Garcia v.

Philippine Airlines
G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009
Carpio Morales, J.

Facts:
Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees –herein
petitioners for allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of
company security personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical
Center’s Tool room Section. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for
transgressing company’s Code of Discipline prompting them to file a
Complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision
ruled on their favor ordering PAL to immediately comply with the
reinstatement aspect of the decision. Prior to the judgment, SEC placed PAL
under Interim Rehabilitation Receiver who subsequently replaced by
Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal, NLRC reversed said decision
and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.
Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting the
reinstatement aspect of his decision. Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for
Injunction with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the validity of the Writ and
the Notice issued by LA but suspended and referred the action to the
Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action. By manifestation, respondent
informed the Court that SEC issued an Order granting its request to exit
from rehabilitation proceedings.

Issue:
Whether petitioner may collect their wages during the period between
the LA’s Order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision
overturning that of the LA, now that PAL has exited from rehabilitation
proceedings.

Ruling:
Yes. A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the
LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is
immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial
upon the LA to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on
the employer to comply therewith. The Court reaffirms the prevailing
principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the LA is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal
by the higher court. It settles the view that the LA’s order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to
reinstate them in the payroll, and that filing to exercise the options in the
alternative, employer must pay the employee’s salaries. When reinstatement
pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the survival
or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not
contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a
judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive.

1
 St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998
Regalado, J.

Facts:
Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin
Funeral Homes for misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was
supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging
that the dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case against St. Martin
Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the
respondent is not an employee due to the lack of an employer-employee
contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly
payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed,
there was no employer-employee relationship between the two and hence,
there could be no illegal dismissal in such a situation.
The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the
decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed
to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was
properly filed in the Supreme Court.

Ruling:
No. Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the
Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are then appealable to the Office of the
President. However, the new rules do not anymore provide provisions
regarding appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC.

However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to

review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue of their role under the check
and balance system and the perceived intention of the legislative body who
enacted the new rules.

It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the

acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no
right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
unjust adjudications.

The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the

appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals –

2
as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.
Power Shipping Enterprises Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. 138270, June 28, 2001
Buena, J.

Facts:
A complaint for death and burial benefits, and medical and sickness
allowance was filed against Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Western
Shipping Agencies, Fil-Pride, Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., and
More Maritime Agencies Inc. before the POEA who referred the same to
NLRC. All the respondents therein denied any liability.
On October 30, 1997, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the
complainant ordering all respondents therein to be held liable. Upon appeal
by Fil-Pride, the NLRC (Second Division) modified the aforesaid decision
and absolved Fil-Pride from liability but other respondents remained liable
since the LA order has become final and executory.
On October 28, 1998, petitioner filed an MR with the NLRC but this
was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal via Rule 65 to the CA.
However, the CA dismissed its appeal for failure to comply with procedural
requirements which was to attach the certified true copy of judgment, final
order or resolution. This prompted the petitioner to file an appeal to SC to
set aside the dismissal of its case solely on grounds of technicality.

Issue:
Whether CA's dismissal is valid.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner indeed failed to observe procedural requirements.

A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, or final order

or resolution, of the Court of Appeals as in this case, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from.
Petitioner, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, an improper remedy. By availing of a wrong or inappropriate
mode of appeal, the petition merits an outright dismissal pursuant to Circular
No. 2-90.
Similarly, petitioner’s failure to comply with the provisions of Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it filed its petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals is fatal to its cause. A party who seeks to avail of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari must observe the rules laid down by law,
and non-observance of the said rules may not be brushed aside as a mere
technicality.
It must be emphasized that procedural rules should not be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in

3
prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.

Tirazona v. Phil EDS Techno-Service Inc.

G.R. No. 169712, January 20, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts:

The petitioner, a managerial employee who was holding a position of

trust and confidence, was admonished by the latter of her improper handling
of a situation involving a rank-and-file employee. She admitted having read
a supposed confidential letter for the PET directors containing a legal
opinion of the respondent's counsel regarding the status of her employment.
As a consequence, she was terminated for willful breach of trust reposed
upon by her employer. She claimed having been denied of due process.

Issue:

Whether the Petitioner Tirazona is entitled for separation pay and

retirement benefits under existing laws?

Ruling:

No, she is not entitled of separation pay and retirement benefits.

The court ruled that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of

social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character.

The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance

wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best
it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense.

Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are
clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be
poor.
This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those
who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted
the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.

The petitioner has given the respondent more than enough reasons to
distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company
her stubborn uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the
company's termination of her employment. She was found to have violated
the trust and confidence reposed in her by her employer.

4
 UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio
G.R. No. 131235. November 16, 1999
Panganiban, J.

Facts:

Private respondent Mariño et al are duly elected officers of UST

faculty. The union has a 5-year Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with its employer and is set to expire on May 31, 1998.

On September 21, 1996, Secretary General of the Union posted a

general assembly announcement to be held on October 5, 1996. Various
UST club presidents requested a general faculty assembly; thus union and
non-union faculty members convened. New set of officers were elected,
violative of the CBL and that GA was held with the attendance of non-union
members.

Current union officers were served with a notice to vacate the union
office as new set of offices were already elected. CBA was likewise ratified
by an overwhelming majority. Med-Arbiter declared the election conducted
as violative of the union’s CBL. BLR Director Bitonio upheld the decision
with a ruling that the CBL which constituted the covenant between the union
and its members could not be suspended during the general assembly of all
faculty members, since it had not been authorized by the union.

Issue:

Whether the officers “elected” during the general assembly should be

recognized.

Ruling:

Yes. Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the

constitution and labor Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to
join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union
member, an employee must not only signify the intent to become one but
also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union
membership is usually embodied in the union’s CBL. An employee who
becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant
obligations that go with the new status and becomes bound by the union’s
rules and regulations.

5
 Reyes v. Trajano
G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992
Narvasa, CJ.

Facts:
The votes casted by the 141 Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK) members were
segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement
between the competing unions, That INK members should not be allowed to
vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate
in the previous certification elections."
The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK Employees petition. He
decided the fact that "religious belief was (being) utilized to render
meaningless the rights of the non-members of the Iglesia ni Kristo to
exercise the rights to be represented by a labor organization as the
bargaining agent," and declared the petitioners as "not possessed of any legal
personality to institute this present cause of action" since they were not
parties to the petition for certification election.
On appeal, Secretary Trajano opined that the petitioners are "bereft of
legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are
not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the
unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate
in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their
religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor
organizations."

Issues:

(1) Whether or not INK members are disqualified to vote.

(2) Whether or not the failure to participate in previous certification election
is a valid ground to deny subsequent participation.

Ruling:

(1) Neither law, administrative rule, nor jurisprudence requires that

only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a
certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of
the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the
bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.

(2) No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of

the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification
elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously

6
fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion
whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same.

Heritage Hotel Manila v. Piglas

G.R. No. 177024, October 30, 2009
Abad, J.

Facts:
Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file employees of petitioner
Heritage Hotel Manila formed the “Heritage Hotel Employees Union” (the
HHE union). The Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital
Region (DOLE-NCR) later issued a certificate of registration to this union.
The HHE union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner
opposed. The company alleged that the HHE union misrepresented itself to
be an independent union, when it was, in truth, a local chapter of the
National Union of Workers in Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries
(NUWHRAIN).

PIGLAS union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner

also opposed, alleging that the new union’s officers and members were also
those who comprised the old union. According to the company, the
employees involved formed the PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of
Appeals’ injunction against the holding of the certification election sought
by the former union.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the union made fatal misrepresentation in

its application for union registration.
(2) Whether or not dual unionism is a ground for cancelling a
union’s registration

Ruling:

(1) No, Respondent PIGLAS union’s organization meeting lasted for

12 hours. It was possible for the number of attendees to have increased from
90 to 128 as the meeting progressed. Besides, with a total of 250 employees
in the bargaining unit, the union needed only 50 members to comply with
the 20 percent membership requirement. Thus, the union could not be
accused of misrepresentation since it did not pad its membership to secure
registration.

(2) No. The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS union’s members
were also members of the old rank and file union, the HHE union, is not a
ground for canceling the new union’s registration. The right of any person to

7
join an organization also includes the right to leave that organization and
join another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had ceased to exist and its
certificate of registration had already been cancelled. Thus, petitioner’s
arguments on this point may also be now regarded as moot and academic.

Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CENECO) v. Secretary of

Labor and Ceneco Union of Rational Employees (CURE)
G.R. No. 94045, September 13, 1991
Regalado, J.

Facts:
On August 15, 1987, CENECO entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file
employees for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987 and
extending up to March 31, 1990.-On December 28, 1989, CURE wrote
CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new collective
bargaining agreement. CENECO denied CURE's request on the ground that
employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are
not entitled to form or join a union.
CENECO filed a motion to dismiss to the effect that "employees who
at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to
form or join unions for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for
certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners." Med-
Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued an order granting the petition for
certification election in effect, was a denial of CENECO's motion to dismiss,
and directing the holding of a certification election between CURE and No
Union. CENECO appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment
which issued the questioned order modifying the order of the med-arbiter by
directly certifying CURE as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees of CURE.

Issue:
Whether or not the employees of CENECO who withdrew their
membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for
purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed
by the latter.

Ruling:

The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason

why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out
by CURE, the resignation of the member- employees is an expression of
their preference for union membership over that of membership in the
cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford fall protection to labor
and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the

8
employees’ right to form and join unions for purposes of collective
bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

Thus, member employees of a cooperative may withdraw as members

of the cooperative in order to join labor union. Membership in a cooperative
is voluntary; inherent in it is the right not to join.

Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning v. Calleja

G.R. No. 82914, June 20, 1988
Griño-Aquino, J.

Facts:
From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division
of the Universal Robina Corporation. Within the freedom period of 60 days
prior to the expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed an amended notice of strike
as a means of pressuring the company to extend, renew, or negotiate a new
CBA with it.
The NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the
IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect, registered as a labor union, filed a petition for a
certification election at the Bureau of Labor Relations.
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and
that the members of the NEW ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia ni
Kristo sect which three (3) years previous refused to affiliate with any labor
union. It also accused the company of using the NEW ULO to defeat
TUPAS’ bargaining rights.
The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election within
20 days. TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and was
able to negotiate a new 3-year CBA with ROBINA. Respondent BLB
Director Calleja dismissed the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the public respondent erred in affirming the Med-
Arbiter’s order for a certification of election.

Ruling:

No, the public respondent did not err in dismissing the petitioner’s
appeal in BLR Case No. A-12-389-87. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union, upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI
KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious
beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union.
The public respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets
of the sect . . . should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization
granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation."

9
 The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA
within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose
the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS’ claim to
majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on
October 13, 1987 before TUPAS’ old CBA expired on November 15, 1987
and before it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987.

FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, Inc. v. Trajano

G.R. No. 76273, July 31, 1987
Paras, J.:

Facts:
The petitioner, Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial
Foundation, Inc., has a work force of about 350 rank and file employees,
majority of whom are members of private respondent Alliance of Filipino
Workers.

On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Consent

and/or Certification Election with The Ministry of Labor and Employment.
The petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition
involving the same issues and the same parties is pending resolution before
the Supreme Court, private respondent filed a similar petition for
certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment but the
petition was denied on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-
profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or
organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code.

Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme

Court assailing the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code.

Issue:
Whether or not rank and file employees of non-profit organization are
covered by the right to self-organization.

Ruling:
Yes. At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification
election on February 13, 1986, Article 244 of the Labor Code was already
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, to wit:

Art. 244. Coverage and employees’ right to self-organization. — All

persons employed in commercial, industrial and charitable, medical or
educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the
right to self-organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
$bargaining. Ambulant intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed
people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form

10
labor organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their
interests and for their mutual aid and protection.

Under the aforequoted provision, there is no doubt that rank and file
employees of non-profit medical institutions (as herein petitioner) are now
permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes
of collective bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the
requisites provided by law for calling a certification election, it was
incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to
ascertain the bargaining representative of petitioner’s employees.
Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation Labor Union v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Employees and Workers Union, Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation
G.R. No. 121084, February 19, 1997
Kapunan, J.

Facts:

TMPCEWU filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Med-

Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-National Capital Region seeking to represent
the rank-and-file employees of the manufacturing division.
Petitioner filed a motion to intervene and claims that the petition was
premature due to an earlier resolution by the Secretary of Labor ordering the
conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
TMPC represented by petitioner which was the subject of certiorari
proceedings before the Supreme Court and still awaiting final resolution at
the time; and, that the collective bargaining unit which respondent
TMPCEWU sought to represent violated the "single or employer" unit
policy since it excluded the rank-and-file employees in the other divisions
and departments in respondent TMPC.
The Med-Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing for lack of merit
TMPCEWU's Petition for Certification Election, since it failed to include all
rank-and-file employees from Levels 1 to 4 in other departments of TMPC
in violation of the  "one-union in one-company"  policy and likewise
dismissing TMPCLU's Petition-in-Intervention for lack of legal personality.

Issues:
1. Whether TMPCLU has the legal personality to file the Petition-in-
Intervention.
2. Whether or not the appellant has legal authority to oppose the
instant petition.

Ruling:

The registration certificate issued by the Department of Labor and

Employment is void ab initio because at the time of the issuance the
constitution of intervenor union TMPCLU is (sic) a mixture of supervisory

11
and rank-and-file employees as per finding of fact of Med-Arbiter Paterno
Adap.

Petitioner had no valid certificate of registration and therefore no legal

personality to file the Petition for Certification Election and in the absence
of any attempt on its part to rectify the legal infirmity, likewise the
disputed Petition-in-Intervention.

Manila Electric Company v. Secretary of Labor

G.R. No. 91902, May 20, 1991
Medialdea, J.

Facts:

On November 22, 1988, the Staff and Technical Employees

Association of MERALCO, a labor organization of staff and technical
employees of MERALCO, filed a petition for certification election, seeking
to represent regular employees of MERALCO. MERALCO moved for the
dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the employees sought to be
represented by petitioner are security services personnel who are prohibited
from joining or assisting the rank-and-file union, among others.

Issue:

Whether or not security guards may join rank-and-file or supervisors

union.

Ruling:

While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from
joining a labor organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may
now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the
supervisory union, depending on their rank.

We are aware however of possible consequences in the

implementation of the law in allowing security personnel to join labor
unions within the company they serve. The law is apt to produce divided
loyalties in the faithful performance of their duties. Economic reasons would
present the employees concerned with the temptation to subordinate their
duties to the allegiance they owe the union of which they are members,
aware as they are that it is usually union action that obtains for them
increased pecuniary benefits.

Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security

personnel may neglect or outrightly abandon their duties, such as protection
of property of their employer and the persons of its officials and employees,
12
the control of access to the employer’s premises, and the maintenance of
order in the event of emergencies and untoward incidents. It is hoped that
the corresponding amendatory and/or suppletory laws be passed by Congress
to avoid possible conflict of interest in security personnel.

San Miguel Corporation Supervisors v. Laguesma

G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997
Romero, J.

Facts:

Petitioner union filed before the Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE) a Petition for District Certification or Certification
Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

Med-Arbiter Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of

certification among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one
bargaining unit.

The public respondent, granted respondent company’s Appeal and

ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for
determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for on

September 3, 1991 and directed the conduct of separate certification
elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to
S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis.

Issues:

Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of

the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from
joining a union.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that said employees do not fall within the term
“confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a union.

13
 Supervisors 3 and above may not be considered confidential
employees merely because they handle “confidential data” as such must first
be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to fall under
said restrictions.  The information they handle are properly classifiable as
technical and internal business operations data which, to our mind, has no
relevance to negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein the interests
of a union and the management are invariably adversarial.  Since the
employees are not classifiable under the confidential type, they may
appropriately form a bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.  

Metrolab Industries, Inc v.  Roldan-Confessor

G.R. No. 108855, February 28, 1996
Kapunan, J.

Facts:
On 31 December 1990, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between Metrolab and the Union expired.  The negotiations for a new CBA,
however, ended in a deadlock.

The Union filed a notice of strike against Metrolab and Metro Drug
Inc.  The parties failed to settle their dispute despite the conciliation efforts
of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.

The Secretary of Labor assume jurisdiction over the entire labor

dispute and ordered the parties involved to execute a new CBA.Thereafter,
the Union filed a motion for reconsideration.

Acting Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor issued a resolution declaring

the layoff of Metrolab’s 94 rank and file workers illegal and ordered their
reinstatement with full backwages.  

Issues:

Whether or not the exclusion of confidential employees from

bargaining unit is discriminatory.

Ruling:

No, excluding confidential employees from the rank and file

bargaining unit, is not tantamount to discrimination.

The Union’s assurances fail to convince.  The dangers sought to be

prevented, particularly the threat of conflict of interest and espionage, are
not eliminated by non-membership of Metrolab’s executive secretaries or
confidential employees in the Union.  Forming part of the bargaining unit,
the executive secretaries stand to benefit from any agreement executed
between the Union and Metrolab.  Such a scenario, thus, gives rise to a
potential conflict between personal interests and their duty as confidential

14
employees to act for and in behalf of Metrolab.  They do not have to be
union members to affect or influence either side.

Confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file.  As

previously discussed, the nature of employment of confidential employees is
quite distinct from the rank and file, thus, warranting a separate
category.  Excluding confidential employees from the rank and file
bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.

Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (SCBEU-NUBE) v.

Standard Chartered Bank
G.R. NO. 161933, April 22, 2008
Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

The 1998-2000 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the

Standard Chartered Bank employees Union and the Standard Chartered
Bank expired so the parties tried to renew it but then a deadlock ensued.

But then in the renewal sought by SCBEU-NUBE, they only wanted

the exclusion to apply only to the following employees from the appropriate
bargaining unit – all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire
employees, confidential employees, those with access to labor relations
materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex
Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff. SCBEU-NUBE also
averred that employees assigned in an acting capacity for at least a week
should be given salary raise.

A notice of strike was given to the Department of Labor due to this

deadlock. Then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued an order
dismissing the Union’s plea.

Issue:

Whether or not the confidential employees sought to be removed from

the exclusion as appropriate bargaining unit by SCBEU-NUBE holds
ground.

Ruling:

No, whether or not the employees sought to be excluded from the

appropriate bargaining unit are confidential employees is a question of fact,
which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. SCBEU-NUBE insists that the foregoing employees are not
confidential employees; however, it failed to buttress its claim. Aside from
its generalized arguments and despite the Secretary’s finding that there was

15
no evidence to support it, SCBEU-NUBE still failed to substantiate its
claim. SCBEU-NUBE did not even bother to state the nature of the duties
and functions of these employees, depriving the Court of any basis on which
it may be concluded that they are indeed confidential employees.

