Lawyer's Oath
It is for this reason
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
1. A.C. No. 11871 POTENCIANO R. MALVAR, Complainant vs.
ATTY. FREDDIE B. FEIR, Respondent
This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by petitioner Potenciano R.
Malvar against Atty. Freddie B. Feir for violation of Canori 19, Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath.1
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On February 13, 2015, petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar filed a
complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie B. Feir
alleging that on December 17, 2014 and January 22, 2015, he
received threatening letters from Feir stating that should he fail to
pay the sum of Pl8,000,000.00 to his client, Rogelio M. Amurao, a
criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and Estafa,
a civil complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title, and
an administrative complaint for the revocation of his license as a
physician would be filed against him. 2 According to Mal var, Feir's
demands were tantamount to blackmail or extortion due to the fact
that F eir tried to obtain something of value by means of threats of
filing complaints.3 Said acts are in violation of the Lawyer's Oath
which provides that: "I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the.
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same."4 In support of his complaint, Mal var submitted the following
affidavits executed by: (1) his staff stating that said staff witnessed
Amurao deliver to the office a Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
Amurao, Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima
Toribio;5 and (2) Amurao himself stating that he is one of the sellers
indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, that the signature appearing
thereon is his, and that he personally witnessed Noemi Amurao,
Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio sign said document. 6
For his part, Feir countered that the said letters merely demanded
Malvar to explain how certain parcels of land Malvar was purchasing
from his client, Amurao, were already registered in Malvar's name
when Amurao had never executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
transferring the same. Feir narrated that sometime in 2008, Amurao
was tasked by his co-owners, spouses Teodorico Toribio and Fatima
Toribio, to sell their properties consisting of three. (3) parcels of land
located in Antipolo City for ₱21,200,000.00. The buyer of said
properties was Malvar, who initially paid the sum of ₱3,200,000.00
with a promise to pay the remainder of the purchase price after
verification of the authenticity of the owner's title to the properties.
For this purpose, Malvar borrowed the original copies of said titles
from Amurao. Malvar, however, failed to return the same despite
several demands. To his surprise, Amurao later on learned that the
subject properties were already transferred in Malvar's name
despite the fact that he never executed the necessary Deed of
Absolute Sale nor received the balance of the purchase price. Upon
further verification, Amurao discovered that there exists a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the sale of the subject properties in favor of
Malvar exhibiting not only the signatures of Amurao and Teodorico
but also the signature of Fatima, who had long been dead. 7 But
when asked, Malvar could not proffer any explanation as to the
existence of the suspicious Deed of Absolute Sale or the fact that
the subject properties were already in his name.
that Amurao consulted Feir on his legal remedies as regards his
recovery of the subject properties and/or collection of the
remaining balance of the purchase price. Clearly, therefore, Malvar's
complaint seeking his disbarment appears only to harass and
intimidate Feir. The threat to sue Malvar based on the facts
presented to Feir as a lawyer was not groundless as Amurao stands
to lose his property while· Malvar enriches himself at Amurao's
expense.8 Interestingly, moreover, it was pointed out that the
purported Affidavit executed by Amurao must be a forgery in view
of the fact that he never executed any such document and that his
supposed Senior Citizen Identification Number indicated in the
Acknowledgment thereof was left blank.9
After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Feir for lack of merit on February 23, 2016. 10 On November
5, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution 11 adopting
and approving the recommended dismissal of the complaint, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, 12 Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.13
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law." Moreover, Rule 19.01 thereof states that "a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer
should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal
case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure
a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own
cases against the lawyer's client.14
In the instant case, Malvar claims that Feir sent him the demand
letters in order to interpose threats that should he fail to pay the
sum of ₱18,000,000.00, Feir will file criminal, civil, and
administrative complaints which were, in truth, unfounded for being
based neither on valid nor relevant facts and law. Such demands,
according to Malvar, are tantamount to blackmail or extortion.
The Court, however, does not find merit in Malvar's contention.
Blackmail is defined as "the extortion of money from a person by
threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,
x x x obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining
from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret
calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with
extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a
duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence.
Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the
fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose
the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim. 15
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Malvar is the buyer of the
properties subject herein and that Amurao, Feir’s client, is one of
the owners of the same. It is also undisputed that said subject
properties are already registered under Malvar’s name. But
according to Amurao, he has yet to receive the remaining balance of
its purchase price. To the Court, this fact alone is enough reason for
Amurao to seek the legal advice of Feir and for Feir to send the
demand letters to Malvar. As the IBP held, these demand letters
were based on a legitimate cause or issue, which is the alleged
failure of Malvar to pay the full amount of the consideration in the
sale transaction as well as the alleged falsified Deed of Sale used to
transfer ownership over the lots subject of the instant
case.16 Whether the Deed of Sale used in transferring the properties
in the name of Malvar was, indeed, forged and falsified is another
matter for as far as the instant complaint for disbarment is
concerned, Feir was simply acting in compliance with his lawyer's
oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client.
It bears stressing, moreover, that the monetary consideration Feir
was demanding from Malvar in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00
cannot be considered as the subject of blackmail or extortion. Feir’s
demand for said amount is not an exaction of money for the
exercise of an influence but is actually a legitimate claim for the
remaining balance subject of a legitimate sale transaction. Contrary
to Malvar’s claims, there is nothing in the demand letters to show
that the same was maliciously made with intent to extort money
from him since it was based on a valid and justifiable cause. Indeed,
the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in
this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the
principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal.
Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be
tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps
necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring
payment within a specified period.17
In the absence, therefore, of any evidence preponderant to prove
that Feir committed acts constituting grounds for disbarment, such
as the violation of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, Malvar’s claims must
necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the
Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Freddie Feir for utter lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.
2. A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018 ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND
MARITA BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C.
QUESADA, JR., Respondent.
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment 1 dated February 9, 2006 filed
by complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcilla) and Marita Bumanglag
(Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty.
Quesada) for gross misconduct.
The facts are as follows:
On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-
Complaint2 against respondent Atty. Quesada and complainant
Marita Bumanglag, among others, for falsification of public
documents docketed as I.S. No. 02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged that
Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and
Gloria Quezada (Spouses Quezada) and Atty. Quesada to falsify a
Deed of Sale3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it appear that his
parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of
land under TCT No. T-18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite
knowledge that his parents were already deceased since March 4,
2001 and January 9, 1988, respectively, as per Death
Certificates4 issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing of deed of sale was allegedly
witnessed by a certain Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by
Atty. Quesada.
Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed
that on March 20, 2002, the Spouses Quezada filed a petition for the
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 18490
where they presented the Joint Affidavit of his then already
deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and Tarcela A.
Zarcilla as the petitioners.5 Said Joint-Affidavit of the Spouses
Quezada was again notarized by Atty. Quesada.
However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-
affidavit6 in the same case where she claimed to be the real owner
of the property after Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to her mother.
Bumanglag also stated therein that she facilitated the sale
transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in effect, exonerated her
co-respondents, including Atty. Quesada, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for the
expenses she incurred when she was sick and need medication and
all the (sic) to pay for the expenses of her burial. I offered to sell the
property to Spouses MAX QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I
showed them the Deed of Sale between PERFECTO ZARCILLA and
my mother. I also showed them the paper that my mother signed
giving me the land;
7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the land
provided I will be the one to transfer the said land to their name.
They gave me an advance payment so that I could transfer the land
to them. I made it appear that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the
property to the said spouses because the title of the land was still
in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla. I did not have [any] criminal intent
when I did it because the land no longer belong to Perfecto
Zarcilla. I did all the subsequent acts like Petition for Reconstitution
in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was still in his
name. However, there was no damage to the heirs of PERFECTO
ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my mother and
the sons and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the said
land;
8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA did not
falsify any document because I was the one who facilitated the
transaction knowing that the land I was selling really belonged to
me. Not one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never (sic) complained
when I sold the land. I just delivered the document to the Spouses
MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA including the title in their
name. I was paid the balance after the Certificate of Title in their
name was finally delivered.7
All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty.
Quesada, also filed their respective counter-affidavits where they
reiterated Bumanglag's admission.8
In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of La Union held Bumanglag only to undergo trial. All
other respondents, including Atty. Quesada who did not even file his
counter-affidavit, were exonerated for insufficiency of evidence.
Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but both were denied. Consequently, Bumanglag
was indicted for four counts of falsification of public documents
before the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, La Union, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and 3598.
However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned that
Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of her counter-affidavit
when she signed the same. He also found out that Bumanglag was
deceived by her co accused, including Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the
motion of Zarcilla, in an Order 10 dated July 27, 2005, the court
dismissed all falsification cases against Bumanglag.
In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to require
Atty. Quesada to file a comment on the complaint against him.
On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Comment12 due to voluminous workload. On September
18, 2006, Atty. Quesada filed a second motion for extension to file
comment. In a Resolution13 dated November 20, 2006, the Court
granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension with a warning that
the second motion for extension shall be the last and that no further
extension will be given.
On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a
comment on the complaint against him within the extended period
which expired on October 17, 2006, the Court resolved to require
Atty. Quesada to (a) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt from such failure, and (b) comply
with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required
comment.14
Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause
Resolution dated September 26, 2007, the Court resolved to (a)
impose upon Atty. Quesada, a fine of P1,000.00, and (b) require
Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by
filing the comment required therein.15
No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as evidenced
by a Certification16 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme
Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.
Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay the
fine imposed against him and to submit his comment, the Court, in a
Resolution17 dated February 16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon
Atty. Quesada an additional fine of P1,000.00, or a penalty of
imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not paid within 10
days from notice, and (b) order Atty. Quesada to comply with the
Resolution dated June 26, 2006 to submit his comment on the
complaint against him. Atty. Quesada was also warned that should
he fail to comply, he shall be ordered arrested and detained by the
National Bureau of Investigation until he shall have made the
compliance or until such time as the Court may order.
Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no payment
of fine was ever made as of September 3, 2010 as evidenced by a
Certification18 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court
Chief Judicial Staff Officer. On December 28, 2010, another
Certification19 was issued anew showing no record of payment of
fine by Atty. Quesada.
Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to
(1) increase the fine imposed on Atty. Quesada to P3,000.00, or
imprisonment often (10) days if such fine is not paid within the
prescribed period; and (2) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the
Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required
comment on the complaint.
No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced by a
Certification21 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court
Chief Judicial Staff Officer.
It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous
Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine imposed upon him and
submit comment on the complaint against him, in a
Resolution22 dated August 24, 2011, the Court ordered the arrest of
Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him until
he shall have compli[ed] with the Court's Resolution dated March 9,
2011. Subsequently, the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest. 23
Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years,
Atty. Quesada filed his Comment24 dated October 10, 2011, in
compliance with Resolution dated June 26, 2006. He claimed that he
is a victim of political harassment, vengeance and retribution, and
that the instant case against him was filed solely for the purpose of
maligning his person. Attached to his compliance was postal money
order in the amount of P3,000.00 as payment for the fine imposed
upon him.
In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan, Jr.,
Regional Director of the NBI, informed the Court that Atty. Quesada
voluntarily surrendered before the agents of the NBI on October 11,
2011, and claimed that he had already complied with the Resolution
of the Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a copy of his comment and
payment of fine, thus, on the same day, Atty. Quesada was
immediately released from custody.
On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.26
During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared.
Atty. Quesada failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory
conference was reset to July 11, 2012. However, on July 11, 2012,
Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the mandatory
conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012. Meanwhile, Bumanglag
informed the IBP-CBD that co-complainant Romeo Zarcilla passed
away in 2005.
On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory
conference be reset due to health reasons. He submitted his
Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012 showing that he underwent a
head operation and that he is still on recovery period.
On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the
parties were directed to appear on August 23, 2012 and submit their
respective verified position papers. However, on August 23, 2012,
only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared, and Atty. Quesada failed
to appear anew. Thus, considering that the parties were duly
notified of the hearing, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation,
recommended that respondent Atty. Quesada be disbarred from the
practice of law.
In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers. 27 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the
failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite
numerous notices.
However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. As in this case, considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.28
Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or forgery
against Atty. Quesada must be competently proved because
falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. As such, the allegations
should first be established and determined in appropriate
proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such
proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be
uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to do so. A
disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of
falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed
and determined therein is whether or not the respondent attorney
is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation
of justice. Accordingly, We decline to rule herein whether or not the
respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the subject
affidavit in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the
appropriate proceeding.29
We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial law for
his act of notarizing the: (1) Deed of Sale 30 dated April 12, 2002
purportedly executed by and between the spouses Maximo F.
Quezada and Gloria D. Quezada, the buyers, and complainant
Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla;
and the (2) Joint Affidavit 31 dated March 20, 2002 purportedly
executed by the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla for the
reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490, when in both occasions the
spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer
execute said documents and appear before Atty. Quesada since they
have long been deceased as evidenced by their death certificates.
Tarcela Zarcilla died on January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died
on March 4, 2001.32
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal appearance before
the notary public:
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved
as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signed the same is the very same person who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the
person who actually executed the document in question, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act or deed. Here, Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the
deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud.
This is more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment
thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same
persons who executed the document. When he then solemnly
declared that such appeared before him and acknowledged to him
that the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the
fact that the vendors cannot do so as they were already deceased,
Atty. Quesada deliberately made false representations, and was not
merely negligent.
Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial
law but also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the deed of sale
without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform
his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining
the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the
legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his
solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge
with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. 33
Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document is not
an empty act or routine. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document, thus, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able
to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.34
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should
not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act and deed.35
Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary public,
what this Court find more deplorable was his defiant stance against
the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the Court's
directives to file his comment on the complaint. Despite several
Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of fines for Atty.
Quesada's compliance and payment, he ignored the same for more
than five years. Consequently, this case has dragged on for an
unnecessary length of time. More than five (5) years have already
elapsed from the time the Court issued the first Resolution dated
June 26, 2006 which required Atty. Quesada to file his comment
until his eventual submission of comment on October 10, 2011. It
took a warrant of arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his
Comment and pay the fines imposed upon him. While the Court has
been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its directives,
he shamelessly ignored the same and wasted the Court's time and
resources.
And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer any
apology and/or any justification for his long delay in complying with
the directives/orders of this Court. We surmised that when Atty.
Quesada finally complied with the Court's directives, his compliance
was neither prompted by good faith or willingness to obey the Court
nor was he remorseful of his infractions but was actually only forced
to do so considering his impending arrest. There is, thus, no
question that his failure or obstinate refusal without justification or
valid reason to comply with the Court's directives constitutes
disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of Court, amounting
to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect. 36
Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. His cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of
the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility.
We have repeatedly held that a Court's Resolution is "not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately, or selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect
of the Court's lawful orders which this Court will not tolerate." 37
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity
and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial
authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders and
processes.38 Considering Atty. Quesada's predisposition to disregard
not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court,
it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor. Worse, with his repeated disobedience to this
Court's orders, Atty. Quesada displayed no remorse as to his
misconduct which, thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in
the Philippine Bar. Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to discharge the
duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find respondent ATTY. JOSE
C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is, thus,
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken-
off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. We,
likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial commission, if any,
and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a
notary public.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of
respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.
3. March 12, 2018 A.C. No. 9119 EUGENIO E.
CORTEZ, Complaint vs.
ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES, Respondent
The instant controversy arose from a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed by
complainant Eugenio E. Cortez2 against respondent Atty. Hernando
P. Cortes (Atty. Cortes) for grave misconduct, and violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as
his counsel in an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Explosives
Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and Atty. Cortes had a
handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by way of
attorney's fees.3
Atty. Cortes prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was
decided in favor of complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commissions ordering PEC
to pay complaint the total amount of One million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱1, 100,000) m three staggered payments. PEC
then issued City Bank Check No. 1000003986 dated March 31, 2005
in the amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱550,000),
Check No. 1000003988 in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 15, 2005, and Check No.
