Analysis
December 6, 2010
Summary: At the end of the
Lisbon Summit, almost all of
Ankara’s primary concerns were
addressed, including not naming
Iran or Syria as threats to obtain
ballistic missile capability. As a
result, Turkey went along with
all the decisions taken collec-
tively by the Alliance. The Lisbon
summit proved that Turkey is
firmly anchored in the Western
security and defense community
of democratic countries and that
Turkey’s strategic Westernness
appears alive and well, despite
some hiccups. As for its socio-
political Westernness, devoid of
a forceful EU anchor, the energy
and stamina to build it will have
to be generated by Turkey’s inner
resources.
OFFICES
Washington, DC • Berlin • Paris • Brussels
Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
NATO Summit: Implications for Turkish
Foreign Policy
by Soli Özel
To the disappointment of some and the
relief of others, Turkey did not emerge
as the game-changer at NATO’s Lisbon
summit in November. In the end, Ankara
did address almost all of its primary
concerns.
The Turkish government made its position
clear in the buildup to the summit: Iran
or Syria would not be named as threats to
obtain ballistic missile capability.
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu played
down the notion that Turkey’s neighbors
pose a danger to its NATO allies. “We
do not have a perception of threat in our
adjacent areas including Iran, Russia, and
Syria and the other adjacent countries,” he
said. “NATO should exclude any formula
that confronts Turkey with a group of
countries in its threat definitions and plan-
ning…We do not want a Cold War zone
or psychology around us.” Turkey did not
want to be used as a flank or frontline state
in a potential new Cold War, he added.
The government was also intent on
ensuring that the proposed missile defense
system would cover all of Turkey. Some
journalists close to Turkish officials
raised the question whether information
collected by the system would be shared
with Israel. That concern, along with
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s
eleventh-hour intervention demanding
that Turkey “have the finger on the button”
of the missiles deployed on its territory,
were primarily directed at the domestic
audience. After the summit, the Prime
Minister acknowledged that NATO would
be in control of the system.
Reports suggested that the Defense
Ministry was content with the proposed
system, which it believed would help
solve Turkey’s ballistic defense problem.
The United States’ involvement would
reduce the cost Turkey would incur for
the deployment of its own anti-ballistic
system. In fact, most in the foreign policy
and security establishment were in favor
of missile defense and had no particular
problems with the new Strategic Concept.
Discussion of costs and financial assis-
tance, however, has been left for a later
date, a point muted by enthusiasm about
the system.
For the most part, Ankara emerged
successful. The government could tell its
anxious base that the Alliance’s position
did not violate its “zero problems with
neighbors” principle. Conveniently, many
details about the proposed missile defense
were left to be sorted out at subsequent
meetings.
Turkey’s behavior at the Lisbon summit
revealed a country choosing to remain
firmly anchored in the Western security
and defense community. The choice must
have been difficult but clear. It signals that
the autonomous role Turkey had painstak-
ingly made for itself in the region over the
last few years will be more restricted than
anticipated or desired.
Analysis
There were two main reasons Turkey objected to naming coun-
tries that pose a threat. The first was domestic public opinion,
which is increasingly permissive of the Iranian nuclear program
and less supportive of NATO. The government was afraid of
facing fierce opposition, particularly from its core constituency,
to a program perceived to take an aggressive stance against
yet another Muslim country. At the moment of reckoning, the
government chose its alliance commitments over domestic
political expediency. In order to market this move at home, the
government presented as the primary bone of contention Iran’s
specific identification as a threat, rather than acceptance of the
missile defense system. So when Iran’s name was kept out of the
final document, Turkey could present this as a victory.
The other reason Turkey adamantly opposed the naming of
threatening countries was the fear that a provoked Iran would
redouble its nuclear efforts and seek more advanced missile
capabilities, developments that Turkey is loath to see. , Turkey
also may have decided the international community’s ongoing
containment of Iran were taking their toll and that Tehran might
be more accommodating from here on, although this is less clear.
This is somewhat related to Israel’s role in the missile defense
system. Most everyone in Ankara — indeed in the country — is
convinced that Iran does not represent a real threat to NATO
members. As such, the missile defense system is likely to be used
to help Israel protect itself.
