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Super-project Control Information Management Specification
Participants:
Introduction
Definition of super-projects
In this article, super-projects are characterized as very big, complex and risky, be they absolute
or relative to the organization that execute them. These can consist of many sub-projects or
initiatives, and can be either regional or global (Parnell, Stone, & Aravopoulou, 2020). Global
projects can consist of a smaller project with unique organizational challenges repeated in many
countries (Fossum, Binder, Madsen, Aarseth, & Andersen, 2019). We include all the mega-
projects that are named(Locatelli, Littau, Brookes, & Mancini, 2014). Super-projects might not
be transformative they might just be very big. Projects of transformation are the ones that result
in some structural change and usually have greater scale, complexity and number and
stakeholder variety (Di Maddaloni & Davis, 2017), governance and duration. Our aims range
from aiming the performance of business processes (Abe et al., 2007) to having long-term effect
and affecting the organizational and technical aspects (Janssen, van Veenstra, & Van Der Voort,
2013). The latter, studying the introduction of a new system, defines it as a transition when it
creeping reach, degree of ambition, constant change and complexity and governance, lack of
transparency, lack of insight changes to consumer business model. We call these programs Type
transactional leadership relates to the leadership of tasks). We don’t change the customer but
transform other aspects of how partners interact with the consumer because they’re so large and
significant changes in how an organization works. Its risks are not only transactional but also
linked to the concept of tasks, how tasks, relate to each other, and whether the desired result is at
all achievable. One of the biggest changes of all is business model transition, in which a
company transforms itself completely differently to conduct (with consumers, suppliers and
other stakeholders), typically offering a different kind and/or value scale (Eweje, Turner, &
Müller, 2012). It’s harder to control all of those projects. We call these transition projects Type
B. There’s a lot of research going into managing these projects (Merrow, 2011). The
Government IT project failures literature mainly refers to project failures (Tyssen, Wald, &
towards e-government. Where here the IT project itself could be Type A transformation, the
Definition of complexity
Complexity presents its own challenges, both in terms of understanding and evaluating it, and in
terms of having methods to handle it (Dao, Kermanshachi, Shane, Anderson, & Hare, 2016;
Görög, 2016; H. Maylor & Turner, 2017; H. R. Maylor, Turner, & Murray-Webster, 2014), and
The number, variety and novelty (technically and managerially, for the customer and his
The ability to predict different aspects of the project and its environments (time and
tasks and the climate in which they are being carried out (Foss & Saebi, 2018; Ireland,
carried out, and whether the project is a stable state or a real / pot project.
One of the issues concerning complexity management is the need for creativity, particularly in
mega-projects (Davies, Dodgson, & Gann, 2017; Davies, Gann, & Douglas, 2009) to solve
challenges, rather than using tried and tested methods to deal with things. Complex projects are
also more difficult to forecast work on super-projects shows that control failure is often
correlated with predictive failures. Furthermore, the more complex project, the easier it is to
introduce mid/ disinformation, especially in the prediction of costs, timescales and benefits, and
the more difficult it is to detect (Stone, Aravopoulou, Evans, AlDhaen, & Parnell, 2019).
Definition of Control
Control is the process by which a project is kept on track-the processes of data collection,
management, communication to predict, analysis, understand and possibly change the cost
outcomes and time of a project. Classic approaches to information management are essential for
Transforming data into usable information, using standard, recognizable and easy-to-use
content.
How to handle projects, programs, and changes?
The classic life cycle of project management is as follows: initiating, planning, executing,
closing and reviewing. The project’s initiation and planning is seen as taking place at the start of
the cycle, and subsequently the focus is on project execution, to deliver according to project
requirements. This “waterfall” approach contrasts with the” agile” approach, where defined
resources are dedicated to produce goods or results that are produced in each process over a
The latter approach originated primarily in software projects, after several unsuccessful
implementation using the approach to waterfalls. It can be argued that the agile approach fits
situations where much shifts in the context of the projects, while the approach to waterfalls suits
The theory that a project is better prepared by creating a plan that encompasses the project from
start to finish, in a sequence of phases that can all be foreseen when the project is started, the so-
called waterfall approach, is being called into question, partially because the knowledge needed
to carry out the end-to-end preparation is simply not available at the start. That is for different
reason:
There are genuine environmental uncertainties in which the super-project is being carried
out;
The project examines new concepts, ways of doing business, etc.; and
preparation, with its central idea that a super-project can be divided into several distinct
components, the exact nature of which cannot be completely described until preceding stages are
complete. Shorts prints could be seen as the best way of delivering projects. Agile approaches,
however, can work for projects that are knowledge projects, such as software development but
the agile approach may not operate in situations where significant physical resources are
involved. It may become even more unclear the details needed to plan and implement later stages
of a super-project. Some inputs to a super-project have very long lead times. Resource planning
can involve the securement of inputs long in advance. So, a combination of waterfall and scrum
approaches handles certain super-projects better. Furthermore, as them of IT projects (Budzier &
Flyvbjerg, 2013) has shown, there is no significant relationship between the use of agile
As a project grows larger, more complex and longer (Choo, 2014), knowledge about possible
costs, advantages, resources and context appears to become more dangerous (i.e. with established
Langlo, 2014; Loch, DeMeyer, & Pich, 2011). In super-projects, monitoring must concentrate
not only on whether the project is being carried out as expected but also on recognizing when
implementation may not be following the schedule, whether the plan itself is realistic and
whether risks and uncertainties have been changed the quantities and times that begin to differ
significantly from what was planned, whether this is likely to be the case and whether re-
The various roles of players at different project levels, in particular the role of managers,
holders and the various governance mechanisms (Brunet, 2019; do Rosário Bernardo,
2014).
