on the damage factor (DFar/t). The DFar/t factor is derived from
equipment age, corrosion rate original thickness and inspection efforts, and does determine the
progression of risk for the Tank over time. Thus, the DFar/t factor is the most appropriate risk variable and
reference for planning future inspection.
The principle approach for setting the Target DFar/t values is using a fixed inspection target factor
(DFTarget). The Fixed Inspection Target Factor determines an all-time maximum limit for the acceptable
level of risk, and is set for each consequence category.
The following maximum Inspection Target setting for each Consequence Category is suggested.
Figure 34: Suggested Inspection Planning Targets (DFTarget)
$10K $100K $1M $10M
415 335 250 165 85
A B C D E
CONSEQUENCE
The target factors in Figure 34 are derived from the background material used to develop the ar/t table
(Table 24). The following aspects should be considered in relation to setting these factors:
a. The DFTarget is used solely to trigger an inspection, not to determine the level of Risk that is to be met
or effectiveness of recommended inspections. The time is a variable for the AST inspection planning,
whereas the time is fixed for planning inspection of most other equipment types (Turnaround based).
b. The recommended inspection effectiveness for AST’s is normally A or B, not lower. This is given
that the added cost for a high level inspection versus a lower level is minimal once the tank is opened
and prepared for inspection. Thus, the DFTarget is not suppose to drive the inspection Effectiveness,
just the timing.
c. The DFTarget addresses an ar/t range from 0 to 1 (where 1 is theoretically equal to through wall hole).
This increased WT fraction compared to pressurized equipment justifies a relatively higher target for
the DF for AST’s.
O.8.1.2.1 Development of Target DFTarget

In brief the AST DFTarget factors are developed from the statistical confidence in not having a failure prior
to the targets being met. The numbers were arrived at by iteration of the calculated results with different
target values, while doing the AST analysis in relation to an actual project. Basically, the resulting factors
are set as percentages of the maximum DFar/t:
Figure 35: Development of Target DF for AST Inspection
Consequence Max. DFar/t Fraction of DFTarget

Category DFar/t, Max
A 1390 30% 415
B 1390 24% 335
C 1390 18% 250
D 1390 12% 165
E 1390 6% 85
Optionally, the target factors can be set according to the level of risk that a company decides to apply as
part of their operating strategy. Four risk levels are developed and represented on Figure 36. The
suggested option is Average, and equates to the numbers in Figure 35.
Figure 36: Optional Levels for setting Target DF as function of CoF Category
Target DF DF, Avg

DF, Low
1200 DF, High
DF, Extreem
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-o0o-

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API PUBLICATION 581 – RISK-BASED INSPECTION

BASE RESOURCE DOCUMENT

APPENDIX O – ABOVEGROUND STORAGE TANKS

Rev. 3 Page 1 of 124 June 2003

O.4.5.2 Measured Corrosion Rate ...............................................................................................................46

Rev. 3 Page 2 of 124 June 2003

O.5.8.3 Minimum Require Shell Course Thickness ....................................................................................85

Rev. 3 Page 3 of 124 June 2003

O.8.1.2 Inspection Planning Criteria – DFTarget ..........................................................................................122

Rev. 3 Page 4 of 124 June 2003

Figure 33: Risk Calculation.......................................................................................................................................120

Rev. 3 Page 5 of 124 June 2003

Table 30: Failure modes and probabilities...................................................................................................................66

Rev. 3 Page 6 of 124 June 2003

Equation 11: Adjust for Insulation Quality .................................................................................................................77

Rev. 3 Page 7 of 124 June 2003

Rev. 3 Page 8 of 124 June 2003

Rev. 3 Page 9 of 124 June 2003

Figure 1: Overview of Main Tasks

Collect Tank Data & Info.

(Cost benefit assessment)

Rev. 3 Page 10 of 124 June 2003

Figure 2: Analysis Calculation Overview

Complete Data Base:

Recommended Inspection LoF for the Shell (Max DF

Recommended Inspection or other

RBI study Report, including

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 11 of 124 June 2003

Determine Corrosion Rate: Consequence Calculations:

Cost Benefit Analysis (example)

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 12 of 123 June 2003

Table 1: Liquid release scenarios analyzed in the AST RBI methodology

Release Failure Scenarios Comment

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 13 of 123 June 2003

Likelihood = Base Failure Frequency × Damage Factor (DF)

Table 2: Base Leak Frequencies for Tank Floor and Shell

Floor: 100% 86.78% 7.22 × 10-3

Floor – Leak (≤ 0.5 in.) 99.72% 86.54% 7.2 × 10-3

Floor – Rapid Failure 0.28% 0.24% 2.0 × 10-5

Welded Shell: 100.00% 1.20% 1.00 × 10-4

Shell (Welded) – Rapid Failure

– Tanks maintained to API 653 0.10% 0.00% 1.0 × 10-7

Shell (Welded) – Rapid Failure

– Tanks NOT maintained to API 6532 (3.85%) 4.0 × 10-6

Riveted Shell: 100.00% 12.02% 1.00 × 10-3

Shell (Riveted) – Rapid Failure3 0.00% 0.00% 0

Floor + Welded Shell + Riveted Shell Failures: 100% 8.32 × 10-3

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 14 of 123 June 2003

O.2.3.1 GFF – Floor Failures

Table 3: Summary of Survey Results

Percent with Number with

* Tank years = number of tanks × average number of years in service

O.2.3.1.2 Rupture or Rapid Failure

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 15 of 123 June 2003

O.2.3.2 GFF – Shell Failure

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 16 of 123 June 2003

O 2.5 Limitations, Assumptions, Guidelines and Recommendations

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 17 of 123 June 2003

O.2.5.3 Risk Profile Plot

API Publ. 581 Appendix O - AST R3 Page 18 of 123 June 2003

c. Liner or coating added, or when the liner is inspected and repaired.

e. CP system added and proven effective (by inspection).

O.2.5.4 General Guidelines

f. Detection time (see leak detection time).