Meor

15TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
TEAM CODE: 1618
15th AMITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC

OF EBONY
Special Leave Petition No. _________/2015
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
Royal Retreat Group of Hotels and Palaces Pvt. Ltd and Others … Appellants
v.
North Bilzerian and Wild Bilzerian … Respondents
ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON‘BLE SUPREME COURT OF EBONY
UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF EBONY
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
PAGE | 1
CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... 4
Cases .................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Statues .................................................................................................................................... 9
Books, Articles & Treatises ................................................................................................... 9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................... 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................... 11
Background .......................................................................................................................... 11
Incorporation Of The Company And The Parition Suit....................................................... 11
The Demise Of King Ray .................................................................................................... 11
The Demise Of Queen Kim ................................................................................................. 12
The Order Of The Company Law Board ............................................................................. 12
The Impugned Judgment...................................................................................................... 12
ISSUES INVOLVED ............................................................................................................. 14
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... 15
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................ 17
1. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA HAD NOT

RIGHTLY EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 10F WHILE
HEARING AN APPEAL AGAINST SECTION 111 OF THE COMPANIES
ACT. ............................................................................................................................ 17
1.1 That the order of the Company Law Board was absolutely correct and
should not be set aside. ......................................................................................... 17
1.2 That the parties in an appeal were not aggrieved party............................. 20
1.3 That the Jurisdiction Of High Court is Restricted Under Section 10 F ..... 21
2. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA COULD NOT

HAVE HEARD AND DECIDED VARIOUS ASPECTS AND DISPUTES
PAGE | 2
PENDING ADJUDICATION IN THE COURTS BELOW WHICH WERE IN

THE NATURE OF CIVIL DISPUTES. .................................................................. 22
2.1 High court cannot interfere the fact finding jurisdiction of lower courts. . 23
2.2 That supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court is not absolute under
Article 227 ............................................................................................................. 26

HAVE INTERPRETED A WILL WHILE EXERCISING JURISDICTION
UNDER SECTION 10F. ............................................................................................ 29
3.1 That only questions of law are appealable under section 10f .................... 29
3.2 That interpretation of will is a question of fact .......................................... 32
3.3 That the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited ...................................... 33
4. THAT A JOINT SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE RELIED UPON

WHEREIN ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE VERY SAME CERTIFICATE
HAD EXPIRED. ......................................................................................................... 35
4.1 That the rights conferred by a joint succession certificate are not
separable………………………………………………………………………….………36
4.2 That the certificate is rendered inoperative and useless by such

occurrence ............................................................................................................. 37
5. PROBATE PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE TERMED AS LAPSED ON THE

BASIS OF SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN SOME OF THE
PARTIES .................................................................................................................... 39
5.1 That the Settlement between the Parties is not legally enforceable ........... 39
5.2 That Section 370 (1) of The Indian Succession Act, 1925 is violated ........ 40
5.3 Grant of certificate does not bar suit for title ............................................. 41
PRAYER ................................................................................................................................. 43
PAGE | 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385. .................................................. 20

Ahmedabad Mfg., v. Calico, AIR 1972 SC 1598. ................................................................... 26
Aidal Singh and Ors., v. Karan Singh and Ors., 1957 AIR All 414. ....................................... 28
B.K. Seltharamaiah v. Associated Oxides P. Ltd., (2009) 151 Corn Cases 270 (Karn). ......... 22
Babhutmal v. Laxmibai, AIR 1975 SC 1297 ........................................................................... 29
Babulal Mandal and Ors. v. Sm. Abala Bala Dasya and Ors., AIR 1955 Pat 126................... 41
Bakshi Tek Chand J., in Mt. Charjo v. Dina Nath, AIR 1937 Lahore 196 (2). ....................... 38
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sakwarbai, 26 Bom. 792 (4 Bom. L. R. 637). ................................... 37
Baljit Kaur Vohra v. Dr. Vikramjit Singh Vohra, (2003) 115 C‗om Cases .194 : (2004) 50
SCL 693 (P&H) ................................................................................................................... 17
Bappaditya Mukherjee and Anr. v. The State of West Bengal and Ors., (2013) 4 CALLT 397
(HC). .................................................................................................................................... 42
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V Dabholkar, AIR 1975 SC 2092 ...................................... 20
Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages P. Ltd., v. Stridewell Leathers P. Ltd., (1995) 82 Com
Cases 836 (Mad) .................................................................................................................. 30
Binod Kumar Agarwal v. Ringtong Tea Company, (1996) 85 Comp.Cas 289 (CLB)............ 19
Bokka Subba Rao v. Kukkala Balakrishna and others, (2008) 3 SCC 99 ............................... 35
Boodireddy Chandraiah And Ors v. Arigela Laxmi and Anr, AIR 2008 SC 380 ................... 32
Business Developments Consultants P. Ltd. v. SB, (2007) 80 CLA 269 (Cal). ...................... 22
Chacko & Another v. Mahadevan, (2007) 7 SCC 363 ............................................................ 35
Chand Mall Pinclm v. Hathi Mall Pincha. (1999) 95 Com Cases 368 : (1999) 2 Comp U 108
:(1998) 31 CLA 451 : (1999) 20 SCL 384 (Gan). ............................................................... 22
Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Raovs Ashalata S. Guram, AIR 1987 SC 117 ................................ 34
Chandmallpincha v. Hathimallpincha (1999) 95 ComCase 368 ............................................. 23
Chandrabhai K. Bhoir and Ors. vs. Krishna Arjun Bhoir and Ors., 2008 (15) SCR 652. ....... 39
Chandravarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Asha Latha, (1986) SCC 141 ............................................. 26
Chopra Hospital (P) Ltd. Through v. Usha Chopra (2007) 3 CompLJ 86 Del. ....................... 19
Chopra Hospital (P) Ltd. Through v. Usha Chopra, (2007) 3 Comp LJ 86 Del, 2007 79 SCL
299 Delhi. ............................................................................................................................. 35
PAGE | 4
CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd, AIR 1961 SC 1633. ............................................. 21
Comm., HRCE v. P. Shanmugama, (2005) 9 SCC 232. .......................................................... 24
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. H. Holck Larsen, AIR 1986 SC 1695. ................. 30
Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax v. B.M. Kanodia, 1990 185 ITR 333 All................................ 32
Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments v. P. Shanmugama (2005) 9 SCC
232........................................................................................................................................ 24
D. Ramkishore v. Vijaya- wada Share Brokers Ltd., (2008) 144 Com Cases 326 : (2009) 89
SCL 279 (AP). ..................................................................................................................... 21
Dale and Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. P.K. Prathapan and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1624.
.............................................................................................................................................. 31
Dalmia Airways v. Sukumar, AIR 1951 Cal 193. ................................................................... 26
Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya, AIR 1959 SC 57 .............................................. 32
Dr. H.T. ViraReddi v. Kistamma, AIR 1969 Mad 235. ........................................................... 31
Durga Chowdhrani v. Jawahir Singh, (1891) 17 IA 122 ......................................................... 31
E Shanmusham v. APS Cam—o—Matec P. Ltd., (2009) 148 Com Cases 71 (Del). .............. 21
First National Bank v. Dridevi Dayal, AIR 1968 P&H 292 .................................................... 41
Gappulal v. Thakurji Shreeji Dwarkadhishji, AIR 1969 SC 1291. ......................................... 31
George Anthony Harris v. Millicent, AIR 1933 Bom 370. ..................................................... 34
Gopal v. Narendradeo, AIR 1978 SC 347. .............................................................................. 29
Gordon Woodroffe & Co. Ltd., v. Gordon Woodroffe Ltd., (1999) 97 Com Cases 582 :
(1999) 1 Comp LJ 243 : (1999) 20 SCL 429 : (2001) 42 CLA 39 (Mad). .......................... 33
Gordon Woodroffe & Co. Ltd., v. Gordon Woodroffe Ltd., (1999) 97 Com Cases 582. ....... 22
Gour Chandra v. Sarat Sundari, 40 Cal. 50 ; (15 I. C. 44). ...................................................... 37
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State Of Bombay (Now Gujarat), AIR 1965 SC 1153. ....... 26
Guljarilal Kanoria v. Loptchu Tea Company Ltd, 2000 (102) Comp. Cases 292 (CLB). ....... 19
Gurdev Kaur and Ors. v. Kaki and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1975 .................................................. 35
Gurdev Kaur and Ors. v.Kaki and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1975. .................................................. 26
Gurdev Kaur and Ors.v. Kaki and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1975 ................................................... 33
Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others, AIR 2006 SC 1975. ........................................... 33
Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 270. ............................................................... 24
Hero Vinoth (minor) v. Seshammal, AIR 2006 SC 2234. ....................................................... 34
Hero Vinoth (Minor) vs Seshammal, AIR 2006 SC 2234. ...................................................... 32
Hurri Krishna v. Balabhadra, ILR 23 Cal 431. ........................................................................ 41
PAGE | 5
Indian Bank v. Deepak Fertilisers & Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd., (1999) 21 SCL 224
(Bom.). ................................................................................................................................. 17
Indramani v. Hema Dibya, AIR 1977 Ori 88........................................................................... 42
Janakbati Thakurain v. Gajanand Thakur', AIR 1916 Pat 82. ................................................. 40
Jasbir Singh v. State Of Punjab, (2006) 8 SCC 294. ............................................................... 28
Jijabai v. Panthankhan, AIR 1971 SC 315 ............................................................................... 26
Joginder Pal v. Indian Red Cross Society & Ors on (2000) 2 SCC 789. ................................. 38
Joginder Pal v. Indian Red Cross Society, (2000) 8 SCC 143. ................................................ 42
Kamal Kumari Devi v. Narendra Nath Mukherji, 9 Cal LJ 19. ............................................... 40
Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram, (2001) 5 SCC 311. .............................................. 25
Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh & Anr, AIR 2008 SC 1749 ................................................. 32
Kesha Appliances P. Ltd. and Ors. v. Royal Holdings Services Ltd. and Ors., (2006) 130
CompCas 227 (Bom) ........................................................................................................... 30
Kinkar Santamandasanyasi v. State Bank of India and others, AIR 2002 Ori 114. ................ 38
M.S Jain v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 276. .................................................................... 20
M.S.D Chandrashkhar Raja v. M/S Jayabharath Textile Pvt. Ltd., [2013] 181 Comp Cas
472(Mad).............................................................................................................................. 18
M/S. Hanumant Cement Pvt Ltd. vs Union Of India, 2002 (143) ELT 263 Del. .................... 32
Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai, (2005) 10 SCC 553. ........................................................... 25
Madhu limaye v. State Of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551. ................................................... 28
Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma And Ors v. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi, (2000) 3 SCC 69.
.............................................................................................................................................. 38
Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and another, (2014) 10 SCC 1. ............................ 24
Manmathanath v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 132. ...................................................................... 28
Manulal v. Radhey Lal AIR 1974 SC 1596. ............................................................................ 23
Marble City Hospital & Research Centre P. Ltd. v. Sarabjeet Singh Mokha, (2010) 96 CLA
427 (MP). ............................................................................................................................. 22
MattuLal v. RadheLal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 ............................................................................. 31
Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596; Gappulal v. Thakurji Shreeji Dwarkadhish, AIR
1969 SC 1291....................................................................................................................... 22
Minoo H. Mody v. Hemant D. Vakil, AIR 1994 Bom 39. ...................................................... 19
Mohd, Yunus v. Mod.Mustaqim, 1983 SCC 566. ................................................................... 27
Mr.Minoo H. Mody v. Hemant D. Vakil and Ors., AIR 1994 Bom 39 ................................... 30
Mt. Charic & another v. Dina Nath & Others, AIR 1937 Lahore 196 (49). ............................ 42
PAGE | 6
Murthi Das v. Achut das, AIR 1924 Lah 493 .......................................................................... 42

