G.R. No.
188832               April 23, 2014 To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA,
represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. Mala, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where
one of the parties is not a Muslim.
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to set aside
the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District Court's decision1 dated June 11, 2008
and order2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case
No. 07-200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as
follows:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-
meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao,
now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. On March 3, 1996,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land
was issued in Roldan’s name.3 At the time of the purchase, Vivencio
B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.4
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-
60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering
the same parcel of land.5
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a
report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio
occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title.6
barangay conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Barangay
Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to
settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to
recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court.7
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is
the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of
the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his property.8
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of
summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of summons,
Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be
allowed to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court granted in its order9 dated January 30, 2008.10
In its decision11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to
possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the
property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay ₱10,000.00 as moderate
damages and ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari’a Distict Court issued
the notice of writ of execution12 to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from
receipt of the notice to comply with the decision. He received a copy
of the notice on December 16, 2008.13
On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from
judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction.14 In his petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited
Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines15 and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only
hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims.
Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He
prayed that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court set aside the
decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake.16
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Vivencio
"intentionally [waived] his right to defend himself."17 It noted that he
was duly served with summons and had notice of the following:
Roldan’s motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ of
execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his
right to assail the decision via certiorari."18
According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, Vivencio cited
the wrong provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of
Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a District Courts.19 It ruled that it
had jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession.
Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights were not
prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court decided the
case applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.20
Thus, in its order21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court denied Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for
lack of merit. It reiterated its order directing the issuance of a writ of
execution of the decision dated June 11, 2008.
Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief
from judgment on June 17, 2009.22
On August 6, 2009, Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order with this court.23
In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering the
decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,24 Shari’a
District Courts may only take cognizance of real actions where the
parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim,
Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s action. Thus, all the
proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court, including
the decision dated June 11, 2008, are void.25
In the resolution26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan
to comment on Vivencio’s petition for certiorari. This court
subsequently issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution against Vivencio.27
On September 21, 2011, Roldan filed his comment28 on the petition
for certiorari. He allegedly filed the action for recovery of possession
with the Shari’a District Court where "a more speedy disposition of
the case would be obtained":29
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title…) was
duly filed with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato
City at the option of herein private respondent (petitioner
below) who believed that a more speedy disposition of the
case would be obtained when the action is filed with the
Shariah District Court than in the Regional Trial Courts
considering the voluminous pending cases at the Regional
Trial Courts[.]30
On Vivencio’s claim that respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to decide the action for recovery of
possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan argued that
no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines prohibited non-Muslims from participating in
Shari’a court proceedings, especially in actions where the
Shari’a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Thus, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
validly took cognizance of his action:
2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively
for muslim litigants. No provision in the Code on Muslim
Personal Laws which expressly prohibits non-muslim to
participate in the proceedings in the Shariah Courts,
especially in actions which applies the civil code and not the
Code on Muslim Personal Laws;
3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for
quieting of title filed by a muslim litigant since the nature of
the action involved mere removal of cloud of doubt upon
one’s Certificate of Title. The laws applied in this case is the
Civil Code and other related laws, and not the Code on
Muslim Personal Laws[.]31
Since respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had jurisdiction
to decide the action for recovery of possession, Roldan
argued that the proceedings before it were valid.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Vivencio upon service on him of
summons. When Vivencio failed to file his answer, he
"effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings
[before the Fifth Shari’a District Court]"32 and he cannot
argue that his rights were prejudiced:
4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent
below) was properly served with summons, notices and
other court processes when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200
was filed and heard in the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court,
Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent below) intentionally
or without known reason, ignore the proceedings;
5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is
whether or not herein petitioner (respondent below) has
effectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings
below and had lost his right to appeal via Certiorari; and the
issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court
has jurisdiction over an action where one of the parties is a
non-muslim;
6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City
acquired jurisdiction over the case and that the same Court
had correctly ruled that herein petitioner (respondent)
intentionally waived his right to defend himself including his
right to appeal via certiorari;
7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District
Court took cognizance of an action under its concurrent
jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court, the law rules
applied is not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws but the
Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised Rules of
Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice the right of
herein petitioner (respondent below)[.]33
In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered
Vivencio to reply to Roldan’s comment. On February 3, 2012,
Vivencio filed his manifestation,34 stating that he would no longer file
a reply to the comment as he had "exhaustively discussed the issue
presented for resolution in [his petition for certiorari]."35
The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari’a District
Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is
not a Muslim.
