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4.1 Introduction
CHAPTER IV
COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES AND OTHER RELIEFS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Part XIII of the Companies Act, 1956 (the Act) contains most of the provisions
regarding offences against the Act. As per Section 621 of the Act, only on a
complaint in writing of the Registrar or of a shareholder of the Company or of a
person authorized by the Central Government in that behalf, a court may take
cognizance of any offence against this Act. As per Section 622 of the Act, no court
inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class shall try
any offence under this Act. As per Section 624 of the Act every offence under the
Act shall be deemed to be non-cognizable within the meaning of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).
Part XIII of the Act also contains provisions that deal with the procedure to be
followed in respect of complaints and the penalty to be imposed. Section 621A
provides for compounding of offences against the Act and Section 633 contains
provisions regarding certain relief available to officers of companies in certain
circumstances.
On receipt of the explanation from the accused, the Registrar of Companies may
form an opinion and if he is satisfied he may not prosecute cases involving minor
offences where intention of the parties is clear. The Registrar warns the offenders
and closes the file. The company and its directors may take a serious view of the
offences alleged in the show cause notice issued by the Registrar and they may
comply with the relevant provisions immediately. They may pay additional fee and
file the necessary returns and documents. While dispensing with further proceedings
119
the Registrar also takes into account tine previous track record of tlie Connpany. Tills
system is based on the policy of the Department of Company Affairs not to harass
the top management of companies, provided the case deserves sympathy and there
is adequate compliance of the provisions of the Act. In some cases the Registrar
may refer the matter to the Regional Director to obtain his concurrence for
dispensing with prosecution formalities.
Officers of companies may seek relief from an appropriate court If they apprehend
any prosecution against them or if there is already a proceeding against them for
any offence under the Act. This provision helps officers who have acted honestly
and reasonably to apply for relief and if the appropriate court grants the relief prayed
for they escape from the difficulties associated with the trial formalities In a criminal
court.
The Company Law Board (CLB) traced the origin of the provisions of the Act
• When this section was introduced, the Notes on Clauses stated "this clause
empowers the CLB and the Regional Director to compound offences punishable
with fine, by imposing penalties in lieu of prosecution.
• The recommendations of the Sachar Committee read with the Notes on Clauses
would reveal that there is nothing to indicate that the jurisdiction of the CLB in
exercising the powers to compound is subject to approval of the court either
before or after passing the order of compounding nor is there any indication that
concurrent powers were being conferred on the court.
1 Hoffland Finance Ltd., In re (CLB), the Company Law Board, Northern Region
Bench [1997] 90 Comp Cas 38
121
Salient features
Section 621A provides the code for compounding of certain offences under the Act:
The salient features of the said section are as under:
Offences compoundabie
2
• Filing of the document with requisite fee and additional fee. The CLB dismissed
the applications for compounding the offences under Sections 159 and 220 of
the Act as the defaults arising out of a failure to file the balance sheet and annual
return of the company with the Registrar of Companies had not yet been made
good by the company.
• The Registrar cannot launch prosecution for an offence that has been already
compounded.
^ General Produce Company Limited, In re. (CLB) [1994] 81 Comp Cas 570 (CLB).
124
Section 621A of the Act operates notwithstanding the provisions of CrPC. Sub-
section (7) of Section 621A specifically provides that an offence which is punishable
under the Companies Act with imprisonment or with fine, or with both, shall be
compounded with the permission of the court in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the CrPC, for compounding of offences. Often a question arises as to
whether the CLB can decide on an application for compounding of offences, which
are punishable with imprisonment or with fine, or with both. The said sub-section
provides that such offences can be compounded with the permission of the court in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the CrPC, for compounding of offences.
The CLB, Western Region Bench took a preliminary view that for applicants other
than the company, who are punishable with fine or with imprisonment or with both,
the offence can be compounded with the permission of the court and if the court
permits compounding of offence can proceed with the levy of compounding fees.
The applicants approached the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate llird Court,
Esplanade, Mumbai, for such permission. The learned magistrate by his order dated
October 10, 1996, held that the stage of permission to compound had not quite been
reached as the parties had not finally arrived at the terms and conditions of
compounding and it was only after terms and conditions on which compounding is
made are decided, that the stage of permission for compounding can arise.
