Impeachment Complaint Final Against Justice Del Castillio

Republic of the Philippines
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Quezon City
IN THE MATTER OF THE

IMPEACHMENT OF SUPREME
COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO,
ISABELITA C. VINUYA,
PILAR Q. GALANG,
MAXIMA R. DE LA CRUZ,
LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,
MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
HON. REYNALDO V. UMALI,
HON. BERNADETTE R. HERRERA-
DY,
HON. JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO
HON. CESAR V. SARMIENTO,
HON. IRVIN M. ALCALA,
HON. FLORENCIO T. FLORES, JR.,
HON. VICENTE F. BELMONTE, JR.
HON. TEODORO B. BAGUILAT, JR.,
HON. JORGE “BOLET” BANAL, JR.,
HON. WALDEN F. BELLO,
HON. KAKA J. BAG-AO,
Complainants.
VERIFIED IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
1
COMPLAINANTS, respectfully state that:
PREFATORY
In Tan v. Rosete (A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004),

the Supreme Court had the occasion to state that judges or justices
must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct “to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary because people’s confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge
and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on
the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they
are expected to possess”.
In Buenaventura v. Benedicto1, the Supreme Court

explained the duty of judges to take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
improper conduct, to wit:
Oftentimes…leniency provides the court employees the

opportunity to commit minor transgressions of the laws and
slight breaches of official duty ultimately leading to vicious
delinquencies. The respondent judge should constantly keep a
watchful eye on the conduct of his employees. He should
realize that big fires start small. His constant scrutiny of the
behavior of his employees would deter any abuse on the part
of the latter in the exercise of their duties. Then, his
subordinates would check that any misdemeanor will not
remain unchecked. The slightest semblance of impropriety on
the part of the employees of the court in the performance of
their official duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public
distrust of the judicial administrators. The slightest breach of
duty by and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of court
officers and employees detract from the dignity of the courts
and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.
1
Adm. Case No. 137-J, March 27, 1971
2
What is involved in the present case is not just a slight breach
of duty or a minor transgression. The public official involved is not
just an ordinary court personnel or judge. This case involves an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, who, because of inexcusable
acts of intellectual dishonesty, has dragged his colleagues in the
Court, the entire Supreme Court, and the country’s justice system in
a controversy that has caused not mere ripples, but waves of public
suspicion and distrust in the justice system.
His acts constitute betrayal of public trust. A mere disciplinary

action will not suffice, considering the gravity of the action and its
effects on the entire nation. Impeachment should be the
appropriate remedy.
NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT
This is a verified Impeachment Complaint brought under Article

XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution against Supreme Court
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo on the ground of betrayal of
public trust.
THE PARTIES
The Complainants, Isabelita C. Vinuya, Pilar Q. Galang, Maxima

R. De La Cruz, Leonor H. Sumawang, Maria L. Quilantang,
(hereinafter “Complainants”), are all Filipino citizens, of legal age,
and residents of the Philippines. They are members of Malaya Lolas,
a non-governmental organization that provides aid to victims of rape
by the Japanese imperial forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.
They may be served summons and other processes of the

Honorable House of Representatives at c/o KAISA KA, Libertad St.,
Mandaluyong City.
3
The other Complainants Hon. Reynaldo V. Umali, Hon.
Bernadette R. Herrera-Dy, Hon. Joseph Victor G. Ejercito, Hon. Cesar
V. Sarmiento, Hon. Irvin M. Alcala, Hon. Florencio T. Flores, Jr., Hon.
Vicente F. Belmonte, Jr., Hon. Teodoro B. Baguilat, Jr., Hon. Jorge
“Bolet” Banal, Jr., Hon. Walden F. Bello, Hon. Kaka J. Bag-ao, are
incumbent members of the House of Representatives, and may be
served summons through their respective offices at the House of
Representatives.
The Respondent, Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (hereinafter

“Justice Del Castillo”) is an incumbent Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court and is being sued in his official capacity. He
assumed office as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 29 July
2009. He rose from the ranks of the judiciary, having served as
Municipal Trial Court Judge from 1989 to 1992, Regional Trial Court
Judge from 1992 to 2001 and Court of Appeals Associate Justice
from 2001 until his appointment to the Supreme Court in July 2009.
He may be served summons and other processes of the Honorable
House of Representatives at the Supreme Court, Padre Faura St.,
Ermita, 1000 Manila.
4
THE FACTS
1. On 28 April 2010, the Supreme Court promulgated a

Decision in Isabelita Vinuya et. al., vs. Executive Secretary,
et. al. (G.R. No. 162330). The Decision, penned by Justice
Del Castillo, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the
members of Malaya Lolas, a non-governmental organization
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War, who
were asking the Court to compel the Executive Department
to espouse their claim for apology and other forms of
reparations against the Japanese government for the rape
and sexual slavery that they suffered from the Japanese
military during World War II.
2. Significant portions of Justice Del Castillo’s ponencia were

lifted without attribution from the works of International Law
professors/authors, namely, Dr. Christian J. Tams, Dr. Evan
Criddle, Dr. Evan Fox-Decent, and Dr. Mark Ellis. Worse,
Justice Del Castillo made it appear that the theories of these
authors to support the Decision to dismiss the Vinuya
Petition. The extensive plagiarism and misrepresentation
done by Justice Del Castillo were initially brought to the
attention of the Supreme Court by the counsel of the
petitioners in Vinuya in their Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated 18 July 2010.2
2
The Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration alleges that portions of the Vinuya decision were lifted without
attribution from the works of International Law authors, particularly:
1. Prof. Evan Criddle and Prof. Evan Fox-Decent’s 2009 article in the Yale Journal of International
Law, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens”
2. Dr. Christian Tams’ book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, published by
Cambridge University Press;
3. Dr. Mark Ellis’ article in the 2006 volume of Case Western Journal of International Law,
“Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime.”
5
3. Soon, the International Law professors/authors came
forward with their complaints regarding the plagiarism and
misuse of their works by Justice Del Castillo.
4. In a letter3 addressed to the Supreme Court, dated 23 July

2010, Dr. Mark Ellis states:
“I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to

my attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed

Court, I am compelled, as a question of the integrity of my
work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights
and humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible
unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an
international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in
the case of Vinuya et. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al.
(G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of April 28, 2010).
xxx xxx xxx
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the

extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said
Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that
your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I
made in the article and employed them for cross-purposes.
This would be ironic since the article was written precisely
to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article was published in the Case

Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has
been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that
your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study
the arguments I made in the article.”
5. On 19 July 2010, Prof. Criddle made public his complaint on

the misuse of his works when he posted the following in the
website Opinio Juris:
3
http://www.scribd.com/doc/39856111/Letter-to-Republic-of-the-Philippines-Supreme-Court-Ellis, accessed on
13 December 2010.
6
“The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains
thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to
sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored
with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were
unaware of the petitioners’ plagiarism allegations until after
the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the

court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the
prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual
slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. “ 4
6. Then, in a letter5 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona,

dated 18 August 2010, Professor Tams states:
“My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of

international law at t he University of Glasgow. I am writing
to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the
above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p.