We also resolve the following issues:
1. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and
decide a real action where one of the parties is a non-Muslim
if the District Court decides the action applying the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and
2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and
decide a real action filed by a Muslim against a non-Muslim if
the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.
We rule for petitioner Vivencio.
I
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan’s action for
recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong."36 This power is conferred by law,37 which may
either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter
jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or
agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.38 If a
court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no
jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are
void.39
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action, the material allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are examined.40
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the
Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article
143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not
arising from customary contracts41 wherein the parties involved are
Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court
shall have original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph
1(d)42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
xxxx
When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner
has the right to possess and enjoy it.43 If the owner is dispossessed
of his or her property, he or she has a right of action to recover its
possession from the dispossessor.44 When the property involved is
real,45 such as land, the action to recover it is a real
action;46 otherwise, the action is a personal action.47 In such actions,
the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to
validly take cognizance of them.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of
possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio
stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim,
Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the
case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall
dismiss the claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the
law to decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved
in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s
action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special
Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Roldan chose to file his action with the Shari’a District Court, instead
of filing the action with the regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy
disposition of the case."48 This would have been a valid argument
had all the parties involved in this case been Muslims. Under Article
143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts
over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent
with that of existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction
over real actions "is applicable solely when both parties are
Muslims"49 as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong.50 When
one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the
regular courts.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
by respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court does not validate the
proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code,
customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim
law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when
resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there
is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such
real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of
general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the
Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action.
This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District
Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is
concurrent with that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the
parties involved are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a
Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The
proceedings before it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the
action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines expressly prohibits non-Muslims from participating in
Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when
provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article
13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code on marriage and
divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according
to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93,
paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person of a different religion is
disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by
operation of law and regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the
decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be entitled
to one-third of what he or she would have received without such
disqualification."56 In these instances, non-Muslims may participate in
Shari’a court proceedings.57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited
instances. This case involves an action for recovery of possession of
real property. As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts may only
take cognizance of a real action "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims."58 Considering that one of the parties involved in this case
is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of
possession of real property. The judgment against Vivencio is void
for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter only after respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had rendered
judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court
or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law,
and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."60
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio Figueroa was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa
as charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Figueroa raised for
the first time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to
decide the case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal
case despite the fact that Figueroa objected to the trial court’s
jurisdiction only on appeal.
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,62 Johnny Pastorin filed
a complaint for constructive dismissal against Metromedia Times
Corporation. Metromedia Times Corporation actively participated in
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter
ruled against Metromedia Times, it appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission, arguing for the first time that the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to
Metromedia Times, the case involved a grievance issue "properly
cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63 This court set aside the
decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter despite the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was
raised only on appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred
from assailing the jurisdiction of the court to decide a case. In the
1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the
Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to recover ₱1,908.00. At that time, the court with
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the amount
demanded does not exceed ₱2,000.00 was the court of justices of
the peace and municipal courts in chartered cities under Section 88
of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of
First Instance issued a writ of attachment against the Spouses
Sibonghanoy. However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of First Instance
dissolved the writ of attachment.
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses
Tijam. When the writ of execution returned unsatisfied, the Spouses
Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond. The Court of First Instance
granted the motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to
quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First Instance
denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance’s
decision. Five days after receiving the Court of Appeals’ decision,
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
for the first time that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals forwarded
the case to this court for resolution.