N. Kasturi v. D. Ponnammal, AIR 1961 SC 1302. .................................................................. 33
Narendra Gopal Vidyarthivs Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009) 3 SCC 287 ........................................... 32
National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Glaxo India Ltd., (1999) 2 Comp.LJ 205(Bom.) .......... 17
Officer Receiver v. Chellapa Chettiar, AIR 1951 Mad 935 (FB) ............................................ 20
P. Chandrasekharan & Others v. S. Kanakarajan & Others, AIR 2007 SC 2306. .................. 33
P. Jothi Bai v. B. Dorairaj And Ors, AIR 2002 Mad 191. ...................................................... 40
Pattabhiramaswamy v. Hanumayya, AIR 1959 SC 57; Sinha Ramanuja Jeer v. Ranga
Ramanuja Jeer, AIR 1961 SC 1720 ..................................................................................... 31
PPN Power Generating Co. Ltd. v. PPN (Mauritius) C0., 2005 CLC 1 (Mad-DB). ............... 22
PPN Power Generating Co. Ltd., 2005 CLC 1 (Mad – DB). ................................................... 23
Prakash Timber P.Ltd v. Smt.Sushma Shingla (AIR 1996 All. 262) ...................................... 18
Probir Kumar Misravs Ramani Ramaswamy (2010)154 CompCas 658 (Mad). ..................... 30
Probir Kumar Misravs Ramani Ramaswamy, (2010) 154 CompCas 658(Mad). .................... 32
Probir Kumar Misravs Ramani Ramaswamy., (2010) 154 CompCas 658 (Mad) ................... 30
Purnima Manthena and Anr. v. Dr. Renuka Datla and Ors., (2015) 128 CLA 353 (SC). . 30, 35
Purnima Manthena and Anr. v. Dr. Renuka Datla and others, (2015) 128 CLA 353 (SC). .... 19
R. Balakrishnan and Ors. v. Vijay Dairy and Farm Products 2005, 125 CompCas 661 CLB :
2005 59 SCL 667 CLB ........................................................................................................ 19
R. Ramachandran Ayyarvs Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 .................................... 31
Raghunath Prasad v. Dy. Commisioner, Pratabgarh, AIR 1929 PC 283 (285): 32 Bom LR
129: 1929 All LJ 1265. ........................................................................................................ 39
Rajedra Kumar Malhotra v. Harbanslal Malhotra & Sons.Ltd , (1999) 34 CLA 360 (Cal) .... 18
Ram Raj v. Brijnath, AIR 39 All 470. ..................................................................................... 37
Ram Saran v. Gappu Ram, AIR 1916 Lahore 277 (48) ........................................................... 42
S.P Deshmuhkh v. Shah Nihal Chand Waghajibhai Gujarathi, AIR 1977 SC 1985 : (1977) 3
SCC 515. .............................................................................................................................. 23
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 (Supp.) SCC 87. .............................................................. 28
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Company Ltd., (2003) 3 SCC 524. ............................... 27
Sadhanalodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2003) 6 SCC 524. ........................................... 23
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179. .................................................... 25
Sardar Iqbal Singh v. Sardar Gurbaksh Singh, 2000 (100) Comp. Cases 504 (CLB). ............ 19
Satish Sharma v. Vrinda Realtors Ltd. and Ors, (2014) 183 CompCas 62 (Delhi) ................. 30
Satyanarayana v, Mallikarjuna, AIR 1960 SC 137(142). ........................................................ 26
PAGE | 7
Shell Company of Australia vs. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, (1931 AC 275). ........... 18
Shri V.S. Krishnan and Ors. v. Westfort Hi-Tech Hospital Ltd. and Ors. (2008) 142 CompCas
235 SC.................................................................................................................................. 30
Shri V.S. Krishnan and Ors. v. Westfort Hi-Tech Hospital Ltd. and Ors., (2008) 142
CompCas 235 (SC) .............................................................................................................. 31
Smt. S. Anuratha v. A.K.M.N. Cylinders Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., (1999) 1 CLJ 363 (CLB) ......... 17
Sonubhai v. BalaGovinda, (1983) 1 Bom CR 632 (638). ........................................................ 33
State of Chhatisgarh & Ors. Vs. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar, (2009) INSC 943 (5 May 2009). ..... 36
State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi, (2005) 10 SCC 139. ............................................................. 24
State, through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Ors., (2003) 6
SCC 641. .............................................................................................................................. 29
Subramaniam v. Sundaram, AIR 1963 Mad 217 ..................................................................... 18
Sukumar Deb Roy and Anr. v. Parbati Bala W/O Bidhuranjan, AIR 1941 Cal 663 ............... 37
Sukumar Deb Roy and Anr. v. Parbati Bala W/O Bidhuranjan, AIR 1941 Cal 663. .............. 38
Sundeep Gupta v. Indian Hardware Industries, 2008 (142) Comp. Cas.552 (CLB). .............. 19
Surendra v. Amrita, 47 Cal. 115 : (A.I.R. (7) 1920 Cal. 584). ................................................ 38
T.G Veera Prasad v. Sree Rayalaseema Alkalies & Allied Chemicals Ltd., (1999) 98 Com
Cases 806 : (1999) 20 SCL 419 : (2000) 5 Comp Lj 168 (AP) ........................................... 19
T.G. Veera Prasad v. Sree Rayalaseema Alkalies & Allied Chemicals Ltd., (1999) 98 Com
Cases 806 : (1999) 20 SCL 419 : (2000) 5 Comp LJ 168 (AP). .......................................... 34
Tagore v. Tagore 9 Beng LR 377: 18 WR 359 (PC) ............................................................... 33
Tagore v. Tagore, (1874) 1 IA 387; Lal Behary v. Administrator General, AIR 1935 Cal 284:
39 Cal WN 46. ..................................................................................................................... 39
Tarsem Kansil v. Dev Spinners Ltd. (2000) 24 SCL 519 (CLB) ............................................ 17
The Goods Of Gagan Chandra Das v. Unknown, 1949 AIR 1950 Cal 578. ..................... 37, 38
The Goods Of Gagan Chandra Das vs Unknown, 1949 AIR 1950 Cal 578 ............................ 38
Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil (2004) 5 SCC 762. ......................................... 25
Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. And v. Union Of India and Ors., 1986 59 CompCas 94 Cal ... 18
Union Of India & Ors v. Pratibha Bonnerjea & Anr., (1995) 6 SCC 765. .............................. 27
Union of India v. R. Gandhi, MANU/SC/0378/2010. ............................................................. 28
V.K. Kamalam v. Panchali, AIR 1988 Ker 265....................................................................... 42
Waryamsingh v. Amaranth, AIR 1954 SC 215 ....................................................................... 26
PAGE | 8
STATUTES
 The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

 The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
 The Indian Succession Act, 1925
 The Companies Act, 1956
BOOKS, ARTICLES & TREATISES
1. MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (6th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa,

2010)
2. 13 MANOHAR & CHITALEY, AIR MANUAL – CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, (6th Ed, All India
Reporter Pvt. Ltd. Nagapur, 2004)
3. PARAS DIWAN, LAW OF INTERSTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION, (4th Ed,
Universal Law Publishing Company, 2013)
4. 1 A RAMAIYA, GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES ACT, (17th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth
Wadhwa, 2010)
5. GOPALA KRISHNAN‘S, LAW OF WILLS, (8th Ed, Universal Law Publishing Company,
2012)
6. 1-3 JUSTICE SUJATA V. MANOHAR, T.K. TOPE‘S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (3rd
Ed. Eastern Book Company, 2010)
7. 1-4 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA A CRITICAL COMMENTARY, (4th
Ed. Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2010)
8. G.P. SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, (13th Ed. 2012)
9. MULLA, D.F., MULLA HINDU LAW (15th Ed. 2010)
10. 1 MULLA, PRINCIPLES OF HINDU LAW, (18th Ed. 2001)
11. 1-4 P RAMANATHA AIYAR, ADVANCED LAW LEXICON, (YV Chandrachud, 3rd Ed,
LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa, 2009)
PAGE | 9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellants humbly submit this memorandum for the appeal filed before this Honourable
Court vide Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Article 136 of the Constitution of India is
reproduced below:
136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its
discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in
the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or

