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RASID LUCMAN, petitioner,
vs.
MACACUNA DIMAPURO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF LANAO DEL SUR, respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF THE
COMELEC
HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court cannot review the rulings or findings of
fact of the Commission on Elections, for the following reasons:
(1) the Constitution uses the term "review," not "appeal," and
these terms have different connotations in our jurisdiction; (2)
Congress is deemed to retain its general power to define the
manner in which the Supreme Court shall exercise its power of
review, in the absence of clear and specific provision to the
contrary, and no such provision exists; (3) pursuant to our
Administrative Law, the findings of fact of administrative organs
created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings, and there is no
reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to
place the Commission on Elections—created and explicitly made
"independent" by the Constitution itself—on a lower level that said
statutory administrative organs; and (4) the last paragraph of
section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 which provides that the
Supreme Court may only review the rulings of the Commission
on Elections by writ of certiorari, which means that only
questions of law could be raised and decided, is presumed to be
valid until otherwise declared by competent court.
The true nature and scope of the power of the Boards of Canvassers
and the Comelec, under our Electoral Code and jurisprudence, in
connection with the canvass of votes, is that the canvassers are to
be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns which means the
exercise of judgment or discretion, however limited, whether any
given return before them is genuine.
PROCESO SIDRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NESTORIO
TEJANO, respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N THE FINDINGS OF COMELEC MAY BE DISTURBED AS IN
THIS CASE
HELD: NO.
There is no basis for disturbing the findings of the COMELEC
that private respondent has always been a member of the
Nacionalista Party same being supported by evidence. It was
held that respondent Tejano has always been an NP and logically
was the then official NP candidate for mayor. There is undisputed
testimony that he had been elected as mayor of Mapanas under the
NP, three times since 1967 to December 30, 1979 until his
successor, the petitioner herein, was appointed by the President as
mayor on January 2, 1980. It is not also denied that respondent
Tejano presided over the local NP convention before the January 30,
1980 elections. And said respondent likewise denied that he was
the chairman of the local KBL during said elections, that he signed
any affiliation paper, or that he ever took his oath as a member of
the party.
RULE 65
ISSUE:
W/N THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RESOLVING THE INSTANT LABOR DISPUTE
HELD: NO.
Petitioner’s claim of grave abuse of discretion is anchored on the
simple fact that public respondent adopted largely the proposals of
private respondent. It should be understood that bargaining is not
equivalent to an adversarial litigation where rights and obligations
are delineated and remedies applied. It is simply a process of
finding a reasonable solution to a conflict and harmonizing opposite
positions into a fair and reasonable compromise. When parties
agree to submit unresolved issues to the secretary of labor for
his resolution, they should not expect their positions to be
adopted in toto. It is understood that they defer to his wisdom
and objectivity in insuring industrial peace. And unless they
can clearly demonstrate bias, arbitrariness, capriciousness or
personal hostility on the part of such public officer, the Court
will not interfere or substitute the said officer’s judgment with
its own.
ISSUE:
W/N THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WILL PROSPER
HELD: NO.
Since appeal was available from an administrative decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to the Office of the President,
resort to filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 is inapt.
Petitioner should have appealed the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lanao Del Norte to the Office of
the President pursuant to the Local Government Code. Sections
61(b) and 67(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 are germane
on the matter, to wit:
FACTS:
She argues that Deutsch should not have been acquitted since the
evidence shows that the latter was an active participant in the
conspiracy perpetrated to defraud her. She claims that conspiracy
was more than sufficiently established by the following
circumstances:
(2) It was Deutsch who made a telephone call the next day from
Cebu and who dealt with the Rabadons regarding the beach lot.
(3) Deutsch made the deal appear too hard to resist.
They likewise point out that the real estate mortgage and the
subsequent adjudication of the property to the Bantayan Rural
Bank, Inc., was duly registered with the Register of Deeds; that
there was sufficient notice, not only to the buyer but to the whole
world, of the infirmities extant in the said property; that they even
accompanied Wilson to Anapog, San Remigio, Cebu to check the
property, something they would not have done if their intention was
to defraud and misrepresent; and that Wilson could have easily
checked on any defects in the title of the said property. They posit
that under the principle of caveat emptor, Wilson has had sufficient
warning.
ISSUES:
RULING:
2. NO.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, petitioner,
vs.
