PUBLIC CORPORATIONS (2019-2020) the GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

I. General Principles Proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).

A. Corporation B. Principles of Local Autonomy

1. Definition 1. Principle of Local Authority (Section 25, Article II and
Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
2. Classification
Cases: 
3. Criterion to determine Public Corporation
Basco v. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991)
4. Classes of Public Corporations
Lina v. Pano (G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001)
Cases:
Liban v. Gordon (G.R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011, 654 Limbona v. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989)
PHIL 680-738)
Disomangcop v. Datumanong (G.R. No. 149848, 25
Boy Scouts of the Phil. v. COA (G.R. No. 177131, [June 7, November 2004)
2011], 666 PHIL 140-224)
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 138810,
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 29 September 2004)
v. Commission on Audit, et al. (G.R. No. 169752, 25
September 2007) 2. Power of the President over LGUs (Sec. 4, Art. X 1987
Constitution)
The Province of North Cotabato v. the Gov. of the Republic
of the Phils. Peace Panel (G.R. No. 183591, 14 October
2008) Cases:

Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 125350,

Read: (a) Republic Act No. 11054 or the “Organic Law for December 3, 2002)
the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao”;
(b) Articles and legal discussion on federalism (as
proposed by the Duterte Administration); and (c) Pimentel v. Aguirre, et al. (G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000),
Newspaper articles of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, former Chief in relation to Secs. 284-294, LGC.
Justice Artemio Panganiban and Atty. Raul Pangalanan on
Province of Batangas v. Romulo (G.R. No. 152774, 27 May Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. 180050, 10 February 2010 and
2004) Resolution dated 12 April 2011; Min. Res., GR No. 180050,
Navarro v. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 11,
ACORD v. Zamora (G.R. No. 144256, 08 June 2005) 2012

Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (G.R. No. 196271, 18
October 2011; and Resolution dated 28 February 2012)
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. and Prov. Of Camsur v. Robredo, G.R.
No. 195390, 10 December 2014
Miranda v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999)
Samson v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133076, 22 September 1999) 
Alvarez v. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, 31 January 1996)

Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 199802, 03 July 2018 Mariano v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 118577, 07 March 1995)

Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, 12 February 2019 Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R, No. 146319, October 26,
C. Municipal Corporations (aka Local Government Units 2001)
[LGUs])
1. Elements  Aquino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189793, 07 April 2010)

2. Dual Nature and Functions  Tan v. Comelec (G.R. No. 73155, 11 July 1986)
E. The Local Government Code, as amended
3. Municipal Corporations/LGUs in the Philippines (Section 1. Effectivity
1, Article X, Constitution)
2. Rules of Interpretation
D. Creation and Alteration of Municipal Corporations/LGUs

Cases:

Sema v. Comelec (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008)

League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec (GR No.