The business case for the idea, and how far it depends on the changing needs and costs.
The role of knowledge in project management and the flow of information between
various stakeholders, enabling them to fulfill their roles and enabling the management of
resource flexibility (Leach, 2014) and flexibility in start and end times for different
activities.
Reasons for problems and delays at each point and the fact that new opportunities or
threats that arise during a project including the need to replant to catch or avoid/ mitigate
not only by resources but also by project manager’s competence and how they work
(Dalcher, 2019) and the systems and processes enabling them), the experience of the
company with respect to project management ( e.g. has a long history of successful
projects), whether the organization is ambidextrous (Khanagha, Volberda, & Oshri, 2014;
Turner, Swart, & Maylor, 2013; Turner, Swart, Maylor, & Antonacopoulou, 2016)
developing( innovation and exploration problem-solving) and attentive ( again this has
different definitions, awareness of what it is, what it can do, what it is planning to do,
what are the risk’s associated and how they could be handled, etc.).
There are many papers on the success and failure of the project and its evaluation (Budzier &
Flyvbjerg, 2013; Davis, 2018; Parnell et al., 2020). These have been condensed into 12 most
important factors. These are listed below (Table 1), along with their general requirements, and
A concern with super-projects in building and IT and policy transition projects is systemic
One of the best success factor studies in large programs has come to several key conclusions,
described below, along with our findings on the control implications (Table 11).
Public transition involves several examples of success and failure. The (Parnell et al., 2020)
Defining scope in various ways, including wide options for early exploration.
operability, and device limitations- making decisions about how things work in practice.
The need for skilled program management, strong leadership commitment, extreme
Realism regarding the size and timing of benefits, and time to change culture and
behavior.
final benefits.
Project-Control
As the center of the discussion on project control is the idea that business case development
project design and project management processes can determine controllability, especially if
their information aspects are early built to facilitate monitoring and control (San Cristóbal, 2017)
projects can be made tradeoffs on the basis of limitations, budget flexibility, external factors and
The need for control does not end at project handover because in most cases, it is at the
start of the flow of benefits (Badewi, 2016), while project costs may continue in the form of
maintenance and operation costs, as well as additional elements of the project that is planned
after the start of the planning is planned Benefits flow. If the benefits are much lower than
planned while post-implementation costs are more or less as planned, the net cost of the project
Transactional or Transformational
control, process required information, and research findings on control success and failure
(Klakegg & Lichtenberg, 2016; Perrier, Benbrahim, & Pellerin, 2018). However, it mainly
focuses on projects, where there is relatively little uncertainty about project standards, for
example, costs and schedules. Known methods are applied to situations whose high-level
parameters are well understood (for example, small construction projects, implementation of
stable programs in mature situations, replacing one piece of software with another with the same
function, use of cases and interfaces). Here, most of the risks (as well as failures of control)
relate to estimates of time and resources needed to do the tasks, supplier delivery, testing and the
like.
For high-end projects, the consequences of failure include serious or direct project delays
failure, significant cost overruns, which set the budget for the test sponsors (Flyvbjerg, 2006;
Lind & Brunes, 2015), and sometimes quality - what was produced may not work for purpose.
Many of the problems that lead to these failures are related to how information is used to plan
and then control the project. The intermittent nature of most of these projects and their "cluster"
(the fact that it consists of several subprojects or programs, many of which are not the same as
projects or programs that the organization has previously carried out before) means that there is
This means that the information system for controlling high-end projects is not the same
as the regular operating system, which tracks well-understood activity flows (for example in the
supply chain or with large numbers of customers who buy similar products), so that the system in
effect is used and constantly tested for availability and accuracy. Nor is it just a very large
project information system. You should allow several information management problems for
The development of the ability to manage (collect, store, interpret and use) large amounts
of information has improved dramatically in recent years (Mallick et al., 2016). This, in theory,
should make a big difference in controlling high-end projects. However, as we shall see, the
problem of controlling the super project is not data management, but with misleading (D. A.
