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Increasing ship operational reliability through the implementation of a

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Increasing ship operational reliability through the implementation of a

holistic maintenance management strategy
Iraklis Lazakisa; Osman Turana; Seref Aksub
a
Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering (NA-ME), University of Strathclyde,
Glasgow, Scotland, UK b School of Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle University Marine
International (NUMI), Singapore

Online publication date: 15 October 2010

To cite this Article Lazakis, Iraklis , Turan, Osman and Aksu, Seref(2010) 'Increasing ship operational reliability through
the implementation of a holistic maintenance management strategy', Ships and Offshore Structures, 5: 4, 337 — 357
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17445302.2010.480899
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17445302.2010.480899

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 Ships and Offshore Structures
Vol. 5, No. 4, 2010, 337–357

Increasing ship operational reliability through the implementation of a holistic maintenance

management strategy
Iraklis Lazakisa∗ , Osman Turana and Seref Aksub
a
Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering (NA-ME), University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, UK; b School of
Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle University Marine International (NUMI), Singapore
(Received 17 December 2009; final version received 16 April 2010)

Ship maintenance was initially considered as more of a financial burden than as a way to preserve safety, environment and
quality transportation. The benefits from applying a sound and systematic maintenance policy are emerging both in the
minimisation of unnecessary downtime as well as in the increase of operational capability. In this paper, a novel predictive
maintenance strategy is demonstrated, combining the existing ship operational and maintenance tasks with the advances
stemming from new applied techniques. The initial step for the application of the above-mentioned strategy is also shown
Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:57 1 November 2010

regarding the machinery space of a cruise ship. Well-known tools are applied such as Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Outcomes of this study are the identification of the critical components
of the system, the estimation of the reliability of the overall system and sub-systems, the prioritisation of the maintenance
tasks and finally the availability of the specific end events/items.
Keywords: ship maintenance; reliability; criticality; diesel generator system; availability; importance measures

1. Introduction They try to go through the complexity of data acquisition,

In various industries including defence, aviation, manufac-
turing, automobile and nuclear power energy applications,
maintenance activities have been implemented and tested
in a structured way for a long time. Ship maintenance was
considered as more of a task to be undertaken in a random
day-by-day operation, based on the practical knowledge of
the chief engineer or the captain of the ship regarding the
on-board equipment and procedures. The main aim from
a technical point of view was not to lose operational time
and to minimise the failures occurring unexpectedly. In the
last few years and in addition to the above, the shipping
industry has adjusted to the international standards and
recommendations set by the International Maritime Organ-
isation (IMO) and other consulting bodies. IMO promotes
the safe and effective transportation of people and cargo,
environmental protection (reducing ship emissions, avoid-
ing or minimising oil pollution, promoting environmentally
friendly dismantling) and in general has increased the qual-
ity of the asset it operates. Moreover, a favourable image
of ship operators/managers is crucial in today’s world of
public awareness and competitiveness.
Accordingly, ship maintenance has also evolved in a
similar way. All the maintenance methodologies have so far
tried to bridge the gap between the theoretical background
of solutions presented and their application in real time.
improper maintenance data recordings, control of the actual
maintenance procedures, monitoring of measuring equip-
ment (in the case of automated systems), implementation of
the right maintenance tasks as well as efficient maintenance
operation. Overall, a maintenance system must address the
following objectives:
r It must be a well-structured approach;
r It must be flexible;
r Obtain feedback from the operational procedure;
r Involve experts’ judgement;
r Include periodical reviews and incorporate changes;
r Take account of a Maintenance Information Technology
system.
In this respect, the maintenance strategy presented
herein addresses the above-mentioned aspects as will be
shown in the following sections. More specifically, Sec-
tion 2 presents the evolution of maintenance through the
years together with the maintenance specifications origi-
nating from regulatory bodies. In Section 3, the suggested
methodology is demonstrated and explained. Section 4 dis-
cusses the application of the above-mentioned methodology
on a Diesel Generator system of a passenger ship. The re-
sults of this analysis are also shown in Section 5. Finally,
the conclusions and remarks are presented in Section 6.

