1. G.R. No.

152662               June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the
nullification and setting aside of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private
Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."

The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3

Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-

complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of
Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos
(₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of

commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend

Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with
the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the

suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action
respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of
BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No.
127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of
₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and

1
violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-
complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999,
were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases
were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She
alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order
dated 5 October 2000.

On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases
were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City
reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision
reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the
Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are
covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action
on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the
same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the
proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997
yet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal
Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.4

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R.
Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for
appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and
private complainant to comment on the petition.

In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC,
Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for
the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as
it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of
the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by
law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as

2
amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or
information against the petitioner before the proper court.

The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the
petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03
February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.

xxx

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred
to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the
filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running
of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as
amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court,
considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the
prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes 8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.9

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 According to
the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further
amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription
for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the
court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of
the offense charged.10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private
complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of
the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine
laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could
have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, 12 the CA allegedly failed
to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, 13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of
a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of
the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with the
MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four
years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with
Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the
OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the
required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.

3
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City
Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that
the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on

erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of
BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326,
as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses
covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered
by the RPC.

The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription
of such offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a
duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the
required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that
attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It
was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by
the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in
ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No.
3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the
law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against
the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 16 this Court ruled that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the

4
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot
try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of
Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. 17 when it held that the filing of the complaint
with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal
offense.

Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special
laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and
those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling in special laws. In
Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution
of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with
the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for
the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg.
22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively
pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the
reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such
being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of
the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September
1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because
in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial
question". The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice
so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC
of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings,
which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in
court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte, 25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the
offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite
complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March
2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22
against the respondent.

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SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. 137366               November 27, 2003

People of the Philippines, appellee,

vs.
Romeo Mole y Santos, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On appeal is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, finding
appellant Romeo Mole y Santos guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The accusatory portion of the Information2 charged appellant as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one EMERITA REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent.

On motion of the prosecution, the accusatory portion was later amended to read:

That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one EMERITA REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent, while dizzy or
otherwise unconscious. (Emphasis supplied.)

Culled from the documentary and the testimonial evidence for the prosecution consisting
of the testimonies of the following witnesses, to wit: private complainant Emerita Reyes
(Emerita); Aurea Villena, the Medico-Legal Officer from the National Bureau of
Investigation; SPO4 Lilia R. Hogar, the police investigator; and Wildredo Reyes, the
husband of Emerita, are the following:

On April 11, 1997, the then 34-year old Emerita, her husband Wilfredo and their three
children consulted appellant, Romeo Mole, an albularyo (quack doctor), in the latter’s
house, they having been experiencing itchiness all over their bodies. Appellant,
diagnosing the Reyeses to be victims of kulam (witchcraft), asked for and was given
₱935.00 for the purchase of 17 black candles which he needed to insulate them from the
spell. Appellant asked them to return the next day for treatment. 3

As advised, the Reyeses returned to appellant’s house the next day, April 12, 1997. On
appellant’s instructions, the Reyeses removed their clothes upon which appellant
massaged their bodies one at a time with cotton dipped in oil. 4

After the "treatment," the Reyeses repaired home, accompanied by appellant who
brought with him two black candles. Upon reaching the Reyeses’ house, appellant lit the
candles and placed one at the main door and another near the door of the kitchen. He
then invited Emerita’s husband Wilfredo to drink gin while waiting for the candles to burn
out. After three shots, Wilfredo became dizzy and passed out. Appellant thereupon

6
brought Wilfredo to the only bedroom of the house and blew something on his
(Wilfredo’s) chest.5

At about 11:00 p.m., appellant left the Reyeses’ residence after asking for and receiving
the amount of ₱350.00 representing payment for his services.6

