Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) vs.
NLRC, 272 SCRA 596 (1997);  differential and separation pay.
FACTS
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and
defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee.  That
employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really
motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies.  She thus claims that she
was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being
outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage is valid?
HELD: petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination,
afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.  staffhouses of a company, like private respondent who attends to the needs of the company's
it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by the branch supervisor
of the company, with the reminder, that “you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting
married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.” Again, in the termination
notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand
that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married
status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company’s policy against marriage
(“and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.”
Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with
her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to
deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in
the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient,
the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against
legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
Mining Company, Inc., vs NLRC, 196 SCRA 251 [1991];  summons were served upon it. MHC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It owns
FACTS
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc to
perform laundry services at its staff house.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her
laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the accident she was
not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication.
De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00
to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work.
Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment,
which the latter rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex Mining Co. to pay Candida the total
amount of P55,161.42 for salary differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay
Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently dismissed for lack of
merit.
ISSUE Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as househelper or domestic
servant or a regular employee.
HELD Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term
"househelper" as
used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person,
whether
male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are
usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or laundrywomen working in
guest and other persons availing of said facilities.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the
business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its
staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that
such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public
respondent. NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
The Manila Hotel Corp. Vs, NLRC, [343 SCRA 1 (2000)];Jo vs. NLRC, 324 SCRA 437 (2000);
FACTS
In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he was recruited
by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed to the hotel’s
job offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The employment contract between
him and Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace Hotel notified Santos that he will be
laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but no
50% of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of the Palace Hotel.
The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of Santos. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:
1.    The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;
2.    However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations – MHC cannot be held liable
because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel.
The veil of corporate fiction can’t be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is directly
managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.
3.    Santos’ contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;
4.    Santos’ contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA intervened,
NLRC still does not have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear the case);
5.    MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are not
residents of the Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining to the
case. It is not competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of happened Mariveles Shipyard Corp vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 144134. November 11, 2003]
outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case a judgment is
rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was not served any FACTS
summons). Petitioner submits that respondent Court of Appeals (CA) erred in its decisions in the previous
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court cases where the petitioner was involved. The latter contend that, among other issues, CA
or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: gravely erred in its affirmation on the National Labor Relations Commission‘s (NLRC) decision
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; that the petitioner together with ‘Longest Force’, a security agency, are jointly and severally
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the liable for the payment of back wages and overtime pay to private respondents. The petitioner
facts; and invokes that it has already paid all the necessary compensation to the private respondents.
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held jointly and severally liable, together with
‘Longest Force’ in the payment of back wages to the private respondents as affirmed by
respondent CA?
Canlubang Security Corp. Vs NLRC, SCRA 280; Insular Life vs. NLRC 179 SCRA 459;
HELD: Yes. Under Article 106, par. 2 of the Labor Code, ‘in the event that the contractor or
FACTS
subcontractor fails to pay wages of his employees…the employer shall be jointly and severally
Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation (CARCO) had a security service contract with
liable with his contractor or subcontractor xxx’. Also, in Article 107 of the same Code, the law
Canlubang Security Agency (CSA). This contractual relation continued until CARCO notified
states that ‘…the preceding Article shall likewise apply to person, partnership, association or
CSA that in view of recent developments and performance of the security personnel detailed
corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent
with CARCO, the latter decided to engage the services of another agency.
contractor…’. Pursuant to the mentioned provisions of the Labor Code, the Court said that, in
this case, the petitioner as an indirect employer, shall truly be liable jointly and severally with
Several security guards, supervisors, and officers headed by private respondent Bartolay, filed a
‘Longest Force’ in paying backwages and overtime pay to the private respondents. Moreover,
complaint for illegal termination against CSA and CARCO. However, they thereafter filed a
the Court emphasized that ‘Labor standard are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as against CSA saying that “after a careful and thorough
of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor laws are
analysis of the circumstances giving rise to this case, they were convinced and of the conviction
considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered
that they have no cause of action against CSA, the latter not being their employer but CARCO.”
null‘. Therefore, the petitioner should be held jointly and severally liable, together with ‘Longest
Force’ to the private respondents as earlier decided by NLRC, as affirmed by the CA.
