TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)

Contents

NEGLIGENCE........................................................................2
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE.........................2
Picart vs. Smith Jr.........................................................2
MEANING OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE.........................3
Chan vs Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC)...................................3
Marinduque Iron Mines vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) 4
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.......................5
Picart vs. Smith Jr.........................................................5
Allied Banking Corp. (ABC) Vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) 6
PROXIMATE CAUSE; REMOTE CAUSE; INTERVENING CAUSES 7
Bataclan vs. Medina.....................................................7
De La Llana vs Biong...................................................8
Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc...........10
Southeastern College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals...12
Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Ching.............................14
Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court Of Appeals 15
NEGLIGENCE PER SE and WHEN NOT NEGLIGENCE PER SE 19
Cipriano Ent. vs. Court of Appeals and Maclin Electronics, Inc. 19
F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Mable 20
Teague vs. Fernandez...............................................21
Añonuevo vs. Court of Appeals and Villagarcia.....22
Marinduque Iron Mines vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) 24
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals25

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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
NEGLIGENCE
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE
Picart vs. Smith Jr.
FACTS:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony. However, before
he had gotten half way across bridge, Frank Smith Jr.
(defendant) approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the Smith neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. However, being perturbed by the rapidity of
the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the left.
As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, Smith instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the Smith quickly turned his car to escape hitting the
horse but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, the horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence.
Thus, Picart sought to recover from Frank Smith, Jr., the
sum of P31, 000, as damages alleged to have been
caused by an automobile driven by the Smith.
Court of First Instance: Absolved the Smith from liability.
Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Smith in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such
as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done? YES, Smith was guilty of negligence.
RULING:
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Would a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precaution against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so con.
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did Smith in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the Smith in the
present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
Smith, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and
the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
Court held:
As Smith started across the bridge, he had the right to
assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to
the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of
the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle.
In the nature of things this change of situation occurred
while the automobile was yet some distance away; and
from this moment it was no longer within the power of
the Picart to escape being run down by going to a place
of greater safety. The control of the situation had then
passed entirely to the Smith; and it was his duty either to
bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there
were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to
avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the Smith ran straight on until he
was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived
into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet
exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of
horses, there was an appreciable risks that, if the animal
in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he
might get excited and jump under the conditions which
here confronted him. When Smith exposed the horse
and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent
in the eye of the law.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the
negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an
automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to
the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile,
however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away.
He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the
horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around
and was killed by the passing car. Held: That although
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the
wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was
nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting
from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid
the accident af ter he realized the situation created by
the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself
of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by no means
then place himself in a position of greater safety.
DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is rendered that Picard could recover of Smith
the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of
other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to
include the value of the horse, medical expenses of
Picart, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his
apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of
this recovery.
MEANING OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE
Chan vs Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC)
Facts:
The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by John
Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. (Chan). It is located in Sta. Rita
East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by a
chapel of the respondent.
The gasoline station supposedly needed additional
sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of
this, the services of Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro (Yoro), a retired
general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
procured by Chan, as the Yoro was allegedly a
construction contractor in the locality.
Chan and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement
which stipulated that “any damage within or outside the
property of the first party (Chan) incurred during the
digging shall be borne by the second party (Yoro)”.
Further, the MOA discusses the division of wealth in
case hidden treasure is found during the digging. After
some time, Chan was informed by the members of the
Iglesia Ni Cristo, Inc (INC) that the digging traversed and
penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter.
The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel
was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of
INC.
A complaint against Chan was filed by the INC before
the RTC. Chan avers that no liability should attach to
him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He argues that
the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law
between them and must be given weight by the courts.
Issue:
WON the MOA entered into by Chan and Yoro has the
effect of making the latter solely responsible for
damages to the respondent?
Held:
No. Chan is still liable.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-
delict are the following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to
another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or
negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The
tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to
INC because it was done surreptitiously within its
premises and it may have affected the foundation of the
chapel. The excavation on INC’s premises was caused
by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual
relation between Chan and Yoro on one hand, and INC
on the other.
For the damage caused to INC, Chan and Yoro are
jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.
The heavy reliance of Chan in paragraph 4 of the MOA
cited earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit.
Indubitably, Chan and Yoro cooperated in committing
the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to
how they would divide the treasure if any is found within
or outside Chan’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead
of exculpating Chan from liability, is the very noose that
insures that he be so declared as liable.
Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know
that the excavation traversed the INC’s property. In fact,
he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the
diggings, his security guard and his engineer Teofilo
Oller.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good. In
quasidelicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
Chan Jr. acted with gross negligence.
By gross negligence is meant such entire want of care
as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is
conscious of the probable consequences of
carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger
of injury to person or property of others.
Surreptitiously digging under the INC’s chapel which
may weaken the foundation thereof, thereby
endangering the lives and limbs of the people in worship,
unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. Not to
mention the damage that may be caused to the structure
itself. INC may indeed be awarded exemplary damages.
Marinduque Iron Mines vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission (WCC)
FACTS:
On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga,
Mogpog, Marinduque, the deceased Pedro Mamador
(Mamador) together with other laborers of the
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. (Respondent-
corporation) boarded a truck belonging to the latter,
which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also
employed by the corporation, and on its way to their
place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while
trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it
turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death
of said Mamador and injury to the others.
Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of Mamador. He has paid nothing
however, to the latter.
The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by
certiorari the order of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of
compensation to the heirs of Mamador for his accidental
death.
Marinduque Iron Mines maintains that this claim is
barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Law, because (a) Macunat was prosecuted and required
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and (b) an
amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs
and Macunat.
“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee
suffers an injury for which compensation is due under
this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
shall be optional with such injured employee either to
claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or
sue such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; xxx”
It is the Marinduque Iron Mines’ contention that the
criminal case and its outcome constituted an election by
the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
election having the effect of releasing the employer.
However, the criminal case was not a suit for damages
against the third person, it being alleged, without
contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and
have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the
court.
As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” The contention
may not be sustained, inasmuch as the widow’s
promised was to forego the offender’s criminal
prosecution.
In addition, Marinduque Iron Mines claims that Mamador
violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers
riding the haulage trucks, thus, such violation was the
laborer’s “notorious negligence” which, under the law,
precludes recovery.
ISSUE:
WON there is “notorious negligence” on part of the
laborer which precludes recovery.
HELD:
Article 1173 of the New Civil Code defines negligence as
the omission of that degree of diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or
stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It
couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not
dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious
negligence in this particular instance because there was
the employer’s prohibition. Many courts hold that
violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence
per se. Others consider the circumstances.
However, there is practical unanimity in the proposition
that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or
board is not negligence per se; but it may be an
evidence of negligence.
This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t
be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission
or board. And the referee correctly considered this
violation as possible evidence of negligence; but it
declared that under the circumstance, the laborer could
not be declared to have acted with negligence. Correctly,
it is believed, since the prohibition had nothing to do with
personal safety of the riders.
Moreover, the Commission has not declared that the
prohibition was known to Mamador. Yet the employer
does not point out in the record evidence to that effect.
Supposing Mamador knew the prohibition, said the
referee, “Can we truthfully say that he boarded the fatal
truck with full apprehension of the existence of the
danger, if any at all, that an ordinary prudent man would
try to avoid? I do not believe so, and even in the
presence of doubt, the same must be resolved in his
favor. Unless of course, we can attribute to him a desire
to end his life. Nowhere in the records of this case can
we find the slightest insinuation of that desire.”