176951, 18 November 2008; 21 December 2009; 24 August
2010; and 15 February 2011)
#1. LIBAN vs. GORDON
G.R. No. 175352
January 18, 2011
FACTS:
This case resolves the Decision promulgated by the Court which held that
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted
the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors as such office is not a
government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in
Sec 13, Art 6 of the Constitution. The decision further declared void the
PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and
consequently ruled that it should incorporate under the Corporaion Code and
register with the SEC if it wants to be a private corporation.
Gordon raised that the pronouncement as to the validity of RA 95, the PNRC
Charter, should be considered obiter insofar as the constitutionality was not
raised by the parties.
PNRC, in its MPR, maintains that the constitutionality of the charter be
sustained as such was not an issue in the case. It further mentioned that the
structure of PNRC is sui generis, that it is an entity separate and independent
of government control yet it does not qualify as strictly private in character.
In this regard, the Court reconsidered its pronouncements. It correctly
pointed out that the issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of the case.
Therefore, not being the lis mota, the rule is that the Court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times. The
passage of these laws notwithstanding the proscription on the creation of
private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in
the nature of a private corporation.
A closer look at the nature of PNRC in terms of not just structure, but history,
public service and official status merits the contention that its structure is
indeed sui generis.
The provisions of RA 95 show the historical background and legal basis of its
creation that it is a voluntary organization impressed with public interest.
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public
authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field. They are a
protected component of the Red Cross movement under the articles of the
First Geneva Convention which focuses especially in times of armed conflict.
These national societies are therefore organizations that are directly
regulated by international humanitarian law. They are recognized at the
International level, an element which distinguish it from NGOs and other
forms of humanitarian response. The auxiliary status of a Red Cross Society
means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public
service organization because the very nature of its work implies a link with
the State.
It is in recognition of this sui generis character that the Charter of PNRC has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment under the 1935 C
and during the effectivity of the 1973 and 1987 C.
The purpose of the constitutional prohibition is to prevent granting of special
privileges to certain groups but based on the position paper submitted by the
PNRC, it can be seen that its Charter does not come within the spirit of the
provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a particular individual,
family or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the common good.
By requiring PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code, the Decision lost
sight of the PNRC’s special status under IHL and as an auxiliary of the State.
To be recognized in the international committee, PNRC must have an
autonomous status and carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and
impartial manner.
Thus, the Decision correctly allowing respondent to hold his position as
Chairman concurrently while serving as a Senator is a conclusion which does
not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary
of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its
commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden
refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. The
sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
#2. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHIL. vs. COA
G.R. No. 177131
September 25, 2007
FACTS:
The case arose when the COA issued Resolution No 00-11 where it sought
to audit the BSP and classifies the BSP for purposes of audit supervision as
among the government corporations belonging to the Educational, Social,
Scientific, Civic and Research Sector.
The BSP sought reconsideration in a letter stating its position that it is not
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction not being a GOCC. However, it was
argued by the COA General Counsel that the ruling in another case which
spoke of the character of BSP as a government-controlled corporation was
never superseded by RA 7278 which came later than the case, an
amendatory act to the law creating the BSP which eliminated government
participation in the National Executive Board. And although an attached
agency of the DECS, it does not change its nature and therefore must
necessarily be subject to COA audit jurisdiction.
BSP then filed for a PetRev with Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO but was
denied by COA.
The BSP reiterates its stand that the public character of its purpose and
functions do not place it within the ambit of the audit jurisdiction of the COA
as it lacks the government ownership or control that the Constitution requires
before an entity may be subject of said jurisdiction.
The COA then cited from jurisprudence that, “The true criterion, therefore, to
determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of
the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the
State as the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise,
it is private.”
ISSUE: Whether BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction
HELD: Yes.
BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit
jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter created the BSP as a public corporation, amended by PD
460 and further amended by CA 111 by strengthening the volunteer and
democratic character of the BSP and reducing government representation in
its governing body.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was
created in order to implement a State policy declared in Art 2, Sec 13 of the
Constitution. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve
a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the
class of public corporations defined by Art 44(2) of the Civil Code and
governed by the law which creates it.
Under the Administrative Code, BSP’s classification is an attached agency of
the DECS which enjoys operational autonomy. However, this characteristic
does not make the attached chartered agency a private corporation covered
by the constitutional proscription.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality
with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional
prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its
charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled,
are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another
distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise
known as public corporations. These corporations are treated by law as
agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the
tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria
relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its
Departments or Offices.
Even though the amended BSP charter did away with most of the
governmental presence in the BSP Board, this was done to more strongly
promote the BSPs objectives, which were not supported under Presidential
Decree No. 460. The BSP objectives, as pointed out earlier, are consistent
with the public purpose of the promotion of the well-being of the youth, the
future leaders of the country. The amendments were not done with the view
of changing the character of the BSP into a privatized corporation. The BSP
remains an agency attached to a department of the government, the DECS,
and it was not at all stripped of its public character.
Historically, therefore, the BSP had been subjected to government audit in so
far as public funds had been infused thereto. However, this practice should
not preclude the exercise of the audit jurisdiction of COA
#3. PSPCA vs COA
G.R. No. 169752
September 25, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act 1285 by the
Philippine Commission. At the time it was created, petitioner was composed
of animal aficionados and propagandists, the objective of which is to enforce
laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in
the Philippine Islands.
On December 2003, an audit team from COA visited the office of the
petitioner to conduct an audit survey but petitioner demurred on the ground
that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction of the COA.
Petitioner explained that:
1. there was no law under which it may be organized or incorporated at the
time of its inception;
2. there is nowhere in its charter that it is indicated as a public corporation;
3. if it were a government body, there would have been no need for the
State to grant it tax exemptions;
4. employees are under the SSS instead of GSIS;
5. petitioner does not receive any form of financial assistance from the
government;
6. CA 148 stripped petitioner of its arresting powers and the collection for
violation of the laws accrue to the Municipality where the offense was
committed;
7. no gov’t appointee sits in the BoT;
8. nothing in its charter shows that petitioner is subject to approval or control
by any gov’t agency
9. the Committee on Animal Welfare includes members from both private
and the public sectors
Respondents contended that petitioner is a body politic created by a special
legislation and endowed with a government purpose. Therefore, the COA
may audit the financial activities of the latter. Respondents contended further
that:
1. the test to determine whether an entity is a government corporation lies in
the manner of its creation
2. petitioner exercises sovereign powers, that is to enforce the laws for the
protection and welfare of animals; thus, it is deemed to be a government
instrumentality as defined under the Admin Code
3. Office of the President exercises supervision or control over the petitioner
4. The requirement under its special charter to render a report to the Civil
Governor whose functions have been inherited by the OP reflects the
nature of the petitioner as a government instrumentality
5. Despite passage of the Corporation Code, the law creating petitioner had
not been abolished
6. RA 8485 designates petitioner as a member of its Committee on Animal
Welfare
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is a government agency and may therefore be
subject to audit by the COA
HELD: Petitioner is a quasi-public corporation.
This class of corporations are private corporations that render public service,
supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While
purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required
by law to discharge functions for the public benefit.
The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or
private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If
the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private.
Notes:
- Charter Test: [T]he test to determine whether a corporation is government
owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the
general corporation law? Those with special charters are government
corporations subject to its provisions
#4. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN
G.R. No. 183752
October 14, 2008
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP -
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
ISSUE: Whether the creation of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law
HELD: Yes.
The BJE is to be granted the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro by the MOA and is to be
vested the status of an associated state or at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. This concept of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under
our laws as having an associative relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from
that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,[154] namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
#5. BASCO vs PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649
May 14, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners sought to annul PD 1869, the PAGCOR Charter because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order and because:
(1) It constitutes a waiver of the right of the Manila City government to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law,
(2) For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph,
the law contravenes the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
authority;
(3) It violates the protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes
PAGCOR;
(4) It violates the avowed the trend of the Cory government away from
the monopolist
Amended petition: contrary to the declared national policy of the “new
restored democracy” and the people’s will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution. The decree has a gambling objective and contrary to Sections
11, 12 and 13 of Art. 2, Section 1 of Art 8 and Section 3(2) of Art 14.
PAGCOR was created to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise permitted by law. It also gives territorial
jurisdiction and is the third largest source of government revenue, next to BIR
and BOC.
ISSUE: Whether the PAGCOR charter is valid
HELD: Yes.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But
the prohibition of gambling does not mean the Government cannot regulate it
in the exercise of its police power.
The charer is beneficial not only to the Government but to society in general.
It provides funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to the
close scrutiny regulation, supervision and control ot eh government thereby
minimizing if not eradicating the evil practices and corruption that go with
gambling. Public welfare then lies at the bottom of PD 1869.
IN CONTRAVENTION OF MANILA’S LOCAL AUTONOMY
The City of Manila being a mere corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. Absent in its charter, such right cannot be assumed. It must first yield
to a legal act. As the Charter of Manila City is subject to control by the
Congress, municipal corporations are mere creations by Congress.
PAGCOR is a GOCC with an original charter and thus, local governments
have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
Otherwise, operations might be burdened and impeded or subjected to
control by a mere local government.
Citing Justice Holmes, he said that “it can be agreed that no state or political
subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a ways as to
prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities or to seriously
burden it is the accomplishment.”
LOCAL AUTONOMY CLAUSE
The power to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until
amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains as an
exemption to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes
and fees.

