Ethnic Identity and Politics in Southeast Asia,

Comparative Analysis of Malaysia and Thailand

Gabriel Bell
Asian Politics and Development
Professor Felker
May 7, 2007
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Ethnic division has been among the most important sources of conflict

and war throughout the globe. Although the countries of Southeast Asia have

not experienced anything as horrendous as the incidences of ethnic cleansing

that have occurred in other parts of the world, they have had significant conflict

due to ethnicity. The Southeast Asian nations of Malaysia and Thailand have

both experienced differing levels of ethnic tensions. These tensions seem to be

greater in Malaysia than Thailand; Malaysian politics are dominated by political

parties based upon essentially ethnic lines, while Thailand’s political parties do

not. Malaysia has also experienced a large amount of widespread rioting

instigated by ethnic conflict, something Thailand has not experienced to a similar

degree. The history of nation-building, government policy in regards to forming

ethnic identity, and culture have all shaped ethnic identity, and its involvement

to politics, in Malaysia and Thailand differently, resulting in differing levels of

ethnic tension.

Before a further assessment of the role that ethnicity plays in the politics of

Malaysia and Thailand, the definition of ethnicity itself must be examined. The

Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ethnicity as “a large group of people

classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or

cultural origin or background.” Of these attributes, ethnicity is most often

assumed to be synonymous with race. This common misconception can be

problematic, especially in the examination of the role of ethnicity in Southeast

Asian politics. Ethnicity is better understood as with what groups people

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identify themselves with; these associations do not always rely on shared racial

commonalities. Shared language, religion, territory, customs, and class can all

play important parts in establishing ethnicity.

All of these traits are in constant change in society. Customs and religions

are adopted and discarded. Languages can change with a nation’s educational

system. A society’s can culture change and transform itself due to a large

number of factors. Even, racial identity can change as populations intermarry or

migrate. Because the common attributes that constitute an ethnicity are often in

constant transformation, the notion of ethnicity itself is one that can be in

continual change.

When the concept of we talk of “nation” in Southeast Asia, we are actually

referring the state defined nation rather than the social science-defined nation.

Ethnic identities have been heavily influential in shaping the nation identity.

Modern ethnicity theory draws attention to the role of ethnicity in relation

to nation-building and modernization (Laungaramsri, 157). A nation-state’s

government-led nationalistic and development projects can play particular

importance in shaping ethnic identifications, as well as the ways in which such

groups see themselves in relation to the nation. Ethnic categories can be more

than simply constituted by shared identity, but also a powerful instrument of

control by the modern state. But the state definition of ethnicity is certainly not a

given; it is constantly created through negotiation as ethnic majorities and

minorities respond to national intervention.

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Malaysia

The ethnic-based political parties of Malaysia central to current politics

have their origins in the British colonial influence. The British East India

Company entered the region late in the eighteenth century in search of trade and

military posts to facilitate valuable trade with China. British colonialism sought

to modify the structure of the economy from one focus on subsistence agriculture

and local trade to one focused on the exportation of raw materials (mainly tin,

rubber, and timber) (Brown, 216). Because of the reluctance of Malays to work

outside their villages for low pay in poor working conditions, the British allowed

free immigration. From the beginning of the nineteenth century the

development of the Straits Settlements as trading centers attracted large numbers

of Chinese traders. As demand for tin escalated in the 1850’s, Chinese laborers

and capital moved into Perak and Selangor and Chinese mining settlements

developed (Brown, 216). In the early twentieth century as world demand for

rubber rose, the British colonial government subsidized the importation for labor

from the Indian colony for European-owned rubber plantations (Liew, 88).

The reluctance of the Malay population to leave their peasant

communities for work in mines and plantations, contrasted with the docility of

Indian immigrant laborers and the enforced industriousness of Chinese workers,

produced British colonial ethnic stereotypes of Malay laziness, Indian docility,

and Chinese enterprise. These stereotypes supported from the beginning the

racial division of labor. This resulted in a number of programs enacted by the

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British colonial government, which legal endorsed the racial division of labor

encouraged its continuation (Brown, 217).