30 of your Court ’s Judgment, in the sect ion addressing the
concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to
this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost
word by word from the introductory chapter of my book
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law
(Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a
generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another
author (Bruno Simma) rather than wit h respect to the
substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment , I do not
think it can be considered an appropriate form of
referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been

used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to the
erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows
that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite:
namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely
accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international
law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that “[t]he
present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very
mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its
4
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-bedevils-philippines-supreme-court-
justice/ accessed on 13 December 2010.
5
http://www.scribd.com/doc/39856262/Tams-Letter-to-Supreme-Court, accessed on 13 December 2010.
7
implementation” (p.5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that “the preceding chapters show that the
concept is now a part of the reality of international law,
established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice
of States” (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss t

o see how my work should have been cited to support – as it
seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I
am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s
judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.”
7. The extent of the plagiarism and misrepresentation done by

Justice Del Castillo is best appreciated from the tables
drawn by Supreme Court Associate Justice Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno in her dissenting opinion6 in the case “In the
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism Against Associate Justice
Mariano Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, 15 October
2010), thus:
TABLE A: Comparison of Christian J. Tams’s book, entitled

Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law (2005),
hereinafter called “Tams’s work” and the Supreme Court’s 28
April 2010 Decision in Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary.
CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive

ENFORCING ERGA OMNES Secretary, G.R. No. 162230,
OBLIGATIONS IN 28 April 2010.
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
1. xxx The Latin phrase ‘erga *The Latin phrase, ‘erga

omnes’ thus has become omnes,’ has since become
one of the rallying cries of one of the rallying cries of
those sharing a belief in the those sharing a belief in the
emergence of a value-based emergence of a value-based
international public order international public order.
based on law. xxx However, as is so often the
case, the reality is neither so
As often, the reality is clear nor so bright. Whatever
6
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2010/10-7-17-SC_sereno.htm, accessed on 13 December
2010.
8
neither so clear nor so the relevance of obligations
bright. One problem is erga omnes as a legal
readily admitted by concept, its full potential
commentators: whatever the remains to be realized in
relevance of obligations practice.[FN69] (p. 30, Body of
erga omnes as a legal the 28 April 2010 Decision)
concept, its full potential
remains to be realised in [FN69]
Bruno Simma’s much-
practice. xxx Bruno Simma’s quoted observation
much-quoted observation encapsulates this feeling of
encapsulates this feeling of disappointment: ‘Viewed
disappointment: ‘Viewed realistically, the world of
realistically, the world of obligations erga omnes is
obligations erga omnes is still the world of the “ought”
still the world of the ‘‘ought’’ rather than of the “is”’ THE
rather than of the ‘‘is’’. CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
125 (Simma, ed. 1995). See
Tams, Enforcing Obligations
Erga omnes in International
Law (2005).
*The decision mentioned

Christian Tams’s book in
(pp. 3-4 of the Christian footnote 69.
Tams’s book)
TABLE B: Comparison of Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent’s

article in the Yale Journal of International Law, entitled A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens (2009), hereinafter called
“Criddle’s & Fox-Decent’s work” and the Supreme Court’s 28
April 2010 Decision in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary.
Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox- Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive

Decent, A Fiduciary Theory Secretary, G.R. No. 162230,
of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. 28 April 2010
INT'L L. 331 (2009).
1. In international law, the In international law, the

term “jus cogens” (literally, term “jus cogens” (literally,
“compelling law”) refers to “compelling law”) refers to
norms that command norms that command
peremptory authority, peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting superseding conflicting
treaties and custom. xxx Jus treaties and custom. Jus
cogens norms are cogens norms are
9
considered peremptory in considered peremptory in
the sense that they are the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be derogation, and can be
modified only by general modified only by general
international norms ofinternational norms of
equivalent authority.[FN2] equivalent authority.[FN70]
(pp. 30-31, Body of the 28
[FN2]
See Vienna Convention April 2010 Decision)
on the Law of Treaties art.
53, opened for signature [FN70] See Vienna Convention
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. on the Law of Treaties art.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 53, opened for signature
[hereinafter VCLT]. May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679
(pp. 331-332 of the Yale Law [hereinafter VCLT].
Journal of Int’l Law)
2. Peremptory norms began to xxx but peremptory norms

attract greater scholarly began to attract greater
attention with the scholarly attention with the
publication of Alfred von publication of Alfred von
Verdross's influential 1937 Verdross's influential 1937
article, Forbidden Treaties inarticle, Forbidden Treaties in
International Law.[FN10] International Law. [FN72] (p.
31, Body of the 28 April
[FN10]
For example, in the 2010 Decision)
1934 Oscar Chinn Case,
Judge Schücking's influential [FN72] Verdross argued that
dissent stated that neither certain discrete rules of
an interna-tional court nor international custom had
an arbitral tribunal should come to be recognized as
apply a treaty provision in having a compulsory
contradiction to bonos character notwithstanding
mores. Oscar Chinn Case, contrary state agreements.
1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. At first, Verdross's vision of
63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) international jus cogens
(Schücking, J., dissenting). encountered skepticism
within the legal academy.
These voices of resistance
soon found themselves in
the minority, however, as
the jus cogens concept
gained enhanced
recognition and credibility
following the Second World
War. (See Lauri
Hannikainen, Peremptory
10
(p. 334 of the Yale Law Norms (Jus cogens) in
Journal of Int’l Law) International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria,
Present Status 150 (1988)
(surveying legal scholarship
during the period 1945-69
and reporting that “about
eighty per cent [of scholars]
held the opinion that there
are peremptory norms
existing in international
law”).
3. Classical publicists such as Classical publicists such

[FN71]
Hugo Grotius, Emer de as Hugo Grotius, Emer de

Vattel, and Christian Wolff Vattel, and Christian Wolff
drew upon the Roman law drew upon the Roman law
distinction between jus distinction between jus
dispositivum (voluntary law) dispositivum (voluntary law)
and jus scriptum (obligatory and jus scriptum (obligatory
law) to differentiate law) to differentiate
consensual agreements consensual agreements
between states from the between states from the
“necessary” principles of “necessary” principles of
international law that bind international law that bind
all states as a point of all states as a point of
conscience regardless of conscience regardless of
consent.[FN6] consent.
[FN6]
See Hugonis Grotii, De
Jure Belli et Pacis [On the
Law of War and Peace]
(William Whewell ed. &
trans., John W. Parker,
London 2009) (1625); Emer
de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens
ou Principes de la Loi
Naturelle [The Law of
Nations or Principles of
Natural Law] §§ 9, 27 (1758)
(distinguishing “le Droit des
Gens Naturel, ou (p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28
Nécessaire” from “le Droit April 2010 Decision)
Volontaire”); Christian Wolff,
Jus Gentium Methodo
Scientifica Pertractorum [A
Scientific Method for
11
Understanding the Law of
Nations] ¶ 5 (James Brown
Scott ed., Joseph H. Drake
trans., Clarendon Press
1934) (1764).
(p. 334 of the Yale Law

4. Early twentieth-century [FN71]

xxx Early twentieth-
publicists such as Lassa century publicists such as
Oppenheim and William Hall Lassa Oppenheim and
asserted confidently that William Hall asserted that
states could not abrogate states could not abrogate
certain “universally certain “universally
recognized principles” by recognized principles” by
mutual agreement.[FN9] mutual agreement. xxx
Outside the academy, Judges on the Permanent
judges on the Permanent Court of International Justice
Court of International Justice affirmed the existence of
affirmed the existence of peremptory norms in
peremptory norms in international law by
international law by referencing treaties contra
referencing treaties contra bonos mores (contrary to
bonos mores (contrary to public policy) in a series of
public policy) in a series of individual concurring and
individual concurring and dissenting opinions. xxx
dissenting opinions.[FN10] xxx
[FN9]
William Hall, A Treatise
on International Law 382-83
(8th ed. 1924) (asserting
that “fundamental principles
of international law” may
“invalidate [], or at least
render voidable,” conflicting
international agreements); 1
Lassa Oppen-heim,
International Law 528
(1905).
[FN10]
For example, in the (p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28
1934 Oscar Chinn Case, April 2010 Decision)
Judge Schücking's influential
dissent stated that neither
an interna-tional court nor
an arbitral tribunal should
apply a treaty provision in
12
contradiction to bonos
mores. Oscar Chinn Case,
1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12)
(Schücking, J., dissenting).
(pp. 334-5 of the Yale Law