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it
surely was not “notorious” negligence, which we have
interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross”
negligence implying “conscious indifference to
consequences” “pursuing a course of conduct which
would naturally and probably result in injury” “utter
disregard of consequences.” (38 Am. Jur., 691) Getting
or accepting a free ride on the company’s haulage truck
couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee
found, “no danger or risk was apparent.”
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Picart vs. Smith Jr.
FACTS:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony. However, before
he had gotten half way across bridge, Frank Smith Jr.
(defendant) approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the Smith neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. However, being perturbed by the rapidity of
the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the left.
As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, Smith instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the Smith quickly turned his car to escape hitting the
horse but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head
toward the railing. In so doing, the horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence.
Thus, Picart sought to recover from Frank Smith, Jr., the
sum of P31, 000, as damages alleged to have been
caused by an automobile driven by the Smith.
Court of First Instance: Absolved the Smith from liability.
Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Smith in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done? YES, Smith was guilty of negligence.
RULING:
Applying this test to the conduct of the Smith in the
present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
Smith, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and
the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the
negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
Picart was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an
automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to
the railing on the right. The Smith Jr. however, guided
his car toward Picart without diminution of speed until he
was only a few feet away. Smith Jr. then turned to the
right but passed so closely to the horse that Picart being
frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing
car.
Held: That although Picart was guilty of negligence in
being on the wrong side of the bridge, Smith Jr. was
nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting
from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid
the accident after he realized the situation created by the
negligence of Picart and failed to avail himself of that
opportunity; while the Picart could by no means then
place himself in a position of greater safety.
Allied Banking Corp. (ABC) Vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI)
A collecting bank is guilty of contributory negligence
when it accepted for deposit a post-dated check
notwithstanding that said check had been cleared by the
drawee bank which failed to return the check within the
24-hour reglementary period.
FACTS:
On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of
₱1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group
International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and
accepted at Allied Bank's Kawit Branch.
The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against
the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with BPI’s Bel-
Air Branch.
Upon receipt, Allied Bank sent the check for clearing to
respondent through the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC). The check was cleared by BPI and
Allied Bank credited the account of MMGI.
On October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was closed and
all the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva
discovered the debit of ₱1,000,000.00 from his account.
In response to Silva’s complaint, BPI credited his
account with the aforesaid sum.
On March 21, 2003, BPI returned a photocopy of the
check to Allied Bank for the reason: "Postdated." Allied
Bank, however, refused to accept and sent back to BPI a
photocopy of the check. The check was then tossed
several times from Allied Bank to BPI, and back to Allied
Bank. Until on May 6, 2003, BPI requested the PCHC to
take custody of the check.
Acting on the request, PCHC directed BPI to deliver the
original check and informed it of PCHC’s authority under
Clearing House Operating Memo (CHOM) to split 50/50
the amount of the check subject of a "Ping-Pong"
controversy.
However, it was Allied Bank who filed a complaint before
the Arbitration Committee, asserting that BPI should
solely bear the entire face value of the check due to its
negligence in failing to return the check to Allied Bank
within the 24-hour reglementary period.
In its Answer with Counterclaims, BPI charged Allied
Bank with gross negligence for accepting the post-dated
check in the first place. It contended that Allied Bank’s
admitted negligence was the sole and proximate cause
of the loss.
PCHC ARBITRATION COMMITTEE – decision in favor
of Allied Bank. Finding both parties negligent in the
performance of their duties, the Committee applied the
doctrine of "Last Clear Chance" and ruled that the loss
should be shouldered by BPI alone
RESPONDENT – filed MR. Denied by PCHC BOD.
Then, filed a petition for review in the RTC
RTC – affirmed Arbitration Committee’s decision.
RES – appealed to the CA
CA – set aside the RTC judgment and ruled for a 60-40
sharing of the loss as it found Allied Bank guilty of
contributory negligence in accepting what is clearly a
post-dated check. The CA found that Allied Bank’s
failure to notice the irregularity on the face of the check
was a breach of its duty to the public and a telling sign of
its lack of due diligence in handling checks coursed
through it.
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
PET – MR denied by CA
Hence, this Petition
ISSUES:
(1) WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this
case;
(2) WON petitioner is guilty of contributory negligence
HELD/DISCUSSION:
Allied Bank argues that the CA should have sustained
PCHC’s finding that despite the antecedent negligence
of Allied Bank in accepting the postdated check for
deposit, BPI, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
had it not negligently cleared the check in question.
Allied Bank pointed out that in applying the doctrine of
last clear chance, the PCHC cited the case of Philippine
Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
As well established by the records, both Allied Bank and
BPI were admittedly negligent in the encashment of a
check post-dated one year from its presentment.
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that
the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes
negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply
except upon that assumption.
Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in
situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was
defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care,
having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which
was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss
or injury.
IN THIS CASE:
The evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of
the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was
the negligence of BPI who cleared a post-dated check
sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without
observing its own verification procedure.
As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC,
if only BPI exercised ordinary care in the clearing
process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect
upon seeing the date written on the face of the check
"Oct. 9, 2003". BPI could have then promptly returned
the check and with the check thus dishonored, Allied
Bank would have not credited the amount thereof to the
payee’s account.
AS TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE:
What Allied Bank omitted to mention is that in the cited
case of case of Phil Bank of Commerce v. CA – “while
the Court found petitioner as the culpable party under
the doctrine of last clear chance since it had, thru its
teller, the last opportunity to avert the injury incurred by
its client simply by faithfully observing its own validation
procedure, it nevertheless ruled that the plaintiff
depositor (private respondent) must share in the loss on
account of its contributory negligence.”
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code:
“When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.”
Explaining this provision in Lambert v. Heirs of Ray
Castillon, the Court held:
"The underlying precept on contributory negligence is
that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence. xxx xxx xxx"
"Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection."
IN THIS CASE:
Admittedly, Allied Bank’s acceptance of the subject
check for deposit despite the one year postdate written
on its face was a clear violation of established banking
regulations and practices. In such instances, payment
should be refused by the drawee bank and returned
through the PCHC within the 24-hour reglementary
period. As aptly observed by the CA, Allied Bank’s
failure to comply with this basic policy regarding post-
dated checks was "a telling sign of its lack of due
diligence in handling checks coursed through it."
It bears stressing that "the diligence required of banks is
more than that of a Roman paterfamilias or a good father
of a family. The highest degree of diligence is expected,"
considering the nature of the banking business that is
imbued with public interest. While it is true that BPI's
liability for its negligent clearing of the check is greater,
Allied Bank cannot take lightly its own violation of the
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long-standing rule against encashment of post-dated
checks and the injurious consequences of allowing such
checks into the clearing system.
Allied Bank repeatedly harps on BPI's transgression of
clearing house rules when the latter resorted to direct
presentment way beyond the reglementary period but
glosses over its own negligent act that clearly fell short
of the conduct expected of it as a collecting bank. Allied
Bank must bear the consequences of its omission to
exercise extraordinary diligence in scrutinizing checks
presented by its depositors.
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. CA
decision AFFIRMED.