With regards to the salary increase of employees in acting capacities,

the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a restrictive
provision would curtail management’s prerogative, and at the same time,
recognized that employees should not be made to work in an acting capacity
for long periods of time without adequate compensation.

Paper Industries Corp v. Laguesma

G. R. No.101738. April 12, 2000
De Leon, Jr., J.

Facts:
Petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines is engaged
in the manufacture of paper and timber products. PICOP-Bislig instituted a
Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP
for collective bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes.
Initial hearing was set. Paper Industries Corp failed to file any
comment or position paper. Meanwhile, private respondents Federation of
Free Workers (FFW) and Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed their
respective petitions for intervention. An Order was issued granting the
petitions for interventions of the FFW and ALU. Another Order issued on
the same day set the holding of a certification election among PICOP's
supervisory and technical staff employees in with four choices, namely: (1)
PICOP Bislig Union; (2) FFW; (3) ALU; and (4) no union. Paper Industries
Corp appealed the Order which set the holding of the certification election
contending that the Med-Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in
deciding the case without giving the corporation the opportunity to file its
comments/answer, and that PICOP-Bislig Union had no personality to file
the petition for certification election.
PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads
and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were
reclassified as managerial employees in the light of the reorganization
effected by it.

Issue: 
Whether or not the positions Section Heads and Supervisors, who
have been designated as Section Managers and Unit Managers, were
converted to managerial employees under the decentralization and
reorganization program

Ruling:
No, they are not managerial employees. A thorough dissection of the
job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section heads

16
indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory
employees since they do not lay down company policies. PICOP's
contention that the subject section heads and unit managers exercise the
authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading for the reason
that any authority they exercise is not supreme but merely advisory in
character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies
inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring,
promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is still subject
to confirmation and approval by their respective superior. Thus, where such
power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject to
evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other higher
executives of the company, the same, although present, is not effective and
not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc v. Hon. Puraferrer-Calleja
G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989
Cortes, J.

Facts:
Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor
Organizations (BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) alleging that
BENECO has in its employ 214 rank and file employees; that 198 or92.5%
of these employees have supported the filing of the petition; that no
certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is
no existing collective bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no
collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative.

An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees

Labor Union (BELU) contending that it was certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the subject

The med-arbiter found that there are 37 employees who are not
members and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the
cooperative. BELU and BENECO appealed but the same was dismissed for
lack of merit. So BENECO filed with the SC a petition for certiorari which
the SC dismissed for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated April 1986.

BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest. The

med-arbiter dismissed the protest. BLR director Calleja affirmed the med-
arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.

Issue:
Whether or not employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or
join a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

17
Ruling:
The right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a
cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With
respect, however, to employees who are neither members nor co-owners of
the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the Constitution and
applicable statutes.

The fact that the members-employees of BENECO do not participate

in the actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible to
form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining with petitioner.

Central Negros Electric Cooperative v. DOLE

G.R. No. 94045 September 13, 1991
Regalado, J.

Facts:

On August 15, 1987, CENECO entered into a collective bargaining

agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file
employees, providing for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987
and extending up to March 31, 1990. On December 28, 1989, CURE wrote
CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA).
On January 18, 1990, CENECO denied CURE’s request on the
ground that, under applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees
who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled
to form or join a union.

Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE

members, in a general assembly held on December 9, 1989, approved
Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that ‘tall union members shall
withdraw, retract, or recall the union members’ membership from Central
Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. in order to avail (of) the full benefits under
the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by and between
CENECO and CURE, and the supposed benefits that our union may avail of
under the renewed CBA. However, the withdrawal from membership was
denied by CENECO on February 27, 1990 under Resolution No. 90.

Issue:

Whether or not the employees of CENECO who withdrew their

membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for
purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed
by the latter.

Ruling:

18
 The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason
why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out
by CURE, the resignation of the member- employees is an expression of
their preference for union membership over that of membership in the
cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford fall protection to labor
and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the
employees’ right to form and join unions for purposes of collective
bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

Thus, member employees of a cooperative may withdraw as members

of the cooperative in order to join labor union. Membership in a cooperative
is voluntary; inherent in it is the right not to join.
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja
G.R. No. 85750, September 28, 1990
Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to

operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was
incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-
profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work.
IRRI on the other hand was intended to be an autonomous,
philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-stock organization designed to carry
out the principal objective of conducting “basic research on the rice plant, on
all phases of rice production, management, distribution and utilization with a
view to attaining nutritive and economic advantage or benefit for the people
of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through improvement in quality
and quantity of rice.”
The labor organizations in each of the above mentioned agencies filed
a petition for certification election, which was opposed by both, invoking
diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the
application of Philippine labor laws valid?

Ruling:

Yes. ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no

means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by our
Constitution.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are
disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that

19
“each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private
character to which the specialized agency is a party.” Moreover, pursuant to
Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the
Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC,
the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute

with management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for better
management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the
Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein “both
management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of
maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its
employees.”
Republic Planters Bank General Services Employees Union –National
Association of Trade Unions v. Bienvenido Laguesma
G.R. No. 119675. November 21, 1996
Puno, J.

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for certification election to determine the

sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular employees outside
the bargaining unit of Republic Planters Bank The proposed bargaining unit
is composed of clerks, messengers, janitors, plumbers, telex operators,
mailing and printing personnel, drivers, mechanics and computer personnel.
They are excluded from the existing collective bargaining agreement
between private respondent and RPBEU, the duly certified bargaining
representative of the regular employees of private respondent.

Private respondent filed its position paper and moved to dismiss the
petition for certification election. Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin dismissed
the petition for certification election on the ground that there is already a
certified bargaining agent.

Petitioner sought a ruling that the other workers in the proposed

bargaining unit should also be considered regular employees of private
respondents since they perform duties necessary to the bank’s business
operations. Petitioner submitted additional documents containing the job
descriptions of eleven (11) employees assigned at private respondent, most
of whom were performing messengerial services. Private respondent
reiterated its objection to the admissibility of the new evidence.

Issues:

Whether or not the filed petition for certification election is valid.

Ruling:

20
 No, the filing of the petition for certification election was not valid.

The petition for certification election was filed on January 21, 1991.
The collective bargaining agreement between the duly certified bargaining
agent, Republic Planters Bank Employees Union, and private respondent
was effective from June 30, 1988 to June 30, 1991. It is crystal clear that the
filing of the petition for certification election was premature.

The petitioner’s act of trying to tilt the balance in its favor by assailing
the legal standing of private respondent in intervening in the certification
election is futile because petitioner did not raise this issue in the proceedings
below. It is too late to litigate the issue on appeal.

Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon

G.R. No. 91307, January 24, 1991
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:

On February 15, 1989, the respondent union filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of
the Singer Sewing Machine Company, Baguio City branch (hereinafter
referred to as "the Company").

The Company opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the
union members are actually not employees but are independent contractors
as evidenced by the collection agency agreement which they signed.

The respondent Med-Arbiter, finding that there exists an employer-

employee relationship between the union members and the Company,
granted the petition for certification election. On appeal, Secretary of Labor
Franklin M. Drilon affirmed it. The motion for reconsideration of the
Secretary's resolution was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
has jurisdiction over the case since the existence of employer-employee
relationship is at issue.

Ruling:

A thorough examination of the facts of the case leads us to the

conclusion that the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
the Company and the collection agents cannot be sustained.

The grounds specified in the contract for termination of the

relationship do not support the view that control exists "for the causes of

21
termination thus specified have no relation to the means and methods of
work that are ordinarily required of or imposed upon employees."
(Investment Planning Corp. of the Phil. v. Social Security System, supra)

The last and most important element of the control test is not satisfied
by the terms and conditions of the contracts. There is nothing in the
agreement which implies control by the Company not only over the end to
be achieved but also over the means and methods in achieving the end (LVN
Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 1 SCRA 132 [1961]).

University of the Philippines v. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja

G.R. No. 96189 July 14, 1992
Narvasa, C.J.

Facts:
The Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed
a petition for certification of election before the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) to which the University of the Philippines (UP) had no objection to
the election. ONAPUP claims to have a membership of 3,236 members
where 33% are non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baños, Manila,
and Visayas. April 18, 1990, another registered labor union, the All UP
Workers’ Union (AUPWU) filed a comment as intervenor in the
certification election proceeding. It alleges that its membership covers
both academic and non-academic personnel and that it aims to unite all
UP rank-and-file employees in one union. It assent to the holding of the
election provided the appropriate organization unit was clearly defined. It
observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professional
Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be
deemed part of the organizational unit. UP on the other hand made records
of its view that there should be 2 unions one for academic and the other for
non-academic or administrative personnel considering the dichotomy of
interest, conditions and rules governing these employees.

Issue:
Whether or not academic personnel should form a distinct collective
bargaining unit from those non-academic employees of the University.

Ruling:
Yes, although there was no standard mentioned in forming a
collective bargaining unit the Supreme Court referred to American
Jurisprudence for guidance and have followed principles in the American
Magna Carta which stated that the collective bargaining unit must be based
on the following factors: Will of the employees (Global Doctrine), Affinity
and unit of employees’ interest --- substantial similarity of work and duties

22
or similarity of compensation and working conditions, prior collective
bargaining agreement history, employment status --- temporary, seasonal,
probationary. Furthermore the Supreme Court also followed the 10th
Annual Report of the NLRB which sets the following factors: History,
extent and type of organization of employees, history of their collective
bargaining, history, extent and type or organization of employees in other
plants of the same employer, or other employers in the same industry, the
skill, wages, work and working conditions of the employees, the desires of
the employees, the eligibility of the employees for membership in the
unions/s involved, and the relationship between the unit/s proposed and the
employer’s organization, management ,and operation.
To summarize it, the two groups have nothing mutual in common and
have different interests thus should have their own collective bargaining
units.

San Miguel Corporation Supervisors v. Laguesma

G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997
Romero, J.

Facts:

Petitioner union filed before the Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE) a Petition for District Certification or Certification
Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

Med-Arbiter Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of

certification among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one
bargaining unit.

The public respondent, granted respondent company’s Appeal and

ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for
determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for on

September 3, 1991 and directed the conduct of separate certification
elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to
S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis.

Issues:

Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of

the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from
joining a union.

23
Ruling:

The Court ruled that said employees do not fall within the term
“confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a union.

Supervisors 3 and above may not be considered confidential

employees merely because they handle “confidential data” as such must first
be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to fall under
said restrictions.  The information they handle are properly classifiable as
technical and internal business operations data which, to our mind, has no
relevance to negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein the interests
of a union and the management are invariably adversarial.  Since the
employees are not classifiable under the confidential type, they may
appropriately form a bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.  

Benguet Consolidated Inc. And Balatok Mining Co. v.

Bobok Lumberjack Association
G.R. No. L-24729, March 29, 1972
Makalintal, J.

Facts:
The Bobok Lumber Jack Association filed a petition with the Court of
Industrial Relations on January 24, 1955, praying that a certification election
be ordered in the Bobok Timber Project (Case No. 225-MC). On February
19, 1955, a similar petition (No. 235-MC) was filed by the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company Laborers Union, praying that a certification
election be held in the Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc canps. In its turn, the
Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union filed on Karen 14, 1955, a petition (Case
No. 231-MC) praying that the aforesaid five camps be declared an employer
unit and that it be certified as the exclusive representative of all the
employees therein.
In their joint answer to the said petitions, the petitioning companies
agreed to the holding of a certification election but prayed that its five camps
be merged into one employer unit. The three petitions were heard jointly. On
May 29, 1956, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order holding that
it finds no valid reason to change the status of the petitioners' five camps as
separate bargaining units. According to this court, while "the history of
collective bargaining by this different unions with management and the
functional interdependence of the different departments of work to each
other would indicate that the employer unit is the appropriate unit", there are
other factors favoring the maintenance of the five camps as separate
bargaining units. These factors, the court held, are the distribution of the
workers in the five different camps, which are separated from each other by
some distance, the presence of a superintendent, and the difference in the
nature of the work in each camp.
The petitioners companies and the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union
moved for the reconsideration of the said order, but the Court of Industrial
Relations denied the request.

24
Issue:
Whether the system of having one collective bargaining unit for each
camp should be maintained.

Ruling:
Yes. The present system had operated satisfactorily. Prime element
in determining whether a group of employees constitute a proper bargaining
unit is whether it will, without inequity to the employer, best serve all the
employees in the exercise of bargaining rights.
Separation between camps and the different kind of work in each all
militate in favor of the present system since the problem and interest of the
worker are peculiar in each camp or department.
The system of having one collective bargaining unit in each camp has
operated satisfactorily in the past.

Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc.

v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union
G.R. NO. 158075, June 30, 2006
Carpio Morales, J.

Facts:
The Diamond Hotel Employee’s Union (the union) filed a petition for
Certification Election before the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR)
seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of its
members. The DOLE-NCR denied said petition as it failed to comply with
the legal requirements.
The Union later notified petitioner hotel of its intention to negotiate
for collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Human Resource
Department of Diamond Hotel rejected the notice and advised the union
since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it
could not be recognized as such. After several conferences, the union
suddenly went on strike. The following day, the National Union of Workers
in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the
strike and openly extended its support to the union. The some of the
entrances were blocked by the striking employees. The NLRC issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directing the strikers to immediately
“cease and desist from obstructing the free ingress and egress from the Hotel
premises. During the implementation of the order, the striking employees
resisted and some of the guards tasked to remove the barricades were
injured. The NLRC declared that the strike was illegal.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the union members is valid on the
grounds of participating in an illegal strike.

Ruling:

25
 Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held
illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus, the employment of
violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted
activities which are injurious to the rights to property renders a strike illegal.
As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be
dismissed for staging and participating in the illegal strike, following
paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code which provides that “any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.”

An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere

participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by
mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an
illegal act during a strike.

FILOIL REFINERY CORP. VS. FILOIL SUPERVISORY &

CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ASSO. AND COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-26736, August 18, 1972
Teehankee, J.

Facts:
Respondent association is a labor organization duly registered with
the Department of Labor. It is composed exclusively of the supervisory and
confidential employees of petitioner corporation. There exists another
entirely distinct labor association composed of the corporation’s rank-and-
file employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers Association (FEWA) with
which petitioner executed a collective bargaining agreement. This collective
bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its coverage petitioner’s
supervisory and confidential employees, who in turn organized their own
labor association, respondent herein. Respondent association filed on
February 18, 1965 with the industrial court its petition for certification as the
sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all of petitioner’s
supervisory and confidential employees working at its refinery in Rosario,
Cavite.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming
that supervisors are not employees within the meaning of Republic Act 875,
the Industrial Peace Act, and that since they are part of management, they do
not have the right to bargain collectively although they may organize an
organization of their own and that supervisors form part of management and
are not considered as employees entitled to bargain collectively. Respondent
court denied the dismissal motion.”

Issue:
Whether the respondent Supervisors and confidential employees may
form a labor organization and enjoy right to collective bargaining?

26
Ruling:

Yes. Supervisors and confidential employees even though they may

exercise the prerogatives of management as regards the rank and file
employees are indeed employees in relation to their employer, the company
which is owned by the stockholders and bondholders (capital) and should
therefore be entitled under the law to bargain collectively with the top
management with respect to their terms and conditions of employment.
As stated for the SC in AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. C.I.R., section
3 of the Industrial Peace Act “explicitly provides that “employees” — and
this term includes supervisors — “shall have the right to self-organization,
and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining through representations of their own
choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection” and that “individuals
employed as supervisors … may form separate organizations of their own”.

Philippine Scout Veterans Security v. Torres

G.R. No. 92357 July 21, 1993
Nocon, J.

Facts:
On April 6, 1989, private respondent labor union, PGA Brotherhood
Association – Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), hereinafter referred to as
“the Union” filed a petition for Direct Certification/Certification Election
among the rank and file employees of Philippine Scout Veterans Security
and Investigation Agency (PSVSIA), GVM Security and Investigations
Agency, Inc. (GVM) and Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc.
(ASDA). These three agencies were collectively referred to by private
respondent Union as the “PGA Security Agency,” which is actually the first
letters of the corporate names of the agencies.
On April 11, 1989, summons was issued to the management of
PSVSIA, GVM, ASDA (PGA Security Agency) at 82 E. Rodriquez Avenue,
Quezon City.
On April 11, 26, 1986, petitioners filed a single comment alleging
therein that the said three security agencies have separate and distinct
corporate personalities while PGA Security Agency is not a business or
corporate entity and does not possess any personality whatsoever.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can interfere with the certification election
proceeding.

Ruling:
Except where the employer has to file a petition for certification
election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to
bargain collectively, it has nothing to do with a certification election which

27
is the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification election has aptly
been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in
a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-
Arbiter’s orders related thereto. An employer that involves itself in a
certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a
company union.
This Court’s disapprobation of management interference in
certification elections is even more forceful in Consolidated Farms, Inc. v.
Noriel, where the court held that on a matter that should be the exclusive
concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the
employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend
support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of
labor.

Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union v. Calica

G.R. No. 96490, February 3, 1992
Medialdea, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-¬PTGWO is a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment and the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and¬-file
employees of Indophil Textile Mills, Incorporated. Respondent Teodorico P.
Calica is impleaded in his official capacity as the Voluntary Arbitrator of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and
Employment, while private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a
corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and export of yarns of various
counts and kinds and of materials of kindred character and has its plants at
Barrio Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan. In April, 1987, petitioner Indophil
Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO and private respondent Indophil
Textile Mills, Inc. executed a collective bargaining agreement effective from
April 1, 1987 to March 31, 1990. On November 3, 1987, Indophil Acrylic
Manufacturing Corporation was formed and registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In 1988, Acrylic became operational and hired
workers according to its own criteria and standards. Sometime in July, 1989,
the workers of Acrylic unionized and a duly certified collective bargaining
agreement was executed. It is the petitioner's contention that Acrylic is part
of the Indophil bargaining unit and was opposed by private respondent
which submits that it is a juridical entity separate and distinct from Acrylic.

Issue:
Whether or not Indophil Acrylic is a separate and distinct entity from
respondent company for purposes of union representation.

28
Ruling:

We already ruled in the case of Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110

of the ULGWP v. Ople (supra) that it is grave abuse of discretion to treat
two companies as a single bargaining unit when these companies are
indubitably distinct entities with separate juridical personalities.