Stone et al., 2019). Many project mission definitions, resource requirements, and timing depend
on expert judgment on what is needed, and this opens the opportunity for mis / misinformation
and bias (Budzier & Flyvbjerg, 2011; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Osmani, Glass, & Price, 2008; D. A.
Stone et al., 2019). In changing a business model, for example, it may not be clear to managers
what information they need to determine whether their business model is working and whether
One of the specific requirements in some cases is the management of corruption and
fraud across the project cycle (Bach, Dumičić, Žmuk, Ćurlin, & Zoroja, 2018). Here, the Afonso
and Aubyn (2019) on the use of analyzes is pioneering, not in terms of its technical approach but
in terms of its recommendations, which mainly relate to countries where corruption in public
projects is high, although its conclusions can apply to all public projects The big one. A
particularly important part of this report is to identify risks of corruption and fraud at various
stages of the project cycle. The recommendations are not related to specific programs or systems,
So, in short, information management for major projects faces many special issues, As
follows:
Uncertainty about what is the real situation for starting a super project in some cases,
which requires important additional fact-finding and problems knowing the current
Predicting costs, benefits and risks when the size and impact of a project are very large.
Much greater scope to reduce costs and schedules, and to overestimate benefits.
The use of research methods, biases, denial, misinformation / misinformation, and
excessive confidence in relation to the current situation and what can be achieved, in
The increased probability of fraud because many things are at stake (financial, reputation)
- this can apply at any stage of the progress from bidding to measurement, evaluation,
and control.
Various possible interpretations of success and failure, especially when the project is
results or timelines.
Talib's statement (2007) that we can't really plan because we don't understand the future,
so we must plan with this limitation in mind, is a warning to those who assume that controlling
the plans is only a matter of owning the correct data. As Flyvbjerg and Budzier (2013) point out,
when discussing the idea of a program or program failing, we must be clear what we mean. Do
we mean total failure in providing benefits or severe cost overruns or is the project taking much
longer than planned? Their study determines that cost overruns - in their study of around 300
percent or in the worst case, project collapse or severe delays, up to about 100 percent are
significant limits. Benefit delivery tends to be within a narrow range around the planned figure.
Therefore, this means that there must be two main purposes for control. The first is to
maintain the correct course of a project or program that appears to be well planned or near cost,
time and budget benefits. The second should be to identify projects, which are potentially
negative boundaries, so that any existing governance mechanism can turn into action, for
example, to determine whether the project will be canceled, or the budget to increase costs or
time or seek ways to mitigate Issues that may arise within or outside the organization, for
example, with suppliers or beneficiaries when the project is one of several, whether concurrent or
sequential, either in a program or in a group of projects that are less related to the program
(Filippov, Van der Weg, Van Ogtrop, Beelen, & Mooi, 2014), the other aim of control is to
determine if the other is facing the Hroat the same problems and / or need the same solutions.
promoters to reduce costs and reduce benefits, while the larger the project size, the more likely
this misinformation will occur. He believes that this problem is exacerbated by several other
factors, such as long planning horizons, the use of non-standard technology and design, and the
participation of many different parties in planning and management, the lack of serious analysis
of alternatives, changes in project objectives or scope and the absence of an allowance for risks
and unplanned events. Flyvbjerg's conclusion is that technical factors rarely explain problems.
He rejects optimism bias, on the grounds that the project management profession would have
learned how to avoid this, but over time the incidence of severe problems in the project did not
methodological problems, citing evidence from his studies in which project planners readily
acknowledge the benefits and reduce costs in order to obtain approval. His views have been
confirmed by (Osmani et al., 2008), on their studies of software projects. It also indicates that it
is appropriate for government officials responsible for failures to blame the bias of optimism
(often on the part of others) when the problem is how they carry out the project planning and
bidding process.