5. [FN9]
William Hall, A Treatise [FN71]
xxx (William Hall, A
on International Law 382-83 Treatise on International
(8th ed. 1924) (asserting Law 382-83 (8th ed. 1924)
that “fundamental principles (asserting that “fundamental
of international law” may principles of international
“invalidate [], or at least law” may “invalidate [], or at
render voidable,” conflicting least render voidable,”
international agreements) conflicting international
xxx agreements) xxx
(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28

(Footnote 9 of the Yale Law April 2010 Decision)
6. [FN10]
For example, in the xxx (For example, in the
[FN71]
1934 Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 Oscar Chinn Case,

Judge Schücking's influential Judge Schücking's influential
dissent stated that neither dissent stated that neither
an international court nor an an international court nor an
arbitral tribunal should arbitral tribunal should apply
apply a treaty provision in a treaty provision in
contradiction to bonos contradiction to bonos
mores. Oscar Chinn Case, mores. Oscar Chinn Case,
1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12)
(Schücking, J., dissenting). (Schücking, J., dissenting).
(Footnote 9 of the Yale Law (p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28

Journal of Int’l Law) April 2010 Decision)
7. Verdross argued that certain [FN72]

Verdross argued that
discrete rules of certain discrete rules of
international custom had international custom had
come to be recognized as come to be recognized as
having a compulsory having a compulsory
character notwithstanding character notwithstanding
contrary state agreements. contrary state agreements.
[FN12]
xxx
13
[Von Verdross, supra
[FN12]
note 5.]
(pp. 335 of the Yale Law April 2010 Decision)
8. At first, Verdross's vision of [FN72]

xxx At first, Verdross's
international jus cogens vision of international jus
encountered skepticism cogens encountered
within the legal academy. skepticism within the legal
xxx These voices of academy. These voices of
resistance soon found resistance soon found
themselves in the minority, themselves in the minority,
however, as the jus cogens however, as the jus cogens
concept gained enhanced concept gained enhanced
recognition and credibility recognition and credibility
following the Second World following the Second World
War. War. xxx

(pp. 335-6 of the Yale Law April 2010 Decision)
9. See Lauri Hannikainen,

[FN18] [FN72]
xxx (See Lauri
Peremptory Norms (Jus Hannikainen, Peremptory
Cogens) in International Norms (Jus cogens) in
Law: Historical International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Development, Criteria,
Present Status 150 (1988) Present Status 150 (1988)
(surveying legal scholarship (surveying legal scholarship
during the period 1945-69 during the period 1945-69
and reporting that “about and reporting that “about
eighty per cent [of scholars] eighty per cent [of scholars]
held the opinion that there held the opinion that there
are peremptory norms are peremptory norms
existing in international existing in international
law”). law”).

(Footnote 18 of the Yale Law April 2010 Decision)
10 xxx the 1950s and 1960s xxx the 1950s and 1960s
. with the United Nations with the ILC’s preparation of
International Law the Vienna Convention on
14
Commission's (ILC) the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
preparation of the Vienna [FN73]
Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT).[FN20] (p. 31, Body of the 28 April
2010 Decision)
[FN20]
VCLT, supra note 2.
[FN73]
In March 1953, the ILC's
Special Rapporteur, Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht,
submitted for the ILC's
consideration a partial draft
convention on treaties which
stated that “[a] treaty, or
(p. 336 of the Yale Law any of its provisions, is void
Journal of Int’l Law) if its performance involves
an act which is illegal under
international law and if it is
declared so to be by the
International Court of
Justice.” Hersch
Lauterpacht, Law of
Treaties: Report by Special
Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 93, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/63.
11 In March 1953, Lauterpacht [FN73]

In March 1953, the ILC's
. submitted for the ILC's Special Rapporteur, Sir
consideration a partial draft Hersch Lauterpacht,
convention on treaties which submitted for the ILC's
stated that “[a] treaty, or consideration a partial draft
any of its provisions, is void convention on treaties which
if its performance involves stated that “[a] treaty, or
an act which is illegal under any of its provisions, is void
international law and if it is if its performance involves
declared so to be by the an act which is illegal under
International Court of international law and if it is
Justice.” [FN21]
declared so to be by the
International Court of
[FN21]
Hersch Lauterpacht, Justice.” Hersch
Law of Treaties: Report by Lauterpacht, Law of
Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Treaties: Report by Special
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 93, Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63. Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 93, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/63.
Journal of Int’l Law) (p. 31, Footnote 73 of the 28
15
April 2010 Decision)
12 Lauterpacht's colleagues on Though there was a

. the ILC generally accepted consensus that certain
his assessment that certain international norms had
international norms had attained the status of jus
attained the status of jus cogens, [FN74] the ILC was
cogens. [FN23] Yet despite unable to reach a consensus
general agreement over the on the proper criteria for
existence of international identifying peremptory
jus cogens, the ILC was norms.
unable to reach a consensus
regarding either the (p. 31, Body of the 28 April
theoretical basis for 2010 Decision)
peremptory norms' legal
authority or the proper See Summary Records
[FN74]
criteria for identifying of the 877th Meeting, [1966]

peremptory norms. 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227,
230-231, U.N. Doc.
See Hannikainen, supra
[FN23] A/CN.4/188 (noting that the
note 18, at 160-61 (noting “emergence of a rule of jus
that none of the twenty five cogens banning aggressive
members of the ILC in 1963 war as an international
denied the existence of jus crime” was evidence that
cogens or contested the international law contains
inclusion of an article on jus “minimum requirement[s]
cogens in the VCLT); see, for safeguarding the
e.g., Summary Records of existence of the
the 877th Meeting, [1966] 1 international community”).
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227,
230-231, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/188 (noting that the
“emergence of a rule of jus
cogens banning aggressive
war as an international
crime” was evidence that
international law contains
“minimum requirement[s]
for safeguarding the
existence of the
international community”).

13 xxx see, e.g., Summary [FN74] See Summary Records

[FN23]
. Records of the 877th of the 877th Meeting, [1966]
16
Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Int'l 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227,
L. Comm'n 227, 230-231, 230-231, U.N. Doc.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 A/CN.4/188 (noting that the
(noting that the “emergence “emergence of a rule of jus
of a rule of jus cogens cogens banning aggressive
banning aggressive war as war as an international
an international crime” was crime” was evidence that
evidence that international international law contains
law contains “minimum “minimum requirement[s]
requirement[s] for for safeguarding the
safeguarding the existence existence of the
of the international international community”).
community”).
(Footnote 23 of the Yale Law
14 After an extended debate After an extended debate

. over these and other over these and other
theories of jus cogens, the theories of jus cogens, the
ILC concluded ruefully in ILC concluded ruefully in
1963 that “there is not as 1963 that “there is not as
yet any generally accepted yet any generally accepted
criterion by which to identify criterion by which to identify
a general rule of a general rule of
international law as having international law as having
the character of jus the character of jus
cogens.” [FN27]
xxx In cogens.” [FN75]
In a
commentary accompanying commentary accompanying
the draft convention, the ILC the draft convention, the ILC
indicated that “the prudent indicated that “the prudent
course seems to be to . . . course seems to be to x x x
leave the full content of this leave the full content of this
rule to be worked out in rule to be worked out in
State practice and in the State practice and in the
jurisprudence of jurisprudence of
international tribunals.”[FN29] international tribunals.”[FN76]
xxx xxx
[FN27]
Second Report on the (p. 32, Body of the 28 April
Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 2010 Decision)
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 52,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156. [FN75]
Second Report on the
Law of Treaties, [1963] 2
[FN29]
Second Report on the Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 52,
Law of Treaties, supra note U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156.
27, at 53.
[76]
Id. at 53.
17
(p. 337-8 of the Yale Law
15 In some municipal cases, xxx In some municipal

[FN77]
. courts have declined to cases, courts have declined

recognize international to recognize international
norms as peremptory while norms as peremptory while
expressing doubt about the expressing doubt about the
proper criteria for proper criteria for identifying
identifying jus cogens.[FN72] jus cogens. (See, e.g.,
Sampson v. Federal Republic
See, e.g., Sampson v.
[FN72]
of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145,
Federal Republic of 1149 (7th Cir. 2001)
Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, (expressing concern that jus
1149 (7th Cir. 2001) cogens should be invoked
(expressing concern that jus “[o]nly as a last resort”)).
cogens should be invoked xxx
“[o]nly as a last resort”).