TANODBAYAN and LOLITA G. LEDESMA, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
Nor could she be held under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code
because the transfer of the BTR Funded [Depository Account No.
345-8400198] amounting to P183,079.70 to Trust Depository
Account [No. 345-8404963] does not appear illegal since it was
authorized or sanctioned by her superior and there appears no
specific showing that the BTR funded depository account is
appropriated for any limited purpose only and could not be applied
to other purpose of public service by the MOH (Ministry of Health).
ISSUE:
RULING:
The general rule is that the resolutions of the Tanodbayan can not
be brought to judicial review.
BIDIN, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
YES.
17.
Increasingly, the Court has been committed to the view that unless
the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on
the Court of Industrial Relations. Thus: "That such a result is not to
be deplored should be obvious to all, for no agency is better
equipped by training, experience, and background to handle labor
controversies than the Court of Industrial Relations. The regular
courts 'have not intervened in labor cases [since 1936], and are
therefore ill-prepared to apply labor laws and policies. And the
frequency with which this Court has had to upset their labor
injunctions attests to the fact.” In Republic Savings Bank v. Court of
Industrial Relations, the Court stated that collective bargaining does
not end with the execution of an agreement. It is a continuous
process. The duty to bargain imposes on the parties during the term
of their agreement the mutual obligation "to meet and confer
promptly and expeditiously and in good faith ... for the purpose of
adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement"
. Once it is admitted that a violation of a collective bargaining
agreement is an unfair labor practice, the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations is correspondingly enlarged for
such class of disputes is exclusively within its competence. In
the case of Mindanao Rapid Co., Inc. v. Omandam, it was stated that
"whenever the existence of such dispute and of other facts
placing the issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations has been duly established, this Court
has not hesitated to declare that the court of first instance has
no authority to hear and decide the case."
In this case, the very allegations in the petition in the PAMFCI case,
the allegation of non-compliance with the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement could plausibly be maintained by respondent
and appellant Managers and Supervisors Association. In
the certiorari proceeding filed by the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration Employees Association, it is undeniable that as far
back as August 7, 1967, the allegation of bad faith by way of a
retaliatory action for union activity, the basis of an unfair labor
practice charge, had already been made. The petition then for
declaratory relief filed before the CFI by someone from management
came much later and certainly furnished no basis for the CFI acting
thereon.
18.
FACTS:
The private respondent C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. (CFSCI) filed a
complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief in the CFI against
79 Japanese corporations as defendants, among which are the
petitioners herein. It alleges, among others, that it is a domestic
corporation; that there is another corporation organized under the
law of Japan with the corporate name C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha; that the CFSCI and C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha are in all
respects separate and distinct from each other; that C.F. Sharp
Kabushiki Kaisha appears to have incurred obligations to several
creditors amongst which are defendants, also foreign corporations
(Japan), then it failed and/or refused to pay its creditors and
because of that the latter have been demanding from CFSCI, the
payment of the alleged obligations to them of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha.
The CFI denied such petitions and their MR thereafter. Hence, the
present petition.
19.
JUAN EDADES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SEVERINO EDADES, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellees, G.R. No. L-8964. July 31, 1956.
20.
FACTS:
The CFI declared the municipal ordinance in question null and void
and ordered the Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments
it made under the said ordinance. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Did the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of
the petitioner in an action for declaratory relief?
Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file
such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an...ordinance,
should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of
the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under
protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not
affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper
because the applicability of the ordinance to future
transactions still remained to be resolved, although the matter
could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of
taxes paid (Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of
Sipocot, L-12680, March 20, 1959). In its petition for declaratory
relief, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the
respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to
respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case.
Multiplicity of suits should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the
context of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and unnecessary
(to file a separate suit for the refund). The inclusion of said
allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the
respondents in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the
payments made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents
were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of
what would happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by
the court.
Finally, the Court finds the inspection fee of P0.30 per bag, imposed
by the ordinance in question to be excessive and confiscatory as
analyzed and compared to the marginal average profit of P0.40, per
bag realized by the petitioner. Its imposition would force the
petitioner to close or stop its cassava flour starch milling business.
MACABAGO v COMELEC
392 SCRA 178
FACTS:
Private respondent Jamael Salacop filed a petition with the
COMELEC against petitioner Sabdullah Macabago and the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors, as well as the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, to annul the
elections and the proclamation of candidates in the Municipality
of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur.