PROXIMATE CAUSE; REMOTE CAUSE;
INTERVENING CAUSES
Bataclan vs. Medina
Facts:
Medina Transportation was operated by its owner
defendant Mariano Medina under a Certificate of Public
Convenience. On its way to Pasay City, Conrado Saylon
(driver) together with 18 passengers (wherein Juan
Bataclan was one of the passengers), and the conductor
were on board the bus. While the bus was running within
the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires of
the bus burst and the vehicle began to zigzag until it fell
into a canal and turned turtle. Some passengers
managed to get out of the bus but 4 including Bataclan
could not get out of the bus. After half an hour, ten men
came carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
approached the overturned bus, then a fierce fire started
burning the bus including the passengers inside the bus
and resulted to the death of the passengers trapped
including Juan Bataclan.
Salud Bataclan, the widow of Juan Bataclan brought an
action against Mariano Medina to recover from
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees
Issue:
WON the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was
the overturning of the bus.
Held:
Yes.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The proximate cause in this case is the overturning of
the bus. The vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.
The burning of the bus wherein some of the passengers
were trapped can also be attributed to the negligence of
the carrier, through the driver and conductor who were
on the road walking back and forth. They should and
must have known that in the position in which the
overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline
when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and detected even from a distance.
Held: That the failure of the driver and the conductor to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, constitutes
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under
the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article
1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.
De La Llana vs Biong
FACTS:
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela
Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North
Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. Leila dela Llana
was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain
Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car
across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal
light turned red. A few seconds after the car stopped, a
dump truck driven by Joel Primero (employed by
Rebecca Biong under Pongkay Trading engaged in a
gravel and sand business) suddenly rammed the car’s
rear end, violently pushing the car forward.
Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its
rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew,
puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor
wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered
from any other visible physical injuries. In the first week
of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to
moderate pain and her health deteriorated to the extent
that she could no longer move her left arm. Dra. Dela
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Llana needed to undergo operation of her spine and
neck due to severe pain. The operation released the
impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela
Llana from the practice of her profession since June
2000 despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana demanded from Rebecca compensation
for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Dra. dela
Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC. Dra.
Dela Llana alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm
as a result of the vehicular accident.
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana
had no cause of action against her as no reasonable
relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra.
dela Llana’s injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela
Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one
week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a
counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorney’s
fees and costs of the suit. Rebecca testified that Dra.
dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met
several days after the vehicular accident. She also
asserted that she observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel.
She pointed out that she required Joel to submit a
certification of good moral character as well as
barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his
employment. She also stressed that she only hired Joel
after he successfully passed the driving skills test
conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-
mechanic.
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held
that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash
injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.
CA: the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra.
dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury
by preponderance of evidence.
Issue:
Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
Held:
No. Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by
preponderance of evidence.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-
delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to
establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant
or by some person for whose acts the defendant
must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damages.
These elements show that the source of obligation in a
quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual
duties that civilized society imposes upon its members,
or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain
members of society to others.
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first
establish by preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s
liability as Joel’s employer. She should show the chain of
causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the
presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Joel - arise.
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate
causation are established, this Court can then proceed
with the application and the interpretation of the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the
fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on
an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against
the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or
omission committed by his employee."
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is
that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-
contractual obligations.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving
his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence.
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate
causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She
must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced
her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash
injury would not have occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on
three pieces of evidence:
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(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20,
2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of
these pieces of evidence show the causal
relation between the vehicular accident and the
whiplash injury.
In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not
adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by
which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be
established.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by
the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. Dela
Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary
evidence that directly shows the causal relation between
the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her
claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash injury
was not established because of the deficiency of the
presented evidence during trial. We point out in this
respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that
vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This
proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. We have no
expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges
are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the
basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their
corresponding legal arguments. In sum, Dra. dela Llana
miserably failed to establish her cause by
preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with
her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially
assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against
Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by
preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion
and has no leg to stand on.
Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc.
FACTS:
Rommel Abrogar joined the "1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon" organized by Intergames with Cosmos as a
sponsor. This race was held on a 10-kilometer course
starting from the premises of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through public roads and
streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle. Rommel
died along the race because he was bumped by a
jeepney that was then running along the route of the
marathon on Don Mariano Marcos Avenue it was later
found that the jeep was racing against a minibus and the
two vehicles were trying to crowd each other. Sps.
Abrogar [parents] filed a case for damages against
Cosmos and Inergames. Cosmos and Intergames
denied liability putting up arguments such as diligence
on their part.
RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Abrogar finding that the
safeguards for the race were not sufficient to be deemed
compliant with the diligence required of the organizers.
CA reversed the RTC and held that Intergames had
sufficient marshalls and safeguards placed for the event.
Issue:
WON Intergames’s & Cosmos’s respective negligence
were the proximate cause of Rommel’s death.
Ruling:
The SC held that Intergames’s negligence is the
proximate cause but for Cosmos, it is not.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the
“omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time and of the
place.” The Civil Code makes liability for negligence
clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.
The negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause
of the death of Rommel; and that the negligence of the
jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause.
First of all, Intergames’ negligence in not conducting the
race in a road blocked off from vehicular traffic, and in
not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel
manning the marathon route effectively set the stage for
the injury complained of. The submission that
Intergames had previously conducted numerous safe
races did not persuasively demonstrate that it had
exercised due diligence because, as the trial court
pointedly observed, “[t]hey were only lucky that no
accident occurred during the previous marathon races
but still the danger was there.”
Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an
unfortunate vehicular accident on the route was an event
known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could
then have been avoided if only Intergames had acted
with due diligence by undertaking the race on a blocked-
off road, and if only Intergames had enforced and
adopted more efficient supervision of the race through its
volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit
an intervening cause, was not efficient enough to break
the chain of connection between the negligence of
Intergames and the injurious consequence suffered by
Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered
efficient, must be “one not produced by a wrongful act or
omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring
the injurious results.
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Any cause intervening between the first wrongful cause
and the final injury which might reasonably have been
foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not
such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the
original wrong of its character as the proximate cause of
the final injury.”
SC considers the "safeguards" employed and adopted
by Intergames not adequate to meet the requirement of
due diligence.
For one, the police authorities specifically prohibited
Intergames from blocking Don Mariano Marcos Highway
in order not to impair road accessibility to the residential
villages located beyond the IBP Lane. However, contrary
to the findings of the CA, Intergames had a choice on
where to stage the marathon, considering its admission
of the sole responsibility for the conduct of the event,
including the choice of location.
Based on the foregoing testimony of Castro, Jr.,
Intergames had full awareness of the higher risks
involved in staging the race alongside running vehicles,
and had the option to hold the race in a route where
such risks could be minimized, if not eliminated. But it
did not heed the danger already foreseen, if not
expected, and went ahead with staging the race along
the plotted route on Don Mariano Marcos Highway on
the basis of its supposedly familiarity with the route.
Such familiarity of the organizer with the route and the
fact that previous races had been conducted therein
without any untoward incident were not in themselves
sufficient safeguards
The evidence presented undoubtedly established that
Intergames' notion of coordination only involved
informing the cooperating agencies of the date of the
race, the starting and ending points of the route, and the
places along the route to man. Intergames did not
conduct any general assembly with all of them, being
content with holding a few sporadic meetings with the
leaders of the coordinating agencies. It held no briefings
of any kind on the actual duties to be performed by each
group of volunteers prior to the race. It did not instruct
the volunteers on how to minimize, if not avert, the risks
of danger in manning the race, despite such being
precisely why their assistance had been obtained in the
first place.