Hence, the Acrylic not being an extension or expansion of private

respondent, the rank-and-file employees working at Acrylic should not be
recognized as part of, and/or within the scope of the petitioner, as the
bargaining representative of private respondent.

Umali v. CA
G.R. No. 89561, September 13, 1990
Regalado, J.

Facts:

Mauricia died. Her successor-administratrix, Buenaflor Umali,

questioned the foreclosure made by ICP. Umali alleged that all the
transactions are void and simulated hence they were defrauded; that through
Bormaheco’s machinations, Mauricia was fooled into entering into a surety
agreement with ICP; that Bormaheco even made the premium payments to
ICP for said surety bond; that the president of Bormaheco is a director of
PMPMC; that the counsel who assisted in all the transactions, Atty. Martin
De Guzman, was the legal counsel of ICP, Bormaheco, and PMPMC.

Issue: 

Whether or not the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced.

Ruling: 

No. There is no clear showing of fraud in this case. The mere fact that
Bormaheco paid said premium payments to ICP does not constitute fraud
per se. As it turned out, Bormaheco is an agent of ICP.

Further, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is not the proper remedy
in order that the foreclosure conducted by ICP be declared a nullity.

The veil of corporate fiction can’t be pierced by the simple reason that
the businesses of two or more corporations are interrelated, absent sufficient

29
showing that the corporate entity was purposely used as a shield to defraud
creditors and third persons of their rights. In this case, there is no
justification for disregarding their separate personalities.

San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTGWO v. Confesor

G.R. No. 111262, September 19, 1996
Kapunan, J.

Facts:
On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation
Employees Union — PTGWO entered into a CBA with private respondent
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to take effect upon the expiration of the
previous CBA or on June 30, 1989. Meanwhile, effective October 1, 1991,
Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were spun-off and became two
separate and distinct corporations: Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and
San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA
remained in force and effect.
After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the terms
of the CBA and Article 253-A of the Labor Code.
During the negotiations, the petitioner-union insisted that the
bargaining unit of SMC should still include the employees of the spun-off
corporations: Magnolia and SMFI; and that the renegotiated terms of the
CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period of two years or until
June 30, 1994. SMC, on the other hand, contended that the
members/employees who had moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically
ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at the SMC. Unable to agree on these
issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration of the CBA,
petitioner-union declared a deadlock on September 29, 1990.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is
to be effective for three years
2) Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the
employees of the Magnolia and SMFI.

30
Ruling:

(1) Pertinent to the first issue is Art. 253-A of the Labor Code as
amended. The issue as to the term of the non-representation provisions of the
CBA need not be laboured. The parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a
renegotiated contract with a term of three (3) years or one which does not
coincide with the said 5-year term, and said agreement is ratified by majority
of the members in the bargaining unit, the subject contract is valid and legal
and therefore, binds the contracting parties. Thus, we do not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in ruling that the
effectivity of the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be for 3 years.
(2) Indubitably, therefore, Magnolia and SMFI became distinct
entities with separate juridical personalities. Thus, they cannot belong to a
single bargaining unit. Moreover, in determining an appropriate bargaining
unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The
employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must
have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working
conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed.
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad (Kapisanan)
v. Yard Crew Union
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979
Fernando, J.

Facts:
Kapisanan filed with the CIR a petition praying that it be certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent in Manila Railroad Company. During the
proceewding, 3 appropraite bargaining units were dterenmined by CIR.
Kapisanan was eventually certified as exclusive bargaining agent (EBA) for
the remaining-company-personal unit. After the decision in favor of
Kapisanan became final, the Yard Crew Union, the Station Employees
Union, and the rail road Engineering Department Union filed their respective
petitions, praying that they be defined as separate bargaining unit and they
be certified in the units sought to be separated. CIR ordered a plebiscite
among the employees in the 3 proposed group as above-mentioned. The
employees of the proposed vote in a secret ballot to be conducted by CIR
whether they desire to be separated from the unit of the rest of the
employees being represented by the Kapisanan. Kapisanan being the EBA
of the appropriate bargaining unit from which the 3 unions is petitioning for
separate appropriate bargaining unit now contends that the existence of a
CBA between Kapisanan and Company bars the subject 3 petitions.

Issue:
Whether or not CIR’s orders are contrary to law.

Ruling:

31
 Because of the modern complexity of the relation between both
employer and union structure, it becomes difficult to determine from the
evidence alone which of the several claimants group forms a proper
bargaining unit. It becomes necessary if to give consideration to the express
will or desire of the employees-a practice designated as the Globe doctrine
which sanctioned the holding of a series of elections, not for the purpose of
allowing the group receiving an overall majority of votes to represent all
employees, but for the purpose of permitting the employees in each of the
several categories to select the group which each chooses as a bargaining
unit.

CIR was simply interested in the verification of the evidence

submitted wherein the workers have signed manifestations of their desire to
be separated from the Kapisanan. CIR has the right of full investigation in
arriving at a correct finding of fact in order to deny or grant the petition for
certification election. And one way of determining the desire of the
employees is what CIR suggested: a plebiscite. A plebiscite and not the
certification election itself. The subject orders of CIR do not decide the
petitions of the 3 unions.

Farley Fulache Et. al v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation

G.R. No. 183810, January 21, 2010
Brion, J.

Facts:
The petitioners in this case are questioning the CBA executed between
ABS-CBN and the ABS-CBN Rank-and-File Employees Union (Union)
because under such agreement, they are only considered as temporary and
not regular employees. The petitioners claimed that they should be
recognized as regular employees of ABS-CBN because they had already
rendered more than a year of service in the company and, therefore, entitled
to the benefits of a regular employee.
ABS-CBN pointed out that they are “talents” who are paid a pre-
arranged consideration called “talent fee” taken from the budget of a
particular program. Their contracts are terminated once the program,
production or segment is completed. ABS-CBN alleged that the petitioners’
services were contracted on various dates by its Cebu station as independent
contractors, hence, not entitled to regularization in these capacities. Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision holding that the petitioners were regular
employees of ABS-CBN, not independent contractors, and are entitled to the
benefits and privileges of regular employees. ABS-CBN appealed the ruling
to the NLRC. Pending, ABS-CBN dismissed Fulache, Jabonero, Castillo,
Lagunzad and Atinen (all drivers) for their refusal to sign up contracts of
employment with service contractor Able Services. The four drivers and
Atinen responded by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter upheld the validity of ABS-CBN's contracting out of certain work or

32
services in its operations. The labor arbiter found that petitioners Fulache,
Jabonero, Castillo, Lagunzad and Atinen had been dismissed due to
redundancy, an authorized cause under the law. The NLRC reversed the
labor arbiter’s ruling in the illegal dismissal case.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are correct that they should be
considered already as regular employees.

Ruling:
As regular employees, the petitioners fall within the coverage of the
bargaining unit and are therefore entitled to CBA benefits as a matter of law
and contract. Nothing in the records shows that they are supervisory or
confidential employees; neither are they casual nor probationary employees.
Most importantly, the labor arbiter’s decision of January 17, 2002 – affirmed
all the way up to the CA level – ruled against ABS-CBN’s submission that
they are independent contractors. Thus, as regular rank-and-file employees,
they fall within CBA coverage under the CBA’s express terms and are
entitled to its benefits. The bad faith in ABS-CBN’s move toward its
illegitimate goal was not even hidden; it dismissed the petitioners – already
recognized as regular employees – for refusing to sign up with its service
contractor.

General Rubber and Footwear Corporation v. BLR

G.R. No. 74262, October 29, 1987
Paras, J.

Facts:
On 15 Oct 1982, General Rubber executed a CBA with General
Rubber Workers Union (Independent). Three years later, the monthly paid
employees formed their own collective bargaining unit [NATU] and filed a
petition for direct certification with the BLR. General Rubber opposed this.
On 02 Sep 1985, the Med-Arbiter issued an order for the holding of a
certification election. A month later, the CBA expired. The daily paid rank
and file employees formed the Samahang Manggagawa sa General Rubber
Corporation-ANGLO as their union for collective bargaining. BLR issued an
order that sanctioned the creation of 2 bargaining units in General Rubber.
According to General Rubber there is already an existing bargaining unit,
whose members are represented by the ANGLO for collective bargaining
purposes.

Issue:
Whether or not the NATU members/monthly-paid employees are
rank-and-file employees, and w/n the monthly-paid employees should be
allowed to join the union of the daily-paid employees.

Ruling:

33
 The fact that the employees perform supervisory functions does not
make them managerial employees already. It has not been clearly established
how effective those recommendations are. The proliferation of unions in an
employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless there are
compelling reasons which would deny a certain class of employees the right
to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. This case does not
fall squarely within the exception. The monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees have been historically excluded from the bargaining unit
composed of daily-paid rank-and-filers. The NATU members are not
managerial employees but merely considered as rank-and-file employees
who have every right to self-organization or to be heard through a duly
certified collective bargaining union. Members of supervisory unions who
do not fall within the definition of managerial employees shall become
eligible to join or assist the rank-and-file labor organization, and if none
exists, to form or assist in the forming of such organizations. Perhaps it is
unusual for General Rubber to have to deal with two collective bargaining
unions but there is no one to blame except General Rubber itself for creating
the situation it is in. From the beginning of the existence of a bargaining
unit, General sought to suppress the NATU members right to self-
organization. Even if it were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and
unions because it is a curtailment of the right to self-organization. The
monthly-paid rank-and-file employees should be allowed to join the union of
the daily-paid-rank-and-file employees so that they can also avail of the
CBA benefits or to form their own rank-and-file union, without prejudice to
the certification election that has been ordered.
Dela Salle University Employees Association-National Federation of
Teachers and Employees Union (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
v. Dela Salle University
G.R. No. 109002, April 12, 2000
Buena, J.

Facts:

Dela Salle University and Dela Salle University Employees

Association - National Federation of Teachers and Employees Union
(DLSUEA-NAFTEU), which is composed of regular non-academic rank and
file employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a life
span of three (3) years, During the freedom period, the Union initiated
negotiations with the University for a new collective bargaining
agreement which, however, turned out to be unsuccessful, hence, the Union
filed a Notice of Strike.

The University filed with the Second Division of this Court, a petition
for certiorari with temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
assailing the decision of the voluntary arbitrator, as having been rendered "in
excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion."

34
Issue:

Whether or not the voluntary arbitrator committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The Court affirms the findings of the voluntary arbitrator that the
employees of the College of St. Benilde should be excluded from the
bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of Dela Salle University,
because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical
personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of
the veil of corporate fiction.

The right to join a labor organization should carry with it the corollary right
not to join the same. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations
recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The
legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a
closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of
the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be
members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their
jobs.

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation (SLECC)

v. Secretary of Labor and Employment
G.R. NO. 162355, August 14, 2009

Facts:

On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines

(CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification
election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates, docketed as Case No. RO400-
0202-RU-007.  The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE
Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading,
Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials. On 21 August
2001, Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to
inappropriateness of the bargaining unit.  CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union appealed the order of
dismissal to this Office on 14 September 2001. 
 
Issue:

Whether or the subsequent negotiations and registration of a collective

Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia East

35
Commercial Corporation Workers Association’s (SLECCWA) petition for
direct certification?
 
Ruling:

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a

union in unorganized establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized
establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive
bargaining representative on 20 July 2001.  CLUP-SLECC and its affiliates
workers union filed a petition for certification election on 27 February 2001
and this petition remained pending as of 20 July 2001.  Thus, SLECC’s
voluntary recognition of SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent
negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and
SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for
certification election. Court finds it strange that the employer itself, SLECC,
filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification
election.  In petitions for certification election, the employer is a mere
bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter’s
decision.  The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is
requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us.

Port Workers Union of the Philippines V. Laguesma

G.R. Nos. 94929-30, March 18, 1992
Cruz, J.

Facts:

The CBA between the workers of the International Container

Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI and Associate Port Checkers and Workers
Union (APCWU) was about to expire. Other unions were seeking to
represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already
plotting their moves.
Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition
for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the
employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days after the petition.
Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition
for intervention. PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that
Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written consent to
be submitted simultaneously with the petition forcertification election.
DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of
the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP’s appeal.

36
 Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, which was ratified by a majority of the
workers in the bargaining unit, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in

application of Art 256 of the Labor Code.

Ruling:

No, grave abuse of discretion was not commited by respondent.

Doctrine in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United

Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines vs. Trajano: “it has long
been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the
holding of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and
certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent the
workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic concept,
this Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of
sound discretion, may order a certification election notwithstanding the
failure to meet the 30% requirement”.

In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring
the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing
of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate
the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers.

Reyes vs. Trajano

G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992
Narvasa, CJ.

Facts:

The votes casted by the 141 Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK) members were
segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement
between the competing unions, That INK members should not be allowed to
vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate
in the previous certification elections."

The Med-Arbiter saw no merit in the INK Employees petition. He

decided the fact that "religious belief was (being) utilized to render
meaningless the rights of the non-members of the Iglesia ni Kristo to
exercise the rights to be represented by a labor organization as the
bargaining agent," and declared the petitioners as "not possessed of any legal
personality to institute this present cause of action" since they were not
parties to the petition for certification election.

37
 On appeal, Secretary Trajano opined that the petitioners are "bereft of
legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are
not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the
unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative." He also pointed out that the petitioners "did not participate
in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their
religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor
organizations."

Issues:

(1) Whether or not INK members are disqualified to vote.

(2) Whether or not the failure to participate in previous certification
election is a valid ground to deny subsequent participation.

Ruling:

(1) Neither law, administrative rule, nor jurisprudence requires that

only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a
certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of
the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the
bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.

(2) No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of

the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification
elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously
fallacious grounds, the public respondents exercised their discretion
whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the same.

Young Men Labor Union Stevedores V. The Court Of Industrial

Relations, Et Al.
G.R. No. L-20307, February 26, 1965
Bautista Angelo, J.

Facts:
Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. (NALCO) entered into a contract with
Young Men Labor Union Stevedores (YMLUS) and Victory Stevedoring
and Labor Union (VISLU) whereby the 2 unions bound themselves to
undertake loading jobs of NALCO’s exports at 50-50. YMLUS later sent
NALCO a letter demanding the withdrawal of the job from VISLU on the
ground that its registration permit granted by DOLE had been cancelled;
VISLU refused as the order of cancellation had not become final. YMLUS
sent a notice of picketing if their demand was not carried out.
NALCO filed a petition with the CIR praying that pending
determination of the issue, the unions observe status quo; and, after due
hearing, decide which union gets the job, or comply with the 50-50
arrangement.

38
 After a series of bloody incidents resulting from the picketing by
YMLUS and retaliation from VISLU, NALCO filed a petition with the CIR
praying (1) to issue a TRO against YMLUS to refrain from preventing
VISLU’s operations in any manner (2) issue a similar TRO to VISLU,
ordering them to desist from retaliating (3) after hearing, to issue and order
making such injunctions permanent.
Both unions filed separate motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the CIR but later submitted to the CIR’s jurisdiction. Judge
Martinez rendered a decision enjoining parties to continue observing the 50-
50 arrangement until it is decided by certification election, which party was
to become the bargaining unit. YMLUS and NALCO each filed MFRs as to
the holding of certification elections which were denied, hence this petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not CIR had jurisdiction to act on the controversy
(2) Whether or not CIR erred in ordering a certification election

Ruling:
(1) Yes, Sec. 12b of RA 875 provides that matters pertaining to
certification election involving 2 or more unions fall under the jurisdiction of
the CIR. Also, petitioner is estopped from questioning the same since it
withdrew its MFR and voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction to present
evidence.

(2) No, Sec. 12(b) of RA 875 and is the only expedient way to resolve the
friction between the 2 unions. The object of certification proceedings is not a
decision of any alleged commission of a wrong or asserted deprivation of
rights but is merely the determination of the proper bargaining unit. As such,
said proceedings are investigatory in nature and this Court should not
interfere with the judgment of the CIR, unless grave abuse of discretion is
shown.
Samahang Manggawa sa Permex v. Secretary of Labor, National
Federation Of Labor, Permex Producer And Exporter Corporation
(PPEC)
G.R. No. 107792, March 2, 1998
Mendoza, J.

Facts:
On Jan. 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among
employees of PPEC which resulted to a no union. However, some
employees of said company formed a labor organization known as the
Samahang Manggagawa sa PERMEX (SMP) which was registered with
DOLE. The union affiliated itself with Philippine Industries Labor Union
(PIILU). On Aug. 16, 1991, SMP- PIILU requested PPEC to recognize the
former as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees.

PECC recognized SMP-PIILU and both entered into a collective

bargaining agreement Dec. 1, 1991) which was later on ratified by the

39
majority of the rank and file employees (Dec. 9 & 10, 1991) which was
subsequently certified by DOLE (Dec. 13, 1991). On Feb. 25, 1992,
National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed a PCE which was dismissed by the
Med- Arbiter but granted by Sec of Labor on appeal. SMP-PIILU questioned
the resolution of the Sec of Labor. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether PECC's voluntary recognition of SMP-PIILU as the
exclusive bargaining agent within 12 months after the last certification
election is valid.

Ruling:
As pointed out by the respondent Sec of Labor in his decision, there
can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of the
proclamation of the results of the certification election. Here the results,
which showed that 61% of the employees voted for "no union, during the
first PCE were certified on Feb. 22, 1991 but on Dec. 1, 1991 PECC already
recognized SMP- PIILU and entered a CBA with it. The Court said that
there is something dubious about the fact that just 10 months after the
employees had voted that they did not want any union to represent them;
they would be expressing support for SMP-PIILU.

Excepted from the contract bar rule are certain types of contracts
which do not forester industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity
of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts
must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does
not establish the kind of industrial peace contemplated by law. Moreso, in
the case at bar, the sworn affidavits f some employees showed that there
existed coercion and intimidation when they supported SMP- PIILU.

Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Calleja, Et. Al.

G.R. No. 77395, November 29, 1988
Paras, J.

Facts:
On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-
TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, filed a petition for direct certification
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file
employees/workers of Belyca Corporation, a duly organized, registered and
existing corporation, employing approximately 205 rank and file
employees/workers.

Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper,

among others, (1) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who
authorized, signed and supported the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no
longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986 (c) 6

40
withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were retrenched on
June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination and
destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped
working; and (2) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification
election has not been complied with by the union.

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by

petitioner union in his order dated August 18, 1986.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the
employees in the proposed bargaining unit, asking for a certification election
had been strictly complied with.

