4. DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA vs.  HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br.

62,
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION
May 5, 1994 | Bellosillo, J.
Rule 113 - Arrest - I. Nature and Definition - B. Types of Arrest -1. With a warrant - b. Requisites for issuance - (1) By a
Regional Trial Court: Concept of probable cause in issuance of warrant
DOCTRINE: Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The judge
must personally evaluate the evidence in determining probable cause
SUMMARY: Allado and Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van
Twist. An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Umbal, who
admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of petitioners. Thereafter, Judge Diokno,
ordered the arrest of petitioners (without bail). Petitioners, contended that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no
probable cause.SC held that probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners. Respondent judge did not
personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and its witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead,
he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.

FACTS:
1. Allado and Mendoza were accused and arrested without bail as masterminds for the kidnapping with murder of
a German national, Eugen Alexander Van Twest, by the PACC on the basis of an alleged extra-judicial confession
executed by security guard, Escolastico Umbal (a dischargee of the Philippine Constabulary).

2. In a sworn statement, Umbal said that he and his companions, ex-policeman Gamatero, AFPCIG agent Santiago
and SPO2 Antonio were hired by Allado and Mendoza in exchange of Php 2.5 M to apprehend Van Twest who
allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him.
o After placing Van Twest under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino
abducted Van Twest. They blocked his car, forced him into their car, and brought him to a "safe house" just
behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry.
o 4 days after, Umbal’s companions returned to the safe house where Van Twest was being kept and where
SPO2 Bato (Batok) allegedly faked the interrogation and made Van Twest sign certain documents.
o The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonio stabbed
him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and
rubber tires. Umbal approximated that the incident happened a year ago.

3. The day after Umbal’s confession, the operatives of PACC armed with a search warrant issued by RTC Manila
Judge, separately raided the two dwellings of Santiago.Sr.
o The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago
and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day were Antonino and Bato who
where found to have in their possession several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier
sunglasses.
o Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the Department of Justice for
the institution of criminal proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Santiago, SPO1 Antonino, SPO2 Bato, Ex-
policeman Gamatero, Madolid, as well as Atty. Allado and Atty. Mendoza, for illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority.

4. RTC Judge issued a warrant of arrest against Allado and Mendoza. Petitioners principally contend that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in:
- "whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of
the evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings,"  and
- "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the
certification is flawed." 
Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent judge solely relied
upon failed to establish probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and impartiality (sic)."
5. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the
accused probably committed the crime charged.
ISSUE: WoN there was sufficient finding of probable cause – None. Respondent judge did not personally examine
the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and its witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead,
he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.

RULING:

1. Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
è Before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there
is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
thereof.
è The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relied heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who
supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest.

2. Based on the evidence thus far submitted, there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to
incriminate petitioners. To sustain a warrant for their arrest—facts and circumstances strong enough in
themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. This has not been met.
è In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court said that the judge:
a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or,
b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of
probable cause.

3. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).
è The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process (see People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277).
è However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is
conducted in the sense of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary
investigation serves not only for the purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a part of the guarantees of
freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in the country. It is therefore imperative upon the
fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going thru a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to
form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.

4. Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that
he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge.
è On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the
facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man
that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. 
è Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the
documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and
the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and
further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. prLL

5. In the instant case, the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. They should
have armed themselves with facts and circumstances. The undue haste in the filing of the information and the
inordinate interest of the government cannot be ignored.
è From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the
state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for the arrest.
è Umbal's sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was
 considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the
evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as
the undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for
approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy
of the resolution and the information against them.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order
we issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is
made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is
ENJOINED from proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati.

NOTE/S:

Other Issue and Holding: 

Whether or not a warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause
even if the accused was not in the custody of the court.

Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing the warrant of
arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding in the case on the ground of lack of probable
cause. As with other earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement that the
accused be in the custody of the law. Various reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court to accused even if they
are not in the custody of the law.