Soundness of Mind

Baltazar vs. Laxa

Facts: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli
Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" 7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and
Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures
below its attestation clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, 11 in the presence of
Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa. Lorenzo is Pacencia’s nephew.

Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and
for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.

However, Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Moreover, contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not
been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the
Civil Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing
that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the
USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio. 27

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins and that that Paciencia
was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen
then start looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a
doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal
assessment.

Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the
grounds that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution, that she was
forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threat and that the execution of the Will
had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo.

Lorenzo testified that at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and
was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute. Lorenzo belied and denied having used force,
intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have
testamentary capacity.58

CA reversed the decision of the RTC

Issue: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk
of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public,
are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one
another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of
one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person
mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. 68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and
voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." 69 More importantly, a
testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove
otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that
the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the
making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by
them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.

Substantive Validity

Miciano vs. Brimo

FACTS:    A will of a Turkish testator (Joseph Brimo) provided that his Philippine
estate is disposed of in accordance with the Philippine Law. The testator further
provided that whoever fails to comply with this request (that his estate be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law) would forfeit his inheritance.

The Appellant (Andre Brimo), one of the brothers of the deceased Joseph Brimo,
opposed the Appellee (Juan Miciano)'s partition scheme of the estate which denies
his participation in the inheritance.

ISSUE: Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis on the distribution of
Joseph Brimo's estates. Will Andre Brimo forfeit his inheritance?

RULING: The court held that the provision of a foreigner's will that his properties
shall be distributed according to Philippine law and not his national law is NOT LEGAL
because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article
16 of the civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.

Testator’s estate shall be distributed according to his national (Turkish) law. He

cannot provide otherwise. The appellant's inheritance will not be forfeited because
the provision is not legal.

Aznar vs. Garcia

Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5,
1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but
left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been
declared acknowledged natural daughter.

Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately
applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen
contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the
deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter;
that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of
any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being
entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:

The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in
California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California.
The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his
domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines,
ought to be followed.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.

Matias v. Salud
L-10751, 23 June 1958

FACTS:

The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. It must be noted that Gabina
Raquel was suffering from herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm and shoulder of the
testatrix, which made writing difficult and a painful act. Thus, upon the insistence of the
attorney, Gabina attempted to sign, but since it was so painful she just managed to
thumbmarked the foot of the document and the left margin at each page.
The parties opposing the probate of the will contended that the will was void due to the
irregularities in the execution thereof.

One of the points raised by the oppositors was that the finger mark can not be regarded
as the decedent’s valid signature as it does not show distinct identifying ridgelines. And
since the finger mark was an invalid signature, there must appear in
the attestation clause that another person wrote the testator’s name at his request.
ISSUE:

W/N the will was valid.

HELD:

YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is so dependent on

aleatory requirements as to require dexterity that can be expected of very few persons;
testators should not be required to possess the skill of trained officers.

And as to the validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has been held
in a long line of cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient signature for the
purpose of complying with the requirement of the article.

Furthermore, the validity of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of illness or

infirmity. A thumbprint is considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying
with the requirements of the article.

Nera vs. Rimando

Facts: The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument
propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the
small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large
room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it
impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act
of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

Ruling: In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other
sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with
relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.

But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other  at the moment
of the subscription of each signature , must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to
do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to
have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been
able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing
conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the moment when
the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position
with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the
proper direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so ." And the decision merely
laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged
will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their
eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at
that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely
casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine
further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would
defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in
the execution of a will.

Cruz vs. Villasor

Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing the probate
of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the
surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"), alleging the will
was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument
was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to
what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in
accordance with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last
will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was given due course.

Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Reduced to simpler terms,
the question was attested and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other, considering that the three attesting witnesses must appear before the
notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner
argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge
the will. On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed
executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is substantial
compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary
public acted as one of them.

Issue:  whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was executed
in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring at
least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the
testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public

Ruling: the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary
public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge
before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262; Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239,
247); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or
ahead of. (The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, p. 72; Funk &
Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 252; Webster's New International
Dictionary 2d. p. 245.) Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would
have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested sustaining the
validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him in
inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud (Report of
Code Commission p. 106-107), would be thwarted.
Garcia vs. Lacuesta

FACTS:

Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Florentino Javier as he wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his name for the testatior on the will.
HOWEVER, immediately after Antero Mercado’s will, Mercado himself placed an “X” mark.
The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation clause states
that all pages of the will were “signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the
witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.” The
attestation clause however did not indicate that Javier wrote Antero Mercado’s name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:

No. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by Section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner’s argument that such recital is unnecessary because the
testator signed the will himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a
thumb-mark (which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the
same as a thumb mark, because the cross mark does not have the same trustworthiness of a thumb
mark.

Caneda vs. CA

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in

the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3
witnesses.

He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.

In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises
his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be
related to the testator.

4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will
and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the
probate court regarding the will.

On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by
the probate court.

Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special
administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted
a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the
testator’s will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.

Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and
gave an order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and
resolved first.

In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s
will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the
genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the
testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced
in any way in the execution of his will.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and
testament of the late Mateo Caballero.

CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially complies with
Article 805. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can

be cured under the art. 809.

HELD:

No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.

Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting witnesses.
The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to
the attesting witnesses.

It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of

execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact
that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed.

The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution
of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.

It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically

state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its
pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.

The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.

The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided
for his signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not
the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will
and testament.”

Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another. That the absence of the statement
required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.

Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally
omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect
to the form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by
intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.

Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings
shall be revived.

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with
Article 805.