TOPIC: Defense #2- Imputable Negligence

CASE 1:
GREGORIO GENOBIAGON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

Doctrine:
The negligence of a driver who is also guilty of contributory
negligence cannot be imputed to a passenger or to a third person who has
no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he
sustains no relation of master and servant.

Facts:
At about 7:30 p.m. on December 31, 1959, Genobiagon was driving
fast on a steep down-grade road in order to overtake a rig in front of him
when his rig bumped Cabrera, an 81 year old woman who was crossing the
street. Cabrera fell on the middle of the road. Genobiagon continued to
drive on but was stopped by a by-stander who witnessed the incident. When
asked why he bumped the old woman, Genobiagon answered that 'it was the
old woman that bumped him.' He then went back to the place where he
bumped Cabrera and brought her to the hospital. Unfortunately, she died
hours later.
Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. After trial, Genobiagon was found guilty of
the felony charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the Genobiagon’s negligence is imputable to the
victim as to exonerate him.

Ruling:
No, the alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not
exonerate the accused.
The Court held that the defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one
cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence.
CASE 2:
M. H., RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 1719            January 23, 1907
TRACEY, J.

Doctrine:
A person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for
torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for
whom he is responsible. 

Facts:
Rakes is one of the eight African-American employees of Atlantic
whose work is to transport iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard in Manila. Rakes alleged that they were hauling the rails on
two hand car; some of them were behind or at its side and some in front
hauling the cars by a rope. At a certain spot, the track sagged, the tie broke,
the car either canted, the rails slid off and caught Rakes, breaking his leg,
which was later amputated at the knee.
During trial, the cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking
of the tie, was found to be due to a recent typhoon. A fellow workman of
Rakes also testified that the day before the accident, he called the attention
of McKenna, the foreman, to it but the company did no further inspection of
the track after. In its defense, the company averred that there was a
general prohibition made known to the all employees against walking by the
side of the cars. And that Rakes was walking along the cars’ side when the
accident occurred, he should then be said to have contributed in some
degree to the injury inflicted. The company further contends that it should
be only be subsidiarilly liable.

Issue:
Whether or not the negligence of Atlantic’s foreman to repair the weakened
track is imputed as a negligence of Atlantic itself.

Ruling:
Yes.
Section1903 of the Civil Code provides that xxx [o]wners or directors
of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or in the performance of their duties. xxx The liability referred to
in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damages. The Court further ruled that where relations are already formed,
it give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract,
then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104,
of the same code. A typical application of the distinction may be found in
the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied
by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract
of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage while
that to that injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
Here, Atlantic’s foreman was made aware of the track’s defect but it
still failed to repair and to maintain its track in reasonably sound condition,
which is its legal duty, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary
danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty,
otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently the
negligence of Atlantic is established.