Intergames had no right to assume that the volunteers
had already been aware of what exactly they would be
doing during the race. It had the responsibility and duty
to give to them the proper instructions despite their
experience from the past races it had organized
considering that the particular race related to runners of
a different level of experience, and involved different
weather and environmental conditions, and traffic
situations
It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st Pop
Cola Junior Marathon were mostly minors aged 14 to 18
years joining a race of that kind for the first time. The
combined factors of their youth, eagerness and
inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent
organizer on higher guard as to their safety and security
needs during the race, especially considering
Intergames' awareness of the risks already foreseen and
of other risks already known to it as of similar events in
the past organizer.
The negligence of Intergames as the organizer was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel.
As aforementioned, CA found that Rommel, while
running the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos Avenue
and after passing the Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission Building, was bumped by a passenger
jeepney that was racing with a minibus and two other
vehicles as if trying to crowd each other out [Intergames
insists it is not liable or if it were the jeepney driver was
the proximate cause of Rommel’s death].
The SC hold that the negligence of Intergames was the
proximate cause despite the intervening negligence of
the jeepney driver.
In Vda. de Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing, it was held that in
order to establish his right to a recovery, plaintiff must
establish by competent evidence:
i. Damages to the plaintiff.
ii. Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.
iii. The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
Proximate cause as defined in Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v.
Medina is defined extensively as: [NCS / EIC / I / R]
a. that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence,
b. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
c. produces the injury and
d. without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.’
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To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the
negligence need not be the event closest in time to the
injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time
in relation to the injury, if the happening of it set other
foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in the
damage.
According to an authority on civil law:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action, if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause, even
though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no damage exists in the
condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such act or
condition is the proximate cause.
Bouvier adds: The question of proximate cause is said to
be determined, not by the existence or non-existence of
intervening events, but by their character and the natural
connection between the original act or omission and the
injurious consequences. When the intervening cause is
set in operation by the original negligence, such
negligence is still the proximate cause; x x x If the party
guilty of the first act of negligence might have anticipated
the intervening cause, the connection is not broken; Any
number of causes and effects may intervene, and if they
are such as might with reasonable diligence have been
foreseen, the last result is to be considered as the
proximate result. But whenever a new cause intervenes,
which is not a consequence of the first wrongful cause,
which is not under control of the wrongdoer, which could
not have been foreseen by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, and except for which the final injurious
consequence could not have happened, then such
injurious consequence must be deemed too remote.
Cosmos is not liable for the negligence of Intergames as
the organizer
CA did not err in absolving Cosmos from liability.
The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited
to financing the race. Cosmos did nothing beyond that,
and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the
actual conduct of the race. This verity was expressly
confirmed by Intergames, through Intergames President
Castro, Jr., who declared as follows:
a. The sponsor has nothing to do as well as its code
of the race because they are not the ones running;
and
b. They have no right to who (sic) suggest the
location, the number of runners.
In the absence of evidence showing that Cosmos had a
hand in the organization of the race, and took part in the
determination of the route for the race and the adoption
of the action plan, including the safety and security
measures for the benefit of the runners, we cannot but
conclude that the requirement for the direct or immediate
causal connection between the financial sponsorship of
Cosmos and the death of Rommel simply did not exist.
Indeed, Cosmos' mere sponsorship of the race was,
legally speaking, too remote to be the efficient and
proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
The doctrine of assumption of risk had no application to
Rommel
As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the
doctrine requires the concurrence of three elements,
namely:
(1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;
(2) he must further understand its nature; and
(3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.
Rommel could not have assumed the risk of death when
he participated in the race because death was neither a
known nor normal risk incident to running a race.
Although he had surveyed the route prior to the race and
should be presumed to know that he would be running
the race alongside moving vehicular traffic, such
knowledge of the general danger was not enough, for
some authorities have required that the knowledge must
be of the specific risk that caused the harm to him.
Southeastern College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Juanita De Jesus Vda. De Dimaano, Emerita Dimaano,
Remedios Dimaano, Consolacion Dimaano And
Milagros Dimaan (Private Respondents) are the owners
of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay city while
Southeastern College, Inc. (Petitioner) owns a four-
storey school building along the same College Road.
On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a
powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by
very strong winds, the roof of Southeastern College
building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing
on and destroying portions of the roofing of Dimaano’s
house.
After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of
the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of
engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna.
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Engr. Jesus L. Reyna then recommended that to avoid
any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property
of persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject
school building be declared as a structural hazard.
The Dimaano’s filed a complaint before the RTC, for
damages based on culpa aquiliana, alleged that the
damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable,
forcing them to stay temporarily in others houses. They
sought to recover from Southeastern College payment
for damages
Southeastern College averred that subject school
building had withstood several devastating typhoons and
other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any
portion thereof giving way. That it has not been remiss in
its responsibility to see to it that said school building,
which houses school children, faculty members, and
employees, is in tip-top condition and furthermore,
typhoon Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond
human control such that Southeastern College cannot
be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent
any negligence on its part.
RTC - giving credence to the ocular inspection report,
found that, while typhoon Saling was accompanied by
strong winds, the damage to Dimaano’s house could
have been avoided if the construction of the roof of
Southeastern College building was not faulty
CA – affirmed with modification trial court’s decision.
HENCE, THIS PETITION.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the damage on the roof of the building
of private respondents resulting from the impact of
the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped
off by the strong winds of typhoon Saling, was, within
legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event; if so,
(b) WON petitioner can be held liable for the damages
suffered by the private respondents
HELD:
[A] APPLICABLE PROVISION (NCC):
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law,
or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.
The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is
found in the Partidas which defines it as an event which
takes place by accident and could not have been
foreseen. Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event
or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor
resisted. Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that [f]ortuitous
events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by
nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics,
fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed
invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions,
robbery, etc.
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person
from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which
the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God
cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has
been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall
its possible adverse consequences.
When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God
in producing damage or injury to another, such person is
not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate
or proximate causeof the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event.
When the effect is found to be partly the result of the
participation of man whether it be from active
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the
rules applicable to acts of God.
SUPREME COURT
In the case under consideration, the lower court
accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating
team that subject school buildings roofing had no
sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when
battered by strong winds. Based on such finding, the trial
court imputed negligence to Southeastern College and
adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents.
The SC believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general
rule that factual findings by the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. The SC found exception to
this rule and holds that the lower courts misappreciated
the evidence proffered.
[B] There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a
fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be
foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from
liability arising from any adverse consequence
engendered thereby, there should have been no human
participation amounting to a negligent act.
In other words, the person seeking exoneration from
liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as
commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may
be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or
the omission to do something which a prudent and
reasonable man, guided by considerations which
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ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do.
From these premises, we proceed to determine whether
Southeastern College was negligent, such that if it were
not, the damage caused to Dimaano’s house could have
been avoided.
At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person
claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence
causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and
conclusions without basis in fact.
The Dimaanos, in establishing the culpability of
Southeastern College, merely relied on the
aforementioned report submitted by a team which made
an ocular inspection of Southeastern College school
building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular
inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing.
What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective
of the real cause behind.