Emerita then went to sleep. At about 12:00 midnight, however, she heard someone
knock at the main door. Clad in a duster, she opened the door and saw appellant who
was looking for her youngest son, he saying that "the sorcerer will take and kill him" and
to save him (the son), appellant needed ₱2,500.00. Panicky and crying, Emerita
immediately gave the said amount to appellant who thereafter went to the bedroom and
sprinkled a pungent liquid on Wilfredo and their three children. Appellant also sprinkled
the same liquid on Emerita, blew something on her chest and, while looking at her eyes,
mumbled as if in prayer at which point Emerita instantly felt weak and dizzy. 7

Appellant then dragged Emerita to the kitchen, laid her on the floor and removed her
underwear. She felt appellant, who was naked from the waist down, lie on top of her.
While she wanted to resist she was too weak and dizzy and eventually lost
consciousness.8

Before losing consciousness, however, Emerita felt something heavy on her breast as
appellant lay on top of her.9

When Emerita regained consciousness, appellant had left and her entire body, including
her vagina, was aching. She was later to declare in the course of her testimony in court,
when asked why her vagina was aching, that appellant "raped" her. 10

The next morning, or on April 13, 1997, Emerita, without the knowledge of her husband,
reported her experience to the police. 11 Her husband, however, was informed by a
neighbor that Emerita went to the police station, prompting him to follow her. On arrival at
the police station, he was unable to talk to his wife, and it was only on her return home at
around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. of that day that Emerita related to him the incidents that
occurred the night before, albeit he could not remember if Emerita ever mentioned to him
that she became unconscious, because there have been a lot of things which then
occupied his mind.12

On April 14, 1997, Emerita was physically examined by Dr. Aurea Villena who found
multiple lacerations on her hymen which are secondary to child birth 13 and noted the
following:

1. No extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of the
examination.

2. Hymen, reduced to myrtiformis.14

At the witness stand, the doctor disclosed that the seminology examination conducted on
Emerita yielded negative result, and that there was no medical basis to conclude that she
had been subjected to sexual abuse.15

From the Final Investigation Report 16 of SPO4 Lilia Hogar to whom the case was referred
for investigation, the following datum appears:

xxx

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07. Suspect ROMEO MOLE when apprised of his constitutional rights admitted raping
EMERITA and also told the same admission to the PRESS people who interviewed him.

xxx

SPO4 Hogar’s testimony in court was dispensed with after the prosecution stipulated that
appellant was investigated and "gave the statement to her." 17

Appellant on the other hand denied the accusation. He claims that it was his wife
Adoracion Mole, not him, who treated Emerita; that both Emerita and Wilfredo were
awake when he returned to their house on the night of April 13, 1997; that he merely fell
asleep on the Reyeses’ sofa in the living room; and that when he awoke at around 8:00
the following morning, Wilfredo even offered him breakfast which he turned down as it
was already late. He, however, admitted that there is no reason why Emerita would file a
complaint for rape against him.18

Appellant’s testimony was corroborated by his wife Adoracion Mole. 19

Giving weight to the testimony of Emerita and relying on Romeo’s verbal admission to
SPO4 Hogar of having raped the victim, as reflected in the aforementioned datum in the
Final Investigation Report, the trial court convicted appellant of rape by the assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Romeo Mole y Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape. Accordingly, accused Romeo Mole y Santos is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to INDEMNIFY private complainant Emerita Reyes y
Tamayo in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.20

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court:

1. . . . In deciding the case by mere confusion or supposition, and in failing to consider

certain unrebutted substantial matters of facts tending to show the non-occurrence or at
least a doubtful occurrence of rape.

2. . . . In failing to apply the rule that in case of doubt, the same must be resolved in favor
of the accused.21

In rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its case with clarity
and persuasion to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion.22

And the credibility of the private complainant is of vital importance for, in view of the
peculiar nature of rape, conviction or acquittal rests entirely upon her. 23 It has thus
become doctrine that the accused may be convicted even solely on the basis of the
victim’s testimony provided that the testimony is clear, credible, convincing, unshaken by
rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material
points.24

Although the findings of trial courts are normally respected and not disturbed on
appeal,25 inconsistencies in the testimony of Emerita put serious doubts on her claim of
rape, compelling this Court to reverse appellant’s conviction.