"There can be no doubt that the compounding indeed signifies a joint action of two
parties and when the offence is said to be compoundable with the permission of the
court all that is meant is that a compromise already arrived at by and between the
parties, should not be given effect to without the approval of the court. If the view
expressed by the learned Member of the CLB were accepted, it would mean that the
accused would obtain the permission of the court before compounding would be
effected. In fact, it would not be certain, if such procedure were adopted, that the
offence would be compounded. It is possible that the parties may disagree with the
terms and conditions on which the compounding is to be made. In that event, the
permission sought from the court would be meaningless".
Taking into account the above view of the Magistrate the CLB held that it has been
invested with the power, authority and jurisdiction to compound the offence and it is
only when such compounding is done that the matter can be brought before the
court for according permission to compound the offences which are punishable with
fine or imprisonment or with both.
In Hoffland Finance Ltd's case cited supra, the question as to whether the need for
seeking permission of the court arises either before or after the compounding by the
CLB was thoroughly examined. The CLB in the said case observed as follows:
• It appears from the provisions of sub-section (4)(a) to 4(d) and also from sub-
section (1) of Section 621A of the Act that the CLB is not debarred in any
manner to compound any offence in accordance with the procedure as
contemplated by Section 621A of the Act.
• While Section 621A of the Act starts with the non-obstante clause
"notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC", sub-section (7) of Section
621A also provides a non-obstante clause "notwithstanding anything
contained in the CrPC".
126
• Under sub-section (7)(a) of Section 621A of the Act, it is provided that any
offence which is punishable under the Act with imprisonment or with fine or with
both shall be compoundable "with the permission of the court" in accordance with
the procedure laid down in that Act, namely, CrPC.
• It appears from sub-section (7)(a), that there is specific wording "with the
permission of the court, in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Act".
• In addition a question would also arise as to who will make the application - the
offender, the Registrar or the CLB.
• In a case where the CLB has exercised its discretion to compound an offence
punishable with fine or imprisonment or with both, and on an application for
permission, if the court refuses to accord permission, then it would mean that the
court is sitting in judgment over the decision of the CLB.
• In the same way, if prior permission is applied for and the court grants the same,
even then, the CLB, at its discretion may not compound the offence, as the
permission granted by the court is not binding on the CLB.
• Not only is there no such proviso in that sub-section, but right through up to sub-
section (6) of Section 621 A, there is nothing to indicate to this effect, and all
these sub-sections deal with matters relating to the CLB / Regional Director only.
• When sub-section (4) of Section 621A stipulates that on intimation to the court
about the composition of the offence the accused stands discharged, where is
the question of applying to the court for permission to compound.
In Hofflands' case cited supra, the CLB brought out a clear distinction between the
provisions of the Act and those of the CrPC with regard to compounding of offences.
The CLB observed as follows:
The CLB observed that under Section 320 of the CrPC the parties to a criminal
proceeding, with the permission of the criminal court, might compound any
compoundable offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code if prosecution
relating to the offence is pending. Before the introduction of Section 621A of the Act,
the criminal court had no jurisdiction to permit compounding of offences committed
under the Act or any other law.
But the introduction of Sub-section (7) of Section 621A of the Act paved way for the
criminal court to permit compounding of any offence under the Act if there if
prosecution relating to any offence under the Act is pending before it. Sub-section
(7) of Section 621A of the Act is thus an enabling sub-section under
128
which compounding of offence may be proceeded with before the criminal court with
the sanction of the court. As per sub-section (8) of Section 621A of the Act
specifically provides that no offence shall be compounded except and in accordance
with the provisions of this section. Thus offences under the Act punishable with
imprisonment or with fine or with both can be compounded in the criminal court
where the prosecution relating to the offence is pending, but such compounding
should be done in accordance with the procedure laid down in the CrPC and with
the sanction of the court.
• Under the Second Schedule to the CrPC, 1898, offences against laws other than
the Indian Penal Code, 1860, were not compoundable.
• Under the First Schedule to the CrPC, 1973, there is no mention about any
prohibition on compounding of offences against other laws as contained in the
Second Schedule to the 1898 code.
• Section 320(9) of the 1973 Code says "no offence shall be compoundable
except as provided by this section", i.e. the prohibition regarding compounding of
offences shall be as mentioned in that section only.
• Therefore, the inference is that the Legislature, while drafting the new Code,
intended to permit offences under other laws to be compounded.