In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine
the real cause of the partial unroofing of Southeastern
College school building. The Dimaanos did not even
show that the plans, specifications and design of said
school building were deficient and defective. Neither did
they prove any substantial deviation from the approved
plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively
establish that the construction of such building was
basically flawed
On the other hand, Southeastern College elicited from
one of the witnesses of the Dimaanos, city building
official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design
of Southeastern College’s building were approved prior
to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it was a
legal requirement before the construction of any building
to obtain a permit from the city building official
In like manner, after construction of the building, a
certification must be secured from the same official
attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the edifice.
Having obtained both building permit and certificate of
occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie
evidence of the regular and proper construction of
subject school building
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing
evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court.
We thus hold that Southeastern College has not been
shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction
and maintenance of its school building in question and
that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the
damage suffered by private respondent’s house.
Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Ching
FACTS:
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by Dy
Teban Trading, Inc. (petitioner) while a Joana Paula
passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane
towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a
parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.
The night before, the prime mover with trailer suffered a
tire blowout, thus they parked it askew occupying a
substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane
of the passenger bus.
The prime mover was not equipped with triangular,
collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning device
required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As
substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves
on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to
warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga
likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front
and rear of the trailer.
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its
lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right,
onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. When Ortiz
saw the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his
break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming
bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime
mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime
mover.
Ortiz only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van,
however, became inoperable as a result of the incident.
Dy Teban Trading, Inc filed a complaint for damages
against private respondents
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban
Trading, Inc. that the proximate cause of collision was
improper parking of the prime mover and the absence of
an early warning device on the vehicle.
CA: reversed RTC: that the proximate cause of the
vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to
give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger
bus. Hence this appeal.
Issues:
(a) whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was
negligent in parking the vehicle? YES
(b) whether or not Limabaga’s negligence (skewed
parking) was the proximate cause of the damage to
the Nissan van? YES
Ruling:
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(a) Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover
on the national highway; he failed to prevent or minimize
the risk to oncoming motorists.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant;
and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
plaintiff.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.
The test of negligence (Picart v. Smith) is: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
IN THIS CASE
Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime
mover askew, occupying a substantial portion on the
lane of the passenger bus. It is common sense that the
skewed parking posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists.
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the
risk posed by (1) not immediately inform his employer
that the prime mover suffered two tire blowouts, (2)
simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the
prime mover to serve as warning hence NO WARLY
WARNING DEVICE and (3) slept on the prime mover
instead of standing guard beside the vehicle.
Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime mover in
proper condition as it had worn out tires, and only
equipped with one spare tire.
(b) The skewed parking of the prime mover was the
proximate cause of the collision.
What is proximate cause?
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine
proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff
must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act
or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not
be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will
attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and
probable result of the act or omission.
How to establish proximate cause?
There is no exact mathematical formula.
1.Plaintiff must establish a sufficient link between the
act or omission and the damage or injury.
2.That link must not be remote or far-fetched;
otherwise, no liability will attach.
3.The damage or injury must be a natural and
probable result of the act or omission.
IN THIS CASE
The damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural
and probable result of the improper parking of the prime
mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of
the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that
risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered
the series of events that led to the collision, particularly
the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga
are liable for all damages that resulted from the skewed
parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those
damages resulting from precautionary measures taken
by other motorist in trying to avoid collision with the
parked prime mover.
As the SC see it, the passenger bus swerved to the
right, onto the lane of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding
with the improperly parked prime mover. The driver of
the Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by swerving to the
left, onto the lane of the passenger bus, hitting the
parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not have
swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying
his van’s lane. The passenger bus, in turn, would not
have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for the
prime mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed
parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, it’s
fault will not necessarily absolve private respondents
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from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint
tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of
joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that
petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages
from the collision.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals decision is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC
decision is REINSTATED IN FULL.
Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court Of Appeals
Facts:
M/V Pavlodar, owned and operated by the Far Eastern
Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the port of Manila.
Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilot's
Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the
safe docking of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself in
the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor
Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the
pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov
relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel. However
the anchor did not hold as expected. The speed of the
vessel did not slacken.
A commotion ensued between the crew members. When
Gavino inquired about the commotion, Kavankov
assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.
The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier
causing considerable damage to the pier. Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) filed a complaint in the RTC for a
sum of money against FESC, Gavino and MPA.
The trial court ordered FESC therein jointly and severally
to pay the PPA the actual damages and the costs of suit.
CA ruled in favor of PPA holding them liable with MPA
(employer of Kavankov) entitled to reimbursement from
Gavino.
Issue:
ISSUES:
(1) WON the pilot of a commercial vessel, under
compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused
by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his
negligence?
(2) WON the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the
damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the
master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master
for the time being in the command and navigation of the
ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation. He becomes the master
pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed,
course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and
the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a
place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist
on having effective control of the vessel or to decline to
act as pilot.
Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not
take entire charge of the vessel but is deemed merely
the adviser of the master, who retains command and
control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage
is compulsory. It is quite common for states and
localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety
laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching
their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board
pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of
these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly
acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to
enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from
the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as
a compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the
universally accepted high standards of care and
diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to
have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the
particular waters over which his license extends superior
to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is
not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care
but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care
demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by
an expert in his profession.
Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise
extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to
measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence
required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As
the pilot, he should have made sure that his directions
were promptly and strictly followed.
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is
evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for
the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of
Capt. Kabankov’s testimony makes it apparent that he
was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of
the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the
pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this
risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not
personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory
pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a
compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be
held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the
provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in
the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in
compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption
from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his
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negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the
owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does
not release the pilot from the consequences of his own
negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a
compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their
liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or
her owners are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in
charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or
those in possession and control of a vessel and the
vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent
management or navigation.
Dispositive: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino,
MPA and FESC are declared solidarily liable with MPA
entitled to reimbursement from Gavino for such amount
of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the
amount equivalent to 75% of its prescribed reserved
fund.
Syllabus
Admiralty; Maritime Law; Ships and Shipping; Torts; In
American jurisprudence, there is a presumption of fault
against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object
such as a dock or navigational aid.—We start our
discussion of the successive issues bearing in mind the
evidentiary rule in American jurisprudence that there is a
presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes
a stationary object such as a dock or navigational aid. In
admiralty, this presumption does more than merely
require the ship to go forward and produce some
evidence on the presumptive matter. The moving vessel
must show that it was without fault or that the collision
was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or
was the result of inevitable accident. It has been held
that such vessel must exhaust every reasonable
possibility which the circumstances admit and show that
in each, they did all that reasonable care required. In the
absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of
fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a
fixed object and makes a prima facie case of fault
against the vessel. Logic and experience support this
presumption.
Pilots; Words and Phrases; “Pilot,” Defined.—A pilot, in
maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to
conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters.
In a broad sense, the term “pilot” includes both (1) those
whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or in
particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the
navigation of vessels on the high seas. However, the
term “pilot” is more generally understood as a person
taken on board at a particular place for the purpose of
conducting a ship through a river, road or channel, or
from a port.
Under English and American authorities, generally
speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time
being in the command and navigation of the ship, and
his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with
her navigation.—Under English and American
authorities, generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the
master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in
all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes
the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as
to speed, course, stopping and reversing, anchoring,
towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is
his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel,
or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of
foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the
vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master,
who retains command and control of the navigation even
in localities where pilotage is compulsory.