The employees further waived all claims under any law or contract which they have or might
have against CSA. In view of this, the case against CSA was dismissed.
ZIALCITA VS. PAL . (RO4-3-3398-76 (Feb. 20, 1977)
ISSUE: Whether or not CARCO is the employer of Bartolay.
FACTS
Zialcita is a stewardess of PAL. She was fired from work because she had gotten married. PAL
argued and cited its policy that stewardesses must be single. The policy also states that
HELD: NO. CSA is the employer and is therefore liable for the claims.
subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall automatically terminate employment.
In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. PAL sought refuge from Article 132.
generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the power to control the employee's conduct
Article 132 provides, "Article 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
(most important element).
shall establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In
appropriate cases, he shall, by regulations, require any employer to: To determine appropriate
Applying the right-of-control test, the Court determined that it is CSA that has “control not only on
minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as
the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such an end.” Such was by
those of flight attendants and the like."
express stipulation in the contract 1 with CARCO.
a watchman cannot perform any security service for the petitioner's vessels unless the agency
Article 136 provides, "Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an
first accepts him as its watchmen. With respect to his wages, the amount to be paid to a security
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
guard is beyond the power of the petitioner to determine. Certainly, the lump sum amount paid
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
by the petitioner to the agency in consideration of the latter's service is much more than the
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
wages of any one watchman. In point of fact, it is the agency that quantifies and pays the wages
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage."
to which the watchman is entitled. Neither does the petitioner have any power to dismiss the
security guards. In fact, We fail to see any evidence in the record that it wielded such a power. It
is true that it may request the agency to change a particular guard. But this, precisely, is proof
ISSUE: Was Zialcita's termination proper?
that the power lies in the hands of the agency.

HELD: YES. The termination was improper. First of all, during the time Zialcita was terminated,
1
no regulation had yet been issued by the Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. Second,
even assuming that the Secretary of Labor had already issued such a regulation and to the
effect that stewardesses should remain single, such would be in violation of Article 136 of the
Labor Code.
Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided
under Article 132.
Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Franco, 458 SCRA 515 [2005];
FACTS
Supervisory employees of the Corporation, spearheaded by Franco, Pabalan, Perrin and
Candelario, decided to form a labor union called Lopez Sugar Corporation Supervisor's.
Corporation's president issued a Memorandum to the vice-president and department heads for
the adoption of a special retirement program for supervisory and middle level managers. He
emphasized that the management shall have the final say on who would be covered, and that
the program would be irrevocable once approved. Masa, Pabalan, Franco, Perrin and
Candelario received copies of the Memorandum dated August 25, 1995 from the Corporation's
Vice-President for Administration and Finance, informing them that they were included in the
"special retirement program" for supervisors and middle level managers; hence, their
employment with the Corporation was to be terminated. Respondents filed separate complaints
against the corporation with the NLRC for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, reinstatement
and damages.
The petitioner further argues that the decision of the NLRC is essentially flawed
because the private respondents were terminated on the ground of redundancy, and not
retrenchment which is an entirely different concept. It insists that unlike retrenchment,
redundancy does not require business losses to be an authorized cause for dismissal. Moreover,
the law does not give any criteria, guidelines or standard for the selection of employees who are
to be dismissed on the ground of redundancy. It insists that Article 283 of the Labor Code merely
requires that "in case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at
least his one (1) month pay or to, at least, one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher."