RULING:
Yes. It is undisputed that petitioner Belyca Corporation (Livestock
and Agro Division) employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-and-
file employees and workers. It is significant to note that 124 employees out
of such number have expressed their written consent to the certification
election; much more than the required 30% and over and above the present
requirement of 20% by Executive Order No. 111.

More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the
petition for holding a certification election cannot be a bar to its being
granted. In fact, once the required percentage requirement has been reached,
even the employees’ withdrawal from union membership taking place after
the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition.
Also, until a decision, final in character, has been issued declaring the strike
illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be
denied participation in the certification election.

George and Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union

G.R. No. L-51602, January 17, 1985
Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:
ALU filed for a petition for Direct Certification, praying that it be
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank and
file employees of G&PL.

G&PL opposed the petition stating that ALU does not represent the
majority of the employees concerned, especially in the light of the claim of
more than 80% of the licensed and unlicensed crew of its vessels that they
are not members of any union and have no desire to join any.
The Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying ALU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of G&PL employees.

41
 G&PL moved for reconsideration alleging that a certification election
(CE) should be called for the interest of fairness and justice.

Issue:

Whether a direct certification would suffice to prove the alleged

majority representation status of a union.

Ruling:

No, it would not suffice.

Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of

ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive
bargaining representative. The fact that there are no competing unions
involved should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the
employees being the primordial consideration besides the fact that the
employees can still choose between ALU and No Union. Even if the
withdrawals of the employees concerned were submitted after the Petition
for direct certification had been filed, the doubt as to the majority
representation of the Union has arisen and it is best to determine the true
sentiment of the employees through a certification election.

Plum Federation Of Industrial And Agrarian Workers v.

Director Carmelo C. Noriel, Et Al.
G.R. No. L-48007, December 15, 1982
De Castro, J.

Facts:
Plum Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers (PLUM) filed a
petition, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file workers of Manila Jockey Club, Inc. Manila
Jockey Club Race Day Operation Employees Labor Union-PTGWO filed a
motion to intervene and opposition to said petition and alleged that it is the
recognized collective bargaining representative of all the employees of the
company. Another supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by
intervenor PTGWO, this time invoking the "No Union Raiding Clause" of
the "Code of Ethics" adopted by the members of the Trade Union Congress
of the Philippines (TUCP) wherein both petitioner and intervenor are

42
members, and claiming that the petition failed to satisfy the 30%
requirement of the law. The entire record of the case was forwarded to the
Office of the President of the TUCP for the purpose of submitting the matter
to the Congress for decision. TUCP’s decision is that MJCR-OELU-
PTGWO be declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, thus
dismissing the petition of PLUM.

Issue:
Whether or not TUCP (here both PLU and PTGWO) has the authority
to supersede or impair the holding of a certification election or deny the
majority employees of their right to elect their own union.

Ruling:
No. Certification election is the fairest and most effective way of
determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force.
A letter from the president of respondent union reveals the present state of
affairs of the employees wherein they are deprived of the benefits of a
collective bargaining agreement, for management refused to bargain with the
union. If this situation continues, the employees would stand to lose a long-
line of cases that the workers' welfare can be promoted through the
bargaining process.
As to the issue of whether or not the 30% minimum subscription
requirement was met, it was held that the Director is still empowered to call
for a certification election provided there was no abuse of discretion.
However, in the case at bar, instead of ordering an election, respondent
Director dismissed the appeal of PLUM based on the decision of the TUCP,
which the Court considers an impairment of the freedom of the workers to
voice out their choice of the union to represent them. Since there has been no
certification election for the past three (3) years as well as a certified
collective bargaining agreement which should govern the economic and
working conditions of the workers, a certification election should
immediately be ordered.

Acoje Workers’ Union v. National Mines and Allied Workers' Union

G.R. No. L-18848, April 23, 1963
Concepcion, J.

Facts:
Department of Labor, through the BLR, conducted on June 9, 1961, a
“consent election” among the workers of the Acoje Mining Company at
Santa Cruz, Zambales, in which 5 labor unions participated, namely, the
Acoje United Workers’ Union, the Acoje Labor Union (PELTA), the Acoje
Labor Union (PLUM), respondent National Mines and Allied Workers’
Union (NAMAWU), and petitioner Acoje Workers’ Union. NAMAWU won
in the said election.

Petitioner Union — which had been defeated by respondent Union by

a margin of 282 votes — had filed a motion to invalidate said election upon

43
several grounds. After hearing, the lower court issued, on July 21, 1961, the
order appealed from holding that said motion was without merit, and
certifying respondent Union NAMAWU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the workers of the Company. MR of petitioner was
denied, hence this present appeal by certiorari, and petitioner now maintains
that the lower court should have invalidated the aforementioned election for
the same was “the result of acts of terrorism, force, threat and intimidation
employed by” agents of respondent Union. The petitioner also questioned
the list of qualified voters that was used during the election which was based
on the payroll of the employees.

Issue:
Can a payroll be used as the basis for qualified employee- voters?

Ruling:
Yes. It appears that labor unions concerned agreed, not only to the
holding of the aforementioned election, but also to the use of the Company
payroll of March 31, 1961, as the basis for determining who are qualified to
vote subject to the approval of the lower court. The Company presented its
aforementioned payroll to said court and stated that the labor unions had
been furnished copy thereof, at least 3 days prior thereto. Said labor unions
were given an opportunity to make their comments and observations on the
list of workers contained in the payroll and to ask or suggest the inclusion or
exclusion of names therein or therefrom. Petitioner’s representative then
stated that it would abide by whatever ruling the court may make on the
matter of inclusion and exclusion of voters. Indeed, on May 19, 1961, the
court issued the corresponding order for the holding of the election and
made its ruling on the question as to who were qualified to vote, and
petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of said ruling. Hence, petitioner
may no longer contest the accuracy of the aforementioned voters list.

Airtime Specialists, Inc., Et Al. v.

Hon. Director of Labor Relations Calleja, Et Al.
G.R. No. 80612-16, December 29, 1989
Paras, J.

Facts:
Respondent Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia-FFW Chapter
(SAMA-ASIA, for short) filed with the National Capital Region, Ministry of
Labor and Employment, two separate petitions for direct certification and/or
certification election on behalf of the regular rank-and-file employees of the
petitioners Airtime Specialists and Absolute Sound, Inc. The other
respondent Pinagbuklod ng Manggagawa sa Ataco-FFW Chapter (PMA for
short) also filed with the same office, on the same day, similar separate
petitions in behalf of the regular rank and file employees of petitioners

44
Country-Wealth Development, Ad Planner and Marketing Counsellors and
Atlas Resources.
All these five cases were consolidated. Petitioners filed their position
paper with motion to dismiss on the following grounds — disaffiliation of
the rank and file employees, ineligibility of some signatories because they
had less than one (1) year of service resulting in the non-compliance with the
30% requirement. The Med-Arbiter issued an Order mandating a
certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of
the Airtime Specialists, Inc.; Absolute Sound, Inc.; Commonwealth
Development Corporation; Ad Planners & Mktg. Corp.; and Atlas Resources
& Management Group, within 20 days from receipt of the Order.

Issue:
Whether or not the Bureau of Labor Relations has discretion in
ordering a certification election.

Ruling:
Yes. This Court had made it clear that they should give discretion to
the Court of Industrial Relations, or in this case, the Bureau of Labor
Relations in deciding whether or not to grant a petition for certification
election considering the facts and circumstances of which it has intimate
knowledge.
Moreover, a perusal of Art. 258 of the Labor Code as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 442 reveals that compliance with the 30%
requirement (now 20%) makes it mandatory upon the Bureau of Labor
Relations to order the holding of a certification election in order to
determine the exclusive-bargaining agent of the employees. Parenthetically,
where the petition is supported by less than 30% (now 20%) the Bureau of
Labor Relations has discretion whether or not to order the holding of
certification election depending on the circumstances of the case. Thus, it is
our holding in LVN Pictures vs. Musicians Guild, et al. (1 SCRA 132) that
in connection with certification election, the Court of Industrial Relations
enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure a
fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees, and having
exercised its sound discretion, this Court cannot interfere (Arguelles v.
Young, 153 SCRA 690).
Philippine Fruits and Vegetable Industries, Inc.
v. Hon. Ruben D. Torres and Tupas
G.R. No. 92391, July 3, 1992
Paras, J.

Facts:
In 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa issued an Order granting the petition for
Certification election filed by the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS). Said order directed the holding of a certification election
among the regular and seasonal workers of the Philippine Fruits and
Vegetables, Inc. After a series of pre-election conferences, all issues relative
to the conduct of the certification election were threshed out except that

45
which pertains to the voting qualifications of the hundred ninety-four (194)
workers enumerated in the lists of qualified voters submitted by TUPAS.
Election transpired and only 168 of the questioned workers actually voted.
This was opposed by the company and objected the proceeding. However, it
was subsequently agreed upon that workers whose names were inadvertently
omitted in the list of qualified voters were allowed to vote, subject to
challenge. Only 38 of them voted in the election. Subsequently, since the
majority votes of the employees were not reached, a need to open the 168
challenged vote was necessary, this was again objected by the company.
Eventually, the petitioner-company filed a protest but was then denied. After
the denial of its motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Labor, the
company filed for a petition for certiorari in the Court alleging that the
Secretary of Labor committed manifest error in upholding the certification
of TUPAS as the sole bargaining agent mainly on an erroneous ruling that
the protest against the canvassing of the votes cast by 168 dismissed workers
was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Issue:
Whether or not the protest was belatedly filed.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that that the formal protest of petitioner PFVII
was filed beyond the reglementary period. Under Section 4, Rule VI, Book
V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, protest is to be decided in
twenty (20) working days.
The Court stated the two requirements in order that a protest filed
thereunder would prosper: (1) The protest must be filed with the
representation officer and made of record in the minutes of the proceedings
before the close of election proceedings, and (2) The protest must be
formalized before the Med-Arbiter within five (5) days after the close of the
election proceedings.
The records of the case clearly disclosed that petitioner, after filing a
manifestation of protest on December 16, 1988, election day, only
formalized the same on February 20, 1989, or more than two months after
the close of election proceedings.

Alexander Reyes, Et Al. v. Cresenciano B. Trajano, Et Al.

G.R. No. 84433, June 2, 1992
Narvasa, CJ.

Facts:

There were two competing unions, Tri-Union Employees Union-

Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-
OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS). 348 workers were deemed to be qualified voters for the
certification election.

46
 Of the 348 qualified voters, only 240 voted, 141 of these are members
of the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK). The INK employees promptly made known
their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the
election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect
the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA
opposed the petition. The Med Arbiter saw no merit in the INK employees’
petition which prompted the petitioners to appeal before BLR which also
denied the appeal.

Issue:

Are the members of INK being guaranteed of the right to self-

organization?

Ruling:

Yes. The right not to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to
disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to
join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right
to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no
one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one
should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a
person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude
his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.

The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment

of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the
affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the
election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be
represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union
may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in
the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment.

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T) v.

LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 101730, June 17, 1993
Bellosillo, J.

Facts:
On October 1990, private respondent PT&T Supervisory Employees
Union-APSOTEU (UNION) filed a petition before the Industrial Relations
Decision of the DOLE praying for the holding of a certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner Philippine Telegraph &

47
Telephone Corporation (PT&T), and alleging that PT&T was an
unorganized establishment employing roughly 100 supervisory employees
from whose ranks will constitute the bargaining unit sought to be
established. PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on
the ground that UNION members were performing managerial functions and
thus were not merely supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that
a certified bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file employees
which barred the filing of the petition. Petitioner PT&T appealed to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. Both the Acting Secretary of Labor
and Employment Nieves R. Confesor denied petitioner's appeal.

Issue:
Can a petition for certification election filed by supervisory
employees of an unorganized establishment — one without a certified
bargaining agent — be dismissed on the ground that these employees are
actually performing managerial functions?

Ruling:

No. Art. 257 of the Labor Code provides that “ In any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall
automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition
by a legitimate labor organization”.
The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified
bargaining agent to represent them at the time the UNION, thus, PT&T may
be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of Art. 257 of
the Labor Code. The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were
already represented by a certified bargaining agent does not make PT&T an
organized establishment vis-a-vis the supervisory employees. After all,
supervisory employees are "not . . . eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees."
At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner failed to
sufficiently show that the supervisory employees who sought to be included
in the bargaining unit were in fact performing managerial functions. On the
contrary, while these supervisory employees did exercise independent
judgment which is not routinary or clerical in nature, their authority was
merely recommendatory in character. In all instances, they were still
accountable for their actions to a superior officer, i.e., their respective
superintendents.
Hercules Industries v. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 96255, Sept. 18, 1992
Griño-Aquino, J.

Facts:
Hercules Industries, Inc. (company) is a corporation which employs
more or less 180 employees. Private respondent National Federation of
Labor (NFL) filed a petition for Certification Election (CE), alleging that the
existing CBA is already bound to expire and that it enjoys more than 20% of

48
the rank-and-file employees. Pre-election conference was held, the company
charged that the list of voters included 98 scabs (contract replacement
workers); 16 capatazes (boss, foreman, overseer); 8 security guards; and 9
managerial employees. Deleted in the list of voters were the managerial
employees, security guards and the strike employees who have executed a
deed of quitclaim and voluntarily accepted separation pay. Pending
resolution of NFL’s appeal, however, the CE took place. The Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR): granted the appeal of NFL; rendered the CE as null
and void, and ordered a new CE minus the 98 scab replacement. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Hercules Industries, Inc., as employer, may question
the validity of the certification election among its rank-and-file employees.

Ruling:
The employer is not a party to a CE which is the sole or exclusive
concern of the workers. In the choice of their collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. The only instance
when the employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to
file a petition for CE on its workers’ request to bargain collectively pursuant
to Art. 258 of the LC. After the order for a CE issues. The employer’s
involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander.
These allegations are all belied by the minutes of the pre-election
conference which showed that company was duly notified of the conference
and attended the same. The minutes of the CE show that the list of voters
was copied from the payroll. The same minutes also certified that “the CE
just concluded was conducted in the most just, honest and (free) manner
without untoward happening.” And that “we certify that the result above is
true and correct”. This refutes company’s allegation that only 15 of the 98
workers signed the master list to show that they actually voted again.
Besides, there is no showing that the company protested the conduct of the
CE. Book V, Rule VI sec. 3 of the Omnibus Rules states that the
representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the
conduct of the election. The interested party may however, file a protest with
the representation officer before the close of the proceedings.”
On the basis of the election minutes, which are the only relevant and
competent evidence on the conduct of the election, the MA did not err in
declaring the NFL as the duly elected bargaining agent of the company’s
rank and file workers.
Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 116751, August 28, 1998
Romero, J.

Facts:

Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing Company, Inc. (the
company) is engaged in the manufacture of tin can containers and metal

49
sheets. On March 3, 1994, it entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the
existing CBA was due to expire on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of
the company’s rank-and-file employees authorized the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW) to file a petition for certification election. On March 10,
1994, however, this petition was repudiated via a written waiver by 115 of
the signatories who, along with other employees totalling 897, ratified the
CBA on the same date.

Issue:

Whether or not the company has a personality to challenge the

conduct of a certification elections.

Ruling:

No. It is a well-established rule that certification elections are

exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal
personality to challenge the same. Law and policy demand that employers
take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining
representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous
influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective,
must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.

Tanduay Distillery Labor Union V. NLRC

G.R. NO. 75037, April 30, 1987
Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:
Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc.,
(TDI) and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly

50
organized and registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner company.

A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed between

TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in
TDI including herein private respondents and contained a union security
clause which provides that “all workers who are or may during the
effectivity of the CBA, become members of the Union in accordance with its
Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued
employment, maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the
duration of the agreement.”

TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in

accordance with its by-laws which are not disputed by the private
respondents. Thereafter, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and
approved by TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled the private respondents
from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union.

Issue:

Whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private respondents'

employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's demand for the
enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and
TDLU.

Ruling:

The dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority

union in accordance with a union security agreement following the loss of
seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor
practice.

Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes

the closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop,
the union shop, the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop,
the maintenance of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms
of union security and strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice
nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the
Constitution. There is no showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a
violation of the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court
interpreting union security arrangements brought to us for review.
Republic Planters Bank General Services Employees Union –National
Association of Trade Unions v. Bienvenido Laguesma
G.R. No. 119675, November 21, 1996
Puno, J.

Facts:

51
 Petitioner filed a petition for certification election to determine the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular employees outside
the bargaining unit of Republic Planters Bank The proposed bargaining unit
is composed of clerks, messengers, janitors, plumbers, telex operators,
mailing and printing personnel, drivers, mechanics and computer personnel.
They are excluded from the existing collective bargaining agreement
between private respondent and RPBEU, the duly certified bargaining
representative of the regular employees of private respondent.

Private respondent filed its position paper and moved to dismiss the
petition for certification election. Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin dismissed
the petition for certification election on the ground that there is already a
certified bargaining agent.

Petitioner sought a ruling that the other workers in the proposed

bargaining unit should also be considered regular employees of private
respondents since they perform duties necessary to the bank’s business
operations. Petitioner submitted additional documents containing the job
descriptions of eleven (11) employees assigned at private respondent, most
of whom were performing messengerial services. Private respondent
reiterated its objection to the admissibility of the new evidence.

Issues:

Whether or not the filed petition for certification election is valid.

Ruling:

No, it is invalid. The petition for certification election was filed on

January 21, 1991. The collective bargaining agreement between the duly
certified bargaining agent, Republic Planters Bank Employees Union, and
private respondent was effective from June 30, 1988 to June 30, 1991. It is
crystal clear that the filing of the petition for certification election was
premature.

The Petitioner’s act of trying to tilt the balance in its favor by

assailing the legal standing of private respondent in intervening in the
certification election is futile because petitioner did not raise this issue in the
proceedings below. It is too late to litigate the issue on appeal.
The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
it rejected the documents submitted by petitioner for the first time on appeal.
Associated Labor Union v. Calleja
G.R. No. L-77282, May 5, 1989
Regalado, J.

Facts:

52
 The associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed GAW Trading, Inc.
(GAWTI) that majority of the latter’s employees have authorized ALU to be
their sole and exclusive bargaining representative, and requested GAW
Trading Inc., for a conference for the execution of an initial CBA. GAWTI
recognized ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for ALU in
behalf of the majority of the employees of GAW Trading Inc. and GAWTI
signed and executed the CBA.

In the meantime, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)

together with Nagkaisang Mamumuno sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a
Strike after it failed to get the management of GAWTI to sit for a conference
respecting its demands in an effort to pressure GAWTI to make a turnabout
of its standing recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees, as to which strike GAWTI filed a petition
for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, and which strike Labor Arbiter
Tumamak held as illegal.