1000003989 also in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 30, 2005, all payable in the
name of complainant.4
Complainant narrated that after the maturity of the first check, he
went to China Bank, Southmall Las Pinas with Atty. Cortes and his
wife to open an account to deposit the said check. Atty. Cortes
asked complainant to wait outside the bank while he personally, for
and in his behalf, facilitated the opening of the account. After thirty
minutes, he was asked to go inside and sign a joint savings account
with Atty. Cortes.5
On April 7, 2005, complainant alleged that when he was about to
withdraw the amount of the initial check deposited, Atty. Cortes
arrived with his wife and ordered the bank teller to hold off the
transaction. When complainant asked why he did that, Atty. Cortes
answered that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as
attorney's fees. When complainant questioned him, Atty. Cortes
became hysterical and imposingly maintained that 50% of the total
awarded claims belongs to him.6
Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and
offered to pay ₱200,000, and when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he
offered the third check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty. Cortes still
insisted on the 50% of the total award. Complainant was then
forced to endorse the second and third checks to Atty. Cortes, after
which he was able to withdraw the proceeds of the first check. With
the help of the lawyers in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), complainant was able to have the drawer of the
checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes before he
was able to encash the same.
Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were engaged
by complainant to pursue the labor claims. He, however, denied
that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of attorney's
fees.7
Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but
considering that the case was to be filed in Pampanga and he
resided in Las Piñas, he would only accept the case on a fifty-fifty
sharing arrangement.8
Atty. Cortes alleged that the checks were issued pursuant to the
preexecution agreement reached by the parties at the office of
Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo. He and complainant agreed that
the amount of the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the whole of the
second check would be the complainant's, and the third check
would be his.9
Atty. Cortes further alleged that he had to assist complainant in the
opening of an account to deposit the checks. Atty. Cortes had to
convince the bank manager to accept the checks issued in the name
of Eugene E. Cortez despite the fact that complainant's ID's are all in
the name of Eugenio E. Cortez. 10 He claimed that anyone in his place
would have demanded for the holding off of the transaction
because of the base ingratitude, patent deception and treachery of
complainant.11
Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the
judgment award to which he had a lien corresponding to his
attorney's fees and complainant should have at least invited him to
witness the "harvest of the fruits."12
Atty. Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being
merely a concoction of Gomplainant’s fertile and unstable mind. He
also pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing arrangement is not
unconscionably high because the complainant was given the option
to hire other lawyers, but still he engaged his services. 13
After hearing and submission of position papers, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, in a Report and Recommendation
dated April 11, 2007, recommended the six-month suspension of
Atty. Cortes. It ruled that a contingent fee arrangement should
generally be in writing, and that contingent fees depend upon an
express contract without which the lawyer can only recover on the
basis of quantum meruit. It also pointed out that the Labor Code
establishes a limit as to the amount of attorney's fees that a lawyer
may collect or charge his client in labor cases.
The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the
IBP Board of Governors in an August 17, 2007 Resolution:
R E S O L U T I O N NO. XVIII-2007-74
CBD Case No. 05-1482
Eugenio E. Cortez vs. Atty. Hernando P. Cortes
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and for violation of A1iicle 11 (b) of the Labor Code, Atty.
Hernando P. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months and Ordered to Return to complainant whatever
amount he received in excess of the 10% allowable attorney's fees
in labor case (sic).
TOMAS N. PRADO
National Secretary14
A motion for reconsideration15 was filed by Atty. Cortes, which was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors.16
The issue, plainly, is whether or not the acts complained of
constitute misconduct on the part of Atty. Cortes, which would
subject him to disciplinary action.
We rule in the affirmative.
We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is generally recognized as valid and binding, but must
be laid down in, an express contract. 17 The case of Rayos v. Atty.
Hernandez18 discussed the same succinctly, thus:
A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is
generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in
an express contract. The amount of contingent fee agreed upon by
the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for
his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the
risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts of this
nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the
poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has
meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for
legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a
contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the
litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the only
means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries
sustained and have their rights vindicated.19 (Emphasis Ours)
In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express
contract as regards the payment of fees. Complainant alleges that
the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement,
while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%.
The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what
respondent handled was merely a labor case, his attorney's foes
should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article 111 20 of the
Labor Code.
Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We
do not agree that the 10% limitation as provided in Article 111 is
automatically applicable.
The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al., 21 discussed the
matter of application of Article 111 of the Labor Code on attorney's
fees:
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense,
attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On
the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may
be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by
the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the
cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those
authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable
not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as
part thereof.
Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code
deals with the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees.1âwphi1 It
regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature
of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It
may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to
the lawyer by his client for the legal services he
rendered.22 (Emphasis Ours)
It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes
required is in the ordinary sense as it represents reasonable
compensation for legal services he rendered for complainant.
Necessarily, the 10% limitation of the Labor Code would not be
applicable. Beyond the limit fixed by Article 111, such as between
the lawyer and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed 10% on
the basis of quantum meriut.23 We, however, are hard-pressed to
accept the justification of the 50% contingency fee that Atty. Cortes
is insisting on for being exorbitant.
Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the
retainer Agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the
lawyers compensation.1âwphi1 In the absence thereof, the amount
of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the
reasonable worth of the attorneys services. 24 Courts may ascertain
also if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is
reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a
lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable,
pursuant to Section 24, Rule 13825 of the Rules of Court.26
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 of the
same canon enumerates the following factors which should guide a
lawyer in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of
fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or' certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j)The professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's case was
merely grounded on complainant's alleged absence without leave
for the second time and challenging the plant manager, the
complainant's immediate superior, to a fist fight. He also claimed
that the travel from his home in Las Piñas City to San Fernando,
Pampanga was costly and was an ordeal. We likewise note that Atty.
Cortes admitted that complainant was a close kin of his, and that Relative to the said civil case, herein respondent lawyer, as counsel
complainant appealed to his services because, since his separation for therein defendants, notarized and acknowledged a SPA 3 which
from work, he had no visible means of income and had so many reads:
mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by Atty. Cortes to justify
the fees; to Our mind, does not exculpate Atty. Cortes, but in fact, SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
makes Us question all the more, the reasonableness of it.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by
Atty. Cortes was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly WE, x x x the HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA ALMARIO, to wit:
excessive and unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly be RONALD A. GA TD ULA, of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident
said to be novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that of 973 Del Pan St., Tondo, Manila and FRANCISCA A. MALLARI, of the
complainant was already hard up. We have held that lawyering is same address, do hereby appoint, name and constitute also MA.
not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. 27 Law LOURDES ALMARIO P. PEDIA, above named, to do the following acts
advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. 28 The and things:
returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy
1. To act as our representative and agent in administering our
a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is
property x x x located at District of Tondo, City of Manila consisting
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
of SEVENTY EIGHT SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY FIVE DECIMETERS
regulation.29
(78.65) Square meters, covered by TCT No. T-244909 of the
[Register] of Deeds of the City of Manila;
Here, considering that complainant was amenable to a 12%
contingency fee, and which we likewise deem to be the reasonable
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorney-in-fact full
worth of the attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes under the
power and authority, whatsoever requisite to be done in or about
circumstances, Atty. Cortes is hereby adjudged to return to
the premises, as fully as we might or could lawfully do if personally
complainant the amount he received in excess of 12% of the total
present and hereby ratifying and confirming all that our said
award. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to
attorney shall do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents
attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only
until revoked in writing by me.
master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles. 30
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed this instrument on the
26th day of July 2006 at Muntinlupa City.
We, however, find that the recommended suspension of six months
is too harsh and considering that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years
HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA A. ALMARIO:
old and that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was able to get
a favorable outcome, a reduction of the suspension is proper. We
then reduce and sanction Atty. Cortes to a three-month suspension (Signed)
from the practice of law. RONALD A. GATDULA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Hernando P. (Signed)

Cortes is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of FRANCISCA A. MALLARI
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months, and is ordered to return to ACKNOWLEDGMENT
complainant Eugenio E. Cortez the amount he received in excess of
the 12% allowable attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) SS.
CITY OF MUNTINLUPA )
4. January 8, 2018 A.C. No. 10689 ROMEO A.
ALMARIO, Complainant vs. ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA- BEFORE ME, a notary public for the City of Muntinlupa, personally
AGNO, Respondent appeared the following persons on the 26[th] day of July 2006:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed by Ronald A. Gatdula with CTC No. 16785315 issued at Manila on 1-19-
complainant Romeo A. Almario (complainant) before the 06 Francisca Mallari with CTC No. 16785314 issued at Manila on 1-
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the 19-06 known to me and to me known to be the same persons who
Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L. Agno executed the foregoing Special Power of Attorney, consisting of
(respondent lawyer), for notarizing a Special Power of Attorney three (3) pages including this page where the acknowledgement is
(SPA) without the personal appearance of one of the affiants written, signed by the parties and their instrumental witnesses and
therein. they acknowledged to me that the same is their own true act and
deed.
Factual Background
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.
On July 5, 2006, a Complaint for Judicial Partition with Delivery of
Certificate of Title, docketed as Civil Case No. 06115416 2 (civil case), (Signed)
was instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila by the DOMINICA L. AGNO
herein complainant against therein defendants Angelita A.
Barrameda and several other persons. It was therein alleged that Notary Public
complainant is the sole surviving registered owner of a parcel of Until 31 Dec 2006
land situated at No. 973 Del Pan Street, San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, PTR No. 0007769
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 244909, and that Muntinlupa City
the defendants therein are co-owners of that parcel of land by 06 January 2006
virtue of intestate succession. IBP Life Roll 00577
Doc. No. 193
Page No. 55
Book No. 11 Mallari is a resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San Antonio,
Series of 2006 Tondo, Manila, even though he knew that Mallari was in
Japan at the time of filing of the civil case.
It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified
because one of the affiants therein, Francisca A. Mallari Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
(Mallari),4 could not possibly have executed the same because she
was in Japan at the time the SP A was executed, as certified to 5 by In a Report and Recommendation,10 the Investigating Commissioner
the Bureau of Immigration (BI); (2) that this SP A was used in the found respondent lawyer liable for violation of Section 12 of the
said civil case to perpetrate fraud and deception against 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and recommended that she be
complainant resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No. 452612-CR, suspended for six months as notary public.
for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Use of
Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia, (Pedia), the According to the Investigating Commissioner, it was evident that
attorney-in-fact mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer respondent lawyer notarized the SPA despite knowing that Mallari,
notarized the SP A although Mallari did not personally appear one of the affiants therein, did not personally appear before her.
before her; (4) that in the process of notarizing the SP A, respondent
lawyer also accepted a Community Tax Certificate (CTC), which is no
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
longer considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent
On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a
lawyer violated Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Resolution11 adopting the finding and approving the
Responsibility, which state -
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Reconsideration,12 which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors
in a Resolution13 dated May 3, 2014.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
Respondent lawyer admits the infraction imputed against her, and
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
simply pleads that the penalty recommended by the IBP be reduced
or lowered. She argues that: (1) this is her first offense since she was
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
first commissioned as a notary public in 1973; (2) the case involved
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
only one document; (3) the notarization was done in good faith; (4)
the civil case wherein the questioned SP A was used ended in a
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Compromise Agreement; and finally (5) she is already 71 years old
court. and is truly sorry for what she had done, and promises to be more
circumspect in the performance of her duties as a notary public. 14
Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be In his Comment15 to the Petition, complainant insists that
misled by any artifice. respondent lawyer must be disciplined accordingly and that
suspension is the appropriate penalty for such infraction.
In her Answer,6 respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and offered the following arguments: The sole issue that this Court must thus address is the appropriate
penalty to be meted out against respondent lawyer.
1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan
and it was brought back to the Philippines on July 25, 2006 Our Ruling
by Mallari's son, Roman Mallari-Vestido;
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a
2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of document is notarized is underscored by Section 1, Rule II of the
expediency, because therein defendants were pressed for 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which states:
time in filing their Answer in the civil case, and that in any
event, Mallari undertook to have the SPA acknowledged
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in
before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August
which an individual on a single occasion:
28, 2006, (thereby giving it retroactive effect). Respondent
lawyer claimed that the aforementioned circumstances
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
showed that she acted in good faith in notarizing the SPA;
integrally complete instrument or document;
3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SP A with red
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or
ribbon7 before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
August 28, 2006;
identity as defined by these Rules; and
4) Neither fraud nor deception was perpetrated as the
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the
parties in the said civil case executed a Compromise
instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the
Agreement,8 which was approved by the RTC;9
purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he
has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary
5) Contrary to complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently
act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity,
accepted as proof of personal identification in cases where
that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis
no other proof of personal identification is available; and,
supplied)

6) That, if at all, it was complainant himself who defrauded

Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that:
the RTC when he stated in his verified complaint that
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved
as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical
or personal presence of the person/s who executed a document,
before notarizing the same. In other words, a document should not
be notarized unless the person/s who is/are executing it is/are
personally or physically present before the notary public. The
personal and physical presence of the parties to the deed is
necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the due execution of the
document.
Notaries public are absolutely prohibited or forbidden from
notarizing a fictitious or spurious document.1âwphi1 They are the
law's vanguards and sentinels against illegal deeds. The confidence
of the public in the integrity of notarial acts would be undermined
and impaired if notaries public do not observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties spelled out in
the notarial law.
This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, 16 held that "notarization is
not an empty, meaningless and routinary act[;i]t is imbued with
public interest x xx."
In cognate or similar cases, 17 this Court likewise held that a notary
public must not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
it are the very same persons who executed the same, and personally
appeared before him to attest to the truth of the contents thereof.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary
act and deed.
In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by
respondent lawyer despite the absence of Mallari, one of the
affiants therein. Mallari could not have personally appeared before
respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City, Philippines where the SPA
was notarized on July 26, 2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that
time, as certified to by the Bureau of Immigration.
It goes without saying that it was respondent lawyer's bounden
duty, as a lawyer and notary public, to obey the laws of the land and
to promote respect for legal processes. Respondent lawyer may only
forsake this duty at the risk of forfeiting her membership in the
Philippine Bar and the revocation of her license as a notary public.
Considering however, the circumstances attendant upon this case,
we resolve to reduce or lower the recommended penalty on
respondent lawyer.
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for
two months, instead of six months as the IBP had recommended.
We are impelled by the following reasons for taking this course of
action: first, the apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing the
SP A in question; second, the civil case wherein the flawed SP A was
used ended up in a judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally, this
is her first administrative case since she was commissioned as a
Notary Public in 1973. In addition, respondent lawyer invites our
attention to the fact that she is already in the twilight years of her
life.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is
hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for the aforesaid infraction for
two months and WARNED that the commission of a similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Agno's personal record. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
info1mation and guidance. SO ORDERED.
5. A.C. No. 5161 April 14, 2004 ISIDRA TING
DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S.
TORRES, respondent.
In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court,
complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S.
Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in,
consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of
complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer
and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita
Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera;
Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein
respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died
intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon
Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or
less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-
19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or less,
and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of
the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or less
and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry
of Deeds of Cavite.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his
relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to
deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the
commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to
the respondent the following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed
to advise against, the perjury committed by his wife
Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11
November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they
were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He
presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite
for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names
of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel
Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made
to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed
to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in
a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17
March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was
in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract
worker. He even presented the falsified document to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the
property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law
 Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable
them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was
received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial
Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by
complainant’s sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24
October 1995, the respondent made gross
misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect
that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and
legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita
Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their
names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express
conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina
were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for
P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of
their other siblings. Partial payment was even received
pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and
false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting
therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain
Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under
the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be
released within a month when he knew that it would be
impossible because he presented evidence in the
reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate
the release of the money, he even used the stationery of
the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.
In his Comment,2 the respondent denies the allegations of the
complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his
profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left
by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that
Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely
profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving
Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document.
All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had
already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever
complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was done
in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting
Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No.