Thus, on direct examination, she related that appellant, who was naked from waist down,
lay on top of her after removing her underwear, whereupon she lost consciousness; and

8
that after she regained consciousness, her entire body, including her vagina, was aching.
She thus concluded that she was raped:

Q You mean Madam Witness that after your panty was removed and accused was able
to l[ay] you down [o]n the floor you lost consciousness and you don’t remember
anything?

A Yes, sir.

Q Prior [to] you[r] los[s of] consciousness, what was the accused doing [to] you that you
could remember?

A I just felt that there was something heavy on my breast, sir.

xxx

Q What was the condition of your body when you regained consciousness?

A I felt pain all over my body, sir.

Q What particular portion of your body was aching or suffering from pain?

A My whole body and also my vagina, sir.

Q Do you know of any reason why your vagina is aching?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that?

A He raped me, sir.26 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, Emerita gave the following account:

ATTY. OLIVA

Q You testified Madam Witness on direct examinatio[n] that the last time you were
conscious that you felt that the accused was on top of you, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.1âwphi1

Q You also testified that you lost consciousness and that when you regained
consciousnes[s] the accused ha[d] left already, am I right, Madam Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, my question, Madam Witness, when did you lose your consciousness?

A When he was halfway [with] what he was doing to me, Sir.

Q Are you referring to the . . .[m]ashing of your breast and kissing of your lips, Madam
Witness?

A Yes, Sir.

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 xxx

Q Miss Witness, can you possibly tell the Honorabl[e] Court if there was actual
penetration of the sexual organ of the accused to you?

WITNESS

A Yes, sir.

COURT

Q Why do you know that there was [f]ull penetratio[n] Madam Witness?

A Because Your Honor, when I regained consciousnes[s] and he already left the house, I
felt that my vagina was somewhat forced and it was very painful, Sir.

xxx

Q Why do you know that he was able to have sexual intercourse with you?

WITNESS

A Because my organ was wet, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)

When, also on during cross-examination, she was questioned by the trial court, she gave
the following statement:

COURT

Q What was that thing that he did which you felt the accused was doing to you?

WITNESS

A I felt that he put his sexual organ on top of my body, Sir.

COURT

Q On top of your body?

[Q] Where did the accused plac[e] his sexual organ, Madam Witness?

[WITNESS]

[A] On my vagina, Sir.28 (Underscoring supplied)

The foregoing testimony of Emerita prompted the defense to propound the following
question which elicited the following answer:

ATTY. OLIVA

Q Madam Witness, you made several inconsistent statements during your direct
examination that you lost consciousness and that you learned that you were raped after
you regained consciousness. Likewise, when asked by this Honorable Court when you
came to know that you were raped, you also said that you learned that you were raped

10
because when you woke up, your sexual organ was painful and when you were finally
asked when for the first time you c[a]me to know that you were raped, you changed your
testimony that you felt that the accused inserted his sex organ into your vagina, which is
which now, Madam Witness?

A I lost consciousness after he was finished having sexual intercourse with me, Sir.29 
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When asked to clarify her statements, Emerita did not give categorical answers:

ATTY. OLIVA

Q When the accus[ed] was holding your breast and kissing your lips, in the middle of
that, you lost consciousness, Madam Witness?

A I felt what he was doing to me but because my body was very weak, I tried to move my
head around so he could not kiss me, Sir.30

xxx

COURT

Q When [did] you know that your organ was wet?

WITNESS

A When he was gone already, Sir.

COURT

Q In other words, you only came to know tha[t] there was sexual intercourse after the
accused has already left the premises[,] is that correct?

WITNESS

A No, Your Honor, because when he dragged me, I already felt weak and dizzy but I felt
all those things that he did to me.31 (Underscoring supplied)

Emerita’s vacillating account of the incident failed to stand the test of consistency. This
Court is thus put on guard as to the veracity of her claim. For while minor inconsistencies
do not detract from the actual fact of rape, 32 those in Emerita’s testimony may not be
considered minor for they relate to the fact of commission of the offense charged.