4
M.Mohan Reddy v Jairaj D.Bhale Rao (AP) [1997] 90 Comp Cas 142
129
The Duplicate Share certificate case - Reliance Industries Ltd, cited supra
A leading listed public company with a huge market captialisation had issued
duplicate share certificates without bearing the distinctive numbers that were
contained in the original certificates. Share certificates used to contain distinctive
numbers before the coming into force of the Depositories Act, which introduced the
concept of dematerialised shares. Dematerialisation involved conversion of physical
share certificates into paperless scrip, where registers are maintained in electronic
form. The issue of duplicate share certificates without the same distinctive numbers
created suspicion that the promoters of the company had indulged in the fraud
called switching of shares. Switching of shares is an expression to denote issue of
duplicate share certificates without bearing the same distinctive numbers. The
promoters may be able to circulate some shares in the capital market and take
advantage of the market situation to make wrongful gain for them by creating
artificial demand for the shares of their company and thereby jack up the price of
shares. Most of the investors hold with them their investment in shares not for any
speculative purposes but for appreciation of capital. Once in a blue moon they sell
those shares off in the market. This means so many number of shares are held by
the investors without trading activity. The promoters in connivance with Registrars
and Transfer Agents could use these idle shares so that they are able to pump those
shares into the market until the actual shares reach the transfer agents. At that point
of time they will stop circulating the same shares. As per Section 84 of the Act, issue
of duplicate share certificates with an intention to defraud is an offence.
130
• The company and its officer have committed default under Section 297 of not
getting the approval of the Central Government in respect of a number of
contracts during the period from April, 1996, to February, 1997.
• The two distinctive features of Section 297 of the Act which reflect the rigour of
the said section are (a) a positive prohibition as reflected by the words "shall not
enter into any contract"; and (b) the requirements of prior approval of the Central
Government in case the paid-up share capital is not less than Rs.1 Crore.
^ Otto Burlingtons Mail Orders Pvt. Ltd. In re [1999] 96 Comp Cas 525 (CLB)
131
The following are the offences, which are not compoundable under the Act:
Section Nature of offence Extent of punishment (Fine
indicated in Rs.)
58A(6) Invitation of deposits in Imprisonment for a term, which may
contravention of the provisions extend to 5 years AND shall also, be
of sub-sections (1) and (2). liable to fine.
58A(10) Failure to comply with the Imprisonment which may extend to
order of CLB under sub-section 3 years AND a fine of not less than
(9) with regard to repayment of Rs.500/- for every day during which
deposit. the non-compliance continues.
68A Personation for acquisition of Imprisonment for a term which may
shares, etc. extend to 5 years.
73(2B) Default in refund of application Fine which may extend to
moneys / excess application Rs.50,000/- AND also with an
moneys, where repayment is imprisonment with may extend to 1
not made within 6 months from year.
the expiry of the 8'^ day.
6
General Circular No.6/2002[Fnos.23/75/96-CL-ll & 2/6/2002-CL-V] dated
06/03/2002 [2002] 47 CLA (St.) 90
133
Sub-clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 621A of the Act prohibits compounding
of offences that are punishable with imprisonment only or with imprisonment and
also with fine. However there are certain offences that capable of being
compounded despite the fact that such offences are capable of damaging public
interest since those offences do not fall the prohibition referred above in sub-section
(7).
Under Section 454(5) of the Act, failure to comply with the requirements of this
section regarding statement of affairs and related matters is an offence punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years or with fine which
may extend to Rs.1,000/- for every day during which the default continues, or
with both.
135
Similarly is the offence under Section 240 (3) of the Act arising out of a failure of a
person who without reasonable cause refuses to produce books to / appear before
an inspector and the said offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to 6 months, or with fine, which may extend to Rs.20,000/-,
or with both, and also with a further fine which may extend to Rs.20,000/- for
every day after the first during which the failure or refusal continues.
Under Section 538 (1) of the Act commission of certain offences by any past or
present officer of a company in liquidation are punishable with imprisonment for a
term which extend to 5 years, or with fine, or both, and in the case of other
offences imprisonment for a term which extend to 2 years, or with fine, or
both.
Relief mechanism
♦ The Court may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from his liability.
♦ The Court may grant such relief on such terms as it may think fit.
♦ In a criminal proceeding under this sub-section, the Court shall have no power to
grant relief from any civil liability which may attach to an officer in respect of such
negligence, default, breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust.
♦ If any such officer has reason to apprehend that any proceeding might be
brought against him in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty,
misfeasance or breach of trust, he may apply to the High Court for relief.
♦ The High Court on such application shall have the same power to relieve him as
it would have had if it had been a Court before which a proceeding against that
officer had been brought under sub section (1).