T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and
Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita
Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear
oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc.,
was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through
his signature was pro-forma because the property was a
paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his alleged
gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution
would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say
that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro
Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually
uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to
harass him in bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this
administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of
Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal
case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal
will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by
their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances:
(1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the
properties in total disregard of their father was morally
reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother
died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondent’s
wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in
response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam,
denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the
respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted,
the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation or decision.3
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues
presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the
actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02
of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law.4
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333 5 of 21 June 2003, the Board of
Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San
Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings
of facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent has
sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to
remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal
profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his
sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court
inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH
I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support
its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement
to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards;
nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing
the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of
law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of
justice.6 This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
 Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
...
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
… Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of
the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his
pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that
they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only
between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other
siblings.7 There was concealment of the fact that there were other
compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the
respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to
complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. In fact, he
declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in
the Philippines.8 Yet, the respondent presented that document to
the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer
of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his
sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted 9 regarding
the falsification of complainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial
Settlement10 dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which
contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over
the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s
name in that document.11 Such act of counterfeiting the
complainant’s signature to make it appear that the complainant had
participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to
falsification of a public document.12
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of
attorney and against committing falsification, he presented 13 such
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot
in favor of Marcelina and his wife.14 He himself, therefore, may also
be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the
damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs. 15 Notably, he
also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared
the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.16
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing
acts which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first
and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the
laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility
underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that
a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law and legal processes. 17 For a lawyer is
the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.18 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for
others to emulate.19 He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. 20 He makes himself unfit to
remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or
conduct.21
Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his
sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for
the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight
does not deserve credence in view of the following
circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and
heirs of the unpartitioned lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said
case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has
brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The
transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of
the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir.23
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false
testimony24 in court, and he never corrected the same despite full
knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the
case.25 Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false
testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony. 26
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the
court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice."27 This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the
respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she
had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such
testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot
1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an
officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of
justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause.
For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him.28
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the
reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was
executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of
this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in
that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she
was never in possession of the title 29 and would not, therefore, know
that the same was lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a
certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of 50% of
the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel
Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of
Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605
would be released within the month. 30 Respondent’s information
was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August
1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter. 31 Such act, therefore,
shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.
Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless
bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute
gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
 Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against
an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of
disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. 32 While the assessment of what
sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound
discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever
be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the
purity and independence of the bar.33
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We
will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. 34 Verily,
given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we
find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance of
his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the
penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando
S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s
oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED
from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the
respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.
5.A July 11, 2017 A.C. No. 5161
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF
ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
ROLANDO S. TORRES, Petitioner
For resolution is the Petition1 dated March 10, 2017 filed by Rolando
S. Torres (Torres) who seeks judicial clemency in order to be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in a Resolution 2 dated April 14, 2004 in Ting-
Dumali v. Torres,3 the Court meted the supreme penalty of
disbarment on Torres for "presentation of false testimony;
participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery
of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery,"4 thereby committing gross misconduct
and violating Canons 1 and 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando
S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer's
oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is
ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Aggrieved, Torres twice moved for reconsideration, 6 both of which
were denied with finality by the Court, 7 which then stated that "[n]o
further pleadings will be entertained."8 This notwithstanding,
Torres: (a) filed an Ex-Parte  Motion to Lift Disbarment9 dated
January 26, 2006 begging for compassion, mercy, and
understanding;10 and (b) wrote letters to former Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban11 and former Associate Justice Dante 0.
Tinga12 reiterating his pleas for compassion and mercy. However,
these were ordered expunged through the Court's Resolutions
dated June 13, 200613 and September 5, 2006,14 considering the
previous directive that no further pleadings will be further
entertained in this case. Still undaunted, Torres continued to file
numerous submissions either seeking his reinstatement to the
bar15 or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to
suspension,16 all of which were either expunged from the
records17 or denied18 by the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, Torres filed a
Petition19 dated June 11, 2015 seeking judicial clemency from the
Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attomeys. 20 In a
Resolution21 dated August 25, 2015 (August 25, 2015 Resolution),
the Court denied the petition, holding that Torres had failed to
provide substantial proof that he had reformed himself, especially
considering the absence of showing that he had reconciled or
attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law, the original
complainant in the disbarment case against him; nor was it
demonstrated that he was remorseful over the fraudulent acts he
had committed against her.22
Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant petition, again seeking
judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of
Attorneys.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
The principle which should hold true for lawyers, being officers of
the court, is that judicial clemency, as an act of mercy removing any
disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is
a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable. 23 In Re: The Matter of the
Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres as a member of the
Philippine Bar,24 the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall
include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of
the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding
of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still
has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem himself.1âwphi1
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may
justify clemency.25
In support of the instant petition for reinstatement, Torres merely
rehashed all the several testimonials and endorsements which he
had already attached to his previous petitions, in addition to
another endorsement, this time coming from the incumbent
Secretary of Justice, stating that Torres "is a person of good moral
character and a law abiding citizen."26 However, these testimonials
and endorsements do not prove whatsoever that Torres had already
successfully reformed himself subsequent to his disbarment.
Neither do they exhibit remorse towards the actions which caused
his delisting from the Roll of Attorneys, i.e., the fraudulent acts he
committed against his sister-in-law. In this regard, it is noteworthy
to point out that since the promulgation of the Court's August 25,
2015 Resolution, there was still no showing that Torres had
reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law so
as to show remorse for his previous faults.
Moreover, Torres also failed to present any evidence to
demonstrate his potential for public service or that he - now being
70 years of age27 - still has productive years ahead of him that can be
put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
In sum, Torres failed to comply with the guidelines for the grant of
judicial clemency; hence, the instant petition must necessarily be
denied.- WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED
6. A.C. No. 5333 October 18, 2000 ROSA
YAPPARAS, complainant,  vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS
PARAS, respondent.
This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant
Rosa Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The
parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their copious pleadings,
hurling invectives, cutting remarks and insults at each other.
Reduced to its essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband with
dishonesty and falsification of public documents, harassment and
intimidation, and immorality for siring a child with another woman.
Respondent denied the allegations, contending that his wife, in
cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of his share
in their multi-million conjugal assets.
The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They
were married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children.
They have vast sugarlands and other businesses. Respondent was a
Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town for
2 terms during the administration of President Aquino. Complainant
is a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart
when due to "marital strain that has developed through the years,"
respondent left his wife and children to live with his mother and
sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice.
Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of
their marriage, which case is still pending in court.
The complaint charged:
DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD
… respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of
complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely
making it appear that complainant was the applicant for said loans.
Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of
the loans.
. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some
personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership without
the consent of complainant.
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of
concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms.
Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married
to complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to
frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a position
diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing
complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized strategies
to obstruct justice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal
actions initiated against him, respondent used his legal skills not to
prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings.
(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his
favor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or
crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and
secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais
Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262)
(2) On the Charge of Forgery:
That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found
that "the questioned signatures (referring to the alleged forged
signatures of complainant) and the standard sample signatures
JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person…"(Annex
"B" of the Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife
filed against him a string of cases for falsification of public
documents because he intends to disinherit his children and
bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own
mother.
(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage:
That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law,
Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in the
conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for
concubinage filed against him by his wife before the City Prosecutor
of Negros Oriental as proof of his innocence.
Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are
solicitous and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching
and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own deceased
daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house and giving them
some financial assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary
in his law office, who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting
her pregnant.
(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:
That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense
are legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer."
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines investigated the complaint against respondent
summarizing the causes of action as follows:
(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal
assets; and
(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with her while
married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own family.
(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)
No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely
submit their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces
of evidence attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and
recommended:
(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months on the first charge; and
(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law on
the second charge.
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent for falsification and use of falsified documents (Criminal
Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar
the filing of an administrative case for disbarment against him. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for
conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a
preponderance of evidence is necessary.
The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned
signatures (referring to the signatures appearing in the loan
agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample
signatures of respondent were written by one and the same
person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras
that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments.
Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and is,
therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on
the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's
children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair
with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their
statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,
"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly
sworn hereby depose and say:
1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the
College of Nursing, Silliman University.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras. My
father has left the family home in Bindoy and now lives at his
mother's house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City.
3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma. Jocelyn
Ching.1âwphi1 They have a child named Cyndee Rose, who was
delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical Center on July
19, 1990.
4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor
Arboleda when they practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their
relationship started in 1989. When she became pregnant, my father
rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete
City.
5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn
in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father spend time
there often with Jocelyn and their child.
6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past years,
and almost every time I was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting,
watching TV, serving coffee in my father's law office, and one time,
she was washing my father's clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at
San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He was
there at the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I
became convinced that she was my father's daughter with Jocelyn.
8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now
deceased).
9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys and
child's clothes in my father's room.
10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to talk
to her or be alone with her, but she would deliberately avoid me. I
could see that she was hiding something from me." p. 109, Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I made
several visits to my father at his mother's house in San Jose
Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved after he left our
home in Bindoy;
2. That these visits were made on different times and different days
of the week;
3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also living
at my father's place. This woman is now known to me to be Ma.
Jocelyn Ching;
4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my
father's house is that during my visits, whether during office hours
or after office hours, I would meet her at my father's place, not his
office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as skimpy
clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she was
generally unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one
occasion, I even saw her, washing my father's clothes as well as a
small child's clothing; and she conducted herself around the house
in the manner of someone who lived there;
5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living
with my father from Josie Vailoces, who was then a working student
living at my father's place;
6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that my
father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were living together as husband and
wife at my father's place in a deposition taken in connection with
Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City, Branch 30, the
Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the transcript of
the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the record of this
case. For emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent portion of the
written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto attached as Annexes
"A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records
Respondent's son has this to say:
"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly
sworn according to law, depose and say:
1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School,
Dumaguete City.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a
lawyer.
3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his
mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is not
giving us support any more.
4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting my
allowance of P50.00 a week. I would go to their house at San Jose
Extension and personally ask him for it.
5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San
Jose Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an
adopted son of my father's sister, if my father was around. Josephus
said my father was in his room.
6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not locked,
I entered the room without knocking. There I saw my father lying in
bed side by side with a woman. He was only wearing a brief. The
woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.
7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father hurriedly
gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I felt bad and
embarrassed.
8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father's
house in San Jose Extension. Every time I went to see my father, she
was also there.
9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she
was my father's "kabit" or concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father." p.
112, Records
Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children
is the damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who
was respondent's secretary when respondent was a mayor of
Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as follows:
"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident
of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in
accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary during
his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In fact,
through the latter's recommendation and intercession, I was later
on appointed as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986
to January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete City, I
became his personal aide and performed various chores for the
same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the same house and room
with the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he
felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then
requested me to invite the latter to a dinner date at Chin Loong
Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn
Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had dinner at the
above-mentioned restaurant.
5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on
several occasions, always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin, Negros
Oriental. Said invitations were always accepted by the latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J.
Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more
intimate with each other.
7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening
on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J. Paras to the area in front of the
Silliman University Medical Center, where he said he was going to
meet someone.
8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and
immediately boarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was
driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested me to drive both
of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel
somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for them
outside the room, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching entered the
said room.
10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which
the two of them emerged from the room. We then proceeded to
Chin Loong to eat supper.
11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front
of the Dumaguete City Cockpit.
12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same place
and always on a Friday.
13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working
for Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look for
a job, having been jobless since I left Dumaguete City to go home to
Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend,
Bernard Dejillo was staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My friend
Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the second floor of the said
house which he shared with me.
3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my job
hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having not seen each other for some
time, we talked for a while, discussing matters about the barangay
elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me where I
was staying, to which I answered that I was staying at the
aforementioned house. He then requested me to find out if there
was an available room at the said house which he could rent with
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my friend
Bernard Dejillo about the matter.
5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend
Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which the latter signified his
approval. He told me that a room at the first floor of the same house
was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching.
6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard
Dejillo's approval of his request.
7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching
moved in to the room she had rented at the first floor of the house I
was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to the
house and stay overnight. When he came at night Justo J. Paras and
I would converse and while conversing, drink a bottle of Tanduay
Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join in our conversation.
9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn
Ching would enter the room rented and sleep there, while I would
also go upstairs to my room.
10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras came out
of said room and depart from the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying ceased
after about one (1) month when they transferred to another house.
12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental
some time in June 1989.
13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime, I
went to the house of Justo J. Paras to consult him about a
Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son. When I arrived at his
house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was no one
there.
14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I
proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J. Paras located at Maayong
Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.
15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not
there but the person in charge of the said resthouse informed me
that Justo J. Paras was at his house at Barangay Maayong Tubig,
Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave me directions so
that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier.
16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was able
to locate the house of Justo J. Paras.
17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was
home while knocking on the door.
18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door. Upon
seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J. Paras was home. She then let
me in the house and told me to sit down and wait for a while. She
then proceeded to a room.
19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same room
and sat down near me. I noticed that the latter had just woke up
from a nap.
20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and
sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us coffee.
21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl,
about three (3) years old, walking around the sala, whom I later
came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of Justo J. Paras and
Ma. Jocelyn Ching.
22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to see
him at this office at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the
following Monday to discuss the matter some more.
23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros
Oriental.
24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit
dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records
The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the
deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a
former repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a
working student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both
gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship between
respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee
Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the Paras'
household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living
in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the other
hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to deliver
money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after she
gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by respondent to
procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate after the latter was
baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in
said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of
Cyndee Rose which explains why the latter is using the surname
"Paras." (p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated
by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned signature
"Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the
following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J.
PARAS were written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP
PARAS were not written by one and the same person.
(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent
forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the
above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned
or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored
by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the
sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for
an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City.
Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places
him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from
the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the
bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially
authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the
principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-
statements of his children and three other persons who used to
work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose
Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child
(Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased
first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and
the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the
allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206
SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below
the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan
documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife.
However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and
as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148,
July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the
end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]).
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his
wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan
instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the
charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be
spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned. SO ORDERED.
7. October 3, 2017 A.C. No. 11483
LUZVIMINDA S. CERILLA, Complainant  vs. ATTY. SAMUEL SM.
LEZAMA, Respondent
On November 22, 2010, complainant Luzviminda S. Cerilla filed an
administrative complaint1 for gross misconduct against respondent
Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
In her Complaint, complainant stated that she is one of the co-
owners of a parcel of land located at BarangayPoblacion,
Municipality of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, with an area of 730 square
meters. The said property is covered by TCT No. 1-20416 and
registered in the name of Fulquerio Gringio. It was later sold by his
sole heir, Pancracio A. Gringio, to the heirs of Fabio 2 Solmayor,
including the herein complainant. Being a co-owner of the subject
property, complainant engaged the services of respondent to file an
unlawful detainer case against Carmelita S. Garlito with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental. At that
time, the complainant was working at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City,
and for this reason, she executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of the respondent to perform the following
acts, to wit:
(1) To represent and act on my behalf in filing a case of ejectment
against Lita Garlito of Sibulan, Negros Oriental;
(2) To appear on my behalf during the preliminary conference in
Civil Case No. 497-04 and to make stipulations of facts, admissions
and other matters for the early resolution of the same including
amicable settlement of the case if necessary. 3
Complainant said that on the basis of the SPA, respondent entered
into a compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful
detainer case to sell the subject property of the complainant for
₱350,000.00 without her consent or a special authority from her.
Paragraph 2 of the Compromise Agreement dated January 31, 2005
states:
2. The plaintiff is willing to sell [the] property in question to the
defendant in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within a period of three
months beginning February 1, 2005 up to April 30, 2005, the
payment of which shall be paid in one setting.4
The Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental in an Order5 dated January 31, 2005. Subsequently,
a Motion for Execution6 dated June 2, 2005 was filed due to
complainant's failure to comply with the terms and conditions set
forth in the compromise agreement, as complainant refused to
execute a Deed of Sale. The MTC issued a Writ of Execution 7 on June
10, 2005.
Complainant contended that respondent misrepresented in
paragraph 2 of the Compromise Agreement that she was willing to
sell the subject property for ₱350,000.00. Complainant averred that
she did not authorize the respondent to sell the property and she is
not willing to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00,
considering that there are other co-owners of the property.