The principle of local autonomy simply means decentralization ; it does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in
imperio.”
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable and arbitrary. A law does not operate in equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to the Equal Protection Clause. The
mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions
while the others are prohibited does not render the applicable laws
unconstitutional.
Gambling may have been the antecedent but certainly not necessarily the
cause. For the same consequence could have been preceded by an
overdose of food, drink, exercise, work and even sex.
#6. LINA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. 129093
August 30, 2001
FACTS:
This petition seeks the reversal of the decision enjoining petitioners from
implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508.
Respondent Tony Clavento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install a
terminal for the operation of lotto. Mayor Calixto Cataquiz of San Pedro,
Laguna, denied to issue a mayor’s permit on the ground of an ordinance
passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which prohibits any form of
gambling, especially lotto and jueteng.
Calvento filed for declaratory relief w/ prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
TRO. He also sought to require Mayor Calixto to issue the necessary permit
and to order the annulment of said ordinance.
Respondent Judge, Francisco Paño, ruled in favour of Clavento, which gave
birth to this petition.
Petitioners contend that the resolution is a valid policy declaration of the
Provincial Government of Laguna and is likewise a valid exercise of its police
power under the General Welfare Clause of RA 7160. They also maintained
that respondents lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and
approval by the LGU were sought before it was implemented, which is
contrary to said law.
Respondent argues that the questioned resolution is a curtailment of the
power of the national legislature which itself had declared lotto as legal and
permitted its operations in the country. As for the consultations and approval,
respondent contends that this is not mandatory since such requirement is
merely a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of the LGC.
He also stated that the operation of the lotto system is legal as it had been
granted a franchise by Congress.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the ordinance is valid
2. Whether prior consultations and approval are needed before a lotto
system can be operated in a LGU
HELD:
1. The ordinance is a mere policy statement on the part of the local council,
which is not self-executing. The Petitioners themselves admitted that it is
a policy declaration. As such and as an exercise of to express contrary
views, the resolution is valid. However, this freedom does not mean that
LGUs may enact ordinances that go against those duly enacted by
Congress. The resolution in this case COULD NOT and SHOULD NOT be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national
government thru RA 1169, as amended by BP 42, the law which grants a
franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries.
The power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances
and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress, the
municipal governments being agents of the national government. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. What national legislature expressly allows by law,
a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state or an imperium in imperio.
Hence, Mayor Calixto cannot avail of the ordinance as a justification to
prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an
expression of the local legislative unit concerned.
2. No. From the careful reading of the provisions regarding consultations, it
is the finding of the court that such only apply to national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community.
Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of
a charitable institution, the PCSO.

