#1

MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MEWAP) VS.
ROMULO

G.R. No. 160093. July 31, 2007

FACTS:

 President issued E.O. No. 165 “Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening and
Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch” which created the Presidential Committee on
Executive Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair

 PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 62, entitled “Implementing Executive Order
No. 102, Series of 1999 Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health.”

 A.O. No. 94 outlined the general guidelines for the selection and placement of employees adopting the
procedures and standards set forth in R.A. No. 66564 or the “Rules on Governmental Reorganization,”
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Sections 76 to 78 of the GAA for the Year 2000, and Section 42 of
E.O. No. 292

 MEWAP filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify Department
Memorandum No. 157, the NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and
other issuances implementing E.O. No. 102

ISSUES:

1. WON Sec. 78 and 80 of the GAA of 1998 empower President Estrada to reorganize structurally and
functionally the DOH?

2. WON Sec. 20, Chapter 1, Title 1, Book III of the Admin Code of 1987 provides legal basis in
reorganizing the DOH

3. WON the President has authority under Sec 17, Art 8 of the Constitution to effect a reorganization of a
department under the Executive Branch

4. WON there has been abuse of discretion amting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
President in issuing EO 102, redirecting the functions and operations of DOH

5. WON EO 102 is null and void

RULING:

1. YES!

 The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII,
Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution

 In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we held that reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel,

consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It alters
the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged with the
legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such
abolition, is permissible under our present laws

 The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers
under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers
to implement reorganization measures

 We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the President did not commit bad faith in the
questioned reorganization
 THE PETITION IS DENIED.

Note.—President’s power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive
departments, bureaus and offices uniformly differentiated in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
(National Liga Ng Mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130 [2004])

#2
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS–INVESTIGATIVE and ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, and as an ex officio member of the Monetary Board, respondents. G.R. No. 196425. July 24,
2012
FACTS:

 E.O 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC): power to investigate or hear
adminstrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President
 E.O 13 abolishing PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD)
 respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for
grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc
 petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the
same transaction and charge of grave misconduct is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman
 In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized
under any existing law to create the IAD-ODESLA
ISSUE: WON E.O. 13 is unconstitutional?
RULING: NO!

 Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency
 Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within
the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated
legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
 Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or
a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the
Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or
merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to
another
 The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper
 The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the establishment of a third division—the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division—
through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under
E.O. 13
 A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and
efficiency. In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy
 After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature’s power to appropriate funds when the President
simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office
 The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers
  The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman
 Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-
ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate
both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means
exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies
PETITION IS DISMISSED. Notes.—A reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions”; For a reorganization for the
purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of
good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio. (Pan vs. Peña, 579 SCRA 314 [2009]) If the reorganization is done in
good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government
employees, would be valid. (Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488 [2010])
#3
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. MERCEDITAS DE SAHAGUN, MANUELA T. WAQUIZ and
RAIDIS J. BASSIG, respondents G.R. No. 167982. August 13, 2008

FACTS: respondent Raidis J. Bassig, Chief of the Research and Publications Division of the Intramuros
Administration, submitted a Memorandum to then Intramuros Administrator Edda V. Henson (Henson)
recommending that Brand Asia, Ltd. be commissioned to produce a video

 a contract of service to produce a video documentary on Intramuros for TV program airing was
executed between Henson and Brand Asia, Ltd

 an anonymous complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PGAC) against Henson in relation to the contracts entered into with Brand Asia, Ltd

 Henson was dismissed from the service by the Office of the President upon recommendation of the
PGAC which found that the contracts were entered into without the required public bidding and in
violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act

 an anonymous complaint was filed with the Ombudsman against the BAC in relation to the latter’s
participation in the contracts with Brand Asia, Ltd. for which Henson was dismissed from service

 Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) filed criminal and administrative charges against respondents,
along with Ferrer and Rustia, for violation of Section 3 (a) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to Section
1 of Executive Order No. 302 and grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and gross violation of Rules and Regulations pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987

 Respondents and Ferrer were found guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed from service. Rustia was
found guilty of simple misconduct and suspended for six months without pay

 The CA held that respondents may no longer be prosecuted since the complaint was filed more than
seven years after the imputed acts were committed which was beyond the one year period provided for
by Section 20 (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989”;
and that the nature of the function of the Ombudsman was purely recommendatory and it did not have
the power to penalize erring government officials and employees

ISSUES:

1. WON Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 prohibits administrative investigations in cases filed more than
one year after commission

2. WON the Ombudsman only has recommendatory not punitive, powers against erring government
officials and employees

RULING:

1. NO! well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative offenses
by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public
officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our
government
  “SEC. 20. Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of
any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that: x x x (5) The complaint was filed
after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.” (Emphasis supplied)

 Melchor v. Gironella: the period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the
prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would
investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word “may” in the provision is construed
as permissive and operating to confer discretion”

 Thus, while the complaint herein was filed only on September 5, 2000, or more than seven years after
the commission of the acts imputed against respondents in November 1992 and June 1993, it was
within the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation of the subject complaint

2. NO! Ombudsman’s power as regards the administrative penalty to be imposed on an erring public
officer or employee is not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary, found to be at fault, within the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided in the Constitution, R.A. No. 6770, as well as
jurisprudence. This power gives the said constitutional office teeth to render it not merely functional, but
also effective

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED. Note.—It is not for the Court to review the Ombudsman’s
exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before his office. (Rizon vs. Desierto,
441 SCRA 115 [2004])

#4
THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by THE CITY TREASURER OF DAVAO CITY, petitioner, vs. THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF AMADO S. DALISAY, represented by SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR ATTY.
NICASIO B. PADERNA, respondent. G.R. No. 207791. July 15, 2015
FACTS:

 The Estate of Amado S. Dalisay all located in Davao City were advertised for sale at a public auction
for nonpayment of real estate taxes
 The public auction was scheduled on July 19, 2004. No bidders appeared on the date of the public
auction, thus, the aforesaid properties were acquired by the City Government of Davao (the City)
pursuant to Section 263 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC)
 more than a year after the public auction, the Declarations of Forfeiture for the five (5) properties were
separately issued by the City Treasurer
 the Estate delivered a written tender of payment to the City Treasurer and, at the same time, tendered
the amount of P5,000,000.00. The City, however, refused to accept the same
 For its part, the City said that the period of redemption had long expired on July 19, 2005, a year after
the subject properties were acquired by the City during the public auction for want of a bidder. Hence,
its refusal to accept the tendered amount was valid and for a lawful cause
 the RTC ruled in favor of the Estate, finding the latter’s evidence as preponderantly acceptable in
establishing its right of redemption. The City was ordered to: 1) receive the P5,000,000.00 deposited
with the Clerk of Court, as full payment of the redemption price of the forfeited properties; and 2) issue
a certificate of redemption in favor of the Estate
 the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC
 The City argues that no law provides that the one (1) year redemption period should be counted from
the date of the Declaration of Forfeiture. What the LGC simply provides is that the period of redemption
is “within one (1) year from the date of such forfeiture.” For the City, this phrase means that the
effective date of the forfeiture was July 19, 2004, when the tax delinquent properties were sold at a
public auction and, thus, forfeited in its favor for want of a bidder, rather than September 13, 2005 or
the date of the issued Declarations of Forfeiture
 Assuming arguendo that the City Treasurer is mandated by law to issue a declaration of forfeiture
within two (2) days from the purchase of the properties, the City avers that it should not be bound by
the consequences of the malfeasance of its public officers. In other words, the City invokes the doctrine
that the principle of estoppel does not operate against the government for the act of its agents, and that
it is never estopped by any mistake or error on their part
ISSUES:
  WON the City Govt of Davao is estopped from disclaiming and denying the erroneous statement made
by the City Treasurer in his declaration of forfeitures dated Sep 13, 2006 which inadvertently informed
the plaintiff that the 1 yr redemption period starts from the date of declaration
RULING: NO!

 The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents. Indeed, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions. Estoppel should not be invoked
except in a rare and unusual circumstance. It may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat
the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it
 It is the City that would suffer an injustice if it were to be bound by its officer’s suspect actions. The
policy of enabling local governments to fully utilize the income potentialities of the real property tax
would be put at a losing end if tax delinquent properties could be recovered by the sheer expediency of
a document erroneously or, perhaps fraudulently, issued by its officers. This would place at naught, the
essence of redemption as a statutory privilege; for then, the statutory period for its exercise may be
extended by the indiscretion of scrupulous officers. In other words, the period would become flexible
because extensions of the period would depend, not just on the sound discretion of the City Treasurer
but on his attitude, work ethics and worse, temperament
 In this case, the period to redeem the subject properties of this case had long expired on July 19, 2005,
and since then, the forfeiture of the properties had become absolute. The failure of the Estate to validly
exercise its right of redemption within the statutory period had already resulted in the consolidation of
ownership over the properties by the City
 The resolution of this case does not, in any way, cloud the glaring misfeasance in office committed by
the City Treasurer. As discussed, this legal battle could not have developed were it not for the lull of
more than a year between the subject auction and the issuance of the declarations of forfeiture. More
often than not, inordinate delay in the issuance of documents, whether out of a ministerial or directory
function, creates an injurious effect to the parties concerned. This inefficiency in the bureaucracy must
be thwarted lest the quality of public service in local governments deteriorate and personal rights suffer.
No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all
public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency.26 These attributes, by all means, are expected of a City Treasurer.