16 In other cases, national [FN77]

xxx In other cases,
. courts have accepted national courts have
international norms as accepted international
peremptory, but have norms as peremptory, but
hesitated to enforce these have hesitated to enforce
norms for fear that they these norms for fear that
might thereby compromise they might thereby
state sovereignty.[FN73] xxx compromise state
In Congo v. Rwanda, for sovereignty. (See, e.g.,
example, Judge ad hoc John Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71
Dugard observed that the O.R.3d 675 (Can.) (holding
ICJ had refrained from that the prohibition against
invoking the jus cogens torture does not entail a
concept in several previous right to a civil remedy
cases where peremptory enforceable in a foreign
norms manifestly clashed court)).
with other principles of
general international law. In Congo v. Rwanda, for
[FN74] Similarly, the example, Judge ad hoc John
European Court of Human Dugard observed that the
Rights has addressed jus ICJ had refrained from
cogens only once, in Al- invoking the jus cogens
18
Adsani v. United Kingdom, concept in several previous
when it famously rejected cases where peremptory
the argument that jus norms manifestly clashed
cogens violations would with other principles of
deprive a state of sovereign general international law.
immunity. (See Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo
[FN73] See, e.g., Bouzari v. (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 Rwanda) (Judgment of
(Can.) (holding that the February 3, 2006), at 2
prohibition against torture (Dissenting Opinion of Judge
does not entail a right to a Dugard))
civil remedy enforceable in
a foreign court). Similarly, the European
Court of Human Rights has
[FN74] See Armed Activities addressed jus cogens only
on the Territory of the once, in Al-Adsani v. United
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Kingdom, when it famously
Rwanda) (Judgment of Feb. rejected the argument that
3, 2006), at 2 (dissenting jus cogens violations would
opinion of Judge Dugard) deprive a state of sovereign
xxx. immunity. Al-Adsani v.
United Kingdom, 2001-XI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 61).

(pp. 346-7 of the Yale Law

TABLE C: Comparison of Mark Ellis’s article in the Case

Western Reserve Journal of International Law, entitled Breaking
the Silence: Rape as an International Crime (2006-7), hereafter
called “Ellis’s work” and the Supreme Court’s 28 April 2010
Decision in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary.
Mark Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an Vinuya, et. al. v.

International Crime, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 225 Executive
(2006-2007). Secretary, G.R.
No. 162230, 28
April 2010.
19
1 The concept of rape as an international crime is The concept
[FN65]
. relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never of rape as an
been historically prohibited, particularly in war.[FN7] international
The 1863 Lieber Instructions, which codified crime is
customary inter-national law of land warfare, relatively new.
classified rape as a crime of “troop discipline.”[FN8] It This is not to say
specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the that rape has
death penalty.[FN9] The 1907 Hague Convention never been
protected women by requiring the protection of historically
their “honour.”[FN10] But modern-day sensitivity to prohibited,
the crime of rape did not emerge until after World particularly in
War II. war. But
modern-day
For example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce
[FN7]
sensitivity to the
Prussia and the United States provides that in time crime of rape did
of war all women and children “shall not be not emerge until
molested in their persons.” The Treaty of Amity and after World War
Commerce, Between his Majesty the King of Prussia II. xxx (For
and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, example, the
1785, U.S.-Pruss., 8 TREATIES & OTHER INT'L Treaty of Amity
AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. 78, 85, available at xxx. and Commerce
between Prussia
[FN8]
David Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in and the United
International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus States provides
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. that in time of
INT'L L. 219, 224. war all women
and children
[FN9]
Id. at 236. “shall not be
molested in their
“Family honour and rights, the lives of persons,
[FN10]
persons.” The
and private property, as well as religious convictions Treaty of Amity
and practice, must be respected.” Convention (IV) and Commerce,
Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. Between his
46, Oct. 18, 1907, available at Majesty the King
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague of Prussia and
04.htm #art46. the United
States of
America, art. 23,
Sept. 10, 1785,
U.S.-Pruss., 8
TREATIES &
OTHER INT'L
AGREEMENTS OF
(p. 227 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of THE U.S. 78,
Int’l Law) 85[)]. The 1863
20
Lieber
Instructions
classified rape
as a crime of
“troop
discipline.”
(Mitchell, The
Prohibition of
Rape in
International
Humanitarian
Law as a Norm
of Jus cogens:
Clarifying the
Doctrine, 15
DUKE J. COMP.
INT’L. L. 219,
224). It specified
rape as a capital
crime punishable
by the death
penalty (Id. at
236). The 1907
Hague
Convention
protected
women by
requiring the
protection of
their “honour.”
(“Family honour
and rights, the
lives of persons,
and private
property, as well
as religious
convictions and
practice, must
be respected.”
Convention (IV)
Respecting the
Laws & Customs
of War on Land,
art. 46, Oct. 18,
1907[)]. xxx.
21
(p. 27, Footnote
65 of the 28
April 2010
Decision)
2 After World War II, when the Allies established the [FN65]
xxx In the
. Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not Nuremberg
mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity Charter, the
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not word rape was
mentioned by name.[FN11] not mentioned.
The article on
See generally, Agreement for the Prosecution
[FN11]
crimes against
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the humanity
Euro-pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 explicitly set
U.N.T.S. 279. forth prohibited
acts, but rape
was not
(p. 227 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of mentioned by
Int’l Law) name. xxx See
Agreement for
the Prosecution
and Punishment
of the Major War
Criminals of the
European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
xxx.
(p. 27, Footnote

65 of the 28
April 2010
Decision)
3 The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any xxx The

[FN65]
. reference to rape and rape was not prosecuted.[FN13] Nuremberg

xxx. Judgment did
22
not make any
It was different for the Charter of the International reference to
Military Tribunal for the Far East.[FN15] xxx The rape and rape
Tribunal prosecuted rape crimes, even though its was not
Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape.[FN17] The prosecuted.
Far East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, (Judge Gabrielle
Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Kirk McDonald,
Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, The International
including rape, committed by persons under their Criminal Tribunals
authority.[FN18] Crime and
Punishment in the
International
[FN13]
Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Arena,7 ILSA J. Int’l.
International Criminal Tribunals Crime and Comp. L. 667, 676.)
Punishment in the International Arena, 7 ILSA J. However,
INT'L COMP L. 667, at 676. International
Military Tribunal
See Charter of the International Tribunal for the
[FN15]
for the Far East
Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589. prosecuted
rape crimes,
[FN17]
See McDonald, supra note 13, at 676. even though its
Statute did not
THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT OF THE
[FN18]
explicitly
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR criminalize rape.
EAST 445-54 (B.V.A. Roling and C.F. Ruter eds., The Far East
1977). Tribunal held
General Iwane
Matsui,
Commander
(p. 228 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of Shunroku Hata
Int’l Law) and Foreign
Minister Hirota
criminally
responsible for a
series of crimes,
including rape,
committed by
23
persons under
their authority.
(THE TOKYO
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT OF
THE
INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY
TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FAR EAST
445-54 (1977).
xxx
(p. 27, Footnote

65 of the 28
April 2010
Decision)
4 The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in xxx The first
[FN65]
. December 1945 when Control Council Law No. 10 mention of rape

included the term rape in the definition of crimes as a specific
against humanity.[FN22] Law No. 10, adopted by the crime came in
four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to December 1945
establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war when Control
criminals in German courts. Council Law No.
10 included the
[FN22]
Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10: term rape in the
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes definition of
Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, crimes against
24
1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany
humanity. Law
50, 53 (1946), available at
No. 10, adopted
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ccno10.htm by the four
(last visited Nov. 20, 2003). This law set forth a occupying
uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution powers in
of war criminals and similar offenders, other than Germany, was
those dealt with under the International Military devised to
Tribunal. See id. at 50. establish a
uniform basis for
(pp. 228-9 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal prosecuting war
of Int’l Law) criminals in
German courts.
(Control Council
for Germany,
Law No. 10:
Punishment of
Persons Guilty of
War Crimes,
Crimes Against
Peace and
Against
Humanity, Dec.
20, 1945, 3
Official Gazette
Control Council
for Germany 50,
53 (1946)) xxx
(p. 27, Footnote