Complainant contended that by entering into the compromise
agreement to sell the subject property without any special power to
do so, respondent committed gross misconduct in the discharge of
his duties to his client. She asserted that respondent's misconduct
was the proximate cause of the loss of the subject property in the
ejectment case, which prejudiced her and the other co-owners, as
respondent knew that the ejectment case was filed by her for the
benefit of all the co-owners of the property.
According to complainant, the subject property is located near the
Municipal Hall and town plaza of the Municipality of Sibulan, Negros
Oriental and the property's market value is not less than
₱l,500,000.00. Since respondent sold the property for only
₱350,000.00, she (complainant) and the other co-owners suffer
actual loss.
Complainant contended that respondent's act of entering into the
compromise agreement with the misrepresentation that she was
willing to sell the property in the unlawful detainer case without her
consent or conformity, which caused her material damage, warrants
respondent's suspension or disbarment.
In his Answer,8 respondent denied complainant's allegation that he
misrepresented that complainant was willing to sell the property in
the amount of ₱350,000.00, since he was duly armed with an SPA to
enter into a compromise agreement, and the price of ₱350,000.00
was the actual price paid by the complainant to the owner of the
property.
Respondent contended that complainant has no cause of action
against him for the following reasons:
(a) The SPA dated December 27, 2004 was executed by the
complainant in favor of the respondent due to her inability to attend
every hearing of the unlawful detainer case;
(b) The SPA contains the sentence under number 2: "including
amicable settlement of the case if necessary";
(c) During the preliminary conference of the unlawful detainer case,
the respondent requested Presiding Judge Rafael Cresencio C. Tan,
Jr. to allow him to contact the complainant by mobile phone before
any compromise agreement could be executed. Respondent tried
several times to contact complainant to no avail during the recess.
When the case was called again, he requested a resetting, but the
Presiding Judge insisted on a compromise agreement to be
submitted because respondent was armed with the necessary SPA
anyway, and the result was the Compromise Agreement of January
31, 2005;
(d) Upon the signing of the Compromise Agreement, respondent
was able to contact complainant, who objected to the agreement
because the amount of ₱350,000.00 was small;
(e) After writing a letter of repudiation to the counsel of the
defendant in the unlawful detainer case, respondent filed
a Manifestation dated February 24, 2005 with the MTC of Sibulan,
attaching therewith the letter of repudiation, and he also filed
a Motion to Set Aside Order and to Annul Compromise
Agreement9(on the ground of mistake). However, the MTC denied
the said motion in an Order10 dated May 30, 2005. Respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the MTC;
(f) In 2006, the heirs of Favio Solmayor filed another unlawful
detainer case over the same property with the same MTC against
the same defendant, which was dismissed by the court on the
ground of res judicata; 11 and
(g) In 2008, complainant filed a civil case 12 for annulment of
judgment/quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages
against Carmelita S. Garlito, respondent Atty. Lezama and the MTC
of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, and the case is still pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 35, Negros
Oriental.13
Further, respondent stated that the payment for the property in the
amount of ₱350,000.00 is under the custody of the MTC of Sibulan,
although the money was deposited with the Philippine Veterans
Bank by defendant Carmelita S. Garlito, who opened an account in
respondent's name. Respondent stated that he has never touched
the said deposit.
Respondent contended that the SP A given to him by the
complainant was sufficient authority to enter into the said
compromise agreement.1âwphi1 The amount of ₱350,000.00 was
the price of the subject property, because the complainant paid the
same amount for the purchase of the property from the Gringio
family.
According to the respondent, he entered into the compromise
agreement under the honest and sincere belief that it was the
fairest and most equitable arrangement. Under the present policy of
the Court, parties should endeavor to settle their differences (in civil
cases, at least) amicably. To penalize lawyers for their judgment calls
in cases where they are armed with authority to settle would wreck
havoc on our system of litigation, making them hesitant,
apprehensive and wary that their clients might file disciplinary cases
against them for the slightest reasons. While the filing of such
complaint is part of the professional hazards of lawyering, the same
should only be anchored on the most serious misconduct of lawyers,
which respondent does not believe is present in this case. Hence,
respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
On June 10, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline held a
mandatory conference with the parties, who were required to
submit their respective Position Papers thereafter.
The Commissioner's Report
On June 28, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.
submitted his Report,14 finding respondent guilty of violating Canons
15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years.
The Investigating Commissioner stated that during the mandatory
conference, it was agreed upon that the SPA dated December 27,
2004 was the same SP A granted by complainant in favor of
respondent. It was also agreed upon that by virtue of the said SP A,
respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the
defendant in the unlawful detainer case. According to the
complainant, while it is true that she executed an SPA in favor of the
respondent, there was no specific authority granted to him to sell
the subject property for ₱350,000.00, and that was the reason why
she refused to sign the Deed of Sale.
Moreover, respondent admitted during the mandatory conference
that complainant did not give him any instruction to sell the
property, thus:
Comm. De La Rama: Prior to the execution of the compromise
agreement on January 31, 2005, were you under instruction by Ms.
Cerilla to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama: No, Your Honor.
Comm. De La Rama: You were not?
Atty. Lezama There was none.
Comm. De La Rama: So what prompted you to [have] that idea that
Ms. Cerilla is willing to sell this property in the amount of
Php350,000.00?
Atty. Lezama : Because that is the same amount that she paid [for]
the property. It is an amicable settlement in meeting halfway.
Comm. De La Rama: But you at that time, prior to the signing of the
Compromise Agreement, you do not have any instruction from Ms.
Cerilla to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama No, Your Honor.
Comm. De La Rama : So it was your own volition?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, my own belief.15
The Investigating Commissioner stated that respondent must have
overlooked the fact that the subject property was co-owned by
complainant's siblings. Respondent knew about the co-ownership
because of the existence of the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate,16 but he did not assert that his authority to compromise
binds only the complainant. Respondent merely made a flimsy
excuse as shown in the transcript of stenographic notes, to wit:
Comm. De La Rama: Are you aware, Atty. Lezama, that the property
does not belong exclusively to Ms. Cerilla?
Atty. Lezama I was of the impression that it was owned by
complainant that's why the ejectment complaint filed speaks only of
Luzviminda Cerilla but that was her claim because she said she paid
for it.17
The Investigating Commissioner stated that the transcript of
stenographic notes shows that respondent admitted that
complainant did not grant him the authority to sell the property in
the amount of ₱350,000.00. Thus, knowing that he did not possess
such authority, respondent cannot validly claim that his client,
complainant herein, was willing to sell the property in the amount
of ₱350,000.00.
In order to save himself, respondent allegedly filed
a Manifestation, but he failed to submit a copy of the same before
the Commission.
Further, the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary conference of the unlawful detainer case shows that it
was the respondent who stated that the plaintiff (complainant
herein) was willing to sell the property, and it was also the
respondent who fixed the selling price of the property at
₱350,000.00, thus:
Court : The plaintiff is willing to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, if the defendant is willing to pay the amount of
sale.
Court : How much?
Atty. Lezama : ₱l00,000.00, although the record is more than that,
your Honor.
Court : They will also want to buy the property. You will sell it for
₱l00,000.00?
Atty. Lezama : I don't think, your Honor. Maybe it's ₱300,000.00.
Court : ₱300,000.00. How much?
Atty. Lezama : ₱350,000.00.
The MTC Judge also inquired about respondent's authority, and
respondent replied, thus:
Court Are you authorize[d] to make some suggestions to other
matter, dismissal or other settlement? Do you have an authority?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, your Honor, but I have some limitations. I think,
your Honor, we need one more setting because I cannot agree on
the proposal of the amount of the property your Honor. 19
The Investigating Commissioner stated that based on the foregoing,
respondent acted beyond the scope of his authority. Respondent
knew beforehand that no instruction was given by his client to sell
the property, yet he bound his client to sell the property without her
knowledge. Thus, he betrayed the trust of his client, complainant
herein.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating
Canons 1520 and 1721 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years.
The Ruling of the IBP Board of Governors
On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XXI-2014-386,22 which adopted and approved the Report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Finding that
the recommendation was fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and for violation of Canons 15 and 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Board suspended
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in Resolution No. XXII-2016-179 23 dated
February 25, 2016.
In a letter24 dated August 18, 2016, Director for Bar Discipline
Ramon S. Esguerra notified the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the transmittal of the documents of the case to the Court for final
action, pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the finding and recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors.
Respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement 25 on the basis
of the SP A granted to him by complainant. The SPA authorized
respondent to represent complainant in filing the ejectment case
and "[t]o appear on [complainant's] behalf during the preliminary
conference in said ejectment case and to make stipulations of fact,
admissions and other matters for the early resolution of the case,
including amicable settlement of the case if necessary." Nowhere is
it expressly stated in the SPA that respondent is authorized to
compromise on the sale of the property or to sell the property of
complainant.
The records show that respondent admitted that he entered into
the compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful
detainer case and stated that the plaintiff, who is the complainant
herein, was willing to sell the property to the defendant in the
amount of ₱350,000.00 even if the complainant did not instruct or
authorize him to sell the property, and he merely acted upon his
own belief.26 As the SPA granted to him by the complainant did not
contain the power to sell the property, respondent clearly acted
beyond the scope of his authority in entering into the compromise
agreement wherein the property was sold to the defendant
Carmelita S. Garlito.
Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of
Resolution No. XXI-2014-386, stated that his action was based on an
honest belief that he was serving both the interest of his client and
the policy of the law to settle cases amicably. However, his
justification does not persuade, because his alleged honest belief
prejudiced his client, since the property she was not willing to sell
was sold at a price decided upon by respondent on his own, which
caused his client and her co-owners to file further cases to recover
their property that was sold due to respondent's mistake. He
overlooked the fact that he was not authorized by his client to sell
the property.
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts
to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty
have been reiterated in Hernandez v. Atty. Padilla,27thus:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries
with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.28
As found by the IBP Board of Governors, respondent also violated
Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Responsibility:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The Court sustains the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent be penalized with suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama is found guilty of
violating Canons 5, 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of TWO (2) YEARS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to the personal file of respondent.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
of the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED
8. August 15, 2017 A.C. No. 11149
LAURENCE D. PUNLA and MARILYN SANTOS, Complainants,  Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to always keep
vs. ATTY. ELEONOR MARA VILLA-ONA,, Respondent.
The present administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-
Affidavit1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) by complainants Laurence D. Punla and
Marilyn Santos against respondent Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona,
charging the latter with violation of the lawyer's oath, for neglecting
her clients' interests.
Factual Background
The facts, as culled from the disbarment complaint, are summarized
in the Report and Recommendation2 of Investigating Commissioner
Ricardo M. Espina viz.:
In a complaint-affidavit filed on 15 January 2013, complainants
alleged that they got to know respondent lawyer sometime in
January 2012 when they requested her to notarize a Deed of Sale;
that subsequently, they broached the idea to respondent that they
intend (sic) to file two (2) annulment cases and they wanted
respondent to represent them; that respondent committed to finish
the two (2) annulment cases within six (6) months from full
payment; that the agreed lawyer's fee for the two annulment cases
is P350,000.00; that the ₱350,000.00 was paid in full by
complainants, as follows: ₱100,000.00 on 27 January 2012 as
evidenced by respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 55749 of even
date (Annex "A"); ₱150,000.00 on 28 January 2012 as evidenced by
respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 56509 of even date (Annex
"B"); ₱50,000.00 on 14 March 2012 personally handed to
respondent lawyer and evidenced by respondent's handwritten
acknowledgement receipt of same date (Annex "C"); and,
₱50,000.00 on 15 March 2012 deposited to respondent's
Metrobank account no. 495-3-49509141-5 (Annex "D").
On the commitment of respondent that she will (sic) finish the cases
in six (6) months, complainants followed up their cases in
September 2012 or about 6 months from their last payment in
March 2012. They were ignored by respondent. On 25 September
2012, complainants sent a letter (Annex "E") to respondent
demanding that the ₱350,000.00 they paid her be refunded in full
within five (5) days from receipt of the letter. In a Certification dated
07 November 2012 (Annex "F"), the Philpost of Dasmarinas, Cavite,
attested that complainants' letter was received by respondent on 01
October 2012. No refi.md was made by respondent. 3
In an Order4 dated January 25, 2013, the IBP directed respondent to
file her Answer within 15 days. No answer was filed. A Mandatory
Conference/Hearing was set on December 4, 2013 5 but respondent
did not appear, so it was reset to January 22,
2014.6 However, respondent again failed to attend the mandatory
conference/hearing as scheduled. Hence, in an Order7 dated
January 22, 2014, the mandatory conference was terminated and
both parties were directed to submit their verified position papers.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
The Investigating Commissioner was of the opinion that respondent
is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:8
There is clear violation of Canons 17 and 18, Canons of Professional
Responsibility. These canons, quoted hereunder, [state]:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Of particular concern is Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
the client informed of the developments in his case and to respond
whenever the client requests for information. Respondent has
miserably failed to comply with this Canon.9
In addition, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that
respondent has been charged with several infractions. Thus:
Moreover, verification conducted by this Office shows that this is Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
not the first time that respondent lawyer has been administratively
charged before this Office. As shown in the table below, respondent The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXI-2015-156 12 dated
is involved in the following active cases: February 20, 2015, resolved to adopt the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner as well as the recommended penalty of
disbarment.
COMPLAINANT CASE STATUS PENALTY WHEN
S NO. FILED
The issue in this case is whether respondent should be disbarred.
Ten (10)  
consolidated A.C. Pending Suspension Our Ruling
cases: No. with
1. Felisa 6369 Supreme The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP but must,
Amistoso, et al. A.C. Court however, modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's
2. Anita Lagman No. previous disbarment.
3. Isidro H. 6371
Montoya A.C. Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of
4. NoelAngcao No. disbarment and suspension as follows:
5. Mercedes 6458
Bayan A.C. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
6. Rustica No. therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
Canuel 6459 from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
7. Anita Canuel A.C. malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
8. Elmer Canuel No. immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
9. Evangeline 6460 moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
Sangalang A.C. to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
10. Felisa No. any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
Amistoso 6462 appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
A.C. to do x x x.
No.
6457 Here, there is no question as to respondent's guilt.1âwphi1 It is clear
A.C. from the records that respondent violated her lawyer's oath and
No. code of conduct when she withheld from complainants the amount
6463 of ₱350,000.00 given to her, despite her failure to render the
A.C. necessary legal services, and after complainants demanded its
No. return.
6464
A.C.
It cannot be stressed enough that once a lawyer takes up the cause
No.
of a client, that lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with
6469
competence and zeal, especially when he/she accepts it for a fee.
11. Beatrice CBD Pending with Suspension July The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
Yatco, et al. Case Supreme Court 26, of the trust and confidence reposed upon him/her. 13 Moreover, a
No. 2010 lawyer's failure to return upon demand the monies he/she holds for
10- his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has
2733 appropriated the said monies for his/her own use, to the prejudice
and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client. 14
12. Nonna CBD For report and   May
Guiterrez Case recommendation 23, What is more, this Court cannot overlook the reality that several
No. 2012 cases had been filed against respondent, as pointed out by the
12- IBP.1âwphi1 In fact, one such case eventually led to the disbarment
3444 of respondent. In Suarez v. Maravilla-Ona, 15 the Court meted out
the ultimate penalty of disbarment and held that the misconduct of
13. Bienvenida CBD For report and   August respondent was aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
Flor Suarez Case recommendation 01, orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer and to appear at the
No. 2012 scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant
12- disrespect towards the IBP and amounts to conduct unbecoming a
3534 lawyer.