A woman raped in a state of unconsciousness would not be able to narrate her

defloration during that state, and her violation may be proved indirectly by other
evidence.33 Whereas, a woman fully conscious at the time of rape need only testify in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remain consistent in her
testimony to convict the accused.34

While this Court has held in numerous rape cases that no person would subject herself to
a rape trial given the attendant embarrassment of a medical examination and the stigma
of a sexual assault unless the accusation be true, 35 it is gathered from those cases that
the victim was able to clearly and categorically impute the crime on the offender.

11
In the case at bar, save for Emerita’s inconsistent testimonies as noted above, there is no
other evidence showing that appellant did have carnal knowledge with her.

The testimony of Wilfredo merely dwelt on events that occurred before and after the
alleged rape, while the result of the medical examination showed no physical
manifestations of sexual intercourse. While Dr. Villena did not rule out the possibility of
sexual intercourse, her testimony could hardly be characterized as consistent and
unwavering, having first ruled out the possibility of sexual intercourse, only to later retract
upon being scrutinized by the trial court.36

As for the trial court’s reliance on the investigative report-Exhibit "E" of SPO4 Lilia Hogar
in this wise:

Incidentally, the defense did not interpose any objection to the admission of Exhibit "E",
the Investigation report. SPO4 Lilia Hogar, the Investigator-on-Case, stated in the said
report that ROMEO, when interviewed by the media people admitted raping EMERITA, 37

the same report showing that appellant admitted having raped Emerita is inadmissible in
evidence. The admission was not in writing and there is no showing that appellant was
assisted by a competent and independent counsel of his choice when he made such
statement in accordance with Section 2 (d) 38 of Republic Act 7438 39 in relation to Section
12 (1) Article III of the Constitution.40

The failure of the prosecution to establish appellant Mole’s guilt for rape notwithstanding,
this Court finds him liable for the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. The records
clearly show that appellant lay on top of the victim, mashed her breasts and kissed her
lips, acts from which appellant’s lewd design was evident. Although the information filed
was for the crime of rape, appellant can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because
the latter is necessarily included in rape.41

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged in the information or

proven during trial, the penalty of prision correccional42 shall be imposed in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant must suffer the penalty of
Six (6) Months of arresto mayor as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months
of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the July 15, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Romeo Mole y Santos is CONVICTED of the crime of
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six
(6) Months of arresto mayor as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of
prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

12
3. G.R. No. 127128            August 15, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ROEL MENDIGURIN Y CANLAS, appellant.

AZCUNA, J.:

Appellant Roel Mendigurin challenges the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 74, convicting him of rape and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay P30,000 as moral damages.

The information under which appellant was charged states, as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of June 1992, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, have sexual intercourse with
ELENA SEBASTIAN and successfully did so by employing force, threat and intimidation
on her person.

Contrary to law.2

In his arraignment on March 1, 1993, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not
guilty3 and trial thereafter ensued.

Appellant’s conviction was principally based on the testimonies of complainant Elena

Sebastian, her nephew Mark Figueroa who allegedly witnessed the incident, and Dr.
Louella Nario of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Also testifying for the
prosecution on peripheral matters were the elder sister of complainant, Edna Figueroa,
and Dr. Remedios Puentespina.

Complainant Elena Sebastian, who was 19 years old on the date of the alleged rape, is
a native of Pampanga. After her elementary education, she moved in with her elder sister
Edna Figueroa to the latter’s residence in 217 Gov. Pascual, Sipac, Navotas, Metro
Manila. Edna Figueroa is married to Salvador Figueroa, who happens to be the brother of
Daisy Mendigurin, wife of appellant herein. Appellant’s house is adjacent to the
Figueroa’s. In fact the two houses are separated only by a concrete wall.