137
• No Court shall grant any relief to any officer under sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2) unless It has, by notice served in the manner specified by it, required the
Registrar and such other person, if any, as it thinks necessary, to show cause
why such relief should not be granted.
The intention of the legislature can be understood fronn the following two reasons:
ii. Courts of law are far removed from material matters, which are the primary
concern of the corporate sector and courts can only act in an impartial way.
The avowed object of section 633 of the Act is to relieve a director or officer who
may not take part in the day-to-day affairs of the company in a case where the
offence might have been committed due to inadvertence.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the object underlying Section 633 of
the Act obviously is to avoid hardship to officers of the company in deserving cases
and to relieve them of their liability in cases where they are technically guilty if they
are able to convince the court that they had been acting honestly and reasonably
and that having regard to the circumstances of the case, they, in all fairness, ought
to be excused from the charge or charges made against them.
Scope of Relief
The scope of relief under Section 633 of the Act can be understood from the
g
observation of the Bombay High Court , where the court held as follows:
• Under Section 633, the court has the exceptional power to excuse a petitioner
from prosecution in respect of an act, which has, under the Act, penal
consequences.
• The power must be circumspectly exercised.
• Section 633 does not contemplate adversary proceedings in the ordinary sense.
• A petition under Section 633 cannot be compromised nor can the court relieve
the petitioner by an order made invitum, for the court has to be reasonably
satisfied that the petitioner had acted honestly and reasonably.
• The Registrar may, of course, state that no prosecution would be launched
against the petitioner, in which case the petition would not survive.
g
The Bombay High Court held that the power under Section 633 of the Act should
be very sparingly used and the officers of the company cannot as a matter of right
claim that civil or criminal proceedings should not be instituted against them for the
default.
10
The Punjab and Harayana High Court held as follows:
Upon its plain language. Section 633, the design and object of which is to provide
protection to the officers of a company against certain kinds of liabilities and undue
hardship and harassment in deserving cases, confers a discretion on the court to
relieve an officer from the same, if the officer who had been proceeded against for
any negligence, default, breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust, is able to
satisfy the conscience of the court that he had acted honestly and reasonably
and also, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, he ought fairly to be
excused.
• "Acting reasonably" means acting in the way in which a man of affairs dealing
with his own affairs with reasonable care and circumspection could reasonably
be expected to act in such a case.
• No distinction can be drawn amongst the directors for fastening the liability or
granting a relief from the liability on the consideration that a person is on the
board purely by virtue of his technical skill or because he represents certain
special interests and there are other directors who are in effective control of the
management and affairs of the company.
• Since the criteria for granting relief have been explicitly laid in the section itself,
no other criteria can be imported into it, though the circumstance of a person
being purely on the Board on account of his special skill or expertise may be a
relevant factor in deciding whether he had acted honestly and reasonably in
conjunction with other circumstances of the case.
Appropriate court
Where proceedings have already been instituted before a court having appropriate
jurisdiction, it is that court which is entitled to grant relief. Where proceedings have
not been instituted, but it is apprehended by an officer concerned that a prosecution
will be launched against him, he is entitled to seek relief from High Court.
11
In an interesting case where by tine time the Andhra Pradesh High Court passed
an order (against the Registrar) directing him not to tal<e any final decision in the
matter of launching prosecution, the Registrar had already launched the
prosecution. The High Court held that on the date on which company petition under
Section 633 of the Act was made, the cause for moving the court under Section 633
of the Act did exist, and, therefore, the petition cannot be dismissed merely on the
ground that subsequent to the filing of the petition, the prosecution had been
launched.
12
The interesting question that arose before the Calcutta High Court was whether
an application under Section 633 of the Act was maintainable before the said High
Court after a complaint had been filed and cognizance of the same had been taken
by the magistrate and as such whether the High Court has jurisdiction to grant the
relief under sub-section (2) of Section 633. The said complaint was filed during the
period when an injunction order against Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, was
in force and operative as issued by the said High court the complaint was filed in
violation of the injunction order and cognizance of the offence was taken by the
Magistrate during the period when the injunction was in force and operative against
the respondents. Therefore the order of the magistrate is of no effect bad and a
nullity and without jurisdiction and hence it cannot be said that any criminal
proceeding was pending.
13
Recently the Bombay High Court had the occasion to consider the maintainability
of an application under Section 633 of the Act at a time when the Registrar had
already filed the complaint and an application for condonation of delay had also
11
Progressive Aluminium Limited and others v Registrar of Companies and another
[1997] 89 Comp Cas147 (A.P.)