∗
Corresponding author. Email: iraklis.lazakis@strath.ac.uk

ISSN: 1744-5302 print / 1754-212X online

Copyright 
C 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17445302.2010.480899
http://www.informaworld.com
 338 I. Lazakis et al.
2. Maintenance background
Maintenance was initially considered as a type of ‘neces-
sary rework’ and was not paid too much attention. It was
only after WW II that more attention was attributed to it
in aviation and in addition in other industrial sectors like
defence, nuclear, chemical and petrochemical. Ship main-
tenance was not well structured or organised in comparison
to the other industrial entities which observed that huge
savings may be made when carrying out proper mainte-
nance tasks. This is the case in the chemical sector where
an investigation at the Du Pont Company in 1991 revealed
that a maintenance cost saving of 350 million $/year was
achieved after a proper maintenance strategy was imple-
mented (Ledet 2002). Similarly, at the BP Lima refinery
in Ohio in 1998, the implemented improved maintenance
system not only prevented the closure of the refinery but
also improved the cash margin by almost 1$ per barrel of
oil processed (Repenning and Sterman 2001).
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Regarding processes to standardise maintenance, the
British Standards define maintenance as (BS 1993):
‘The combination of all technical and administrative ac-
tions, including supervision actions, intended to retain an
item in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform a
required action’.
The offshore industry has also demonstrated efforts to
maintain its assets in an operational, safe and environmen-
tally first-class condition. The Norwegian petroleum in-
dustry developed the Norsok standard Z-008 (NTS 2001)
which provides guidelines and requirements for the imple-
mentation of maintenance programs for new and in-service
facilities both offshore and onshore regarding risks re-
lated to personnel, environment, production loss and direct
economical cost. The Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA)
handbook (2002) was another effort originating from a few
oil companies to enhance the maintenance and operation of
offshore structures. In it, data collected from topside and
sub-sea equipment for exploration and production of oil and
gas are presented and updated in different phases starting
from Phase I in 1983 and reaching Phase IX by the end of
2008.
Based on the OREDA handbook, the ISO 14224 stan-
dard was updated in 2006 (ISO 14224). It deals with the
reliability and maintenance data collection and standard-
isation activity of the petroleum, petrochemical and nat-
ural gas industries. It also discusses the requirements for
data exchange as well as the main categories of data pre-
sented. These refer to data related to equipment (taxonomy
and attributes), failures (failure cause and consequence)
and maintenance (maintenance action, resources used and
downtime).
Additionally, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
board published the Key Programme 3-Asset Integrity
(KP3) handbook related to the offshore infrastructure of
Asset
n
lutio management
e evo
anc
in ten
Ma
Predictive
Preventive
Corrective
Figure 1. Evolution of maintenance practices. This figure is
available in colour online.
the UK continental shelf in 2007 (HSE 2007). The aim
of the KP3 project was to ensure that the risks associated
with the offshore operations are managed effectively and
without causing accidents and fatalities. It was divided into
four pilot projects: KP3/1 included the gathering and re-
viewing of information about setting up the project, KP3/2
included on-site inspections using a standard template with
a ‘traffic light’ system, denoting the good or bad condition
of the specific component/element, KP3/3 was a 3-year in-
spection programme implemented on a year-by-year basis
and KP3/4 consisted of stakeholders initiatives and the de-
velopment of joint supporting projects with external bodies
such as the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Associa-
tion (UKOOA 2003) and others.
A further evolution of maintenance is ‘Asset Manage-
ment’ (Figure 1). According to Woodhouse (2006), Asset
Management is a process for a ‘better and more business-
focused maintenance’ putting together risk-controlled op-
timised, life-cycle management of an asset. Moreover, in
the Publicly Available Specification Part 1 (PAS 55-1) stan-
dard, the specifications for the optimised management of
physical assets are provided. In it, Asset Management is
described as (BSI 2008a):
‘the systematic and coordinated activities and practices
through which an organisation optimally and sustainably
manages its assets and asset systems, their associated per-
formance, risks and expenditures over their lifecycles for
the purpose of achieving its organisational strategic plan’.
Part 2 of the PAS 55 (BSI 2008b) complements this
procedure as it provides the guidelines for the application
of PAS 55-1. It provides:
‘guidance on the establishment, implementation, mainte-
nance and improvement of an asset management system
and its coordination with other management systems’.
In comparison to the above-mentioned systems, for a
long time, ship maintenance was thought to be an area of
needless expenditure and overwhelming cost and not as an
element which, even if it may involve an additional capital
expenditure, it can prevent unscheduled repairs, increase
 Ships and Offshore Structures
CMMS
RCM
RBI
PMS Predictive
CM
Preventive
tion
volu
ce e
Corrective te nan
in
Ma
Figure 2. Evolution of maintenance practices in shipping
industry. This figure is available in colour online.
the operational life of a ship and consequently increase
operational earning. Especially in the case of high fuel
oil prices/cost, it is essential for a ship owner/manager to
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operate a ship safely and continuously at all times without
unnecessary delays.
In shipping, corrective maintenance measures were ini-
tially applied (Figure 2). According to British Standards
(BS 1993), corrective maintenance ‘is the maintenance car-
ried out after fault recognition and intended to put an item
into a state in which it can perform a required function’.
In IACS recommendation 74, it is mentioned that in order
to perform corrective maintenance tasks, several steps need
to be followed (IACS 2001). These start with the identifi-
cation of the existing failure, establishing the failure cause
and finally suggest and implement a corrective measure.
Corrective maintenance was the preferred method to use in
the early stages of the maintenance history, as well as in
cases in which specific conditions apply, like the lay-up of
ships or when spare parts are not available on-site.
Then, it was in 1993 that IMO presented the Interna-
tional Safety Management (ISM) code, setting the founda-
tions for a preventive maintenance regime (IMO 1993). In
Chapter 10, the procedures, requirements and obligations
that a shipping company must have in place are mentioned
so as to ensure the company’s conformity with the inter-
national regulations. Accordingly, shipping companies’
conformity with the international regulations and classifica-
tion society’s Rules have developed the Safety Management
Manual (SMM) which follows this perspective by car-
rying out inspections at defined intervals, reporting any
non-conformity, taking appropriate corrective actions and
keeping records with all necessary steps followed. This
was assisted by the introduction of Planned Maintenance
Systems (PMS) with which it was easier to keep track
of the maintenance tasks and actions taken. Pintelon and
Gelders (1992) mention some of the benefits of preventive
maintenance, like the decrease of the probability of failure,
the cost savings occurring from avoiding breakdowns and
the increase of equipment availability. Tsai et al. (2004) also
studied preventive maintenance planning for the mechani-
339
cal service, repair and replacement of complicated systems
based on the availability of the components of the system.
Preventive maintenance was followed next by predic-
tive advances. With predictive maintenance, it was possible
to evaluate the condition of the system in question and
prevent the occurrence of unexpected failures. It also ad-
dressed optimising the maintenance intervals, extending the
replacement period till it was actually needed and reducing
the use and cost of spare parts. As can be seen in Figure 2,
predictive maintenance can be split up into three different
categories: Reliability-Centred Maintenance (RCM), Risk-
Based Inspection (RBI) and Condition Monitoring (CM).
Reliability-Centred Maintenance (RCM) originated in
the USA military sector when the US Air Transport Asso-
ciation (ATA) introduced it in its pursuit of a maintenance
programme for the Boeing 747 aircraft (ATA 1968). This re-
search included the publication of the first handbook of the
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG-1) with two updated
versions following (MSG 2 and MSG 3). In addition, the
US Department of Defence produced a military standard
procedure including RCM for the reliability-centred main-
tenance requirements for the naval aircraft, weapon systems
and support equipment (US DoD 1986). Also, Villemeur
(1992) and Moubray (1997) described the benefits initiat-
ing from the RCM application. In shipping, Mokashi et al.
(2002) discussed the introduction of RCM on board ships
and how it can influence the ship management and the work
of seafarers. Conachey (2005) examined the RCM-specific
application on the machinery of the ships and the relevant
survey requirements in order to achieve enhanced mainte-
nance intervals.
Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) is another method for car-
rying out predictive maintenance. The UK HSE suggests
the use of RBI in order to provide guidance to the Depart-
ment of Hazardous Installations Directorate about the plant
integrity management of refineries, chemical process plants
off and onshore (HSE 2004) and the inspection of pressure
equipment and systems (HSE 2001). Khan et al. (2004)
present a risk-based inspection and maintenance system for
the oil and gas industry using a fuzzy logic methodology
to calculate the risk in the operation of onshore plants. In
Hamada et al. (2002), the RBI system for ship hull in-
spections is demonstrated based on the combination of the
necessary hull structural information from inspection and
maintenance techniques, with an integrated shipbuilding
computer application to map the occurrence of probable
deficiencies.
Also, in 2003, Lloyd’s Register prepared a report for
the UKOOA about the FPSO’s in service in the UK con-
tinental shelf (UKOOA 2003). It included database results
from a questionnaire distributed among FPSO operators,
information gathered from interviews of the participating
companies and a further study on the practices adopted in
this industry. The aim was to establish the best practice in
inspection, repair and maintenance in this industrial sector.
 340
Goyet et al. (2004) also discussed the implementation of
RBI planning in FPSO’s and FSO’s regarding the fatigue
degradation of these structures. They examined the overall
system of these structures including hull, the process and
ship service systems, the turret, the offloading system and
the complementary systems and structures. In Cabos et al.
(2008), the RBI process is also used in conjunction with a
hull condition monitoring system, as well as a robot for the
thickness measurements of the outer hull structure. Regard-
ing the influence of corrosion on the structural reliability
of ships, Paik et al. (2003) presented a corrosion wastage
model examining data from 230 single-hull ocean-going
tanker ships and 34 different member groups including
plates, stiffened webs and face plates. Melchers (2005) also
addressed the corrosion effect on the structural reliability of
offshore structures in terms of general and pitting corrosion
patterns. Turan et al. (2009) investigated the effect of apply-
ing good maintenance practices on the life cycle cost of the
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hull structure of a chemical tanker ship. Paik and Melchers
(2008) have discussed the issues relating to the condition
assessment of ships, particularly corrosion management of
ship structures. Risk and Reliability in Marine Technology
