Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Panganiban           September 9, 1933
JOSE R. PAÑGANIBAN, complainant,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent.
The Respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent attorney are before us on the representations of the
Solicitor-General that the respondent appear and show cause, if any he has, why he should not be proceeded
against for professional malpractice. The respondent admits that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized the
document which is the basis of the complaint against him, and that the document contains provisions contrary to law
, morals and good customs, but by way of defense disclaims any previous knowledge of the illegal character of the
document.
On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala husband and wife, subscribed a contract before the
notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a regularly admitted member of the Philippine Bar. The contract
in question had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney Borromeo cooperated in
the execution of the document and had, at lease, some knowledge of its contents, although he may not have been
fully informed because of a difference in dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate an agreement
between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to
live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them.
Two questions are suggested by the record. The first concerns the points of whether or not the contract sanctioned
an illicit and immoral purpose. The second concerns the point, on the supposition that the contract did sanction an
illicit and immoral purpose, of whether a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public.
The contract of the spouses, it will be recalled, was executed at a time when the Spanish Penal Code, as modified
by Act No. 1773 was in force. Conceding, however, that the more liberal provisions of the Revised Penal Code
should be given application, it is herein provided that the consent or pardon given by the offended party constitutes
a bar to prosecution for adultery or concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses should retain their present frame of
mind, no prosecution of either one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of
the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution
cannot be instituted if the offended party consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future
contingency and is not matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the contract to contain
provisions contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
Passing to the second question, we think there can be no question as to the right of the court to discipline an
attorney who, in his capacity as notary public, has been guilty of misconduct. To the office of notary public there is
not attached such importance under present conditions as under the Spanish administration. Even so, the notary
public exercise duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to
which he intends to certify, and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has
been admitted to the practice of law, and such, in the commingling of his duties as notary and lawyer, must be held
responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a
disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment. (See 2
Thornton on Attorneys At Law, pp. 1258, 1259; In re Chappell [1909], 115 N.Y.S., 868; In re Bernard [1912], 136 N.
Y.S., 185; In re Arctander [1879], 1 N.W., 43; In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; In re Adriatico [1906], 7 Phil., 173; U.
S. vs. Kilayko [1916], 34 Phil., 796; De la Cruz vs. Capinpin and Albea [1918], 38 Phil., 492.)
It now becomes necessary to pronounce sentence. As mitigating circumstances, there may be taken into
consideration (1) that the attorney may not have realized the full purport of the document to which he took
acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification of facts was attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent as a
notary public has been revoked. Accordingly, we are disposed in this case to exercise clemency and to confine our
discipline of the respondent to severe censure. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 138             May 31, 1961
CONRADO S. ACUÑA, complainant,
vs.
ISIDRO DUNCA and TIMOTEO DAVID, respondents.
Conrado S. Acuña for and in his own behalf as complainant.
Isidro T. Dunca for and in his own behalf as respondent.
Timoteo A. David for and in his own behalf as respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for investigator.
NATIVIDAD, J.:
This is an administrative case instituted by the complainant, Conrado S. Acuña, to disbar the
respondents, Timoteo David and Isidro Dunca, and to further secure the cancellation of the latter's
commission as Notary public, on the ground that the first had prepared and the second had
notarized an affidavit, Annex A to the complaint, purporting to be that of complainant's daughter,
Adoracion Acuña, wherein she appears to have stated that she was determined to marry a man
whom she knew to be already married to another woman.
We gave due course to the complaint and required the respondents to answer the same within ten
days from notice. After respondents' answer had been filed, we referred the matter to the Solicitor
General for investigation and recommendation. While the case was pending in the Office of the
Solicitor General, the complainant filed a motion asking that the charge be dismissed, on the ground
that its filing was due to a mere misunderstanding between his daughter Adoracion Acuña and the
respondents, and that he is no longer interested in the prosecution of the case. Based on this motion
, the Solicitor General recommended dismissal of the charge. This Court, however, in a resolution
dated January 29, 1957, denied the Solicitor General's motion and ordered that the investigation of
the charge proceed.
The case was properly investigated in the Office of the Solicitor General. Notice of the hearing was
sent to all the parties concerned, and on the date set therefor the complainant and his daughter
Adoracion Acuña and the respondents appeared. The complainant, however, confined himself to
explaining why he filed the motion to withdraw his complaint, refused to make any further statement
to substantiate its allegations and once more stated that he was no longer interested in the
prosecution of the case. Adoracion Acuña, in turn, likewise refused to make any statement in
substantiation of the allegations of her father's complaint, stating that she was already satisfied with
the result of the bigamy charge filed against her and her co-accused Alfonso Eugenio of which they
were both acquitted.