""^ Hindustan Wire and Metal Products [1983] 54 Comp Cas 104 (Cal)
13
Jyotindra Manhadal Vakil and another v Registrar of Companies, Maharahstra
[2001] 103 Comp Cas 935 (Bom.)
141
been filed. The question tliat arose was wtnetlier tine iVIagistrate could be deemed to
have taken cognizance of the offence in view of the application for condonation of
delay. If it is considered as a proceeding, Section 633 of the Act does not confer any
jurisdiction on the High Court and it is the trial court, which alone can grant relief
under Section 633(1) of the Act. The High Court held that Section 633 of the Act
does not talk of "taking cognizance as such". Even an application for condonation of
delay would be a proceeding and therefore, the High Court held that the petition
couldn't be entertained.
While handing down the decision as above, the Bombay High Court had referred to
the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the Hindustan Wire and Metal Products'
case cited supra and categorically stated that Section 633 of the Act does not
contemplate taking cognizance of an offence at all and the said section merely
refers to the existence of an apprehension that any proceeding will or might be
brought against the person seeking relief under the said section. Even an application
for condonation of delay filed by the Registrar under Section 473 of the CrPC would
amount to a proceeding, whether or not the Magistrate has condoned the delay or
not and therefore there is no jurisdiction under Section 633 (2) for the High Court to
grant relief and the power lies with the Magistrate under Section 633 (1) of the Act.
Proceedings
In the Law Lexicon, P.Ramanatha Aiyar, it is stated that the word 'proceedings'
mean as follows:
In Tamilnadu General Clauses Act, 1891, the expression 'Judicial Proceedings' has
been defined to mean any proceeding in the course of which evidence is, or may be,
legally taken. Most other states have also adopted a similar definition.
14
The Supreme Court held that the expression 'any proceeding' occurring in Section
633 cannot be read out of context and treated in isolation.
15
The Madras High Court held that the expression 'any proceeding' occurring in
Section 633 cannot be read out of context and treated in isolation. It must be
construed in the light of the penal provisions.
In order to seek relief under section 633 of the Act, the liability of the officer
concerned should have arisen due to any negligence, default, breach of duty,
misfeasance or breach of trust committed by the officer seeking relief. The officer
seeking relief might be either the person who was actually responsible for the
commission of the offence or by a fiction by virtue of the position he occupies in the
company, he ought to be deemed to be liable.
Relief Discretionary
16
It was held by Bombay High Court that even if all the directors are, in law, liable
for their acts, the question of relieving them is still one of discretion.
If the responsibility of all the directors, whether they perform part time duties or full
time duties, is equal, should any of the directors be relieved from the liability in
respect of negligence, breach of trust, misfeasance, etc? This is always a question
of judicial discretion.
14
Rabindra Chamaria and others v Registrar of Companies and others [1992] 73
Comp Cas 257 (SC)
15
Madhavan Nambiar v Registrar of Companies [2002] 108 Comp Cas 1 (Mad)
16
Jagjivan Hiralal Doshi and others v Registrar of Companies [1989] 65 Comp Cas
553 (Bom)
143
In Tri-sure India Limited's case cited supra, the Bombay High Court held that the
relief under Section 633 of the Act is, as the use of the word "may" implies,
discretionary, the discretion to be judicially exercised.
In Prestolite's case cited supra the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 633 of the Act are exceptional as these
relieve an officer of the company from the consequences of a default, whether penal
or otherwise, before he is asked to face the proceedings of either levying penalty or
of prosecution. The court has, therefore, to be cautious in its approach before
exercising discretion in favour of the delinquent officer though, no doubt, the
discretion has to be a judicial one. Before exercising any such discretion, the court
has to be reasonably satisfied that the requirements of the section have been met.
Relief will be granted only to deserving officers and to borrow from sub-section (1) of
Section 633, the following two important factors have to be established:
The Madras High Court , while refusing to grant relief, held when the petitioners
were fully aware of the change in the activities of the company and they cannot
claim to have acted honestly or reasonably. They ought to have taken care to follow
the provisions of the amendments in the Act and the guidelines given by the
Registrar of Companies.
""^ D.C.Kothari v Asst. Registrar of Companies [1993] 78 Comp Cas 520 (Mad)
144
Service of notice
As per sub-section (3) of Section 633 of the Act, a notice is required to be given to
the Registrar of Companies and such other person, if any as the court thinks
necessary. The notice must be given by the court before which the proceeding for
negligence, default, breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust has already been
instituted or by the High Court while considering an application for relief by an officer
of a company. It is the duty of the court to serve the notice in such manner as it
thinks fit and it is for the purpose of requiring the Registrar of Companies and such
other person, if any, to show cause as to why such relief should not be granted.