book (Guedes Soares 1998) offers very useful information
on reliability of ships and offshore structures including sys-
tem reliability of repairable and non-repairable items.
In the case of the Condition Monitoring (CM) tool, it is
defined by British Standards as (BS 1993):
‘the continuous or periodic measurement and interpreta-
tion of data to indicate the condition of an item to determine
the need for maintenance’
BSI/ISO 17359 (2003) also provides guidelines for the
general procedures to be taken into account when designing
a condition monitoring programme for machinery systems.
It includes an overview of the condition monitoring proce-
dure and the auditing of the equipment to be used. Reli-
ability and criticality assessments are also suggested such
as Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) and Failure Modes,
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Apart from the
above, the measurement method to be followed is described
together with the data collection and analysis process. Fi-
nally, the determination of the maintenance action to be
taken is also discussed.
Another standard procedure for describing the gen-
eral requirements of personnel for condition monitoring
of machinery parts is the common BSI/ISO 18436 standard
(2009). It consists of seven parts covering the requirements
of certification and training as well as the most frequently
applied processes like vibration and diagnostics, field lubri-
cant analysis and the requirements for lubricant laboratory
technicians and analysts, acoustic emissions and thermog-
raphy analysis.
Moreover, Wang et al. (2001) used CM procedures
for the hull structure monitoring of a naval vessel. More
I. Lazakis et al.
precisely, they studied the result of embedding fibre optic
strain sensors in the composite hull of a fast patrol vessel
in order to carry out sea-keeping tests and provide valuable
feedback on the initial ship design. In a paper by Yamamoto
et al. (2007), a CM system is described for measuring the
fatigue of the hull of the ships. Their study was tested on
a 145,000 m3 LNG ship using sensors to detect the accu-
mulated stresses on the welded structural parts for a period
of time. They suggested the combination of the hull fatigue
monitoring system with software designed to make fatigue
calculations for achieving better results.
Courtney (2009) discussed about CM implementation
for the machinery of ships including pumps, purifiers, com-
pressors, turbochargers and thrusters among other equip-
ment. He also suggested a database registration of CM
measurements of the equipment which are then sent to an
onshore server. From there, further analysis and a main-
tenance report are prepared for the ship operator’s main
office and the ship as well. Chandroth (2004) discussed
CM applications such as the measuring of cylinder pres-
sures, acoustic emissions and linear vibration analysis of a
four-stroke twin-cylinder diesel engine. He also suggested
the combination of artificial neural networks and multiple
engine diagnostics to evaluate the condition of an engine.
The above-mentioned methods may be coupled with a
Computerised Maintenance Management System (CMMS)
which is a further development of the initial planned main-
tenance system. Rodseth et al. (2007) studied the combina-
tion of a CM tool with technical condition indices (TCI).
As its short name suggests, TCI are applied to evaluate
the technical condition of a system under examination us-
ing diagnostic evaluation tools. They developed a system
for online monitoring/measuring spots of different machin-
ery equipment and applied it on a gas export compression
plant. TCI differ from key performance indicators (KPI)
as the latter are used to measure, evaluate and review the
performance and strategy of a company/organisation at a
higher level (Hatzigrigoris et al. 2008).
Thobem et al. (2008) presented their work also on
CMMS. This platform includes a combination of data
sources like damage statistics/reports, ship’s operational
data like Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) details, monitoring
of the main engine components, hull condition monitoring
and shaft and propeller monitoring through a central server,
which archives the data and sends them in a compressed for-
mat to the shore-based main maintenance system for further
analysis. Apart from the obvious advantages of this kind of
system, there are some system bottlenecks identified, such
as data recording from the various ship items/components
is entered manually and not automatically (no real time
information); all the information is transferred through the
main server to the onshore office without informing the cap-
tain/chief engineer of the ship of the current condition of
the vessel; and there is also the question of the applicability
of this system to a fleet of ships.
 Ships and Offshore Structures
In Prioletti and Tobin (2008), a CMMS is presented re-
garding the application of a standardised system in the US
Navy Regional Maintenance Centres (US RMC). In it, the
transition from handwritten reports and repair assessment
of ship’s tanks and void spaces to a Personal Digital Assis-
tant (PDA) usage is described. The general feature of this
process is the combination of different work orders starting
off from a ship, planning and properly scheduling the main-
tenance action as well as assigning the work to a specific
person or team to carry it out. All this information is trans-
ferred from a centralised database (by logging in a specified
website) to a touch-screen PDA which is further used by
a competent assessor to complete the maintenance report
while being in the tank/void space. This report is then sent
back via the same operational channel to the centralised
database for further investigation.
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3. Methodology
In this section, the methodology that is followed within
the novel holistic predictive maintenance strategy is pre-
sented. Figure 3 shows the details described in the following
paragraphs.
In the figure, the overall system is demonstrated. In
the middle of the graph, the current situation in a typ-
ical shipping company is shown comprising of different
Figure 3. Risk- and criticality-based maintenance.
341
departments such as the technical, operations, chartering,
crewing, safety and quality and purchasing ones. On the
right-hand side, there is a sequence of steps to be per-
formed in order to achieve the cost-effective inspection and
repair sequence starting with the condition monitoring and
inspection tools. These include thermography, lube oil anal-
ysis and monitoring of the shaft of the main engine and all
the rotating equipment. The devices which may be used to
carry out the inspection include electronic means and on-
line applications (wireless sensors, PDAs and barcodes) or
manual retrieval of data.
The process mentioned above will also facilitate the
next development which is data collection and processing.
Data collection may include information coming from al-
ready applied data collection systems, published databases,
etc. Processing may be carried out by using various software
tools. Having all this information, a decision support system
is developed and applied in order to give all stakeholders
involved (company’s managers, captain and chief engineer)
a quick and thorough decision-making tool. With this in
mind, the optimal maintenance sequence can be planned
leading to a cost-effective inspection and repair action.
On the left-hand side of Figure 3, another significant
issue of this strategy is the training of the personnel on and
offshore. This means that the crew on board the ship needs
to be trained well enough to work with the new systems
 342 I. Lazakis et al.
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Figure 4. Proposed data collection and processing module.
available and that the captain/chief engineer need to get
familiar with the technical aspects (i.e., condition monitor-
ing tools, software applications, etc.) which will eventually
help them in the decision-making process. For the onshore
personnel, training has to do with the familiarisation with
the new IT tools and decision-making process as well.
What follows is a criticality-based assessment on a com-
mon working platform for all the participants involved and
finally to an overall management decision strategy which
can be applied on a single ship or a fleet of similar vessels.
Concluding, the decisions made will then be communicated
to all various partners like equipment suppliers, shipyards
and original engine manufacturers so as to have a lean re-
pair and maintenance sequence either during dry dockings
or throughout the operation of the ship.
In Figure 4, a more detailed description for the proposed
data collection and processing module is given.
This module consists of data originating from two broad
areas which are the hull and machinery equipment of the
ship. Further on, several well-established analysis tools used
such as the Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Markov analysis
or other analytical reliability tools are incorporated in this
module.
Regarding FMECA, it was described and developed in
detail for the US DoD in the military standard 1629A as
early as 1980 (US DoD 1980). This handbook includes def-
initions of the maintenance- and reliability-related terms
and describes the requirements for FMECA presenting
worksheet tables, functional and reliability block diagrams,
graphs in relation to the criticality classification and exam-
ples of various cases. FMECA is an expanded version of
the classical Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
tool. FMEA provides a systematic method for organizing
the study of a particular system or process. The overall
aim for conducting FMEA is to review the system in or-
der to provide details on how to identify failures and their
causes as well as determine the end results of the failures
occurring. FMEA can be applied in a bottom-up approach
which helps in mapping the overall failure potential of the
system or process. FMECA also makes use of severity and
frequency indices thus creating a risk and criticality ma-
trix (Kumamoto and Henley 1996; IMO 2002; Turan et al.
2003; Zafiropoulos and Dialynas 2005).
On the other hand, FTA uses failure rates, Mean Time
Between Failures (Dhillon 1999; Bedford and Cooke 2001)
and minimal cut sets (Tang and Dugan 2004) to evaluate
the reliability and availability of the system in question. In
contrast with FMECA, FTA is a top-down approach which
provides all the necessary information about the likelihood
of a failure occurring as well as how these failures might
take place. The focus of FTA is on the specific failures
developed in the system. This means that thorough knowl-
edge of the system under consideration is needed in or-
der to identify the potential failure events and their initial
causes.
 Ships and Offshore Structures
In addition to the FT analysis described above, a fur-
ther assessment using importance measures like Birnbaum,
Fussell-Vesely and criticality (Birnbaum 1969; Fussell
1975; Beeson and Andrews 2003; Espiritu et al. 2007) can
be conducted. Birnbaum importance measure is the rate
of change in the top gate probability with respect to the
change in the unavailability of a basic event. Therefore,
the ranking of events obtained using the Birnbaum impor-
tance measures is helpful when selecting which end event
needs to be enhanced. The Birnbaum importance measure
for event A can also be calculated as the difference in the
probability of the top event given that event A did occur
minus the probability of the top event given that event A
did not occur, that is,
IiB (A) = P {X|A} − P {X| ∼A},
where
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1. I B (A) = Birnbaum importance measure for event A;
2. A = the event whose importance is being measured;
3. ∼A = the event did not occur;
4. X = the top event.
Regarding the Fussell–Vesely (F-V) importance mea-
sure, it is used when an event contributes to the failure of
the top event but is not necessarily the most critical one.
F-V importance measures rely on the minimal cut sets,
which determine the shortest way the failure of the top
event/system may occur. For this to happen, at least one
cut set path including the specific event must occur. The
F-V importance measure shows the ratio of the probability
of occurrence of any cut set containing event A and the
probability of the top event. That is,