Clearly, respondent lawyer has been a serial violator of the Canons
of Professional Responsibility as shown in the thirteen (13) pending
cases filed against her. Add to that the present case and that places
the total pending administrative cases against respondent at
fourteen (14). That these 14 cases were filed on different dates and
by various individuals is substantial proof that respondent has the
propensity to violate her lawyer's oath- and has not changed in her
professional dealing with the public.10
Consequently, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the
amount of ₱350,000.00 with legal interest until fully paid. 11
In the same case, the Court took note of the past disbarment
complaints that had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona viz.:
x x x In A.C. No. 10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her
AttorneyIn- Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the
complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for
issuing several worthless checks as rental payments for the
complainant's property and for refusing to vacate the said property,
thus forcing the latter to file an ejectment case against Atty.
Maravilla-Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to file her
Answer, but she failed to do so. Neither did she make an
appearance during the scheduled mandatory conference. In its
Resolution dated February 13, 2013, the IBP found Atty. Maravilla-
Ona guilty of serious misconduct[,] and for violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code. The Court later adopted and approved the IBP's
findings in its Resolution of September 15, 2014, and suspended
Atty. Maravilla-Ona from the practice of law for a period of one
year.
In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona,
docketed as A.C. No. 10944[,] and entitled Norma M Gutierrez v.
Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant therein alleged that
she engaged the services of Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave her the
amount of ₱80,000.00 for the filing of a case in court. However,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file the case, prompting the
complainant to withdraw from the engagement and to demand the
return of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Ona returned
₱15,000.00[,] and executed a promissory note to pay the remaining
₱65,000.00. However, despite several demands, Atty. Maravilla-Ona
failed to refund completely the complainant's money. Thus, a
complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for
grave misconduct, gross negligence and incompetence. But again,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file her Answer and [to] appear in the
mandatory conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty.
Maravilla-Ona violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code [of
Professional Responsibility] and recommended her suspension for a
period of five (5) years, considering her previous infractions. The
Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely. She was also ordered to return the
complainant's money.
Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of violating her oath
as a lawyer and the Code [of Professional Responsibility], as well as
defying the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant
disregard of the Code [of Professional Responsibility] and her sworn
duty as a member of the Bar to continue. She had been warned that
a similar violation [would] merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her
reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and
dishonor to the legal profession.16
Back to the case at bar: While indeed respondent's condemnable
acts ought to merit the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar her
anew, for in this jurisdiction we do not impose double disbarment.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and FINDSrespondent ATIY.
ELEONOR MARA VILLA-ONA GUILTY of gross and continuing
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
accordingly FINED ₱40,000.00. Respondent is also ORDERED to
PAYcomplainants the amount of ₱350,000.00, with 12% interest
from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. 17 This is without
prejudice to the complainants' filing of the appropriate criminal
case, if they so desire.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which shall append the same to the personal record of respondent;
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.This Decision shall be
immediately executory. SO ORDERED
9. A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017 ELIBENA A.
CABILES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEANDRO S.
CEDO, Respondent.
Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) filed this administrative
complaint1before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo (respondent lawyer) for
neglecting the two cases she referred to him to handle.
The Facts
According to Elibena, she engaged the services of respondent lawyer
to handle an illegal dismissal case,  i.e., NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-
16153-08 entitled "Danilo Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or Even
Cabiles and Rico Guido," where therein respondents were Elibena's
business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5,500.00 2 for
drafting therein respondents' position paper3 and Php2,000.004 for
his every appearance in the NLRC hearings.
During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo Ligbos
(Danilo), the complainant therein, showed up and submitted his
Reply.5 On the other hand respondent lawyer did not file a Reply for
his clients,6 despite being paid his appearance fee earlier.7
In a Decision8 dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter ruled for
Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent lawyer to pay Danilo
backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay.
Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise dismissed the
appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer for failure to post the
required cash or surety bond, an essential requisite in perfecting an
appeal.9
According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming
that it was Danilo who was absent during the said hearing on March
26, 2009; and that moreover, because of the failure to submit a
Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash
vouchers10 that would refute Danilo's claim that he was a regular
employee.
With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the NLRC,
Elibena claimed that respondent lawyer instructed them (his clients)
to pick up the said Memorandum only on the last day to file the
appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009; that the memorandum was ready for
pick up only at around 2:30 p.m. that day; that left to themselves,
with no help or assistance from respondent lawyer, they rushed to
file their appeal with the NLRC in Quezon City an hour later; that the
NLRC Receiving Section informed them that their appeal was
incomplete, as it lacked the mandatory cash/surety bond, a matter
that respondent lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and,
consequently, their appeal was dismissed for non-perfection.
Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance 11 in
the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he
prepared. Elibena pointed to a certification 12 issued on June 29,
2010 by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all
complied with the first, second, and third compliance periods 13 of
the (MCLE) requirement.
Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired respondent lawyer
to file a criminal case for unjust vexation against Emelita Claudit;
that as evidenced by a May 5, 2009 handwritten receipt, 14 she paid
respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses for the filing of
the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00; and that
in order to come up with the necessary amount, she sold 'to
respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth
Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an unnotarized Deed of
Sale15dated August 1, 2009.
Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees,
respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably file her
Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office;
that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed
her Complaint for unjust vexation on September 10, 2009 on the
ground of prescription; and that although she moved for
reconsideration of the Order dismissing the case, her motion for
reconsideration was denied by the City Prosecutor's Office in a
resolution dated October 19, 2009.16
In his Answer,17 respondent lawyer argued that the March 26, 2009
hearing was set to provide the parties the opportunity either to
explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, or give time for
him (respondent lawyer) to decide whether to file a responsive
pleading, after which the case would be routinely submitted for
resolution, with or without the parties' further appearances. As
regards the cash vouchers, respondent lawyer opined that their
submission would only contradict their defense of lack of employer-
employee relationship. Respondent lawyer likewise claimed that
Elibena was only feigning ignorance of the cost of the appeal bond,
and that in any event, Elibena herself could have paid the appeal
bond. With regard to Elibena's allegation that she was virtually
forced to sell her car to respondent lawyer to complete payment of
the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed that he had
fully paid for the car.18
Respondent lawyer did not refute Ebilena's claim that he failed to
indicate his MCLE compliance in the position paper and in the
memorandum of appeal.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation, 19 the Investigating
Commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated
Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two
years. Aside from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him
grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing
to appear on the March 26, 2009 hearing in the NLRC, and file the
necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his
clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the
NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file
seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the city
prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by
prescription.
In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation, but modified the recommended administrative
sanction by reducing the suspension to one year.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the IBP's finding that respondent lawyer violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We also agree with the
recommended penalty.
Violation of Canon 5
Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP
members as an additional requirement to enable them to practice
law. This is ''to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." 20 Non-
compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be
listed as a delinquent IBP member. 21 In Arnado v. Adaza,22 we
administratively sanctioned therein respondent lawyer for his non-
compliance with four MCLE Compliance Periods. We stressed
therein that in accordance with Section 12(d) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations,23 even if therein respondent attended an
MCLE Program covered by the Fourth Compliance Period, his
attendance therein would only cover his deficiency for the First
Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and had
to make up for the other compliance periods. Consequently, we
declared respondent lawyer therein a delinquent member of the IBP
and suspended him from law practice for six months or until he had
fully complied with all the MCLE requirements for all his non-
compliant periods.
In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the
pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of issue of
his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance
Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010, considering that
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In
fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office, Elibena discovered that
respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three MCLE
compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that
respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which reads:
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN
LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW
STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION
REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule 18.03
The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was
guilty of gross negligence for failing to exert his utmost best in
prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client. Hence, he is
guilty of the following:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance
fee for legal services, only to subsequently fail to render such
service at the appropriate time, was a clear violation of Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 24
Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases
that he accepted, although he had been fully compensated for
them. First off, respondent lawyer never successfully refuted
Elibena's claim that he was paid in advance his Php2,000.00
appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the
labor case on March 26, 2009, during which he was absent.
Furthermore, although respondent lawyer had already received the
sum of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed to
promptly file the appropriate complaint therefor with the City
Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the crime prescribed,
resulting in the dismissal of the case.
We have held that:
Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and
diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the
counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of
properly representing the client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing
the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting
for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him
to disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is
incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that
the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client
isper se a violation.25
"[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and [utmost] ability
to [protect and defend] his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty
displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice."'26 However, in the two cases for which he was duly
compensated, respondent lawyer was grossly remiss in his duties as
counsel. He exhibited lack of professionalism, even indifference, in
the defense and protection of Elibena's rights which resulted in her
losing the two cases.
With regard to the labor case tor which he opted not to file a Reply
and refused to present the cash vouchers which, according to
Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the NLRC, we hold that
even granting that he had the discretion being the handling lawyer
to present what he believed were available legal defenses for his
client, and conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an
allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his way of
handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from handing over or
delivering the requisite pleading to his clients almost at the end of
the day, at the last day to file the appeal before the NLRC, he never
even bothered to advise Elibena and the rest of his clients about the
requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect Elibena and
her companions to be conversant with the indispensable procedural
requirements to perfect the appeal before the NLRC. If the
averments in his Answer are any indication, respondent lawyer
seemed to have relied heavily on the NLRC's much vaunted
'leniency' in gaining the successful prosecution of the appeal of his
clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his propensity for
passing the blame onto his clients for not doing what he himself
ought to have done. And, in the criminal case, he should have
known the basic rules relative to the prescription of crimes that
operate to extinguish criminal liability. All these contretemps could
have been avoided had respondent lawyer displayed the requisite
zeal and diligence.
As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements warranted a six-month suspension in the Adaza case.
Respondent lawyer must likewise be called to account for violating
Canons 17, 18, and Rule 18.03. In one case involving violation of
Canons 17 and 18 where a lawyer failed to file a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, the lawyer was penalized with a six-
month suspension.27 In another case,28 involving transgression of the
same Canons, the guilty lawyer was meted out the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months and
admonished and sternly warned that a commission of the same or
similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
"[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts."29 Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency with his refusal to comply with the
MCLE as well as his lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena's interest
in view of his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the
cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate to the
facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of the IBP to
suspend him from the practice of law for one year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt
of this Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo's personal
record as attorney-at-law. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate said copies to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO
ORDERED
10. A.C. No. 10580, July 12, 2017 SPOUSES GERALDY AND
LILIBETH VICTORY, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIAN JO S.
MERCADO, Respondent.
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Marian Jo S.
Mercado for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Sometime in 2009, Spouses Geraldy and Lilibeth Victory (Spouses
Victory) were enticed by respondent to enter into a financial
transaction with her with a promise of good monetary returns. As
respondent is a lawyer and a person of reputation, Spouses Victory
entrusted their money to respondent to invest, manage, and
administer into some financial transactions that would earn good
profit for the parties.1
Respondent called and asked Geraldy Victory (Geraldy) whether he
wanted to invest his money. The respondent promised that for an
investment of PhP 400,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 600,000 in 30
days; and for PhP 500,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 625,000. 2
The investment transactions went well for the first 10 months.
Spouses Victory received the agreed return of profit. Some of such
financial transactions were covered by Memoranda of Agreement. 3
La!er on, respondent became evasive in returning to Spouses
Victory the money that the latter were supposed to receive as part
of the agreement. Respondent failed to settle and account the
money entrusted to her by Spouses Victory. 4
Spouses Victory alleged that the outstanding obligation of
respondent is PhP 5 Million plus interest or a total of PhP 8.3
Million.5
Spouses Victory filed a criminal complaint for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna.6
After the filing of said criminal case, respondent met with Spouses
Victory. Respondent proposed to reduce her obligation from PhP 8.3
Million to PhP 7.5 Million in staggered payments, to which Spouses
Victory agreed. Respondent then issued three postdated checks in
the amount of PhP 300,000 each. However, said checks bounced. 7
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) found that respondent indeed lured Spouses Victory
in entering into a series of financial transactions with a promise of
return of profit. Respondent, however, failed to deliver such
promise. On such premise, the IBP-CBD recommended respondent's
suspension, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado be SUSPENDED for SIX (6)
MONTHS from the practice of law.8
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XX-2013-199, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED,  with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering
Respondent's violation of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for evading the settlement of her financial obligations
to the complainants and for not bothering to appear in the
investigation of this case, Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is
hereby DISBARRED.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 10 which was denied
in Resolution No. XXI-2014-158, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission
and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. However,
considering that Respondent is currently settling her financial
obligations to Complainants and very apologetic and granting her
good faith in her investment transaction with Complainants,
Resolution No. XX-2013-199 dated March 20, 2013 is
hereby AFFIRMED, with modification, and accordingly the penalty
earlier imposed on Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby reduced
to  SUSPENSION  from the practice of law for one (1)
year.11(Emphasis supplied)
Issue
Should the respondent be held administratively liable based on the
allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record?
OurRuling
Emphatically, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.12 Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 -A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Exercising its disciplinary authority over the members of the bar,
this Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for
any gross misconduct that a lawyer committed, whether it is in his
professional or in his private capacity. Good character is an essential
qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law.
Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional,
indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action. 13
In this case, it is without dispute that respondent has an outstanding
obligation with Spouses Victory, as the latter's investments which
they coursed through the respondent fell through. To make matters
worse, respondent issued several checks to settle her obligation;
unfortunately, said checks bounced.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to act with the highest degree
of integrity and fair dealing. She is expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in
the judicial system is ensured. She must, at all times, faithfully
perform her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her
clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. 14
It must be considered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts
and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. 15
We cannot exempt respondent from liability just because she
encountered financial difficulties in the course of her investment
deals. Respondent even admitted that she continued to do business
despite such financial hardships; as such, her monetary obligations
with different investors. accumulated at an alarming rate. In an
attempt to settle her obligations, respondent issued checks, which
all bounced.
To Our mind, the actuations of respondent fell short of the exacting
standards expected of every member of the bar.
In this case, while respondent admitted her responsibility and
signified her intention of complying with the same, We cannot close
our eyes to the fact that respondent committed infractions. To
uphold the integrity of the legal profession, We deem it proper to
uphold the findings as well as the sanction imposed by the IBP Board
of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to SUSPEND Atty.
Marian Jo S. Mercado from the practice of law for one (1) year to
commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as
member of the Bar.SO ORDERED
11. A.C. No. 11256, March 07, 2017 FLORDELIZA A.
MADRIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS P.
RIVERA, Respondent.
A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only
violates the court and its processes, but also betrays the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his client and must be disbarred to
maintain the integrity of the Law Profession.
Antecedents
In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the
respondent in his law office in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire
about the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan
C. Madria. After giving the details of her marriage and other facts
relevant to the annulment, the respondent told her that she had a
strong case, and guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree
of annulment. He told her, too, that his legal services would cost
P25,000.00, and that she should return on November 19, 2002
inasmuch as he would still prepare the complaint for the annulment.
At the time of the consultation, she was accompanied by her
daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew, Jayson Argonza. 1
The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November
19, 2002. On that occasion, he showed her the petition for
annulment, and asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial
amount of P4,000.00.2 He acknowledged the payment through a
handwritten receipt.3
The complainant again went to the respondent's office on
December 16, 2002 to deliver another partial payment, and to
follow up on the case. The respondent advised her to just wait for
the resolution of her complaint, and assured her that she did not
need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices and
processes would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly
apprise her of the developments.4 On December 28, 2002, she
returned to his office to complete her payment, and he also issued
his receipt for the payment.5
The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several
followups on behalf of her mother. In the latter part of April 2003,
the respondent informed the complainant that her petition had
been granted.6 Thus, Vanessa went to the respondent's office and
received a copy of the trial court's decision dated April 16, 2003
signed by Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, in Tuguegarao City.7
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow
five months to lapse after the release of the decision before she
could safely claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such time,
she declared in her Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was
single.8
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the
respondent a copy of the certificate of finality dated September 26,
2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4). 9
Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used
the purported decision and certificate of finality in applying for the
renewal of her passport.10 However, she became the object of an
investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because
her former partner, Andrew Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint
charging that she had fabricated the decision for the annulment of
her marriage. Only then did she learn that the decision and the
certificate of finality given by the respondent did not exist in the
court records, as borne out by the letter signed by Atty. Aura
Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC Branch IV, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
Officer-in-Charge
Regional Consular Office
Tuguegarao City
Madam:
This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on
whether Civil Case No. 6149 for the Annulment of Marriage
between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed
and decided by this Court.