WHEREFORE, ASSAILED DECISIONS ARE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Notes.—Since National Housing Authority (NHA) is liable neither for real property taxes nor for the bond
requirement in Section 267, it necessarily follows that any public auction sale involving property owned by
NHA would be null and void and any suit filed by the latter questioning such sale should not be dismissed
for failure to pay the bond. (National Housing Authority vs. Iloilo City, 562 SCRA 629 [2008]) The written
notice requirement for purposes of the exercise of the right of redemption is indispensable. (Pascual vs.
Ballesteros, 666 SCRA 297 [2012])

#5
PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION AND HEE ACUSAR, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MAYOR CELESTINO E. MARTINEZ JR., THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BOGO
(CEBU) and SANTIAGO SEVILLA, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-72969-70. December 17, 1986
FACTS:

 Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was ordered to relocate the same pursuant to
P.D. No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, on the ground that it was situated in a tertiary commercial
zone, a prohibited area
 Santiago Sevilla, private respondent herein, was granted a license to operate a cockpit by Mayor
Celestino E. Martinez by authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with subsequent approval of
the PC Regional Command 7 as required by law
 As only one cockpit is allowed by law in cities or municipalities with a population of not more than one
hundred thousand,5 Acusar sued to revoke this license
 Acusar went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his cockpit license and the
cancellation of Sevilla's
  the Philippine Gamefowl Commission issued its resolution on the merits of Acusar's petition and
ordered Mayor Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan "to issue the necessary mayor's permit in favor of
Hee Acusar" and "to cancel and/or revoke the mayor's permit in favor of Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla."
 The above-stated resolution was on appeal declared null and void by the Intermediate Court of
Appeals,14 and its decision is now before us in a petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: WON Philippine Gamefowl Commission has authority to issue license for the operm of ordinary
cockpits
RULING: NO!

 it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to
issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits.
 Its power to license is limited only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits.
Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review and supervision
 Supervision is a lesser power than control, which connotes "the power of the officer to alter or modify or
set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter." Review, on the other hand, is a reconsideration or reexamination for
purposes of correction.
 As thus defined, the power of supervision does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the
subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that the
subordinate performs his duties in accordance with law
 The conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in the municipal authorities is in
line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in Article II, Section 10, and Article XI of the 1973
Constitution. It is also a recognition, as the Court of Appeals correctly points out, of the superior
competence of the municipal officials in dealing with this local matter with which they can be expected
to be more knowledgeable than the national officials. Surely, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission
cannot claim to know more than the municipal mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo, Cebu,
about the issues being disputed by the applicants to the cockpit license
 the PGC cannot directly exercise the power to license cockpits and in effect usurp the authority directly
conferred by law on the municipal authorities
 If at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority to
substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound
discretion. In the instant case, the PGC did not limit itself to vetoing the choice of Sevilla, assuming he
was disqualified, but directly exercised the authority of replacing him with its own choice. Assuming
Sevilla was really disqualified, the choice of his replacement still remained with the municipal
authorities, subject only to the review of the PGC
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DISMISSED. Notes.—Republic Act No. 938, which provides the regulation and
prohibition by ordinance of the establishment, maintenance and operation, among others, of cockpits, applies,
not only to "municipal or city board or council of each chartered city," but also, to "the municipal council of each
municipality or municipal district." (Quimsing vs. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182.) An ordinance authorizing the operation
of cockpits on weekdays at discretion of the municipal mayor is void. (Chief of Philippine Constabulary vs.
Sabungan Bagong Silang, Inc., 16 SCRA 336.)

#6
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

G.R. No. L-23825. December 24, 1965

FACTS:

 During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1064 the President of the Philippines, purporting to
act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos, 93 to
121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating (33) municipalities

 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by
,said municipalities
  Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power

 since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed'' except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated."

 Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power

ISSUE: WON there was undue delegation of legislative power to the Pres in creating municipalities

RULING: YES!

 Reqts for valid delegation of power: that said law (a) be complete in itself —it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and b) fix a standard —the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions

 Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a
valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law, it does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to

 It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court
had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid
delegation of the authority to execute the law. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section
880 As above indicated, the creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one which is
essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is "purely a legislative question

 if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 88 were upheld, there would no longer be any
legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion,
may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual
abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse
of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of
this Court to uphold.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

#7
EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, et. al vs. SONIA R. LORENZO, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor of San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, et. al. G.R. No. 160367. December 18, 2009

FACTS:

 Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, issued Resolution declaring the reorganization of
all offices of the municipal government

 SB passed Reso approving and adopting the proposed new staffing pattern of the MLGU

 Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, herein respondent Sonia R. Lorenzo, issued a
memorandum informing all employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the
reorganization, all positions were deemed vacant and that all employees must file their respective
applications for the newly created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern. Otherwise, they
would not be considered for any of the newly created positions.
  Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners, on January 17, 2002, filed with the CA a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with application for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order. They alleged that they were permanent employees of the Rural Health Unit of the
Municipality of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija

 Petitioners sought to prohibit respondents from implementing the reorganization of the municipal
government of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 s. 2001 of the Sangguniang
Bayan. They likewise prayed for the nullification of said Resolutions

 While the case was pending, respondent Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a letter terminating the
services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not selected for the new positions

 the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit

 CA ruled in favor of Mayor and other officials of MLGU

 Peti contend that decision of CA were not in accordance with RA 6656, otherwise known as “An Act to
Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization,”

 Respondents, for their part, argue that petitioners’ separation from service was a result of a valid
reorganization done in accordance with law and in good faith.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioners’ automatic resort to the Court of Appeals is proper

2. WON the case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies

RULING:

1. NO!

 Petitioners’ recourse should have been with the Civil Service Commission and not with the CA

 Section 2 (1) and Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution and Section 4 of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 19-99 provide that the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has
jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service

 In this case, considering that the petitioners belong to the civil service, the CSC has jurisdiction over
their separation from office

 Under RA 6656 and RA 7305, it is also the CSC which has the power to reinstate or reappoint an
unlawfully dismissed or terminated employee

 Consequently, petitioners’ resort to the CA was premature. The jurisdiction lies with the CSC and not
with the appellate court.

2. NO!

 The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it
admits of exceptions, viz: 1. when there is a violation of due process; 2. when the issue involved is
purely a legal question; 3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; 4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; 5. when
there is irreparable injury; 6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7. when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; 8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; 9.
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; 10. when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and 11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention
  The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for mandamus
and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and
prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only
in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief

 we find that the CA correctly dismissed the petition but not the grounds cited in support thereof. The CA
should have dismissed the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

 doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which precludes courts from resolving, in the first instance,
controversies falling under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DENIED.

Note.—Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith, and, as a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. (Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications [DOTC] vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA
128 [2002])

#8
ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO, petitioner, vs. HON.NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-17169. November 30, 1963

FACTS:

 Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola
Far East Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila Isidro
Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the concentrates, but this official
seeing perhaps that the importation did not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank advised
the counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had
jurisdiction over the case

 Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco
read to him the letter after which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the
basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to the propriety of the action
suggested, finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding
duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.

 When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates in
question he immediately ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the
warehouse. Whereupon, he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco
charging him with having committed a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the customs service

 As a result, Collector Ang-Angco was suspended from office

 Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President rendered a decision on the case
finding Ang-Angco “guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service”, and considering him
resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs

 Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President
Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him
from office had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by
the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such decision is in
violation of the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service
against removal or suspension except for cause in the manner provided by law

ISSUE: WON the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to
the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959

RULING: NO!
  It is, therefore, clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of
petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been
deprived of the procedure laid down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of his
case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law

 power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor
or agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken
by a subordinate in the performance of his duties

 There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power
to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if
they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified
under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson v. Romero,
supra), but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to
them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution
which says that “the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President
alone, in the courts, or in heads of department” (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to
these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law
for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the
Civil Service Act of 1959

 Since petitioner is an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential
appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he
cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the Civil
Service Act of 1959

 the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in taking
direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner
of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his office as Collector of
Customs for the Port of Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil
Service to be dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.

#9
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture 6, Sports,
DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO,
HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER,
respondents. G.R. No. 96681. December 2,1991

FACTS:

 members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and
highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances
that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention

 For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal’s report and given five (5) days to answer the
charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days

 the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.

 Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case

 respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño’s motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent
Lolarga “to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days x x (after which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over or the power to try and decide or
hear and determine certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights

RULING: NO!

 The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official

 The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law

WHEREFORE, PETITON IS GRANTED

#10
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES: G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
FACTS:

 petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating
the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.”
 Under the deregulated environment, “any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude
oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and
other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,”
subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
 the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372.
The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372
 The petition is anchored on three arguments
 First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential
unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the
downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum
products from abroad
 Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but
instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff
differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other
players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing
refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law “to foster a truly competitive market.”
 Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1)
Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in
its title
 In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following
submissions:
 First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define
when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable
to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine
when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable
  Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of
the OPSF fund—a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.
ISSUES:
1. WON section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power
2. WON E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable
RULING:
1. NO!
 Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,
regardless of the occurrence of any event
 Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the
end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President—he is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable
2. YES!
 A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be
considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion
of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation
 Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered
the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be
justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of
crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372
void.

With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of Congress.
Such criticism is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation
as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the
Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms
with the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution.
Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in
tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of
protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of
the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to
strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the
political and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of
the people’s political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor
and the powerless is of greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the exoterics of living and
less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court
be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our
defense of the people’s economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.

#11
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA
MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents

G.R. No. 110571. October 7, 1994

FACTS:

 Petitioner’s contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded Art. 82 of the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino
 promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress
defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, § 2 of the Constitution, while the circular is a rule
of procedure which this Court promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power under Art. VIII, § 5(5).

 Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments (BOI) was originally
provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 (P.D. No. 1789),2 Art. 78

 Art. 78 was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, by granting in thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) over the decisions and final orders
of quasijudicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was
promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the
Supreme Court was again granted

 By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, §
30 that “No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.”

ISSUE: WON Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme
Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, unduly increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court

RULING: YES!

 Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to this
Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of § 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to
provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial
agencies, with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the
Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the
BOI directly to the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, MR IS DENIED.

Note.—There are instances when the Supreme Court desires a further review of facts or a detailed analysis
and systematic presentation of issues which the appellate court is in a more favored position to accomplish.
Standing between the trial courts and the Supreme Court, the appellate court was precisely created to take
over much of the work that used to be previously done by this Court. It has been of great help to the Supreme
Court in synthesizing facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors
which ordinarily might have escaped detection. Statistics will show that the great majority of petitions to review
the decisions of the appellate court have been denied due course for lack of merit in minute resolutions. The
appellate court has, therefore, freed this Court to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most
important work which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, “is less concerned with the decision of cases that
begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the
direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental
authority and its impact upon fundamental rights.” (Philippine Political Law, 10th Edition, p. 323). (Conde vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 144 [1986])

#12
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MUNGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL,
JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTO C. BLAS, JR.,
ELPIDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents. G.R. No. L-77372. April 29, 1988
FACTS:
  PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its “Additional Instructions to Examinees,” to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy: “No examinee shall attend
any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review
material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer. lecturer. instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions
during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day.
“Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of
the Rules and Regulations of the Commission."
 petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy scheduled on
October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others
similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for
injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to
restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
 PRC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to
enjoin the enforcement of its resolution
 the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission
from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional,
 PRC filed with CA a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court
ISSUE:
1. WON Resolution No. 105 issued by PRC should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the RTC
2. WON Resolution No. 105 issued by PRC is constitutional
RULING:

1. NO! quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation.14 This does not cover rules and regulations of
general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies
and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to
preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

2. NO!

 It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid

 The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent
PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on
each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.

 Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as
to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfUlment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their
endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth

 Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and
centers believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a
full-fledged public accountant WHEREFORE, DECISION OF CA IS REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
RESO NO. 105 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note.—Interpretation of officers of laws entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect. (Siera
Madre Trust vs. Secretary ofAgricutlure and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384).

#13
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL.,
respondents. G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986
FACTS:

 Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval
 Art. 2, CC: “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."
ISSUES:
1. WON “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the non-requirement of publication
2. WON publication is required only for laws of general application
RULING:
1. NO!
 the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication
 Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
15-day period shall be shortened or extended
 It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it
 It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
2. NO!
 The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual
 all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity
 Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation
 Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code
 We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws
 under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a
different period provided by the legislature. publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval,
or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article
2 of the Civil Code
#14
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ANG TANG Ho, defendant and appellant.
G.R. No. 17122. February 27, 1922
FACTS:

 At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making
an appropriation for this purpose,"
 the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold
 a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price. he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine
 from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No.
53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in
imposing the sentence
ISSUE: WON ACT 2868 IS A VALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
RULING: NO!

 The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself
and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power
and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and
some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor General, the act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
 The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other
and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and
different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General', and a delegation by him of that power to provincial
treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by
the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a
subdelegation of that power.
 We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the
Governor General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale
of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged
#15
#16
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner appellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,
respondent-appellee. G.R. No. L-16704. March 17, 1962
FACTS:

 Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22: “all Employers in computing the premiums due
the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay”
 petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in
effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7,
1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees'
respective monthly premium contributions and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at
a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their
observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words
"compensation", "remuneration" and "wages"
 Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the
approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere
administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the
law should be construed.
ISSUE: WON Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the
President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this
Act."
RULING: MERE REGULATION

 When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force
and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law
 A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its
scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement
with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit.. 195-197). On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
 Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of
the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f ) of
Republic Act No. 1161
 It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given
in addition to the regular or base pay were -expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the
term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became
necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination.
Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding
of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or
detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the
Commission as to how the law should be construed.
WHEREFORE, RESOLUTION APPEALED FROM IS AFFIRMED

#17
LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED),
Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997
FACTS:

 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner of Layugan’s action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck of forest products without required documents
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277
 Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated order of RED, which was, however, denied in
a subsequent order
 Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private
respondents’ statement in their letter that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then
“this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.”
 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, was filed by the private respondents
against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the RTC, Branch 2 of Cagayan which
issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents
 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies
 RTC denied the motion to dismiss
 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioners with the respondent CA which sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal question
 Hence, this present petition
ISSUES:
 1. WON w/out violating the principle of exhaustion of admin remedies, an action for replevin may
prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D 705
2. WON Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government
RULING:
1. NO!
 This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. (DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES)
 The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent
any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies
 It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and
disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and
plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now,
without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek the court’s intervention by
filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings
 Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the DENR
 The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes
an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative
 XPNs to the rule: (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when
there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,(8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim,(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,(10) when
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention
 BUT, none of the exceptions apply to the instant case
 First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23,
1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard One may
be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration,31 as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the
opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which
was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan
 Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because
the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. It
is thus clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations
 the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR. Courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.

#18
ROSITO BAGUNU, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT,
respondents.
G.R. No. 186487. August 15, 2011
FACTS:

 unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land) pending before DENR-RFO2
 The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo
Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag
 Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands
Management Bureau).
 Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free
patent applicant. The parties’ deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot
subject of Atty. Binag’s pending free patent application.
 respondents filed a protest against the petitioner’s free patent application. The respondents asserted
ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971
and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista
 DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application
since this lot belongs to the respondents
 On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional Office
 The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA
ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate
administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR
Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality
 The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court
 during the pendency of the respondents’ protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of
instruments with the Cabagan, Isabela RTC
 After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretary’s favorable resolution on the respondents’ protest, the
respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretary’s
ruling
ISSUE:

 WON the determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENR’s exclusive jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of lands of the public domain
RULING:

 YES!
 While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the court’s jurisdiction to
resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands
 The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative
findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership
of the property
 For his part, the petitioner’s act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an
acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land whose management and
disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands
 Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192, the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the
duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (C.A. No. 141) by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or
any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain
 This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the
administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the public
domain
 The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands,
must likewise determine the applicant’s entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent
 After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the
exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction,33 such
as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property
 Under the DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, courts must refrain from determining a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its
resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact
 Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al.,: the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to
questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical determination
 by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand
aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency
WHEREFORE, MR DENIED.
Note.—The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. (Smart Communications, Inc.
[SMART] vs. National Telecommunications Commission [NTC], 408 SCRA 678 [2003])

#19
ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P. OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGA-SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN DRILON and MAYOR JINGGOY ESTRADA
(JOSE EJERCITO) OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 118233. December 10, 1999
FACTS:

 The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax ordinances
 On May 21, 1993, petitioners filed an appeal with the Department of Justice assailing the
constitutionality of these tax ordinances allegedly because they were promulgated without previous
public hearings thereby constituting deprivation of property without due process of law
 On June 10, 1993, respondent Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of
time
 Petitioners filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition but CA affirmed decision of Secretary.
The MR filed by petitioners was denied for lack of merit
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Secretary of Justice who dismissed the
prohibition suit, on the ground that it was filed out of time
2. WON Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan did not comply with the prescribed procedure for
enacting an ordinance because they failed to conduct public hearings
RULING:
1. NO
 Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160: the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance
must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the
Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court.
But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to
seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite
before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well
as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this reason, the courts construe
these provisions of statutes as mandatory
 A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the
most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local
government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in
implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests
over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames
 In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of petitioners to appeal to the Secretary of Justice
within 30 days as required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to their cause

2. NO
 In any event, for the purpose of securing certainty where doubt would be intolerable, it is a general rule
that the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute or ordinance may not be
impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of individual officers and members, or of
strangers who may be interested in nullifying legislative action.11 This rule supplements the
 presumption in favor of the regularity of official conduct which we have upheld repeatedly, absent a
clear showing to the contrary
 Proof that public hearings were not held falls on petitioners’ shoulders. For failing to discharge that
burden, their petition was properly dismissed
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DISMISSED
Note.—It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality. (Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 [1997])

#20
GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO E.
ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH
REGIONAL DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER ANGELITO M. TWAÑO, FELIX
A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND
LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C. SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2ND
ENGINEERING DISTRICT, petitioners, vs. ARNULFO D. AQUINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 180388. January 18, 2011
FACTS:

 petitioner Angelito M. Twaño, then OIC-DE of DPWH-2nd DEO of Pampanga sent an Invitation to Bid to
respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino, the owner of A.D. Aquino Construction and Supplies. The bidding was
for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac River at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle,
Guagua, Pampanga
 the project was awarded to respondent, and a “Contract of Agreement” was thereafter executed
between him and concerned petitioners
 By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of
Project Completion dated 16 July 1992. The certificate was signed by Romeo M. Yumul, the Project
Engineer; as well as petitioner Romeo N. Supan, Chief of the Construction Section, and by petitioner
Twaño
 Respondent Aquino, however, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners refused
to pay the amount. He thus filed a Complaint3 for the collection of sum of money with damages before
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
 Petitioners, for their part, set up the defense4 that the Complaint was a suit against the state; that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of Agreement” covering
the project was void for violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper appropriation and the
Certificate of Availability of Funds
 RTC ruled in favor of Aquino
 CA reversed RTC
ISSUE:

 WON respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies

RULING:

 NO
 the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions
to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue
 of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings
 In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.
 The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To
delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely
prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the validity and the
enforceability of the “Contract of Agreement” entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of
law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH
 Secondly, in ordering the payment of the obligation due respondent on a quantum meruit basis, the
Court of Appeals correctly relied on Royal Trust Corporation v. COA, Eslao v. COA, Melchor v. COA,
EPG Construction Company v. Vigilar,13 and Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates,
Architects.
 All these cases involved government projects undertaken in violation of the relevant laws, rules and
regulations covering public bidding, budget appropriations, and release of funds for the projects.
Consistently in these cases, this Court has held that the contracts were void for failing to meet the
requirements mandated by law; public interest and equity, however, dictate that the contractor should
be compensated for services rendered and work done
 The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9
July 1992. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by
respondent.
 Court of Appeals was correct in applying Eslao to the present case: ‘To deny the payment to the
contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully completed and presently occupied by the
university would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice
and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit”
 Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate respondent for services rendered and
work done by invoking the state’s immunity from suit. This Court has long established in Ministerio v.
CFI of Cebu,16 and recently reiterated in Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO,17 that the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DENIED.