mi
1− [1 − P {Mij (t)}]
j =1
IiFV (t) = ,
1 − RS (r(t))
where
IiFV = Fussell–Vesely importance measure;
mi = the number of minimal cut sets containing i;
Mij (t) = the j th minimal cut set among those containing
i, verified at time t.
For the Criticality importance measure, it is the prob-
ability that component A is critical for the system and has
occurred given that the top event has occurred. While the
Birnbaum importance measure considers only the condi-
tional probability that event A is critical, the Criticality
importance measure also considers the overall probability
of the top event occurrence due to event A. Alternatively,
the Criticality importance measure modifies the Birnbaum
importance measure by adjusting for the relative probabil-
ity of basic event A to reflect how likely the event is to occur
343
and how feasible it is to improve the event. The Criticality
importance measure is defined as
Iicr (A) = (P {X|A} − P {X| ∼A})∗ P {A}/P {X}, (3)
where
Iicr (A) = Criticality importance measure for event A;
A = the event whose importance is being measured;
∼A = the event did not occur;
X = the top event.
Also, overall system reliability can be examined by us-
ing Markov analysis or other analytical reliability tools (Dai
and Wang 1992; Pil et al. 2008). Markov analysis is used
to study dynamic behaviour of systems. It is also known
(1) as the state transition diagram as it represents the different
states of the system and the transition from one state of the
system to another with their interdependencies. The differ-
ent states of the system can be described as good or failed
depending on the failure of their components at a given
time. These conditions are determined in the initial stage of
the analysis. Markov models are also useful for establish-
ing the behaviour of a system for a number of failure cases
like common cause failures, complex repair policies, degra-
dation, dependent failures and other sequence-dependent
events.
Expanding the classical theory about Static Fault Trees
(SFT), the Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) are introduced.
DFTs have been used to describe and solve the prob-
lems occurring in complex systems. Examples include the
electrical power supply system (Rao et al. 2009) and the
maintenance activities of the safety equipment of a nu-
clear power plant (Cepin and Mavko 2002). In the maritime
area, the application of DFT has been investigated on the
pod propulsion system of a Roll On–Roll Off (Ro-Ro) ves-
sel (Aksu et al. 2006). The advantage of DFT compared
with the SFT is that the time-dependent relations as well
(2)
as the different sequential combinations among the differ-
ent events can be described in a more explicit way thus
performing a more detailed analysis of the system under
investigation.
When employing static gates for the formulation of FTs,
‘AND’ as well as ‘OR’ gates are used, which are described
below at time t
    
PANDgate (t) = P c1 c2 c3 ...... cn
= P (c1 )P (c2 )....P (cn ) (5)
and
    
P ORgate (t) = P c1 c2 c3 .... cn
= 1 − [1 − P (c1 )][1 − P (c2 )].....[1 − p(cn )],
(6)
 344 I. Lazakis et al.
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Figure 5. Fault tree structure of the mentioned DG system. This figure is available in colour online.

where the online recording system of the vessel. More specifically

PANDgate (t) = probability for the ‘AND’ gate;
PORgate (t) = probability for the ‘OR’ gate;
ci . . . cn = independent basic events.
Another gate that is used in the DFT is the ‘TWO-
OUT-OF-THREE’ gate which describes the probability of
the redundant components in the system. This is given as
follows:
P2 out of 3 (t)
        
= P c1 c2 P c1 c3 P c2 c3
= P (c1 )P (c2 ) + P (c1 )P (c3 ) + P (c2 )P (c3 )
−2P (c1 )P (c2 )P (c3 ).
In addition to the above, criticality is described as the
product of the severity and frequency indices, that is,
Criticality = Severity × Frequency.
‘Mean Times Between Failures’ (MTBF) of the different
items are collected. The FMECA tool is then used to iden-
tify the most severe and frequent causes of the overall DG
system failures. Following this step is the creation of an
FT using static and dynamic gates, which are populated by
the MTBF mentioned above. The FT is divided into port
and starboard branches representing the actual layout of the
vessel’s engine room. Port side includes DG 1 and DG 2
while starboard side includes DG 3 and DG 4 (Figure 5).
In this way, the reliability of the overall DG system as well
as port and starboard side sub-systems is examined. More-
over, the least reliable DGs are identified and spare gates are
introduced to study the variation in their reliability. Next,
criticality importance measures are applied for all DGs and
(7) finally the availability of all the end events/items of the DG
system is shown.
The main particulars of the vessel under consideration
are presented in Table 1 and the main characteristics of the
DG system are given in Table 2.
(8)