These ethnic categories became part of official and everyday dialogue as

numerous legal enactments formalized and consolidated the census-constructed

ethnic categories. Prior to this legitimization, Malay identity and consciousness

was based on subethnicities; Malays identified themselves as Javanese,

Sumatran, Rawa, Achenese, Minangkabau, Bugis, and others. The Chinese also,

identified themselves based on dialect groups; the Indians related by caste and

subethnic group (Shamsul, 137). Because of the legal formalization and

widespread use of these ethnic categories, this usage prevailed not only amongst

colonialist, but also amongst the different ethnic groups, as they became

increasingly aware and conscious of their differences.

The end result was the clustering of different ethnic groups in specific

territories and sectors of the economy. The Malays consisted of the rice-farming

peasantry; the Chinese clustered in urban commerce and tin-mining

communities; and the Indians focused in rubber plantation labor (Brown, 217).

Although the structure of the Malaysian economy has undergone

important changes since the colonial period, the ethnic division of labor

remained generally intact.

As Malaysia neared independence in the postwar period, the resulting

majority-minority discourse significantly shaped the nationalist movement. The

British colonial government proposed transferring sovereignty from the British

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Crown to a proposed Malayan Union, which would have a majority Malay

population. But under the Malayan Union, non-Malays claiming Malaysia as

there home would enjoy equal citizenship under the law.

The Malay nationalist movement as a whole was opposed to the proposed

Malayan Union, but was remained factionalized into three main ideological

orientations: the Malay left, the Islamic group, and the administrocrats. Each

ideological position was organized into a political party: the Malay left had its

Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM) or Malay Nationalist Party, the

Islamic faction had Partai Islam SeMalaya (PAS), and the administrocrats had the

United Malays National Organisation (UMNO).

Essentially these Malay factions were divided by the ethnic classification

debate of what it meant to be “Malay”. It was also a debate of kind of nation

they wanted. The leaders of the nationalist factions provided definitions that

suited their interests, with some broad and inclusive, while others were parochial

and exclusive. The PKMM distinguished the Malay community from a broader

interpretation of “Malayness”, which was to shape the Malay nation. This

crucial distinction suggested that non-Malays could be part of this “Malayness”

without being from the Malay community. PKMM leaders asserted that loyalty

ought to be to the Malay nation rather than the Malay community, but that the

Malay nation was to be based on basic Malay characteristics: custom, language,

and political and social values. Hence the PKMM could have been said to

support the formation of an indigenous social-nation.

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The UMNO supported concept of what it meant to be Malay was much

more exclusionary. UMNO advocated a concept of “Malay-ness” which

encompassed the Malay language, subscription to the Islamic faith, loyalty to the

raja (king), and an Islamic-based culture. Because UMNO still recognized the

primacy of each of the Malay states and acknowledgment of its raja as ruler as

essential to the ethnic definition of Malay, proposed the formation of the

Federation of Malaya, its alternative to the Malayan Union (Shamsul, 140). This

resulted in the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, by which the British set

up a Federation consisting of the nine Malay states and the settlements of Penang

and Malacca.

In the first general election in 1955, UMNO was able to gather support

with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress

(MIC), each ethnically based parties, to form an Alliance and emerge as the clear

victor. In 1957 the British government granted independence for Malaya under

the Federation of Malaya and power was transferred to the Alliance. Under the

terms of independence the Constitution would enshrine special rights an

privileges for Malays, Islam would be the official state religion, and Malay and

English would be the only official languages, but citizenship would apply to all

(Liew, 91). In essence the Federation of Malaya was to become a multi-ethnic

nation.

These special rights provided for in the Constitution have shaped

Malaysian politics since independence and remain a highly contentious and

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sensitive political issue. Since the constitution also guarantees the right of

freedom of speech for all citizens (Shamsul, 141), non-Malays, as citizens can

question, and have continuously questioned, the special Malay rights.