#21
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND
PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING, respondents.
G.R. No. 120567. March 20, 1998
FACTS:

 Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their
alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong
 Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction
 the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from
enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of dismissal
 petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC erred in granting a temporary injunction
order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only
under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes
 MR denied
ISSUE:

 WON the NLRC may, even without complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter, entertain
an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. from enforcing its
Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private
respondents to their previous positions
RULING:

 NO!
  injunction is a preservative remedy resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before
the main case be regularly heard
 From the provisions of Art. 218 of the Labor Code and Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from “any labor dispute” upon
application by a party thereof, which application if not granted “may cause grave or irreparable damage
to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.”
 The term “labor dispute” is defined as “any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.”
 The term “controversy” is likewise defined as “a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of
law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute.”
 A “justiciable controversy” is “one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side
and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue.”
 Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential requirement that there must first be a
labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no
labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for
illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner
 In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it
cannot entertain the private respondents’ petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of
petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its
divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor dispute
 Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private
respondents’ petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents
 In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a
petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.
Note.—The office of the writ of injunction is to restrain the wrongdoer not to protect him. (Villanueva vs. Court
of Appeals, 259 SCRA 14 [1996])

#22
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY,
BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARAÑAQUE CITY, ROBERTO GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS PUNONG
BARANGAY AND MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 156686. July 27, 2011
FACTS;

 The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the “BSV Sangguniang Barangay”) issued BSV
Resolution No. 98-0963 entitled “Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic,”
 The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI) filed a Petition for a “Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO” with the RTC of Parañaque City
claiming that implementation of BSV Resolution opening the roads to public use is a violation of the
rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful environment
 RTC issued a TRO
 NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition: BSV Sangguniang Barangay had no jurisdiction over the
opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the “subject roads”) and that a Barangay Resolution cannot
validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect
such an act
 RTC ruled in favor of NSVHAI
 RTC subsequently dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiff to exhaust the administrative remedies
under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government Code
  CA affirmed RTC
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
RULING:
1. YES
 We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s recourse in
questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of Parañaque City, as clearly
stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code
 It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it acted within the
scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the
local government
 Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible error in
dismissing the case for petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under
the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance,
instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to the City
Government of Parañaque
 the local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local
Government Code, Section 21
 Having been already donated or turned over to the City Government of Parañaque, the road lots in
question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of
man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant
 As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also
failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor
as provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be denied
WHEREFORE, PETITON IS DENIED.

Note.—Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him; Exceptions. (Diokno vs. Cacdac, 526 SCRA
440 [2007])

#23
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman;
HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Lu-zon; and NESTOR V.
AGUSTIN, respondents. G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
FACTS:

 Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent (Nestor Agustin, incumbent
District Engr of 1st Metro Manila Engg District) gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and
interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office
 Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner
tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats
 She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint for
violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree)
 Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law
 Ombudsman, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty
of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year
 petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently
provides that: “In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)”
 she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman),2 when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative
proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable
 She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in
the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to
limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure,
she claims that she found it “necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
 Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can
 Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the
Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it, including those rules with respect to the
availability or non-availability of appeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 0
 the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is “an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the ‘Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)’ issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-
95-0411, entitled ‘Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A,
EDSA, Quezon City,’ which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct,
among others.”
ISSUE: WON APPEALS FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES CAN BE DIRECTLY FILED TO THE
SUPREME COURT
RULING: NO!

 the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
 Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only
from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated (court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law) in Section 1 thereof
 Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies
 we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular
courts
 Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions
  Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court
 Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional
 In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only
 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That
right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed

#24
ERDITO QUARTO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M. TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS
A. GAYYA - G.R. No. 169042. October 5, 2011
FACTS:

 The petitioner is the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH. The respondents are
members of the SIT
 In the course of its investigation, the DPWH-IAS11 learned that the emergency repairs and/or purchase
of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles basically undergo documentary process
 DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or purchase
of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the
government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million
for this ten-month period alone
 Thus, Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint
Affidavit and a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and
employees—including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly
benefited from the anomalous transactions— with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and
violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code
 After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several
information charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through
falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019
 On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents’ request for immunity in exchange for
their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
 The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsman’s
grant of immunity in the respondents’ favor. The Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsman’s actions before this
Court. Hence, this present petition.
 The petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have included the respondents in the information
since it was their inspection reports that actually paved the way for the commission of the alleged
irregularities.24 The petitioner asserts that the respondents’ criminal complicity clearly appears since
“no repair could have started” and “no payment for repairs, ghost or not,” could have been made
without the respondents’ pre-repair and post-repair inspection reports. By excluding the respondents in
the information, the Ombudsman is engaged in “selective prosecution” which is a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion.
 The Ombudsman counters that RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) expressly grants him the
power to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary course of law
2. WON respondents’ exclusion in the information is valid
3. WON petitioner was able to establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in
granting immunity to the respondents
RULING:
 1. YES. As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that he moved
for a reconsideration of the assailed resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this
present petition. Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents in the
information before filing the present petition. These are adequate remedies that the petitioner chose to
forego; he bypassed these remedies and proceeded to seek recourse through the present petition.

2. YES. Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law
upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only
be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised
 In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different
from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of
discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause
(that must be established for the filing of an information in court) and the degree of participation of
those involved or the lack thereof
 If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some
individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies44 since he is duty-bound, as a
rule, to include in the information all persons who appear responsible for the offense involve
 Congress saw it fit to grant the Ombudsman the power to directly confer immunity to enable his office to
effectively carry out its constitutional and statutory mandate of ensuring effective accountability in the
public service
 The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of the
process and is essentially an executive function
 RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant
immunity, subject to “such terms and conditions” as he may determine. The only textual limitation
imposed by law on this authority is the need to take “into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court,”—i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
 Thus, it is the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the
accused witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms
 An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsman’s exercise
of discretion

3. NO. Under the factual and legal situation before us, we find that the petitioner miserably failed to clearly
and convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity to
the respondents.
 The better view is that the Ombudsman simply saw the higher value of utilizing the respondents
themselves as witnesses instead of prosecuting them in order to fully establish and strengthen its case
against those mainly responsible for the criminal act, as indicated by the available evidence
 The fact that the respondents had previously been found administratively liable, based on the same set
of facts, does not necessarily make them the “most guilty.” An administrative case is altogether different
from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same
disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts.82 The most that we can
read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have been found to be administratively guilty by
substantial evidence—the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding
 paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,87 the Court reiterates its policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them,
the power to grant immunity to witnesses), and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the
integrity of the public service.”
 Following this policy, we deem it neither appropriate nor advisable to interfere with the Ombudsman’s
grant of immunity to the respondents, particularly in this case, where the petitioner has not clearly and
convincingly shown the grave abuse of discretion that would call for our intervention
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DISMISSED.
Note.—The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately
executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. (Office of the Ombudsman
vs. Samaniego, 632 SCRA 140 [2010])

#25
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents. G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998
FACTS:

 The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private
respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No.
III, in San Fernando, Pampanga
 the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.
 private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving
credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a “volunteer” and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home
 the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the
labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution for lack of merit,
 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
ISSUE: WON petitioner correctly appealed the decision of NLRC directly to the SUPREME COURT
RULING: NO

 under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC
 R.A. No. 7902, Section 9: CA shall have jurisdiction except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
 our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be
by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original
action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in
almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
 A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may
have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications
of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the
intended mode of review
 The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC
 there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact,
has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous
factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for
expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
 the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any
further or subsequent remedy,12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
decision.
 Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired
WHEREFORE, the petition is REMANDED to COURT OF APPEALS
Notes.—It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative
power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. (San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of
Labor, 64 SCRA 56 [1975]) The fact that P.D. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial review of NHA
decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does not necessarily preclude judicial review. The
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or quo warranto (Rules 65 and 66) are always available
in proper cases where there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The power of the Supreme Court to strike down acts which infringe on constitutional protections or to
nullify administrative decisions contrary to constitutional mandates cannot be reduced or circumscribed by any
statute or decree. No statute is needed to bring arbitrary acts or decisions within our jurisdiction (Tropical
Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987])
#26
ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO BARREDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. 161596. February 20, 2013
FACTS:

 the IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union), representing the workers, had a bargaining
deadlock with the IPI management. This deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike and IPI
ordering a lockout.
 DOLE Secretary Decision: against IPI
 IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly to SC through a petition for certiorari but the
Court dismissed its petition on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion had attended the issuance
of the assailed decisions. Considering that IPI did not seek the reconsideration of the dismissal of its
petition, the entry of judgment issued in due course
 Aggrieved by the reinstatement of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, IPI moved for a reconsideration
 pending resolution of IPI’s motion for reconsideration, Regional Director Macaraya issued a writ of
execution in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado to recover P3,416,402.10 pursuant
to the order dated August 27, 1996 of Secretary Quisumbing
 Virgilio Saragena, et al. brought to this Court a petition for certiorari to assail the December 24, 1997
and March 27, 1998 Orders of the Secretary of Labor
 Ultimately, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued her Order affirming the order issued on March
27, 1998, and declaring that the full execution of the order of March 27, 1998 “completely CLOSED and
TERMINATED this case.”
 Only herein petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, et al assailed the July 4, 2001 order of Secretary Sto.
Tomas by petition for certiorari in the CA
 The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under the April 12, 1995 notice of
computation/ execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya, only the first two groups, that is, the 15
employees initially represented by Atty. Arnado; and the nine salesmen led by Geronimo S. Banquirigo,
had been granted a writ of execution.
 The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,41 but the CA denied the motion on October 30,
2003.Hence, they commenced this special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON THE PRESENT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED
RULING:
1. YES
 Firstly, an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to be taken to
this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order raising only questions of law, was
the proper remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition for certiorari on January
9, 2004 to assail the CA’s May 30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
65970 upon their allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper
 The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the filing of the petition
for certiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course under Rule 45 was not an
adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or
substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course.
 It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether a special civil
action for certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy
 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court still requires the petition for certiorari to comply with the following
requisites, namely: (1) the writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
 Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be
deemed proper, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party;
(b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be
 danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where
the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency
 Yet, a reading of the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals that the petition does not come under
any of the situations
 In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner
carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not a merely reversible error but a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order
 Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasijudicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for its lack of merit; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on May 30, 2003; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Notes.―The computation of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement includes the period for which
backwages were awarded. (Aliling vs. Feliciano, 671 SCRA 186 [2012]) If reinstatement proves
impracticable, and hardly in the best interest of the parties, due to the lapse of time since the
employee’s dismissal, the latter should be awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. (Park Hotel
vs. Soriano, 680 SCRA 328 [2012])
#27
GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P. ALDON, and
RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 215847. January 12, 2016
FACTS:

 Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code). Coercion, as an election
offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years. Notably,
Section 68 of the Election Code provides that the Commission may administratively disqualify a
candidate who violates Section 261(d) or (e).
 Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised
Penal Code. It increased the penalty for coercion committed in violation of a person’s right to suffrage
to prision mayor. Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d)(1) and
(2) of the Election Code
 Valderrama Municipal Vice Mayor Christopher B. Maguad filed an administrative complaint for Gross
Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U.
Roquero
 Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution No. 291-2012 recommending to Antique Governor
Exequiel Javier (Gov. Javier) the preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero
 Mayor Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO before
RTC against Gov. Javier and the members of the SP to restrain them from proceeding with Admin
Case which was granted by court
 Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013, preventively suspending Mayor Roquero for thirty
(30) days
 SP of Antique issued a decision finding Mayor Roquero guilty of Grave Misconduct in relation with
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and Grave Abuse of Authority in relation with Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 6713.
The SP suspended her for four (4) months
 Aldon and Roquero sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and the other incumbent officials from
running in the 2013 elections on the ground that the latter committed the election offenses of
Coercion of Subordinates [Sec. 261(d)] and Threats, Intimidation, Terrorism x x x or Other
Forms of Coercion [Sec. 261(e)] by suspending Mayor Roquero
 the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-254 (DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier
and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of Antique. The resolution was penned by
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph
 The COMELEC ruled that Gov. Javier’s act of preventively suspending Mayor Roquero during the
election period ban fell within the contemplation of Section 261(d) of the Election Code, which is a
ground for disqualification under Section 68. It held that while Section 261(d) of the Election Code was
repealed by Republic Act No. 7890, it did not remove coercion “as a ground per se for disqualification
under [Section] 68.”
 Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia dissented from the resolution. Commissioner Guia reasoned that the
legal basis to dismiss Gov. Javier no longer exists because Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7890 had
repealed Section 261(d) of the Election Code
 The Commission En Banc agreed, as a matter of internal arrangement, to submit their respective
opinions explaining their respective votes or their concurrence with either Commissioner Yusoph or
Commissioner Guia.
 the vote was 4-2-1 in favor of disqualification of Gov Javier and annulled his proc as Gov
ISSUES:

 WON the Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion on the basis of an already
repealed law
RULING:

 YES
 Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Commission’s act of fixing the election period does not
amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The Commission did not prescribe or define the
elements of election offenses. Congress already defined them through the Omnibus Election Code, the
Fair Elections Act, and other pertinent election laws
  Election Code only applies to criminal prosecutions. Disqualification cases are summary in nature and
governed by Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
 Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal
hearing is not always necessary and the observance of technical rules of procedure is not strictly
applied in administrative proceedings. The essence of administrative due process is the right to be
heard and to be given an opportunity to explain one’s side. Where the Commission hears both sides
and considers their contentions, the requirements of administrative due process are complied with.
 When the Commission En Banc, as a matter of internal arrangement, agreed among themselves to
submit their own opinion explaining their respective vote or merely their concurrence with either
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph or Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia’s position on the matter, no legal or
ethical impediment existed preventing him (Commissioner Arthur Lim) from subsequently participating
in the deliberations and from casting his vote.
 The COMELEC Rules specifically authorize the Commission to suspend the strict application of its
rules in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases. In this case, the Commission
suspended Rule 18, Section 1. The Commission, as a body, dispensed with the preparation of another
ponencia and opted to vote on the legal positions of Commissioners Yusoph and Guia. Nevertheless,
the decision was evidently reached through consultation.
 Moreover, the Commission resorted to this arrangement because, as the petitioner pointed out, three
Commissioners were retiring soon. There was a need to resolve the cases because the impending
vacancies would have resulted in further delay. Contrary to the petitioner’s insinuations, “midnight
decisions” are not illegal. Judges and other quasi-judicial officers cannot sit back, relax, and refuse to
do their work just because they are nearing retirement or are near the end of their term
 We note that the vote was divided and dissents were filed, thereby indicating the absence of any
malicious departure from the usual procedures in arriving at the Commission’s ruling on the case.
 No less than the Constitution empowers the Commission to decide all questions affecting elections
except those involving the right to vote. It is the sole arbiter of all issues involving elections. Hence,
unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by COMELEC
cannot be reviewed even by this Court
 An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; they only
involve errors in the court or tribunal’s appreciation of the facts and the law. An error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
 HOWEVER,
 With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer existed. As we
held in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, [t]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify
candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other
election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature
 Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is
confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice
 There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, where power is
exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility
amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility
 To our mind, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it disqualified Gov. Javier based on a
provision of law that had already been expressly repealed. Its stubborn insistence that R.A. No. 7890
merely impliedly repealed Section 261(d) despite the clear wordings of the law, amounted to an
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of judgment.

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED AND COMELEC ORDER IS SET ASIDE.

#28
DIONNIE RICAFORT, complainant, vs. ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, respondent.
A.C. No. 5179. May 31, 2016
FACTS:

 Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene O.
Medina
 on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped respondent’s car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City.3
Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at com
plainant, saying: “Wa ka makaila sa ako?” (“Do you not know me?”) Respondent proceeded to slap
complainant, and then left
 Attached to complainant’s letter were his Affidavit, traffic aide Manuel Cuizon’s Affidavit, and a letter
signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del
Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped complainant and caused
him great humiliation. Thus, respondent should be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct
and abuse of authority. Attached to Mayor Navarro’s letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures
of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao del Norte
 respondent denied slapping complainant. Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself. Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against his son and himself,
respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic
officer. Both parties agreed that they were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a
sketch. No traffic officer was present during the incident.
 According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of the
incident during the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay
Washington, Surigao City
 this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation
 Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on
July 20, 2007
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors issued the Resolution suspending Atty. Medina
from the practice of law for 30 days
ISSUE:

 WON Atty. Medina should be held administratively liable

RULING:

 YES!
 In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of evidence,
or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of “greater weight than the other.”
 In this case, complainant discharged this burden
 The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized Affidavit;
complainant’s Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit of a traffic aide present
during the incident
 In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent, Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the
letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that “the people’s faith in the legal profession eroded”
because of respondent’s act of slapping complainant. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of
Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.
 The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who
are no longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and
harassment committed by its officers.
 Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
 Respondent’s question to complainant, “Wa ka makaila sa ako?” (“Do you not know me?”) confirms
such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and
discrimination.
  This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is
unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted
the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission.
 This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties’ rights. Rather,
they are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer’s fitness to
continue holding the privileges of being a court officer
 As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses. They
are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of administrative
liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings
 Hence, complainant’s absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a
bar against a finding of administrative liability

WHEREFORE, ATTY. MEDINA IS FOUND TO HAVE VIOLATED CANON 7, RULE 7.03 OF THE CPR, AND
IS SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR 3 MONTHS

#29
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) and ATTY. MARIA CONCEPCION
S. NOCHE, in her own behalf and as President of ALFI, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO,
ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS, EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALVACION C. MONTIERO,
MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI and MILDRED C. CASTOR,
petitioners, vs. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary Designate of the Department of Health, NICOLAS
B. LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of Health, Officer-in Charge, Food and Drug Administration, and
MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, Officer-in-Charge, Center for Drug Regulation and Research,
respondents.
G.R. No. 217872. August 24, 2016. (CONSOLIDATED CASES)
FACTS:

 Petitioner Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) believed that the contraceptives enumerated
in the Notice fell within the definition of “abortifacient” under Section 4(a) of the RH Law because of
their “secondary mechanism of action which induces abortion or destruction of the fetus inside the
mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb.” For said reason, ALFI, through its president, Maria Concepcion S. Noche (Noche), filed its
preliminary opposition, dated October 8, 2014, to all 50 applications with the FDA. The same opposition
also questioned some twenty-seven (27) other contraceptive drugs and devices that had existing FDA
registrations that were not subjects of any application for reevaluation/recertification.
 Notwithstanding this, FDA issued two (2) certificates of product registration9 for the hormonal
contraceptives, “Implanon” and “Implanon NXT.”
 The petitioners also contend that due to lack of any procedure, rules and regulations and consultations
for reevaluation/recertification of contraceptive drugs and devices, the FDA had also violated the
rudimentary requirements of due process
 The petitioners allege that despite the Court’s declaration in Imbong vs. Ochoa that several portions of
the RH Law and the RH-IRR are unconstitutional, the DOH has not effected any amendment in the RH-
IRR to conform with the Court’s judgment. They claim that the RH-IRR posted on the DOH website still
contain the provisions which were declared by the Court to be unconstitutional
 Court issued TRO
 In their Comment, the respondents, through the OSG, argued that petitioners failed to establish not only
the direct injury that they had suffered, or would suffer, but also the transcendental importance of the
issues raised as a result of [1] the issuance of certificates of registration and the re-certification of
contraceptive drugs and devices; and [2] the purchase of Implanon and Implanon NXT
ISSUES:
1. WON certiorari is proper to challenge acts of the FDA
2. WON FDA violated due process when it issued recertification to some drugs
RULING:
1. YES!
  the Court dismisses the notion that the re-certification of contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in
exercise of its regulatory function is beyond judicial review. After all, the Constitution mandates that
judicial power include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government
2. YES!
 Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that a particular
act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both
the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof
 Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person
to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or
steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without
arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it
 Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as
the right to due process in investigations and hearings
 FDA certified, procured and administered such contraceptive drugs and devices, without the
observance of the basic tenets of due process, without notice and without public hearing, despite the
constant opposition from the petitioners. From the records, it appears that other than the notice inviting
stakeholders to apply for certification/recertification of their reproductive health products, there was no
showing that the respondents notified the oppositors and conducted a hearing on the applications and
oppositions submitted
 Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and
administrative proceedings
 The fact that the FDA is not among the agencies enumerated in Rule 43 as subject of a petition for
review to the CA is of no consequence. In Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, the Court disagreed with the
opinion of the CA that the enumeration of the agencies mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 43 was
exclusive (30 days from notice of judgment)
WHEREFORE, CASE IS REMANDED TO THE FDA which is hereby ordered to observe the basic
requirements of due process by conducting a hearing, and allowing the petitioners to be heard, on the
recertified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, including Implanon and
Implanon NXT, and to determine whether they are abortifacients or nonabortifacients
The respondents are hereby also ordered to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations to
conform to the rulings and guidelines in G.R. No. 204819 and related cases.
The above foregoing directives notwithstanding, within 30 days from receipt of this disposition, the
Food and Drugs Administration should commence to conduct the necessary hearing guided by the
cardinal rights of the parties laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR
 
Note.—To determine whether the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari or a petition for review,
what is decisive is whether or not the challenged order is a final order that disposes of the merits of the case.
(Department of Labor and Employment [DOLE] vs. Maceda, 610 SCRA 266 [2010])

#30
SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, PETITIONER, V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 229288, August 01, 2018
FACTS:

 Six different criminal complaints were filed by the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman including petitioner Sherwin Gatchalian who was specifically complained of (a) violation
of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019); (b) Malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (c) violation of Section X126.2 (c) (1), (2) and (3) of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks (MORB) in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 (R.A. 7653
  The said complaint arose from the sale of shares in Express Savings Bank, Inc. (ESBI), in which
Gatchalian was a stockholder, in 2009, to Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), a government-
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC)
 the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian
 Ombudsman denied MRs of the respondents
 Aggrieved, Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
and sought to annul the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order of the Ombudsman for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. He argued that the Ombudsman made a general conclusion without
specifying a "series of acts" done by him that would "clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common
intent or design to commit a crime.
 The OSG argued that the CA had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, as the decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases were unappealable and may thus be assailed only through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court. On the merits, it maintained that the Joint
Resolution and the Joint Order were based on evidence, and were thus issued without grave abuse of
discretion.
 The CA held that it had no jurisdiction over the case and opined that the Morales ruling should be
understood in its proper context, i.e., that what was assailed therein was the preventive suspension
order arising from an administrative case filed against a public official
 Gatchalian sought reconsideration of the CA's Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. He
reiterated his arguments in the petition, and maintained that the CA has jurisdiction over the case by
virtue of the ruling in Morales. MR denied
ISSUE:

 WON CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 for its alleged
lack of jurisdiction over the said case.
RULING:

 NO!
 The Court thus held that "appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43."
 Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario: However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the
Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting. to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
 Estrada v. Desierto: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the finding
of the existence of probable cause --- or the lack thereof ---- by the Ombudsman should be filed with
the Supreme Court; Kuizon and the subsequent case of Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) drove home the point that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of
the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the
Court of Appeals
 In the Morales case, what was involved was the preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman against Jejomar Binay, Jr. (Binay) in an administrative case filed against the latter.
The preventive suspension order was questioned by Binay in the CA via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
 The Court agrees with the CA that the Morales decision should be read and viewed in its proper
context. The Court in Morales held that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 filed therein because what was assailed in the said petition was a preventive
suspension order, which was an interlocutory order and thus unappealable, issued by the Ombudsman.
Consistent with the rationale of Estrada, the Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
proper as R.A. 6770 did not provide for an appeal procedure for interlocutory orders issued by the
Ombudsman. The Court also held that it was correctly filed with the CA because the preventive
suspension order was an incident of an administrative case. The Court in Morales was thus applying
only what was already well established in jurisprudence.
 To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause
(or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the
Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr., Mendoza-Arce v.
Ombudsman,[44] Estrada, and subsequent cases affirming the said rule. The rule was, therefore, not
anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of
its rule-making powers. The declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore
immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal
cases is concerned.
 The argument therefore that the promulgation of the Morales decision — a case which involved an
interlocutory order arising from an administrative case, and which did not categorically abandon the
cases of Kuizon, Tirol, Jr., Mendoza-Arce, and Estrada — gave the CA certiorari jurisdiction over final
orders and decisions arising from nonadministrative or criminal cases is clearly untenable
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DENIED
 START OF MIDTERMS
#31 MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-
Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.
FACTS:
 COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the Education and Info Dept (EID)
 Commissioner Javier renewed appointment of petitioner to the same position in a “Temporary” capacity
 Pres Arroyo appointed, ad interim Benipayo as COMELEC Chair, and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners,
each for a term of 7 yrs
 OP submitted to CA the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason for confirmation, however CA
did not act on said appointments
 Pres Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason to the same positions and for
the same term of 7 yrs for a 2nd time
 Benipayo issued a Memo addressed to petitioner designating Cinco OIC of the EID and reassigning peti to the
Law Dept
 Peti requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
 Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning
January 2 until June 13, 2001."
 Benipayo denied her request for consideration
 Peti appealed and also filed an admin and crim complaint against Benipayo
 Peti claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members
 In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the  ad
interim appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners,
respectively, for a term of seven years expiring on February 2
ISSUES:
1. WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the  ad interim appointments issued
by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the
same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

3. WON Benipayo’s removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a
collegial body;
RULING:
1. NO
 An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.
 The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character
 The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides
 More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim appointment is permanent in
character; Summers vs. Ozaeta: It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character
 The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad
interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de
jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office
 Petitioner cites Black’s Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in the meantime" or "for the
time being."
 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. IAC: Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said appointments
were made, that is, done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which
is originally vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable to act
 Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of
the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again
occasion to explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. CA

 Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but
also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.

 An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution: (1)
disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the CA; (2) adjournment of Congress without the CA
acting on his appointment
  The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution
which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately

 Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose
either of 2 modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments: (1) while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee,
and pending consent of the CA, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office; (2) during the recess of
Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to
immediately qualify and assume office.

2. NO
 An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the CA to organize is
another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by
the CA at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the CA to give or withhold
its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of
the Rules of the CA

 Hence, under the Rules of the CA, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President
renews the appointment.

 The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments

 A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is

no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not
result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of 7 years.

 However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the CA does not constitute a term of
office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a
fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral
action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of
the CA. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the CA.

3. NO
 Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the
powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective
 The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority
to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law
 Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive
Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as
prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission.
Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin
Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal
 permanent appointment can be issued only ‘to a person who meets all the requirements for the position
to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed
 Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of the necessary
qualifications to hold the position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming that her
reassignment was contrary to the Civil Service Law
 The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or
reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to
COMELEC field personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner

 Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and
reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en banc
to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.

WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DISMISSED

#32 LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, petitioner vs. RAMON S. ROCO, respondent
GR 143366 and GR 143524

FACTS:
 Roco was appointed by Pres. Fidel Ramos on Aug 26, 1996 as RD of LTO-Region V, a position equivalent
to CES rank level V. Pres. Estrada re-appointed him to same position on Feb 8, 1999. At time of apptment in
1996 and 1999, he was not a CES eligible. However, during his incumbency on Aug 13, 1999, he was
conferred CES eligibility by the CES Board.
 On Sept 7, 1999, Peti, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by Pres. Estrada as RD of LTO-Region V,
same position as resp. DOTC Undersec issued Memo directing peti to assume office
 Aggrieved, Roco filed before CA a petition for quo warranto w/ prayer for issuance of writ of prelim injunc
and/or TRO. CA issued a TRO enabling Roco to re-assume office. After lapse of 60 days, General again
assumed office.
 CA affirmed apptment of Roco, and nullified apptment of General
 Hence, petition for review under Rule 45
ISSUES:
1. WON CES eligibility alone will not suffice and unless and until an employee in the Career Executive Service
is appointed to the appropriate CES rank, he acquires no security of tenure
RULING:
1. YES
 Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law: Permanent status. – A permanent appointment shall be issued to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated
in pursuance thereof
 In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent
appointment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board: Passing the CES
examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name
in the roster of CES eligible
Levels of Duties and Responsibilities Rank
Equivalent

if level of managerial responsibilities are I

comparable to that of an Undersecretary

If comparable to that of an Assistant Secretary II

if comparable to that of a Bureau Director, or a III

Department Regional Director

if comparable to that of an Assistant Bureau IV

Director, Department Assistant Regional
Director or Department Service Chief

if comparable to that of Bureau Regional V

Director

if comparable to that of a Bureau Assistant VI

Regional Director

 As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, 2 requisites must concur in order that an employee in the
career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit:
a) CES eligibility; and
b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank
 a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without
losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no
diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated
according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies
  In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not
possess the appropriate CES rank, which is – CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the
LTO (Region V)
 Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot
successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other
positions in the career executive service
 Evidently, the law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said
eligibility, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES
rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary
capacity.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

#33 PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, petitioner, vs. BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman of
the National Labor Relations Commission, EDNA BONTO PEREZ, LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G.
LADRIDO III, MUSIB M. BUAT, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, IRENEO B. BERNARDO,
IRENEA E. CENIZA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA, RUSTICO L.
DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN and OSCAR N. ABELLA, in their capacity as Commissioners of the
National Labor Relations Commission, and GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget
and Management, respondents.G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992

FACTS:

 This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

 Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity.
RA 6715 is not, according to petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive
contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
CA of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of
the issue in this case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the
respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which
requires the confirmation by the CA of such appointments.
 The SG, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Sec 16,
Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the CA w/out constitutional basis

 Respondent reiterates that if confirmation is required, the three (3) stage process of nomination,
confirmation and appointment operates. This is only true of the first group enumerated in Section 16, but the
word nominate does not any more appear in the 2nd and 3rd sentences. Therefore, the president's
appointment pursuant to the 2nd and 3rd sentences needs no confirmation. 

ISSUE:

 WON Congress, may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments extended by the pres to govt
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the 1 st sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Consti whose
appointments require confirmation by the CA

RULING:

 NO. Mison case: there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:

 1st, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution

 2nd, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law

 3rd, those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint

 4th, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone

 Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e.
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
  Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the CA

 To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman
and Members of the NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:

 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the CA

 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the CA on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President

 Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial
function.

 The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity
of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the CA
over appointments of the Chairman and Member of the NLRC is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are
to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof

 It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously,
intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935
Constitution where the CA exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments,
leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as
it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and
Members of the NLRC is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effec

#34 ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. Nos. 174730-37               February 9, 2011
FACTS:
 Ong was elected Mayor of LGU Naga, Cebu in 1988 and served as such until 1998.
 Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of
Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I
 In their SALN, Galeos and Rivera answered “No” to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?"
 SB members of Naga filed a letter-complaint against Ong (then incumbent Vice Mayor), before the Office of
the Ombudsman, Galeso, and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for
the crime of falsification of public documents
 the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong
 In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements in
his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus silence or non-disclosure cannot
be considered one. And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they were not
made in a "narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of law." He also
argues that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to support the finding that he was aware of
their relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of good faith, Galeos
avers that the fourth element of the crime – the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made
with the wrongful intent of injuring a 3rd person – is missing. He also faults the Sandiganbayan for its
heavy reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution’s sole witness despite the fact that
there are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.
 Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a
narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the
execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely
administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer
administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or veracity of the contents of the document.
Neither can he be made liable for falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there was
no evidence adduced that it was made to support Rivera’s appointment.

ISSUE:
 WON petitioners are guilty of the crime under Art. 171 of RPC: Falsification by public officer,
employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister

RULING:
 YES
 All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been
established by the prosecution
 In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call
for an application of law in a particular set of facts.
 The question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, statements concerning relationship may
be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion.
 When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such
information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the
RPC.
 Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the
employee’s eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on
the appointing power.
 Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the
government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein
as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters).
 No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority
 Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993
are appointments in the LGUs of persons who are related to the appointing or recommending authority
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity.
 Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are
those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
 In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or
recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
 The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and
reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants
 As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification
recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos’ appointment although he admitted only the authenticity
and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on nepotistic
appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 79 41 of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a
solemn affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity.
 Having executed the certification despite his knowledge that he and Rivera were related to each other
within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of
Rivera’s wife is the sister of Ong’s mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making
untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the
appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification.
 Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a head of office or
appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in violation of Civil Service Law
and Rules or who commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts concerning
other civil service matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or neglects to comply with any of such
provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable.
 Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.
 WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
#35 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, respondent.
G.R. No. 135805 April 29, 1999

FACTS:
 George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the
Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual
drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism
 Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the
charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his
two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under
his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator as Balicuatro College of
Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service
 Dacoycoy filed MR with CSC but denied
 Dacoycoy filed with CA a special civil action for certiorari
 The CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of CSC
 Hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
 WON THE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF NEPOTISM
RULING:
 YES

 Sec. 59. Nepotism. — (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments
or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations,
made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or
office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

 As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

 Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

 a) appointing authority;

 b) recommending authority;
  c) chief of the bureau or office, and

 d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

 In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is.
To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
 Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades,
Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of
driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag,
Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr.
Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen, security
guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of 3 to 6
months

 The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a
subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr.
Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then
Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under
respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions
are career positions.

 Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In
Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also
strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or
abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now
is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the "outstanding" civil servants, but also to plug the
hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal
procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law." 

 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.

#36 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and

ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, Respondents. G.R. NO. 164185 : July 23, 2008

FACTS:
 Mayor Villapando designated Tiape (losing mayoralty candidate) as Municipal Administrator of the
Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan thru a Contract of Consultancy whereby Tiape was employed for
his services as Municipal Administrative and Devt Planning Consultant at Office of Mayor for period of 6
months
 Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Art. 244
of RPC (Unlawful Appointment)
 After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence
 Article 244. Unlawful appointments.' Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any
public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos
ISSUE:

 WON Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his] designation as Municipal Administrator, was lacking in legal
qualification. Stated differently, does "legal qualification" contemplate the one (1) year prohibition on
appointment as provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local
Government Code, mandating that a candidate who lost in any election shall not, within one year after
such election, be appointed to any office in the Government?

RULING:

 Accdg to Sandiganbayan, NO
  In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a public office, "there must be a law
providing for the qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed" therein. To illuminate further,
Justice Rodolfo Palattao succinctly discussed in his book that the qualification of a public officer to hold
a particular position in the government is provided for by law, which may refer to educational
attainment, civil service eligibility or experience
 In this case, Orlando Tiape was allegedly appointed to the position of Municipal Administrator. As such,
the law that provides for the legal qualification for the position of municipal administrator is Section
480, Article X of the Local Government Code
 "Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties. - (a) No person shall be appointed
administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit
concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in public administration,
law, or any other related course from a recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service
eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management and administration work
for at least five (5) years in the case of the provincial or city administrator, and three (3) years in the
case of the municipal administrator”
 It bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of legal
qualification. A person who possessed the required legal qualifications for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one year prohibition
imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be temporarily disqualified for
appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal qualifications
imposed by law
 Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in
the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries
 So Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence of Mayor which is now being questioned by peti
as an act amounting to grave abuse of discretion
 Accdg to SC, YES. SO SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED W/ GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
 Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There
should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. CASE IS REMANDED TO SANDIGANBAYAN, 4 TH
DIVISION FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

#37 ELENO T. REGIDOR, JR., ANICETO T. SIETE, CAMILO B. ZAPATOS & RODULFO
ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,vs.GOV. WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, Vice Gov. FLORENCIO GARCIA, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Members MARIVIC SAGRADO, MORPHEUS AGOT, CONSTANCIO BALAIS, ALEGRIA CARIÑO,
ERNESTO IRA, PACITA YAP, JULIO TIU and Sangguniang Panglunsod, ROBERT O. TACLOB, respondents.