From the testimony of the respondents, the following facts appear proven: In the year 1947, Alfonso
Eugenio and the respondents Isidro Dunca and Timoteo David had separate offices at the Chaco
Building, Manila. Complainant's daughter Adoracion Acuña was at that time employed as secretary
to respondent David. She fell in love with and became deeply intimate with Eugenio, who despite his
marriage to Marta Cruz in 1932, was willing to marry Adoracion provided she subscribed to a written
statement professing her knowledge of his marital status. Such an affidavit, he told her would
prevent her from charging him with bigamy. Desperately wanting a marriage certificate with which to
appease her parents' wrath over her misdeeds, Adoracion sought the help of her employer.
Respondent David, at first, refused to prepare the requested statement, and explained to her that
such an affidavit would be immoral and illegal. Because however of Adoracion's insistent pleas and
explanations that it was the only way by which she could be married to Eugenio and thus redeem
her honor, finally respondent David acceded to Adoracion's request and on May 31, 1947, he drafted
the affidavit Annex A, which reads as follows:
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
IN THE CITY OF MANILA                  ) S.S.
AFFIDAVIT
I, ADORACION S. ACUÑA of age, single and residing at 1415 Miguelin, Manila, after having
been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and say:
That I know personally the status of ALFONSO H. EUGENIO, he being married in lawful
wedlock with one Marta Cruz of Pasig, Rizal, with three children begotten of said marriage:
That I am to contract marriage with the said ALFONSO H. EUGENIO in spite of my personal
knowledge of the above marriage so as to show to society of our good intentions and further
to hide my misdeeds from my parents;
That I am executing this foregoing statement free from any force, duress or any intimidation
from any person whosoever and that the same is my voluntary act and deed;
IN TRUTH OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I have hereunto affixed my hand below on this 31st
day of May, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines. (Sgd.) A. S. Acuña Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 4th day of June, 1947, in the City of Manila, the
affiant exhibiting her residence certificate No. A-2727772 issued in Manila, on May 27, 1947.

(Sgd.) Isidro T. Dunca

          Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1948

Doc. No. 315

Page No. 64
Book No. II
Series of 1947.
Adoracion signed this affidavit on that same date, and on that very day she and Eugenio were
married. Four days thereafter, or on June 4, 1947, evidently upon the indication of Eugenio,
Adoracion, accompanied by respondent David, approached respondent Dunca and asked him to
notarize the affidavit. The latter acceded to the request.
Sometime in the year 1952, the complainant Conrado S. Acuña, evidently informed of the civil status
of Alfonso Eugenio, filed a charge of bigamy against the latter. This sparked off a number of
countercharges; Marta Cruz accused Adoracion Acuña and Alfonso Eugenio of bigamy; Eugenio
filed against Adoracion Acuña a complaint for perjury. It developed, however, that Eugenio had
divorced his first wife Marta Cruz during the Japanese occupation. As a consequence, Eugenio and
Adoracion Acuña were both acquitted of the charge of bigamy.
That the affidavit Annex A is immoral is not disputed; and it is admitted fact that it was prepared for
the signature of Adoracion Acuña by respondent Timoteo David and notarized by respondent Isidro
Dunca. Their only explanation is that they did not have the courage to deny help to Adoracion Acuña
who was an employee of the former and a friend of the latter. It is, therefore, clear that the
respondents, who are both members of the bar, have committed disgraceful acts which constitute
gross misconduct in office and a violation of their oath of office as attorneys at law, for which they
may be disciplined by this Court. Rule 127, sec. 25, Rules of Court; Panganiban vs. Borromeo, 58
Phil. 367. Upon the facts, however we agree with the Solicitor General that they are entitled to a
lenient treatment. We have no doubt that they committed the immoral acts charged, not for monetary
considerations, but only out of pure generosity.
WHEREFORE, following precedents (Panganiban vs. Borromeo, supra), it is hereby decreed that
the respondents Attorneys Isidro Dunca and Timoteo David, be, as they are hereby, severely
censured, with admonition that a repetition of the same of similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and
De Leon, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6270             January 22, 2007
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent), filed by the heirs of the late
spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva (spouses Villanueva), namely: Ardenio M. Fonacier,
Araceli M. Fonacier, Alano M. Fonacier, Eusebio M. Fonacier, Jr., Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro V.
Nazarro, Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado, and Herminigildo Ylhi (complainants).