Flyvbjerg (2009) recommends using reference class prediction (Lovallo & Kahneman,
2003) to deal with this issue. This means taking an external view of the project and using data
from similar projects to identify true potential outcomes. For example, if projects of a particular
type tend to be overtaken on time or cost by a certain amount, this should be taken into account
when budgeting and planning. However, the reference class control is also required. This means
checking data during project implementation and determining whether the project differs from
the plan at that stage in the same way as similar projects. The use of this approach requires a
major change in project management, including a more transparent approach. It also requires a
Flyvbjerg (2009) suggests that project monitoring officials need intimate knowledge of
how the project is justified in the first place, and whether governance focuses on eliminating
them, including a peer review of the expected costs and benefits, setting standards and
transparency for all stakeholders, and in the case of public sector projects, private capital is at
risk, but these are beyond the scope of this article, other than to say that those responsible for
Project control needs to know if these approaches have been used. A useful contribution comes
from (Martens & Van Weelden, 2014), who argue that the uncertainty (lack of reliable
knowledge about the project) and ambiguity (different perspectives on projects -(Pich, Loch, &
The above discussion leads to an interesting conclusion. The greater the size of the
project, the more likely it is that it will shift for some or all of the stakeholders, but the greater
the risk of misleading / misleading the planning (D. A. Stone et al., 2019). Those responsible for
controlling high-end projects must take a mysterious approach. Here, "funny" has a different but
related meaning to the one actually used. As discussed above, the project needs to control
transactions - similar to the operational aspect of management covered in the classic theory of
strangeness. This focuses on whether the project, step by step, stage after stage, meets its costs
and timing and then benefits from the objectives and whether the required actions are in place to
However, major projects also need transformational control, which focuses on much
larger questions, such as whether the project plan is largely unrealistic. This may be on the
positive side, given that there are significant untapped opportunities, or the downside (costs and
timing have been greatly reduced and / or benefits have been greatly reduced) so that project
planning needs to be re-planned, the project needs more innovation, there is a need to search for
larger budgets, significant delay and communication must be accepted or the project may need to
be canceled). This conversion monitoring should also focus on how to identify and review key
preliminary project decisions, for example, scope, overall schedule, revised options, total budget,
and who is involved in it, as well as the softer data arising during the project, such as those
related to Perceptions and attitudes of key project stakeholders, as it evolves. The more project is
type B instead of type A (and most high-end projects are a mixture of the two), the greater the
Due to the completely different nature of transaction control and conversion, it is likely
that the people involved in each team need to be separate from each other, and may need
different skills. Transaction control appears to match the traditional PMO skills, while
transformational control may need a team that combines leadership and analytical talent.
transaction control, where signs of problems may appear at any time, even at the stage of
realizing benefits. The feedback loop of transformational control is especially important because
it should stimulate increased awareness of the failure caused by policy-based super-project
planning.
Flyvbjerg (2009) notes that overcoming control issues requires taking a picture from the
outside offer, but it is this very external view that is likely to be resisted by project participants
who have reduced costs, schedules, and exaggerated benefits to a minimum in order to obtain
project approval, and their resistance to it throughout the course of the project may even be The
gaps between the plan and the outcome are so severe that they are no longer hidden. Our opinion
on this is that in the event of such severe governance problems, the issue is not related to the
super project itself, but to the DNA of the organizations concerned as sponsors or providers, so a
Our conclusions from our analysis above are that those responsible for super-project
Governance
The need to involve stakeholders, their approval and commitment to plan for the
provision and use of information, to support control throughout the entire super project
lifecycle.
The need for strong information provided to those responsible for governance that are
updated and properly allocated at various levels - project, program, board of directors,
etc., to support governance processes and to ensure alignment with business strategy and
change management.
Provide information on softer issues, such as stakeholders' satisfaction with project
progress, awareness of project status, and project management satisfaction, at every stage
Paying much stronger attention to how to possess and use that information at different
and providing them with information that is appropriate to that and can be understood by
Provide summaries of information that supports learning from mistakes and successes -
inside and across high-profile projects for better planning and better implementation.
The need derived from all of the above to obtain control information needs to be
Self-awareness / awareness of the maturity of the organization and its suppliers / partners
regarding high-level project management competencies (Daniel & Daniel, 2018), risk
management (Carvalho & Rabechini Junior, 2015; Kutsch, Denyer, Hall, & Lee-Kelley,
Define information management requirements to audit projects directly from the start of
projects.
Technique
approach is used, that is, the monitoring information requirements will be for each
Explore new sources of information, for example using the IoT approach where
appropriate in projects that contain a lot of hardware, and developing user applications
for the project team, which provide their own information, for example about when,
where and how applications are used and the results of their use, and use artificial
To provide better tools for assessing possible ranges of costs, benefits, timing, and
Conclusion
The main research implications of all of the above are that the problem of super project
management is only one example of a more general problem, which has already been identified
(D. A. Stone et al., 2019), but it must be addressed using learning from a wide range of
(Shepherd & Rudd, 2014), but also other areas such as leadership (Coleman & Bourne, 2018;
Tyssen, Wald, & Spieth, 2014), big data (Merendino et al., 2018), cognitive bias (Montibeller &
Von Winterfeldt, 2015), artificial Intelligence (Katsevich, Frenkel, Prieto, & Yu, 2019)), Military
Strategy (Payne, 2018) and Knowledge Management (Ekamb aram et al., 2018). In some
respects, supreme literature discovers phenomena that have been extensively researched and
documented in other literature, but in an interesting mixture, which needs stronger integration.
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