Following this, the above-mentioned maintenance strat- Table 1. Main particulars of the subject vessel
egy will be shown more explicitly with the demonstration
of a case study of a Diesel Generator (DG) system of a Built 1990
cruise ship. Ship type Motor sailing yacht
Main propulsion Diesel-electric (four diesel generators)
Masts 5
Capacity 308 passengers
4. Case study Length 187.0 m (including bow sprit)
In the case study presented next, the first steps of the mainte- Breadth 20.0 metres
nance strategy which include the evaluation of the reliability Draft 5.0 metres
Tonnage 14,745 GRT
and availability of the overall system are described. At first, Service speed 10–15 knots
the data collection activity is shown including data from
 Ships and Offshore Structures 345

Table 2. DG characteristics example, in the case of DG 1 (Figure 7), the main part
of the DG is the main body/frame. Additional sub-systems
Total no of DG 4 include the fuel, air and lube oil system in addition to the al-
Rated kW 2,280
Total HP 13,216 ternator and the other components system. Accordingly, the
Total kW 9,720 same sub-division breakdown is followed for the rest of the
Engine rpm 750 DGs.
Cylinder bore 320 mm Initially, the FMECA table is created in order to identify
Cylinder stroke 350 mm the primary features of the system under examination. The
FO consumption 3 tonnes/24 hrs (normal
conditions) FMECA table is a combination of (Table 3):
r The failure events and their causes;
r The local and global effects taking place;
Figure 6 describes the DG system in more detail. It r The detection and prevention method applied;
consists of four DGs plus an emergency DG which cov- r The severity, frequency and criticality values;
ers all the needs of the ship in the case of an emergency. r The repair and unavailability times; and
The four DGs are connected through the main switchboard r Any additional remarks provided.
with two transformers, one for the 440 V and one for the
220 V electrical units. The 440 V unit is used to provide the In Table 4, the severity and frequency indices are pre-
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main propulsion of the ship through two propulsion units,
propulsion unit 1 (port) and propulsion unit 2 (starboard).
They also provide for the manoeuvrability of the ship with
two thruster units, thrusters unit 1 (aft) and thrusters unit 2
(forward). The 220 V electrical unit provides for the gen-
eral needs of the ship together with the control panel (CP)
boards for the bridge, engine room, etc. The emergency DG
is responsible for the primary needs of the ship in the case
of an emergency/unexpected event.
Furthermore, in order to understand the function of
each DG, they are divided in their own sub-systems. For
sented, while in Table 5 the explanations for severity, fre-
quency and criticality are mentioned in detail (also see IMO
2002).
In this way, the most critical components are identified
which will provide assistance in the preparation of the FT
structure that follows. More specifically, the most critical
components identified are:
r Engine preheating unit;
r Turbocharger;
r Fuel system, valves, piping;

Figure 6. Layout of the diesel generator (DG) system for the diesel–electric passenger ship. This figure is available in colour online.
 Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:57 1 November 2010

346

Table 3. Part of the FMECA table for the DG system

Effects
Failed Failure Failure Detection Prevention Repair
# item event cause Local Global method method Severity Frequency Criticality time Unavailability Remarks

1 Fuel system, Rupture of pipe, Bad diesel/HFO, Oil spillage, Fire in E/R, Visual, loss of Good 3 4 12 0.5 hrs Depending on In case of
valves, leakage, cat fines, hot spot genset power, high purification, situation (a major
piping sludge/water sludge creation failure, temperature filter few hrs) failure
in the line (MDO) blackout deviation cleaning, (fire), un-
fuel availability
treatment >4 weeks
2 Fuel filter Blocked Mechanism Low fuel oil Blackout and Differential Draining of 3 3 9 2 hrs 2.5 hrs Autoflush
autoclean failure pressure loss of pressure water/ mechanism
power alarm sludge in place
3 Fuel filter Blocked Choked filter Low fuel oil Blackout and Differential Draining of 3 3 9 1 hr 1.5 hrs Manual
duplex pressure loss of pressure water/ changeover
power alarm sludge & cleaning
4 Cooler lube oil Blocked, broken Sea water con- High lube oil Stoppage or Alarm Regular 3 3 9 3 hrs 4 hrs Manual
tube tamination, tempera- failure of cleaning of cleaning of
high ture, low DG coolers cooler
temperature lube oil
of cooling pressure, oil
I. Lazakis et al.

medium contamina-
(fresh or sea tion
water) (water)
5 Glacier oil Blocked Accumulation of Out of use Engine (piston Differential Manual 2 3 6 .5 hrs 1 hr Manual
filter sludge ring and pressure cleaning at cleaning of
deposits, not bearing) regular filter
proper wear intervals
cleaning
6 Filter, lube oil Blocked Choked filter Low lube oil Engine wear Differential Regular 3 3 9 1 hr 1.5 hrs Manual
(duplex) pressure pressure cleaning changeover
alarm & cleaning
7 Motor/starter, Start failure Motor over- Pump Reduced Motor alarm Motor regular 3 2 6 2 hrs 3 hrs Replace motor
pre-lube oil load/control stoppage electrical monitoring
pump failure load
supplied
 Ships and Offshore Structures 347
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Figure 7. Boundary condition of the DG 1 sub-system.

r DG 2: main body/frame, fuel system, filter/glacier oil,

Table 4. Criticality matrix
alternator and start air system (Figure 9);
5 10 15 20 25
r DG 3: main body/frame, fuel system, lube oil system,
4 8 12 16 20 other components and start air system (Figure 10);
r DG 4: main body/frame, lube oil system, alternator and
Severity

3 6 9 12 15
fuel system (Figure 11);
2 4 6 8 10 r Emergency DG (EDG): alternator and panel control
1 2 3 4 5
(Figure 7).
Frequency
The mentioned sub-systems include gates and basic
r Alarms; events which describe the level of details of the DG sys-
r Alternator 1; tem. For example, in the case of DG2, the sub-systems are
r Start air system. the main body/frame of DG2 which is divided into oil mist
detectors, cylinder heads, governor and turbocharger and
Moreover, the purpose of any study which applies the the fuel system of DG2 which is divided into fuel system,
FTA method is to use the appropriate static and/or dynamic valves and piping and fuel filter autoclean. The items of
gates that best fit each specific case. In this case study, static filter, glacier oil, alternator and start air system complete
as well as dynamic gates are used. the components of DG2 used for this analysis. Moreover, in
Next, the Reliability Excellence software (Relex Relia- order to populate the FT, actual failure data were gathered
bility Studio 2009) is used to perform the reliability analy- from the actual operational experience of the mentioned
sis. Moreover, the DGs are divided into: ship for a period between January 2004 and December
2008 and include failure, underperforming and overhaul-
r DG 1: main body/frame, fuel system, other components, ing events (Table 6). The values are described as the MTBF
air system and filter/glacier oil (Figure 8); for the operation of the DGs in hours. It is worthwhile