As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on
April 25, 2003 but was dismissed as per Order of this Court dated
April 6, 2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in
the alleged decision attached to your letter is a blatant forgery.
For your information and guidance. 
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court V11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of
the Philippine Passport Act in the RTC in Tuguegarao City. 12 She
claims that she had relied in good faith on the representations of
the respondent; and that he had taken advantage of his position in
convincing her to part with her money and to rely on the falsified
court documents.13
In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the
complainant. He averred that he had informed her that he would
still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her petition; that
she had insisted that he should prepare the draft of her petition that
she could show to her foreigner fiance; that she had also prevailed
upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that her
marriage had been annulled, and to fabricate the certificate of
finality; that she had assured him that such simulated documents
would be kept strictly confidential; that he had informed her that
the petition had been filed in April 2003, but she had paid no
attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any of
the scheduled hearings despite notice; and that he had not heard
from her since then, and that she had not even returned to his
office.
Findings and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and
Recommendation15 wherein she concluded that the respondent had
violated his Lawyer's Oath; and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for a period of two years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the recommendation of
suspension from the practice of law for two years to disbarment
through its Resolution No. XXI-2015-242, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
                RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
                CDB Case No. 14-4315
                Flordeliza A. Madria vs. Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering violation of
his lawyers' oath as a lawyer and a member of the Bar by preparing
a simulated Court decision granting the petition for annulment of
marriage of complainant and a certificate of finality of the
annulment petition. Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for
annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of the decision and
certificate of finality. His explanation of having done so only upon
the complainant's persistent prodding did not exculpate him from
responsibility. For one, the explanation is unacceptable, if not
altogether empty. Simulating or participating in the simulation of a
court decision and a certificate of finality of the same decision is an
outright criminal falsification or forgery. One need not be a lawyer
to know so, but it was worse in the respondent's case because he
was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally intolerable. Specifically, his
deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of
finality of the decision reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on
his part, and made a mockery of the administration of justice in this
country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member
of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules
1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with
the laws and the principles of fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person
like the complainant could have swayed a lawyer like the
respondent into committing the simulations was patently
improbable. Yet, even if he had committed the simulations upon the
client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a lawyer,
he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly those quoted earlier,
which would have been enough to deter him from committing the
falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly frustrate her
prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer to always
act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he
could not have soon forgotten his express undertaking under his
Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to its
commission."17Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly
enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of
law.18 As we have observed in one case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a
lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to
the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility required the respondent be true to the
complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary
responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he committed a
further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to
"delay any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct
[him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients." He compounded this violation by taking advantage of his
legal knowledge to promote his own selfish motives, thereby
disregarding his responsibility under Canon 17. 22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be
disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a
lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit,
malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was already a
ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court.24 The moral standards of the Legal Profession
expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of
professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice
of law.25 That he turned his back on such standards exhibited his
baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and
general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court. 26
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for
unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera,27 he was
suspended from the practice of law because he had notarized
documents without a notarial commission. This circumstance shows
his predisposition to beguile other persons into believing in the
documents that he had falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop
to such proclivity. He should be quickly removed through
disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great
caution and only for the most imperative reasons or in cases of clear
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 28 But we do not
hesitate when the misconduct is gross, like in the respondent's case.
We wield the power now because the respondent, by his gross
misconduct as herein described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to
remain in the Law Profession. As we reminded in Embido v. Pe,29 in
which we disbarred the respondent lawyer for falsifying a court
decision:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of
the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only
to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath
and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for
dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross
misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that
reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily,
no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court
whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.
The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and
whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an
officer of the Court.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P.
RIVERA guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE
LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY, ORDERS his DISBARMENT.
Let his name be STRICKENfrom the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country for their information and guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR
CONFIDANT for appending to the respondent's personal record as a
member of the Bar; and (d) the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE for possible criminal
prosecution of the respondent. SO ORDERED.
12. February 1, 2017 A.C. No. 5819 HEIRS OF SIXTO L. TAN,
SR., represented by RECTO A. TAN, Complainants  vs.
ATTY. NESTOR B. BELTRAN, Respondent
Before this Court is an administrative complaint against respondent,
Atty. Nestor B. Beltran. His derelictions allegedly consisted of his
belated filing of an appeal in a criminal case and failure to relay a
court directive for the payment of docket fees in a civil case to his
clients - complainants Heirs of Sixto L. Tan, Sr. represented by Recto
A. Tan. The latter also accused him of unduly receiving ₱200,000 as
payment for legal services.
FACTS OF THE CASE
After agreeing to pay attorney's fees of ₱200,000, complainants
engaged the services of respondent counsel for the filing of cases to
recover their commercial properties valued at approximately ₱30
million.
On July 2001, complainants filed a criminal action for falsification of
public documents and use of falsified documents against Spouses
Melanio and Nancy Fernando and Sixto Tan, Jr. Docketed as LS. No.
2001-037,1 this case was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor of
Albay.
Respondent was notified of the order of dismissal on 18 October
2001.2 On 6 November 2001, he filed an appeal via a Petition for
Review before the Secretary of the Department of Justice (SOJ). It
was, however, filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period to
perfect an appeal.3 Consequently, in his Resolution promulgated on
5 March 2002,4the SOJ dismissed the belated Petition for Review.
Respondent no longer filed a motion for reconsideration to remedy
the ruling.
On 11 September 2001, complainants instituted a related civil suit
to annul the sale of their commercial properties before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-
0329.5 After being given ₱7,000 by his clients, respondent tasked his
secretary to pay the docket fees computed at ₱1,722.
Unfortunately, the Clerk of Court erred in the assessment of the
docket fees. To correct the error, the RTC required the payment of
additional docket fees through an Order dated 20 May 2002, 6 which
respondent received on 29 May 2002.7 However, two weeks earlier,
on 13 May 2002, he had moved to withdraw as counsel with the
conformity of his clients. 8 No separate copy of the Order dated 20
May 2002 was sent to any of the complainants.9
The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid. Subsequently, the
RTC dismissed the civil case, citing the nonpayment of docket fees as
one of its bases.10
Aggrieved by their defeat, complainants wrote this Court a letter-
complaint11 asking that disciplinary actions be meted out to
respondent. They likewise contended that he had unduly received
₱200,000 as attorney's fees, despite his failure to render effective
legal services for them.
Respondent claimed12 that he could no longer move for the
reconsideration of the SOJ's dismissal of his belated Petition for
Review as he had only learned of the dismissal after the period to
file a motion for reconsideration had lapsed. He argued that while
he prepared the Petition for Review, his clients themselves, through
Nilo Tan and Recto Tan, signed and filed the same. Thus, he imputed
to complainants the belated filing of the appeal.
As for the dismissal of the civil action for nonpayment of docket
fees, respondent disclaimed any fault on his part, since he had
already withdrawn as counsel in that case.1âwphi1
Anent his receipt of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees, respondent denied
collecting that amount. He only admitted that he had received
₱30,000 to cover expenses for "the preparation of the complaints,
docket fee, affidavits, and other papers needed for the filing of the
said cases."13 He did not deny his receipt of ₱7,000 for fees and
other sundry expenses, of which ₱l,722 had already been paid to the
Clerk of Court for docket fees. In any event, Atty. Beltran argued
that ₱200,000 as attorney's fees was inadequate, considering that
the property under dispute was worth ₱30 million.
FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In a Resolution dated 12 March 2003, 14 this Court referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, in a Report dated 24 July
2006,15 found respondent guilty of neglect in handling the criminal
case and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months. The gist of the report reads:16
The Respondent admits that the Petition for Review in this case was
not filed. This key detail leads the Commissioner to conclude
that the Respondent was negligent in failing to seasonably file the
Petition for Review in LS. No. 2001-037.
The Respondent's bare defense is that he allegedly left the filing of
this petition to the Complainants, who filed it out of time. Even
assuming this is true, the Respondent cannot disclaim negligence,
being the lawyer and knowing that the case related to the
Complainants' claims on properties the Respondent himself states
are worth about PHP30 million. xxx.
Some of the Respondent's pleadings instead focus to the Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the late Petition for Review's dismissal,
which the Respondent explains by stating that the Complainants
informed him of this when the period to file a Motion for
Reconsideration had already lapsed. Even assuming this is true, it is
irrelevant since it is clear that the Petition for Review itself was not
seasonably filed. x x x. (Emphasis in the original)
With respect to dismissal of the civil case, the Investigating
Commissioner cleared respondent of any liability. The former gave
credence to the fact that by the time respondent received the
directive of the RTC requiring the payment of the balance of the
docket fees, the latter had already filed his withdrawal from the
case.
Finally, as regards the factual claim of complainants that they paid
respondent attorney's fees amounting to ₱200,000, the
Investigating Commissioner determined that their allegation was
unfounded, as none of them produced receipts evidencing payment.
At most, what the Investigating Commissioner found was that
respondent only admitted to receiving ₱30,000 for expenses, aside
from ₱5,278.17 The former recommended that respondent be
ordered to restitute these sums to complainants.
In its Resolution dated 1 February 2007,18 the Board of Governors of
the IBP resolved to fully dismiss the administrative case against
respondent without any explanation. Neither party has filed a
motion for reconsideration or petition for review thereafter. 19
ISSUES OF THE CASE
l. Whether respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to him
when he belatedly filed an appeal before the SOJ, resulting in the
dismissal of LS. No. 2001-03 7
II. Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and other ethical standards for failing to
inform complainants of the RTC Order to pay the balance of the
docket fees in Civil Case No. 2001-0329
III. Whether respondent unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees
RULING OF THE COURT
We set aside the unsubstantiated recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors. Its resolutions are only recommendatory and always
subject to this Court’s review.20
Respondent filed a belated appeal
before the SOJ.
In Reontoy v. Ibadlit,21 we ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal
within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice.
The Court elucidated that per Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."
In the case at bar, respondent similarly admits that he failed to
timely file the Petition for Review before the SOJ. As a result of his
delayed action, his clients lost the criminal case. Straightforwardly,
this Court sanctions him for belatedly filing an appeal.
The excuse forwarded by respondent - that he delegated the filing
of the Petition for Review to complainants - will not exculpate him
from administrative liability. As correctly explained by the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, respondent cannot disclaim
negligence, since he was the lawyer tasked to pursue the legal
remedies available to his clients.
Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law
and legal procedure. A client who deals with counsel has the right to
expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence, but also a wholehearted fealty to the client's
cause.22 Thus, we find that passing the blame to persons not trained
in remedial law is not just wrong; it is reflective of the want of care
on the part of lawyers handling the legal matters entrusted to them
by their clients.23
24
After surveying related jurisprudence,  the Investigating
Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for three months given his infraction of filing a
belated appeal before the SOJ. Yet, without explanation, the Board
of Goven1ors resolved to ignore the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Accordingly, this Court will not adopt an unsubstantiated resolution
of the Board of Governors, especially when jurisprudence shows
that we have penalized lawyers for filing belated motions and
pleadings. In the resolution of this Court in Reontoy,25 we suspended
the counsel therein from the practice of law for two months, given
that his belated filing of an appeal caused his client to lose the case.
In Fernandez v. Novero, Jr.,26 we likewise suspended the respondent
counsel for a month after he filed a motion for reconsideration
outside the reglementary period. In Barbuco v. Beltran,27 this Court
imposed a six-month suspension on the lawyer, who had belatedly
filed a pleading, among other derelictions. We stressed in that case
that the failure to file a brief within the reglementary period
certainly constituted inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of
43 days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
Respondent failed to inform complainants of the RTC Order
requiring the payment of full docket fees.
Respondent argues that he was no longer bound to inform
complainants of the RTC Order requiring the payment of full docket
fees, given that he had already moved to withdraw as counsel with
the conformity of the latter. We find that argument unjustified.
Mercado v. Commission on Higher Education28 is instructive on the
effect of the withdrawal of counsel with the conformity of the client:
As a rule, the withdrawal of a counsel from a case made with the
written conformity of the client takes effect once the same is filed
with the court. The leading case of Arambulo v. Court of Appeals  laid
out the rule that, in general, such kind of a withdrawal does not
require any further action or approval from the court in order to be
effective. In contrast, the norm with respect to withdrawals of
counsels without  the written conformity of the client is that they
only take effect after their approval by the court.
The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the written
conformity of the client is immediately effective once filed in court,
however, is not absolute. When the counsel's impending withdrawal
with the written conformity of the client would leave the latter with
no legal representation in the case, it is an accepted practice for
courts to order the deferment of the effectivity of such withdrawal
until such time that it becomes certain that service of court
processes and other papers to the party-client would not thereby be
compromised - either by the due substitution of the withdrawing
counsel in the case or by the express assurance of the party-client
that he now undertakes to himself receive serviceable processes
and other papers. Adoption by courts of such a practice in that
particular context, while neither mandatory nor sanctioned by a
specific provision of the Rules of Court, is nevertheless justified as
part of their inherent power to see to it that the potency of judicial
processes and judgment are preserved. (Emphasis in the original)
On 29 May 2002, when respondent herein received the RTC Order
dated 20 May 2002, complainants still had no new counsel on
record. Therefore, Atty. Beltran should have acted with prudence by
informing his previous clients that he had received the directive of
the court requiring the payment of docket fees. After all, lawyers are
officers of the court. Like the court itself, respondent is an
instrument for advancing the ends of justice and his cooperation
with the court is due whenever justice may be imperiled if
cooperation is withheld.29
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.30 In this case, we consider the fact that not only did
respondent file a belated appeal before the SOJ, but he also failed to
act with prudence by failing to inform complainants of the RTC
Order dated 20 May 2002.
However, we cannot put the blame solely on Atty. Beltran for the
nonpayment of the docket fees in the civil case. Although not
discussed by the Investigating Commissioner, the records reveal that
even if complainants' new counsel learned about the ruling on 30
May 2002, the former still failed to pay the additional docket fees. 31
Taking into consideration the attendant circumstances herein vis-à-
vis the aforementioned administrative cases decided by this Court,
we deem it proper to impose on Atty. Beltran a two-month
suspension from the practice of law for belatedly filing an appeal
before the SOJ. We also admonish him to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duty to administer justice.
Complainants failed to prove that
respondent received ₱200,000 as
attorney's fees.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof
required is preponderance of evidence. 32Preponderance of evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. 33
Complainants have the burden to discharge that required quantum
of proof.34 Here, as accurately assessed by the Investigating
Commissioner, the records do not bear any receipt proving Atty.
Beltran's collection of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees.
Complainants venture to argue that these sums were paid to
respondent without receipts. However, that bare argument has no
other supporting evidence - object, documentary, or testimonial.
Even during the hearing of this case before the IBP, when
confronted with particular questions regarding the sums paid to
respondent, complainants could not answer when and where they
gave installment payments to Atty. Beltran.35
General allegations will not meet the evidentiary standard of
preponderance of evidence.36 Hence, we adopt the factual finding of
the Investigating Commissioner that complainants failed to prove
their claim of payment to respondent of ₱200,000 as attorney's
fees.
As a final point, the Court must clarify that the resolution of this
case should not include a directive for the return of the ₱35,278 as
the Investigating Commissioner recommended.
The Investigating Commissioner did not explain the
recommendation for the restitution of that sum. Moreover,
complainants do not contest that respondent received this sum for
fees and other sundry expenses. Neither do the records show that
they demanded the return of this amount from respondent. In
consideration of these facts, the proper corrective action is to order
the accounting of the full sum of ₱35,278.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nestor B.
Beltran is SUSPENDED FOR TWO MONTHS from the practice of law
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. He is ADMONISHED to exercise greater
care and diligence in the performance of his duties. He is
also ORDERED TO ACCOUNT for the ₱35,278 he received from his
clients, with the obligation to return the entire amount, or so much
thereof remaining, to complainants.