This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance on the ground of estoppel by
laches. Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action if it took them an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to object to the court’s
jurisdiction.65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of parties
in invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief, only to
repudiate the court’s jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief
sought.66 In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is overlooked in favor of the public policy of
discouraging such inequitable and unfair conduct.67
In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before
assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. As early as
1948, the surety company became a party to the case when it issued
the counter-bond to the writ of attachment. During trial, it invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by seeking several
affirmative reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of execution.
The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance in 1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s decision. This court said:
x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and
Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
on July 19, 1948 and compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their
Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.68
After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam, this court
observed that the "non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction"69 has
been ignored, and the Tijam doctrine has become more the general
rule than the exception.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld
in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over
the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which
were obviously not contemplated therein. x x x.71
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted"72 rule that
objections to a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This is
because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a "matter of law"73 and
"may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties."74
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be
applied with great care;"76 otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most
effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":77
x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by
law. It is to be applied rarely — only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the
doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. x x x. No laches will even
attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction x x
x.78
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not
exist. Vivencio never invoked respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s
jurisdiction to seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief
from judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court over Roldan’s petition for recovery of
possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction
of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over the action for recovery
of possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Roldan’s action.
II
That respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Vivencio
Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari’a
District Court were valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Vivencio. When Vivencio was served with summons, he
failed to file his answer and waived his right to participate in the
proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. Since
Vivencio waived his right to participate in the proceedings, he cannot
argue that his rights were prejudiced.
Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to
the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action."79 A court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff once he or she
files the initiatory pleading.80 As for the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her voluntary
appearance in court81 or a valid service on him or her of summons.82
Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam83 or
actions based on a party’s personal liability.84 Since actions in
personam "are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments,"85 it is necessary that the parties to the action "are
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard."86 With respect to the defendant, he or she must have been
duly served with summons to be considered properly impleaded;
otherwise, the proceedings in personam, including the judgment
rendered, are void.87
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a
court to validly try and decide actions in rem.88 Actions in rem are
"directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek
judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world."89 In
actions in rem, the court trying the case must have jurisdiction over
the res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective."90 In actions in rem, summons must still be served on the
defendant but only to satisfy due process requirements.91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the court’s jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule 9,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived."
In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on
Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him the possession of his
property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his
property.92 Thus, Roldan’s action for recovery of possession is an
action in personam. As this court explained in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa
and Santiago,93 an action to recover the title to or possession of a
parcel of land "is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing."94 Also, in Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,95 this court said that "a
judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to
another is in personam. It is binding only against the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action."96
This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was
necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire
jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not
being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent
Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio,
are void.
III
The Shari’a Appellate Court and the
Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines
We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for
certiorari of respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision. Under
the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of
decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed his
petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.
However, the Shari’a Appellate Court is yet to be
organized.1âwphi1 Thus, we call for the organization of the court
system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce
the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal
system – a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal,
commercial, political, international, and religious laws98 – is part of
the law of the land,99 and Shari’a courts are part of the Philippine
judicial system.100
Shari’a Circuit Courts and Shari’a District Courts created under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines shall continue to
discharge their duties.101 All cases tried in Shari’a Circuit Courts shall
be appealable to Shari’a District Courts.[[102]
The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a
District Courts.103 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and
other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate SO ORDERED.
jurisdiction.104 The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be
final and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
jurisdiction of this court.105 Associate Justice

This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time WE CONCUR:
that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been
organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
appealable to the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a Associate Justice
Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] Chairperson
stations preferably composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals]
Justices."108 However, considering that To m a w i s was not yet
promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari on August DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the Associate Justice Associate Justice
exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.109
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Associate Justice
Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is
an officer with authority to render legal opinions or "fatawa"110 on any ATTESTATION
questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be
based on recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in precise I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
accordance with precedent."113 In the Philippines where only Muslim in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an and opinion of the Court's Division.
Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a court
judges in resolving disputes not involving Muslim personal laws. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
All told, Shari’a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action Chairperson, Third Division
only when the parties involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance CERTIFICATION
of Roldan E. Mala’s action for recovery of possession considering
that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the
proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
including the judgment rendered, are void. Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court’s decision dated June 11, 2008 and order
dated May 29, 2009 in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the filing of respondent Roldan Chief Justice
E. Mala of an action with the proper court.
G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the
case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be
impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated
August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano)
as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita
twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993
in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was
indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole
world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate
children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that
Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in
1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant
Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil Code,
is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by
deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio
because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to
Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status
being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis,
because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda
in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so
because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have
divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of
P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the
deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed,
legally and factually, to have been one contracted under
Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083,
since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not
register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She
then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her
answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15
days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the
Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment
complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction
over the case for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in
November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred
the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP
No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued
to try the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration
of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer.
Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing
parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to
adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were
postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22,
1996, suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary
restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from
hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to
Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then
elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC
ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As
Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9,
1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked
for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and
Adib moved to submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that
Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the
ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the
outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon
City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages
celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a
court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming
jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24,
1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with
finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC
rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s
marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage
to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of
the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows
that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was
entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very
beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as
"divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second
marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino
spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a
previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was
solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be
heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of
the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed
that the RTC should have required her to file her answer after the
denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is
capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce
with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she
highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the validity of
her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the
CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as
she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by
asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer
despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was
prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her
pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an
independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings
in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that
Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being
bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano
is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an
absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under
civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal
standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence,
the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with
Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s
Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
where it debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted
that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the
existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the
Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate
the trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had
been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that
the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is
attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA
disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously
rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the
records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the
issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of
the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now
argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter
was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an
answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations
against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss
instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and,
consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while
her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet
been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely
participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s
assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever
action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s
jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered
an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records
of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11,
1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public
prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being
a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party
has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late
senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim
Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both
parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim
law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under
Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the
deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal
standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme
Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the
CA’s reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her
right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does
not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there
is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential
considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that
obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports
private respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of
Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any
proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void
marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as
they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely
because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for
the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition,
i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer
and thus was denied due process; and c) the public
prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether
there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to
have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her
right to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on
certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the
higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the
principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right
to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even
actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension
of the period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial
court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In
said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which,
apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’
instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion
suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint.
Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it
behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case
on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its
Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under
Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section
4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule
11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed
from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court
within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced
therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally
resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the
above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its
proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the
motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts.
In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course
of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to
present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste
even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file
an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended
period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for
extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment,
as it should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to
Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the
pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the
proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial
which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of."42 Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the
case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the
RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule
45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court from
proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an
answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so,
insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R.
No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present
her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be
allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with
the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have
waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the
lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final
and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back
to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the
Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of
the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in
cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the
prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether
there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one
month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of
Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the
court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies
thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall
state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file
their respective comments on the finding of collusion within
ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall
set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties
are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists,
the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of
the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public
prosecutor to submit the required report,45 which we find to have
been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo
T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he
attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no
fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of
the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even
assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of
participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not
invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the
petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-
intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The
only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given
time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to
Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims,
or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of
the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that
"Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977,
and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective
application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the
time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to
extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all
laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly,
plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-
existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article
186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this
Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one
contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their
mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law,
the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage
was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we
have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status
since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted
at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is
correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities
to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for
nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent
marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the
Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof,
only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and
Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this
interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses
may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs,
we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following
manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section
3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment
of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate
heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If
Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule
contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or
she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son RENATO C. CORONA
from impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at Chief Justice
bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action Chairperson
for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages
celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, JR. DE CASTRO
2003.58 Associate Justice Associate Justice

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with Associate Justice
respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held
CERTIFICATION
that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and
cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise the opinion of the Court’s Division.
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his
mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured RENATO C. CORONA
by the judgment in the suit.60 Chief Justice

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they
should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective
rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find
the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17,

2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as
well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005,
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89,
Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A.
TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano)
married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death,
particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita
J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son
Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullify of
Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively,
thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda
and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the
decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never
became final and executory for non-compliance with publication
requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and
nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage"
could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other
spouse, 1 hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for
annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that
since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in
Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was
vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the
instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married
in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in
accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of Muslim Personal
laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied;
hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court
seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent
presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order
denying reconsideration thereof.
In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to
the Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371.
Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the
Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other
consolidated cases.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts only when
filed in places where there are shari'a court. But in places where
there are no shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case
could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that
it is the shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 3 Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract
of marriage and marital relations. 4 Personal actions, such as
the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may
be commenced and tried where the  plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of
the  plaintiff.  5 There should be no question by now that what
determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the
court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by
the  plaintiff in this case. 6 In the complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was
alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned
that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or
PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion
to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim
laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim
laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the
allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and
Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a
court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses
set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the
complaint. 7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's causes of action. 8
Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over
the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083, 9 which
provides —
Art. 13. Application. — (1) The provisions of this
Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the
Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal
impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and
filiation, guardianship and custody of minors,
support and maintenance, claims for customary
dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to
marry, solemnization and registration of
marriage and divorce, rights and obligations
between husband and wife, parental authority,
and the property relations between husband and
wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were
married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to
the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the
instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were
likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall
under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original
and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the
Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original
jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which
provides —
 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions . . .

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August
1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court — Br. 89, Quezon City,
denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is
AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until
terminated.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162894             February 26, 2008
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against
petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents
appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State
of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton
W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby
BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March
1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and
Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.4 On 28 September
1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering
BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims.5 Upon appeal
by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was
dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union,
instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case
No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon
International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations
impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially
reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally
employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him
from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of
BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as
petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim,
it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with
respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also
denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming
the alleged obligation of the said companies.9 Petitioner also referred
to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement
between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special
Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non
conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary
Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary
Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds
of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action.
Respondent opposed the same. Pending the resolution of the
omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken before
the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s
omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the
complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the
trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the
principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial
court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which
motion was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July
2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule
65 Petition19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a
writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of
the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to
enjoin the trial court from conducting further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have
confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have
also considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner’s omnibus
motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the
deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of
determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the
other on the issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner,
named as defendants in the case had indeed merged together based
solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that
the issue should be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the
appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the
latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground
of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated
notices. The Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record for
respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the case, Atty.
Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with the law firm even
before the filing of the instant petition and that it could no longer find
the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite diligent
efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20 November 2006, the Court
resolved to dispense with the filing of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the
dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American
corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is
located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts
inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of
the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three
consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws
problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances27 where the Court
held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve
controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to
be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce
its decision.28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where
the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or
can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law30 and by the material
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature
of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing
of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall
be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not
suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for
that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction
and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive
law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-
laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not
the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s
averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle
of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is
more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within
the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction
on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established,
to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of
Appeals respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over
the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same
manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts
because their findings are binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-
BG failed to state a cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state
a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading.36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a
cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and
RUST to function as one company. Petitioner contends that the
deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation. On this score,
the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter
Browning as well as other documents produced in the
hearing shows that these evidence aliunde are not quite
sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action.
 Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial,
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
convincing and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers
Associate Justice Associate Justice
and Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty
obligations of defendant Rust International in the Makar Port PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Project in General Santos City, after Rust International Associate Justice
ceased to exist after being absorbed by REC. Other
documents already submitted in evidence are likewise
meager to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon
International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand
Marine Service, Inc. have combined into one company, so ATTESTATION
much so that Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving
company (if at all) may be held liable for the obligation of
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither
38 in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
these documents clearly speak otherwise.
opinion of the Court’s Division.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
whether petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together requires the
Associate Justice
presentation of further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the
Acting Chairperson
merits can afford.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari

is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. CERTIFICATION

SO ORDERED. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
DANTE O. TINGA conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
Associate Justice before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

*ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case.