The petitioner further posits that the law does not require a corporation to adopt
radical cost-cutting measures prior to a termination on the ground of redundancy. It avers that
the mere fact that the termination took place at a time when the private respondents had just
organized the union does not automatically render their termination invalid. It theorizes that the
union could have been organized as leverage to the implementation of the redundancy program
which the supervisory employees knew was forthcoming.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner illegally dismissed respondents
HELD: YES. Petitioner illegally dismissed the private respondents from their employment by
including them in its special retirement program, thus, debilitating the union, rendering it pliant by
decapacitating its leadership. As such, the so-called "downsizing" of the Cane Marketing
Department and SMSD based on the SGV Study Report was a farce — capricious and arbitrary
Their dismissal from the petitioner corporation was a fait accompli, solely because
they organized a union that would bargain for reasonable terms and conditions of employment
sought to be included in a CBA. In fine, the private respondents were left to fend for themselves,
with no source of income from then on; prospects for new jobs were dim. Their backs against the
wall, the private respondents were forced to sign the said documents and receive their
separation pay.
PNB vs. PNBEA 115 SCRA 527;
FACTS
– PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a dispute regarding the proper
computation of overtime pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living allowance (granted in 1958) and
longevity pay (granted in 1961) to be included in the computation. PNB disagreed and the 2
parties later went before the CIR to resolve the dispute.
– CIR decided in favor of PEMA and held that PNB should compute the overtime pay of its
employees on the basis of the sum total of the employee’s basic salary or wage plus cost of
living allowance and longevity pay. The CIR relied on the ruling in NAWASA v NAWASA
Consolidated Unions, which held that “for purposes of computing overtime compensation,
regular wage includes all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received during the
work week, including differentiated payments for working at undesirable times, such as at night
and the board and lodging customarily furnished the employee.” This prompted PNB to appeal,
hence this case.
ISSUE: WON the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should be included in the
computation of overtime pay as held by the CIR
HELD: NO. Ratio Overtime pay is for extra effort beyond that contemplated in the employment
contract; additional pay given for any other purpose cannot be included in the basis for the
computation of overtime pay.
– Absent a specific provision in the CBA, the bases for thecomputation of overtime pay are 2
computations, namely:
1. WON the additional pay is for extra work done or service rendered
2. WON the same is intended to be permanent and regular, not contingent nor temporary as a
given only to remedy a situation which can change any time.
Reasoning
– Longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of overtime pay for the very simple
reason that the contrary is expressly stipulated in the CBA, which constitutes the law between
the parties.
– As regards cost of living allowance, there is nothing in Commonwealth Act 444 [or “the 8-hour
Labor Law,” now Art. 87 Labor Code] that could justify PEMA’s posture that it should be added
to the regular wage in computing overtime pay. C.A. 444 prescribes that overtime work shall be
paid “at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional.” The law did
not define what is a regular wage or salary. What the law emphasized is that in addition to
“regular wage,” there must be paid an additional 25% of that “regular wage” to constitute
overtime rate of pay. Parties were thus allowed to agree on what shall be mutually considered
regular pay from or upon which a 25% premium shall be based and added to makeup overtime
compensation.
– No rule of universal application to other cases may be justifiably extracted from the NAWASA
case. CIR relies on the part of the NAWASA decision where the SC cited American decisions
whose legislation on overtime is at variance with the law in this jurisdiction. The US legislation
considers work in excess of forty hours a week as overtime; whereas, what is generally
considered overtime in the Philippines is work in excess of the regular 8 hours a day. It is
understandably material to refer to precedents in the US for purposes of computing weekly
wages under a 40-hour week rule, since the particular issue involved in NAWASA is the
conversion of prior weekly regular earnings into daily rates without allowing diminution or
addition.

– To apply the NAWASA computation would require a different formula for each and every
employee. It would require reference to and continued use of individual earnings in the past,
thus multiplying the administrative difficulties of the Company. It would be cumbersome and
tedious a process to compute overtime pay and this may again cause delays in payments, which
in turn could lead to serious disputes. To apply this mode of computation would retard and stifle
the growth of unions themselves as Companies would be irresistibly drawn into denying, new
and additional fringe benefits, if not those already existing, for fear of bloating their overhead
expenses through overtime which, by reason of being unfixed, becomes instead a veritable
source of irritant in labor relations.