order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law
relating to the Armed Forces
PAGE | 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
King Big Bilzerian was the monarch of the erstwhile kingdom of Thelesalonica at the time of
unification of the Democratic Republic of Ebony. He married the three princesses of the
province of Scion and gave birth to Dumas and princess Dumagoli from Queen Khloe, Drago
and Drakshin from queen Kourtney and Ray from Queen Kim respectively 1945. Ray was
given in adoption to the issueless King Dueta of the Royal Family of Thalai. In 1977, Prince
Ray fell in love with Princess Carlen of the province of Malay and subsequently gave birth to
prince Wild Bilzerian and princess North Bilzerian. However, an irretrievable breakdown of
marriage surfaced in 1990 after which Carlen returned to Malay with her children.
INCORPORATION OF THE COMPANY AND THE PARITION SUIT
After the demise of Lord Big Bilzerian, the Bilzerian Fort and Palace came under the
management of the three Bilzerian brothers who, in 1981, decided to set up a business
wherein their former residence could be used for earning profits. Thus, the ―Royal Retreat
Group of Hotels Resorts and Palaces Pvt. Ltd.‖ (hereinafter referred to as the Company) came
into existence wherein the three brothers were acting as the Promoters and Joint Managing
Directors. Ray was added to the team on the request of Queen Kim in 1983 and clause 11 was
inserted in the Articles. Later in 1986, a Partition Suit was filed in the High Court of
Thelesalonica due to disputes arising among the members of the royal family.
THE DEMISE OF KING RAY
King Ray died in the year 1977 due to ill health. His children thereafter filed Succession Case
No. 413 of 1998 before the District Court of Thelesalonica seeking one-third share in their
father‘s estate along with Queen Kim. Dumas objected to this petition by filing an
Impleadment Application. Ray‘s will dated 23.06.1996 was found by Queen Kim in
December, 2005 whereby he had bequeathed all his movable and immovable properties and
assets to Queen Kim and disinherited his children. In May 2006, Kim wrote to the Company
to transfer the shares of late King Ray in view of the will and also filed Probate Petition No.
72 of 2006. However, the Company refused to do so until title was established through
probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. On 08.05.2009, North and Wild entered into a
PAGE | 11
Settlement Deed with Kim regarding the distribution of one-third share of Ray‘s estate before
the District Court of Thelesalonica and obtained a succession certificate.
THE DEMISE OF QUEEN KIM
Queen Kim expired in late 2009 due to natural causes and Wild, along with North, moved an
Application for substitution as her legal heir before all the courts wherein a dispute was
pending. Similar applications were moved by the rest of the family members. Wild and North
also filed Probate Petition No. 3983 of 2010 before the District Court of Thelesalonica on the
basis of the will of Queen Kim dates 10.05.2009. The authenticity of this will was challenged
by the other members of the Bilzerian family. Pending all of the aforementioned disputes, all
the above parties wrote to the Company seeking the transfer of the shares of late King Ray in
their own name claiming themselves to be legal heirs. The Company, however, refused due to
absence of probate. On 1.09.2010, the High Court of Thelesalonica passed an Interim Order
that both the groups were Kim‘s legal heirs. The aggrieved grandchildren of Queen Kim filed
the Review Petition No. 76347 of 2010 which is pending adjudication. The Company,
however, refused the transfer of shares.
THE ORDER OF THE COMPANY LAW BOARD
Aggrieved by continued refusal of the Company, the parties divided themselves into two
groups and civil petition number 34/111/2010 was filed before the Company Law Board
(CLB) under section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956. Subsequently in 2011, a civil suit for
declaration and permanent injunction was filed against Kim‘s grandchildren contending that
the alleged will of late Queen Kim dated 10.05.2009 was forged and fabricated. The CLB
vide its order dated 18.03.2011 held that it cannot while exercising summary jurisdiction
under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 decide complicated questions of fact and law
which undisputedly arise before it where the title to the shares standing in the name of late
King Ray is under serious dispute.
THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
Aggrieved by the same, Company Appeals were filed before the Hon‘ble High Court of
Thelesalonica wherein the High Court relying on the succession certificates dated 08.05.2009
held that they were documents which were prima facie proof of title of the Prince and
Princess and the CLB failed to appreciate the controversy in the correct perspective thereby
holding that the Order of the CLB was bad in law. It held that Prince Wild and Princess North
PAGE | 12
had a right to acquire the shares of Late queen Kim and Late King Ray and thus accordingly
ordered for transfer of the assets and shares. The will of late King Ray was interpreted and it
was held that the concern of the Testator was that his estranged wife should not grab his
property through his children since both of them were minors at that point of time and were
thus under the influence of their mother. It also held that the Will in fact reflected the
anguished state of mind of the Testator wherein he was unwell and had an urgent need to
address the reckonings which were going on his mind. It was further held that the alleged
disputes which were pending adjudication appeared to be illusionary and that a Petition under
Section 111 was very much maintainable. The aggrieved group approached this Hon‘ble
Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition against the impugned judgment.
PAGE | 13
ISSUES INVOLVED
ISSUE 1:
Whether the High Court had rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 10F while
hearing an Appeal against Section 111 of The Companies Act?
ISSUE 2:
Whether the High Court could have heard and decided various aspects and disputes
pending adjudication in the courts below which were in the nature of civil disputes?
ISSUE 3:
Whether the High Court could have interpreted a will while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 10F?
ISSUE 4:
Can a joint succession certificate be relied upon wherein one of the members to the
very same certificate had expired?
ISSUE 5:
Can probate proceedings be termed as lapsed on the basis of settlement entered into
between some of the parties?
PAGE | 14
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT HAD RIGHTLY EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION UNDER
SECTION 10F WHILE HEARING AN APPEAL AGAINST SECTION 111 OF THE

COMPANIES ACT?
The Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica had not rightly exercised its jurisdiction under
section 10 F while hearing an appeal against section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 for
three reasons. Firstly, the order of the Company Law Board was absolutely correct and
should not be set aside. Secondly, the parties in an appeal where not aggrieved party. And
thirdly, the Jurisdiction of High Court is restricted under Section 10 F of Companies Act
1956.
2. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT COULD HAVE HEARD AND DECIDED VARIOUS ASPECTS
AND DISPUTES PENDING ADJUDICATION IN THE COURTS BELOW WHICH WERE IN THE
NATURE OF CIVIL DISPUTES?
The Hon‘ble high court of Thelesalonica could not have heard and decided various aspects
and disputes pending adjudication in the courts below which were in the nature of civil
disputes mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, High court cannot interfere into the fact
finding jurisdiction of lower courts. And secondly, that supervisory jurisdiction of the High
Court is not absolute under Article 227 of the Constitution.
3. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT COULD HAVE INTERPRETED A WILL WHILE
EXERCISING JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 10F?
The Hon‘ble high court of Thelesalonica could not have interpreted a will while exercising
jurisdiction under section 10 F of The Companies Act, 1956 because of three reasons. Firstly,
that the only questions of law are appealable under section 10 F Companies Act, 1956.
Secondly, that the interpretation of will is a question of fact. And thirdly, that the jurisdiction
of the High Court is limited while exercising the jurisdiction of 10 F of the Companies Act,
1956.
PAGE | 15
4. CAN A JOINT SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE BE RELIED UPON WHEREIN ONE OF THE
MEMBERS TO THE VERY SAME CERTIFICATE HAD EXPIRED?
A joint succession certificate cannot be relied upon wherein one of the parties to the very
same certificate had expired mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, that the rights conferred
by a joint succession certificate are not separable. And secondly, the certificate is rendered
inoperative and useless by such occurrence.
5. CAN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS BE TERMED AS LAPSED ON THE BASIS OF SETTLEMENT

ENTERED INTO BETWEEN SOME OF THE PARTIES?
The probate proceedings cannot be termed as lapsed on the basis of settlement entered into
between some of the parties mainly because of three reasons. Firstly, the rights conferred by
a joint succession certificate are not separable. Secondly, the Section 370 (1) of The Indian
Succession Act, 1925 is violated. And thirdly, Grant of certificate does not bar suit for title.
PAGE | 16
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA HAD NOT

RIGHTLY EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 10F WHILE
HEARING AN APPEAL AGAINST SECTION 111 OF THE COMPANIES ACT.
(¶1.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that the respectable High Court of
Thelesalonica had not rightly exercised its jurisdiction under section 10F while hearing an
appeal against Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 because the order of the Company
Law Board was absolutely right [1.1] and that the parties were not the aggrieved party[1.2]
1.1 That the order of the Company Law Board was absolutely correct and should
not be set aside.
(¶2.) The Company Law Board is not an appropriate forum to decide the disputes relating to
title as they ought to be decided by the civil court as has been settled in the case of Indian
Bank v. Deepak Fertilisers & Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd.1 The Company Law Board, in
the instant case, vide its order dated 18.03.2011 held that it could not decide complicated
questions of fact and law owing to the disputes of title pending in the civil courts. If issues
which have to be answered are not peripheral to rectification but issues regarding title, etc.
then such other issues will have to be decided by the Civil Court.2 The applications in the
CLB are disposed by a Company judge who is an expert in Company Law matters.3 The
Apex Court has now recognised that it is the Company Court which would be the Court of
exclusive jurisdiction in so far as rectification is concerned. However, if issues arise, whether
the applicant is the owner of the shares or whether there is fraud or forgery in holding the
shares or the very title to the shares, then such issues will be beyond the jurisdiction of the
Company Court and will have to be decided by the Civil Court.4 It is settled law that where in
1
Indian Bank v. Deepak Fertilisers & Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd., (1999) 21 SCL 224 (Bom.).
2
National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Glaxo India Ltd., (1999) 2 Comp.LJ 205(Bom.); Smt. S. Anuratha v.
A.K.M.N. Cylinders Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., (1999) 1 CLJ 363 (CLB); Tarsem Kansil v. Dev Spinners Ltd.
(2000) 24 SCL 519 (CLB).
3
Baljit Kaur Vohra v. Dr. Vikramjit Singh Vohra, (2003) 115 Com Cases 194 : (2004) 50 SCL 693 (P&H).
4
Page 10 ¶ 9 Moot Problem.
PAGE | 17
case of transfer/transmission of shares, matter involves highly disputed questions of fact