65 of the 28
April 2010
Decision)
25
[FN65]
xxx The
5 The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the 1949 Geneva
. Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modern- Convention
day international instrument to establish protections Relative to the
against rape for women.[FN23] However, the most Treatment of
important development in breaking the silence of Prisoners of War
rape as an international crime has come through was the first
the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the International modern-day
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Both of these international
Tribunals have significantly advanced the crime of instrument to
rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a establish
war crime, and a crime against humanity. xxx. protections
against rape for
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
[FN23]
women. Geneva
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Convention
art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into Relative to the
force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Protection of
Convention]. Civilian Persons
in Time of War,
(p. 229 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of Aug. 12, 1949,
Int’l Law) art. 27, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 (entry into
force Oct. 20,
1950)
[hereinafter
Fourth Geneva
Convention].
Furthermore, the
ICC, the ICTY,
and the
International
Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
(ICTR) have
26
significantly
advanced the
crime of rape by
enabling it to be
prosecuted as
genocide, a war
crime, and a
crime against
humanity. xxx.
(p. 27, Footnote

65 of the 28
April 2010
Decision)
8. The controversy generated by the issue of plagiarism at the

Supreme Court heightened even more, and Justice Del
Castillo circulated a letter to other members of the Supreme
Court explaining:
It must be emphasized that there was every intention to

attribute all sources, whenever due. At no point was
there ever any malicious intent to appropriate another’s
work as our own. We recall that this ponencia was thrice
included in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was
deliberated upon during the Baguio session on April 13,
2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010.
Each time, suggestions were made which necessitated
major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied,
discussions modified, passages added or deleted. The
resulting decision comprises 34 pages with 78
footnotes.
xxxx
As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts

as contained in the above foreign materials were
27
“twisted,” the same remains their opinion which we do
not necessarily share.7
9. On 27 July 2010, the Supreme Court convened its Ethics

Committee and directed it to commence an investigation on
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation
committed by Justice Del Castillo in the Vinuya Decision. On
12 October 2010, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam
Decision finding that Justice Del Castillo did not commit any
misconduct, or inexcusable negligence, and absolved him of
the charges of plagiarism and misrepresentation.8
10. Meanwhile, on 27 July 2010, law professors at the UP

College of Law issued a Statement, “Restoring Integrity,”
asserting that:
“With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn

duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the
profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v.

Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in
breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the
Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity

and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and
undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial
system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and
the establishment of legal precedents through dubious
means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the

Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of
the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice
7
See “In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo,” A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC.
8
id.
28
to all those who have been left without legal or
equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching

nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and
dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any
other sanctions that the Court may consider
appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to

review the manner by which it conducts research,
prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order
to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to
ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.”
11. On 19 October 2010, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution

in the case “Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled
Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court”(A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC) directing UP Law
Professors, to “show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons
10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and further directing the the UP
Law Dean to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03 “for submitting, through his letter dated August 10,
2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the
consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a
true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement,
entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
29
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court.”
12. The controversy brought about by the intellectual

dishonesty of Justice Del Castillo, has unnecessarily
burdened the Supreme Court and tarnished its integrity,
both locally and internationally. Thus:
12.1. On 22 October 2010, UP Prof. Diane Desierto

posted “An Open Appeal to fellow International Legal
Scholars” to support the UP Law faculty on the
international law community blog Opino Juris.9
12.2. On 24 October 2010, Prof. Bruce Ackerman, a

Sterling Professor of Law & Political Science at Yale
University, was reported to have emailed: “I can only hope
that good sense prevails & leads to some sober second-
thought from the Court majority. Otherwise, the continuing
controversy will do serious damage to the Philippine’s
standing in the world.”10
12.3. On 26 October 2010, Profs. Criddle and Fox-

Decent posted in Opinio Juris “That a court would assert
jurisdiction to sanction its detractors is, in our opinion, an
abuse of judicial power. To the best of our knowledge, no
court in a democracy has ever attempted to assert the kind
of jurisdiction the PSC is asserting now against the UP
College of Law.”11
12.4. On 26 October 2010, Senator Francis Escudero

issued a Statement12 saying “It is my strong belief that any
government official, including members of the judiciary,
should not be thin-skinned about dissenting public opinion
which is permitted in a democratic country like ours.” He
further stated that the “SC members, as all other
government officials, are always under public visibility,
thus criticisms such as that from the UP Law faculty should
be taken constructively, especially given the fact that even
our Supreme Court had the matter already investigated.”
9
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/24/philippines-supreme-court-threatens-law-faculty-with-contempt-after-
allegations-of-judicial-plagiarism/ accessed on 13 December 2010.
10
http://services.inquirer.net/print/print.php?article_id=20101024-299516 accessed on 13 December 2010.
11
http://opiniojuris.org/tag/philippines-plagiarism-allegations/ accessed on 13 December 2010.
12
http://www.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2010/1026_escudero1.asp accessed on 13 December 2010.
30
Also, Senator Francis Pangilinan commented that “Judicial
restraint will best serve the interest of the Supreme Court.
With all due respect, the Supreme Court should learn to
choose its battles and to my mind, this isn't one of them.”13
12.5. On 27 October 2010, Senate President Juan Ponce

Enrile released a statement stating among others that
“Freedom of expression which embraces academic
freedom may be orphaned should our Highest Court choose
to use its strong hand when it feels bruised or hurt, rather
than to act as its faithful guardian. Ultimately, it is the
Supreme Court, acting as the stronghold of civil liberties
and rising above its own frailties, which is in the best
position to cleanse itself and its ranks and repair the
damage brought upon its image before the nation and
before the world.”14
12.6. On 29 October 2010, the Executive Committee of

UP Diliman issued a statement “No to Plagiarism! Asserting
Academic Freedom!" against the Supreme Court's decision
in the Plagiarism case, and in support the UP College of
Law faculty, assertingthat “We stand by the UP College of
Law Faculty for speaking out against plagiarism. We ask
the Supreme Court to withdraw the 'show cause' order
against the 37 faculty members of the U.P. College of Law.”
15
12.7. On 31 October 2010, the College of Law of the

Lyceum of the Philippines University, Makati City, released
to the public a Statement on Plagiarism. The LPU Law
faculty declared that it “regrets that, by [the] Decision in
AM No. 10-10-4-SC, dated October 19, 2010, the Supreme
Court disregarded & ignored its own decisions, rules &
regulations when it did not hold any person responsible for
copying and infringing intellectual property rights of foreign
academicians; did not require any person to apologize for
the oversight (if that is what it was); and did not issue a
corrected decision in the Vinuya case with proper
attributions.”16
12.8. On 04 November 2010, Dr. John Paul C. Vergara,