Trajano’s decision was reversed by herein public respondent Calleja.

ALU filed MFR but was denied. Calleja ordered the holding of a
certification election ruling that the “contract bar rule” relied upon by her
predecessor Trajano does not apply in the present case. Calleja ruled that
CBA is defective because it “was not duly submitted in accordance with
Sec. I, Rule IX, Book V of the Implementing Rules of BP 130.”

Issue:

Whether or not Calleja erred in reversing Trajano’s ruling and

ordering the holding of a certification election.

Ruling:

No, The CBA in question is defective. The standing of ALU as an

exclusive bargaining representative is dubious. The recognition by GAWTI
appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the
support of the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.

CBA was defective also because of: [a] the failure of GAWTI to post
the CBA in at least 2 conspicuous places in the establishment at least 5 days
before its ratification, [b] the finding of Calleja that 181 of the 281 4 Art.
256. Representation issue in organized establishments.

Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and

Employment and Divine Word University Employees Union-ALU
G.R. No. 91915, September 11, 1992
Romero, J.

Facts:

53
 Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) is the sole and
bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. Sometime in 1985,
DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining proposals. The University
replied and requested a preliminary conference which unfortunately did not
take place due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA proposals.

Because of this, the union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of

bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice. Then, an agreement between
the University and DWUEU-ALU were held after the filing of the notice of
strike. DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submit edits collective
bargaining proposals but were ignored by the University.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the
Union is with merit.

Ruling:

A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no “ reasonable

effort at good faith bargaining” specially on the part of the University. Its
indifferent to wards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of
the parties to arrives at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves
were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no counter
action of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining
should be initiated by the unin, there is a corresponding responsibility on the
part of the employer to respond in some manner to such acts. This is clear
from the provision of the Labor Code Art 250 which states when a party
desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the
other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than 10 calendar days from receipt of such notice.
Hence, petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's proposals may not be
unilaterally imposed on it on the ground that a collective bargaining
agreement is a contract wherein the consent of both parties is indispensable
is devoid of merit. A similar argument had already been disregarded in the
case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, where we upheld the order of the NLRC
declaring unions draft CBA proposal as the collective bargaining agreement
which should govern the relationship between the parties.

A company’s refusal to make counter proposal if considered in

relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is
especially true where the Union.
San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
GR NO. 80774, May 31, 1988
Feliciano, J.

Facts:

54
 Private Respondent, Vega, had been in the employ of petitioner
Corporation for thirteen years and was then holding the position of
"mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC Plant Brewery. Mr. Vega
submitted a proposal entitled Modified Grande Pasteurization Process in line
with the an Innovation Program sponsored by petitioner SMC and under
which management undertook to grant cash awards to all SMC employees.
Vega alleged there that his proposal had been accepted by the methods
analyst and implemented by the Corporation [in] October 1980, and that the
same ultimately and finally solved the problem of the Corporation in the
production of Beer Grande.
Petitioner alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction. Mr. Vega
having improperly bypassed the grievance machinery procedure prescribed
under a then existing collective bargaining agreement between management
and employees, and available administrative remedies provided under the
rules of the Innovation Program. The Labor Arbiter, noting that the money
claim of complainant Vega in this case is "not a necessary incident of his
employment" and that said claim is not among those mentioned in Article
217 of the Labor Code, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
NLRC on 4 September 1987, rendered a Decision, ordering to set aside the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and entered the judgment that the respondent
shall pay the complainant the amount of P60,000.00.

Issue:
Whether the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.

Ruling:
Yes, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction. While
paragraph 3 of Art. 217 of the Labor Code refers to "all money claims of
workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money
claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
The Court notes that the SMC Innovation Program was essentially an
invitation from petitioner Corporation to its employees to submit innovation
proposals, and that petitioner Corporation undertook to grant cash awards to
employees who accept such invitation and whose innovation suggestions.
Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract had arisen between
petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of
this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently
legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation
and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of
employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.

Colegio De San Juan De Letran v. Association of Employees and

Faculty of Letran and Eleonor Ambas
G.R. No. 141471, September 18, 2000
Kapunan, J.

55
Facts:

Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before

the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo
M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter's
decision was reversed on appeal before the NLRC.

On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the grounds (sic) of
petitioner's: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete the name of
Atty. Federico Leynes as the union's legal counsel; and (2) refusal to
bargain. The parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start
negotiation on a new five-year CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7,
1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the
union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been
submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed
through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her superior that her work
schedule was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday.
Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a
grievance machinery under the old CBA.

Issue:

Whether or not the termination of the union president amounts to an

interference of the employees' right to self-organization.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit. In the case at bar, the lifetime of the
previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by
ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996.
Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence,
the filing thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate
representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification
election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation.

Colegio De San Juan De Letran v. Association of Employees and

Faculty of Letran and Eleonor Ambas
G.R. No. 141471, September 18, 2000
Kapunan, J.

56
Facts:

Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before

the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo
M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter's
decision was reversed on appeal before the NLRC.

On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the grounds (sic) of
petitioner's: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete the name of
Atty. Federico Leynes as the union's legal counsel; and (2) refusal to
bargain. The parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start
negotiation on a new five-year CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7,
1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the
union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been
submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed
through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her superior that her work
schedule was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday.
Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a
grievance machinery under the old CBA.

Issue:

Whether or not the termination of the union president amounts to an

interference of the employees' right to self-organization.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit. In the case at bar, the lifetime of the
previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by
ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996.
Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence,
the filing thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate
representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification
election did not constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation.

B. F. Goodrich Philippines v. B. F. Goodrich Confidential

GR Nos. L-34069-70, Feb 28, 1973
Fernando, J.

Facts:

57
 In February 1971, one Rodolfo Pajaro, as President of B. F. Goodrich
(Makati Office) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU, sent a
letter to the petitioner, seeking recognition as the bargaining agent of such
employees so that thereafter there could be negotiations for a collective
contract. Similarly, on the same date, one Pablo C. Fulgar, as President of B.
F. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential and Salaried Employees
Union-NATU, and one Marcelino Lontok, Jr., representing himself as Vice-
President, NATU, sent a letter to the petitioner, of a similar tenor.

Petitioner, as employer, countered by filing two petitions for

certification election with respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Then
came in March 1971, two strike notices from respondents, filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations, demanding union recognition.

Issue:

Whether the existence of an unfair labor practice case against a labor

organization, consisting of an illegal strike, would suffice to call for the
postponement of a proposed certification election?

Ruling:

No, because the objectives of the Industrial Peace Act would be

sooner attained if, at the earliest opportunity, the employees, all of them of
an appropriate collective bargaining unit, be polled to determine which labor
organization should be its exclusive representative. Moreover, the discretion
on the matter vested in respondent Court is rarely interfered with. The
prevailing principle then on questions as to certification, as well as in other
labor cases, is that only where there is a showing of clear abuse of discretion
would this Tribunal be warranted in reversing the actuation of respondent
Court. There is no showing of such a failing in this case. Hence, petition is
dismiss.

United CMC Textile Workers Union v. Labor Arbiter

G.R. No. 70763, April 30, 1987
Paras, J.

Facts:

58
 Petitioner union filed a complaint against CTMI for non-payment of
the 1978 Christmas bonus of rank and file employees as provided in their
CBA. The decision of the SC has become final and executory in favor of the
petitioner union.

Subsequently, CTMI filed an appeal stating that the decision of the SC

has become moot and academic by virtue of a previous jurisprudence (La
Carlota) ruling that employers already paying the equivalent of the 13th
month pay to their employees, such as Christmas bonus, are under no legal
obligation to pay an additional month pay prescribed under PD 851.
Respondent Labor Arbiter refused to continue with the execution of the
decision contending that it has become moot and academic.

Issues:

Whether or not employer paying its employees the Christmas bonus

under the CBA is no longer required to pay the 13th month pay provided
under PD 851.

Ruling:

Yes. If the Christmas bonus was included in the 13th month pay, then
there would be no need for having a specific provision on Christmas bonus
in the CBA. But it did provide, thus the intention is clear that said bonus is
meant to be in addition to the legal requirement. La Carlota doctrine cannot
be applied because judgments which had been long become final and
executory can no longer be amended or modified by the courts. Such
doctrine known as “the law of the case.”

Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v.

Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma
G.R. No. 111245, January 31, 1997
Mendoza, J.

59
Facts:
SAMAHAN and MNMPP agreed to hold the certification election on
the basis of the list of employees submitted by MNMPP, without prejudice
to the submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list. Thereafter, they
agreed to postpone election to await the list of employees requested from the
Social Security System. Upon motion of MNMPP, the certification election
was finally set for. But SAMAHAN objected despite its agreement with
MNMPP to hold an election using the list furnished by the SSS. It also
objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) which in the meantime had filed a
motion for intervention. The certification election was held on October 6,
1992. Over SAMAHAN's objection KAMAPI was allowed to participate.
MNMPP won as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank
and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation Petitioner SAMAHAN
protest and contends that the certification election held on October 6, 1992 is
null and void on the ground that only 62 out of 130 employees participated
in the activity.

Issue:
Whether or not the election of MNMPP as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative is valid?

Ruling:

Yes, the election of MNMPP is valid.

The certification election is valid. Art. 256 of the labor Code provides
that in order to have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters
in the unit must have cast their votes. The certification election results show
that more than a majority, i.e, 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included
in the list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast their votes. Hence, the
legal requirement for a valid election was met.
We have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular
union represents the majority of the rank and file employees, in the absence
of a legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most
democratic method of determining the employees' choice of their bargaining
representative.
Insistence on the application of the Omnibus Implementing Rules
could defeat this policy. This Court has therefore consistently adhered to the
principle in U.E. Automotive Employees v. Noriel that certain provisions
that may be considered mandatory before the voting takes place become
thereafter merely directory in order that the wishes of the electorate prevail.
Thus, we find no substantial reason to nullify the certification election
conducted on October 6, 1992 on the basis of a mere technicality.
Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) vs. DOLE
G.R. Nos. 94929-30, March 18, 1992
Cruz, J.

60
Facts:
Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition
for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the
employees in the bargaining unit were submitted on eleven days after the
petition. Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) and Port
Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU).APCWU filed a motion
to dismiss .Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance
with the requirement for the 25% consent signatures at the time of filing.
This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5,
1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions.
PWUP is claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent. PWUP claimed that SAMADA and PEALU substantially
complied with the law when they submitted the required consent signatures
several days after filing the petition. The petitioner complains that the
dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own petition
for intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI employees.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a substantial compliance with the requirements
of the law.

Ruling:

The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious

method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as
their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are
working.  As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, the
holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented.
Conformably to said basic concept, this Court recognized that the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may order a
certification election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30%
requirement.
In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring
the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing
of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate
the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers.
Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law
it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should
at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere
filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is
sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification
election, subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a
reasonable period from such filing.

Scout Ramon V. Noriel

G.R. No. L-48347, October 3, 1978

61
 Fernando, Acting C.J.

Facts:
The controversy began with the filing of a petition for certification
election by the Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College Chapter of
private respondent labor union. A motion to dismiss the petition was filed by
the employer. It was based on the lack of the 30% consent requirement as
there were 250 employees, the required thirty percent of the said work force
being 75. With the figure of the actual number of employees in the school
establishment thus supplied, private respondent submitted the additional
signatures of 22 employees in support of its plea for a certification election.
There was an opposition on the part of the petitioner. Then came, fifteen
days later, an order from the Med-Arbiter assigned to the case dismissing the
petition for certification on the ground that the compliance with the 30%
requirement must be shown as of the time of its filing. Private respondent
appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations such order of the Med-Arbiter
dismissing its petition. Respondent Noriel sustained the appeal, ordering a
certification election at the Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College
within twenty (20) days from receipt thereof, with the following as
contending unions: 1. FFW (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College
Chapter): 2. No Union. An appeal to the Secretary of Labor was likewise of
no avail. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether respondent Director of Labor Relations Noriel committed
grave abuse of discretion, when he ordered a certification election at the
instance of private respondent, Federation of Free Workers, was his alleged
failure to abide by previous rulings of the Department of Labor?

Ruling:

No, this Court, in the aforesaid Philippine Association of Free Labor

Unions decision, recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may order a certification election
notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30% requirement. Once that requisite
is complied with, the Code makes clear that "it shall be mandatory for the
Bureau to conduct an identification election for the purpose of determining
the representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit." At
any rate, additional signatures were subsequently secured. The allegation
that there was thereafter a retraction on the part of a number of such
signatories lends added support to the decision arrived at by respondent
Noriel that the only way of determining with accuracy the true will of the
personnel involved in the bargaining unit is to conduct a certification
petition. The resolution of which by respondent Noriel is entitled to respect
by this Tribunal. 
Today’s Knitting v. Noriel
G.R. No. L-45057, February 28, 1971

62
 Fernando, J.

Facts:
Philippine National Union Council, on April 1, 1976, filing with the
Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for the holding of a certification
election. Along with this were 200 signatures of Company’s employees
confirming such petition. A petition for intervention on behalf of petitioner
Today’s Knitting Free Workers Union. It saw no need for a certification
election, asserting that it had already been voluntarily recognized by the
management as the bargaining representative.
Today’s Knitting Company apparently affirmed the assertion that
intervenor union, now petitioner, had been recognized by management as
representing the minority of the workers. Respondent Union countered with
the allegation that there was no legal bar to the petition for certification.
Med-Arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez issued an order granting the petition for
certification election. The matter was then appealed to the Bureau of Labor
Relations. Appeal was deniedl. It ordered a certification election to be
conducted by the Bureau within twenty days from receipt of the resolution.
Hence this certiorari and prohibition petition with this Court

Issue:
Whether or not arbiter erred in granting the petition of a certificate
elections inspite of the company’s recognition that another union is the
bargaining representative.

Ruling:
No. ART. 257 of the Labor Code is applicable here. What is required
is that the petition for certification election should have in its favor “the
written consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
The duty then cast on the Detector of Labor Relations is to ascertain whether
there has been such a compliance. There is no doubt in this case there was
evidence that more than a total of two-hundred signatures were obtained by
respondent Union in seeking such a certification election. The respondent
Director having satisfied himself that the codal requisite had been met, he
had no choice but to order such certification. In the language of the above
provision, “it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification
election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit.”

Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club v. CA and Eagle Ridge Employees
Union (EREU)
G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010

63
 Velasco JR, J.

Facts:
EREU union filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge
Golf & Country Club. The latter opposed this petition, followed by its filing
of a petition for the cancellation of EREU union registration. Eagle Ridge’s
petition ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU in
connection with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws, the numerical
composition of the Union. Eagle Ridge contended that the withdrawal of the
five members effectively reduced the union membership to 20 or 21, either
of which is below the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement
under Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code. Reckoned from 112 rank-and-file
employees of Eagle Ridge, the required number would be 22 or 23
employees.

Issue:
Whether or not there is substantial compliance by EREU Union of the
registration requirements in Art.234 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code.

Ruling:
Yes, there is compliance. Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file
employees in Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of at least 22
employees. When the EREU filed its application for registration on
December 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the
certificate of registration was granted, there is no dispute that the Union
complied with the mandatory 20% membership requirement.
With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still compliance
with the mandatory membership requirement under Art. 234(c), for the
remaining 24 union members constitute more than the 20% membership
requirement of 22 employees.
Indeed, where the company seeks the cancellation of a union’s
registration during the pendency of a petition for certification election, the
same grounds invoked to cancel should not be used to bar the certification
election. A certification election is the most expeditious and fairest mode of
ascertaining the will of a collective bargaining unit as to its choice of its
exclusive representative.
We have in precedent cases said that the employees’ withdrawal from
a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election
is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is
considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if
a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for certification
election has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to
assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of the
union. Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the
BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the
affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.
S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union
G.R. No. 161690, July 23, 2008

64
 Velasco JR, J.

Facts:
Venture Labor Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for
certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures.
Ventures International filed a Petition to cancel the Union's certificate of
registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor
Code, alleging among others; the Union's application for registration was not
supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures, or
418 of the total 2,197-employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the
500 signatures were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures
would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum (2197
total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.

Issue:
Whether the registration of the Union must be cancelled.

Ruling:
No, the right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected
by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and such right, according to Art.
III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be
abridged. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy
with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in
a bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union may be
decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the
status of a legitimate labor organization.
Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Art. 239 of the Labor Code, such as fraud and
misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of the
union's constitution and like documents. The Court, has in previous cases,
said that to decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes
ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was
misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the
application for registration and the supporting documents.
We have in precedent cases said that the employees' withdrawal from
a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election
is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is
considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Upon this light,
the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its
discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction
of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.

Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Secretary Of Labor

G.R. No. 116751, August 28, 1998
Romero, J.

65
Facts:

Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing Company, Inc. (the
company) is engaged in the manufacture of tin can containers and metal
sheets. On March 3, 1994, it entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the
existing CBA was due to expire on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of
the company’s rank-and-file employees authorized the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW) to file a petition for certification election. On March 10,
1994, however, this petition was repudiated via a written waiver by 115 of
the signatories who, along with other employees totalling 897, ratified the
CBA on the same date.

Issue:

Whether or not the company has a personality to challenge the

conduct of a certification elections.

Ruling:

No. It is a well-established rule that certification elections are

exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal
personality to challenge the same. Law and policy demand that employers
take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining
representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous
influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective,
must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.

Philippine Skylanders v. NLRC

G.R. No. 127374, January 31, 2002
Bellosillo, J.

66
Facts:
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor
union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) September (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted
among the rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its
rival union, Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-
WATU) immediately protested the result of the election before the Secretary
of Labor. Several months later, pending settlement of the controversy, PSEA
sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation citing as reason PAFLU's supposed
deliberate and habitual dereliction of duty toward its members. PSEA
subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW),
changed its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees Association -
National Congress of Workers (PSEANCW), and allowed the former
officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected
officers PSEA-NCW. On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with PSI which was immediately registered
with DOLE. PAFLU Secretary General Serafin Ayroso wrote Mariles C.
Romulo requesting a copy of PSI's audited financial statement. Ayroso
explained that with the dismissal of PSEA-WATU's election protest the time
was ripe for the parties to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. PSI
through its personnel manager Francisco Dakila denied the request citing as
reason PSEA's disaffiliation from PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with
NCW. PAFLU through Serafin Ayroso filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice against PSI, its president Mariles Romulo and personnel manager
Francisco Dakila. PAFLU amended its complaint by including the elected
officers of PSEA-PAFLU as additional party respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not PSEA, which is an independent and separate local
union, may validly disaffiliate from PAFLU pending the settlement of an
election protest questioning its status as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of PSI's rank and file employees.