regarding fraud, forgery misrepresentation and manipulation, such matters cannot be decided
by the Hon'ble Company Law Board in summary jurisdiction under Section 111A5 and the
petitioner, if so advised, could approach civil court.
(¶3.) It is humbly submitted that although CLB is also granted the powers of inherent
Jurisdiction under Regulation 446 mutatis mutandis to Section 1517 of Code of Civil
Procedure, 19088 but the High Court of Madras following the precedents of the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court has clearly said that the Company Law Board is not a court.9 When a question
relating to title arises, it should be decided by the Lower or District Court of a Competent
Jurisdiction.10 In the case of Rajendra Kumar Malhotra v. Harbanslal Malhotra & Sons. Ltd.,
it has been said that it is the duty of the court to take notice of subsequent events lest it may
fail to do justice between the parties.11 The CLB is an adjudicatory body created by the
statute12 which is an expert in cases related to Company Law13 and deciding the disputes
related to titles includes question to be answered that are purely related to Family Law such
as Probate and Succession Certificate. It is contended that the decision of CLB would fail or
not be as wise and competent as a Judge of Civil Court of Competent Jurisdiction would
decide.
(¶4.) The order dated 18.03.201114 of the Company Law Board said that the Board cannot
decide the complicated questions of fact and law15 where it found that the dispute regarding
the legal heirs of King Ray was not decided. The CLB did not intend to interfere in the
matters pending adjudication in the District Court of Thelesalonica as it was beyond its
5
The Companies Act, 1956.
6
Regulation 44 -Saving of inherent power of the Bench – Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect the inherent power of the Bench to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Bench.
7
§ 151 CPC - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of
the Court.
8
Subramaniam v. Sundaram, AIR 1963 Mad 217.
9
M.S.D Chandrashkhar Raja v. M/S Jayabharath Textile Pvt. Ltd., [2013] 181 Comp Cas 472(Mad). See Also,
Prakash Timber P.Ltd v. Smt.Sushma Shingla (AIR 1996 All. 262); Shell Company of Australia vs. Federal
Commissioner of Taxation, (1931 AC 275).
10
§ 264, The Indian Succession Act.
11
Rajedra Kumar Malhotra v. Harbanslal Malhotra & Sons.Ltd, (1999) 34 CLA 360 (Cal).
12
The Companies Act 1956.
13
Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. And v. Union Of India and Ors., 1986 59 CompCas 94 Cal.
14
Page 10, ¶ 24, Moot Proposition.
15
Page 10, ¶ 9 Moot Problems.
PAGE | 18
Summary Jurisdiction16.The Board said so because it was beyond its power to act in the
manner of Civil Court, although the CLB has the power of Civil Court in some matters
relating to transfer of shares.17
(¶5.) In the present matter the Company Law Board waited for the decision of the District
Court of Thelesalonica regarding the legal heir of King Ray in order to decide the transfer of
shares18. The Jurisdiction of the High Court was not exercised properly but violated the
guidelines laid down by the Apex Court.19 When a matter is presented before the CLB and
the boards directs it back to the Civil Court or waits for the decision of the Civil Court in
order to derive conclusion from the decision, it can do so within its power.20 In a case, the
Principal Bench of the Company Law Board indicated that whenever proceedings were
pending before the Civil Court, the Company Law Board has been taking a consistent stand
to stay the proceedings before it, to avoid conflict of decisions on common issues and the
same was upheld by the Hon‘ble High Court of Calcutta.21
(¶6.) The CLB has often sent the matter back to the civil courts22 and has sometimes gone to
the extent of dismissing the main petition.23If an appeal lies to High court on CLB‘s failure to
answer the complicated question of law and fact, High Court in such cases directs the CLB to
re-examine the matter. Under Section 10F, High Court being the appellant body24 can only
differ on a conclusion of a question of law that has already been answered by the CLB.
(¶7.) A similar situation surfaced in the case of T.G Veera Prasad v. Sree Rayalaseema
Alkalies & Allied Chemicals Ltd.,25 wherein the Board had to re-examine the facts whether
complicated questions of title, forgery , fabrication, etc., are involved or not and refer the
parties to a civil suit only after such examination. CLB is the final authority on facts.26
16
Page 10 ¶ 9 Moot Problem.
17
R. Balakrishnan and Ors. v. Vijay Dairy and Farm Products 2005, 125 CompCas 661 CLB : 2005 59 SCL
667 CLB; See Also, Shree Cement Ltd., v. Power Grid Corporation Ltd. 1998 93 CompCas 854 CLB.
18
Para 24, ¶ 10, Moot Problem.
19
Purnima Manthena and Anr. v. Dr. Renuka Datla and others, (2015) 128 CLA 353 (SC).
20
Sardar Iqbal Singh v. Sardar Gurbaksh Singh, 2000 (100) Comp. Cases 504 (CLB).
21
Guljarilal Kanoria v. Loptchu Tea Company Ltd, 2000 (102) Comp. Cases 292 (CLB).
22
Binod Kumar Agarwal v. Ringtong Tea Company, (1996) 85 Comp.Cas 289 (CLB).
23
Sundeep Gupta v. Indian Hardware Industries, 2008 (142) Comp. Cas.552 (CLB).
24
Minoo H. Mody v. Hemant D. Vakil, AIR 1994 Bom 39.
25
T.G Veera Prasad v. Sree Rayalaseema Alkalies & Allied Chemicals Ltd., (1999) 98 Com Cases 806 :
(1999) 20 SCL 419 : (2000) 5 Comp LJ 168 (AP).
26
Chopra Hospital (P) Ltd. Through v. Usha Chopra (2007) 3 CompLJ 86 Del.
PAGE | 19
(¶8.) Therefore, it is most respectfully submitted that the Hon‘ble High Court of
Thelesalonica was absolutely wrong in exercising its jurisdiction as it should have dismissed
the appeal without going on merits because the CLB was absolutely correct and was working
according to the set principles laid by the Hon‘ble Apex Court.
1.2 That the parties in an appeal were not aggrieved party
(¶9.) Under Section 10F an appeal can be filed only by an aggrieved person and not where an
order causes no prejudice to the appellant.27A party can only be said to be aggrieved when the
decision of the Board is bad in law or is injurious to the parties and affecting their financial,
personal or proprietary rights. In the present matter the order of the Board was not in favour
of the opposite party nor was the matter finally decided. The decision of the Board did not
cause any harm to the parties to the suit in terms of any finance or rights because it did not
actually decide the matter. The decision of the Board indirectly demanded extension of time
to decide the complicated questions of Law and Fact which was necessary and important for
the Board to arrive at a proper conclusion. It is humbly submitted that the Hon‘ble Apex
Court has also said that it was necessary for the CLB to refer the matter to the Civil Courts if
the matter is not within its summary jurisdiction. Not every person who has suffered some
disappointments or whose expectations have not been realised as a result or decision or order
can claim to be an aggrieved person.28
(¶10.) A person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a person aggrieved.29
The orders must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something.30 A
party or person is aggrieved by a decision only when it operates directly and injuriously upon
his personal, pecuniary or proprietary rights31. It is humbly contended that the respondents
did not qualify as valid ―aggrieved parties‖ because the order of the CLB did not result in
any specific legal grievance to Prince North and Princess Wild.
(¶11.) It is further contended that an aggrieved party is one whose legal right is invaded by an
act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree
or judgement. The word ‗aggrieved‘ refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some
27
1 RAMAIYA, GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES ACT, (17th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa, 2010.
28
Officer Receiver v. Chellapa Chettiar, AIR 1951 Mad 935 (FB). See also, Bar Council of Maharashtra v.
M.V Dabholkar, AIR 1975 SC 2092; M.S Jain v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 276.
30
Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385.
31
CORPUS JURIS SECONDUM, 356 (Vol. IV).
PAGE | 20
personal, pecuniary or property rights, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or

obligation.32 It is courteously submitted that the Company Law Board had not passed a
conclusive order directly affecting the rights of the respondents and therefore, there was no
locus standi for them to file appeals in the Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica.
1.3 That the Jurisdiction Of High Court is Restricted Under Section 10 F
(¶12.) The Jurisdiction of High Court under Section 1OF of the Companies Act, 1956 is
limited and it can only exercise its jurisdiction on question of law arising out of the orders of
the Company Law Board in respect of the matters raised before it.33 The Company Law
Board in this suit was approached against Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 which in
accordance speaks about the rectification in transfer of shares in the register of the Company.
The matter in appeal before the High Court is limited to the purview about the conclusion
drawn by the CLB on the question of law presented before it. An appeal lies only on a
question of law and not of fact even if the CLB erred on the question of fact.34
(¶13.) The High Court under 10F being an appellate body cannot decide the facts or change
the facts or consider material evidence in order to derive the facts. It is submitted that the
Hon‘ble High Court has erred and it has gone very far beyond its jurisdiction. In the appeal
against the CLB the High Court has decided issues which were not raised before the CLB
under section 111.35 The High Court, in its impugned judgment, has discussed about the Will
of Late Queen Kim,36 which was neither relevant nor entertained by the CLB. The High
37
Court had relied on the Succession certificate which later became inoperative on the death
of Queen Kim.38 The High Court not only exceeded its jurisdiction under 10F but has made
evident errors by encroaching the Jurisdiction of District Court where a Probate Petition was
pending. Where allegation not made before the High Court cannot be pleaded before it for the
first time39. The High Court not only ignored the Probate Petition but interpreted the will
without proper Probate and also ordered its decision against the intent of the Testator. The
Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd40 has said that when a
32
P. RAMANATHA AIYER LAW LEXICON, 78 (7th Edn., Reprint 2010).
34
D. Ramkishore v. Vijaya- wada Share Brokers Ltd., (2008) 144 Com Cases 326 : (2009) 89 SCL 279 (AP).
35
The Companies Act, 1956.
36
Page 9, ¶ 25, Moot Problem.
37
Page 7, ¶ 18, Moot Problem.
39
E Shanmusham v. APS Cam—o—Matec P. Ltd., (2009) 148 Com Cases 71 (Del).
40
CIT v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd, AIR 1961 SC 1633.
PAGE | 21
question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it, it will not be a
question arising out of its order notwithstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it.
(¶14.) It is a well settled principle that says that jurisdiction of the High Court on appeal
against decisions of the Company Law Board is confined to questions of law. In the exercise
of such limited jurisdiction the High Court cannot go into the questions of the validity of
transfers of shares which require consideration of evidence including examination of
witnesses.41 The mere fact that the High Court would have come to a different conclusion on
the facts also does not make the matter appealable.42 Where the finding recorded by the
competent authority is based on some evidence available on record and is also a possible
finding which could be arrived at in the given set of circumstances, it would not give rise to a
question of law.43 The appellate court cannot reassess the mater and reach a conclusion
different from the one reached by the CLB solely on basis that if it had considered the facts in
a particular manner, it would have come to a conclusion. While reversing the order of CLB,
the court must come into close owners with the reasoning assigned by the CLB and then the
court has to assign its own qua in arriving at a different conclusion.44 There is no scope under
the provisions relating to appeals for the High Court to examine the fact finding of CLB. A
finding of law cannot be examined as to its correctness.45 An appeal was filed on the basis of
certain grounds, but no question of law was framed. The court rejected the appeal.46
(¶15.) There can be no appeal on a finding of fact even if the circumstances are such that the
appellate court would have come to a different conclusion on the facts. The High Court did
not interfere in this factual solution of the problem adopted by the Company Law Board. 47In
another case between the same parties 48it was held that no appeal would lie against orders.

HAVE HEARD AND DECIDED VARIOUS ASPECTS AND DISPUTES
41
Gordon Woodroffe & Co. Ltd., v. Gordon Woodroffe Ltd., (1999) 97 Com Cases 582.
42
Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596; Gappulal v. Thakurji Shreeji Dwarkadhish, AIR 1969 SC 1291.
43
Marble City Hospital & Research Centre P. Ltd. v. Sarabjeet Singh Mokha, (2010) 96 CLA 427 (MP).
44
PPN Power Generating Co. Ltd. v. PPN (Mauritius) Co., 2005 CLC 1 (Mad-DB).
45
Business Developments Consultants P. Ltd. v. SB, (2007) 80 CLA 269 (Cal).
46
B.K. Seltharamaiah v. Associated Oxides P. Ltd., (2009) 151 Corn Cases 270 (Karn).
47
Chand Mall Pinclm v. Hathi Mall Pincha. (1999) 95 Com Cases 368 : (1999) 2 Comp U 108 :(1998) 31 CLA
451 : (1999) 20 SCL 384 (Gan).
48
Id.
PAGE | 22
PENDING ADJUDICATION IN THE COURTS BELOW WHICH WERE IN