Vice President for the Loyola Schools (Ateneo), issued a
memorandum, “Treatment of Plagiarism Cases in the
13
http://www.kiko.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=587:sc-should-leave-academe-
alone&catid=70:press-release&Itemid=82 accessed on 13 December 2010.
14
http://philippinecommentary.blogspot.com/2010/10/jpe-appeals-for-judicial-restraint-from.html accessed on
13 December 2010.
15
http://www.upalumni.net/up-diliman-executive-committee-no-to-plagiarism-asserting-academic-freedom/
accessed on 13 December 2010.
16
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=145375932175254 accessed on 13 December 2010.
31
Loyola Schools in Light of the Recent Supreme Court
Decision” reiterating the Ateneo schools' position “that
academic honesty and the acknowledgement of sources is
not simply a matter of the correct use of quotation marks,
placement of footnotes, or acquisition of permissions; it is a
question of personal discipline and moral character. The
school's resolve on the stringent requirements in the
proper acknowledgement of sources goes to the heart of its
mission in forming persons for others-persons who value
truth, respect, gratitude, integrity and justice.”17
12.9. On 09 November 2010, the Coordinating Council

of Private Educational Associations (COCOPEA) issued a
Statement of Concern to take exception to the Plagiarism
decision, and “implore[d] the Supreme Court, most
respectfully, to follow 'The Way Forward' of Justice Sereno's
Dissenting Opinion as the only way by which it can
maintain its judicial dignity.”18
13. Due to Justice Del Castillo’s singular act of intellectual

dishonesty, the Supreme Court was exposed to ridicule
before the international legal community, its integrity as an
institution was put to question, and the public confidence in
the judicial system and in the moral authority of the
judiciary was further eroded.
14. Complainants therefore accuse Associate Justice Mariano

C. Del Castillo of betraying the public trust.
17
http://ls.ateneo.edu/module.php?LM=articles.detail&eid=1289178048540 accessed on 13 December 2010.
18
http://ceap.org.ph/upload/download/201011/9121818985_1.pdf accessed on 13 December 2010.
32
GROUND FOR IMPEACHMENT
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo betrayed public trust

when he committed acts that undermined public
confidence in the judicial system and in the moral
authority and integrity of the judiciary. Specifically:
I. Justice Del Castillo betrayed public trust when he

lifted without attribution significant portions of the
works of foreign authorities, in violation of pertinent
rules on use and citation of sources.
II. Justice Del Castillo betrayed public trust when he

twisted what International Law professors/authors
Criddle, Fox-Decent, Tams, and Ellis said in their
works, making it appear that the theory espoused by
these authors support an argument to dismiss the
case of the Petitioners in Vinuya, et. al. vs. Executive
Secretary, et. al., when in fact, the theories of these
authors support the claims of the Petitioners.
III. Justice Del Castillo betrayed public trust when, in

twisting the true intents of the sources, he misled
the other members of the Honorable Supreme Court.
DISCUSSION
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo betrayed public trust

when he committed acts that undermined public
confidence in the judicial system and in the moral
authority and integrity of the judiciary.
The first section of the 1987 Constitution’s Article on

Accountability of Public Officers (Article XI) contains the fundamental
standards of public service, thus:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
33
This is followed by the provision on impeachment of certain public
officers, to wit:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Public office is a public trust. This is the essential principle that

should serve as a yardstick for proper conduct of public officers.
Thus, the 1987 Constitution added the concept of “betrayal of public
trust” as a ground for impeachment. Explaining the addition of this
ground, constitutional expert Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., stated:
The 1973 Constitution, however, added “graft and
corruption” as another ground, and the 1987 Constitution
added the broad concept of “betrayal of public trust.” The
phrase was intended to be a catch-all phrase to cover any
violation of the oath of office. Commissioner de los Reyes,
who had been responsible for the insertion of the phrase, said
that it referred to all acts, even if not punishable by statute as
penal offenses, which would render the officer unfit to
continue in office. He enumerated “betrayal of public interest,
inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power,
breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance,
cronyism, favoritism, etc., to the prejudice of public interest
and which tend to bring the office into disrepute.” To which
Romulo added “obstruction of justice.” But “profanity,
obscenity, habitual drunkenness while performing official
duty” were not meant to be included. (Bernas, J., The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary,
2009 ed., p. 1153; citing II RECORD 272, 286)
It bears emphasis that respondent Del Castillo, prior to

assuming office, took an oath to uphold, defend and bear true faith
and allegiance to the Constitution, obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities, to will well
34
and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the
office or position entrusted to him, and to voluntarily assume the
obligation imposed by his oath of office, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. (Chapter 10, Section 40, Revised
Administrative Code)
Being a magistrate of the highest court of the land, respondent

Del Castillo is likewise expected to possess the highest qualifications
and eminence. The public exacts from him a profound knowledge of
the law and a demonstration of competence, independence and
integrity.
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

Judiciary provides the standards for integrity within the judiciary,
thus:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of
a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become
aware.
In Tan vs. Rosete19, the Supreme Court elucidated on the

importance of maintaining integrity within the judiciary. The Court
explained thus:
19
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 581.
35
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the
highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The
exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the people's confidence
in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of
legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess. When a judge
becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to
apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect
for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount
that a judge's personal behavior both in the performance of
his duties and daily life, be free from any appearance of
impropriety as to be beyond reproach. (italics supplied)
Still on the matter of integrity of judges, in Sibayan-Joaquin vs.

Javellana20, the Supreme Court further reminded judges as follows,
to wit:
Hence, a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the

performance of judicial duties should be free from the
appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. One
who occupies an exalted position in the administration of
justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon
him, for his private as well as his official conduct must at all
times be free from the appearance of impropriety. Because
appearance is as important as reality in the performance of
judicial functions, like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be
pure but also beyond suspicion. A judge has the duty to not
only render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity.
Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

mandates respondent to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence.
Against these exacting standards of judicial conduct,

respondent Del Castillo’s intellectual dishonesty, as narrated earlier,
20
A.M. No. RTJ- 00-1001, November 13, 2001, 368 SCRA 503
36
and will be further explained below, constitutes not merely an act of
impropriety, but an act of betrayal of public trust. The grave
negative impacts of his plagiarized decision on the public perception
of the judiciary and the justice system in the country, coupled with
his manifest incapacity to perform his Constitutional mandate in
good faith, render him unfit to continue in office.
Justice Del Castillo betrayed public trust when he lifted

without attribution significant portions of the works of
foreign authorities,
in violation of pertinent rules on use and citation of
sources.
Applying the afore-quoted norms required in the conduct of

judges (and justices), the questioned acts of Justice Del Castillo in
the Vinuya case fall very much short of performing judicial duties
beyond reproach. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno in the
case entitled “In The Matter Of The Charges Of Plagiarism, Etc.,
Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo. (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC), the Honorable Justice enumerated 24 acts of Justice Del Castillo
of failing to make proper citations, namely:
A.1.Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the entire

paragraph in the body of the decision on page 30 was not the
ponente’s original paragraph, but was lifted verbatim from
Tams’s work. The attribution to Tams is wholly insufficient
because without the quotation marks, there is nothing to alert
the reader that the paragraph was lifted verbatim from Tams.
The footnote leaves the reader with the impression that the
said paragraph is the author’s own analysis of erga omnes.
The “See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in

International Law (2005)” line in footnote 69 of the Vinuya
decision does not clearly indicate that the statement on
Simma’s observation was lifted directly from Tams’s work; it
only directs the reader to Tams’s work should the reader wish
to read further discussions on the matter.
37
B.1 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the two
sentences were not the ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim
from two non-adjoining sentences found on pages 331 and
332 of the Yale Law Journal of International Law article of
Criddle & Fox-Decent and with absolutely no attribution to the
latter.
B.2 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the

sentence fragment on peremptory norms was not the
ponente’s original writing, but was lifted verbatim from page
334 of the Yale Law Journal of International Law article of
Criddle & Fox-Decent with absolutely no attribution to the
authors.
B.3 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the first

sentence in discursive footnote number 71 was not the
ponente’s idea, but was lifted verbatim from Criddle & Fox-
Decent’s work at page 334.
B.4 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the third

sentence in discursive footnote number 71 was not the
ponente’s idea, but was lifted from Criddle & Fox-Decent’s
work at 334-335.
B.5 Failure to indicate that one footnote source in discursive

footnote 71 was lifted verbatim from discursive footnote 9 of
Tams; thus, even the idea being propounded in this discursive
part of footnote 71 was presented as the ponente’s, instead of
Criddle’s & Fox-Decent’s.
B.6 Failure to indicate that the last discursive sentence in