The projects and programs referred to are those whose effects are
enumerated under Section 26 of the LGC. To wit:
(1) may cause pollution,
(2) may bring about climatic change,
(3) may cause depletion of non-renewable resources
(4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover;
(5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the
planet; and
(6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented.
Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of
lotto in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by
petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part. There is no indication in
the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his
refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but
erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
#7. LIMBONA vs MANGELIN
G.R. No. 80391
February 2, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Sultan Limbona was appointed member of the Sangguniang
Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government of Region 12. Later, he was
elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook
of Central Mindanao. In his capacity, petitioner was invited by the Acting
Secretary to the November conference of the Committee on Muslim Affairs
along with the speaker of Region 9. The said committee will undertake
consultations and dialogues with local government officials the result of which
would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions and
may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative
Commission as mandated by the Commission.
Petitioner responded that there shall be no session in the set dates because
their presence in the house committee hearing of Congress takes
precedence over any pending business in Batasang Pampook. The Acting
Secretary then forwarded the instructions of petitioner. However, the session
ensued in defiance of the instructions.
During the session, a speaker pro-tempore was authorized to preside and on
motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all assemblymen voted in
the affirmative.
This incident caused for the instant petition to transpire. Petitioner prays that
he be given in due course, that respondents be enjoined from proceeding
with their session, that a judgment be rendered declaring the previously held
proceeding as null and void, that the election of petitioner as Speaker of
Batasan Pampook be held valid and subsisting.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner should be reinstated as Speaker (issue not relevant,
FYI only)
2. Whether the courts may rightfully intervene in the affairs of the
autonomous Sangguniang Pampook
HELD:
1. Yes.
Pending proceedings, an expulsion resolution was filed by the Sanggunian
on the ground of the ff. reasons: firstly, that he was considered resigned after
filing his COC for Congressman for the First District of Maguindanao and no
request for reinstatement was made thereafter; secondly, that he caused to
withdraw an amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment
of the salaries and emolument of some Assemblymen, and that he had filed a
case before the SC when it could have been resolved within the assembly. In
this regard, respondents submit that the instant petition had become moot
and academic.
The court did not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic
by reason simply of the expulsion resolution because such is of no force and
effect on the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone.
Petitioner was not afforded the opportunity of an investigation nor had been
heard in his defense for it does not also appear that petitioner was made
aware that he had been charged for graft and corruption before his
colleagues.
Secondly, the resolution appears to be a mere afterthought for having been
belatedly issued and a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen as
petitioner was being expelled on the ground of filing a case before the SC. It
then seems that the petitioner is being punished for seeking redress in
courts, which should not be the case.
The Court therefore orders reinstatement, with the caution that should the
past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is
enjoined to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most
elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion
of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their
acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the
event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
2. Yes.
There are 2 kinds of autonomous governments. The first class, under BP 337
(Old Local Gov’t Code) which was enacted prior to the 1987 Constitution and
RA 7160, is under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President. The second class, under the 1987 Constitution, enjoys
autonomy and is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
the accepted principles on the effects and limits of “autonomy.”
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9
and 12 by PD 1618. The Decree established an “internal autonomy” in those
2 regions “within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with legislative and executive
machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities. HOWEVER it also
requires that EXCEPT on matters which are within the jurisdiction and
competence of the National Government, the autonomous governments may
undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions. The
exceptions are as follows:
(1) National defense and security
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-
banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all
natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.
Essentially, they belong to the first class.
Those autonomous under the first class are unarguably under the jurisdiction
of the Court. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy. In fact, Presidential Decree No. 1618 mandates
that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions. Secondly, In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative
services.
Hence, the Court may assume jurisdiction.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Ruling as to the other issue: (FYI only)
Previous sessions were declared invalid even if the Speaker invalidly called
for a recess because the issue of whether or not he could call for a recess
was not settled.
On Local Autonomy:
[A]utonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
#8. DISOMANGCOP vs SECRETARY OF DPWH
G.R. No. 149848
November 25, 2004
FACTS:
For the first time in its history, the Philippines ordained the establishment of
regional autonomy with the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. The provisions
under Sections 1 & 15, Article 10 mandate the creation of the ARMM and the
CAR, among others to effectuate such mandate.
Corollary to this is the enactment of RA 6734, An Act Providing for An
Organic Act for the ARMM, which called for the holding of a plebiscite in 13
provinces and 9 cities in the South. Only 4 provinces, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted for the creation of the autonomous
region. These provinces now constitute the ARMM.
EOs were signed by then President Cory devolving to ARMM the powers of 7
cabinet departments: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment; (3)
science and technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social welfare
and development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources.
9 years later, the DPWH issued DO 119 stating therein that a DPWH Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office shall be created and shall have jurisdiction
over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH w/n
Marawi City and Lanao del Sur.
2 years later, President Estrada signed into law RA 8999, An Act
Establishing An Engineering District in the First Disctrict of the Province of
Lanao Del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
Congress later passed amendatory act RA 9054, An Act to Strengthen and
Expand the Organic Act for the ARMM. This act, like its forerunner, contains
detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the
retained areas of governance of the National Government.RA 9054 lapsed
into law in 2001.
In July 2001, Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang addressed a petition
to DPWH Secretary Datumanong for the revocation of DO 119, but no action
was taken on the petition; hence, they filed the same with the First
Engineering District of the DPWH ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Their prayers are
as follows:
- To annul and set aside DO 119
- To prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing the DO and
RA 8999 and the release of funds for public works projects in the
administrative regions
- To compel the Secretary of DBM to release all funds for public works
projects intended for Marawi and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM
only; and
- To compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let DPWH-ARMM 1 st Engg.
District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects within its
jurisdictional area
Petitioners also allege grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged DO
has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that
have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur.
Respondents maintained the validity of the DO. They submit that the powers
of the autonomous regions did not diminish eh legislative power of Congress.
They also contend that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the
constitutionality of the law and the DO, them having no personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy.
ISSUE: Whether RA 8999 and DO 119 re unconstitutional and were issued
with grave abuse of discretion
HELD: Yes.
1. On the Constitutionality of RA 8999
It is not necessary to declare RA 8999 unconstitutional, not being the lis mota
of the case. The accepted rule is that the Court will not resolve a
constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can
be disposed of or settle on other grounds (Liban vs Gordon).
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy
scheme. While they are classified as statutes, they are more than ordinary
statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions
cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, RA 8999 in this case. The
amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite as clarified in the
transcript of the Constitutional Commission.
Furthermore, EO 426 had already devolved to the DPWH-ARMM the
functions and powers the RA 8999 aimed to transfer. E.O. 426 clearly
ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH
within the ARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities,
personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG. Also, according
to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional Government enables it to
appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for the
region by the central government.
The use of the word powers in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable case of
devolution. It was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM
Organic Act.
2. On the Constitutionality of DO 119
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued
pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated the creation of the constitutionally-
mandated autonomous region [87] and which defined the basic structure of
the autonomous government.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a
duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur
formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes
back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive
order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426.
3. There is partly grave abuse of discretion
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They
implemented R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put
in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in
accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the
ARMM Organic Acts.
Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however, cannot
uphold petitioners argument that R.A. 8999 was signed into law under
suspicious circumstances to support the assertion that there was a capricious
and whimsical exercise of legislative authority. Once more, this Court cannot
inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of the
legislative branch.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
On Regional Autonomy
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to
allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and
traditions. As a matter of right, these cultures must be allowed to flourish.
Autonomy recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural and even religious diversities. The need for regional
autonomy is a response to the unresponsiveness of the unitary system to the
specific political struggles of these cultures.
The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.
HOWEVER, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the
establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be
installed ONLY within the framework of the Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as
a right to political separation, but rather a s a complex net of legal-political
relations between a certain people and the state of authorities.
On decentralization: Deconcentration and devolution
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its
subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise
authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units. It
is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to
delegate certain authority to more local governments. Federalism implies
some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the
sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess
any claim of right against the central government.
Decentralization comes in two forms: deconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of
functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national
office to the regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is also
referred to as administrative decentralization.
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the
transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of
certain functions from the central government to local government units. This
is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer of
powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local
government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make
them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.
#9. BATANGAS CATV INC vs CA
G.R. No. 138810
September 29, 2004
FACTS:
Sangguniang Panlungsod enated Resolution No. 210 granting Petitioner to
construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. It was also
provided that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribesr the maximum
rates specified therein, provided, that any increase in rates shall be subject to
the Sanggunian.
Petitioner later on increased its rates from P88 to P180 per month. As a
result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its
permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sanggunian.
Petitioner filed a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sanggunian
has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators.
Petitioner contends that while Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, extends to the LGUs the general power to perform any act that
will benefit their constituents, nonetheless, it does not authorize them to
regulate the CATV operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has
the authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of
subscriber rates.