As already stated, as per Section 621 of the Act, a complaint for an offence under
the Act may be instituted by any one of the following as provided in Section 621 of
the Act:
• The Registrar of Companies.
• Shareholder.
• An officer authorised by Central Government.
• An officer authorised by SEBI.
18
Sitaram Biyani and another v Registrar of Companies [1985] 58 Comp Cas 870
(Cal)
19
M.O.Varghese v Thomas Stephen and Co.Limited [1970] 40 Comp Cas 1131
(Ker); AIR 1971 Ker223
145
Hence if the proceeding lias been instituted or is likely to be instituted by any one of
the above, service of notice on the Registrar and such other person is necessary.
As per sub-section (1) of Section 633, the officer seeking relief may be relieved,
either v^/holiy or partly, from his liability on such terms as the court may think fit.
Section 633 of the Act cannot provide any relief to a company. The plain meaning of
the words "negligence, default, breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust"
would suggest that except default and breach of duty all other things cannot be
attributed to an artificial person. None can say that an artificial person was negligent
or has a committed breach of trust. But wherever the Act casts a duty upon the
company to comply with a requirement of any provision of the Act, it is possible for
the company to have committed a default or breach of duty.
20
The Allahabad High Court observed that it is significant to note that sub-sections
(1) and (2) of Section 633 of the Act does not contemplate any order relieving the
company from any of the liabilities incurred by it.
Sub-section (1) of Section 633 of the Act refers to an officer of a company. Section
2(30) of the Act, defines the expression "officer". The expression 'officer' includes
any director, manager or secretary or any person in accordance with whose
directions or instructions the Board of Directors or any one or more of the directors is
or are accustomed to act. Hence a director is an officer of a company. The Act does
not distinguish between a whole-time director or a part time director, in so far as it
pertains to the liabilities of a person, holding the office of a director in a company.
20
Mau Cold Storage and Khandsari Sugar Factory (P) Limited and others v
Registrar of Companies and others [1985] 57 Comp Cas 37 (All)
146
In Jagjivan Hiralal Doshi's case cited supra, the Bombay High Court held as follows:
The Court further said that in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty,
misfeasance, breach of trust, the Act and the rules admit of no distinction between
members of the Board of Directors based on their part time or full time performance
of duties. Their liability for any proceedings for such acts is equal.
147
In Tri-sure India Limited cited supra, the Bombay High Court held that a distinction
has to be made between directors who are on the Board purely by virtue of their
technical skill and those who are in effective control of the management and affairs
of the company. It would be unreasonable to fasten liability on independent directors
for defaults and breaches of the company where such directors are appointed by
virtue of their special skill or expertise and who do not participate in the
management.
The said court further held that in proceedings under Section 633 of the Act there is
no distinction between whole-time or part time director or nominated director or co-
opted director. The liability for acts of commission or omission is equal. There
cannot be a blanket direction or a blanket indemnity favouring the petitioner or other
directors who are nominated by the Government either ex officio or otherwise.
21
Om Prakash Khaitan v Shree Kesharia Investment Limited [1978] 48 Comp Cas
85 (Del)
148
Whether a sick industrial company within the meaning of the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 would be entitled for any relief or
extension of time under Section 633 (2) of the Act is a pertinent question.
22
The Rajasthan High Court held that in larger public interest, it is necessary that
the time limit for prosecution is extended for a period of two years. The court has
granted relief for a limited pehod of two years.
The relief granted by the said court should be sufficient for the prosecuting
agency to file the complaint after the extended period of time and such filing
will not be hit by the period of limitation specified under Section 468 of the
CrPC.
23
The Rajasthan High Court directed the petitioners who were directors of a sick
industrial company to file the audited balance sheet as required under Section 220
of the Act within six months of the company's revival and until then no prosecution
should to be initiated against them. While granting the above relief, the court
observed the following facts:
• The company had been declared sick under the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA).
• The company had been closed from 1987.
• The Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) had recommended
winding up in 1990.
• An appeal had been filed and stay of the operation of the order of the BIFR had
been obtained.
• Pending the appeal, the petitioner had sought police help to enter the premises
of the company to prepare the accounts, but was unable to do so.
