BARUT v.

PEOPLE
G.R. No. 167454, 24 September 2014

FACTS:
Around 6 PM of September 24, 1995, SPO4 Vicente Ucag was coming from a picnic in Laguna
and returning home to Taguig, Metro Manila on board a passenger jeepney driven by his brother
Rolando on the South Luzon Expressway. Ucag’s wife and 16 year-old son Vincent were then riding an
owner-type jeep driven by Rico Villas on the same route. When the latter vehicle exited at the Sucat
Interchange ahead of Ucag’s passenger jeepney, PNCC guards Conrado Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas
and directed him to park his vehicle at the road side.
After informing Villas that his vehicle had no headlights, Ancheta asked for his driving license,
but it took a while before Villas produced the same apparently waiting for his companions in the
passenger jeepney to arrive. Nonetheless, Villas ultimately surrendered his driving license, and Ancheta
issued to him a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket. Right about then, the passenger jeepney carrying
Ucag stopped where Villas’ jeep had parked.
Ucag and Danilo Fabiano, a co-passenger, alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire
what the matter was. Apprised of the reason for the stoppage of Villas’ jeep, Ucag requested the return
of Villas’ driving license. But Ancheta refused because he had already issued the TVR ticket. Ucag argued
with Ancheta and Barut. Later on, however, Ucag turned around in order to avoid further argument, and
simply told Villas to return for his driving license the next day.
This apparently irked Ancheta, who dared Ucag to finish the issue right there and then. Ancheta
suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fired it several times, hitting Ucag on both thighs. Ucag
fired back and hit Ancheta. Fabiano and Villas witnessed the exchange of gunshots between Ucag and
Ancheta.
Upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, Vincent Ucag rushed towards his father to go to his
succor. Before Vincent could reach his father, however, Barut fired at Vincent in the chest. Vincent,
badly bleeding, tried to go back to the owner-type jeep where his mother was, but fell to the ground
before reaching the jeep. Vincent was rushed to the Parañaque Medical Center, where he expired while
undergoing emergency surgery. His father was brought to the Camp Panopio Hospital in Quezon City for
treatment and medical attendance.
ISSUE: Whether or not (a) CA misapprehended, overlooked or neglected facts that were favorable to
him; and (b) the finding on the supposed consistency of the testimonies of the State’s witnesses
constituted a sweeping conclusion. (No for both)
HELD:
Although the record of the trial is laid bare and open during every appeal in a criminal case, the
credibility of witnesses is a factual issue that the Court cannot disturb in this appeal. We reiterate that
the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by
the CA. This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial judge’s access to the witnesses while
they testify in her presence, giving the trial judge the personal and direct observation of their manner
and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, thereby enabling her to see if the
witnesses werefidgeting and prevaricating, or were sincere and trustworthy.
Secondly, Barut adverts to the extra-judicial sworn statement that Villas gave at about 1:00
o’clock in the afternoon of September 25, 1995 – barely a day following the fatal shooting of Vincent – in
which he declared not having seen Barut fire a gun. Barut contends that this declaration definitely
contradicted Villas’ court testimony on June 10, 1996, and manifested that he was "not clear and
convincing because he never pointed out who [had] really shot Vincent Ucag." Citing Villas’ answer of
"Maybe he was hit" to the question on direct examination: "What was the reason if you know why he
[referring to Vincent Ucag] was weak?" Barut insists that Villas was thereby ambiguous and gave rise to
the doubt as "to who [had] really shot and killed the victim," whether it was Ancheta (who had traded
shots with the victim’s father), or himself.9
Noting that neither Ucag nor Ancheta had shot Vincent, the RTC explained that the former could
not anymore fire his gun at Vincent not only because Vincent was his own son but also because he
himself had already been lying on the ground after being hit in his lower extremities; and that
Ancheta could not have fired at Vincent at all because he, too, had been already wounded and
lying on the groundand profusedly bleeding from his own gunshot wounds. The RTC further noted that
the slug extracted from the body of Vincent had come from a .38 caliber revolver, not from Ucag’s .45
caliber firearm.
Barut’s contention did not itself go unnoticed by the CA, which observed that the RTC could not
take the declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas’ extra-judicial sworn statement containing
the declaration had not been offered and admitted as evidence by either side. The CA stressed that only
evidence that was formally offered and made part of the records could be considered; and that in any
event, the supposed contradiction between the extra-judicial sworn statement and the court testimony
should be resolved in favor of the latter.
The CA’s negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas’ extra-judicial sworn statement was in
accord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
the RTC as the trial court could consider only the evidence that had been formally offered; towards that
end, the offering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered. The rule
would ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise, the adverse party
would not be put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as to properly counter the
impact of evidence not formally offered.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it
or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges
are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only— and strictly—upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the
court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be
deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will
have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits
in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing
of the case.
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed
where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded;
and, two, the evidence was incorporated inthe records of the case.12 Furthermore, the rule has no
application where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2,13 Rule 129
of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such
judicial admissions within the context of Section 4,14 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the trial
court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without the offer of the
demeanor as evidence.