Respondents counter that:
1. First, Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Section 177(c) and (d)
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, the Local Government Code of 1983, which
authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses. The term businesses necessarily
includes the CATV industry. 2. Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a
contract between petitioner and respondents, it being a grant to the former of
a franchise to operate a CATV system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended
its terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts.
ISSUE: Whether the LGU may regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction
HELD: No.
The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national
legislature. There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate
CAT. Whaterver authority the LGUs had before, the same had been
withdrawn when President Marcos issued PD 1512 terminating all franchises,
permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted
by local governments.
Today, pursuant to Section 3 of EO 436, only persons, associations,
partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or
Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable
television system or render cable TV service within a service area.
It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization,
municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment
of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and
grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.
#10. DADOLE vs COA
G.R. No. 125350
December 3, 2002
FACTS:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly
allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance
enacted by its Sangguniang Panlungsod. In 1991, Mandaue City increased
the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
Later, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the
disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that
“additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding
P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be
granted.”
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowance to petitioners RTC Judges Dadole, Caete and Vestil and MTC
Judges Boholst, Fanilag and Dagatan. The additional monthly allowances of
the petitioner were reduced to P1,000 and they were also asked to reimburse
the amount they received in excess of P1,000.
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor against the
notices. The same was indorsed to the COA Regional Office which
eventually denied it.
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for:
(1) infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City;
(2) for being not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the
supervisory powers of the President;
(3) for lack of publication;
On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional
allowances to judges is allowed by Sex 458(a)(1) of the LGC.
In his comment, the SolGen filed a manifestation supporting the position of
the petitioner judges. He furthers that (1) DBM only enjoys the power to
review and determine whether the disbursements were made in accordance
with the ordinance passed by a local government unit and (2) the COA has
no more than auditorial visitation powers over local government units
pursuant to Sec 348 of the LGC.
Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and
statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges
stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on the
exercise of autonomy. It is for the President through the DBM to check
whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local
government units.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory
powers of the President and for not having been published; and
(2) Whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of
Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the
annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress
HELD:
(1) Yes. LBC is null and void.
Our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by
Congress and the power of supervision by the President.
Section 4 of Article 10 has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
Supervision and control differed in meaning and extent. Supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail to neglect to fulfil them, the
former may take such action as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Clearly, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law.
This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any of his alter egos cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution; otherwise, the principle
of local autonomy and separation of the powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations are violated.
Moreover, LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement. LBC 55 sets a
uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances which the law
otherwise permits provided that the finances of the city government allows for
such allowances.
LBC 55 is also void on account of lack of publication in violation of the ruling
in Tañada vs Tuvera.
(2) No. COA failed to prove that the expenses of the city government and the
funds used for said expenses were taken from the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) because no evidence was submitted. Furthermore, 90 days
from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should
have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have
been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect.
#11. PIMENTEL vs AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 132988
July 19, 2000
FACTS:
The President of the Philippines issued AO 372 which provides that all
government departments and agencies, including state universities and
colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measure that will
reduce by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services items. Section 4 of the same provides that pending assessment and
evaluation by the Dev’t Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC) of the
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal
revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO
372, by reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President in issuing AO 372 was in effect
exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the
President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs,
consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner furthers that the
directive to withhold 10% of the IRA is in contravention of Sec 286 of the
LGC and Sec 6 of Article 10 of the Constitution which provide for the
automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal
revenue.
The SolGen, on behalf of the respondents, claims that AO 372 was issued to
alleviate economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation and
constituted merely an exercise of the President’s power of supervision over
LGUs as it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will
reduce their total expenditures. Likewise, the withholding of 10% of the IRA
does not violate the statutory prohibition because such withholding is
temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the DBCC of
the emerging fiscal situation.
ISSUE: Whether
(1) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25%; and
(2) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10% of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general
supervision over local governments
HELD:
(1) Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable
share in the national taxes release by the national government, as well as the
power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision. In order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.

In the case at bar, the respondents failed to meet the requisites before the
President may interfere in local fiscal matters, before the issuance and
implementation of AO 372. To wit:
(a) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the nat’l gov’t
(b) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House
of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and
(c) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Dep’t of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Firstly, at the very least, they did not even try to show that the national
government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit.
Secondly, they did they claim having conducted consultations with the
different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the
President has no authority to adjust unilaterally the LGU’s IRA.
The SolGen insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory which is
intended to advise the undertaking of cost-reduction measures that will help
maintain economic stability. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case
of non-compliance. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
The Court accepts the reassurance of the SolGen. Since no legal sanction
may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such
advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in
regard to Section 1.
(2) Section 4 of AO 372 contravenes explicit provisions of the LGC and the
Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to are authorized by law; but
quite the opposite, Sec 4 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.
This Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs as the
President may make necessary adjustments in case of unmanageable public
sector deficit in line with Sec 284 of the LGC. Such reduction, however, is
subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
and with the presidents of the leagues of local governments.
Notably, the need for interaction between the national government and the
LGUs at the planning level in order to ensure that the local development
plans hew to national policies and standards. The problem is that no such
interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372.
This is why the petitioner and the intervenor have protested and instituted
this action. Significantly, respondents do not deny lack of consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287[40] of the LGC as impliedly
authorizing the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its
compliance with certain requirements. Even a cursory reading of the
provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs
LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20 percent of their respective
IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive power granted the
President to priorly withhold any amount.
#12. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS vs ROMULO
G.R. No. 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
The Province of Batangas filed to declare as unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the GAA of 1999-2001 insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of 5b pesos of the IRA
for the Local Gov’t Svc Equalization Fund and imposed conditions for the
release thereof.
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program
for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of
LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which
were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines
formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the
project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the
Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD: Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.