22
Oriental Power Cables Ltd and others v Registrar of Companies and others,
[1995] 83 Comp Cas 447 (Raj)
Sanjay Modi v Registrar of Companies [1995] 82 Comp Cas 651 (Raj.)
149
The efforts of prosecution for punishing those who violate provisions of the Act
should not be allowed to be thwarted on the ground that the company is sick if the
directors are otherwise liable. While genuine industrial recession and sickness would
require sympathetic consideration, there is no denying fact that there are many
cases of sickness caused due to mismanagement of affairs of companies, diversion
of funds and reckless investments. This cannot be appreciated by a court in a
petition under Section 633 of the Act unless an investigation is carried out. Hence
there is the need for care and caution.
Civil Liability
The proviso under sub-section (1) of Section 633 of the Act provides that the
criminal court, which may grant relief under this sub-section, has no power to grant
relief to an officer from any civil liability for the same negligence, default, breach of
duty, misfeasance or breach of trust. Sub-section (1) talks about a proceeding
already launched against an officer of a company for negligence, default, breach of
duty, misfeasance or breach of trust. Sub-section (1) also deals with such a
proceeding where an officer of a company may be liable in respect of the
negligence, default, breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust. There may be a
civil case or a criminal case against an officer of a company in respect of any
negligence, default, breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust. What the proviso
intends to clarify is that in a criminal proceeding, the trial court before which such a
proceeding has been instituted has no power to grant relief from any civil liability for
which the officer in question may be liable.
In Rabindra Chamaria's case cited supra the Supreme Court held that the court
granting relief under Section 633 has no power to grant relief from any civil liability.
But sub-section (2) is quite different and the proviso does not operate for sub-
section (2). The court having power under sub-section (2) is the High Court. The
word 'proceeding' used in sub-section (2) includes any proceeding instituted in any
150
There are not many verdicts regarding granting of relief under Section 633 of the Act
for an offence punishable under a law other than the Act.
In Prestolite's case cited supra, the petitioner had sought relief from the court under
Section 633, inter alia, for an offence committed by an officer of a company under
the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The Punjab
and Haryana High Court did not give any decision regarding the power of the court
to release an officer under Section 633 of the Act for an offence under the said Act.
The High Court said that there are different considerations for the defaults
committed under different Acts. As petitioners gave no particulars and had not led
any evidence to relieve them of the liability incurred, the court refused to grant the
relief sought for by the petitioners without categorically saying that Section 633
permits granting relief for offences under enactments other than the Act also.
In Rabindra Chamaria's case cited supra, the Supreme Court held that the penal
clauses under the various other Acts would be rendered ineffective by application of
Section 633 of the Act. If Parliament had intended that Section 633 of the Act should
have coverage wider than the Act, it would have specifically provided.
The Supreme Court in the said case further held that if the interpretation that Section
633 of the Act covers liabilities under other Act also was to be accepted, it would
cover not only the existing laws, but all legislations to be enacted in future.
151
While examining tlie ambit of Section 633 of tine Act in the context of relief for
24
offences under other Acts, the Bombay High Court held that there is an intrinsic
indication in sub-section (3) of Section 633 to hold that exercise of powers under
sub-section (2) must be restricted in respect of proceedings arising out of violations
of the Act. Sub-section (3) provides that relief under sub-section (2) shall not be
granted without notice being served in the manner specified to the Registrar and
such other person to show cause why the relief should not be granted. The
expression "such other person" would cover shareholders of the company or the
person authorized by the Central Government to launch a prosecution.
It should be understood that sub-section (1) or (2) must be read in conjunction with
sub-section (3). In sub-section (3) it should be noted that a notice must be sent to
the Registrar and such other person, if any. It is the conjunction 'and' used between
the words "Registrar" and "such other person, if any", that enables one to conclude
that notice must go to the Registrar, whether it is an application sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2) irrespective of whether the complaint in question is filed by the
Registrar or any other person.
The words "such other person" used in sub-section (3) of Section 633 of the Act
would mean only those persons who are entitled for filing a complaint under the Act.