They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong
de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of
Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as
she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant
used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant,
and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street
in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was
proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's
carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-
hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's
delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of
passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her
head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon
the horse which was drawing it.
x x x           x x x          x x x
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence
to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at
the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had
sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran,
and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the
team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to
the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the
wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that
while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out,
another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and
made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to
the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown
from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and
on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which
the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence
and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate
of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the
costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that
embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this
case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair
the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for
the damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with
them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of
their duties.
 The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damages should have been caused by the
official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle
and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last
paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in
handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed
upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was
negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some
what different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now
discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are,
nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating
the  person  responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in
many jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same
here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4
December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March,
1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13
April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898;
3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the
damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and
capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other
five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of
leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the
accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been,
therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and
assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of
the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of
the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the
defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their
employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving
the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case, either
under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422;
Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. &
W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs.  Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord
Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the
house, and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the
street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another
to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of
the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein  (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of
his horse, at the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised
by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like
circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse
unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a
horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse;
whether he was under the observation and control of some person
all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be
determined by the jury from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner  (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was
error on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence
for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise
unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the
sidewalk loading goods on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with
these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in
finding that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was
upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the
alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that
 way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as
requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the
defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were
proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co.  (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver
goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel
at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left
the horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the
house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for
three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is
not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in
question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable
care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to
produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact
ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15
Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron
Works vs. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63;
Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was
not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not
proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced
in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not
be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very
reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather
than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from
the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary
results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury,
the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does
not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at
most only creates a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof
of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It is
something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing
the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the
creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur  disappears. This is
demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs.
Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the
case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and
in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf
properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this
would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the
defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole
evidence in the case this  prima facie  evidence was rebutted. As
such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat
under control of her officers and carefully managed by them,
evidence that such damage was done in this case was  prima
facie,  and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their
part, and the jury might properly be so instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only
the fact of the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the
conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of
themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the
management of the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any,
was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal
practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being
delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being
delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the
manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom
in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public,
finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection
or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby
make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to
believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil
forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J.,  dissenting:
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
G.R. No. 185582               February 29, 2012
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the
Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,1 petitioner
Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, prays that the Resolution2 dated 21
November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be
declared void and the case be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings. In the assailed Resolution, the RTC dismissed
petitioner’s Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Award3 against respondent Philippine Kingford,
Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines,4 on the ground that petitioner lacked legal
capacity to sue.5
The Antecedents
On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as
the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine
Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911
(collectively referred to as the "Yamaoka Patent"),6 and five (5)
Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation,
East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz
Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as
the "sponsors"/"licensees")7 entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA),8 pertinent provisions of which read:
1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of
U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and
Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an
alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three
aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those
patents, and collecting royalties.
The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned
patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those
patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia,
enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction
with Licensor.
xxx
4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties
hereto agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc.
("TPI"), a corporation established in the State of California, in
order to implement the objectives of this Agreement.
5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank
accounts in the United States, which will be used exclusively
to deposit funds that it will collect and to disburse cash it will
be obligated to spend in connection with the implementation
of this Agreement.
6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors
and Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI
for the purpose of being elected as member of the board of
directors. The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the
Sponsors according to their respective equity shares. 9
xxx
The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of
Agreement10 dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to Amend
Memorandum of Agreement11 dated 14 July 2003.
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees,
including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and
correspondingly reneged on their obligations.12 Petitioner submitted
the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute
Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case
against respondent.13 Pertinent portions of the award read:
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award
to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total sum to
be paid by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the
sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS
($1,750,846.10).
(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due
assessments, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall
pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY
NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE
DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is
20% of MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]
(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate
with CLAIMANT TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA,
RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total
sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY
CENTS ($271,490.20)[;]14 and
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of
the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT
KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE
MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS
AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx
xxx15
To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007
a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Award  before the RTC of Makati City. The petition was
raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.