According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the
local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to
one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power
of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order
his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision
merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down
the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of
the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that
the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the
release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive
the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of further action“.
To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules
& regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-
2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs
IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is
less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The
exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the
LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise
control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a
separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a
separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to amend
another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“. Increasing/decreasing
the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general &
substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments
through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the
spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.
#13. ACORD vs ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
June 8, 2005
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec 22, Art. 7 of the Constitution, President Estrada submitted
the Nat’l Expenditures Program for the Fiscal Year 2000. The President
proposed an IRA of P121.78B following the formula provided in Sec 284 of
the LGC which provides that on the third year and thereafter after the
effectivity of the LGC, the LGUs shall have a 40% share in the nat’l internal
revenue taxes.
President later approved the GAA of the year 2000 which provides a
P111.78B IRA as Programmed Fund while separating the remaining P10B as
Unprogrammed Fund. The latter amount is to be released only upon the
concurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
Thus, a number of NGOs and people’s organizations, along with three
barangay officials filed this petition against respondents challenging the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the GAA.
Petitioners contend that the pertinent sections (Sec 1, 37(A) and special
provisions 1 and 4 are:
(1) null and void as they violate the autonomy of local governments by
unlawfully reducing P10B of IRA and withholding the release of such
amount by placing the same under Unprogrammed Funds
(2) constitutive of an undue delegation of legislative power to the
respondents (who are the Executive Secretary, DBM Secretary, National
Treasurer and the COA)
(3) constitutive of amendments of the LGC
(4) undermining the foundation of our local governance system
(5) a transgression of the Constitution and the LGC’s prohibition on any
invalid reduction and withholding of the local government’s IRA.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated constitutional mandate laid in Sec 6,
Article 10 when it made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue
collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic.
Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is
addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does
not rprevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the
IRA.