The Facts
During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of land in Pangasinan, one of
which was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in 1968, and
Lucas in 1974. Their five children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia,
survived them.
On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication 1 (affidavit of adjudication) stating
that as "the only surviving son and sole heirs (sic)" of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to
himself the parcel of land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 2 (
deed of sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared
as notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale.
Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still alive at the time he
executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale, as were descendants of the other
children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants claimed that respondent was aware of this fact, as
respondent had been their neighbor in Balungao, Pangasinan, from the time of their birth, and
respondent constantly mingled with their family. Complainants accused respondent of knowing the "
true facts and surrounding circumstances" regarding the properties of the spouses Villanueva, yet
conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of their rightful shares in the property.
In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
.
In her Comment, 3 respondent admitted that she notarized the affidavit of adjudication and the deed
of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984. However, respondent denied that she conspired with Alfonso to
dispose of fraudulently the property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed the two documents
under the following circumstances:
That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been divided equally among their
compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for themselves one titled lot, the subject now of the
complaint x x x That said titled property was the only property left by the old couple, to answer for
their needs while they are still alive until their deaths x x x. Alfonso [and his wife] were tasked to
take care of the old couple, as they were the ones living in the same compound with their late
parents. This fact was and is known by the other compulsory heirs, and they never
questioned the said act of their parents, as they already had their own share on the estate of
the late [spouses Villanueva]. This fact was also known to me because [Lucas] and [Alfonso]
lived across the street from our house and I was requested to the house of the old man when
he gave said title to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his wife]. The other compulsory heirs who were still
alive at the time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in their old house to help in the
care of their parents. Even [when] the parents died, it was [Alfonso and his wife] who took charge of
the funeral and all other acts relative thereto.
xxxx
That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after the death of the old man, when the
spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa] needed money to finance the schooling of their children, it was then
that they thought of disposing the land x x x and said land was sold by them to one Adriano
Villanueva of which in both documents, I notarized the same (sic).
xxxx
I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I notarized said documents, it was done in
good faith, to do my job as expected of me, to help, assist and to guide people who come to me for
legal assistance, as contained in my oath as a lawyer when I passed the bar. x x x 4 (Emphasis
supplied)
According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonso’s co-heirs filed their objections at the time he
executed the affidavit of adjudication proved that most of the properties of the spouses Villanueva
had earlier been distributed to the other heirs. It also proved that the heirs had agreed to abide by
the intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the property to Alfonso. Respondent asserted that "
the personal appearances and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the core of the
ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public document x x x."
On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
which designated Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (IBP Commissioner Villadolid) to
investigate, and submit his report and recommendation on, the complaint.
The IBP’s Findings
In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid found that respondent violated
the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the spirit and intent of the notarial law
when she notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory heir of the
spouses Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of fraudulent intent on respondent’s part, IBP
Commissioner Villadolid held that respondent "engaged in conduct that lessened confidence in the
legal system." Thus, he recommended suspension of respondent’s notarial commission for one year.
He further recommended that respondent be reprimanded or suspended from the practice of law for
up to six months.
The Court’s Ruling
We sustain partly the IBP’s findings and recommendations.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or instrument. In the performance of such notarial
acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a
document. The notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after which it may be
presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. 5 Thus,
notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. 6 As early as
Panganiban v. Borromeo, 7 we held that notaries public must inform themselves of the facts to which
they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal transactions. They must guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangements. 8
On its face, Alfonso’s affidavit does not appear to contain any "illegal or immoral" declaration.
However, respondent herself admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonso’s statement that he was
the "sole heir" of the spouses Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a document while fully
aware that it contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonso’s assertion of status as sole heir. The
affidavit of adjudication is premised on this very assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a
portion of his parents’ estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards,
respondent notarized the deed of sale, knowing that the deed took basis from the unlawful affidavit
of adjudication.
Respondent never disputed complainants’ allegation of her close relationship with the Villanueva
family spanning several decades. Respondent even underscored this closeness by claiming that
Lucas himself requested her to come to his house the day Lucas handed to Alfonso a copy of OCT
No. 2522, allegedly so she could hear the conversation between them.
Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the time Alfonso executed the
affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their respective shares from the estate of the spouses
Villanueva. However, we are not concerned here with the proper distribution of the spouses
Villanueva’s estates. Rather, respondent’s liability springs from her failure to discharge properly her
duties as a notary public and as a member of the bar.
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined
and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
We also view with disfavor respondent’s lack of candor before the IBP proceedings. The transcript of
hearings shows that respondent denied preparing or notarizing the deed of sale, 9 when she already
admitted having done so in her Comment.
WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we
REVOKE the commission of respondent Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing, and
DISQUALIFY her from being commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We further SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5851             November 25, 2008
GRACE DELA CRUZ-SILLANO, complainant
vs.
ATTY. WILFREDO PAUL D. PANGAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint filed by Grace Dela Cruz-Sillano (complainant) against Atty. Wilfredo Paul D. Pangan (
respondent) for disbarment for having conspired in forging a Special Power of Attorney.
The Facts
The facts in the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) read as follows:
Respondent is accused of forging the signature of an affiant [Zenaida A. Dela Cruz] in a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA). The affiant in this SPA is the mother of complainant. The SPA appears
to have authorized a certain Ronaldo F. Apostol to "process, claim, receive and encash checks
representing my (affiant's) benefits arising from my insurance policy with the Insular Life
Assurance Company Ltd." Consequently, respondent also stands accused of notarizing a
document in the absence of the affiant. Complainant specifically alleges:
"That on March 15, 1999, Atty. Pangan conspiring and confederating with the other
accused R.F. Apostol falsified and forged a document denominated as a Special Power
of Attorney (by forgering [sic] the signature of my deceased mother and notarizing the
same), which empowered the accused Ronaldo F. Apostol to process, receive claim and
encash check representing benefits arising from the insurance policy of my deceased
mother Zenaida Apostol de la Cruz (of which I am the beneficiary). The accused
successfully encash [sic] the check in the amount of P71,033.53 to my damage and
prejudice."
The charge of forgery is premised on complainant's claim that when the SPA was notarized on 15
March 1999, the affiant therein was bedridden in the United States, who was sick with malignant
cancer of the lungs, and that, in fact, the alleged affiant died on 27 May 1999 also in the United
States. Complainant specifically alleges:
"The accused being both blood relatives were well aware that my deceased mother who
resides in the U.S. of A has been bedridden for several months as she was diagnosed to
be suffering from Malignant Cancer of the Lungs, prior to her death on May 27, 1999.
Hence for obvious reasons, my deceased mother could not have on March 15, 1999
executed, prepared and signed the Special Power of Attorney and sworn to the same
before Atty. Pangan. xxx"
In his comment Atty. Pangan claims that the "act of notarizing was done in accordance with law
and practice." Moreover, respondent emphasized that:
"4. Respondent has no participation in the submission and processing of the insurance
proceeds. Respondent Notary Public could not have made use of the alleged falsified
document. He cannot be considered as having benefited from the falsified document as
he was never a grantee nor a beneficiary [in] said document. He did not benefit from the
insurance proceeds. He never conspired with anyone in the commission of any crime
much less has taken advantage of his position as notary public to defraud any person or
entity."1
 The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report dated 8 July 2005, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Doroteo B. Aguila (Commissioner
2

Aguila) found respondent guilty of notarizing the SPA in the absence of affiant. Commissioner Aguila
found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for 30 days, and that he be barred from acting as notary public, if he
is presently one, or from being given a commission to act as such, for a period of one year from the
effectivity of the recommended penalty.
In a Resolution3 dated 22 October 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Aguila. The IBP Board of Governors
suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration dated 12 December 2005 before the IBP Board of
Governors. In a Resolution dated 28 January 2006, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to deny
respondent's motion for reconsideration since the Board had no jurisdiction to consider and resolve a
matter already endorsed to this Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations. Respondent violated his oath as a
lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he made it appear that Zenaida A. Dela Cruz
personally appeared before him and executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Ronaldo Apostol.
Respondent Notarized a Special Power of Attorney
in the Absence of the Affiant
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law provides:
Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the
act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Moreover, Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 emphasizes the necessity of
the affiant's personal appearance before the notary public:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
In the present case, respondent does not deny notarizing the questioned Special Power of Attorney.
Moreover, instead of exculpating respondent, the affidavits presented by respondent prove that affiant
was not in the personal presence of respondent at the time of the notarization.
Ronaldo F. Apostol, respondent's co-accused in the criminal complaint for estafa through falsification filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, executed an affidavit absolving respondent from any
wrongdoing.