Private respondent alleged that there was a massive
substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in
voting procedures in four precincts and a failure of the Board
of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29
of Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer, petitioner denied the truth of the material allegations
in the petition and averred that it raised a pre-proclamation
controversy.
He further alleged that the grounds relied upon by private
respondent would be proper in an election protest but not in a
pre-proclamation controversy.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with this Court the instant special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, praying for the reversal of the order of the
COMELEC En Banc.
Petitioner avers that he was impelled to file the instant petition
without first filing with the COMELEC a motion for a
reconsideration of its order because under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, a motion for a reconsideration of an
interlocutory order of the COMELEC En Banc is a prohibited
pleading, and that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed order.
Private respondent on the other hand insists that under Rule
64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a special civil action
for certiorari filed with this Court is proper only for the
nullification of a final order or resolution of the COMELEC and
not of its interlocutory order or resolution such as the assailed
order in this case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s recourse to this Court Under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is in order.
RULING: YES.
Section 1, Rule 64, as amended, reads:
“SECTION 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern the review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.”8
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, a judgment or final order or
resolution of the COMELEC may be brought by the aggrieved party
to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65, as amended, except as
therein provided. We ruled in Elpidio M. Salva, et al. vs. Hon.
Roberto L. Makalintal, et al. 9 that Rule 64 of the Rules applies only
to judgments or final orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. The rule does not apply to interlocutory
orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions or to its administrative orders. In this case, the assailed
order of the COMELEC declaring private respondent’s petition
to be one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of
a failure of elections in the municipality and ordering the
production of the original copies of the VRRs for the technical
examination is administrative in nature.10 Rule 64, a procedural
device for the review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the
COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under Rule 65
from administrative orders of said Commission issued in the
exercise of its administrative function. 11
FLORES v COMELEC
GR 89604, April 20, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed as having received the
highest number of votes for kagawad in the elections in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay in
accordance with Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 6679, providing in part
as follows:
Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four votes cast
for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or
initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being
divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores,
another candidate for kagawad. The judge held that the
original total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced
by 2, to 462, demoting him to second place. 2
The petitioner was only acting in accordance with the said law when
he appealed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tayum to the Regional Trial Court of Abra. That is what the statute
specifically directed in its Section 9 which, at the time the appeal
was made, was considered constitutional. The petitioner had a right
to rely on its presumed validity as everyone apparently did.
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several
Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and
political parties. With the number of these petitions and the
observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of
these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual
resolution on political parties.
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from
notice. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.8
RULING: YES.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before
the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec,
however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the
elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent
events have proven the urgency of petitioner’s action; to this date,
the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But
a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
PADILLA v COMELEC
137 SCRA 424
FACTS:
ISSUE:
WON the recourse to the SC is proper.
RULING: No.
The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 11, Article
XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, “not as broad as it used to be” under the
old Constitution and it “should be confined to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial
of due process.” Moreover, the legislative construction of the
constitutional provision has narrowed down
“the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to
undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished
from review.” And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a case decided under
the Constitution of 1935, this Court, speaking through then Chief
Justice Concepcion, ruled that “this Court can not x x x review
rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections,” as there
is “no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution
intended to place the [said] Commission—created and explicitly
made ‘independent’ by the Constitution itself—on a lower level”
than statutory administrative organs (whose factual findings are not
“disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings”).
Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in
proceedings brought either “as an original action for certiorari or as
an appeal by certiorari. . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is
one of jurisdiction—lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction” while “petitions
for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of
questions of law.”
It is readily seen, upon examination of the 115-page petition (with
annexes consisting of 395 pages) and the other pleadings filed, that
the questions raised therein are mostly factual. We are called
upon to look into the credibility and probative value of evidence
presented and relied upon by one party and weigh the same in
relation to that submitted by the adverse party. A review of the
respondent Commission’s factual findings/conclusions made
on the basis of the evidence evaluated is urged by the
petitioner, “if only to guard against or prevent any possible
misuse or abuse of power.” To do so would mean “digging into
the merits and unearthing errors of judgment” rendered on
matters within the exclusive function of the Commission,
which is proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this
Court. And the possibility of abuse is not a valid argument for, as
observed in Angara: “All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary”; “if any mistake” was
committed in investing the respondent Commission with such
“exclusive jurisdiction . . . the remedy is political, not judicial, and
must be sought through ordinary processes of democracy.”