FACTS:
 Respondents William Chiongbian and Florencio Garcia, Marivic Sagrada Morpheus Agot, Constancio Balais,
Alegria Carifio, Ernesto Ira, Pacita Yap, and Julio Tiu, who are respectively the Provincial Governor, the Vice-
Governor, and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, approved Resolution No. 340-88 recommending the
suspension of the petitioners who failed to appear on November 18, 1988 at the hearing of a complaint for
unspecified misconduct which respondent Robert O. Taclob filed against them in the office of the Governor and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
 Governor William Chiongbian issued an Order of Preventive Suspension suspending the petitioners "from their
elective positions as City Mayor, City Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Panglunsod members of Tangub City for a
period of 60 days
 The petition alleges that respondents Governor Chiongbian and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan acted without
authority, and contrary to law, in issuing the Order of Preventive Suspension against the petitioners because
under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, a provincial or city official  may be preventively suspended by
the Minister of Local Government, not by the Provincial Governor
 the respondents justified the suspension of the petitioners as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governor's power
of general supervision over a component city (Par. 6.4, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Implementing Rules &
Regulations of the LGC), and that it was done "in pursuance to (sic) the provisions of the LGC and the Rules &
Regulations implementing said law
ISSUE:
 WON THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ISSUED BY GOV CHIONGBIAN WAS WITHIN HIS
AUTHORITY GRANTED BY LGC

RULING:
  NO
 Respondents misread and misconstrued Section 7, Rule 18 of the Implementing Rules & Regulations of the LGC.
The rule should be read in juxtaposition with Section 63 of the Code which provides that "preventive suspension
may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official."
 This is as it should be for complaints against provincial or city officials are supposed to be filed with the Minister
(now Secretary) of Local Government, hence, it is he (not the provincial governor) who would know whether or not
the charges are serious enough to warrant the suspension of the accused elective provincial or city official.
 No rule or regulation issued by the Secretary of Local Government may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of
the Local Government Code. The implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement,
for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity
 As the complaint or complaints against the petitioners were filed with the Office of the Provincial Governor, not
with the Minister of Local Government as required in Section 61 of the Local Government Code, and, as the
preventive suspension of the petitioners was ordered by the Provincial Governor, not by the Minister of Local
Government, the notice of hearing, subpoena, and order of preventive suspension issued by the respondents
governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan against the petitioners are hereby declared null and
void
 The respondents are without authority to investigate the petitioners, and the latter may not be compelled to attend
the hearings. Their refusal to answer the charges against them was justified.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Resolution No. 340-88 of the Sangguniang Panglunsod,
and the order of preventive suspension issued by respondent Governor William Chiongbian the appointment of
Robert O. Taclob as OIC Mayor of Tangub City, the notices of hearing and subpoenas issued to the petitioners by
the respondents are all annulled and set aside. The temporary restraining order which We issued on December 7,
1988, is hereby made permanent.

#38 JOSE C. MIRANDA, Petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D.
LINA, in his capacity as Secretary of the DILG,* and FAUSTINO DY, JR. in his capacity as Governor of the
Province of Isabela, Respondents
G.R. NO. 154098 July 27, 2005

FACTS:
 Ombudsman placed Mayor Miranda, mayor of Santiago City under preventive suspension for 6 months for
violations of RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees
 Vice Mayor Navarro filed complaint w/ Ombudsman alleging that Mayor Miranda committed acts despite
continuing effectivity of the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order
 Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official
functions under Art. 177 of RPC
 In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good
faith. He contended that under Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code, local elective officials could not be
preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days
 Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Article 177 of the
RPC, penalizing usurpation of authority
 Special Prosecution Officer recommended the dismissal of the case, Coquia held that Miranda reassumed his
office in "good faith" and on "mistake of fact" due to the "difficult questions of law" involved
 Ombudsman’s Chief Legal Counsel disagreed with Coquia’s findings and recommended the filing of the case
against Mayor Miranda. He pointed out that Mayor Miranda’s invocation of good faith was belied by the fact that
he received a memorandum from the DILG informing him that his view of the preventive suspension period was
untenable and that he should serve out its remaining period
 Ombudsman Desierto adopted the Chief Legal Counsel’s recommendation
 the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days
 Hence, the present petition assailing the Sandiganbayan’s orders of preventive suspension
ISSUES:
1. WON Sec 13 of RA 3019 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or property
2. WON the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves "fraud upon government or public funds or
property" found in Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING:
1. NO!

 The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any
offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. Contrary to the
submission of the petitioner, nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to acts
involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase "any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property" is clear and categorical. To limit the use of "government" as an adjective that qualifies "funds" is
baseless. The word "public" precedes "funds" and distinguishes the same from private funds. To qualify further
"public funds" as "government" funds, as petitioner claims is the law’s intent, is plainly superfluous. We are bound
by the rule that a statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its
 provisions should not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019, commonly
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own
officials.

2. YES!

 It ought to follow that "fraud upon government" was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed the duties
and performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.

 Accused’s acts therefore in assuming the duties and function of the Office of the Mayor despite his suspension
from said office resulted to a clear disruption of office and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the
government as the employees, as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the Office
 This actuation of herein accused constitutes fraud which in general sense is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and unconscious
advantage is taken of another

 When accused-mayor appointed persons in various positions, he indirectly dealt with the city’s funds as those
persons appointed will be given their respective salaries, benefits and other monetary consideration which will be
paid wholly or mainly out of the city’s funds. Additionally, when he performed acts pertaining to the Office of the
Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers, and payment of other expenses which is subject to proof, he likewise indirectly
dealt with the funds of the city.

 Petitioner’s excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He
alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect
for the rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the
law into their own hands
 administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the
Local Government Code
 In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be
similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension
 In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of
guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that the charges should warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The
Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive,
who are under investigation
 Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the
Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be
enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence

#39
#40
#41
#42
#43 GEORGE C. CORDERO, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF NURSING, respondent.
G.R. No. 188646. September 21, 2016

FACTS:

 The case traces its origin from the controversial June 2006 PRC Nursing Licensure Exams which involved
leakage of actual examination questions, damaging the credibility of the professional examinations in the country
and tarnishing the reputation of the Philippine nursing profession.
 One of the review centers involved in the controversy is INRESS Review Center (INRESS) headed by petitioner
George C. Cordero (Cordero)
 Cordero received a summon from the Board of Nursing requiring him to file his counter-affidavit/verified answer to
Formal Charge signed by Chairman of Board, for violation of Sec 15(a) of RA 8981 and Sec 23(a), (b) and (f) of
Article IV of RA No. 9173
 In his Answer, Cordero argued that the Formal Charge was not supported by documentary evidence or sworn
statements covering the testimony of witnesses which would support the charges.7 Hence, there is no basis for
the finding of a prima facie case against him
 In a Resolution the Board denied Cordero’s Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, it ruled that no verified
complaint is necessary since it, or the PRC itself, may bring an administrative action against any registered
professional whose practice and privileges come under its regulation
 CA denied the petition. According to the CA, the Board not only has adjudicatory powers but has regulatory and
investigatory powers as well for the public interest

ISSUE:

 WON the Board has jurisdiction to issue a formal charge against Cordero
RULING:

 YES!
 Under the same law, the various professional regulatory boards of the PRC, the Board of Nursing included, are
given the following powers, functions and responsibilities: Sec. 9. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the
Various Professional Regulatory Boards.—The various, professional regulatory boards shall retain the following
powers, functions and responsibilities:
 (a) To regulate the practice of the professions in accordance with the provisions of their respective professional
regulatory laws;
 (c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their respective laws, the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder and their Codes of Ethics and, for this purpose, may issue summons, subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum to alleged violators and/or witnesses to compel their attendance in such investigations or
hearings
 (g) After due process, to suspend, revoke or reissue, reinstate certificate of registration or licenses for causes
provided by law
 These powers are echoed in the provisions of RA No. 9173
 Article II of the PRC Rules provides how a complaint should be filed, to wit: Sec. 1. Complaint.—A complaint shall
be in writing and under oath or embodied in an affidavit. Sec. 2. Who May File.—The complaint may be filed by
any person, firm, partnership, association or corporation, through its duly authorized representative. The
Commission or the Board may, motu proprio, initiate an administrative investigation, in which case, the
complainant shall be the office, section, or division of the Commission where the respondent committed the
actionable conduct or violation of the rule or regulation of the Commission or the Board. Sec. 5. Where to File a
Complaint.—A complaint may be filed at the Legal and Investigation Division (Legal Division) of the Central Office
or at the Regional Office of the Commission having territorial jurisdiction over the parties at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
 The Board is not precluded from filing an administrative case motu proprio and initiate an administrative
investigation on its own. Having determined the existence of a prima facie case against Cordero, there is no more
need to wait for a complainant, or a formal complaint, much more file the same at the offices mentioned in the
PRC Rules
 In proceedings before quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, the general rule has always been liberality
 the allegation of improper venue and the fact that a complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for
the dismissal of a complaint
 In an administrative proceeding involving government employees, we ruled that an administrative charge filed by
the head of chief of the office concerned need not be under oath, for it is only when the complaint be filed by
another person that it be required to be under oath to protect respondents from malicious complaints filed only for
the purpose of harassing them.63 In the same manner, there is no need for the formal charge to be under oath in
this case since the Board itself initiated the charge and its Chairperson signed the same in her capacity as head
of the Board of Nursing and under her oath of office. The danger of a malicious complaint is no longer present
 Even the Board’s alleged failure to furnish Cordero affidavits of witnesses and certified true copy/ies of
documentary evidence, copies of the NBI Report and the Board’s findings, is not fatal to the administrative case
 Indeed, Cordero is not entitled to copies of the documents, but as pointed out by the Board, Cordero is not
precluded from asking copies of the NBI Report and the Board’s findings,66 but he did not
 The Board’s jurisdiction to hear and decide administrative cases against nursing professionals is inherent in its
authority to supervise and regulate the nursing profession
 We emphasize that in administrative proceedings, such as the case at bar, procedural due process simply means
the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.74 To reiterate, Cordero was informed of the subject matter of the charges against him. He was
given the opportunity to dispute the charges through his Answer
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
Notes.—The essence of procedural due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submits
one’s evidence in support of his defense. (Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation [PDIC] vs. Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank, Inc., 640 SCRA 322 [2011]) Procedural due process is that which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one’s person or property. (Aberca vs. Ver, 668
SCRA 173 [2012])