Ruling:
Yes. The pendency of an election protest involving both the mother
federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid
disaffiliation.
Reasoning In Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton
Mills, Inc. the SC upheld the right of local unions to separate from their
mother federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations,
local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national
federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their
members. The sole essence of affiliation is to increase, by collective action,
the common bargaining power of local unions for the effective enhancement
and protection of their interests.
Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation v. NLRC
G.R. No. 115180, November 16, 1999

67
 Purisima, J.

Facts:
On February 10, 1986, respondent National Labor Union-Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines (NLU-TUCP), a national federation of labor
unions, filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, in behalf of
its local chapter, the Filipino Pipe Workers Union-National Labor Union
(FPWU-NLU, hereinafter referred to as Union), a notice of strike signed by
its national president, Atty. Eulogio R. Lerum, against the petitioner,
Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation, alleging as grounds therefor union
busting and non-implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In the early morning of March 3, 1986, however, without waiting for
the outcome of the conciliation conference scheduled on said date, the
FPWU-NLU staged the strike in question which lasted until June 13, 1986,
when a return to work agreement was reached by the union and petitioner
company. On December 23, 1988, petitioner company moved for the partial
dismissal of the Complaint against forty-three (43) officers and members of
FPWU-NLU, but maintained the action against the NLU-TUCP and Atty.
Eulogio Lerum.

Issue:
Whether or not NLU- TUCP is responsible for damages as the
principal.

Ruling:
No. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty
Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975], the Court held that the mother
union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent while
the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the
common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by
the constitution and by-laws of the association.”
Conformably, in the above cited case the Court ruled that the mother
federation was a mere agent and the local chapter/union was the principal,
notwithstanding the failure of the local union to comply with the procedural
requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization.
The requirement laid down that the local union must be a legitimate
labor organization, pertains to the conditions before a union may file a
petition for certification election and to be certified as sole and exclusive
bargaining agent. In the present case, there is no dispute that FPWU-NLU is
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of petitioner. The union's status as a legitimate labor organization
is therefore of no moment in the resolution of the controversy here. As the
local union, it is considered as the principal; the entity which staged the
illegal strike and the one responsible for the resulting damages allegedly
sustained by petitioner company.

68
 Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v.
The Court Of Industrial Relations and Adamson & Adamson
Supervisory Union (FFW)
G.R. No. L-35120 January 31, 1984
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:
Adamson and Adamson, Inc. filed this petition to set aside the CIR’s
ruling that the Supervisory Union can represent the supervisory employees.
Even if it is affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) with
whom the Rank and File union is also affiliated. Adamson argues that the
said affiliation violates Sec. 3 of the Industrial Peace Act.

Issue:
Whether or not a supervisors’ union may affiliate with a federation
with which unions of rank and file employees of the same employer are also
affiliated.

Ruling:
No. The supervisory employees of an employer cannot join any labor
organization of employees under their supervision but may validly form a
separate organization of their own. When local unions affiliate, the locals
remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own and common
interests subject to restraints imposed by constitution and by laws. Hence,
notwithstanding, local union remain free to serve common interests of
members.

The Adamson and Adamson Supervisory Union and the Adamson and
Adamson, Inc., Salesmen Association (FFW), have their own respective
constitutions and by-laws. They are separately and independently registered
of each other. Both sent their separate proposals for collective bargaining
agreements with their employer. There could be no employer influence on
rank-and-file organizational activities nor could there be any rank and file
influence on the supervisory function of the supervisors because of the
representation sought to be proscribed.

The confusion seems to have stemmed from the suffix of FFW after
the name of the local unions in the registration of both. Nonetheless, the
inclusion of FFW in the registration is merely to stress that they are its
affiliates at the time of registrations. It does not mean that said local unions
cannot stand on their own neither can it be construed that their personalities
are so merged with the mother federation that for one difference or another
they cannot pursue their own ways, independently of the federation. This is
borne by the fact that FFW, like other federation is a legitimate labor
organization separate and distinct from its locals and affiliates.

69
 Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation Labor Union v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Employees and Workers Union
G.R. No. 135806, August 8, 2002
Bellosillo, J.

Facts:

TMPCEWU filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Med-

Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-National Capital Region seeking to represent
the rank-and-file employees of the manufacturing division.

Petitioner filed a motion to intervene and claims that the petition was
premature due to an earlier resolution by the Secretary of Labor ordering the
conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
TMPC represented by petitioner which was the subject of certiorari
proceedings before the Supreme Court and still awaiting final resolution at
the time; and, that the collective bargaining unit which respondent
TMPCEWU sought to represent violated the "single or employer" unit
policy since it excluded the rank-and-file employees in the other divisions
and departments in respondent TMPC.

The Med-Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing for lack of merit

TMPCEWU's Petition for Certification Election, since it failed to include all
rank-and-file employees from Levels 1 to 4 in other departments of TMPC
in violation of the "one-union in one-company"  policy and likewise
dismissing TMPCLU's Petition-in-Intervention for lack of legal personality.

Issues:

1. Whether TMPCLU has the legal personality to file the Petition-in-

Intervention.
2. Whether or not the appellant has legal authority to oppose the
instant petition.

Ruling:

(1) The registration certificate issued by the Department of Labor and

Employment is void ab initio because at the time of the issuance the
constitution of intervenor union TMPCLU is (sic) a mixture of supervisory
and rank-and-file employees as per finding of fact of Med-Arbiter Paterno
Adap.

(2) Petitioner had no valid certificate of registration and therefore no

legal personality to file the Petition for Certification Election and in the
absence of any attempt on its part to rectify the legal infirmity, likewise the
disputed Petition-in-Intervention.

70
Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands
Employees Union
G.R. No. 142000, January 22, 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union (THEU)–Philippine Transport

and General Workers Organization (PTGWO), Local Chapter No. 776, a
legitimate labor organization said to represent majority of the rank-and-file
employees of THIGCI, filed a petition for certification election before the
DOLE Mediation-Arbitration Unit. THIGCI, opposed THEU’s petition for
certification election on the ground that the list of union members submitted
by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names and signatures
of supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without leave (AWOL)
employees, as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a corporation
distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the
petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file employees of THIGCI.

Issue:
Whether or not Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union has legal
personality.

Ruling:

Yes. The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among

the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article
239 of the Labor Code. THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of
registration, should be considered to have already acquired juridical
personality.
As for petitioner’s allegation that some of the signatures in the
petition for certification election were obtained through fraud, false
statement and misrepresentation, the proper procedure is for it to file a
petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration, and not to intervene
in a petition for certification election. Regarding the alleged withdrawal of
union members from participating in the certification election, this Court’s
following ruling is instructive: ‘[T]he best forum for determining whether
there were indeed retractions from some of the laborers is in the certification
election itself wherein the workers can freely express their choice in a secret
ballot.’
As for the lack of mutuality of interest argument of petitioner, it, at all
events, does not lie given, as found by the court a quo, its failure to present
substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually occupying
supervisory positions. While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with
their corresponding job titles and ranks, there is nothing mentioned about the
supervisors’ respective duties, powers and prerogatives that would show that

71
they can effectively recommend managerial actions which require the use of
independent judgment.
Republic of the Philippines v. Kawashima Textile Manufacturing
Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 160352, July 23, 2008
Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:
KFWU filed with DOLE Regional Office No. IV, a Petition for
Certification Election to be conducted in the bargaining unit composed of
145 rank-and-file employees of respondent. Attached to its petition are a
Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter issued on January 19, 2000 by
DOLE Regional Office No. IV, stating that it [KFWU] submitted to said
office a Charter Certificate issued to it by the national federation Phil.
Transport & General Workers Organization (PTGWO), and a Report of
Creation of Local/Chapter.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that
KFWU did not acquire any legal personality because its membership of
mixed rank-and-file and supervisory employees violated Article 245 of the
Labor Code, and its failure to submit its books of account contravened the
ruling of the Court in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment. In an Order dated May 17, 2000,
Med-Arbiter Bactin found KFWU’s legal personality defective and
dismissed its petition for certification election.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not KFWU cannot qualify as a legitimate labor
organization
(2) Whether an employer like respondent may collaterally attack the
legitimacy of a labor organization by filing a motion to dismiss the latter’s
petition for certification election.

Ruling:
(1) The Court held that after a labor organization has been registered,
it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not
among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling
was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under
Article 239 of the Labor Code.
(2) Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is
a mere bystander to any petition for certification election. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; it cannot interfere
with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an
appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating
in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will
lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The
employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

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 Malayang Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Ramos
G. R. No. 113907, February 28, 2000
Purisima, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield

(MSMG) is a local union. Private respondent M. Greenfield is the employer
of petitioner's members. Members of petitioner conducted a strike, which
was marred by violence. Private respondent attempted to quell the same by
hiring persons for that purpose. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under
preventive suspension; only some of them were eventually allowed to return
to work.

Petitioners thus filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch

of the DOLE, charging private respondent of ULP, in the form of union-
busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, interference in union activities,
discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence, and oppression.
Private respondent's defense was that the strike was illegal for it was marred
by violence.

Issue:

Whether or not the strike should be declared illegal on account of

violence committed during the strike.

Ruling:

No, where both parties are responsible for the violence committed
during the strike, the strike cannot be declared illegal since the strike cannot
be attributed to the striking employees only. This is an exception to the
general rule that the strike shall be declared illegal where it is marred by
violence on the part of the employees.

In the case at bar, the allegation of violence committed in the course

of the strike, it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the
Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent
incidents resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management. The
evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking
employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the
strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the
employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as
illegal.

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 Tropical Hut Employees’ Union v. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc.
G.R. No. L-43495-99, January 20, 1990
Medialdea, J.

Facts:
The rank and file employees of the respondent organized a local union
called the tropical hut employees union (THEU) and sought affiliation with
the national association of trade unions (NATU), thereby accepted the
former’s application for affiliation. It appears, however, that NATU itself as
a labor federation was not a registered with the Department of Labor. CBA
was concluded between the parties.

Issue:
(1) Whether the disaffiliation of local union from the national
federation was valid.

(2) Whether the dismissal of petitioner employees resulting from their

unions disaffiliation from the mother federation was illegal and constituted
unfair labor practice.

Ruling:
(1) Yes, local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is
free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to
disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. All employees enjoy the
right to self- organization and to form and join labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in
concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. This is a fundamental
right of labor that derives its existence from the constitution.
(2) No. When the THEU disaffiliated from its mother federation, the
former did not lose its legal personality as the bargaining union under CBA.
The CBA imposes dismissal only in case an employee is expelled from the
union for joining another federation or for forming another union who fails
or refuses to maintain membership therein. The case at bar does not involve
the withdrawal of merely some employees from the union but of the whole
THEU itself from its federation. Clearly, since there is no violation of the
union security provision in the CBA there was no sufficient ground to
terminate the employment of the petitioners.
The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local union
THEU in the registration with the Department of Labor is merely to stress
that the THEU is NATU’s affiliate at the time of the registration. It does not
mean that the said local union cannot stand on its own. A local union owes
its creation and continued existence to the will of its members and not to
federation to which it belongs. In the absence of enforceable provisions in

74
the federation’s constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union a local
may sever its relationship with its parent. Nothing in the constitution and
by-laws of THEU prohibits the disaffiliation from NATU. Besides NATU is
not even recognized as a national federation.
Philippine Skylanders vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 127374, January 31, 2002
Bellosillo, J.

Facts:
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor
union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) September (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted
among the rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its
rival union, Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-
WATU) immediately protested the result of the election before the Secretary
of Labor. Several months later, pending settlement of the controversy, PSEA
sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation citing as reason PAFLU's supposed
deliberate and habitual dereliction of duty toward its members. PSEA
subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW),
changed its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees Association -
National Congress of Workers (PSEANCW), and allowed the former
officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as elected
officers PSEA-NCW. On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with PSI which was immediately registered
with DOLE. Ayroso explained that with the dismissal of PSEA-WATU's
election protest the time was ripe for the parties to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement. PSI through its personnel manager Francisco Dakila
denied the request citing as reason PSEA's disaffiliation from PAFLU and
its subsequent affiliation with NCW. PAFLU through Serafin Ayroso filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice against PSI, its president Mariles Romulo
and personnel manager Francisco Dakila.

Issue:
Whether or not PSEA, which is an independent and separate local
union, may validly disaffiliate from PAFLU pending the settlement of an
election protest questioning its status as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of PSI's rank and file employees.

Ruling:
Yes. The pendency of an election protest involving both the mother
federation and the local union did not constitute a bar to a valid
disaffiliation.
Reasoning In Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton
Mills, Inc. the SC upheld the right of local unions to separate from their
mother federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations,
local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national
federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their
members. Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to

75
serve their own interests subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution
and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to renounce the
affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought such
affiliation into existence. Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the
claims of a local union as against those of a national federation, those of the
former must be preferred.
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER SUPPLY CO. V. NLRC
G.R. No. 124224. March 17, 2000
Kapunan, J.

Facts:

The National Federation of Labor (NFL), was certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular employees of new
pacific timber. As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit to which
it represented, however, the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by
petitioner NFL, so the former was prompted to file a complaint for unfair
labor practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to bargain
collectively.
The then Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim Abdulwahid, issued an order
declaring (a) petitioner co. guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals
submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the regular rank and file
employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner co.
Petitioner appealed the above order to the NLRC. The NLRC
rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether the private respondents is entitled to benefits under CBA
inspite of the fact that they were not employed by the petitioner.

Ruling:
It is clear from the provision of article 253 of the labor code that until
a new collective bargaining agreement has been executed by and between
the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law
does not provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the
economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and effect;
therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and
conditions in the said agreement.
In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered into by and between
petitioner company and NFL pending appeal of the decision from the
NLRC; nor were any of the economic provisions and/or terms and
conditions pertaining to monetary benefits in the existing agreement
modified or altered. Therefore, the existing CBA in its entirety continues to
have legal effect.

76
 Marino v. Gamilla
G.R. NO. 149763, July 7, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts:
Petitioners are among the executive officers and directors of
University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (ustfu) while respondents are
composed of UST faculty and USTFU members. The dispute arose when
UST and USTFU, represented by petitioners entered a memorandum of
agreement (MOA) whereby UST faculty members belonging to the CBA
unit were granted additional economic benefits and at the same time
stipulated a 10% check-off over said benefits to cover union dues and
special assessment for labor education fund and attorney’s fees.
Respondents filed with the Med Arbiter a complaint assailing, among others,
the check-off for union dues and attorney’s fees collected under the MOA
for being violative of the rights and conditions of membership in USTFU.
DOLE Regional Director, by virtue of an order consolidating all the
compalints by the respondents, rendered among others a decision in favor of
the latter and ruled that the check-off collected as negotiation fees were
invalid. Both the BLR and CA, on appeal, affirmed said decision and
ordered to return to the general membership the amount collected by way of
attorney’s fees, hence this petition.

Issue:
Is the check-off of union dues and special assessment of attorney’s
fees in the written authorization ratifying the MOA benefits valid?

Ruling:
No. The economic benefits package granted under the MOA did not
constitute union funds from which attorney’s fees could have been validly
deducted. Under article 222(b), attorney’s fees may only be paid from union
funds; yet the amount to be used in paying for the same does not become
union funds until it is actually deducted as attorney’s fees from the benefits
awarded to the employees. What the law requires is that the funds be
already deemed union funds even before the attorney’s fees are deducted or
paid therefrom; it does not become union funds after the deduction or
payment. To rule otherwise will also render the generel prohibition stated in
article 222(b) nugatory, because all that the union needs to do is to deduct
from the total benefits awarded to the employees the amount intended for
attorney’s fees and thus, “convert” the latter to union funds, which could
then be used to pay for the said attorney’s fees. Furthermore, the inclusion

77
of the authorization for a check-off union dues and special assessments for
the labor education fund and attorney’s fees in the same document for the
ratification of the moa granting the economic benefits packaged, necessarily
vitiated the consent of USTFU members for there was no way for any
individual union member to separate his or her consent to the ratification of
the moa from his/her authorization of the check-off of union dues and
special assessments. As it were, the ratification of the moa carried with it
the automatic authorization of the check-off union dues and special
assessments in favor of the union.
Palacol v. Ferrer-Calleja
G.R. No. 85333, February 26, 1990
Gancayco, J.

Facts:
The respondent CCBPI sales force union, as collective bargaining
agent of all salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the manila plant
and Metro Manila sales office of the respondent Coca-Cola bottlers (Phils.),
Inc. concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the latter.
President of the union submitted to the company the ratification by the union
members of the new CBA and authorization for the company to deduct
union dues equivalent to P10.00 every payday or P20.00 every month and in
addition 10% by way of special assessment from the CBA lump-sum pay
granted to the union members. The company filed an action for interpleader
with the BLRC in order to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties
concerned. The petitioners filed a motion/complaint for intervention.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent-director committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she held article
241(n) of the Labor Code to be applicable provision instead of article 222(b)
in relation to article 241(o) of the same law.

Ruling:
The court was convinced that the deduction of the 10% special
assessment by the union was not made in accordance with the requirements
provided by law. The principle “that employees are protected by law from
unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation without their
knowledge and consent” is in accord with the constitutional principle of the
state affording full protection to labor. The failure of the union to comply
strictly with the requirements set out by the law invalidates the questioned
special assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in view of the fact
that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union
members. Their express consent is required, and this consent must be
obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be
followed to the letter. No shortcuts allowed.

78
 Pacific Banking Corp. v. Clave
G.R. No. 56965, March 7, 1984
Aquino, J.

Facts:
Since January, 1979, there have been negotiations between the Pacific
Banking Corp and the Pacific Banking Corp Employees Organization
(PABECO) for a collective bargaining agreement for 1979-1981. Because
of a deadlock, the Minster of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the
controversy. On July 10, 1979, the deputy minister rendered a decision
directing the parties to execute a CBA in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth in his decision. The union was represented in the
negotiations by its president allegedly assisted as consultant by the President
of the National Union of Bank employees (NUBE) with which it was
formerly affiliated. Atty. Saavedra’s earliest recorded participation in the
case when he filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion.
No action was taken on said motions. The bank assailed in this court the
said resolutions by means of certiorari. The NUBE and 13 employees of the
bank, members of the PABECO intervened in this case and prayed that the
said resolutions be declared void and that said sum of P345,000 be paid
directly to the employees or union dues.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the President has jurisdiction to adjudicate on
Saavedra’s attorney’s fees;
2) Whether or not Saavedra is entitled to Attorney’s fees and who
should pay.