FACTS:
In the complaint the plaintiffs allege: that they appear and bring the
action for themselves and in the name of other five thousand
persons; that all of them and their predecessors-in-interest from
time immemorial, are in possession for may years of many lots,
where they now have their houses, any many agricultural lands
which they have continously cultivated lots, improvements and
agricultural lands which are found within the Hacienda de San
Pedro Tunasan, situated in the municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna; that they do not claim to be the owners of said lots and
agricultural lands, but only of the improvements on the former; that
they recognize in favor of someone their obligation to pay
reasonable rent or canon for their occupation of the lots and
agricultural lands, rents and canon which they are willing to pay to
the person or entity which the court may determine. That the
Commonwealth of the Philippines is the true owner of the entire
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of escheat; that this
title was acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines because
of the death of Don Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the original
owner of the hacienda; that the Provincial Government of Laguna
may have an interest in the hacienda, for the benefit of the plaintiffs
and the residents of the municipality of San Pedro; that the Colegio
de San Jose, without any right, also claims to be the owner of the
hacienda; and that Carlos Young, without any known right, claims
to have an interest in the same hacienda.
And the plaintiffs conclude by asking that the court order the
defendants or interpleaders to litigate among themselves over the
ownership or dominion of the hacienda and thereafter determine by
judgment who is the rightful owner thereof entitled to collect the
rental from them.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
The plaintiffs appear and bring the action for themselves and in the
name of other five thousand persons; that all of them and their
predecessors-in-interest from time immemorial, are in possession
for many years of many lots, where they now have their houses, and
many agricultural lands which they have continuously cultivated
which are found within the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, they
do not claim to be the owners of said lots and agricultural lands,
but only of the improvements on the former, consisting of houses
and they recognize in favor of someone their obligation to pay
reasonable rent or canon for their occupation of the lots and
agricultural lands, rent and canon which they are willing to pay to
the person or entity which the court may determine.
Commonwealth of the Philippines is the true owner of the entire
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of escheat Colegio de
San Jose, without anv right also claims to be the owner of the
hacienda; and that Carlos Young, without any known right, claims
to have an interest in the same hacienda.
One of the assigned error the appellant assert that the filing of the
complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro should
not have been declared premature.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
Plaintiffs allege that since they first occupied their housing units
under lease from PHHC, under lease and paying monthly rentals
therefor, they were assured that after 5 years of continuous
occupancy they would be entitled to purchase said units. In 1991,
PHHC announced that the management of the project would be
transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHC's debts to GSIS.
Subsequently, however, the new manager of PHHC refused to
recognize all transactions and undertakings previously entered into
with GSIS. Alleging that they do not know now to whom they should
pay the monthly amortizations, plaintiffs filed an interpleader suit
against GSIS and PHHC.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation,
the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00. The lower
court granted the same. Hence, this appeal with the SC, in which
plaintiff maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not
the sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to
litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a
double vexation in respect to one liability."
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The plaintiff relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court,
prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19
of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4
of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those
made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not warrant,
however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein. To
begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of
justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as
amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy",
amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly, "the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts" belongs to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule
5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on
interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the
same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of
interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure
applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Facts:
Issue:
To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the
Government and all its agencies, instrumentalities, and
government-owned or controlled corporations would also result in
nightmarish budgetary problems.
Facts:
The petitioner seeks the review of the resolution dated January 10,
1978 of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration wherein he
opined that certain certificates of sale were not registerable.
The petition for declaratory relief was filed with the Supreme Court
pursuant to section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and section 4
of Republic Act No. 1151 which provide for an appeal to the
Supreme Court from a final order, ruling or decision of the Land
Registration Commission.
Issue:
Held: No.
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
Issue:
Held: Yes.
The Supreme Court has paved the way away from procedural
debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of
constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the
arguments on their content and substance. The Supreme Court
has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules, as well as relaxed the requirement of locus
standi whenever confronted with an important issue of
overreaching significance to society. The Court sanctioned
momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts,
and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount
public importance.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the declaratory relief
filed by the plaintiffs.
Held: No.