Table 5. Severity, frequency and criticality explanation table

Severity Explanation Frequency Explanation Criticality Explanation

Level 1: minor No loss of operation Level 1: unlikely > than 10−6 /hr Cat 1: level 1–4 Not critical
Level 2: marginal Signs of reduced operability Level 2: low 10−5 /hr–10−6 /hr Cat 2: level 5–14 Critical
Level 3: major Reduced performance Level 3: moderate 10−4 /hr–10−5 /hr Cat 3: level 15–25 Very critical
Level 4: critical Shutdown Level 4: high 10−3 /hr–10−4 /hr
Level 5: catastrophic Loss of item/equipment/system/ Level 5: very high < than 10−3 /hr
 348 I. Lazakis et al.

Figure 8. Fault tree structure of the DG 1 system. This figure is available in colour online.
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Figure 9. Fault tree structure of the DG 2 system. This figure is available in colour online.

mentioning that not all the MTBFs for all the different DGs
were available through the data gathering process due to
various reasons like not proper recording sequence of the
numerical values, etc.
After the population of the events, the time-dependent
reliability calculations (computing time) are set. At this
point, the computational pattern presented in Lazakis et al.
is followed (2009). Start point of calculations is set to 0,
while end time of calculations is set to 43,800 hours, which
is 5 years. In between, the calculation process is set to time
steps/intervals of 2,190 hours to coincide with the quar-
terly maintenance intervals period (seamanship practice of
3 months). In this way, one can see the progress of the re-
liability of all the equipment in more practical terms. The
calculation method used is the Exact method, which gives
higher accuracy on numerical results than other methods
using approximation techniques.
As can be seen in Figure 6, the top gate is a ‘VOTING’
gate with two out of three votes used. This means that
in order for the ship/system to fail, two of the three sub-
gates need to fail, that is, either the port side system and
the emergency DG or the starboard side system and the

Figure 10. Fault tree structure of the DG 3 system. This figure is available in colour online.
 Ships and Offshore Structures 349

Figure 11. Fault tree structure of the DG 4 system. This figure is available in colour online.

emergency DG. Next ‘AND’ gates are used to describe the Another dynamic gate that is used is the ‘SPARE’ gate.
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port and starboard side sub-systems. This occurs because in
order for the port or starboard system to fail, both the DGs
comprising these systems have to fail. In this case, there
will be no steering or manoeuvring capability of the ship.
Furthermore, DGs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are broken down to their
sub-systems by using ‘TRANSFER’ gates in order to obtain
a more flexible representation of the FT structure. Next, the
‘Priority AND’ or else ‘PAND’ gate is used to represent
the relationship among the basic events comprising each
sub-system. For example, in the case of DG 2, the main
body/frame of the DG is connected with a ‘PAND’ gate
with the basic events of oil mist detectors, cylinder heads,
governor and turbocharger. In this way and by using the
dynamic gates, a better and more accurate representation of
the whole DG system is made.
This is done in order to observe the reliability and availabil-
ity of each main system and sub-system when introducing a
spare gate and a spare event in the FT structure. In this way,
“SPARE” gates are used for the emergency DG (Figure 12)
and DG 4 (Figure 13).
Also, the F-V and Birnbaum importance measures are
used to show the influence of the end events on the main
system of the ship’s DG and the sub-systems.
Next, the reliability of all the DGs is calculated as
well as the reliability of the port, starboard and over-
all systems of the ship. The Criticality and Birnbaum
importance measures for all the end events are calcu-
lated. The availability of the end events is estimated
and the results of the FT are also presented in the next
section.

Table 6. Actual field data showing the mean time between failures (MTBF) for the operation of all the DGs

Components/MTBF (hours) DG 1 DG 2 DG 3 DG 4 Emergency DG

Valves, fuel injector cyl 1–6 64,056.0 n.a. 5,592.0 n.a. n.a.
Cylinder heads, complete 1–6 8,808.0 14,340.0 24,112.0 13,698.0 n.a.
Governor 11,995.2 25,704.0 36,780.0 1,896.0 n.a.
Turbocharger n.a. 31,944.0 19,512.0 48,288.0 n.a.
Oil mist detectors 8,296.0 5,736.0 n.a. 14,256.0 n.a.
Fuel system, valves, piping 2,208.0 29,436.0 2,208.0 29,736.0 n.a
Fuel filter autoclean n.a. 744.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fuel filter duplex 16,536.0 n.a. 22,992.0 n.a. n.a.
Thermostatic valve circuit 23,184.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Glacier oil filter 16,896.0 16,848.0 40,032.0 16,698.0 n.a.
Filter lube oil (duplex) n.a. n.a. n.a. 33,084.0 n.a.
L/O system, valves, piping n.a. n.a. 43,368.0 n.a. n.a.
Engine preheating unit n.a. n.a. 6,204.0 n.a. n.a.
Alarms 13,608.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Instruments n.a. n.a. 12,120.0 n.a. n.a.
Special tools 7,512.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Start limiter 32,748.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Start air system n.a. 8,048.0 50,856.0 n.a. n.a.
Air cooler and manifold 7,488.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Alternator 2,745.4 2,622.7 1,618.4 2,188.0 4,867.2
Panel control emergency DG n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18,494.4
 350 I. Lazakis et al.
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Figure 12. Fault tree structure of the ship DG’s system including the use of ‘SPARE’ gates. This figure is available in colour online.

5. Results port and starboard sub-systems are operating well enough

The results of the analysis regarding the entire DG sys-
tem of the cruise ship are presented. At first, the results of
the FT analysis with the initial gates used are shown to-
gether with the importance measures of the FT. Then, the
results including the dynamic “SPARE” gates are demon-
strated along with a comparison between the two different
scenarios.
The reliability of the entire DG (DG 1-4) system to-
gether with the reliability of the sub-systems of port and
starboard sides is presented in Figure 14.
As can be observed from the figure, all three systems
are very reliable. In fact, their reliability index is more than
98% for the first 36 months, which is reduced to about 94%
at the end Month 60 (time frame initially set). This is an
indication that the overall system of the DGs as well as the
with the maintenance tasks performed. The reliabilities of
the sub-systems of DG 1, DG 2, DG 3, DG 4 and EDG are
shown in Figure 15.
In this case, DG 1, DG 2 and DG 3 present very good
results in terms of their reliability indices over the 60-month
period (more than 90%). Regarding DG 4 and EDG, a de-
cline in the results is observed starting after the first few
months. This can be attributed to various reasons, such as
not enough maintenance tasks carried out or not follow-
ing the correct maintenance intervals for the specific DGs.
In order to investigate what happens in the case of intro-
ducing mitigation measures like an extra piece of equip-
ment, spare parts or more frequent maintenance, a spare
gate is introduced for both DG 4 and EDG (Figures 16
and 17).