It is quite common for states and localities to provide for
compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain
exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under
local law.—It is quite common for states and localities to
provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have
been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports,
with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly
licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to
create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the
harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and
thus protect life and property from the dangers of
navigation.
A pilot should have a thorough knowledge of general
and local regulations and physical conditions affecting
the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he is
licensed, such as a particular harbor or river.—Pursuant
thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar
into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon
assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino
is held to the universally accepted high standards of care
and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to
have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the
particular waters over which his license extends superior
to and more to be trusted than that of the master. A pilot
should have a thorough knowledge of general and local
regulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel
in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed,
such as a particular harbor or river. He is not held to the
highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have
and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by
the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in
his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a
pilot must exercise extraordinary care.
Negligence; Those who undertake any work calling for
special skills are required not only to exercise
reasonable care in what they do but also possess a
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standard minimum of special knowledge and ability—
every man who offers his services to another, and is
employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such
skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of
diligence.—An act may be negligent if it is done without
the competence that a reasonable person in the position
of the actor would recognize as necessary to prevent it
from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another.
Those who undertake any work calling for special skills
are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what
they do but also possess a standard minimum of special
knowledge and ability. Every man who offers his
services to another, and is employed, assumes to
exercise in the employment such skills he possesses,
with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all these
employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one
offers his services he is understood as holding himself
out to the public as possessing the degree of skill
commonly possessed by others in the same
employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded he
commits a species of fraud on every man who employs
him in reliance on his public profession.
The degree of care required is graduated according to
the danger a person or property attendant upon the
activity which the actor pursues or the instrumentality
which he uses—the greater the danger the greater the
degree of care required.—There is an obligation on all
persons to take the care which, under ordinary
circumstances of the case, a reasonable and prudent
man would take, and the omission of that care
constitutes negligence. Generally, the degree of care
required is graduated according to the danger a person
or property attendant upon the activity which the actor
pursues or the instrumentality which he uses. The
greater the danger the greater the degree of care
required. What is ordinary under extraordinary of
conditions is dictated by those conditions; extraordinary
risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly, the more
imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care.
Ship Masters; While it is indubitable that in exercising his
functions a pilot is in sole command of the ship and
supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of a ship and that he becomes
master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, there is
overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does
not surrender his vessel to the pilot and the pilot is not
the master—the master is not wholly absolved from his
duties while a pilot is on board his vessel, and may
advise with or offer suggestions to him.—While it is
indubitable that in exercising his functions a pilot is in
sole command of the ship and supersedes the master
for the time being in the command and navigation of a
ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a
vessel piloted by him, there is overwhelming authority to
the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel
to the pilot and the pilot is not the master. The master is
still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the
presence of a pilot. There are occasions when the
master may and should interfere and even displace the
pilot, as when the pilot is obviously incompetent or
intoxicated and the circumstances may require the
master to displace a compulsory pilot because of
incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however, the
master does not observe that a compulsory pilot is
incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is
justified in relying on the pilot, but not blindly. The master
is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on
board his vessel, and may advise with or offer
suggestions to him. He is still in command of the vessel,
except so far as her navigation is concerned, and must
cause the ordinary work of the vessel to be properly
carried on and the usual precaution taken. Thus, in
particular, he is bound to see that there is sufficient
watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their
duties, also that engines are stopped, towlines cast off,
and the anchors clear and ready to go at the pilot’s
order.
Where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the
master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the
master observes that the pilot is incompetent or
physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to
refuse to permit the pilot to act, but if no such reasons
are present, then the master is justified in relying upon
the pilot, but not blindly.—In sum, where a compulsory
pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to
permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the
pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the
duty of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But
if no such reasons are present, then the master is
justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly. Under
the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where
the master, exercising that reasonable vigilance which
the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or
should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating
the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into
danger, and there was in the exercise of reasonable
care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to
intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master
should have acted accordingly. The master of a vessel
must exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with
the circumstances.
Damages; A pilot is personally liable for damages
caused by his own negligence or default to the owners of
the vessel, and to third parties for damages sustained in
a collision, such negligence in the performance of duty
constitutes a maritime tort.—In general, a pilot is
personally liable for damages caused by his own
negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to
third parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such
negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty
constitutes a maritime tort. At common law, a shipowner
is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the
negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily.
The exemption from liability for such negligence shall
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apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault.
Since, a pilot is responsible only for his own personal
negligence, he cannot be held accountable for damages
proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there
be anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in
producing the accident, the vessel master and owners
are liable.
The fact that the law compels the master to take the pilot
does not exonerate the vessel from liability—it cannot be
maintained that the circumstance of having a pilot on
board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate
as a discharge of responsibility of the owners.—Since
the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the
burden of proof is upon the party claiming benefit of the
exemption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively
that the pilot was at fault, and that there was no fault on
the part of the officers or crew, which might have been
conducive to the damage. The fact that the law
compelled the master to take the pilot does not
exonerate the vessel from liability. The parties who
suffer are entitled to have their remedy against the
vessel that occasioned the damage, and are not under
necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not
always had for compensation. The owners of the vessel
are responsible to the injured party for the acts of the
pilot, and they must be left to recover the amount as well
as they can against him. It cannot be maintained that the
circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in
conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of
responsibility of the owners. Except insofar as their
liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or
her owner are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in
charge of the vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel is not a
compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of
the vessel are bound to accept him, but is employed
voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more,
liable for his negligent act.
Damages; Obligations; Joint and Solidary Liability;
Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may
be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the
duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
same—each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.—It may be said, as a general rule,
that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes
other than plaintiff’s, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce
injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he
is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that
the negligence of the person charged with injury is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not
attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one
of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not
have resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may
be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the
duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence
of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose
liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
total damage.—There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury and either
of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article
2194 of the Civil Code.
As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and
control of a vessel are liable for all natural and proximate
damages caused to persons or property by reason of her
negligent management or navigation.—Except insofar as
their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel
or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in
charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or
those in possession and control of a vessel and the
vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent
management or navigation.
NEGLIGENCE PER SE and WHEN NOT NEGLIGENCE
PER SE
Cipriano Ent. vs. Court of Appeals and Maclin
Electronics, Inc.
FACTS:
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Elias Cipriano (PETITIONER) is the owner of E.S
Cipriano Enterprises, which is engaged in the
rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Motobilkote.
On April 30, 1991, Maclin Electronics (Private
Respondent), brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples
car to Cipriano’s shop for rustproofing. The vehicle was
received in the shop under Job Order No. 123581.
Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release,
however, was specified.
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the
Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned,
adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire
destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including
Maclin Electronic’s Kia Pride. The car had been kept
inside the building, allegedly to protect it from theft.
Cipriano claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle,
there was simply not enough time to get it out of the
building, unlike three other cars which had been saved
because they were parked near the entrance of the
garage
Maclin Electronics sent a letter to petitioner, demanding
reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. However,
Cipriano denied liability on the ground that the fire was a
fortuitous event.
Maclin Electronics brought suit for the value of its vehicle
and for damages against Maclin Electronics. Alleging
that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and
imprudence of the Cipriano, citing its failure to register
his business with the Department of Trade and Industry
and to insure it as required.