In the 1969 general elections, the most aggressive campaign ever staged

against special Malay right resulted in the unprecedented electoral gains for

Chinese opposition parties. The Alliance vote fell by 10 percent (Liew, 93).

These electoral gains posed a threat to Malay political dominance and aroused

fear among Malays. Malays also have begun to become increasingly impatient

with the lack of progress in Malay economic welfare and the slow

implementation of Malay as the national language. At the same time non-Malays

feared further expansion of special Malay rights. These ethnic tensions resulted

in serious inter-racial rioting which erupted on May 13, 1969.

The aftermath of the 1969 riots revealed the indisputable fact of the

superiority of Malay political power, backed by Malay military power. The riots

were followed by a steady monopolization of power by UMNO. The most

significant policy implemented afterwards was the New Economic Policy (NEP),

which focused on improving the economic status of Malays by restructuring

Malaysian society to correct economic imbalances (Liew, 93).

NEP was followed by a series of other programs which sought to

restructure asset ownership in Malaysia to reflect demographics. For example,

Malaysian businesses were required to have 30% Malay ownership. Malays’

access to post-secondary education increased relative to their ethnic

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counterparts, Chinese and Indians, following the implementation of NEP

(Agadjanian, 213). But while such programs’ relative success resulted in a

“leveling out” of economic disparities amongst ethnic categories, such

government-led redistribution is sure to create “winners and losers.” Because

the “losers” are formed on ethnic lines, ethnic tensions remain high.

Thailand

Thailand as a modern nation is often characterized as ethnically and

cultural homogeneous, such characterizations mask diversity present in

Thailand. The official narrative of the Thai government, which claims that the

vast majority of the population are ethnic Thai who speak Thai, conflates the

heterogeneity present both culturally and linguistically within the Thai speaking

population.

However, within official Thai discourse, this heterogeneity has generally

been regarded as problematic to the process of nation-building. Since the mid-

twentieth century, assimilation has been the major mechanism for incorporating

the diverse ethnic groups living within the nation-state. This process of has

attempted to assimilate other ethnic groups and transform them into the

dominant ethic group; the goal of the Thai government has been to form a

national identity based an ethnicity, an ethno-nation.

The creation of the country Siam, renamed Thailand in 1939, was a

response to the threat of colonial expansion by European power during the late

nineteenth century. Later perceive danger from “internal threats” led King

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Vajiravudh (1910-24) to attempt to strengthen national identity and conduct a

campaign against the Chinese. This idea of “Thai-ness” was based on shared

Thai language, Buddhist religion and loyalty to the monarchy (Laungaramsri,

161). This process continued with the implementation of the first Nationality

Law of 1912, which set the precedent for state attempts to homogenize Thai

ethnic identity around notions of Central Thai identity.

After the Second World War, the Thai government continued its

assimilation program when the Thai language became standardized (based on

the Central Thai dialect) as the official national language and was enforced in

compulsory state education (Laungaramsri, 161).

Although the Thai government has not pursued an ethnically based

development programs, unlike Malaysia, the state’s development programs have

often generally favored the Bangkok metropolitan area. Although, generally all

regions of Thailand have experienced steady economic growth, income disparity

between Bangkok and the other regions has increased. Therefore, most civil

unrest in Thailand has occurred in rural regions (Brown, 166).

This type of assimilation process has been labeled “internal colonialism”

by some scholars because of its parallels with European-style colonialism. The

central suggestion is that the state will promote the economic development and

the ethnic identity of a core region at the expense of peripheral regions, which

will produce a reactive ethno-regional consciousness directly opposed to the

state (Brown, 159).

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Although Thailand has certainly experienced unrest and a lack of

development in it peripheral regions, besides the Muslim Malays and the

indigenous “hill tribe” of the northern providences, the majority of rural Thai,

such as the Northeastern Isan people, do not have large clear set of cultural

differences when compared to the Thai of Bangkok. Because of this political

unrest in Thailand has focused on class differences with no formation of a clear

oppositional ethnic identity; whereas in Malaysia, such class differences are

ethnic.