At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss.16 After
the court denied the motion for lack of merit,17 respondent sought for
the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of
the order denying the motion.18 Judge Alameda inhibited himself
notwithstanding "[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated
assertions in the motion."19 Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61, to
which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.20
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing
its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award.
Issue
The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo  was
correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioner’s lack
of legal capacity to sue.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines  expressly provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license,
or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or
intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or
administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may
be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized
under Philippine laws.
It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a
quo  dismissed the petition.  Thus:
Herein plaintiff TPI’s "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a foreign
corporation established in the State of California" and "was given the
exclusive right to license or sublicense the Yamaoka Patent" and
"was assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said patent and
collect corresponding royalties" in the Philippines. TPI likewise
admits that it does not have a license to do business in the
Philippines.
There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI has
been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license to do so
issued by the concerned government agency of the Republic of the
Philippines, when it collected royalties from "five (5) Philippine tuna
processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish
Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc.
and respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc." This being the real
situation, TPI cannot be permitted to maintain or intervene in any
action, suit or proceedings in any court or administrative agency of
the Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the plaintiff TPI
should be dismissed for it does not have the legal personality to sue
in the Philippines.21
The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the
recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004),22 the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958
(New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),23 as none of these
specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement
should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on the
following:
In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on a
ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004], New York Convention, or Model Law. It is for this reason
that TPI has brought this matter before this most Honorable Court,
as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the Philippines’ international
obligations and State policy to strengthen arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution may be defeated by misplaced technical
considerations not found in the relevant laws.24
Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation
Code of the Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004, the New York Convention and the Model
Law on the other?
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature
and applicability of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a
general law, viz-a-viz other special laws. Thus, in Koruga v. Arcenas,
Jr.,25 this Court rejected the application of the Corporation Code and
applied the New Central Bank Act. It ratiocinated:
Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is
misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:
"The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all
types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates
specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the
dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special
law, the latter shall prevail – generalia specialibus non derogant."
(Emphasis supplied)26
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,27 this Court held:
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for
the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations. On
the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As
between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail—generalia
specialibus non derogant.28
Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act,  as its title - An Act to
Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System
in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, and for Other Purposes -  would suggest, is a law
especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own
arrangements to resolve their disputes."29 It specifically provides
exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.30
Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a
municipal law,  applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need
to discuss compliance with international obligations under the New
York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part
of the law.
In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004 incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by specifically
providing:
SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New York
Convention shall govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards covered by the said Convention.
xxx
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign
arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with the procedural
rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court only on those
grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention.
Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial
court.
It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration. International commercial arbitration shall be governed by
the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the "Model
Law") adopted by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law on June 21, 1985 xxx."
Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the
affirmative.
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides
that the opposing party in an application for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that
were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article
II were, under the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it
or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of
the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked
was not given proper notice of the appointment of
the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those
not so submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
 (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under
the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
also be refused if the competent authority in the country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of
that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity
to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the
award.
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative
Dispute Resolution,31 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court,
likewise support this position.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a foreign
arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign
arbitral award." The contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule
13.5.32 Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on
local arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances where "the place of
arbitration is in the Philippines,"33 it is specifically required that a
petition "to determine any question concerning the existence, validity
and enforceability of such arbitration agreement"34 available to the
parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for
"judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary
question upholding or declining its jurisdiction"35 after arbitration has
already commenced should state "[t]he facts showing that the
persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to
sue or be sued."36
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of
a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the
rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the
Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters
into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this
case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the
contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding
thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract,
participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the
result. Although not on all fours with the instant case, also worthy to
consider is the
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals,37 to wit:
xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining
adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested
mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it
must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the
arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the
very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.38
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award
should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws
and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly
erased any conflict of law question.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the
court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York
Convention, governs the subject arbitral award,39 petitioner may still
seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court,
since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical exclusive questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that we merely
grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.40 abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique
circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues
Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do outright.45
business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement
of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. herein raised should be seriously considered.46 Surely, there is a
need to take cognizance of the case not only to guide the bench and
II the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution, and uphold the policy of the State embodied in
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to wit:
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise
unmeritorious.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. -  It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of
First.  There is no need to consider respondent’s contention that
disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements
petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it posited
to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the State shall
that its act of entering into a MOA should not be considered "doing
encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative Dispute
business" in the Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity
Resolution (ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and
to sue. We reiterate that the foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in
impartial justice and declog court dockets. xxx
the Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of the
foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the court a
Second.  Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion for
quo  where its recognition and enforcement is being sought.
reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21 November
2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again, ruled that the
prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required Fifth.  Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court of
in certiorari  under Rule 45.41 origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for review
on certiorari before the petition was filed with this Court.47 We,
however, find petitioner’s reply in order. Thus:
Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle of
hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary circumstances, warrants
the outright dismissal of the case,42 we opt to relax the rules following 26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in petitioner TPI’s "Motion
the pronouncement in Chua v. Ang,43 to wit: for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45" is
a typographical error. As correctly pointed out by respondent
Kingford, the order sought to be assailed originated from Regional
[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of courts]
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.
generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations.
Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be
brought immediately before us as we are not triers of facts.44 A strict
application  of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the
rule is not present in a case, as in the present case, where the
issues are not factual but purely legal.1âwphi1 In these types of
27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPI’s motion was received by the consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 67. On 8 January 2009, opinion of the Court’s Division.
the motion was forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 61.48 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not Chairperson, Second Division
licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason
alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, CERTIFICATION
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a
Philippine court. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case Court’s Division.
is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings.
RENATO C. CORONA
SO ORDERED. Chief Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P. A.
ARTURO D. BRION
SERENO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo
is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it.
The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the
approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to
this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in
reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or
article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides
the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which
it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs,
36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish
laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be
given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much
so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred
the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain
testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove
such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the
trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was
granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to
our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.  lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect
was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is
one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken
into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of
the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred
upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I
now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with
this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of
his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any
legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who,
by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of
the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the
following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores
the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil
Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above
cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective
even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding
the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon
the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions
and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that
said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is
directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of
the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he
had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust,
in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares
of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a
total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the
lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by
the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court
to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated
Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law
of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing
from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in
this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the
opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief
after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the
printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs
filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the motion.

2
San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

3
Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re  Testate Estate of Suntay, 95
Phil. 500.

G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts
of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her
legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without
issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton,
etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx     xxx     xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen
years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she
been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I
have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof
as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx     xxx     xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real,
personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law
that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if
the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,
which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been
declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for
all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has
the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right
of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also
no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival
in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States
and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during
which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for
the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
 Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective
Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and
"CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n.,
July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the
City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for
short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to
have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in
the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere
physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired
in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of
the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship
by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean
the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside
in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one,
while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to
have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It
is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing
only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as
physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of
meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the
only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined
in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it
can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition
of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the
contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code,
a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P.
2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not
denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen
of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity
of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose
to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of
Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule
looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not
have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted
in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have
looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi
or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical
reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather
than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law.
Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for
they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the
only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in
the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had
the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been
against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would
switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where
the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of
the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce
case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to
the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the
situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by
the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France.
The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the
natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination
of French law, however, would show that if a French court were
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it
would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus
applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the
surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate
succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this
is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying
its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-
of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law
of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German
term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may
arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such
foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it
has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been
the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and
the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as
the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in
toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to
be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as
to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question
which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for
its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of
the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules
of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following
theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the
right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal
statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law
of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of
a question to the same system of law.
 xxx     xxx     xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if
he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law —
he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law
on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In
re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states,
and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property,
the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death
will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost
as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession,
the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state.
The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the
point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal
property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is
one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international
comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age,
when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance
with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the
internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country
of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule
of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as
the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case
at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not
appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state
of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of
the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen

of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed
by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,