REPUBLIC v. DE GUZMAN
GR No. 175021, 15 June 2011
FACTS:
Respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM),4 a contractor accredited by
the PNP for the supply of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the delivery of
various services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of buildings,
facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts.
On December 8, 1995, the PNP Engineering Services (PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher
for the acquisition of various building materials amounting to Two Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos and Sixty Centavos (₱2,288,562.60) for the construction of a
four-storey condominium building with roof deck at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM and petitioner, represented by the PNP, through
its chief, executed a Contract of Agreement (the Contract) wherein MGM, for the price of
₱2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and deliver to the PNP the construction materials itemized in the
purchase order9 attached to the Contract. Respondent claimed that after the PNP Chief approved the
Contract and purchase order, MGM, on March 1, 1996, proceeded with the delivery of the construction
materials, as evidenced by Delivery Receipt Nos. 151-153,11 Sales Invoice Nos. 038 and 041,12 and the
"Report of Public Property Purchase"13 issued by the PNP’s Receiving and Accounting Officers to their
Internal Auditor Chief. Respondent asseverated that following the PNP’s inspection of the delivered
materials on March 4, 1996,14 the PNP issued two Disbursement Vouchers; one in the amount of
₱2,226,147.26 in favor of MGM,15 and the other, in the amount of ₱62,415.34, representing the three
percent (3%) withholding tax, in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
On November 5, 1997, the respondent, through counsel, sent a letter dated October 20, 199718 to the
PNP, demanding the payment of ₱2,288,562.60 for the construction materials MGM procured for the
PNP under their December 1995 Contract.
On November 17, 1997, the PNP, through its Officer-in-Charge, replied to respondent’s counsel,
informing her of the payment made to MGM via Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No.
0000530631, as evidenced by Receipt No. 001, issued by the respondent to the PNP on April 23, 1996.
On November 26, 1997, respondent, through counsel, responded by reiterating her demand23 and
denying having ever received the LBP check, personally or through an authorized person. She also
claimed that Receipt No. 001, a copy of which was attached to the PNP’s November 17, 1997 letter,
could not support the PNP’s claim of payment as the aforesaid receipt belonged to Montaguz Builders,
her other company, which was also doing business with the PNP, and not to MGM, with which the
contract was made.
On May 5, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the petitioner, represented by
the Chief of the PNP, before the RTC.
While the petitioner, in proclaiming that the respondent’s claim had already been extinguished, initially
insisted on having fulfilled its contractual obligation, it now contends that the contract it executed with
the respondent is actually a fictitious contract to conceal the fact that only one contractor will be
supplying all the materials and labor for the PNP condominium project.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the contract between the petitioner and
the respondent on the strength of the documentary evidence presented and offered in Court and on
petitioner’s own stipulations and admissions during various stages of the proceedings.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner’s obligation has not been extinguished.
ISSUE: WON petitioner had failed to establish its case by a preponderance of evidence
HELD:
YES. Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining
preponderance of evidence:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.— In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance
or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.
Expounding on the concept of preponderance of evidence, this Court in Encinas v. National Bookstore,
Inc., held:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals should not have relied "heavily, if not solely" on the
admissions made by petitioner’s former counsel, thereby losing sight of the "secret agreement"
between the respondent and Highland Enterprises, which explains why all the documentary evidence
were in respondent’s name.
The petitioner relies mainly on Cruz’s testimony to support its allegations. Not only did it not present
any other witness to corroborate Cruz, but it also failed to present any documentation to confirm its
story. It is doubtful that the petitioner or the contractors would enter into any "secret agreement"
involving millions of pesos based purely on verbal affirmations. Meanwhile, the respondent not only
presented all the documentary evidence to prove her claims, even the petitioner repeatedly admitted
that respondent had fully complied with her contractual obligations.
The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the clear and adequate
testimony of Cruz, and should have given it utmost weight and credit especially since his testimony was
a "judicial admission against interest – a primary evidence which should have been accorded full
evidentiary value."
The trial court’s appreciation of the witnesses’ testimonies is entitled to the highest respect since it was
in a better position to assess their credibility. The RTC held Cruz’s testimony to be "not credit worthy"
for being irreconcilable with petitioner’s earlier admissions. Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, Cruz’s
testimony cannot be considered as a judicial admission against his interest as he is neither a party to the
case nor was his admission against his own interest, but actually against either the petitioner’s or the
respondent’s interest. Petitioner’s statements on the other hand, were deliberate, clear, and
unequivocal and were made in the course of judicial proceedings; thus, they qualify as judicial
admissions. In Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court held that:

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to
the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the
pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
The petitioner admitted to the existence and validity of the Contract of Agreement executed between
the PNP and MGM, as represented by the respondent, on December 11, 1995. It likewise admitted that
respondent delivered the construction materials subject of the Contract, not once, but several times
during the course of the proceedings. The only matter petitioner assailed was respondent’s allegation
that she had not yet been paid. If Cruz’s testimony were true, the petitioner should have put respondent
in her place the moment she sent a letter to the PNP, demanding payment for the construction
materials she had allegedly delivered. Instead, the petitioner replied that it had already paid respondent
as evidenced by the LBP check and the receipt she supposedly issued. This line of defense continued on,
with the petitioner assailing only the respondent’s claim of nonpayment, and not the rest of
respondent’s claims, in its motion to dismiss, its answer, its pre-trial brief, and even in open court during
the respondent’s testimony. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions.–An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Petitioner’s admissions were proven to have been made in various stages of the proceedings, and since
the petitioner has not shown us that they were made through palpable mistake, they are conclusive as
to the petitioner. Hence, the only question to be resolved is whether the respondent was paid under the
December 1995 Contract of Agreement.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the petitioner’s obligation has not been
extinguished. The petitioner’s obligation consists of payment of a sum of money. In order for petitioner’s
payment to be effective in extinguishing its obligation, it must be made to the proper person.

PEOPLE v. ANTICAMARA
GR NO. 178771, 08 June 2011
FACTS:
Househelper AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers' house. Their employers
were out of the house at that time. Momentarily, AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard voices
saying, We will kill her, kill her now and another voice saying, Not yet! Hiding under her blanket, AAA
later heard someone saying, We only need money, we only need money. Thereafter, she heard
someone talking in Ilocano which she could not understand. Then she heard somebody say, Cebuana
yan, Cebuana yan, kararating lang galing Cebu. AAA heard the persons conversing which she estimated
about four to five meters away
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who she later identified as accused Dick
Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias Al Camara, and
Fernando Fernandez alias Lando Calaguas. One of the intruders approached her and told her not to
move.
Later, when AAA thought that the intruders were already gone, she attempted to run but to her
surprise, someone wearing a bonnet was watching her. Someone, whom she later recognized as Dick
Taedo, tapped her shoulder. AAA asked Taedo, Why Kuya? Taedo replied, Somebody will die. After a
brief commotion, appellant alias Lando Calaguas asked the group saying, What shall we do now? They
then decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad,
who was also tied and blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle.
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their employers. AAA saw Cita Taedo
there. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away.
Later, alias Fred returned telling the group, Make the decision now, Abad has already four bullets in his
body, and the one left is for this girl. When Cita Taedo made a motion of cutting her neck, appellant alias
Lando Calaguas and Fred boarded the vehicle taking along with them AAA. They later proceeded
towards San Miguel Tarlac, where Lando Calaguas resided. They stayed in Lando's house where they
kept AAA from May 7 to May 9, 2002.
On May 9, 2002, appellant Lando Calaguas told AAA that Fred and Bert Taedo would kill her. Lando then
brought AAA to a hotel in Tarlac, telling AAA that he would leave her there as soon as Fred and Bert
Taedo leave the place. However, once inside the hotel room, appellant Lando Calaguas sexually
molested AAA. Lando told AAA to follow what he wanted, threatening her that he would turn her over
to Fred and Bert Taedo. After Lando raped AAA, he brought her back to his house. Later, Fred, Bert
Taedo and Lando Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac.
AAA was brought to the residence of Fred's niece, a certain Minda, where Fred kept AAA as his wife. At
nighttime, Fred would repeatedly ravish AAA, threatening her that he would give her back to appellant
Lando Calaguas who, AAA knew, killed Abad Sulpacio. She was afraid Lando might also kill her.
On May 22, 2002, Fred brought AAA to Carnaga (should be Kananga), Leyte, together with his wife
Marsha and their children. AAA stayed in the house of Marsha's brother Sito, where she was made as a
house helper.
On June 4, 2002, AAA escaped from the house of Sito. She proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought the
help of her friend Susana Ilagan. After hearing AAA's plight, Susana called AAA's brother in Cebu, who
later fetched AAA in Isabel, Leyte and brought her to Mandaue City. When they arrived in Mandaue City,
they immediately reported the incident to the police authorities. On June 23, 2002, AAA executed a
Sworn Statement.
In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He
claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac,
with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan.
Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or
vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was
ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed,
including the members of his family who were in Cebu.
RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and meted out the penalty of death. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the appellants are guilty of the crime charged.
HELD: YES.
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio, the
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities
and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken
together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of
Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial
evidence:

The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:

1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were
sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons
entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and heard the
latter uttering somebody will die;
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio
who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Taedo,
Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando,
Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): Make a decision now.
Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl.[12]

In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter Usapan natin
pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be
eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al
admitted his participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as
the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond.
Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body,
prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts
of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the
gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye
sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the
left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to
paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and
blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He
claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family. On the
other hand, the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who
forcibly took her and Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the trial
court and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible. The Court gives great weight to the trial courts
evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression,
gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying; thus, making it in a better position to determine
whether a witness is lying or telling the truth.
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the
appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving
of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because
they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted.
Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have
any ill-motive to testify against the appellants.
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time
of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to be at the
scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the
appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of
access between the two places.[28] Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the
crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.[29] During the trial of the case, Lando testified that the
distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of Rosales, Pangasinan is
only around forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30 minutes using a private
car and when the travel is continuous.[30] Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant Lando
to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the
defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.