Cipriano, on the other hand, invoked Art. 1174 of the
Civil Code and denied liability for the loss which he
alleged was due to a fortuitous event, and testified that
he employed an electrician who regularly inspected the
lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing shop. And had
installed fire-fighting devices and that the fire was an
accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of
any negligence on his part. He further averred that
Maclin Electronics’ car was ready for release as early as
afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it was Maclin
Electronics’ delay in claiming it that was the cause of the
loss. Cipriano explained that rustproofing involved
spraying asphalt-like materials underneath motor vehicle
so that rust will not corrode its body and that the
materials and chemicals used for this purpose are not
inflammable. Therefore, he could not be made to
assume the risk of loss due to fire. He also claimed that
he was not required to register his business with the
Department of Trade and Industry, because he was not
covered by P.D. No. 1572.
Maclin Electronics argued that Cipriano was liable for the
loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous
event. It contended that the nature of Cipriano’s
business required him to assume the risk because under
P.D. No. 1572, Cipriano was required to insure his
property as well as those of his customers.
Trial Court - court sustained the Maclin Electronics’
contention that the failure of defendant to comply with
P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence
which renders Cipriano liable for the loss of the car even
if the same was caused by fire.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
[a] whether or not petitioner was required to insure his
business and the vehicles received by him in the course
of his business; if so,
[b] whether or not his failure to do so constituted
negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk
required to be insured against.
HELD:
The SC hold that both questions must be answered in
the affirmative.
Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.
In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the SC
held the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started
in his establishment in view of his failure to comply with
an ordinance which required the construction of a
firewall.
In Teague v. Fernandez, the SC stated that where the
very injury which was intended to be prevented by the
ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the
ordinance was not only act negligence, but also the
proximate cause of the death.
Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner
and private respondent does not bar a finding of
negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as the
SC held in Fabre v. Court of Appeals. Petitioner's
negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not
being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation
due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying
with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore
immaterial that the loss occasioned to private
respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was
petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk
which was the proximate cause of the loss.
Thus, Presidential Decree No. 1572 requires service and
repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of
petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and
Industry. As condition for such registration or
accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered
enterprises to secure insurance coverage
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and
it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was
guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to
private respondent. While the fire in this case may be
considered a fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot
exempt petitioner from liability for loss.
F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Mable
FACTS:
F.F. Cruz’s (Petitioner) furniture manufacturing shop is
adjacent to the residence of Mable (Private
respondents). Gregorio Mable approached F.F. Cruz's
plant manager to request that a firewall be constructed
between them but was unheeded.
Subsequently, a fire broke out in F.F. Cruz's shop and
spread to Mable's house. Both were razed to the ground.
The cause of the fire was never discovered, but NBI
found burned structures negative for the presence of
inflammable substances.
Mable filed an action for damages against F.F. Cruz.
CFI: held for private respondents granting actual, moral,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced
the award of damages
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON F.F. Cruz was negligent making them liable for the
injury caused?
RULING:
YES, res ipsa loquitur applies to the case. Also, even
without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, F.F.
Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with
city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence
per se.
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of
is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care. (Africa v. Caltex Phil, Inc.)
IN THIS CASE
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of
the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of
operations of a furniture manufacturing shop,
combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust,
paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may
be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on
the part of F.F. Cruz or its employees was not merely
presumed.
The Court of Appeals found that (1) F.F. Cruz failed to
construct a firewall between its shop and the residence
of Mable as required by a city ordinance; (2) that the fire
could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit
cigarette; (3) that gasoline and alcohol were used and
stored in the shop; and (4) that workers sometimes
smoked inside the shop.
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
F.F. Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance
with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence.
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner
be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to
construct a firewall between its property and private
respondents’ residence which sufficiently complies with
the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with
an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been
ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v.
Fernandez] The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more
than adequate basis to find petitioner liable for the loss
sustained by private respondents.
DISPOSITIVE: Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED
Teague vs. Fernandez
FACTS:
The Realistic Institute (owned and operated by
defendant-appellee Mercedes Teague) was a vocational
school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second
floor of the Gil-Armi Building. At about four o'clock in the
afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store
for surplus materials located about ten meters away from
the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the
institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in
the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter,
a panic ensued. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building
caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students,
including Lourdes Fernandez, (sister of plaintiffs-
appellants Elena Fernandez) were found dead and
several others injured on account of the stampede.
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action
for damages against Mercedes Teague as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute.
The Court of First Instance of Manila found for Mercedes
Teague and dismissed the case. CA reversed and
ordered Teague to pay damages to Fernandez.
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ISSUE:
WON petitioner is liable.
RULING:
M. Teague was negligent and that such negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez.
According to M. Teague "the events of fire, panic and
stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The
weakness in the argument springs from a faulty
juxtaposition (connection) of the events which formed a
chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the
petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in
question was ahead of and prior to the other events in
point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its
occupancy of the building. But the violation was a
continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of
safety designed to prevent a specific situation which
would pose a danger to the occupants of the building.
That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it
could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen
under emergency conditions if there was only one
stairway available.
This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact
that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied
with in connection with the construction and use of the
Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school
was housed. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not
sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was
the proximate cause of the injury complained. However,
if the very injury has happened which was intended to be
prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation
of the statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of
the injury.
It is true that in this particular case there would have
been no overcrowding in the single stair way if there had
not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the
students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in
order to go down. But it was precisely such
contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance
had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway
would be adequate for the occupants of the building.
Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page
841: "The general principle is that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause
of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent."
Dispositive:
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Añonuevo vs. Court of Appeals and Villagarcia
Facts:
Jonas Añonuevo (Petitioner) seeks to bar recovery by an
injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the car
which had struck him. The argument is hinged on the
cyclist’s failure to install safety devices on his bicycle.
However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist
himself caused the collision with his own negligence.
Both RTC and CA adjudged petitioner Añonuevo liable
for the damages for the injuries sustained by the cyclist
Villagracia (Private Respondent).
The accident occurred on 8 February 1989, at around
nine in the evening, at an intersection in Mandaluyong.
Villagracia was traveling on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,
traversing the opposite lane was driving his car. The car
was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan.
Añonuevo was making a left turn when the collision
occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a
result, which necessitated his hospitalization several
times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four
operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before
the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against
Añonuevo before the MTC, but the latter was acquitted
of the criminal charge. Trial on the civil action ensued,
the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble
and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia for
actual damages, moral damages, and attorney’s fees, as
well as legal costs. Both defendants appealed to the CA.
CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. Among
them:
That it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which had struck
Villagracia.
• That Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit
Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a
comminuted fracture;
• That as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano,
witness for Villagracia, Añonuevo was
"umaarangkada," or speeding as he made the left
turn into Libertad;
• That considering Añonuevo’s claim that a
passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he
made the turn, Añonuevo had enough warning to
control his speed;
• And that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary
precaution, care and diligence required of him in
order that the accident could have been avoided.
Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not
dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made
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by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the
alleged negligence of Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no
exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he
dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court
of Appeals.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Article 2185 of the New Civil Code,
which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if
he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the
mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized
vehicles. (No)
2. Whether or not Villagracia’s own fault and negligence
(for transgressing a municipal ordinance requiring the
registration of bicycles and the installation of safety
devices) serves to absolve the Añonuevo of any liability
for damages. (No)
Ruling:
1. Añonuevo points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no
safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as
invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance. Nor was it duly
registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as
required by the same ordinance. Finally, as admitted by
Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes.
