Canon 1

RE: ATTY. EDILLON

A.M. NO. 1928, AUGUST 3, 1978
CASTRO, C.J.

FACTS: 
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues set upon by the provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being obliged as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and
to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed
to him by the Constitution. For this reason, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

RULING: 
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar
associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including paying a reasonable annual fee as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not coerce a lawyer to associate with anyone. He has the freedom to attend or not the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to supplement the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee
as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Moreover, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus allowing the court
to compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
 Canon 6

GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (GBTC); WORLDWIDE INSURANCE AND SURETY
COMPANY (WORLDWIDE); MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION (MIDLAND); AND
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. (STANDARD) v. THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB-GIO RAUL E.
TOTANES AND ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON
G.R. No. 125440, January 31, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.

FACTS:
General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), Worldwide Insurance and Surety Company
(Worldwide), Midland Insurance Corporation (Midland) and Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard)
filed a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon for violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against respondent
ASG de Leon with the Ombudsman is the alleged "inconsistent position" of said respondent in Spec.
Proc. No. 107812 and in Civil Case No. 0005 filed with Sandiganbayan. Civil Case No. 0005 is an
ill-gotten wealth case filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
through the OSG on July 17, 1987. This case was instituted against Lucio Tan, former President
Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et. al.

Petitioners point out that in Civil Case No. 0005, the first of the causes of actions therein as stated in Par. 14
(a)-(1) to (3) alleges that:

(A)The Marcos-dominated Central Bank Closure of GBTC

under MB Resolution, March 25, 1977 ;

(B)The LUCIO TAN'S (sic) takeover of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 29, 1977 ;

are illegal, fraudulent and arbitrary, made thru conspiracy with and taking advantage of the close
relationship between the LUCIO TAN Group and the deposed President and Wife, other CB
officials, with the help and manipulation of then CB Governor Gregorio S. Licaros and former PNB
President Panfilo O. Domingo xxx.

The charge that respondent ASG de Leon espoused conflicting interests rests on the contention
of petitioners that said respondent's act of defending the legality of the Central Bank closure of GBTC
amounts to defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank. Petitioners maintain that the
position taken by the OSG represented by respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 is
"against the 'interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' ". Petitioners wrote
respondent ASG de Leon that he inhibit himself from appearing in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and to
defend the interest of the Government of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan in
Civil Case No. 0005. When respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent the Central Bank
in Spec. Proc. No. 107812, petitioners then filed the complaint against respondent with the
Office of the Ombudsman. On investigation of the Ombudsman, it was dismissed. The
Motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE:

Is ASG De Leon liable for violating RA 3019 for representing conflicting interest?
RULING:

No. We affirm the finding that respondent ASG de Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In defending the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal
duty to defend the interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the position taken by it.
Whatever legal services respondent ASG de Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in Spec.
Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in his official capacity as a member of the legal
staff of the OSG. We note that in all of the pleadings filed by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-
G.R. CV No.

39939, the signature of respondent ASG de Leon appeared

therein as Solicitor and later on as Assistant Solicitor General. However, it must be noted that these
pleadings also bore the signatures of the Solicitor General and other members of the legal staff of the
Office of the Solicitor General.

Hence, the acts of respondent ASG de Leon had the imprimatur of the OSG which had
consistently defended the interest of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No.
39939. Four Solicitor Generals, Estelito Mendoza, Sedfrey Ordoñez, Frank Chavez and Raul I.
Goco have maintained the policy of defending the closure of GBTC by the Central Bank and
respondent ASG de Leon merely acted with the other officials of the OSG in representing the State.

To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five aforementioned elements must concur.
In the absence of proof that respondent ASG de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing
the official stand of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, respondent ASG de
Leon cannot be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove the
fifth element is fatal to their cause.
 Canon 18

SPOUSES RCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA, EDAY RAGADIO AND FRANCING GALGALAN V.
ATTY. ARTURO CEFRA
ADM. CASE NO. 5530 JANUARY 28, 2013
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
The complainants were the defendants in Civil Case No.U-6504 an action for quieting of title, recovery of
possession and damages filed in the Regional Trial Court Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. The Complainants
hired Atty. Cefra to represent them in the proceedings. However, the complainants lost their case because of Atty.
Cefra’s negligence in performing his duties as their counsel. First, Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of
documentary evidence within the period given by the RTC. Second, he failed to comply with the two orders of the
RTC directing him to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence. And third, Atty. Cefra failed to file an
appropriate motion on appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTC’s decision rendered against them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Cefra violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:
YES. Except for the recommended penalty, the Court ruled together with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty
Cefra has been guilty of negligence in handling the complainant’s case. His actuations in the present administrative
case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court. Thus, this warrants a
disciplinary action.cAtty. Cefra was suspended from practicing law for a period of one (1) year and sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.