footnote 71 and the citations thereof were not the ponente’s,
but were lifted verbatim from footnote 9 of Criddle & Fox-
Decent’s work.
B.7 Failure to indicate that the first discursive sentence of

footnote 72 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim
from page 335 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.8 Failure to indicate that the second discursive sentence

of footnote 72 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim
from pages 335-336 of Criddle and Fox-Decent’s work.
B.9 Failure to indicate that the citation and the discursive

passage thereon in the last sentence of footnote 72 was not
the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from discursive
footnote 18 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.10 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that a phrase

in the body of the decision on page 31 was not the ponente’s,
38
but was lifted verbatim from page 336 of Criddle & Fox-
Decent’s work.
B.11 Failure to indicate that the entirety of discursive

footnote 73 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim
from page 336 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.12 Failure to indicate that the idea of lack of “consensus on

whether certain international norms had attained the status of
jus cogens” was a paraphrase of a sentence combined with a
verbatim lifting of a phrase that appears on page 336 of
Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work and was not the ponente’s own
conclusion. This is an example of patchwork plagiarism.
B.13 Failure to indicate that the entirety of discursive

footnote 74 on page 31 of the Decision was not the ponente’s
comment on the source cited, but was lifted verbatim from
footnote 23 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.14 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and with the

proper attribution to Criddle that the first two sentences of
page 32 were not the ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from
two non-adjoining sentences on pages 337-338 of Criddle &
Fox-Decent’s work.
B.15 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and the

right citation that the discursive sentence in the second
paragraph of footnote 77, and the citation therein, were not
the ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from page 346 of the
body of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work in the instance of the
discursive sentence, and from footnote 72 of Criddle & Fox-
Decent’s work in the instance of the case cited and the
description thereof.
B.16 Failure to indicate that the choice of citation and the

discursive thereon statement in the second sentence of the
second paragraph of discursive footnote 77 was not the
ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from footnote 72 of Criddle
& Fox-Decent’s work.
B.17 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and the

right citations that the entirety of the discursive third to fifth
paragraphs of footnote 77 were not the product of the
ponente’s own analysis and choice of sources, but were lifted
verbatim from footnotes 73 and 77 on pages 346-347 of
Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
C.1 to C.6 Failure to use quotation marks and the right

citations to indicate that half of the long discursive footnote
65, including the sources cited therein, was actually
39
comprised of the rearrangement, and in some parts,
rephrasing of 18 sentences found on pages 227-228 of Mr.
Ellis’s work in Case Western Law Reserve Journal of
International Law.
These 24 acts of failing to make proper citations negate lack of

intent to commit plagiarism and does not indicate simple
inadvertence on the part of Justice Del Castillo and/or his court
personnel who initially made the research on the ponencia. One or
two errors or inadvertence may amount to excusable negligence on
the part of the ponente and/or the researcher but not when such
errors amounted to 24 separate acts of plagiarism. Even assuming,
only for the sake of argument, that the 24 separate acts of omission
to take proper citation is not plagiarism, such act is highly irregular
and can hardly be justified as inexcusable negligence.
By delegating the entire adjudication of the Vinuya case to his

court staff and allowing his penned decision to contain lifted
passages from uncited sources, respondent Del Castillo violated his
oath to faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the
office or position entrusted to him and the Code of Judicial Conduct
which mandates him to maintain professional competence. Worse,
he placed his office in disrepute, encouraged disrespect for the law
and impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
Truly, it is not denied that there is a necessity for every Justice

to utilize the services of law clerks to research on points of law at
issue for the orderly and sound administration of justice. However,
this should not be taken to mean as a complete surrender of the
control and supervision over the decision-making process to the
court staff considering that these very decisions eventually become
the Supreme Court’s judgment on the cases and form part of the law
40
of the land. By failing to properly supervise his court staff,
respondent Del Castillo not only cast the Supreme Court in a bad
light, but likewise reprehensibly allowed the flawed decision to
become part of the country’s jurisprudence. Such failure constitutes
inexcusable gross negligence on his part rendering him unfit to
continue with his office.
As the ponente of the Vinuya decision, it was incumbent upon

respondent Del Castillo to personally draft the decision or if one has
been drafted by his court staff as in this case, he should have
scrutinized the sources cited in the draft decision and exercised the
highest degree of diligence in the performance of his Constitutional
mandate. He is not merely a stamp pad of the draft decisions
written by his court staff.
Furthermore, respondent Del Castillo likewise blatantly

displayed a dearth of candor by not even offering an explanation on
the cause of the lack of attribution in the Vinuya decision. In the
explanatory letter submitted by respondent Del Castillo on 22 July
2010 before the Supreme Court, he did not acknowledge the
copying, lack of attribution and use of copied works and did not
even indicate how the lack of attribution came about and who were
responsible therefor. Instead of initiating the proper disciplinary
proceedings against his court staff who was liable for the plagiarism,
respondent Del Castillo even covered up her misdeeds and stated
that “there was every intention to attribute”. This is a violation of
Canon 2, Section 3 of the Judicial Code of Ethics, which states that
“[j]udges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of
which the judge may have become aware.” Justice Del Castillo
has miserably failed to take the necessary disciplinary measures
41
against the court personnel who has voluntarily admitted her
negligence, excusable or not. To date, such court personnel has no
administrative sanction for the negligent acts, which can be a signal
that similar acts by other court personnel may be tolerated even if
the slightest irregularity or breach of duty detract from the dignity of
the courts and erode the confidence in the judiciary.
Justice Del Castillo betrayed public trust when he twisted

what law professors/authors said in their works, making it
appear that the theory espoused by these authors support
an argument to dismiss the case of the Petitioners in
Vinuya, et. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et. al., when in fact,
the theories of these authors support the claims of the
Petitioners.
Justice Del Castillo has not only misappropriated the ideas of

others as his own, he has likewise misused these ideas, and
converted them into arguments that are contrary to the authors’
own positions on the issue.
Respondent Del Castillo’s misuse of the plagiarized portions is

clearly stated in the letters of the authors themselves, thus:
In a letter21 addressed to the Supreme Court, dated 23 July

2010, Dr. Mark Ellis states:
“I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to

my attention in the last few days.
xxx xxx xxx
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the

extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said
Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that
your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I
made in the article and employed them for cross-purposes.
This would be ironic since the article was written precisely
21
http://www.scribd.com/doc/39856111/Letter-to-Republic-of-the-Philippines-Supreme-Court-Ellis, accessed
on 13 December 2010.
42
to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.”
On 19 July 2010, Prof. Criddle made public his complaint on the

misuse of his works when he posted the following in the
website Opinio Juris:
“The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains

thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to
sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored
with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were
unaware of the petitioners’ plagiarism allegations until after
the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the

court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the
prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual
slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. “ 22
In a letter23 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, dated 18

August 2010, Professor Tams states:
“My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of

international law at t he University of Glasgow. I am writing
to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the
above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
xxx xxx xxx
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been

used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to the
erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows
that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite:
namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely
accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international
law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that “[t]he
present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very
mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its
implementation” (p.5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that “the preceding chapters show that the
concept is now a part of the reality of international law,
established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice
of States” (p. 309).
22
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-bedevils-philippines-supreme-court-
justice/ accessed on 13 December 2010.
23
http://www.scribd.com/doc/39856262/Tams-Letter-to-Supreme-Court, last accessed on 13 December 2010.
43
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to
see how my work should have been cited to support – as it
seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I
am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s
judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.”
What the authors referred to as “cross-purposes” and