THE NATURE OF CIVIL DISPUTES.
(¶16.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that the High Court couldn‘t have
heard and decided various aspects and disputes pending adjudication in the courts below
which were in the nature of civil disputes as the High Court cannot interfere with the fact
finding jurisdiction of lower courts [2.1] and that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 227 is not absolute [2.2].
2.1 High court cannot interfere the fact finding jurisdiction of lower courts.
(¶17.) Companies act 1956 which in terms of jurisdiction says that a High Court can entertain
petitions under Section 10F only questions of law arising out of the orders of the CLB. 49Even
the authority of finding of facts is final and only lies in the hands of CLB in an appeal made
in front of it.50 The High Court can only differentiate on the conclusion drawn by the CLB by
a rational reasoning.51 The power of court under s10 F is similar to its power under section
100 of the Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 and to the effect of that the jurisdiction of the court
does not extend to entertaining appeals on a question of fact.52
(¶18.) In the present matter, when the jurisdiction of the High Court was invoked it went
beyond its jurisdiction and answered the questions that were even not raised before it. The
interpretation of queen Kim‘s will and deciding the title of late king Ray‘s shares without the
will getting probated completely hampers the judicial system because the power to grant
probate lies in the hands of district judge and a high court judge on the original side. The
High Court even went to change the desire of the testator as mentioned in his will. The High
court not only acted in gross violation of the established procedure but also missed the
circumstances in which late king Ray had written the will. It is evident from the facts that
king ray disliked his children.53
(¶19.) At any point, the High Court should not interfere with a concurrent finding of fact 54.It
is not permissible to a high court to review and reweigh the evidence upon the which the
50
Chandmallpincha v. Hathimallpincha (1999) 95 ComCase 368.
51
PPN Power Generating Co. Ltd., 2005 CLC 1 (Mad – DB).
52
Manulal v. Radhey Lal AIR 1974 SC 1596.
53
Page 5, ¶14, Moot Problem.
54
S.P Deshmuhkh v. Shah Nihal Chand Waghajibhai Gujarathi, AIR 1977 SC 1985 : (1977) 3 SCC 515.
PAGE | 23
inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of the law in
the decision55. High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with
the finding of facts56. In the case of Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh,57 this Court with anguish
has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact
arrived at by the first appellate court. The order of the CLB intended to wait for the decisions
of the disputes pending in the district court in order to follow its proceedings under the
summary jurisdiction because CLB was not empowered to grant probate or rely on the
succession certificates. These two things are the material evidence in the present case which
ought to have been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the interference of
the Hon‘ble High Court was bad in law.
(¶20.) If any question of law arising out of the matters pending before lower courts high court
can decide those question of law and send back that case to lower courts for disposal because
High Court cannot determine the facts of the case. In the case of Madras Bar Association v.
Union of India and another58 supreme court held that a question of law, which had arisen in
an appeal pending before the Appellate Tribunal, had to be determined by the High Court.
After the High Court had answered the question of law it has to been again sent back to the
respective lower court. The High in the present matter should have sent back the matters for a
review and ordered the CLB to correct its decision if it would not have answered the question
of Law in a correct prerogative. In the present matter there was no question of Law that arose
in the District Court of Thelesalonica that needed to be answered by the High Court. In the
case of State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi59, the same principle has been reiterated that
the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. It is a well
settled law that high court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts recorded by
the first appellant court after careful consideration of the evidence60.
(¶21.) The parties of the company appeals are different from the matters which are pending in
the District Court which implies that the dispute raised before the high court is about the
decision of the company law board which is whether company law board can decide the
complex question of law and facts under s. 111 of companies act 1958 in its summary
55
Sadhanalodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2003) 6 SCC 524.
56
Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments v. P. Shanmugama (2005) 9 SCC 232.
57
Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 270.
58
Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and another, (2014) 10 SCC 1.
59
State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi, (2005) 10 SCC 139.
60
Comm., HRCE v. P. Shanmugama, (2005) 9 SCC 232.
PAGE | 24
jurisdiction. The Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica, however, went beyond that question
of law and interfered into the lower court‘s jurisdiction wherein the relevant facts have not
yet been adjudicated and established.
(¶22.) In the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari,61 the court reiterated the
statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal if the substantial
question of law is not formulated. The high not being the court of first instance has to give
chance to the court below to formulate the substantial question of Law. The same has also
been propounded in the case Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram62 wherein the court
came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate court cannot be
interfered within a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of
such a finding. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil,63 the court has even held
that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. was not justified in interfering
with the findings of fact. The court observed that to say that the approach of the High Court
was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to act in furtherance of the intention of
the legislature and not frustrate. This court in a catena of decisions held that where findings
of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal
cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that
another view was possible. Again, in the case of Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai,64 this court
observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of
fact. This court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an
error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset
the same.
(¶23.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble Court in pursuance of the aforementioned
judicial pronouncements that the Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica could not have
established matters of fact and concluded the issues pending adjudication in the lower courts
as it does not have the jurisdiction to enter into domains of fact-establishment as it is a clear
infringement of the independence of the judiciary.
61
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179.
62
Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram, (2001) 5 SCC 311.
63
Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil (2004) 5 SCC 762.
64
Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai, (2005) 10 SCC 553.
PAGE | 25
2.2 That supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court is not absolute under Article
227
(¶24.) It is respectfully submitted before this esteemed Court that the High Court‘s power
under Article 227 is not unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship65 or wrong
decisions66. The power of superintendence is to be exercised to keep the courts and tribunal
within the bounds of their authority and jurisdiction and not for correcting mere errors of law
and fact67. It is humbly contended that the Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica has exceeded
the domain of its jurisdiction by conclusively deciding on the issues which were themselves
pending adjudication in the lower courts. In the light of the impugned facts, the High court
has, under its supervisory jurisdiction, interfered with the fact finding jurisdiction of the
lower courts thereby overstepping its prescribed jurisdiction.68
(¶25.) The apex Court has observed in a number of cases69 that the findings recorded by the
lower court did not suffer from such an infirmity so as to justify interference with the said
finding under Art. 227. It is most respectfully contended that the High Court of Thelesalonica
in exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be said to be justified in this situation, in any way, as the
High Court cannot establish the facts that have not yet been decided by the Trial Court.
Moreover, establishment of facts which are pending adjudication in an appeal arising from
Section 10F which expressly restrains the ambit of the High Court‘s jurisdiction only and
only to questions of law70 is all the more indicative of an error apparent on the face of record.
(¶26.) It is settled law that the decision of a High Court on a question of fact will rarely be
differed from by the said Courts.71 It is humbly submitted that the Hon‘ble High Court of
Thelesalonica should have considered the perspective of the judgment of the Company Law
Board and reflected on the reasoning behind the finding stated in its order72 rather than
deciding the disputes which were already pending adjudication.
(¶27.) It is further contended that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or
65
Dalmia Airways v. Sukumar, AIR 1951 Cal 193.
66
Satyanarayana v. Mallikarjuna, AIR 1960 SC 137(142).
67
Waryamsingh v. Amaranth, AIR 1954 SC 215; Jijabai v. Panthankhan, AIR 1971 SC 315; Ahmedabad Mfg.,
v. Calico, AIR 1972 SC 1598.
69
Chandravarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Asha Latha, (1986) SCC 141; See also, Gurdev Kaur and Ors. v.Kaki and
Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1975.
71
Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State Of Bombay (Now Gujarat), AIR 1965 SC 1153.
PAGE | 26
tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face
of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article
227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is
also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have
passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision73. It is humbly submitted that the
Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica has superseded its jurisdiction by establishing facts
thereby grossly interfering with the exclusive domain of the subordinate judiciary. It is
contended that the various pending cases and applications in the subordinate courts needed to
be first adjudicated therein.
(¶28.) It is settled law that the Hon‘ble High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction under
Article 227 if an alternative remedy is available.74 It is submitted that the subordinate
judiciary constitutes a very important segment of the judicial system as it is in these courts
that the judiciary comes in close contact with the people. It is, therefore, essential to maintain
the independence and integrity of the subordinate judiciary and for this purpose art 233 to
237 have been placed in the Constitution.75. It is humbly contended that the Hon‘ble High
Court of Thelesalonica has significantly encroached upon the independence of the
subordinate judiciary by stepping into the exclusive jurisdictional domains of the civil courts.
It is humbly submitted that the factual issues decided by the Hon‘ble High Court of
Thelesalonica in its impugned order are a gross infringement of the powers of the trial courts
wherein these issues were pending adjudication in the form of undecided probate petitions of
late Queen Kim and late King Ray and the objections filed against the granting of succession
certificate.
(¶29.) The subordinate constitutes a very important segment of the judicial system as it is in
these courts as it is in these courts that the judiciary comes in close contact with the people .it
is therefore essential to maintain the independence and integrity of the subordinate judiciary
and for this purpose art 233 to 237 have been placed in the Constitution 76. Independence and
impartiality are the two basic attributes essential for a proper discharge of judicial functions77.
The concept of independence of judiciary is a noble concept which inspires the constitutional
73
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Company Ltd., (2003) 3 SCC 524.
74
Mohd, Yunus v. Mod.Mustaqim, 1983 SCC 566.
75
1 MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 389 (6th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa, 2010).
77
Union Of India & Ors v. Pratibha Bonnerjea & Anr., (1995) 6 SCC 765.
PAGE | 27
scheme and constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity78.
`Independence' is the life blood of Judiciary79
(¶30.) However, such power of superintendence does not imply that the High Courts can
influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in a particular manner. The
extraordinary power under Article 227 can only be used by the High Courts to ensure that the
subordinate courts function within the limits of their authority. The High Court cannot
interfere with the judicial functions of a subordinate Judge80.
(¶31.) The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court's under Article 227 of the
Constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits
of its authority, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an
error of law. In exercising its supervisory powers under Article 227, the High Court does not
act as an appellate court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which
the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct any errors of law in the
decision81.
(¶32.) The power of superintendence it confers is a power of a known and well-recognised

character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In
general words, the High Court's power of superintendence is a power to keep subordinate
Courts within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and
that they do it in a legal manner82. It is true that the power of superintendence conferred on
the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and
judicial83, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order
to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. In any event, the power of
superintendence cannot be exercised to influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order
or judgment in a particular manner84.
78
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 (Supp.) SCC 87.
79
Union of India v. R. Gandhi, MANU/SC/0378/2010.
80
Jasbir Singh v. State Of Punjab, (2006) 8 SCC 294.
82
Manmathanath v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 132.
83
Aidal Singh and Ors., v. Karan Singh and Ors., 1957 AIR All 414.
84
Madhu limaye v. State Of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551.
PAGE | 28
(¶33.) In the case of Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta85 this Court reiterated
the view stated in the earlier decisions referred to and held that the power of superintendence
under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only
a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the court of appeal and that the
High Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court
of appeal." The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require
interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent
jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed
because they are initiated illegally, vexatious or without jurisdiction.
(¶34.) As a result of frequent interference by Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or
227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases
by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the
administration of justice86. While exercising jurisdiction under art. 227 the High court would
not allow itself to be converted into a court of pure question of fact 87. It is settled law that the
jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise"88.

