LEGAL PROFESSION

CASES 1 – 5 (DIGESTS)

1. Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100013, September 3, 1991

FACTS: 

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's
alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari
and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming Monsod’s appointment.

HELD:

1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional
commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider
lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that
they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in
the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own
specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their
specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for
example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore,
Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then
worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also
became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged
in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc. 
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by
the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess
the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise
its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

2. Philippine Lawyers’ Association vs. Agrava 105 Phil 773

FACTS:

On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take
the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examination sand
is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing
is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does
not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and
other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore,
he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been
questioned formally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution
of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. 

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent
Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of
their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application
of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law
and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and
conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from
any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent
Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

3. People vs. Villanueva 121 Phil 894

FACTS:

 On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality.  Said
accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte.  The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
prosecutor in this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

HELD: 

The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.  Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.  The word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never
been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
4. Cui vs. Cui 11 SCRA 758

Facts:

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don
Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids,
and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No.
3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed
to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then
incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a
“convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui,
however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the
position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding
that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case.
Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE

Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD

Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2
of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives
preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a
lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order;
or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of
law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree
merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an
administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of
administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for
immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before
he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting
from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

5. In Re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562

FACTS:

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil
case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said
motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion
was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the
trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on
certiorari before the Supreme Court which out rightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then
filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he
claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court
are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged
that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons
why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also
stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as  the Court wanted to wait
for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s
certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . .
in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is
“the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined

HELD: 

Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme
Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the
High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of
the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will
have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as
uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true
that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.  His right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known
that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place
of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.