“opposite approach” is plain and simple misapplication of the
plagiarized articles to support a decision that is contrary to the
position that the authors themselves espouse. If the 24 counts of
plagiarism will be considered as merely casting doubts on the
professional competence of respondent Del Castillo, the
misapplication of the plagiarized material certainly questions the
integrity of the ponente.
Justice Del Castillo betrayed public trust when, in twisting

the true intents of the sources, he misled the other
members of the Honorable Supreme Court.
Had Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism in an article that

he had authored, for publication in a journal, for example, the nature
of his offense would be different. It would still be an irregular
conduct, regardless of whether he is a member of the Supreme
Court or not, but its effects would not be as far-reaching as that of
the plagiarism that he had committed in the Vinuya decision.
Justice Del Castillo was the ponente of the decision. He was

not writing for himself, he was writing for the Supreme Court. He
was not writing an article, he was writing jurisprudence, which forms
part of the law of the land. He was supposed to be formulating the
44
expression of the collective wisdom of the Supreme Court, and, not
just through one of its divisions, but through the Court en banc.
By submitting his ponencia with the plagiarized material, and

for purposes contrary to the intended positions of the original
authors, he had misled the other members of the Court who had
concurred with the ponencia and had authorized its release as the
Court’s decision.
Respondent’s unacceptable act of plagiarism is in fact a

penalized offense under the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. 8293),
the E-Commerce Act (R.A. 8792), and under the Supreme Court’s
own circular on the Computer Guidelines and Policies (AM No 05-3-
08-SC). Due to respondent’s gross negligence, a plagiarized
decision has been released to the worldwide web through no less
than the Supreme Court’s website which, applying the Guidelines
and Policies, qualifies as a criminal offense under the E-Commerce
Act. It is highly deplorable that respondent Del Castillo’s gross
negligence and incompetence has reached to a level that the
Supreme Court is made answerable to repeated violations of
domestic and international intellectual property laws for each and
every single day that the plagiarized decision is posted in the
internet.
The fact that the Supreme Court issued a Decision which found
that respondent is not guilty of plagiarism is of no moment. Del
Castillo’s single act of dishonesty already made a huge impact on
the perception of the local and international legal communities on
the integrity of the Supreme Court, the judiciary and justice system
in the Philippines. Domestically, the members of the legal
profession, students and other citizens have expressed their outcry
45
over the despicable act of intellectual thievery which negatively
affected the integrity and competence of the Supreme Court and its
sitting justices. The international legal community has also
expressed its disdain over respondent’s betrayal of public trust
through different fora, fronted by no other than the people whose
works were not given the proper attribution and were aggrieved by
the plagiarism resorted to by respondent Del Castillo.
Justice Del Castillo has brought infamy not only to himself, but
also to his colleagues in the Supreme Court, in the judiciary, and the
legal profession, and to the country’s justice system in general.
Lawyers are bound under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, “not to do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.” Unfortunately, in this case, it was not an ordinary
lawyer or counsel who caused the Court to be misled, it was one of
its members who was given the very important task of writing the
decision of the Court.
Justice Del Castillo’s acts have rendered him unfit to

continue in office. His continued service will prejudice the
public interest and will bring the entire Supreme Court and
the country’s justice system into disrepute.
Finally, to allow respondent Del Castillo to continue occupying

his position will send a bad signal to our nation, especially our youth,
that plagiarism and the unbridled cut-and-paste habit in our
technologically advanced period are considered as acceptable
practices. Respondent Del Castillo was appointed to one of the
highest positions in the judiciary and thus, there is no reason why
46
his service to the public should be allowed to fall short of the highest
standards expected of him. Accordingly, the flimsy excuse of
“Microsoft Office” should not be even allowed to exonerate him of
the eventual consequences of his negligence and omission.
Through his conduct, respondent Del Castillo has undermined

the integrity of his office, brought disrepute on the Supreme Court,
cast doubt on the justice system of the country and in so doing,
betrayed the public trust. For, how can we expect the Supreme
Court to uphold the law and render justice if the esteemed Justices
themselves commit crucial errors and exhibit lack of professional
competence to decide the cases brought before the Supreme Court?
Justice Del Castillo’s violation of his oath of office, the New

Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and the Code of
Professional Responsibility for lawyers, are pernicious given the fact
that it is committed by an incumbent member of the Supreme Court.
In In Re: Undated Letter Of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner In
Biraogo V. Nograles And Limkaichong, G.R. No. 17912024 , the
Supreme Court held that:
“the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also
infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and
impeded and degraded the administration of justice. The
act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it
was committed by no less than a justice of the Supreme
Court who was supposed to serve as example to the bench
and bar.”
24
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC, February 24, 2009
47
Those words must apply with equal force to this present case of
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
48
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed
that HON. SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO, after due compliance with the procedure set forth
in Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, be found to have
committed BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST and accordingly, cause
the instant Impeachment Complaint to be adopted as the Articles of
Impeachment against ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO for transmission to the Senate for trial.
Complainants pray for other just and equitable relief.
Quezon City, 14 December 2010.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA PILAR Q. GALANG
MAXIMA R. DE LA CRUZ LEONOR H. SUMAWANG
MARIA L. QUILANTANG
HON. REYNALDO V. UMALI HON. BERNADETTE R. HERRERA-

DY
HON. JOSEPH VICTOR G. HON. CESAR V. SARMIENTO

EJERCITO
49
HON. FLORENCIO T. FLORES, JR. HON. IRVIN M. ALCALA
HON. VICENTE F. BELMONTE, JR. HON. TEODORO B. BAGUILAT,

JR.
HON. JORGE “BOLET” BANAL JR. HON. WALDEN F. BELLO
HON. KAKA J. BAG-AO
50

Impeachment Complaint Final Against Justice Del Castillio

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Impeachment Complaint Final Against Justice Del Castillio

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Republic of the Philippines

IN THE MATTER OF THE

VERIFIED IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT

In Tan v. Rosete (A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004),

In Buenaventura v. Benedicto1, the Supreme Court

Oftentimes…leniency provides the court employees the

His acts constitute betrayal of public trust. A mere disciplinary

NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT

This is a verified Impeachment Complaint brought under Article

The Complainants, Isabelita C. Vinuya, Pilar Q. Galang, Maxima

They may be served summons and other processes of the

The Respondent, Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (hereinafter

1. On 28 April 2010, the Supreme Court promulgated a

2. Significant portions of Justice Del Castillo’s ponencia were

4. In a letter3 addressed to the Supreme Court, dated 23 July

“I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed

xxx xxx xxx

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the

I believe a full copy of my article was published in the Case

5. On 19 July 2010, Prof. Criddle made public his complaint on

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the

6. Then, in a letter5 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona,

“My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss t

7. The extent of the plagiarism and misrepresentation done by

TABLE A: Comparison of Christian J. Tams’s book, entitled

CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive

1. xxx The Latin phrase ‘erga *The Latin phrase, ‘erga

*The decision mentioned

TABLE B: Comparison of Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent’s

Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox- Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive

1. In international law, the In international law, the

2. Peremptory norms began to xxx but peremptory norms

3. Classical publicists such as Classical publicists such

Hugo Grotius, Emer de as Hugo Grotius, Emer de

(p. 334 of the Yale Law

4. Early twentieth-century [FN71]

(pp. 334-5 of the Yale Law

(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28

1934 Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 Oscar Chinn Case,

(Footnote 9 of the Yale Law (p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28

7. Verdross argued that certain [FN72]

8. At first, Verdross's vision of [FN72]

(p. 31, Footnote 72 of the 28

9. See Lauri Hannikainen,

(p. 31, Footnote 72 of the 28

11 In March 1953, Lauterpacht [FN73]

12 Lauterpacht's colleagues on Though there was a

criteria for identifying of the 877th Meeting, [1966]

(p. 336 of the Yale Law

13 xxx see, e.g., Summary [FN74] See Summary Records

. Records of the 877th of the 877th Meeting, [1966]

14 After an extended debate After an extended debate

15 In some municipal cases, xxx In some municipal

. courts have declined to cases, courts have declined

(p. 346 of the Yale Law

16 In other cases, national [FN77]

(p. 32, Footnote 77 of the 28

(pp. 346-7 of the Yale Law