HAVE INTERPRETED A WILL WHILE EXERCISING JURISDICTION
UNDER SECTION 10F.
(¶35.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that the respectable High Court of
Thelesalonica could not have interpreted a will while exercising jurisdiction under Section
10F as only and only appeals relating to questions of law can be entertained under this
jurisdiction [3.1]. Further, interpretation of will is, in this case, a question of fact. [3.2]
Moreover, the powers of the High Court to entertain questions of fact is significantly
restrained and limited under this jurisdiction. [3.3]
3.1 That only questions of law are appealable under section 10f
(¶36.) It is settled law that Section 10F permits an appeal to the High Court from an order of
the Company Law Board only on a question of law i.e., the Company Law Board is the final
authority on facts unless such findings are perverse based on no evidence or are otherwise
85
Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta, (1975) 1 SCC 866.
87
Babhutmal v. Laxmibai, AIR 1975 SC 1297; Gopal v. Narendradeo, AIR 1978 SC 347.
88
State, through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 641.
PAGE | 29
arbitrary.89 Moreover, Section 10F has been brought on the statute book by the Companies
(Amendment) Act, 1988 with effect from 31-5-1991. Before this amendment, the High Court
was empowered to entertain the petitions under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act. By this
amendment, this original jurisdiction has been transferred to the Company Law Board.
Having transferred the jurisdiction to the CLB, an appeal to the High Court has been provided
on any question of law arising out of such an order.90 It is humbly contended that section 10F
of the Companies Act, 1956 expressly and precisely allows for appeals to the High Court
only on a question of law arising out of the order of the Company Law Board.91 The nature of
the interpretation of a will relates to probate proceedings which lie within the absolute
domain of the District Judge.92 The Company Law Board exercises summary jurisdiction93
itself and it is only an error of law which can be corrected by the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 10F of the Companies Act. If the finding recorded by the Company
Law Board is purely one of fact, the jurisdiction of the High Court would be barred. 94 It is
humbly submitted that the question of interpretation of a will needs necessary factual
establishment and the same is evident from the decision of the Hon‘ble High Court of
Thelesalonica wherein the facts relating to late King Ray have been substantially and
conclusively interpreted to arrive at a conclusion about the will.95
(¶37.) It is further contended that Section 10F of the Act engrafts the requirement of the
existence of a question of law arising from the decision of the CLB as an essential pre-
condition for the maintainability of an appeal.96 It can therefore be undeniably contended that
only a question of law arising out of the order of the Company Law Board is appealable and
that the Hon‘ble High Court, by interpreting and deciding the will of late King Ray has not
only overstepped its jurisdiction as per Section 10F but the act is also violative of the Code of
89
Shri V.S. Krishnan and Ors. v. Westfort Hi-Tech Hospital Ltd. and Ors., (2008) 142 CompCas 235 SC; See
also, Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages P. Ltd., v. Stridewell Leathers P. Ltd., (1995) 82 Com Cases 836
(Mad); Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. H. Holck Larsen, AIR 1986 SC 1695.
90
Mr.Minoo H. Mody v. Hemant D. Vakil and Ors., AIR 1994 Bom 39; See also, Probir Kumar Misravs
Ramani Ramaswamy (2010)154 CompCas 658 (Mad).
91
§10F, The Companies Act, 1956.
92
§ 264, Indian Succession Act, 1925.
93
Satish Sharma v. Vrinda Realtors Ltd. and Ors, (2014) 183 CompCas 62 (Delhi); See also, Kesha
Appliances P. Ltd. and Ors. v. Royal Holdings Services Ltd. and Ors., (2006) 130 CompCas 227 (Bom).
94
Probir Kumar Misra v. Ramani Ramaswamy, (2010) 154 CompCas 658 (Mad).
96
Purnima Manthena and Anr. v. Dr. Renuka Datla and Ors., (2015) 128 CLA 353 (SC).
PAGE | 30
Civil Procedure, 1908 wherein appeals are allowed to the High Court only on questions of
law.97
(¶38.) It is further submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that the jurisdiction of the appellate
Court under Section 10F is restricted to the question as to whether on the facts as noticed by
the Company Law Board and has placed before it, an inference could reasonably be arrived at
that such conduct was against probity and good conduct or was mala fide or for a collateral
purpose or was burdensome, harsh or wrongful.98 It is humbly contended that the order of the
Company Law Board relating to the factual ambiguity surrounding the successors of late
King Ray and Queen Kim was not harsh or wrongful in any way and that it arose from
perfectly reasonable considerations as the situation herein was under multiple disputes which
could be resolved only through appropriate factual establishment which was, in this case,
pending in the form of various suits in the District Court of Thelesalonica.
(¶39.) Further, it is settled law that the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of
fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may
appear to be to the High Court.99 It is humbly contended that the Hon‘ble High Court did not
function within the domain of its prescribed jurisdiction by deciding the will of late King Ray
as the same had not yet been settled and established by the lower Courts. Moreover, the grant
of a succession certificate based on a settlement deed despite the existence of a will100 which
had not yet been probated makes the situation all the more factually complicated thereby
attracting the jurisdiction of the subordinate judiciary and negating any valid interference by
the Hon‘ble High Court in this regard.
(¶40.) It is humbly submitted that even in pursuance of jurisdiction other than Section 10F,
the Hon‘ble High Court generally does not interfere with question of facts101 which are to be
settled by the subordinate judiciary. It is only on a question of law, and not of fact, that an
appeal would lie against the order of the Company Law Board to the High Court. There is no
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on grounds of erroneous findings of fact, however gross the
97
§ 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. See also, MattuLal v. RadheLal, AIR 1974 SC 1596; Gappulal v.
Thakurji Shreeji Dwarkadhishji, AIR 1969 SC 1291.
98
Shri V.S. Krishnan and Ors. v. Westfort Hi-Tech Hospital Ltd. and Ors., (2008) 142 CompCas 235 (SC); See
also, Dale and Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. P.K. Prathapan and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1624.
99
R. Ramachandran Ayyarvs Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302; See also, Durga Chowdhrani v.
Jawahir Singh, (1891) 17 IA 122; Pattabhiramaswamy v. Hanumayya, AIR 1959 SC 57; Sinha Ramanuja
Jeer v. Ranga Ramanuja Jeer, AIR 1961 SC 1720.
101
Dr. H.T. ViraReddi v. Kistamma, AIR 1969 Mad 235.
PAGE | 31
error may seem to be, for if the question to be decided is one of fact it does not involve an
issue of law.102Moreover, the express usage of the phrase ―question of law‖ in the bare text103
further limits the jurisdiction of the High Court only and only to the ambit of settlement of
pure questions of law arising out of orders passed by the Company Law Board. 104 The
interpretation of the will of late King Ray, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case,
is a purely factual issue which could not have been dealt with by the Hon‘ble High Court in a
proceeding under Section 10F.
3.2 That interpretation of will is a question of fact
(¶41.) It is settled law that an inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a
question of fact.105 An inference of fact from a document is a question of fact.106 It is humbly
submitted that in order to interpret the will of late King Ray, the Hon‘ble High Court relied
on absolute facts and arrived at findings which were completely inspired by the factual
situation surrounding the time of the death of King Ray. It is contended that the High Court
could not have interpreted the contents of a testamentary document without any question of
law being involved therein. The intent of late King Ray was interpreted and decided through
a completely factual analysis which is clearly reflected in the impugned judgment.107
(¶42.) It is humbly submitted that where the determination of an issue depends upon the
appreciation of evidence or materials resulting in ascertainment of basic facts without
application of any principle of law, the issue raises a mere question of fact. 108 It is contended
that the interpretation of the will of late King Ray necessarily required appreciation of
evidence and materials resulting in ascertainment of basic facts which makes the question of
interpretation a question of fact. No application of any legal principle can be seen to have
been relied on in the impugned judgment delivered by the Hon‘ble High Court of
Thelesalonica. It is, therefore, submitted that the interpretation of a will is a question of
102
Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya, AIR 1959 SC 57; See also Probir Kumar Misravs Ramani
Ramaswamy, (2010) 154 CompCas 658 (Mad).
103
§ 10F, The Companies Act, 1956.
105
Narendra Gopal Vidyarthivs Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009) 3 SCC 287; See also, Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh
& Anr, AIR 2008 SC 1749; Boodireddy Chandraiah And Ors v. Arigela Laxmi and Anr, AIR 2008 SC 380.
106
Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, AIR 2006 SC 2234.
108
Commissioner of Wealth-Tax v. B.M. Kanodia, 1990 185 ITR 333 All; See also, M/S. Hanumant Cement
Pvt Ltd., v. Union of India, 2002 (143) ELT 263 Del.
PAGE | 32
fact109 as the answer to this question is purely dependent on establishment of facts and
appreciation of evidence and not on any legal principle.
(¶43.) It has been settled by the apex Court that the interpretation of a will by a High Court in
the absence of a substantial question of law is a gross violation of the legislative intention
wherein issues of a purely legal nature are attributable to the jurisdiction of a High Court.110It
is humbly submitted that the question of interpretation of a will is dealt with in probate
proceedings111 wherein the will of the deceased is interpreted and execution is granted after
appreciation of evidence and examination of witnesses. The proceedings in respect of grant of
probate or revocation are exclusively confined to the jurisdiction of the district courts 112
owing to the nature of proceedings.
(¶44.) It is further submitted that the Court does not substitute its own opinion for what was
the testator's Will or intention as manifested from a reading of the written instrument. After
all, a Will is meant to be an expression of his desire and therefore, may result in
disinheritance of some and grant to another.113 It is humbly contended that the intention of the
testator is supreme114 and that a bare reading of the will of late King Ray expressly and
undeniably disinherited the respondents. It is, therefore, contended that the Hon‘ble High
Court of Thelesalonica not only interpreted the will and established facts which was way
beyond the prescribed jurisdiction but also disregarded the terms of the will which ought to
have been given effect to.
3.3 That the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited
(¶45.) It is settled law that jurisdiction of the High Court on appeals against decisions of the
Company Law Board is confined to questions of law. In the exercise of such limited
jurisdiction the High Court cannot go into the questions of the validity of transfer of shares
which require consideration of evidence.115 Moreover, the Company Law Board has to
examine the fact whether complicated questions of title, forgery, fabrication, etc., are
109
P. Chandrasekharan & Ors., v. S. Kanakarajan & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2306.
110
Gurdev Kaur and Ors.v. Kaki and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1975; See also, Sonubhai v. BalaGovinda, (1983) 1
Bom CR 632 (638).
111
The Indian Succession Act, 1925.
112
113
Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1975.
114
§ 87, Indian Succession Act, 1925; See also, Tagore v. Tagore 9 Beng LR 377: 18 WR 359 (PC); N. Kasturi
v. D. Ponnammal, AIR 1961 SC 1302.
115
Gordon Woodroffe & Co. Ltd., v. Gordon Woodroffe Ltd., (1999) 97 Com Cases 582 : (1999) 1 Comp LJ
243 : (1999) 20 SCL 429 : (2001) 42 CLA 39 (Mad).
PAGE | 33
involved or not.116 The decision of the Company Law Board, in such a case, is liable to be set
aside and the High Court would direct the Company Law Board to re-examine the matter.117
It is settled law that the concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High
Court.118 It is most respectfully submitted that the interpretation of the will of late King Ray
necessarily required appreciation of evidence in order to arrive at a substantial conclusion
which is rightfully the adjudicatory domain of the Company Law Board or the civil courts
wherein the matters are pending.
(¶46.) It is humbly submitted that the High Court‘s jurisdiction to determine facts is
extremely limited and the same has been upheld by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a plethora
of judicial pronouncements.119 It is contended that a bare reading of the impugned judgment
of the Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica clearly states that the facts have been
substantially interpreted and interfered with in the light of the limited jurisdiction prescribed
by the statute as well as the various cases pending adjudication. It is humbly contended that
the Hon‘ble High Court has clearly transgressed its jurisdictional limits under Section 10F.
(¶47.) It is humbly submitted that even otherwise, the question of interpretation of a will is
dealt with in probate proceedings120 wherein the will of the deceased is interpreted and
execution is granted after appreciation of evidence and examination of witnesses. The
proceedings in respect of grant of probate or revocation in respect of testamentary documents
are exclusively confined to the jurisdiction of the district courts121 and that letters of
administration would not be granted by the High Court if proceedings are already pending
before a District Judge. In fact all further proceedings in the High Court would then have to
be stopped.122 It is, therefore, humbly submitted that the High Court cannot, in any
circumstance, act as a court of first instance with respect to the establishment of facts and by
doing so in pursuance of its jurisdiction under Section 10F, grave injustice and legal
perversity has been caused.
117
T.G. Veera Prasad v. Sree Rayalaseema Alkalies & Allied Chemicals Ltd., (1999) 98 Com Cases 806 :
(1999) 20 SCL 419 : (2000) 5 Comp LJ 168 (AP).
118
Hero Vinoth (minor) v. Seshammal, AIR 2006 SC 2234.
119
Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, AIR 1987 SC 117.
120
Indian Succession Act, 1925.
121
122
George Anthony Harris v. Millicent, AIR 1933 Bom 370.
PAGE | 34
(¶48.) It has been decisively settled by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a plethora of cases that
the High Court cannot probe into facts without reasonable justifications.123 It has been
rhetorically declared by the apex Court that a High Court could not interpret a will in the
absence of an appropriate question of law and that if it does so, it is committing as grave
procedural error as legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on facts" or
"one more dice in the gamble.124 It is humbly submitted that the answer to the question of
interpretation of the will of late King Ray necessarily involved a conclusive establishment of
purely factual issues which was completely beyond the jurisdictional domain of the High
Court of Thelesalonica. The fact that the impugned order arose as a result of an appeal from
Section 10F further makes the error all the more glaring as the statute itself limits this
jurisdiction to questions of law.125
(¶49.) It is further submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that the appellate forum though
exercising a jurisdiction which otherwise may be co-ordinate with that of the lower forum,
ought to confine its judicial audit within the layout of the adjudgment undertaken by the
forum of lower tier.126 It is humbly contended that the impugned judgment was nowhere
within the parameters of the order passed by the Company Law Board and that the Hon‘ble
High Court, by establishing a pure question of fact, has in fact overstepped its jurisdiction as
prescribed in Section 10F of Companies Act, 1956.
4. THAT A JOINT SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE RELIED UPON