Figure 13. Fault tree structure of DG 4 including the use of ‘SPARE’ gates. This figure is available in colour online.
 Ships and Offshore Structures 351

1.0

0.9

0.8
Reliability
Gate1-DG 1-4
Gate72-Port side
0.7 Gate73-Stbd side

0.6

0.5
Time 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
Time (months)

Figure 14. Reliability of the overall DG system (gate 1 – DG 1–4) and the main sub-systems (port and starboard sides). This figure is
available in colour online.
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1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6 Gate2-DG 1
Reliability

0.5 Gate8-DG 2
Gate13-DG 3
0.4
Gate19-DG 4
0.3
Gate23-EDG
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
Tim e (m onths)

Figure 15. Reliability of the sub-systems of DG 1, DG 2, DG 3, DG 4 and EDG. This figure is available in colour online.

1.0

0.8

0.6
Reliability

Gate19-DG 4

0.4 with SPARE gate

0.2

0.0
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
Time (months)

Figure 16. Comparison of the reliability of DG 4 before and after the introduction of spare gate. This figure is available in colour online.
 352 I. Lazakis et al.

1.0

0.8

Reliability 0.6
Gate23-EDG

0.4 with SPARE gate

0.2

0.0
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
Time (months)

Figure 17. Comparison of the reliability of EDG before and after the introduction of spare gate. This figure is available in colour online.
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As can be seen, the results for DG 4 and EDG are im- by using the Criticality and Birnbaum importance measures
proved significantly for the initial time period of 6 months for the four DGs. The results are presented in Table 7 and
but still preserve a low value for the overall period. This Figures 18–21.
may be due to problems with the specific DGs which are not Regarding DG 1, the glacier oil filter and the alternator
easily overcome with the introduction of mitigation mea- are the main contributors to the reliability importance of
sures like the ones mentioned above. It is also interesting to DG 1 and these items need special attention when prioritiz-
note that the low reliability results of these two DGs do not ing the maintenance activities. Regarding Birnbaum mea-
affect the overall system (as shown in Figure 14). This can sure, glacier oil filter and start limiter are the most important
be explained as EDG is only rarely used (it is mostly oper- items for this measure.
ated/tested to check its functionality over time) and DG 4 For DG 2, the alternator and start air system are the
was mainly a back-up DG for the overall operation of the most important items according to the Criticality measure,
DG system at the time the maintenance data were gathered. while according to the Birnbaum one, higher importance is
Apart from examining the reliability of the attributed to the fuel system, valves and piping as well as
main systems, the reliability importance of the end the glacier oil filter component.
events/components for DG 1, DG 2, DG 3 and DG 4 is also The alternator keeps appearing as the most important
investigated in depth in order to identify the ones which item according to the Criticality measure for DG 3 too.
need specific maintenance tasks applied. This is carried out Other components of similar importance are the engine

Cri
cality Birnbaum

0.8 0.02
0.6 0.015
0.4 0.01
0.2 0.005
0 0
Governor DG

Governor DG
Air cooler &
Alternator

Air cooler &

Alarms DG 1

Cylinder

Alternator

Alarms DG 1
Fuel filter

Cylinder
Thermosta
c
Oil mist

Valves fuel
Valves and
Start limiter

Thermosta
c
Oil mist
Fuel filter
Special tools

Valves fuel
Valves and
Filter glacier

Start limiter
Special tools
Filter glacier

End events End events

Figure 18. Criticality and Birnbaum importance measures for DG 1. This figure is available in colour online.
 Ships and Offshore Structures 353

Table 7. Criticality and Birnbaum importance measures for DG Table 8. Availability of end events for the DG system
1, DG 2, DG 3 and DG 4
End event Availability (%)
Criticality Birnbaum
importance importance Valves/fuel injectors DG1 87.2%
End events measure measure Start air system DG 3 84.2%
Turbocharger overhaul DG 4 83.4%
Glacier oil filter of DG 1 0.636732 0.012602 L/O system, valves, piping DG 3 81.7%
Alternator DG 1 0.604723 0.00505 Glacier oil filter DG 3 80.3%
Special tools DG 1 0.604723 0.007034 Governor DG 3 78.8%
Alarms DG 1 0.604723 0.010201 Filter, lube oil duplex DG 4 76.7%
Air cooler and manifold DG 1 0.481561 0.005592 Start limiter DG 1 76.5%
Start limiter DG 1 0.481561 0.016429 Turbocharger overhaul DG 2 76.0%
Valves and piping DG 1 0.418505 0.003416 Fuel system, valves piping DG 4 74.5%
Fuel filter duplex DG 1 0.418505 0.008148 Fuel system, valves and piping DG 2 74.3%
Thermostatic valve circuit DG 1 0.418505 0.01065 Governor DG 2 71.1%
Oil mist detectors DG 1 0.11922 0.001464 Cylinder heads DG 3 69.5%
Cylinder heads DG 1 0.11922 0.001515 Thermostatic valve circuit DG 1 68.5%
Governor DG 1 0.11922 0.001842 Fuel filter duplex DG 3 68.3%
Valves fuel injector DG 1 0.11922 0.007469 Turbocharger overhaul DG 3 63.8%
Alternator DG 2 0.737713 0.006124 Panel control EDG 62.3%
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Start air system DG 2 0.730506 0.008819 Glacier oil filter of DG 1 L/O system 59.5%
Glacier oil filter DG 2 0.715832 0.014137 Glacier oil filter DG 2 59.5%
Fuel filter autoclean DG 2 0.69412 0.005558 Glacier oil filter DG 4 59.2%
Fuel system, valves, piping DG 2 0.69412 0.021593 Fuel filter duplex DG 1 58.9%
Oil mist detectors DG 2 0.136151 0.001393 Cylinder heads DG 2 54.3%
Cylinder heads DG 2 0.136151 0.002385 Oil mist detectors DG 4 54.1%
Governor DG 2 0.136151 0.003775 Cylinder heads DG 4 52.8%
Turbocharger DG 2 0.136151 0.004545 Alarms DG 1 52.5%
Alternator DG 3 0.240641 0.001935 Instruments DG 3 48.5%
Engine preheating unit DG 3 0.240641 0.002548 Governor DG 1 48.2%
Instruments DG 3 0.240641 0.003744 Cylinder heads DG 1 37.0%
Fuel system, valves, piping DG 3 0.238967 0.00195 Oil mist detectors DG 1 34.8%
Fuel filter duplex DG 3 0.238967 0.006039 Start air system DG 2 33.7%
Start air system DG 3 0.230806 0.01168 Special tools DG 1 31.2%
Filter, glacier oil DG 3 0.17425 0.007099 Air cooler and manifold DG 1 31.0%
L/O system valves & piping DG 3 0.17425 0.007629 Engine preheating unit DG 3 24.4%
Turbocharger DG 3 0.105057 0.002326 Oil mist detectors DG 2 21.7%
Cylinder heads DG 3 0.105057 0.002761 Valves, fuel injector cyl 1–6 DG 4 20.9%
Governor DG 3 0.105057 0.003969 Alternator EDG 16.5%
Alternator DG 4 0.177634 0.001449 Alternator DG 1 4.1%
Valves, fuel injectors DG 4 0.105057 0.001063 Alternator DG2 3.5%
Fuel system, valves piping DG 4 0.046168 0.001449 Valves and piping DG 1 1.9%
Glacier oil filter DG 4 0.017182 0.000337 Fuel system, valves piping DG 3 1.9%
Filter, lube oil duplex DG 4 0.017182 0.000591 Alternator DG 4 1.8%
Governor DG 4 0.006447 0.000052 Governor DG 4 1.0%
Cylinder heads DG 4 0.006447 0.000109 Alternator DG3 0.4%
Oil mist detectors DG 4 0.006447 0.000112 Fuel filter autoclean DG 2 0.0%
Turbocharger DG 4 0.006447 0.000311