1. I was appointed by my Aunt Zenaida Apostol-Dela Cruz to process and claim her benefits
arising from her insurance policy with the Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.;
 2. Pursuant to this authority I caused the preparation of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing
me to process, claim, receive and encash said insurance policy;
3. I proceeded to the law office of a distant relative - Atty. Wilfredo Paul D. Pangan to have the
said Special Power of Attorney notarized;
4. Atty. Pangan was, however, not present in their office so I asked the staff how I can facilitate
the notarization of the said document;
5. The staff told me that as long as the grantor will appear in their office they can vouched
[sic] the due execution of the document and they will just include the documents among
the "for signature" so that Atty. Pangan can sign them when he comes back from a
hearing;
6. I left the law office and fetch [sic] an aunt of mine. When I returned to the office, I told the staff
that my aunt is too sick to alight from the car;
7. Being a known relative of Atty. Pangan in the law office I was able to convince the staff that
said aunt was indeed the one who executed the document;
8. The following day I returned to the law office and the staff gave me the notarized Special
Power of Attorney;
9. That I have not paid for said notarization as I have been engaging the services of Atty. Pangan
for free;
10. When a feud between me and my cousin who is in the United States developed and their [sic]
was a lack of communication between us, I was surprised that the matter of claiming the
insurance policy was brought when almost everybody in our immediate family knew that I caused
the claiming of the said insurance and hold it in trust until we can communicate with my cousin;
11. In fairness to Atty. Pangan, he has nothing to do with whatever wrongdoings I have committed
in the claiming of the insurance policy;
12. The claiming was done in good faith as no one else in the immediate family can process the
same;
x x x.4 (Emphases added)
Laila N. Mesiano and Manolito F. Farnal, members of the staff of respondent's law office, also executed a
joint affidavit in ostensible support for respondent.
2.Among our duties is to prepare notarial documents for signature of our two (2) notaries public,
Atty. Tiburcio A. Edaño, Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo Paul D. Pangan;
3.The two are very strict in requiring the personal appearance of signatories to documents
especially in documents requiring acknowledgments;
4.Even those documents which were left by clients for notarials and those which we brought to
them while they were having hearing in the nearby Hall of Justice were notarized only if we will
vouched [sic] that the said client indeed personally appeared in our office and executed the said
document;
5.This practice in notarizing documents are relaxed only in cases where mere jurat were required;
x x x.5
Respondent's comment gives us an insight as to how the present administrative complaint arose:
6.If there was fraud, it may not have even been committed in the execution of the Special Power
of Attorney nor in the processing of the claim but in the way the insurance proceeds was shared.
Will complainant question the execution of the alleged document had the grantee turned over to
her the insurance proceed [sic]? If respondent has conspired with said grantee in the commission
of the fraudulent act, he would not have notarized the document and let other notary public do the
notarizing.
7.Respondent has always accommodated his relatives in their legal problems for free. The
imputation upon him of any wrong doings in his practice as notary public is only a result of the
 existing feud between the heirs of the deceased and her relatives.6
In his defense, respondent objected to the evidence presented against him thus:
All the exhibits were not properly identified and their execution were not proven by the
complainant.
In fact the original nor a certified true copy of the questioned Special Power of Attorney was never
presented. The complainant never appeared to identify her complaint affidavit. The Certificate of
Death is a mere xerox copy. The alleged record of the criminal case allegedly filed were mere
xerox copies and the alleged passport was not properly identified by the issuing authority.
In view if the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the said exhibits are inadmissible in
evidence.
The purpose for which the said exhibits was [sic] being offered is likewise being objected to.
The records of the criminal case does [sic] not prove that the accused have committed the crime
charged. They are presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
The death certificate of the alleged signatory does not show that she could not have signed the
alleged document as the face of the questioned document showed that it was executed before
the alleged passing of the signatory.
The passport does not readily show that the signatory could not have signed the said document
nor will it conclusively tell that the signatory could not have signed the said document.
The hospital records does [sic] not show that the signatory could not have possibly executed the
said document.
The check voucher does not show that the herein respondent was not a party thereto.
The questioned Special Power of Attorney alone does not prove that the signature appearing
thereon in [sic] not the signature of the signatory.7
The complaint before us is an administrative case where a fact is deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to justify
a conclusion.8 Aside from his lame objections, respondent does not categorically deny notarizing the
questioned Special Power of Attorney in the absence of the affiant. The seriousness of respondent's
omission is not lessened by his claim that he "has always accommodated his relatives in their legal
problems for free."
The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to authenticate
documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of
this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing away with the
essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the
documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should
not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein
. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.9
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one
making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with
the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred
duties which are dictated by public policy and, as such, impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct.10
Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainant's
rights but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization.
Hence, respondent should be liable for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
11
Respondent must accept the consequences of his professional indiscretion. Thus, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, respondent's notarial commission should not only be suspended but
respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Wilfredo Paul D. Pangan GUILTY of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year;
REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as
a notary public for one year, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.