WHEREIN ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE VERY SAME CERTIFICATE
HAD EXPIRED.
(¶50.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that a joint succession certificate
cannot be relied upon wherein one of the parties to the very same certificate had expired
because a joint succession certificate is an acknowledgment of joint powers that are not
separable [4.1] and that the death of a certificate holder renders the certificate inoperative,
useless and revocable [4.2]. Therefore, the reliability of a joint succession certificate stands
nullified.
123
Chacko & Another v. Mahadevan, (2007) 7 SCC 363; See also, Bokka Subba Rao v. Kukkala Balakrishna
and others, (2008) 3 SCC 99.
124
Gurdev Kaur and Ors. v. Kaki and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1975.
125
§ 10F, The Companies Act, 1956; See also, Chopra Hospital (P) Ltd. Through v. Usha Chopra, (2007) 3
Comp LJ 86 Del, 2007 79 SCL 299 Delhi.
126
Purnima Manthena and Anr. v. Dr. Renuka Datla and Ors., (2015) 128 CLA 353 (SC).
PAGE | 35
4.1 That the rights conferred by a joint succession certificate are not separable
(¶51.) It is humbly submitted that if succession certificate is granted in favour of more than
one person then it becomes inoperative when anyone of the three dies. It is because the
succession certificate is to empower the grantees to discharge debts. This does not derive any
right there under on the property .The power conferred by Succession Certificate is combined
not individual. By reason of grant of such certificate, a person in whose favour succession
certificate is granted becomes a trustee to distribute the amount payable to the deceased to his
heirs and legal representatives.127
(¶52.) In the present matter the Queen Kim, North Bilzerian and Wild Bilzerian were granted
a joint succession certificate. Later on, Queen Kim died in the year 2009 and hence the
Certificate became in operative because the Certificate empowered all of the three certificate
holders to discharge debts or to receive interest on shares. It is a settled law one cannot act for
other or when the responsibility is given to three persons, it cannot be assumed that the
remaining two would be able to handle the responsibility to given to all three of them. The
same has been said that on the death of one of the joint certificate holders, the certificate does
not survive to others but becomes inoperative, and after getting the earlier revoked, another
may be obtained.128
(¶53.) The Learned Judge in the case of The Goods of Gagan Chandra Das v. Unknown, had
clearly faced the same situation and explained the same by giving an illustration. If A, B, C,
are collectively given the power to collect a debt and give discharge, it is only reasonable to
think that no two of them or no one of them can give the proper discharge. The reasoning
given behind this principle is that the Court has not given to the two or to the one, the power
to discharge debts. It is contended in pursuance of this principle that on the death of Queen
Kim, the Succession Certificate became inoperative129 and would not be relied upon by any
court in order to pass any decree, order or judgement by placing reliance on that succession
certificate. It follows, therefore, that on the death of one of the grantees of a succession
certificates the other two cannot give proper discharge.130 There must necessarily have to be a
fresh certificate to empower the survivors to collect the debts and give the discharge.
127
State of Chhatisgarh & Ors. Vs. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar, (2009) INSC 943 (5 May 2009).
128
The Goods of Gagan Chandra Das v. Unknown, 1949 AIR 1950 Cal 578.
129
§ 383(d), Indian Succession Act, 1925.
130
The Goods of Gagan Chandra Das v. Unknown, 1949 AIR 1950 Cal 578.
PAGE | 36
4.2 That the certificate is rendered inoperative and useless by such occurrence
(¶54.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that a succession certificate cannot
be relied upon when one of the holders has expired because the remaining joint certificate
holders could not exercise their powers under the certificate in the absence of the deceased.131
It is, therefore, humbly contended that a joint succession certificate grants equal rights and
powers to all the grantees alike and that joint and mutual rights accrue in respect of every
member.Taking into account the impugned facts, it is evidently discernible that the
succession certificate granted to Queen Kim, Prince North and Princess Wild as a
manifestation of mutual settlement granted joint rights to all the three certificate holders. It is,
therefore, submitted that by the death of late Queen Kim the impugned certificate had
become ‗inoperative‘ and ‗useless‘132 within the meaning of Section 383(d) of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925.
(¶55.) It is further submitted that the grounds which render a succession certificate revocable
are clearly mentioned in Section 383 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 wherein clause (d)
explicitly states that the validity of a succession certificate becomes questionable if the
certificate has become useless and inoperative through circumstances. This term has been
given significant judicial elucidation wherein it has been opined that the words ‗useless and
inoperative," imply the discovery of something which, if known at the date of the grant,
would have been a good ground of refusing it.133 It is most humbly submitted before this
Hon‘ble Court that the succession certificate as per the impugned facts was obtained as an
outcome of the settlement entered into by Queen Kim, Prince North and Princess Wild. The
consequent demise of Queen Kim and the discovery of her will are undoubtedly
circumstances which, if existed at the time of the grant of the joint succession certificate,
would have rendered the grant impossible because it is settled law that proceedings for
succession certificate are summary in nature134 and that complicated questions of title are not
adjudicated and no rights are conclusively decided in these matters.135 It is, therefore,
contended that the demise of the holder of a joint succession certificate obviously renders it
voidable and inoperative as had those circumstances so existed at the time of grant, the
131
Sukumar Deb Roy and Anr. v. Parbati Bala W/O Bidhuranjan, AIR 1941 Cal 663; See also, Ram Raj v.
Brijnath, AIR 39 All 470.
132
§ 383(d), Indian Succession Act 1925.
133
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sakwarbai, 26 Bom. 792 (4 Bom. L. R. 637).
134
Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma and Ors., v. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi 3 SCC 69.
135
Joginder Pal v. Indian Red Cross Society & Ors on 2 SCC 789.
PAGE | 37
settlement would have been indubitably refused in the light of the absolute factual
complexity.136
(¶56.) It is further submitted that the circumstances which make the grant useless and
inoperative and thus 'justify revocation may have come into existence after the original grant
was made.137 It is humbly contended that the demise of Queen Kim was an event subsequent
to the grant of the joint succession certificate and had inevitably defeated the purpose of the
document which was to confer mutual rights of entitlement on all the three certificate holders.
It is contended that the validity and reliability of the succession certificate became
questionable with the demise of late Queen Kim and that the mutual rights attained at the
time of the grant of succession certificate became inoperative within the definition of Section
383 (d) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
(¶57.) It is settled that on the death of one of the grantees of a succession certificates the
other two cannot give proper discharge. There must necessarily have to be a fresh certificate
to empower the survivors to collect the debts and give the discharge.138 It is, therefore,
contended that a joint succession certificate becomes revocable due to the death of any of the
parties to the same as the rights granted thereunder are not severable. Moreover, a succession
certificate is not a final adjudication of the question as to who is the next heir and as such
entitled to the estate of the deceased.139 The grant of a certificate to a person does not give
him an absolute right to the debt nor does it bar a regular suit for adjustment of the claim of
the heirs.140 It is contended that a succession certificate is, in itself, not an absolute proof of
succession and when one of the members to a joint succession certificate die, a situation of
doubt as to reliance automatically arises. In the light of the impugned facts, the situation is all
the more complicated due to the wills of late King Ray and late Queen Kim in addition to the
joint succession certificate. Therefore, it can be undoubtedly said that the joint succession
certificate could not be relied on owing to the factual vacuum created by the demise of late
Queen Kim who was a co-holder of the impugned joint succession certificate which had
thereupon been rendered inoperative and useless due to consequent circumstances.
136
The Goods Of Gagan Chandra Das v. Unknown, 1949 AIR 1950 Cal 578.
137
Surendra v. Amrita, 47 Cal. 115 : (A.I.R. (7) 1920 Cal. 584).
138
The Goods Of Gagan Chandra Das v. Unknown, 1949 AIR 1950 Cal 578; See also, Sukumar Deb Roy and
Anr. v. Parbati Bala W/O Bidhuranjan, AIR 1941 Cal 663.
139
Kinkar Santamandasanyasi v. State Bank of India and others, AIR 2002 Ori 114.
140
Bakshi Tek Chand J., in Mt. Charjo v. Dina Nath, AIR 1937 Lahore 196 (2).
PAGE | 38
5. THAT PROBATE PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE TERMED AS LAPSED ON