One up, one down
Many observers view the decision to support the Alliance
consensus as a strategic choice. It reflects the geopolitical realities
of the country and its corresponding sense of belonging. After
this summit, these observers say, we can lay to rest the debate over
Turkey’s strategic direction and whether or not the country has
changed its axis. But President Abdullah Gül turned this decision
into one that also encompassed Turkey’s choice for the social and
political values that would guide the restructuring of its polity.
In an interview given to journalists accompanying him on the
trip to Lisbon, President Gül said the following: “Let those who
complain about a shift of axis look at the rising values in Turkey. It
is the rule of law, democracy and human rights that are ascendant
in our country. As our democracy’s deficiencies are addressed,
Turkey is becoming a country that inspires those around. There
may be those who envy this or are harmed by this. Turkey’s axis
was wrong in the past. It did not properly take advantage of its
2
geopolitical position, its historical experience. Now she is being
properly situated.”
In an earlier piece (“The back and forth of Turkey’s Westernness”)
I argued that there were two ways of defining the “Westernness”
of Turkey, or posing the question about the country’s identity. One
considers Turkey’s strategic orientation. In that sense, with the
Lisbon summit and the commitment to a new strategic vision for
NATO, Turkey’s fundamental strategic choice in favor of Atlanti-
cism has been reconfirmed.
The other definition of Westernness is concerned with Turkey’s
political character. What kind of country is Turkey likely to be?
As I put it then, “Turkey must be a democratic and secular state
where rule of law is the supreme value. The challenge for the
Turks is whether or not, in this most difficult transition period
from a tutelary democracy toward a genuine one…they can forge
the institutions and the political structure necessary to get there…
Thus, the issue of ‘losing Turkey’ is about the character of the
country more so than its strategic orientation.” This is the issue
that President Gül addressed. It is therefore not coincidental that
the President is also the only principal, apart from chief negotiator
Egemen Bağış, who speaks consistently in favor of the EU process
and Turkish membership.
Turkey’s democratization benefited from the EU accession
process. Major accomplishments — such as the phenomenal
civilianization of the polity, and major steps taken toward estab-
lishing the fundamental tenets of a bona fide democracy — were
not exclusively a function of that process. But without the pres-
ence of the EU membership framework, dramatic progress in a
relatively short time would not have been accomplished. If NATO
was Turkey’s institutional anchor in security matters, the EU was
its anchor in matters of liberalization, rule of law, higher human
rights standards, and democracy.
Eleven days prior to NATO’s Lisbon summit, the European
Commission published its annual progress report on Turkey.
This was the 13th such report prepared for Turkey since 1998 —
more than have been created for any other candidate country. As
membership remains a distant, if not illusory goal, there will be
more reports so long as there are negotiations.
The report holds a mirror to Turkey and accurately enumerates
its accomplishments and remaining problems, particularly on
corruption, due process, and media freedoms. It is more critical
Analysis
of the government than any previous Commission report. It gives
the impression that from now on the Commission will be more
forcefully scrutinizing the Turkish government and its practices.
Yet the progress report this year was greeted by the public with
yawns and a general shrugging of shoulders.
The pro-government press paid scant attention to the report and
ignored its critical assessments. In the mainstream press, only
the committed took it upon themselves to analyze the report
and comment on it. The government — in the person of State
Minister and chief negotiator Egemen Bağış — thought the
Report “smelled of membership” very soon. But besides Bağış, no
other government member seemed to care. In fact, the Commis-
sion’s strategy document lamented the fact that the Union was not
sending a clear message on membership commitment to Turkey.
All of this demonstrates that the EU no longer has the same
impact on Turkey’s political development. The public is thor-
oughly disenchanted with the EU, as is amply demonstrated by
the GMF Transatlantic Trends figure showing 38% of Turks who
think EU membership would be “a good thing.”
So long as the Cyprus issue remains a hindrance, or the sense
of double standards and unfair treatment continue to seep into
Turkish consciousness, it will be difficult to rekindle the passions
of an earlier time. The EU is not in any shape to make the stra-
tegic decisions that could clear the path. Yet it may still move on
Cyprus, so that negotiations retain a semblance of life.
In sum, as the NATO summit demonstrated and reinforced,
Turkey’s strategic Westernness appears alive and well, despite
some hiccups. Its socio-political Westernness, devoid of a forceful
EU anchor, will need to rely on the energy and stamina generated
by Turkey’s inner resources.
Soli Özel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Haberturk
Soli Özel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of Interna-
tional Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the national
daily Haberturk and is senior advisor to the chairman of the Turkish
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he is the edi-
tor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
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