Conclusion

Clearly the differing level of ethnic tensions in Malaysia and Thailand are

the result of several factors. At the forefront of these causes are Malaysia and

Thailand’s differing processes of nation-building. Malaysia experience of

colonialism created ethnic categories that were heavily segregated. This, in turn,

caused class to be divided ethnically. What would have otherwise been class

conflict became expressed as ethnic conflict. Thailand did not experience a

history of colonialism and therefore did not develop a segregated society.

Although Thailand did to lesser extent have a clustering of ethnic Chinese

in central Thailand and underwent a period of state-led anti-Chinese policy, it

never became segregated to the extent of Malaysia. This coupled with a

relatively successful state-led policy of assimilation resulted in no formation of

clear ethnic categories both in the public and private discourse. This lack of

definitive ethnic identities meant that political parties based on ethnicity could

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not form. Also, it is important to note that Thailand began its process of

assimilation well ahead of the formation of the Malay nationalist movement and

this difference in timelines certainly could account for differing levels of ethnic

tension.

When considering the discourse of role ethnic identities play in the

politics of Malaysia and Thailand it is important to consider the function that

religion plays in organizing ethnic identities. Malaysia is dominated by Islam,

while Thailand is essentially a Buddhist nation. Both religions have played

important roles in defining ethnic categories. Ethnic Chinese who are Buddhists

and were born and brought up in Thailand were relatively more easily

integrated into Thai society. Thai Buddhist culture is more similar to Chinese

culture than Malay culture (Suryadinata, 4). In Malaysia, with the ethnic

majority practicing predominantly Islam, religious differences, in addition to

other cultural and social differences, made the possibility of implementing an

assimilationist policy, which attempts to create a national ethnic identity,

essentially impossible.

Significant changes have occurred in both nations recently. In Malaysia, a

new nationalist movement arouse in the 1990s with the proposal of Vision 2020,

envisaging that by 2020 Malaysia would attain “full” socio-economic

development (Liew, 96). The 1990s also marked the end of NEP and a relaxation

of ethnic quotas. However, the Asian Financial Crisis, which hit Malaysia

especially hard, and a resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism, may continue to

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inhibit efforts to ameliorate ethnic polarization. The Thai government has made

concessions in the form of greater religious pluralism, improved education and

socio-economic development packages in border regions, and increased

recruitment of Muslim into state administrative positions, in order to improve

tensions between the minor Muslim Malay population of the southern provinces

(Searle, 8). So while the future of such initiatives and ethnic conflict in Malaysia

and Thailand remains difficult to assess, a brighter future may be possible.

Words: 2868

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Works Citied

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differences in post-secondary education in Peninsular Malaysia” Race

Ethnicity and Education. 8.2(2005): 213-230

Brown, David. The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia. New York:

Routledge, 1994

Chee-Beng, Tan. “Ethnic Identities and National Identities: Some Examples from

Malaysia” Identities. 6.4(2000): 441-480

Jory, Patrick. “Political Decentralisation and the Resurgence of Regional

Identities in Thailand.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. 34.4(1999): 337-

352

Laungaramsri, Pinkaew. “Ethnicity and the politics of ethnic classification in

Thailand.” Ethnicity in Asia. Ed. Colin Mackerras. New York: Routledge,

2003. 157-173

Liew, Leong H. “Ethnicity and class in Malaysia.” Ethnicity in Asia. Ed. Colin

Mackerras. New York: Routledge, 2003. 88-100

Milner, Anthony. “Ideological Work in Constructing the Malay Majority”

Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China,

Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States. Ed. Dru C Gladney.

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 151-172

Searle, Peter. “Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent Developments

in Southeast Asia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia. 24.1(2002): 1-11

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Suryadinata, Leo. Chinese and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia.

Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 1997

Shamsul, A.B. “Bureaucratic Management of Identity in a Modern State:

“Malayness” in a Postwar Malaysia.” Making Majorities: Constituting the

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States. Ed. Dru C Gladney. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 135-

150

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