ISSUE: Whether the questioned provisions violate the constitutional
injunction that the just share of local governments in the national taxes or the
IRA shall be automatically released
HELD: Yes.
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release
the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the
legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing
this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is
virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is
patently absurd.
Moreover, there is merit in the argument of the intervenor Province of
Batangas that, if indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of
statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of
local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not
the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by
the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
Additionally, to interpret the term automatic release in such a broad manner
would be inconsistent with the ruling in Pimentel v. Aguirre. There is no
substantial difference between the withholding of IRA involved in Pimentel
and that in the present case, except that here it is the legislature, not the
executive, which has authorized the withholding of the IRA. The distinction
notwithstanding, the ruling in Pimentel remains applicable. As explained
above, Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution the same provision relied upon
in Pimentel enjoins both the legislative and executive branches of
government. Hence, as in Pimentel, under the same constitutional provision,
the legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.
#14. KIDA vs SENATE
G.R. No. 192671
October 18, 2011
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the
organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM
Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first
regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time
the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected.
However, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections.
The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor,
and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
(2) Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates Sections 15,
16 and 18 of the Constitution
HELD:
1. Yes.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution. The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
(A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their
ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails.)
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that
primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
minor political subdivision. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions
of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously
fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will
serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered
one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article 10 of the
Constitution. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under the
article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is
considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X
of the Constitution.
2. No.
The decision of Congress to synchronize the regional elections with the
national, congressional and all other local elections left it with the problem of
how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between
the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the
assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in
the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem was for interim measures for this period and with the respect
due to the concept of autonomy. The need for interim measures is dictated
by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or
used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does
not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms..
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013
elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain
in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to
appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the
2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
1. Holdover option
The Court ruled out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution. Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they
are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
2. Special elections
Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and
other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. In the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands.
3. Authorization of the President to appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure –
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the
ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and
5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make.
The appointing power embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
classifies four groups of officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the
interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No.
10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is
purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
#15. GOV. VILLAFUERTE, JR. and PROV. OF CAMSUR vs ROBREDO
G.R. No. 195390
December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners sought to annul and set aside the issuances of the respondent, in
his capacity as then Secretary of the DILG on the ground of
unconstitutionality and for having been issued with GAD, to wit:
(a) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, pertaining to the full
disclosure of local budget and finances, and bids and public offerings;2
(b) MC No. 2010-138, pertaining to the use of the 20% component of the
annual internal revenue allotment shares;3 and
(c) MC No. 2011-08, pertaining to the strict adherence to Section 90 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10147 or the General Appropriations Act of 2011.4
The first circular was issued after the COA conducted an examination and
audit which yielded a report that 20% of the development fund of some LGUs
were diverted to expenses for maintenance and other operating expenses in
stark violation of Section 287 of the LGC. It also served as a reminder to
LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public funds shall be spent
judiciously and only for the very purpose/s for which such funds are intended.
The second circular pertained to guidelines on the appropriation and
utilization of the 20% of the IRA and that the development projects should be
utilized for social, economic dev’t and environmental mgt.
The third circular, entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and
Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to promote good governance through
enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs was issued.
These circulars also carry with them sanctions for non-compliance.
The petitioners argue that the assailed issuances of the respondent interfere
with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the Constitution and
the LGC. In particular, they claim that MC No. 2010-138 transgressed these
constitutionally-protected liberties when it restricted the meaning of
“development” and enumerated activities which the local government must
finance from the 20% development fund component of the IRA and provided
sanctions for local authorities who shall use the said component of the fund
for the excluded purposes stated therein.33 They argue that the respondent
cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative council in
enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the
20% component of its IRA should fund.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of
local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
2. Whether respondent went beyond the confines of his supervisory powers,
as alter ego of the President
HELD:
1. No.
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an
existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to
faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the
20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory
to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. It
must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in response to the
report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of
some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects.
The term development was characterized as the “realization of desirable
social, economic and environmental outcome” does not operate as a
restriction of the term so as to exclude some other activities that may bring
about the same result. The statement of a general definition was only
necessary to illustrate among LGUs the nature of expenses that are properly
chargeable against the development fund component of the IRA. It is
expected to guide them and aid them in rethinking their ways so that they
may be able to rectify lapses in judgment, should there be any, or it may
simply stand as a reaffirmation of an already proper administration of
expenses.
2. No.
Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are
still under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws. “Supervision is not incompatible
with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an
investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.”
Clearly then, the President’s power of supervision is not antithetical to
investigation and imposition of sanctions.
CONCLUSION:
The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08,
are but implementation of this avowed policy of the State to make public
officials accountable to the people. They are amalgamations of existing laws,
rules and regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of
transparency and accountability.
The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good
governance through transparency, accountability and participation. The
action of the respondent is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his
power as alter ego of the President.
#16. SEMA vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 177597; G.R. No. 178628
July 16, 2008
FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City
voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two
legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and
8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it
with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the
municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of
Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st
district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later
amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of
S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that
Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival
Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She
contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S.
Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and
since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being
deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that
regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not
affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM
can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence,
ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at
least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one
representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City
did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable.
On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S.
Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
#17. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951
November 18, 2008
FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting
24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate
for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood
bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the
16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities
will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution
(2) Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD:
(1) Yes.
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the
expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A.
No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in
1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the
creation of local government units—income, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities
from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to
uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and
thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic
growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws
explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself.
(2) Yes.
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in
accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for
cityhood up to the present.
The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Cityhood Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
#18. NAVARRO vs ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050
September 11, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province
of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the
Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards
conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded
a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual income for
calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12
square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a
province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than
P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by
the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered
city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted
into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative
votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands,
Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province.
Respondents argued that exemption from the land area requirement is
germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to develop self-
reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects
and purposes of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
HELD: No.
The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a
province, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in
the Local Government Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed
by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized
portion “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands. “
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose
of the law as it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in
creating a territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute that in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
#19. MIRANDA vs AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064
September 16, 1999
FACTS:
On May 5 1994, RA 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. Later on,
the people of Santiago ratified the law in a plebiscite. Later, RA 8528 was
enacted which amended the former, changing the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city.
Petitioner, Jose Miranda, mayor of Santiago assailed the constitutionality of
RA 8528 due to lack of ratification through plebiscite pursuant to Section 10,
Article 10 of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend the petition raises a
political question which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General contends, on the contrary, that the law merely
reclassified the city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
ISSUE: Whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent
component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people
of Santiago City in a plebiscite
HELD: Yes.
Pursuant to Setion 10, Art 10 of the Constitution, the consent of the people of
the local government directly affected is required to serve as a checking
mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of LGUs.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from
an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be
characterized as insubstantial as posited by the Solicitor General. Among
these changes are: (a) the independence of the city as a political unit will be
diminished; (b) the city mayor will be placed under the administrative
supervision of the provincial governor, (c) resolutions and ordinances of the
city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of
Isabela; (d) that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with
the province.
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago
City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the
approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither
rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the
will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the
status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a
law substantially diminishes their right.
Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the LGC provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character,
so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit
directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of
its people.
#20. SAMSON vs AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133076
September 22, 1999
FACTS:
On February 23, 1998, President FBR signed RA 8535 into law, creating the
City of Novaliches out of 15 brgys. Of QC. Petitioner, incumbent councillor of
the 1st district of QC, is now before the Court challenging the
unconstitutionality of said law.
Petitioner contends that RA 8535:
(a) failed to conform to the criteria established by the LGC as to the
requirements of income, population and land area; seat of
government; and no adverse effect to being a city of QC; and its IRR
as to furnishing a copy of the QC Council of brgy resolution; and
(b) essentially amended the Constitution.
He also asserted that certifications were not presented to Congress during
the deliberations that led to the law’s passage. Likewise, there is no
certification attesting that the mother LGU would not be adversely affected by
the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income, population and
land area.
The Solicitor General in its comment claimed, however, that the allegations