preheating unit and various instruments. For the Birnbaum

measure, the important items include the start air system
and the lube oil valves and piping items.
A similar condition applies for DG 4. By using the
Criticality measure, the alternator is identified as the most
important component of this DG together with the valves
and fuel injectors and the fuel system, valves and piping.
Accordingly, for Birnbaum, the important items include the
alternator and the valves and fuel injectors as well.
It is also worth mentioning that in some cases, there is
a difference between the ranking of the importance for the
various end events for Criticality and Birnbaum measures.
This is due to the different purpose that these two measures
serve. In the case of the Criticality measure, the aim is
to prioritise the maintenance effort, while the Birnbaum
measure estimates the difference in the probability of the
top event when the specific event measured is operating
well and when it has failed.
Furthermore, the availability of the end events of the
system after 12 months of operation is examined (Table 8,
Figure 22).
 Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:57 1 November 2010

354

0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8

Alternator

0
0.1
0.2
0.3

0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Alternator DG 2
Alternator Start air
DG 3
DG 4 Engine system DG 2
Valves, fue prehea
ng
Instruments Filter glacier
l injectors DG
Fuel system, DG 3 oil DG 2
Fuel system, Fuel filter
valves piping valves,
Filter glacier Fuel filter autoclean DG
oil DG 4 duplex DG 3 Fuel system,
Cri
cality

Filter, lub oil Start air valves ,

Cri
cality

Cri
cality
system DG 3
End events
duplex DG 4 Filter, glacier Oil mist

End events
End events
Governor DG
oil DG 3 detectors DG
4 L/O system
Cylinder Cylinder
valves &
heads DG 4 Turbocharger heads DG 2
Oil mist DG 3 Governor DG
Cylinder
detectors DG heads DG 3 2
Turbocharger Governor DG Turbocharger
DG 4 3

system with the least available items (less than 20% avail-

system is DG 3 with the alternator and fuel system, valves

valves/fuel injector components. The next most critical sub-
ability) is DG 4 including the governor, alternator and the
As may be seen from the table and the figure, the sub-
DG 2

0.005
0.015

0
0.01

0.0005

0
0.001
0.0015
I. Lazakis et al.

Alternator
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025

Alternator DG 3
DG 4 Engine Alternator
Valves, fue prehea
ng DG 2
Instruments
l injectors DG Start air
Fuel system, DG 3
Fuel system, system DG 2
valves piping valves, Filter glacier
Filter glacier Fuel filter oil DG 2
oil DG 4 duplex DG 3 Fuel filter
Start air
Birnbaum

Filter, lub oil

Birnbaum
system DG 3 autoclean DG
duplex DG 4
Birnbaum

End events Filter, glacier Fuel system,

Governor DG

End events
oil DG 3 valves ,
4 L/O system
End events

Oil mist
Cylinder valves &
Turbocharger detectors DG

Figure 21. Criticality and Birnbaum importance measures for DG 4. This figure is available in colour online.
Figure 20. Criticality and Birnbaum importance measures for DG 3. This figure is available in colour online.
Figure 19. Criticality and Birnbaum importance measures for DG 2. This figure is available in colour online.

after the mentioned period of time.

heads DG 4
Oil mist DG 3 Cylinder
Cylinder heads DG 2
detectors DG
Turbocharger heads DG 3 Governor DG
Governor DG
DG 4 3 2
Turbocharger
DG 2
cial attention since their availability is reduced significantly
also some of the components of the system that need spe-
and piping in the lowest ranking placement. The fuel filter
autoclean of DG 2 and the valves and piping of DG 1 are
 Ships and Offshore Structures
Figure 22. Availability of end events for the DG system. This figure is available in colour online.
Downloaded By: [informa internal users] At: 11:57 1 November 2010
6. Concluding remarks
In the present paper, a criticality and reliability methodol-
ogy is proposed in the context of the overall predictive main-
tenance strategy regarding shipping industry. It involves the
upgrading of the existing ship maintenance regime to an
overall strategy including technological advances and a de-
cision support system in place. The initial phases of this
application were demonstrated by using operational data
from a diesel generator system of a cruise ship comprising
of four main diesel generators and an emergency one. The
well-established and recognised risk and reliability assess-
ment methods of FMECA and FTA with static and dynamic
gates, as well as the Birnbaum and Criticality importance
measures were utilised.
The maintenance data collection activity was carried out
for the various components of the diesel generator system
in a systematic way identifying the values that will be used
for the analysis of the system at the next stages. The initial
classification of all the components of the DG system of the
cruise vessel was also performed by using criticality indices
and thus involving experts’ judgement in the analysis of the
overall system. By employing the FT reliability tool for
the main system (DG) and sub-systems (port and starboard
sides, DG 1, DG 2, DG 3 and DG 4), the overall reliability
was calculated providing the knowledge of which compo-
nents are operating in terms of high and low performance
level. By identifying the underperforming items, additional
corrective steps were taken to improve their condition. This
was achieved by introducing dynamic spare gates which
reflect the mitigation measures involved regarding the tech-
nical part of the maintenance procedures. In this respect,
the criticality of each component of the DGs is also cal-
culated providing in-depth insight on the specific item that
needs to be rectified/improved so as to advance the opera-
tion of the entire DG. Finally, the calculation of the avail-
ability of the end events of the system under consideration
355
is also performed in order to prioritise the maintenance
tasks and establish an effective maintenance sequence.
In this way, the maintenance tasks for the specific equip-
ment and systems can be prioritised, which will lead to a
structured way of coping with the maintenance issues on-
board the ship and subsequently to increasing the avail-
ability and operability of the vessel. Moreover, in order
to obtain a more complete picture of the maintenance chal-
lenges, the inclusion of cost–benefit analysis for the specific
mitigation measures (i.e., introduction of spare parts, better
scheduling of maintenance activities, condition monitoring
system in place to retrieve accurate and continuous flow of
data and outsourcing major maintenance jobs to external
providers on-board the ship) can be introduced. Further-
more, other reliability tools (i.e., Markov analysis) can be
used to identify the dynamic behaviour of the system under
consideration.
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