This Decision shall take effect immediately upon receipt by Atty.
Nestor B. Beltran of a copy of this Decision. He shall inform this
Court and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he
received a copy of this Decision. Copies of this Decision shall be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to
circulate copies of this Decision to all courts concerned. SO
ORDERED
13. A.C. No. 6980, August 30, 2017
CESAR O. STA. ANA, CRISTINA M. STA. ANA AND ESTHER STA. ANA-
SILVERIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F.
CORTES, Respondent.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants against
Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes (respondent) against whom they The Investigating Commissioner summarized the charges against
imputed deceit and falsification of public documents in the sale of respondent as follows:
two parcels of property located at Bo. Lantic, Carmona, Cavite and
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-1069335 and T- (a) First, [r]espondent was involved in the preparation of the
1069336; and in the donation of66 pieces of property by Atty. Cesar
Casal (Atty. Casal) and his wife, Pilar P. Casal (Pilar).
Factual Antecedents
In a sworn letter dated August 4, 2005, complainants alleged that (b)
respondent was left ith the care and maintenance of several
properties either owned or under the administration of Atty. Casal
since the latter's death; that respondent abused his authority, as
such administrator, and engineered the sale or transfer of the said (c)
properties, specifically the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
T-1069335 and T-1069336, which were owned originally by their
(complainants') ancestors; that on May 19, 2004, respondent, in
connivance with Cesar Inis (Inis) and A Casal's alleged adopted
daughter, Gloria Casal Cledera (Gloria), and her husband, Hugh (d)
Cledera (the spouses Cledera), sold the abovementioned parcels of
land to the Property Company of Friends, Inc. (PCFI). 1
(e)
Complainants further averred that as the said properties were
originally in the names of Inis, Ruben Loyola (Loyola), Angela Lacdan
(Lacdan) and Cesar Veloso Casal (Veloso), these persons, in
conspiracy with respondent, caused to be executed a Special Power
of Attorney2 (SPA) dated May 4, 2004, under which Loyola, Lacdan
and Veloso purportedly authorized their co-owner Inis to sell the
said properties; that this SPA was, however, forged or falsified,
because Loyola was already dead on August 15, 1994, whereas
Lacdan died on August 31, 2001, and at the time of the execution of
the SPA in Catmona, Cavite, Veloso was in fact in Tacloban City; and
that indeed, as a consequence of respondent's wrongdoing, criminal
cases for Estata through Falsification of Public Document were filed
against respondent and the spouses Cledera.3
Complainants moreover claimed that respondent notarized 12
falsified Deeds of Donation, dated September 17 and 18, 2003, and
supposedly executed in Carmona, Cavite, under which it was made
to appear that Atty. Casal purportedly donated 66 pieces of property
to Gloria; that they (complainants) caused to be verified/examined
Atty. Casal's "superimposed" signatures on these deeds of donation
by the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI); and that in its Disposition Forms, the NBI
concluded that "the signatures appearing on the said questioned
documents are mere xerox copies which do not truly and clearly
reflect the minute details of the writing strokes and other aspects
relative to the preparation of the questioned signatures." 4
In his answer, respondent asserted that all the criminal complaints
against him had been dismissed, and the criminal information/s
instituted therefor had been withdrawn by the Department of
Justice (DOJ), hence, he had been exonerated of all the charges
against him. Respondent adverted to the Resolution of Regional
State Prosecutor Ernesto C. Mendoza, which in part declared -
x x x the signatures of Cesar E. Casal appearing on the said
questioned documents are mere xerox copies which do not truly
and clearly reflect the minute details of the writing strokes and
other aspects relative to the preparation of the questioned
signatures.
Nowhere in this report was there a categorical statement that the
document was falsified or the signatures were forged. x x x 5
In a Resolution6 dated November 27, 2006, the Court resolved to
refer this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Loyola SPA, which was used to sell the [s)ubject [p]roperties to
PCFI, despite the fact that two (2) of the alleged signatories
therein were already dead at the time the Loyola SPA was
executed;
Second, [r]espondent prepared and notarized 12 Deeds of
Donation, which [appear] to be spurious because the signatures
of Atty. Casal thereon were only superimposed;
Third, [r]espondent notarized the 12 Deeds of Donation in
Quezon City, within his territorial jurisdiction as a notary public
x x x despite the fact that Atty. Casal signed the same in x x x
Cavite, or outside his jurisdiction as a notary public;
Fourth, [r]espondent caused the preparation of the Casal SPA,
which appears to be spurious because the signature of Atty.
Casal thereon was only superimposed; and
Fifth, [r]espondent knowingly used the spurious Casal SPA and
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of PCFI involving other
properties.7
After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner submitted a
Report8dated May 14, 2010, finding respondent not only guilty of
dishonesty and deceitful conduct, but also guilty of having violated
hls oath as a notary public.
In finding respondent guilty of using a falsified document, the
Investigating Commissioner noted that although there was no direct
evidence that it was respondent himself who prepared or drafted
the SPA, there was evidence nonetheless that respondent did
actively participate, or take part, in the offer and sale of the
properties to the PCFI; and that since the execution of the forged or
falsified SPA is a crucial or critical component of the eventual
consummation of the sale to PCFI, respondent could not be heard to
say that he had no knowledge of the use of a falsified document. 9
As regards the 12 Deeds of Donation allegedly executed by Atty.
Casal, the Investigating Commissioner lent more credence to the
unbiased or impartial report of the NBI's finding that the signatures
of Atty. Casal were per se mere xerox copies; and that moreover,
respondent had violated Section 24010 of the Revised Administrative
Code, when he caused to be acknowledged the Deeds of Donation
in his law office in Quezon City, despite the fact that these were
supposedly signed and executed by Atty. Casal in Cavite. The
Investigating Commissioner opined that respondent "ought to have
known that since he was outside his territorial jurisdiction as a
notary public, he could not have performed the acts of a notary
public at the time of the signing of the 12 Deeds of Donation,
including the taking of oath of the parties." 11
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended: 1. ATTY.
ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be suspended from the practice of law for
a period ranging from six (6) months to two (2) years with a STERN
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts or conduct
shall be dealt with more severely; and
2. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be barred from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years, and in
the event that he is presently commissioned as notary public, that
his commission be immediately revoked and suspended for such
period.12
13
In its Resolution  dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the findings of the Investigating b)
Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty to a one-
year suspension from the practice of law, with revocation of
respondent's notarial license, plus a two-year disqualification from
reappointment as notary public. The pertinent portion of the c)
Resolution reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part ofthis Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering
Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law, Atty. Antonio Jose F.
Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and his Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED presently
commissioned. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Publicfor two (2) years.
No motions for reconsideration having been filed by any of the
parties, the case is before us for fmal resolution.
Our Ruling Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. [It is only in living up to the very high
standards and tenets of the legal profession that] the people's faith
and confidence in the judicial system can be ensured. Lawyers may
be disciplined - whether in their professional or in their private
capacity - for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor.14
In the instant case, respondent acted with deceit when he used the
falsified documents to effect the transfer of properties owned or
administered by the late Atty. Casal. In a letter 15 sent by Atty.
Florante O. Villegas, counsel for the PCFI, to the spouses Cledera,
the former explicitly stated that respondent did have a hand in the
negotiation leading to the sale of the properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-1069335 and T-1069336. In clarifying that it only entered into
a Deed of Absolute Sale because of the "offer and representation
that spouses Cesar and Pilar Casal are the true owners of the subject
parcels of land,"16 the PCFI, through its legal counsel, declared:
We understand that you, together with Atty. Antonio Jose F.
Cortes, offered to sell the said parcels ofland to our client, and that
on September 17, 2003, an agreement of Purchase and Sale was
executed between Spouses Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P. Casal
(represented by Atty. Cortes as their attorney-in-fact) and our
client.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mr. Guillermo C. Choa, President of the PCFI, narrated in
his affidavit18 the events leading to another sale likewise involving
properties coowned by Atty. Casal through the use of the spurious
SPA, to wit:
3) That sometime in August 2003, Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria
Casal Cledera and Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes offered to me for
sale several parcels of land owned by Cesar E. Casal(father of Gloria
Casal Cledera) including Lot 5, Psu 10120 and Lot 6, Psu 101205
containing an area of 39,670 square meters and 47,638 square
meters, more or less, located at Bo. Lantic, Carmona, Cavite which
was then registered in the name of Eduardo Gan, et al. under TCT
No. T-79153 of the Register of Deeds fur the Province of Cavite.
4) That Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria Casal Cledera together with
Atty. Cortes also presented to me the following documents, to wit:
a) TCT No. T-79153 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite.
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 15, 1990 executed by
heirs of Eduardo B. Gan, et al. in favor of Cesar E. Casal, Cesar
Inis, Ruben Loyola and Angela Lacdan.
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 19, 1990 executed by
Cesar Veloso Casal, et. al. in favor ofSps. Cesar and Pilar Casal.
6) That in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, it was agreed that
the seller shall register the several Deeds of Sale and deliver the
titles over said properties to Pro-friends (PCFI). In the above-
mentioned Agreement of Purchase and Sale, Sps. Casal were
represented by their duly authorized attorney-in-fact, Atty.
Antonio Jose F. Cortes, of legal age, Filipino, with address at 2/F
ELCO Bldg., 202 E. Rodriguez, Sr., Blvd., Quezon City. Present during
negotiations for the terms and conditions to be contained in
the Agreement of Purchase and Sale aside from myself and
Atty.Cortes were Sps. Hugh and Gloria Cledera, the son-in-law and
daughter, respectively of Sps. Casal; x x x19 (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, it cannot be denied that it was respondent who
engineered the execution of the 12 Deeds of Donation involving 66
pieces of Atty. Casal's property. Respondent was personally present
dwing the alleged signing of the Deeds of Donation in Cavite, which
deeds he brought afterwards to his law office in Quezon City, and
notarized the same. Indeed, in his Affidavit, respondent
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
11. When I presented the documents for signature of the donors-
spouses, Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P. Casal, the late Cesar E. Casal
stamped the rubber facsimile of his genuine signature in all the
spaces provided in all copies of the Deeds of Donation. At the same
time and place, I also saw his wife Pilar P. Casal affixed [sic] her own
signature in the Deeds of Donation. Also present dming the signing
occasion was the donee herself, Dr. Gloria P. Casal, as well as, [sic]
her husband, Dr. Hugh Cledera who affixed their signatures in all the
copies of the Deeds of Donation in my presence.
12. Thereafter, I gathered and brought all the signed copies of the
Deeds of Donation to my office in Quezon City, and notarized
them. Record shows that I notarized them and entered the
documents in my Notarial Registry on September 17 and 18,
2003.20 (Emphasis supplied)
By using the falsified SPA and by knowingly notarizing documents
outside of his notarial commission's jurisdiction, respondent was
evidently bereft of basic integrity which is an indispensable sine qua
non of his ongoing membership, in good standing, in the legal
profession, and as a duly-commissioned notary public.
In actively participating in the offer and sale of property to PCFI,
respondent was guilty of deceit and dishonesty by leveraging on the
use of a spurious Special Power of Attorney
There can be no debate either as to the fact that respondent made
use of a forged or falsified SPA in his dealings with PCFI. As the
lawyer who assisted in the sale of the properties through the use of
the falsified SPA in question, he ought to know that the use of such
falsified or forged SPA gives rise to grievous legal consequences
which must inevitably enmesh him professionally. As a member of
the Bar in apparent good legal standing, he effectively held himself
out as a trustworthy agent for the principals he was purportedly
representing in the transaction/s in question.
Respondent's act of notarizing a forged Deed of Donation outside of
his jurisdiction is a violation of his duties as a notary public, as well
as a blatant falsification of public document
This Court agrees with the fmdings of the IBP Board of Governors
which upheld the impartial report of the NBI and its findings that the
signatures on the Deeds of Donation were mere photocopies
attached to the said Deeds. 21Given the fact that respondent
admitted to having been with the late Atty. Casal at the time of the
execution of the Deed, it would not be far-fetched to say that the
use of the said mere photocopies was with his knowledge and
consent. What is more, his act of bringing the Deeds of Donation
that were executed in Carmona, Cavite, to his law office in Quezon
City, and notarizing them there, not only violated Section 240 of the
Revised Administrative Code but "also [partook] of malpractice of
law and falsification."22
Section 240 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly states:
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public
in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-
extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. 23(Emphasis
supplied)
Needless to say, respondent cannot escape from the clutches of this
provision.
The dismissal of the criminal complaints against respondent did not
change the sui generis character of disbarment proceedings
Respondent's contention that the DOJ had resolved to withdraw the
criminal complaints filed against him and his co-accused, the
spouses Cledera,24 does not persuade. The dismissal or withdrawal
of the criminal complaints/ information/sat the instance of the DOJ,
is of no moment. As a member of the Bar, respondent should know
that administrative cases against lawyers are sui generis, or a class
of their own. "Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance."25 Disbarment cases are
aimed at purging the legal profession of individuals who obdurately
scorn and despise the exalted standards of the noble profession of
law. It is within this Court's power, as a check and balance to its own
system, to ensure undeviating integrity by members of the Bar both
on the professional and the personal level. It is only by maintaining
this integrity and this loyalty to the law, to the Courts of Justice and
to their client and the public at large, that lawyers are enabled to
maintain the trust reposed upon them and to deliver justice inside
and outside the courtroom.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and his
Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED, if he is presently
commissioned. Furthermore, he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years, reckoned from
the date of finality of this Resolution.
Furnish a copy of this Resolution to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which shall append the same to the personal record of respondent;
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in the
country for their infonnation and guidance. SO ORDERED
14. A.C. No. 10553, July 05, 2017
FILIPINAS O. CELEDONIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME F.
ESTRABILLO, Respondent.
For Our resolution is complainant Filipinas O. Celedonio's
disbarment complaint1 against respondent Atty. Jaime F. Estrabillo,
charging the latter with the violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 9, Rule 1.09, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Canon 15, Rules 15.03 and
15.04, Canon 17, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 and 19.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
The instant disbarment case stemmed from a criminal case of Estafa
filed by Alfrito D. Mah (Mah) against complainant's husband in 2006,
the latter being accused of embezzling a substantial amount from
Mah's company. In the said case, respondent was Mah's legal
counsel.2
Complainant averred that she tried talking to Mr. Mah's wife, being
one of the sponsors in their wedding, to drop the criminal case
against her husband, but Mrs. Mah responded that the matter is
already in the hands of their lawyer. Thus, complainant and her
husband met several times with the respondent to negotiate the
withdrawal of the criminal case. Respondent assured the
complainant and her husband that he will talk to his client for the
possibility of settling the case and delaying the prosecution thereof
in the meantime.3
In the process of negotiating, respondent advised the complainant
and her husband to execute a deed of sale over their house and lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 502969-R, which
will be used as a collateral for the settlement of the case.
Respondent explained to them that the said deed of sale will merely
be a security while complainant and her husband are paying the
embezzled money in installments and he assured the spouses that
the said deed of sale will not be registered nor annotated in the
title. The criminal case against complainant's husband was then
dismissed.4
Being the only one who shoulders the family expenses, complainant,
at some point, decided to sell the subject house and lot. 5 However,
on December 8, 2008, complainant received summons from the
court regarding a complaint for specific performance with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) and temporary
restraining order (TRO) filed by Spouses Mah, subject of which was
TCT No. 502969-R.6 Apparently, the deed of sale that complainant
and her husband executed as a security for the settlement of the
criminal case was dated May 5, 2008 and notarized by the
respondent. The said complaint averred that herein complainant
and her husband have an obligation to deliver the subject property
to Spouses Mah. Complainant found out that the respondent
requested the Register of Deeds (RD) of Pampanga to register and
annotate the said deed of sale on the title on November 27, 2008. 7

This prompted the complainant to confront the respondent as this
was contrary to what they have agreed upon. The respondent
merely advised complainant to again negotiate with his client and
assured her that he would back her up. However, complainant's
efforts to negotiate were again proven futile. 8
In the meantime, complainant has a deadline for the filing of a
responsive pleading in the said civil case. Also, the hearing for the
application for issuance of a TRO was already scheduled. When the
complainant went back to the respondent for this matter, the
respondent offered to and indeed prepared a Motion for Extension
of Time and Urgent Motion to Postpone for the complainant dated
December 22, 2008 and January 8, 2009, respectively. Complainant
alleged that it was respondent's secretary upon respondent's
instruction, who drafted the said motions and that she was required
to pay the corresponding fees therefor. In view of the said motion
for postponement, complainant did not appear in the January 9,
2009 hearing.9
It turned out, however, that the said hearing still proceeded. The
respondent even appeared therein and manifested that he filed a
notice of lis pendens and adverse claim with the RD of Pampanga.