Therefore, a person against whom a proceeding has been launched under
Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot seek relief under Section 633 of the
24
Hareshchandra Maganlal and others v Union Bank of India and others [1991] 71
Comp Cas 69 (Bom)
152
Companies Act, merely because, the accused happens to be an officer within the
meaning of Section 2(30) of the Companies Act. It would be absurd to think of
serving a notice to Registrar of Companies in relation to a compliant under the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Relief granted
In Progressive Aluminium's case cited supra, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held
that the prosecution deserves to be quashed at the threshold, for the reason that the
statements (alleged to be untrue statements) made in the prospectus cannot be
treated as wholly untrue. It suffered only from a clarification. In fact in the said case
the High Court has assumed jurisdiction by passing an order for the said purpose,
which literally ousted the jurisdiction of the criminal court before which the
prosecution was originally launched. After taking note of the facts, the High court
allowed the petition for relief under Section 633 of the Act and quashed the
proceedings before the Magistrate.
• As per the prospectus, Progressive Constructions Ltd (PCL) was one of the
promoters of the company and PCL had been described to be a large
construction company engaged in construction activity for 2 Vi decades.
• Moreover, it was also stated that the company is expected to go for trial run in
October, 1990 and begin commercial production in November, 1990.
• The Registrar of Companies issued a show cause notice to the company stating
that the statement in the prospectus with regard to two and a half decades'
experience included in the prospectus could be termed as an untrue statement in
terms of Section 63(1) of the Act, and therefore every person who authorised the
issue of prospectus had incurred the liability of being punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine which may
extend to Rs.5,000/- or with both.
• In reply to the show cause notice, it was pointed out that due to circumstances
beyond the control of the company, the production could not be commenced as
mentioned in the prospectus. The petitioners further stated that there was no
intention to whatsoever to mislead the public and whatever experience they had
mentioned is that of the partnership firm of which they were the partners right
from 1966.
• After analysing the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court observed
that the statement with regard to two and a half decades' experience included in
the prospectus could not be termed as an untrue statement mainly because it
was not besmeared with any mala fide intention of practicing fraud upon the
subscribers apart from the fact that the statement cannot be altogether branded
as a false statement.
25
Shivkumar Dalmia and others v Mangalchand Hukmichand Industries (M.P.) Pvt.
Ltd. and others [1996] 86 Comp Cas 366 (M.P)
154
The second and third respondents (who were at that time the directors) approached
the appellants for help.
• Pursuant to two agreements, the appellants in 1966 were appointed directors of
the company.
• For the years 1967 to 1969, the company failed to file with the Registrar of
Companies, its balance sheet and profit and loss accounts, and complaints were
filed against all the directors.
• The appellants were directed by the court to submit the relevant documents
within two months.
• They did not comply with this direction.
• Consequently, a prosecution under Section 614A(2) of the Companies Act, 1956,
was initiated.
• The appellants, pleading that they were not in actual management, but were
directors only for purposes of the Russian contracts filed petitions in the High
Court for relief from liability in terms of Section 633 of the Act.
• A single judge dismissed the petition holding that so long as the petitioners
continued to be the directors of the company, they were expected to comply with
the provisions of the Companies Act and that if they had any grievance they
could approach the Magistrate concerned for relief.
On appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court, the Division Bench, dismissed the
appeal as there was no unsoundness or arbitrariness in the decision of the single
judge.
Liquidator, had the occasion to deal with a petition for relief by a nominee director.
26
A Stock and Co. (In liquidation) v Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and others [1996] 87
CompCas139(Cal)
155
As per the facts of the case, the respondents have misappropriated a lot of money of
the company as given below:
The Liquidator claimed that the respondents and each of them are bound to restore
the said sums together with interest thereon at the rate of 18 per cent per annum
being the prevailing rate charged by the nationalized banks from the date of
liquidation until realization.
156
The Respondent No.3 who was a nominee director claimed relief on the strength of
Section 64 of the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act. The Calcutta High
Court held as follows:
• The first responsibility was to watch and control the affairs of the company and to
see that nothing goes and / or happens, which is to discharge the duty as a
faithful watchdog.
The Act, at present, provides a scheme for compounding of offences merely based
on the punishment prescribed without malting real distinction between serious and
non-serious offences. This requires a rethinking.
Similarly there has to be a review of the scheme under Section 633 of the Act to
make a proper ascertainment of the position of the company, the fact as to whether
the directors in question have acted honestly and reasonably and thereafter it should
be decided whether relief ought to be granted or not. As the power to grant relief lies
with the judiciary, there is no serious threat. Section 633 of the Act provides clearly
circumstances subject to which alone relief may be granted. Granting relief should
not shadow the role of the directors in letting the company slip into the red and
arrange for a declaration under the SICA so that companies may enjoy immunity
conferred upon the company under SICA from being sued against its properties.
This requires an in depth analysis on a case-to-case basis.
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