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article
2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The
provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.
The provision’s applicability is expressly qualified to
motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume
that the law intended a broader coverage.
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference
in the natures and attached responsibilities of motorized
and non-motorized vehicles. Article 2185 was not
formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic
rules and regulations. The fact that there has long
existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed
on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of
motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to
recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the
standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal
footing with other types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185
should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by
analogy.
2. Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185
should not apply to Villagracia, this should not preclude
any possible finding of negligence on his part.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission
of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. However, the
existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a
given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines
what would be reckless or negligent.
Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the
latter had transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring
the registration of bicycles and the installation of safety
devices thereon. This view finds some support if
anchored on the long standing principle of negligence
per se.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a
statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a
matter of law, or negligence per se.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications
that may arise from the logical consequences of the
facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article
2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial
guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute
culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform
up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny
relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the
statutory violation and the injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not
intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all,
tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide
compensation for the harm suffered by those whose
interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of
others.
In Teague vs. Fernandez, the Court cited with approval
American authorities elucidating on the rule:
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient
basis for an inference that such violation was the
proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if
the very injury has happened which was intended to be
prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation
of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause
of the injury.
The generally accepted view is that violation of a
statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a
matter of law, or, according to the decisions on the
question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-
observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a
suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which
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 TORTS AND DAMAGES – Case Digest 2 (Negligence)
an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the
state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as
to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden
act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be
injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed,
when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to
conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per
se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal
excuse.
According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute
has been violated, whether the act or omission
constituting such violation would have been regarded as
negligence in the absence of any statute on the subject
or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to
anticipate that injury would result from such violation.
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation.
If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed
limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his
prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is
enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance
intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating
the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it
brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended
to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes
only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no
reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously
exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize
it, since it is the very relation which the makers of the
ordinance anticipated. This court has applied these
principles to speed limits and other regulations of the
manner of driving.”
However, the fact that other happenings causing or
contributing toward an injury intervened between the
violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not
necessarily make the result so remote that no action can
be maintained. The test is to be found not in the number
of intervening events or agents, but in their character
and in the natural and probable connection between the
wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general
principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is
not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended
to prevent.
It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for
requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or
horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the
occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face
value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger
sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he
violated.
But this is by no means a simple case. Añonuevo was
speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent
act was the proximate cause of the accident. This
reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky
enough within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned
into the intersection. We are hard put to conclude that
Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle
been up to par with safety regulations, especially
considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he
made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even
assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia
because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights,
such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted
the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to
make the left turn.
The failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous
enough so as to negate monetary relief. The failure of
the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety
practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or
statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery
unless a causal connection is established between such
failure and the injury sustained.
By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia
at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been
decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn,
Añonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid
hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Añonuevo had
sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any
possibility that the absence of lights on the bike
contributed to the cause of the accident. Petition
The leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v.
Atlantic Gulf clarifies that damages may be mitigated if
the claimant “in conjunction with the occurrence,
[contributes] only to his injury.” To hold a person as
having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that
he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger
to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it
is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
contributory only when it contributes proximately to the
injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
DENIED.
Marinduque Iron Mines vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission (WCC)
FACTS:
Deceased Mamador together with other laborers of
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. boarded a truck
belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one
Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation,
and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp
at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on
the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree,
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resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the
others.
Macunat - prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act boarding the truck, which violates
the employer’s prohibition, constitutes negligence per se.
RULING:
NO. The most important aspect of this appeal is the
effect of the deceased's having violated the employer's
prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks.
Marinduque Iron Mines claims such violation was the
laborer's "notorious negligence" which, under the law,
precludes recovery. The Commission has not declared
that the prohibition was known to Mamador.
Supposing Mamador knew the prohibition, can we
truthfully say that he boarded the fatal truck with full
apprehension of the existence of the danger that an
ordinary prudent man would try to avoid?
I do not believe so, and even in the presence of doubt,
the same must be resolved in his favor. Unless of
course, we can attribute to him a desire to end his life.
Nowhere in the records of this case can we find the
slightest insinuation of that desire.
here is no doubt that mere riding on a haulage truck or
stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It
couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not
dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious
negligence in this particular instance because there was
the employer's prohibition. Does violation of this order
constitute negligence? Many courts hold that violation of
a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se.
However, there is practical unanimity in the proposition
that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or
board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of
negligence.
This prohibition of the employer couldn't be of a greater
obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. And
the referee of the Commission correctly considered this
violation as possible evidence of negligence; but it
declared that under the circumstances, the laborer could
not be declared to have acted with negligence since the
prohibition had nothing to do with personal safety of the
riders.
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it
surely was not notorious negligence, which we have
interpreted to mean the same thing as gross negligence
—implying "conscious indifference to consequences"
"pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally
and probably result in injury" "utter disregard of
consequences. Getting or accepting a free ride on the
company's haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence,
because as the referee found, "no danger or risk was
apparent."
Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
A collision between a Mercedes Bent panel truck of
Sanitary Steam Laundry (Petitioner) and a Cimarron,
driven by Rolando Hernandez, and owned by Salvador
Salenga, father of one of the employees of Project
Management Consultants, Inc. (PMCI), caused the
death of three persons (including the driver) and the
injuries of several others. Driving the vehicle was
Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m.,
as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus,
Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit
on its front portion by petitioner's panel truck, bearing
Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the opposite
direction.
Sanitary Steam Laundry contends that the Hernandez
(driver of the Cimarron) was guilty of contributory
negligence and, therefore, its liability should be
mitigated, if not totally extinguished. It claims that the
driver of the Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic
rules and regulations at the time of the mishap. In
accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was
presumed to be negligent for being overloaded, 4 adults
(including the driver) occupied the front seats and it had
only one headlight. Because of his negligence (i.e., the
aforementioned violations of traffic rules and regulations
such as the use of only one headlight at night and the
overcrowding at the front seat of the vehicle), he was not
able to avoid a collision with the panel truck.
RTC found Sanitary Steam Laundry's driver to be
responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly
held Sanitary Steam Laundry liable to private
respondents (Heirs of those who died on the incident).
ISSUE:
WON the alleged aforementioned violation of traffic rules
negligence per se
HELD:
Petitioner has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the violation
of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must
show that the violation of the statute was the proximate
or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto.
It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the
Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the
vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a
causal connection between the injury received and the
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He
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must show that the violation of the statute was the

proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto.

Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of

law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the
injury.

Petitioner says that “driving an overloaded vehicle with

only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly
increases the risk of accident,” that because the
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was “decreased
visibility,” and that the fact that the vehicle was
overloaded and its front seat overcrowded “decreased
[its] maneuverability.” However, mere allegations such
as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of
proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
contributing cause of the injury. The testimonies show
that the driver of the panel truck lost control of his
vehicle and bumped the Cimarron.

All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of petitioner's driver. As the
trial court noted, the swerving of petitioner's panel truck
to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioner's
driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but
that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it
as well.

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