Complainant also found out that respondent filed a Motion to
Declare Defendants in Default in the said case dated February 4,
2009, which was granted by the court on February 27, 2009. On
March 31, 2009, a decision was rendered in the said case in favor of
respondent's clients. The decision became final and executory and,
thereafter, a writ of execution was issued.10
Realizing that respondent employed deceit and was double-dealing
with her and her husband to their prejudice, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint, praying for the respondent's
disbarment.
In his Answer to the instant administrative complaint, respondent
denied complainant's accusations. Despite admitting that he told
the complainant that he would help her out in negotiating with his
client, he averred that he never compromised his relationship with
the latter as counsel. Respondent explained that he suggested a
deed of second mortgage be made on the subject property, as the
same was still mortgaged with the bank, for the purpose of settling
the criminal case with his client. He admitted preparing such deed of
second mortgage but the same was not signed by his client as the
latter preferred a deed of sale with a promissory note. The
complainant and her husband then executed the preferred deed of
sale. Consequently, Mr. Mah executed an affidavit of desistance
relative to the estafa case against complainant's husband. 11
As to the civil case, respondent averred that upon learning that the
complainant was selling the subject property, he filed an adverse
claim on the said property to protect his client's rights. 12
Respondent, further, denied that he was serving conflicting interests
when he instructed his secretary to draft the motions for extension
of time and postponement for the complainant. He averred that he
informed his clients about it and denied demanding payment
therefor from the complainant.13
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
Aside from respondent's act of instructing his secretary to prepare
and file motions for the complainant in the civil case filed by his
client, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) found no proof as to the other allegations in the
complaint imputing deceit and other violations of the CPR against
respondent.14 On May 22, 2012, the IBP-CBD recommended
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. 15
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-187,
which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and for Respondent's
violation of Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, it being not intentional, Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo is
hereby REPRIMANDED.16
Both the complainant and the respondent filed their. respective
motions for reconsideration (MR) of the above-quoted resolution. 17
Acting on the said MRs, the IBP Board  of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2014-116 on March 21, 2014, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of
Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and they being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and
taken into consideration. Further, the Board RESOLVED to AFFIRM
with modification, Resolution No. XX-2013-187 dated March 20,
2013 and accordingly ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner SUSPENDINGAtty. Jaime E. Estrabillo from the
practice of law to [sic] six (6) months.18
This Court is now called to issue its verdict on the matter.
Isuue
Should the respondent be administratively disciplined based on the
allegations in the complaint?
Our Ruling
We answer in the affirmative.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
Respondent admitted that he instructed his secretary to draft and
file motions for the complainant in the civil case filed by his client
against the latter. Such act is a clear violation of the above-stated
rules. The respondent, however, explained that it was merely a
humanitarian act on his part in helping the complainant on the
matter, to give the latter an opportunity to settle their
accountability to his client.19 Respondent insisted that there was no
intention on his part to violate the trust reposed upon him by his
client. In fact, according to the respondent, it was his client's
interest that he had in mind when he prepared the motions as this
would extend the chance of getting a settlement with the
complainant, which is the end favored by his client.
Such explanation cannot, in any way, absolve him from liability.
The rules are clear. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence.20 The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty,
but an obligation, of a lawyer to 'accord the highest degree of
fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's
interest.21 Thus, part of the lawyer's duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.22 Jurisprudence is to the effect
that a lawyer's act which invites suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of his duty already evinces
inconsistency of interests.23 In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to
represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is
their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
them to oppose.24
There is, thus, no denying that respondent's preparation and filing
of motions on behalf of the complainant, the adverse party in the
case filed by him for his client, conflicts his client's interest. Indeed,
a motion for extension to file an answer would not be favorable to
his client's cause as the same would merely delay the judgment
sought by his client in filing the case. Moreso, the motion for
postponement of the TRO hearing would definitely run counter with
the interest of his client as such remedy was precisely sought,
supposedly with urgency, to protect his client's right over the
subject property before complainant could proceed with the sale of
the same.
Moreover, Rule 15.03 above-cited expressly requires a written
consent of all parties concerned after full disclosure of the facts if
ever, for whatever reason, a lawyer will be involved in conflicting
interests. Corollary to this, Rule 15.04 of the CPR substantially states
that if a lawyer would act as a mediator, or a negotiator for that
matter, a written consent of all concerned is also required. Notably,
there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved in this case.
Considering the foregoing, We sustain the findings of the IBP that
respondent violated Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the CPR.
In addition, this Court cannot shun the fact that due to respondent's
acts, complainant lost her day in court. Admittedly, the complainant
cannot impute fault entirely to the respondent for losing the
opportunity to present her defense in the civil case, as no prudent
man will leave the fate of his or her case entirely to his or her
lawyer, much less to his or her opponent's lawyer. However, We
also cannot blame the complainant for relying upon the motions
prepared by the respondent for her, thinking that in view of the said
motions, she was given more time file an answer and more
importantly, that there was no more hearing on the scheduled date
for her to attend. As it turned out, respondent even appeared on
the date of the hearing that was supposedly sought to be
postponed. This is a clear case of an unfair act on the part of the
respondent. Respondent may not have an obligation to apprise the
complainant of the hearing as the latter is not his client, but his
knowledge of the motion for postponement, drafted by his
secretary upon his instruction, calls for his fair judgment as a
defender of justice and officer of the court, to inform the
complainant that the hearing was not postponed.
This exactly demonstrates why dealing with conflicting interests in
the legal profession is prohibited it is not only because the relation
of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good
taste.25
As to the other matters raised in the complaint such as the
allegations that the respondent deceived the complainant to
execute the subject deed of sale, among others, We are one with
the IBP-CBD that such imputations were not supported by sufficient
evidence to warrant consideration.
Anent the penalty, considering that this is respondent's first
infraction, and that there is no clear showing that his malpractice
was deliberately done in bad faith or with deceit, We hold that
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months,
as recommended by the IBP-CBD and adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, is warranted.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty. Jaime F.
Estrabillo from the practice 'of raw for six (6) months to commence
immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more
severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Decision to
brespondent's record as member of the Bar. SO ORDERED.
14.A A.C. No. 6933, July 05, 2017GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN,
JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA,
JR., Respondent.
Before this Court is an administrative complaint 1 filed by
complainant Gregorio Capinpin, Jr., praying for the suspension from
the practice of law or disbarment of respondent Atty. Estanislao L.
Cesa, Jr. for violating the Canons of Professional Ethics in connection
with the foreclosure of complainant's properties.
Factual Antecedents
On February 14, 1997, complainant executed a real estate mortgage
(REM)2on his two lots in favor of Family Lending Corporation (FLC) as
security for a loan amounting to PhP 5 Million with interest at two
percent (2%) per month.
On April 29, 2002, due to complainant's default in payment, FLC,
through its President Dr. Eli Malaya (Dr. Malaya), initiated
foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties. 3
Complainant availed of legal remedies to stop the said foreclosure
proceedings, to wit: (1) he filed a case for damages and injunction
and also moved for the suspension of the sheriffs sale, wherein such
motion for suspension was granted but the injunctive relief was
denied after hearings. Complainant's motion for reconsideration
(MR) therein was also denied; (2) he then filed a petition
for certiorari  and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) with the
Court of Appeals (CA), wherein no TRO was granted due to some
deficiencies in the petition; (3) he also filed an annulment of REM
with prayer for a WPI and/or TRO before the trial court, wherein this
time a WPI was issued to stop the auction sale.4 This prompted FLC
to file a petition for certiorari  before the CA, questioning the trial
court's issuance of the injunctive writ. The CA nullified the said writ,
mainly on the ground of forum shopping, which was affirmed by this
Court on review.5 For these cases, FLC engaged respondent's legal
services.
The complaint alleges that during the above-cited proceedings,
respondent, without the knowledge of his client FLC, approached
complainant to negotiate the deferment of the auction sale and the
possible settlement of the loan obligation at a reduced amount
without resorting to the auction sale. Respondent allegedly
represented himself as being capable of influencing the sheriff to
defer the auction sale, as well as his client FLC through Dr. Malaya to
accept the amount of PhP 7 Million to fully settle the loan
obligation. For this, the complaint alleges that on April 13, 2005,
respondent demanded payment of professional fees amounting to
Php 1 Million from complainant.6 In fact, complainant already gave
the following amounts to respondent as payment of such
professional fees: (1) PhP 50,000 check dated April 13, 2005; (2) PhP
25,000 check dated April 18, 2005; (3) PhP 75,000 check dated April
22, 2005; (4) PhP 20,000 check dated May 16, 2005; (5) PhP 200,000
on June 30, 2005; and (6) PhP 30,000 on August 17, 2005. 7 Despite
such payments, the auction sale proceeded.8 Hence, the instant
complaint.
For his part, respondent denies that he was the one who
approached complainant for negotiation, the truth being that it was
complainant who asked for his help to be given more time to raise
funds to pay the loan obligation.9Respondent further avers that he
communicated the said request to his client.10 Aside from the checks
dated April 13, 18, 22 and May 16, 2005, which respondent claims to
be advance payments of his attorney's fees, respondent avers that
he did not receive any other amount from the complainant. 11 All
these, according to the respondent, were known to his client. 12 In
fact, in a Letter dated April 22, 2005 signed by the complainant and
addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, complainant expressly stated
that he will negotiate for the payment of respondent's fees as FLC's
counsel.13
On July 16, 2007, this Court referred the instant administrative case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation or decision.14
Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In his Report and Recommendation15 dated June 4, 2010, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to complainant's
allegations that respondent, without the knowledge of his client,
negotiated with the complainant for the settlement of the loan
obligation, and that the respondent demanded and received
professional fees in negotiating the said settlement.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, respondent's act of
negotiating with the complainant on the deferment of the auction
sale and the settlement of the loan for a substantially reduced
amount was highly improper as respondent's primary duty, being
FLC's counsel, was to protect the interest of FLC by seeing to it that
the foreclosure proceedings be done successfully to obtain the best
amount possible to cover the loan obligation. 16 The Investigating
Commissioner explained that if a lawyer can collect professional
fees or advanced payment thereof from the adverse party, it results
to a conflict of interest.17 From the foregoing, the respondent was
found to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that a lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. 18
The report further stated that the amounts collected by the
respondent should be considered as money received from his client;
as such, he has the duty to account for and disclose the same to his
client in accordance with Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the said
Code.19 The Investigating Commissioner found nothing on record
that showed that respondent made such accounting for or
disclosure to his client.20
Hence, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent
was liable for malpractice and recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Commissioner
finds the respondent liable for malpractice and, accordingly,
recommends that respondent be meted a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR
suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition
of a similar offense will be dealt with more severity. 21
Resolutions of the Board of Governors
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On September 28, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-84, 22 which
states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated
Canon 15, Rule 15.03, and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.23(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's MR24 was denied in the IBP Board of Governor's
Resolution No. XXI-2014-28025 dated May 3, 2014 as follows:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission
and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration
of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-84 dated September
28, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED. 26
Necessarily, We now give Our final action on this case.
Issue
Should Atty. Cesa, Jr. be administratively disciplined based on the
allegations in the complaint and evidence on record?
The Court's Ruling
We are in full accord with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and
Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Based on the records, We find substantial evidence to hold the
respondent liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the said
Code. It must be stressed that FLC engaged respondent's legal
services to represent it in opposing complainant's actions to
forestall the foreclosure proceedings. As can be gleaned from
respondent's position paper, however, it is admitted that
respondent extended help to the complainant in negotiating with
FLC for the reduction of the loan payment and cessation of the
foreclosure proceedings.27The case of Hornilla v. Salunat28 is
instructive on the concept of conflict of interest, viz.:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. x x x.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double[-]dealing in the
performance thereof.29
Evidently, respondent was working on conflicting interests – that of
his client, which was to be able to foreclose and obtain the best
amount they could get to cover the loan obligation, and that of the
complainant's, which was to forestall the foreclosure and settle the
loan obligation for a lesser amount.
Indeed, the relationship between the lawyer and his client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence.
Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the
lawyer's duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting
interests.30 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. 31
Respondent's allegation that such negotiation was within the
knowledge of his client will not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR. Respondent presented a number
of documents to support his allegation that all the communications
between him and the complainant were relayed to his client but We
find no record of any written consent from any of the parties,
especially from his client, allowing him to negotiate as such.
This Court cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold, at all
times, the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The ethics of
the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course of
their practice of law. Clearly, in this case, respondent failed to
uphold such ethical standard in his practice of law.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governor's Resolution No. XX-2013-84 dated
September 28, 2013 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-280 dated May 3,
2014 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. from
the practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately upon
receipt of this Decision.

Respondent's admission that he received advance payments of
professional fees from the complainant made matters worse for
him. As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, it was
highly improper for respondent to accept professional fees from the
opposing party as this creates clouds of doubt regarding
respondent's legal practice. As aptly stated by the Investigating
Commissioner, if a lawyer receives payment of professional fees
from the adverse party, it gives an impression that he is being paid
for services rendered or to be rendered in favor of such adverse
party's interest, which, needless to say, conflicts that of his client's.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED

Simply put, respondent's professional fees must come from his

client. This holds true even if eventually such fees will be
reimbursed by the adverse party depending on the agreement of
the parties. Respondent cannot justify his act of accepting
professional fees from the complainant by alleging that such was in
accordance with the arrangement between his client and the
complainant as there is no clear proof of such arrangement. The
April 22, 2005 Letter32 signed by the complainant and addressed to MONDAY: 6:00pm- 10:00pm
FLC through Dr. Malaya, invoked by the respondent, does not, in any TUESDAY: 8:00pm- 10:00pm
way, prove that there was an agreement between complainant and WEDNESDAY: 9:00am-12:00pm
FLC. Moreover, the fact that respondent was already receiving THURSDAY: 9:00am-12:00pm
several amounts from the complainant even before the date of the
FRIDAY: 9:00am-12:00pm
said Letter, supposedly stating an agreement between the
complainant and FLC as regards the settlement of the loan
SATURDAY: 6:00pm-10:00pm
obligation and the payment of his professional fees, is also SUNDAY: 6:00pm-10:00pm
suspicious. Such circumstance reveals that even before the
complainant and FLC have come to such purported agreement, he
was already receiving professional fees from the complainant.
Respondent's allegations to the effect that negotiations had already
been going on between the parties through him via phone calls even
before that Letter do not hold water. To be sure, it would have been
easy for the respondent, as a lawyer, to present documentary proof
of such negotiation and/or arrangements but respondent failed to
do so.

At any rate, even assuming that there was indeed an arrangement

between FLC and complainant that respondent's professional fees
shall be paid by the complainant, which will be later on deducted
from whatever the latter will pay FLC for the settlement of his loan
obligation, respondent's act of accepting such payments from the
complainant and appropriating the same for his professional fees is
still reprehensible. The said payments from the complainant are still
considered FLC's money; as such, respondent should have
accounted the same for his client. As correctly found by the
Investigating Commissioner, there is nothing on record, aside from
respondent's bare and self-serving allegations, that would show that
respondent made such accounting or disclosure to his client. Such
acts are in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR above-cited.

In addition, this Court is baffled by the idea that complainant opted

to pay respondent's professional fees first before his loan obligation
was even taken care of, and that FLC would actually agree to this.