are not substantiated with convincing proof. They argued that petitioner had
the burden of proof to overcome the legal presumeption that Congress
considered all the legal requirements under the LGC in passing the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8535 is unconstitutional
HELD: RA 8535 is constitutional.
Firstly, all presumptions are indulged in favour of constitutionality; one who
attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond
a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favour of constitutionality should be adopted. Simply, a person
asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and
unmistakably.
(1) As to requirements
Section 7 of the LGC provides that the creation of a LGU or its conversion
from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability
such as income, population and land area. These indicators shall be
attested to by the DOF, NSO and the LMB of the DENR.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less
than the prescribed minimum requirements as prescribed in the IRR of the
LGC which should be not less than 20M. But as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, the combined average annual income of the
13 brgys was around 26M.
With respect to the population, NSO estimated that the population in the
brgys is around 346,310, exceeding the 150,000 requirement in the IRR.
Having met this requirement, there’s no more need to meet the land
 requirement of 100 sqkm since the law provides that the proposed city
must comply as regards income and population or land area.
(2) As to lack of attestation through certification
During the hearings, the DBM, DILG, and Finance Officials were present
along with other officers armed with official statistics and reference
materials. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on
population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their official
statements could serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring
certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open
session of either the Senate or the House of Representatives give even
greater solemnity than a certification submitted to either chamber
routinely.
(3) As to failure of specifying the seat of government of the proposed
City of Novaliches
Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not
provide for a seat of government. However, this omission is not as fatal to
the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it to be. We agree with
respondents that under Section 12 of the LGC the City of Novaliches can
still establish a seat of government after its creation.
(4) As to non-furnishing of a copy of the petition to the concerned QC
brgys
Such will also not render invalid R.A. No. 8535. The evident purpose of
this requirement is to inform the City Council of the move to create
another city and to enable it to formulate its comments and
recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City Council members are
obviously aware of the petition since the matter has been widely
publicized in the mass media.
(5) As to amending the Constitution
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a
prohibited amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance appended to the
Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives
to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide
that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the
ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its
erroneous interpretation.
#21. MARIANO vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 118577
March 7, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which is entitled, “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati” among the following grounds:
(1) It did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical description s, in violation of
Sec 10, Art 10 of the Constitution in relation to Secs 7 and 450 of the LGC
(2) It attempts to alter or restart the three consecutive term limit for local
elective officials in violation of the Sec 8, Art 10 and Sec 7 of Art 6 of the
Constitution (FYI only)
(3) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law and
such fact was not expressed in the title of the bill and is violative of the
Constitution (FYI only)
ISSUE: Whether or not non-delineation of the technical descriptions of the
territorial boundary of Makati would render the law unconstitutional
HELD: No.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a
LGU lies on the possibility that any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units may sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. However, the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause
confusion as to its boundaries.
However, said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language
that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality.
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason
why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined. At the time
of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts and
thus decided against any fact finding.
The Court also said that the territory requirement of newly-created LGUs, as
long as they may be reasonably ascertained by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, then the legislative intent has
been sufficiently served.
#22. CAWALING JR. vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 146319
October 26, 2001
FACTS:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of
the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law
R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The
Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC held a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been
ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following
grounds: (FYI only)
(1) The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of
Section 54 thereof; and
(2) Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8806 unconstitutional:
(1) The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city"; and
(2) R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of
the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed
by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. (FYI only)
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city
may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays,"
not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8806 was unconstitutional for it provides the
creation of an LGU through merger and not conversion as provided under the
LGC
HELD: The law is constitutional.
Petitioner’s interpretation of Sec 450(a) of the LGC is erroneous. The phrase
“A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city” is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be
created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local
government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay.
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a
division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under
the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
#23. AQUINO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010
FACTS:
RA 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264
and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009.
To that effect, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population
of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
HELD: No.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states
that: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.”
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase
"or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
#24. TAN vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155
July 11, 1986
FACTS:
Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 entitled “An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte.” Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros
Occidental, filed to prohibit the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite
pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros
del Norte and excluded the voters from the rest of the province of Negros
Occidental.
The OSG filed their comment arguing that the challenged statute should be
accorded the presumption of legality and that the law is not void on its face
and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable
demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution.
Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) to
enact the assailed law is beyond question and does not infringe the
Constitution because the requisites of the LGC have been complied with, that
the excluded areas do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term “unit
or units affected.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite to be conducted excluding the rest of
the province of Negros Occidental is valid
HELD: No.
Sec 3, Article 10 of the Constitution makes it imperative that there be first
obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or
units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there
is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is inescapable to conclude that
the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would
necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries
to create the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that both political units would be
affected. First would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered and secondly, the other as it would
be composed of the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of
Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very
lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos,
a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which
We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all
of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as
in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the— forerunner of
the ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar.
#25. DELA CRUZ vs PARAS
G.R. Nos. L-42571-72
July 25, 1983
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators filed for
the prohibition of Ordinance No. 84 which prohibits the operation of night
clubs, under the following grounds:
(1) It is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a
lawful business, occupation or calling
(2) It is violative of the petitioner’s right to due process and the equal
protection of the law as the license previously given to petitioners
were withdrawn without judicial notice
In their answer, respondents aver that the Municipal Council is authorized by
law not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs. They also said that it is not violative of due process
because property rights are subordinate to public interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
HELD: No.
Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows:
“The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as
shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein."
The general welfare clause has two branches:
1. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority,
and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law.
2. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the
specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes
such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.' It is a general rule that
ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of
the State.”
If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases
above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too
wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a
clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of
the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code
provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers
and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows:
"(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it
by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein; ..."
It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night
clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
#26. BINAY vs DOMINGO
G.R. No. 92389
September 11, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution
No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose
gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to
be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury.
The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit
disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons:
(1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati;
(2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and,
(3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.
ISSUES: Whether Resolution No. 60 is an invalid exercise of the police
power under the general welfare clause for not benefiting the whole and
being not connected with public safety, general welfare, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati
HELD: No.
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to
be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real
needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights.
It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with
whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of
the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60
is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be
for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the
majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a
few individuals as in the present case."
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the
promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10,
Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11,
Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support
for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.
#27. TANO vs SOCRATES
G.R. No. 110249
August 21, 1997
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of:
(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE
SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF"
(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage
in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his
possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to
obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being
shipped out from Puerto Princesa and,
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION
PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING,
SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING
AQUATIC ORGANISMS”
The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice
of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute
authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.
They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful
ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they
were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into
contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their
business endeavors to a successful conclusion
Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the
general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional
HELD: No.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in
the LGC and the powers granted therein to local government units which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or
purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral
in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of
Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, LGUs have the power to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It
likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor;
to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods
of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any
violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon
the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang
panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes or of ecological imbalance.
It imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and
the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive
fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance."
#28. WHITE LIGHT CORP. vs CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 156052
January 20, 2009
FACTS:
Then City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of
Manila.” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow
the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the
renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC),
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents,
in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
The RTC declared the ordinance null and void as it “strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution
encouraging private enterprises and the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the LGC which
confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III, Sec 18 of the
Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference
in their business.
CA reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of
the State
HELD: No, Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind the City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling
and the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. All three ordinances were
enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit
activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the
middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its
core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into
and regulate the lives of its citizens
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than
twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through
such implements as the general welfare clause.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution.
SC recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived
of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments
in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights
to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and
the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons
of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence
of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
“wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the
rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned
the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice
a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.