THE BASIS OF SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN SOME OF THE
PARTIES.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon‘ble Court that probate proceedings cannot be termed
as lapsed on the basis of settlement entered into between some of the parties because the
settlement between the parties is not legally enforceable [5.1] and that Section 370(1) of the
Indian Succession Act, 1925 is violated by such an agreement [5.2]. Moreover, the grant of a
succession certificate does not bar the suit for title. [5.3]
5.1 That the Settlement between the Parties is not legally enforceable
(¶58.) It is humbly submitted that when the person deceased has a will any settlement made
on or against the will is not legally valid because it may defeat the intent of the testator141
which has to be accorded absolute supremacy.142 In the present matter North Bilzerian, Wild
Bilzerian and Queen Kim entered into a settlement deed in front of a District Judge and also
obtained Succession Certificate on the basis of it.143 Furthermore, it is contended that not only
was the settlement bad in law as it is not permissible when a valid Will exists the authenticity
of which has not been challenged. The intent of the Testator144 (Late King Ray) was
disregarded as he absolutely disinherited North and Wild Bilzerian from his estate. Therefore,
a settlement made against the intent of the Testator in order to acquire his property is not
permissible by law.
(¶59.) A similar question rose in the case of Chandrabhai K. Bhoir and Ors. vs. Krishna
Arjun Bhoir and Ors. wherein it was observed that it is impermissible in law to ignore the last
Will and Testament on the basis of agreement between the parties.145 It was also said in the
same case that a probate when granted binds the whole world. It is a judgment in rem. The
executor, therefore, has to administer the estate of the testator in terms of the Will and not on
the basis of the settlement arrived at by and between the parties which would be inconsistent
with the terms of the Will. In case of any conflict between the terms of the Will and the
settlement, the former will prevail. The court, thus, in exercise of its jurisdiction
141
Tagore v. Tagore, (1874) 1 IA 387; Lal Behary v. Administrator General, AIR 1935 Cal 284: 39 Cal WN 46.
142
144
Raghunath Prasad v. Dy. Commisioner, Pratabgarh, AIR 1929 PC 283 (285): 32 Bom LR 129: 1929 All LJ
1265.
145
Chandrabhai K. Bhoir and Ors., v. Krishna Arjun Bhoir and Ors., 2008 (15) SCR 652.
PAGE | 39
under Section 302146 can enforce only the terms of the Will and not the terms of the
agreement.147The same situation has been faced by a learned Judge in the case of Janakbati
Thakurain v. Gajanand Thakur where the plaintiff had applied for probate of a will and the
defendant had contended that the will was a forgery. Later, a petition of compromise was
filed with a prayer that the application for probate might be dismissed without decision. The
Court, accordingly, dismissed the suit in terms of the petition of compromise. It was held in
that case that the order of the lower Court was wrong, and that there could be no compromise
of a probate case in accordance with the terms of the petition of compromise because the
main issue in such a case was whether or not the will had been proved and what is the intent
of the testator.148
(¶60.) It is further submitted that in the case of P. Jothi Bai v. B. Dorairaj And Ors., it was
held that the compromise cannot be recorded in a testamentary proceeding, since the
genuineness of the Will has to be proved before the probate can be granted in favour of the
plaintiff as it will be contrary to public policy to introduce into the probate that is granted to
the executor terms of a private compromise that might have been arrived at between him and
any objector. So long as it is not revoked the probate is conclusive against the whole world
and private arrangements between the parties in a proceeding would be quite out of place in
it.149
5.2 That Section 370 (1)150 of The Indian Succession Act, 1925 is violated
(¶61.) It is submitted that the Court of Competent Authority cannot grant a Succession
Certificate until and unless a Will is Probated. It is of no relevance whether the party to
whom the Succession certificate was granted produced the Will of the deceased in his or her
favour. It is because in the above stated situation the Will of the deceased is not probated.
The Will of the deceased is the last desire, wish or order that decides who will acquire the
property or share of the deceased. In the case of Babulal Mandal And Ors. vs Sm. Abala Bala
Dasya And Ors,151 the Court has indicated that the decision of the Full Bench follows from
the plain language used in Section 213 of the Act. In the present case, the defendant could not
146
Indian Succession Act, 1925.
147
Kamal Kumari Devi v. Narendra Nath Mukherji, 9 Cal LJ 19.
148
Janakbati Thakurain v. Gajanand Thakur', AIR 1916 Pat 82.
149
P. Jothi Bai v. B. Dorairaj And Ors, AIR 2002 Mad 191.
150
The Indian Succession Act 1925.
151
Babulal Mandal and Ors. v. Sm. Abala Bala Dasya and Ors., AIR 1955 Pat 126.
PAGE | 40
establish his rights under the will, and, even if the will be admissible in evidence for other
purposes, that will be of no use to the defendant if he cannot establish his rights under the
will and he can disestablish the rights of the plaintiff only if he were to establish his own
under the will. As the will is not probated and no letters of administration have been granted,
he is debarred from relying upon the will for the purpose of establishing his rights.
(¶62.) The same has been propounded in the case of Kesar Singh Sant Singh And Ors. vs
Smt. Tej Kaur on 5 April, 1961 where in facts of the case speak that two different parties
applied for a succession certificate and one of them was granted the succession certificate on
the basis of Will, showing the intent of the deceased in favour of the party. The Court not
found the judgement of Lower Court completely unsupportive as it directly violated the
provision of Section 370 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 which says that a succession
certificate) shall not be granted where it is required by section 212 or section 213 to be
established by letters of administration or probate. The judge also emphasised on Section 213
of the Act152 and said that a legatee cannot set up a right "unless a Court of competent
jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or has
granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the
will annexed."
5.3 Grant of certificate does not bar suit for title
(¶63.) It is established that Succession Certificate does not establish the title of the certificate
holder to the debt or security in respect of which it is given.153 Since the inquiry in
proceedings for grant of certificate is summary in nature, this section lays down that the
decision of the court in certificate proceedings is in no way final or binding between the
parties and does not bar the trail of the question of the title in a civil suit or other proceedings,
between the same parties154. An order granting certificate can be challenged by a regular suit
without filing an appeal155.
152
Indian Succession Act 1925.
153
First National Bank v. Dridevi Dayal, AIR 1968 P&H 292; See also, Hurri Krishna v. Balabhadra, ILR 23
Cal 431.
154
Murthi Das v. Achut das, AIR 1924 Lah 493; See also, Ram Saran v. Gappu Ram, AIR 1916 Lahore 277
(48); Mt. Charic & another v. Dina Nath & Others, AIR 1937 Lahore 196 (49).
155
Indramani v. Hema Dibya, AIR 1977 Ori 88.
PAGE | 41
(¶64.) In the case of V.K. Kamalam v. Panchali,156 the Kerala High Court said that the
procedure for granting of succession certificate is summary in nature and therefore findings
do not operate res judicata. The court added the proceedings for the grant of succession
certificate comes under part 10 of the Act. Section 387 envisages that no decision under part
10 upon any questions of right between parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same
question in any suit other proceedings between same parties, and nothing in this part shall be
construed to affect the liability of any part of any debt or security or any interest or divided
on any security to account therefore to the person lawfully entitled to thereto. The above
section makes it abundantly clear that the proceeding under part 10 of the act are of summary
nature and as such the division of a court under this part does not finally adjudicate the rights
between the parties.
(¶65.) In the case of Joginder Pal v. Indian Red Cross society,157 the Supreme Court held that
merely because issues were raised and/or evidence can be led. The proceedings remain
summary even though the court may, in its discretion, permit leading evidence and raising of
issues. So in a subsequent suit the crucial issues must be decided afresh untrammelled or
uninfluenced by any finding made in the proceedings for grant of succession certificate.
(¶66.) It is settled that if a person dies with a will, it has to be probated in order to get the
Succession Certificate. On the contrary, law is well-settled that if probate has, already,
been granted in respect of the estate of the deceased and is still in force, the learned District
Judge is not competent to grant a succession certificate in respect of the self-same
property.158 It is humbly submitted that in the instant case, the validity of the proceedings
revolving around the grant of succession certificate can be said to be questionable but the
intent of the testator and the probate proceedings preserve their absolute importance.
Therefore, it can be undeniably said that probate proceedings are a must where there is a
valid will and that a private settlement cannot be allowed to shadow the intent of the testator
under any circumstance. Not only is such an agreement a gross violation of the legislative
intention prescribed in the Indian Succession Act, but it is also an act of absolute denial of the
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
156
V.K. Kamalam v. Panchali, AIR 1988 Ker 265.
157
Joginder Pal v. Indian Red Cross Society, (2000) 8 SCC 143.
158
Bappaditya Mukherjee and Anr. v. The State of West Bengal and Ors., (2013) 4 CALLT 397 (HC).
PAGE | 42
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
it is humbly requested that this Honourable Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That the appeal be allowed.

2. That the Impugned Order be set aside.
3. That the Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica had not rightly exercised its
jurisdiction under section 10 F while hearing an appeal against section 111 of the
companies act.
4. That the Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica could not have heard and decided
various aspects and disputes pending adjudication in the courts below which were
in the nature of civil disputes.
5. That the Hon‘ble High Court of Thelesalonica could not have interpreted a will
while exercising jurisdiction under section 10 F.
6. That a joint succession certificate cannot be relied upon wherein one of the parties
to the very same certificate had expired.
7. That probate proceedings cannot be termed as lapsed on the basis of settlement
entered into between some of the parties.
And pass any such order, writ or direction as the Honourable Court deems fit and proper,
for this the Appellants shall duty bound pray.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS
PAGE | 43

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15TH AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

TEAM CODE: 1618

15th AMITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC

Special Leave Petition No. _________/2015

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

North Bilzerian and Wild Bilzerian … Respondents

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON‘BLE SUPREME COURT OF EBONY

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF EBONY

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... 4

Cases .................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Books, Articles & Treatises ................................................................................................... 9

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................... 10

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................... 11

Incorporation Of The Company And The Parition Suit....................................................... 11

The Demise Of King Ray .................................................................................................... 11

The Demise Of Queen Kim ................................................................................................. 12

The Order Of The Company Law Board ............................................................................. 12

The Impugned Judgment...................................................................................................... 12

ISSUES INVOLVED ............................................................................................................. 14

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... 15

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................ 17

1. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA HAD NOT

1.2 That the parties in an appeal were not aggrieved party............................. 20

2. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA COULD NOT

PENDING ADJUDICATION IN THE COURTS BELOW WHICH WERE IN

3. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA COULD NOT

3.2 That interpretation of will is a question of fact .......................................... 32

3.3 That the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited ...................................... 33

4. THAT A JOINT SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE RELIED UPON

4.2 That the certificate is rendered inoperative and useless by such

5. PROBATE PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE TERMED AS LAPSED ON THE

Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385. .................................................. 20

Murthi Das v. Achut das, AIR 1924 Lah 493 .......................................................................... 42

 The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

BOOKS, ARTICLES & TREATISES

1. MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (6th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa,

136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

(2) Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or

INCORPORATION OF THE COMPANY AND THE PARITION SUIT

THE DEMISE OF KING RAY

THE DEMISE OF QUEEN KIM

THE ORDER OF THE COMPANY LAW BOARD

THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

SECTION 10F WHILE HEARING AN APPEAL AGAINST SECTION 111 OF THE

NATURE OF CIVIL DISPUTES?

3. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT COULD HAVE INTERPRETED A WILL WHILE

EXERCISING JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 10F?

4. CAN A JOINT SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE BE RELIED UPON WHEREIN ONE OF THE

MEMBERS TO THE VERY SAME CERTIFICATE HAD EXPIRED?

5. CAN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS BE TERMED AS LAPSED ON THE BASIS OF SETTLEMENT

1. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA HAD NOT

case of transfer/transmission of shares, matter involves highly disputed questions of fact

1.2 That the parties in an appeal were not aggrieved party

personal, pecuniary or property rights, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or

1.3 That the Jurisdiction Of High Court is Restricted Under Section 10 F

2. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA COULD NOT

PENDING ADJUDICATION IN THE COURTS BELOW WHICH WERE IN

(¶32.) The power of superintendence it confers is a power of a known and well-recognised

3. THAT THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF THELESALONICA COULD NOT

3.2 That interpretation of will is a question of fact

3.3 That the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited

4. THAT A JOINT SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE RELIED UPON