Ruling:

1) No. The Office of the President had no jurisdiction to make an

adjudication on Saavedra’s attorney’s fees. The case was appealed with
respect to the CBA terms and conditions, not with respect to attorney’s fees.
Although the fees were a mere incident, nevertheless, the jurisdiction to fix
the same and to order the payment thereof was outside the pale of Clave’s
appellate jurisdiction. He was right in adopting a hands-off attitude in his
first resolution.

79
 2) Yes, union should pay. The case is covered squarely by the
mandatory and explicit prescription of Article 222 which is another
guarantee intended to protect the employee against unwarranted practices
that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and consent.
Saavedra is entitled to the payment of his fees but Labor Code in Article 222
ordains that union funds should be used for that purpose. The amount of
P345,000 does not constitute union funds. It is money of the employees. The
union, not the employees, is obligated to Saavedra.

Kiok Loy v. NLRC

Facts:
The pambansang kilusang paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation,
won and was subsequently certified in a resolution by the blr as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of sweden ice
cream plant. The union furnished the company with the copies of its
proposed cba. At the same time, it requested the company for its coun ter
proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the
company.

Thereafter, the union filed a “notice of strike”, with the blrc on the ground
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining. Conciliation
proceedings then followed during the 30-day statutory cooling-off period.
But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed. The case was
brought to the nlrc for compulsory arbitration pursuant to p.d. no. 823, as
amended. But the company requested for a lot of postponements. Nlrc ruled
that respondents sweden ice cream is guilty of un justified refusal to bargain,
in violation of section (g) article 248 now article 249.

Issue:
Whether the company is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain.

Held:
Article 249, par(g) of the labor code makes it unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse “to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in
good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to
wages, hours of work, and all other terms of conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under
such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if
requested by either party.
A company’s refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to
the entire bargaining process may indicate bad faith since the union’s request
for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Besides, petitioner company’s
approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements,
non-appearance at the hearing conducted, undue delay in submitting its

80
financial statements, leat to no other conclusion except that is unwilling to
negotiate and reach an agreement with the union.

United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines v. Noriel

G.R. No. L-40810, October 3, 1975
Fernando, J.

Facts:

The petition seeks to have the certification election declared null and
void for it was held under circumstances that manifested lack of fairness. It
was alleged that the petitioner union was included, but under another name,
in the list of contending unions in the election, where the winning party had
63% votes, while the petitioner only had 4.5% (thus, the winner won by a
landslide, even if the votes of all the other 7 contending unions were
combined. Therefore, the mistake didn’t really affect the outcome of the
election).

Issue:

Whether the certification election is void.

Ruling:

No. Considering what transpired, it is apparent that the grievance

spoken of is more fancied than real, the assertion of confusion and
demoralization based on conjecture rather than reality. At most, it was an
honest mistake.

The institution of collective bargaining is a prime manifestation

industrial democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship, labor and
management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern
themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of
number of individuals, it is indispensable that they represented by a labor
organization of their choice. Thus, may be discerned how crucial a
certification election is. There must be an opportunity to determine which
labor organization shall act on their behalf. It is precisely because respect
must be accorded to the will of labor thus ascertained that a general
allegation of duress is not sufficient to invalidate a certification election; it

81
must be shown by competent and credible proof. That is to give substance
to the principle of majority rule, one of the basic concepts of a democratic
policy.

Rivera v. Espiritu
G.R. No. 135547, January 23, 2002
Quisumbing, J.

Facts:
PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines (ALPAP) went on a strike, causing serious losses to the
financially beleaguered flag carrier. Faced with bankruptcy, pal adopted a
rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third.
The PAL Employees Association (PALEA) went on strike to protest the
retrenchment measures adopted by the airline which affected 1,899 union
members. Conciliation meetings were then held between PAL management
and the three unions representing the airline employees, with the task force
as mediator. Petitioner’s allegation that the agreement was not meant merely
to suspend the existing PAL-PALEA CBA but to foreclose any renegotiation
or any possibility to forge a new CBA for a decade or up to 2008. It violates
the “protection to labor” laid down by the constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the PAL-PALEA agreement stipulating the suspension
of the PAL-PALEA CBA is unconstitutional and contrary to public policy.

Ruling:
No. The agreement is valid exercise of the freedom to contract. A
CBA is a “contract executed upon request of either the employer or the
exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached
after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms
and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any
grievances or questions arising under such agreement. The purpose of a
CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations inorder to create a
climate of a sound and stable industrial peace.
In the case at hand, the assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the
result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light
of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and
unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but

82
preventing the latter’s closure. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One
is to promote industrial stability and predictability. In as much as the
agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during rehabilitation,
said agreement satisfies the first purpose of article 253-A. The other is to
assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and
requirement.
In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent
of PAL’s ground employees that voluntarily entered into the CBA with
PAL. The acts of the public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year
suspension of the PAL-PALEA did not contravene the “protection of labor”
policy of the constitution. The agreement afforded full protection to labor;
promoted the shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the
exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to
foster industrial peace.
San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
GR NO. 80774, May 31, 1988
Feliciano, J.

Facts:
Private Respondent, Vega, had been in the employ of petitioner
Corporation for thirteen years and was then holding the position of
"mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC Plant Brewery. Mr. Vega
submitted a proposal entitled Modified Grande Pasteurization Process in line
with the an Innovation Program sponsored by petitioner SMC and under
which management undertook to grant cash awards to all SMC employees.
Vega alleged there that his proposal had been accepted by the methods
analyst and implemented by the Corporation [in] October 1980, and that the
same ultimately and finally solved the problem of the Corporation in the
production of Beer Grande.
Petitioner alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction. Mr. Vega
having improperly bypassed the grievance machinery procedure prescribed
under a then existing collective bargaining agreement between management
and employees, and available administrative remedies provided under the
rules of the Innovation Program. The Labor Arbiter, noting that the money
claim of complainant Vega in this case is "not a necessary incident of his
employment" and that said claim is not among those mentioned in Article
217 of the Labor Code, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
NLRC on 4 September 1987, rendered a Decision, ordering to set aside the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and entered the judgment that the respondent
shall pay the complainant the amount of P60,000.00.

Issue:
Whether the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case.

Ruling:
Yes, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction. While
paragraph 3 of Art. 217 of the Labor Code refers to "all money claims of

83
workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money
claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
The Court notes that the SMC Innovation Program was essentially an
invitation from petitioner Corporation to its employees to submit innovation
proposals, and that petitioner Corporation undertook to grant cash awards to
employees who accept such invitation and whose innovation suggestions.
Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract had arisen between
petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of
this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently
legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation
and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of
employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.

National Union of Restaurant Workers v. CIR

GR No. L-20044, Apr 30, 1964
Bautista Angelo, J.

Facts:

On June 9, 1960, a complaint for unfair labor practice was lodged

against the owners of Tres Hermanas Restaurant, particularly Mrs. Felisa
Herrera, on the ground, among others, that respondents refused to bargain
collectively with the complaining union; respondents made a counter-
proposal in the sense that they would bargain with said union and would
accept its demands if the same would become a company union, and one
Martin Briones, and employee, was separated from the service because he
was found to be the organizer and adviser of the complaining union. After
respondents had filed their answer, wherein they denied the charges of unfair
labor practice filed against them, Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, who was
assigned to act on the complaint, received the evidence, and on July 28,
1961, rendered decision exonerating respondents. He found that the charges
were not proven and dismissed the complaint.

Issue:

Whether the respondents refuse to bargain collectively with the union.

Ruling:

No. The inference that respondents did not refuse to bargain

collectively with the complaining union because they accepted some of the
demands while they refused the others even leaving open other demands for
future discussion is correct, especially so when those demands were
discussed at a meeting called by respondents themselves precisely in view of
the letter sent by the union. Noncompliance to procedural requirement of 10
days to proceed to a meeting upon receipt of demands does not amount to
ULP.

84
 It is contended that respondents refused to bargain with the
complaining union as such even if they called a meeting of its officers and
employees hereby concluding that they did not desire to enter into a
bargaining agreement with said union. This conclusion has no rational
relation with the main premise of the union for it is belied by the fact that
respondents did actually agree and bargain with the representatives of the
union.

General Milling Corporation v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the
employees were members of a union which is a duly certified bargaining
agent. The GMC and the union entered into a collective bargaining
agreement which included the issue of representation that is effective for a
term of three years which will expire on November 30, 1991. On November
29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a
proposed CBA, with a request that a counter proposal be submitted within
ten days. On October 1991, GMC received collective and individual letters
from the union members stating that they have withdrawn from their union
membership. On December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive
disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an
employee who is a union member. The union protected the employee and
requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure provided by the CBA,
but GMC argued that there was no basis to negotiate with a union which is
no longer existing.

Issue:
Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its
duty to bargain collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its
employees to self-organization.

Ruling:
Yes, GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to
negotiate with the union upon its request for the renegotiation of the
economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991. The union’s proposal
was submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of
effectivity of the CBA. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to
refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. The refusal to send counter

85
proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the
CBA is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under article 248 of the labor
code.
Under article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to
perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The
union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA
to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC
failed in its duty under article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy
excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its
membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure
in collective bargaining prescribed by the code is mandatory because of the
basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. The Court of
Appeals found that the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union
members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that
GMC exerted pressure on the employees. Thus, the ill-timed letters of
resignation from the union members indicate that GMC interfered with the
right of its employee to self-organization.

Nissan Motors Philipppines, Inc. vs. Sec. of Labor

G.R. NOS. 158190-91, June 21, 2006
Garcia, J.

Facts:

The case turns on the labor disputes triggered by a collective

bargaining deadlock between Nissan Motor and the union resulting in the
filing of four notices of strike with the national conciliation and mediation
board. The first notice of strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor
practice, stemmed from the suspension of about 140 company employees
following the disruptive protest action arising from the employees’ demand
for payment of the second of their 13th month pay. The union filed the
second strike notice on the ground of deadlock in collective bargaining
involving a mix of economic and non-economic issues.

The DOLE, upon Nissan motor’s petition, issued an order assuming

jurisdiction over the dispute at Nissan motor. The dole expressly enjoined
any strike or lockout and directed the parties to cease and desist from
committing any act that might exacerbate the situation, and for the union to
refrain from any slowdown and other similar activities that may disrupt
company operations or bring its production to below its normal and usual
levels.

Issue:

Whether or not the slowdown violates the CBA.

Ruling:

86
 The conclusion of the public respondents, secretary of labor and
employment, as confirmed by the CA, is that the union and its members
indeed “engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which
they were undertaken constitute illegal strike.” The defiance came in the
form of the continuation of the slowdown enjoined in the underlying
assumption order, by the strike actually staged by the union, its officers and
members, the closure of the company’s offices and plant premises and the
barricading of the main gates. In fact, the Dole Secretary had to ask the
intervention of the Laguna Philippine National Police to assist the company
in opening what appeared to be padlocked and welded gates leading to
company’s hands were not entirely clean, having contributes to the ensuing
deteriorating impasse between labor and management.

Pentagon Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 174141, June 26, 2009
Brion, J.

Facts:
The petitioner, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of G.I. wire
and nails, employed respondent Perfecto Balogo since September 1, 1979 in
its wire drawing department. Respondent has been absent from work on Aug
7, 2002 without prior notice. Numerous number of letter were sent to the
address of the respondent requiring his explanation for his absence however
no respond therefore petitioner considered him AWOL.
A complaint was filed by respondent with the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries and wages, overtime
pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay,
and ECOLA. He further explained that his absence from work was due to a
flu and diarrhea and when he was to go back to work petitioner refused to
take him back despite the medical certificate
During the conciliation, petitioner required him, however, to submit
himself to the company physician to determine whether he was fit to return
to work in accordance with existing policies. Respondent presented a
medical certificate issued by the company physician; according to the
petitioner, the respondent refused to return to work and insisted that he be
paid his separation pay. The petitioner refused the respondents demand for
separation pay for lack of basis.

Issue:
Whether or not the statement used during the conciliation maybe used
as evidence.

Ruling:

87
 Based on Art 233 of the Labor Code, “Information and statements
made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged
communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission.
Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body
regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by
them.”   Also in the case of Nissan v. Sec of Labor, the SC pointedly
disallowed the award made by the public respondent Secretary; the award
was based on the information NCMB Administrator Olalia secured from the
confidential position given him by the company during conciliation.
Therefore it was said since the law favors the settlement of
controversies out of court, a person is entitled to buy his or her peace
without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any
communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged.

Union of Filipro Employees v. Benigno Vivar, Jr.

G.R. No. 79255, January 20, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:
Before impending expiration of the existing CBA between Nestlé and
UFE-DFA-KMU, a Letter of Intent, informed Nestlé of their intent to open
new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the next 3 years. Nestlé
acknowledged receipt of the letter and informed that it was preparing its own
counter-proposal. In another letter, Nestlé underscored its position that
“unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and
programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan,
Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very
nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be
excluded therefrom.” On despite 15 meetings between them, the parties
failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. So, the company
requested the NCMB to conduct preventive mediation proceedings between
them. Conciliation proceedings nevertheless proved ineffective.
The union argued that Nestlé’s “refusal to bargain on a very important
CBA economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice” when it allegedly
set as a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations the
non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan.

Issue:
Whether or not a company is guilty of unfair labor practice when it
considers some economic benefits as unilaterally granted and therefore
excluded from CBA negotiations.

Ruling:

88
 No, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in holding Nestlé free
and clear from any unfair labor practice. It is not enough that the union
believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the
circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a
belief. This is especially true when it is viewed in the light of the fact that
eight out of nine bargaining units have allegedly agreed to treat the
Retirement Plan as a unilateral grant. Nestlé, therefore, cannot be faulted for
considering the same benefit as unilaterally granted. To be sure, it must be
shown that Nestlé was motivated by ill will, “bad faith, or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or
grave anxiety resulted x x x” in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper
subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations.
Employers are accorded rights and privileges to assure their self-
determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. This mass
of privileges comprises the so-called management prerogatives.

Manila Fashions v. NLRC

GR No. 117878, Nov 13, 1996
Bellosillo, J.

Facts:
On 15 March 1993 respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Manila
Fashions, Inc., through its president, respondent Nonito Zamora, filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter on behalf of its one hundred and fifty
(150) members who were regular employees of petitioner Manila Fashions,
Inc. The complaint charged petitioner with non-compliance with Wage
Order No. NCR-02 and 02-A mandating a P12 - increase in wages effective
8 January 1991. As a result, complainants' basic pay, 13th month pay,
service incentive leave pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential and
overtime pay were all underpaid.
Petitioner countered that the failure to comply with the pertinent
Wage Order was brought about by the tremendous losses suffered by it
which were aggravated when the workers staged a strike on account of the
non-adjustment of their basic pay. The condonation was distinctly stated in
Sec. 3, Art. VIII, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) dated 4
February 1992, which was voluntarily entered into by the parties and
represents a reasonable settlement.
The Labor Arbiter declared the subject provision void based on a
different ground (i.e. contrary to law). It is only the Tripartite Wage
Productivity Board of the DOLE that could approve the exemption of an
establishment from the coverage of a wage order. NLRC affirmed the labor
arbiter’s decision.

Issue:

89
 Whether or not the condonation of the implementation of the Wage
orders 02 and 02-A contained in Section 3 of Article VIII of the CBA is
valid.

Held:
No, the condonation appearing in Sec. 3, Art. VIII, of the CBA did not
exempt petitioner from compliance with Wage Order No. NCR-02 and 02-
A. As in all other contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. Section 3, Art. VIII, of the CBA is a void provision because
by agreeing to condone the implementation of the Wage Order the parties
thereby contravened its mandate on wage increase of P12.00 effective 8
January 1991. Also, as stated by the Labor Arbiter, it is only the
Tripartite Wage Productivity Board of the DOLE that could approve
exemption of an establishment from coverage of a Wage Order. The Office
of the Solicitor General emphasizes the point that parties to a CBA may not,
by themselves, set a wage lower than the minimum wage. To do so would
render nugatory the purpose of a wage exemption, not to mention the
possibility that employees may be duped or be unwittingly put in a position
to accept a lower wage.
Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Forms Manufacturing United
Workers vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 113856, September 7, 1998
Romero, J.
Facts:

Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing —

United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collective
bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of private
respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. At the collective
bargaining negotiation, the parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic
issues. According to the minutes of the meeting, Article VII of the collective
bargaining agreement was discussed.
On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01
granting an increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of workers. This was
followed by Wage Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990 providing for a
P12.00 daily increase in salary.
As expected, the union requested the implementation of said wage
orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-board
basis. Private respondent refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it
implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.
Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC
alleging that private respondent’s act of “reneging on its
undertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor practice through
bargaining in bad faith.”

Issue:

90
 Whether or not an employer committed an unfair labor practice by
bargaining in bad faith and discriminating against its employees.

Ruling:
To start with, if there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part
of private respondent to obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-
board wage increase, petitioner union should have requested or demanded
that such “promise or undertaking” be incorporated in the CBA. After all,
petitioner union has the means under the law to compel private respondent to
incorporate this specific economic proposal in the CBA. It could have
invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code defining “duty to bargain,” thus, the
duty includes “executing a contract incorporating such agreements if
requested by either party.” Petitioner union’s assertion that it had insisted on
the incorporation of the same proposal may have a factual basis considering
the allegations in the aforementioned joint affidavit of its members.
However, Article 252 also states that the duty to bargain “does not compel
any party to agree to a proposal or make any concession.”
Thus, petitioner union may not validly claim that the proposal
embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it
finally entered into with private respondent.

Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez

GR No. 102132, March 19, 1993
Romero, J.

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent, THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE

UNIONS (ATU-TUCP), entered into a CBA providing for 2 sections on sick
leave with pay benefits which apply to both the regular non-intermittent
workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the
company as governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA, and the
intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the
present regular extra labor pool, as governed by Sec. 3 thereof.

Sec. 1, however, of said CBA had a proviso that only those regular
workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the
commutation of sick leave privilege. A proviso not found in Sec. 3. This
caused the new assistant manager to discontinue the commutation of the
unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent
workers or its conversion to cash.

The Union objected and brought the matter for voluntary arbitration
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board with respondent
Abarquez acting as voluntary arbitrator who later issued an award in favor of
the Union. Hence, the instant petition.

91
Issue:

Whether or not intermittent (irregular) workers are entitled to

commutation of their unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits.

Ruling:

The CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits which
apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner’s company, namely:
(1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily
eight-hour service to the company and (2) intermittent field workers who are
members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool.

Sick leave benefits, like other economic benefits stipulated in the

CBA such as maternity leave and vacation leave benefits, among others, are
by their nature, intended to be replacements for regular income which
otherwise would not be earned because an employee is not working during
the period of said leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in the sense
that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the benefits. By
their nature, upon agreement of the parties, they are intended to alleviate the
economic condition of the workers.

NEW PACIFIC TIMBER SUPPLY CO. V. NLRC

G.R. No. 124224. March 17, 2000
Kapunan, J.

Facts:

The National Federation of Labor (NFL), was certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular employees of new
pacific timber. As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms and
conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit to which
it represented, however, the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by
petitioner NFL, so the former was prompted to file a complaint for unfair
labor practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to bargain
collectively.
The then Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim Abdulwahid, issued an order
declaring (a) petitioner co. guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals
submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the regular rank and file
employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner co.
Petitioner appealed the above order to the NLRC. The NLRC
rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether the private respondents is entitled to benefits under CBA
inspite of the fact that they were not employed by the petitioner.

Ruling:

92
 It is clear from the provision of article 253 of the labor code that until
a new collective bargaining agreement has been executed by and between
the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law
does not provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the
economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and effect;
therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and
conditions in the said agreement.
In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered into by and between
petitioner company and NFL pending appeal of the decision from the
NLRC; nor were any of the economic provisions and/or terms and
conditions pertaining to monetary benefits in the existing agreement
modified or altered. Therefore, the existing CBA in its entirety continues to
have legal effect.

Mactan Workers Union vs. Don Ramon Aboitiz

G.R. No. L-30241, June 30, 1972
Fernando, J.

Facts:
Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. in Lapu-Lapu
City is employing laborers and employees belonging to two rival labor
unions. 72 of these laborers whose names appear in the complaint are
affiliated with the Mactan Workers Union while the rest are members of the
intervenor Associated Labor Union. Defendant Cebu Shipyard &
Engineering Works, Inc. and the Associated Labor Union entered into a
CBA. The Company agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its employees
and laborers to be taken from ten per cent (10%) of its net profits or net
income derived from the direct operation of its shipyard and shop in Lapu-
Lapu to be payable in two (2) installments, the first installment being
payable in March and the second installment in June, each year out of the
profits in agreement. If unaacepted, the profit-sharing bonus which the said
employee or laborer is entitled under this Agreement, will be returned to the
Company.

The members of the Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their

shares in the second installment of bonus because they did not like to go to
the office of the ALU to collect their shares. In accordance with the terms of
the CBA, the uncollected shares of the plaintiff union members was returned
by the ALU to the defendant corporation. At the same time the defendant
93
corporation was advised by the ALU not to deliver the said amount to the
members of the Mactan Workers Union unless ordered by the Court. For the
recovery of claim, this case was filed with the lower court and rendered
decision in favor of the plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in requiring literal compliance
with the terms of a collective bargaining contract?

Ruling:

The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute

the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke
its provisions. Nor does it suffice as a defense that the claim is made on
behalf of non-members of intervenor Associated Labor Union, for it is a
well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement
extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit,
including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor
organization. Any other view would be a discrimination on which the law
frowns. The labor union that gets the majority vote as the exclusive
bargaining representative does not act for its members alone. It represents all
the employees in such a bargaining unit. The assignment of error that the
City Court of Lapu-Lapu was bereft of jurisdiction is singularly
unpersuasive.

Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc. v. Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc. Makati

Employees Union
G.R. NO. 156260, March 10, 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts:
Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.), Inc., is a manufacturing corporation, with
branches at Makati City and Bauan, Batangas. Sometime in December 1997,
petitioner, to improve the operating efficiency and coordination among its
various departments, formulated a plan to transfer the Design Department
from its Makati office to Bauan, Batangas. With this development,
petitioner, on February 24, 1999, sent separate notices to Justiniano G.
Iniego, Xavier Aguila and Bonifacio B. Vergara, who occupied Engineer 1
positions at the Design Department, of their re-assignment and transfer to
Bauan, Batangas effective April 1, 1999. This prompted them to claim for
their relocation allowance provided by Sections 1 and 2, Article XXI of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
However, petitioner refused to implement the CBA, claiming that the
affected employees are not entitled to relocation allowance under Policy
Statement No. BHPI-G-044A dated October 1, 1996 considering that they
are residents of Bauan or its adjacent towns. Thus, the affected union
members (Justiniano Iniego, et al.), represented by Babcock-Hitachi (Phils.),
Inc., Makati Employees Union,  filed with the National Conciliation and

94
Mediation Board (NCMB) a complaint for payment of relocation allowance
against petitioner. In a Submission Agreement dated March 18, 1999, the
parties stipulated to submit the case for voluntary arbitration.

Issue:
Whether or not union members are entitled to relocation allowance in
light of the CBA between the parties.

Ruling:
Yes, any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and
the union members should be resolved in favor of the latter. This is pursuant
to Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provide that in case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety and decent living for the laborer.
Pertinent are Sections 1 and 2, Article XXI of the CBA which
provides that employees transferred from Makati City to Bauan, Batangas
are entitled to a monthly relocation allowance of P1,500.00, provided their
transfer is permanent or for a period exceeding one month. Such provisions
need no interpretation for they are clear. Contracts which are not ambiguous
are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond their
obvious intendment. In Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz, we held that "the
terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the
law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can
invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not
fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress."
Kimberly-Clark Philippines vs. Voluntary Arbitrator Danilo Loredo
and United Kimberly-Clark Employees-PTGWO
G.R. No. 103090, September 21, 1993
Vitug, J.

Facts:
Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc. (KCPI), seeks to set aside the
Resolutions of 15 October 1991 and 21 November 1991 of public
respondent Voluntary Arbitrator Danilo Lorredo, holding that the nephew of
a retired employee should be employed by KCPI as his replacement pursuant
to Section 1, Article XX, of their Collective Bargaining Agreement
("CBA"). Danilo L. Guerrero, an employee assigned as Operator B in
KCPI's Finishing Section, voluntarily resigned on 02 January 1991, after
thirteen (13) years and three (3) months of employment with the petitioner
corporation. Pursuant to Section I, Article XX, of the aforementioned CBA,
Guerrero, through the Union, recommended for hiring his nephew who is a
collateral relative within the third civil degree. KCPI informed the Union,
through its President, that it could not act favorably on Guerrero's
recommendee. The private respondent argued that, since Guerrero's
legitimate children are still minors, he could validly recommend for hiring
his nephew.

Issue:

95
 Whether or not Guerrero can recommend his nephew for hiring and
the petitioner corporation is obligated to hire him under 1, Article XX, of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Ruling:
No. A collective bargaining agreement, just like any other contract, is
respected as the law between the contracting parties and compliance
therewith in good faith is mandated. The intention of the parties is
primodial; if the terms of the contract are clear, the literal meaning of the
stipulations shall control, but if the words appear to be contrary to the
evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
The company has agreed in its CBA with the employees "to employ
(an) immediate member of the family provided qualified upon the
employee's resignation, retirement, disability or death." Covered by the term
"(an) immediate member of the family" are the employee's legitimate
children and, in default thereof, a collateral relative within the third civil
degree. As we see it, the phrase "in default thereof" has not been intended or
contemplated by the parties as having a preclusive effect within the group. It
simply sets a priority on who can possibly be recommendees for
employment.
KCPI is not obligated to unconditionally accept the recommendee
since the latter must still meet the required employment standards
theretofore set by it. And even when the recommendee is qualified, he,
nonetheless, shall be hired only, pursuant to the agreement, on a
"probationary status," an added measure, to further prove his worth for
eventual regular employment. The company is not, therefore, left without its
own safeguards under the agreement.
Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez
GR No. 102132, March 19, 1993
Romero, J.

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent, The Association of Trade Unions

(ATU-TUCP), entered into a CBA providing for 2 sections on sick leave
with pay benefits which apply to both the regular non-intermittent workers
or those workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the company as
governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA, and the intermittent
field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present
regular extra labor pool, as governed by Sec. 3 thereof.

Sec. 1, however, of said CBA had a proviso that only those regular
workers of the company whose work are not intermittent, are entitled to the
commutation of sick leave privilege.A proviso not found in Sec. 3. This
caused the new assistant manager to discontinue the commutation of the
unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent
workers or its conversion to cash.

96
 The Union objected and brought the matter for voluntary arbitration
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board with respondent
Abarquez acting as voluntary arbitrator who later issued an award in favor of
the Union. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not intermittent (irregular) workers are entitled to
commutation of their unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits.

Ruling:

The CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits which
apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner’s company, namely:
(1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily
eight-hour service to the company and (2) intermittent field workers who are
members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool.

Sick leave benefits, like other economic benefits stipulated in the

CBA such as maternity leave and vacation leave benefits, among others, are
by their nature, intended to be replacements for regular income which
otherwise would not be earned because an employee is not working during
the period of said leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in the sense
that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the benefits. By
their nature, upon agreement of the parties, they are intended to alleviate the
economic condition of the workers.

INDOPHIL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION- PTGWO VS. CALICA

G.R. No. 96490, February 3, 1992,
J. Medialdea

Facts:
In April, 1987, petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-
PTGWO and private respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. executed a
collective bargaining agreement effective from April 1, 1987 to March 31,
1990. Subsequently, Acrylic applied for registration with the Board of
Investments for incentives under the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code. The
application was approved on a preferred non-pioneer status. In 1988, Acrylic
became operational and hired workers according to its own criteria and
standards. Sometime in July, 1989, the workers of Acrylic unionized and a
duly certified collective bargaining agreement was executed. In 1990 or a
year after the workers of Acrylic have been unionized and a CBA executed,
the petitioner union claimed that the plant facilities built and set up by
Acrylic should be considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of
private respondent Company pursuant to Section 1(c), Article I of the CBA,
to wit, c) This Agreement shall apply to the Company's plant facilities and
installations and to any extension and expansion thereat. In other words, it is

97
the petitioner's contention that Acrylic is part of the Indophil bargaining unit.
Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of Indophil.

Issue:
Whether Indophil Acrylic is a separate and distinct entity from
respondent company for purposes of union representation.

Ruling:
Yes. Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity, when
valid grounds therefore exist, the legal fiction that a corporation is an entity
with a juridical personality separate and distinct from its members or
stockholders may be disregarded. In such cases, the corporation will be
considered as a mere association of persons. The members or stockholders
of the corporation will be considered as the corporation that is liability will
attach directly to the officers and stockholders.
In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity
of Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade
the application of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent
Company. The fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are
related, that some of the employees of the private respondent are the same
persons manning and providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic,
and that the physical plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same
compound, it is our considered opinion that these facts are not sufficient to
justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic. Hence, the Acrylic not
being an extension or expansion of private respondent, the rank-and-file
employees working at Acrylic should not be recognized as part of, and/or
within the scope of the petitioner, as the bargaining representative of private
respondent.
The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. BLR
G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003
Carpio, J.

Facts:
Solidbank and Solidbank Employees’ Union (Union) were set to
renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-2001 CBA to cover the
remaining 2 years (2000-2001). Negotiations commenced but seeing that an
agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of
Strike on December 29, 1999. In view of the impending actual strike, then
DOLE Sec. Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and in an Assumption Order dated January 18, 2000 directed the
parties “to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation”. In another Order dated March 24, 2000, Sec.
Laguesma resolved all economic and non-economic issues submitted by the
parties.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Union held a rally in front of the
DOLE Office in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of their
MR.

98
 The employees’ work abandonment/boycott lasted for 3 days. On the
3rd day, President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a
memorandum declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees
who will report for work starting April 6, 2000. The remaining 199
employees filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, ULP and damages,
which were then consolidated.

Issues:
Whether or not the protest rally and concerted work
abandonment/boycott is equivalent to a strike.

Ruling:
Art. 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage
of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. The term “strike” shall comprise not only concerted work
stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage,
destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities.
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v.
NLRC, Union contends that the protests conducted are not within the ambit
of strikes, since they were legitimate exercises of their right to peaceably
assemble on the doctrine laid down in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization. In the present case, there was an on-going labor
dispute arising from Toyota’s refusal to recognize and negotiate with the
Union. Thus, the Union’s reliance on Philippine Blooming Mills is
misplaced.
In the case at bar, considering that the mass actions stemmed from a
bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already
been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, there is
no doubt that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was the result of a
labor dispute.

Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of LDB Employees & Garcia

G.R. No. 120319, October 6, 1995
Romero, J.

Facts:
From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to
resolve the following issue: Whether or not the company has violated the
CBA provision and the MOA on promotion. At a conference, the parties
agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in
her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper;
LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter
from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995
no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

Issue: 
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 Whether or not a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA
and not the Supreme Court.

Ruling: 
The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel
of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter.
The “(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission …” Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act
No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator. Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition
for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or
the CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an
unnecessary burden upon it.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a
governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the
Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
“instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his
functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him
within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated therein. In effect, this equates the award or
decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the RTC. Consequently, in a
petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the CA must be deemed
to have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter of policy, this Court
shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for
proper disposition.
Panay Electric Inc. vs. NLRC and Panay Electric Company Employees
and Workers Association
GR No. 102672, Oct 04, 1995
Vitug, J.

Facts:

The EDP/Personnel Manager Panay Electric Company, Inc

recommended Enrique Huyan to assume the responsibility of gathering
accounting and computer data at its power plant who was at the time an
Administrative Personnel Assistant at the head office.

After an administrative investigation Huyan was ordered dismissed

ont the ground of insubordination for his failure to conform with the
recommendation.

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 Petitioner assails NLRC's decision insofar as it has adjudged monetary
awards to private respondents Huyan and Napiar and in not sanctioning the
dismissal of other union officers and members.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC erred in granting separation benefits to

Huyan and Napiar, in awarding moral and exemplary damages to the former,
and in merely sanctioning the suspension, instead of terminating the
employment status, of other officers and members of respondent labor
union.

Ruling:

No, NLRC did not err in granting benefits to the two above stated
employees.
In the case of the other union officers, the NLRC, having found no
sufficient proof to hold them guilty of "bad faith" in taking part in the strike
or of perpetrating "serious disorders" during the concerted activity, merely
decreed suspension. We see no grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC in
this regard and in not thus ordering the dismissal of said officers.
In the case of Huyan, we sustain the NLRC in holding that he, during
the period of his illegal suspension should be entitled to back salaries and
benefits plus moral damages, but in the reduced amount of P10,000.00, in
view of the findings of the NLRC. Exemplary damages, upon the other hand,
are awarded only when a person acts in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner NLRC's findings fall short of the
underhandedness required so as to justify this award.

Malayang Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Ramos

G. R. No. 113907, February 28, 2000
Purisima, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield

(MSMG) is a local union. Private respondent M. Greenfield is the employer
of petitioner's members. Members of petitioner conducted a strike, which
was marred by violence. Private respondent attempted to quell the same by
hiring persons for that purpose. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under
preventive suspension; only some of them were eventually allowed to return
to work.

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 Petitioners thus filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch
of the DOLE, charging private respondent of ULP, in the form of union-
busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, interference in union activities,
discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence, and oppression.
Private respondent's defense was that the strike was illegal for it was marred
by violence.

Issue:

Whether or not the strike should be declared illegal on account of

violence committed during the strike.

Ruling:

No, where both parties are responsible for the violence committed
during the strike, the strike cannot be declared illegal since the strike cannot
be attributed to the striking employees only. This is an exception to the
general rule that the strike shall be declared illegal where it is marred by
violence on the part of the employees.

In the case at bar, the allegation of violence committed in the course

of the strike, it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the
Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent
incidents resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management. The
evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking
employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the
strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the
employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as
illegal.

Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing

G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000
Ynares-Santaigo, J.

Facts:

The court directed the parties to execute a CBA incorporating the

terms among which are the following modifications: Wages: PhP 1,900 for
1995-1996; Retroactivity: December 28, 1996-Dec. 1999, etc. Dissatisfied,
some members of the union filed a motion for intervention/reconsideration.

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Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of Php 2,000.00 per month as
ordered is allowed, it would pass the cost covering such increase to the
consumers through an increased rate of electricity. On the retroactivity of the
CBA arbitral award, the parties reckon the period as when retroaction shall
commence.

Issue:

Whether or not retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commence at such

time as granted by the Secretary.

Ruling:

In St. Luke’s Medical vs. Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA

negotiations between management unions. The Secretary assumed
jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration
of the previous CBA. The Court ratiocinated thus: In the absence of a
specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of
arbitral awards issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the
Labor Code, public respondent is deemed vested with the plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.

In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of

the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if
agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On
the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral
award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties
but by intervention of the government. In the absence of a CBA, the
Secretary’s determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his
discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control. Wherefore, the
arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997;
and the award of wage is increased from Php1,900 to Php2,000.

PICOP Resources Inc., v. Taneca

G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona
fide members of NAMAPRI-SPFL which is the collective bargaining agent
for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI. PRI has a CBA with
NAMAPRI-SPFL. The CBA contained the following union security
provisions: All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are
members of the Union at the time of the signing of this Agreement shall, as a
condition of continued employment by the COMPANY, maintain their

103
membership in the UNION in good standing during the effectivity of this
Agreement. The Company shall give notice of termination of services of any
employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided.
Atty. Fuentes sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the
termination of employees who allegedly supported the FFW during the
effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of
campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as
an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination for a cause in
accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws specifically on Union
Security Clause.
PRI served notices of termination for causes to employees on the
ground of “acts of disloyalty” committed against it when respondents
allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of
FFW before the “freedom period” during the effectivity of the CBA.
Respondents then accused PRI of ULP.

Issue: 
Whether respondent employees were validly terminated.

Ruling:
No, respondents were not validly terminated. The “Union security” is
a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,” “union
shop,” “maintenance of membership,” or any other form of agreement which
imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union
membership as a condition affecting employment. In terminating the
employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the
employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is
applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union
security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support
the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These
requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the
union security provision of the CBA. On third requisite, the Court found that
there is no sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to terminate the
employment of the respondents.
The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for
Certification Election of FFW or before the “freedom period,” is not
sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents inasmuch as
the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period.

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