In her testimony,4 complainant narrated that on June 15, 1992, she woke up at 5:00 a.m.
to prepare breakfast for her brother-in-law and his two children, who were then sleeping
upstairs. As she unlocked the kitchen door leading outside to throw out water from the
rice pot, appellant suddenly pushed the door and barged in. To her surprise, appellant
locked the door, and embraced and kissed her. Startled by appellant’s sudden attack,
she fell unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her abdomen

13
and noticed blood in her private part. At that moment, she saw appellant putting on his
shorts with a smirk on his face. He threatened her not to report the incident to anyone, or
else he would kill her sister. He then left and complainant was unable to do anything but
weep. She went to the bathroom with a knife and attempted to commit suicide. Her fear,
however, prevented her from doing so.

Complainant kept the incident to herself until September 26, 1992, when she was rushed
to the hospital for slashing her wrist. It was then that she divulged to her relatives the
ordeal she suffered at the hands of appellant. On October 22, 1992, she filed a complaint
against appellant before the police authorities of Navotas, where she gave a written
statement5 relating the June 15, 1992 incident. She was thereafter brought to the NBI for
physical examination.

She further testified that due to her heart ailment, it was usual for her to lose
consciousness whenever she felt frightened, as in the past when her elder sister scolded
her. On cross-examination, she said that at the time of the assault, she was unable to cry
for help to her relatives upstairs because she was so surprised. She also stated that it
took her a long time to report the matter to the authorities because of appellant’s threat to
her and her fear that everybody would know about it.

To buttress complainant’s testimony, the prosecution also presented the

testimony6 of Mark Figueroa (Mark), complainant’s nephew who also happens to be the
godchild of appellant. He was then eleven years old at the time of the incident. He
declared that at around 5:30 a.m. of June 15, 1992, while descending the stairs, he saw
appellant bare-buttocked on top of complainant on the kitchen floor. Appellant
immediately stood up, approached him and told him not to tell anybody what he just
witnessed. At that instance, Mark also saw complainant get up to dress up. Out of fear,
he ran back upstairs and thereafter kept silent about the incident. It was only after
complainant’s confinement in the hospital that he volunteered to take the witness stand
because he pitied his aunt. On cross-examination, he recounted that before going down
the stairs, he heard a soft outcry and an angry voice, which prompted him to go down. He
added that his aunt, upon getting up, went into the bathroom where he heard her crying.

Dr. Louella Nario, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who examined complainant, confirmed
in her testimony7 her findings as stated in Living Case Report No. MG-92-858 8 which
showed a healed deep laceration in complainant’s hymen. She further opined that the
laceration could have been effected three to four months before October 4, 1992, the
date of the examination.

The prosecution also presented testimonial evidence to support complainant’s claim that
it was common for her to lose consciousness whenever she feels afraid. Edna
Figueroa testified9 that sometime in 1991, complainant fell unconscious when she
scolded the latter. In corroboration, Dr. Remedios Puentespina testified10 on the
medical history of complainant, who had consulted her on three occasions since 1991.
She stated that complainant’s frequent complaint since the first consultation was the
latter’s tendency to lose consciousness whenever she felt emotional stress. She testified,
however, that based on the results of the examinations previously conducted on
complainant, she found nothing wrong with the latter’s heart.

Appellant Roel Mendigurin and his wife, Daisy Mendigurin, testified for the defense.

Roel Mendigurin took the witness stand and admitted engaging in sexual intercourse
with complainant on June 15, 1992. He, however, denied the rape charge and interposed
the defense that he and complainant were lovers. In his testimony, 11 he stated that his
work as a batilyo12 required him to leave the house before 7:00 p.m., and come home at
past 3:00 a.m. He testified that from March until sometime in September, 1992, he

14
secretly maintained a sexual affair with complainant, who lived just next door. He recalled
that his first sexual intercourse with complainant was in the afternoon of March 1992 in
the room of complainant’s elder sister. He testified that it was on this occasion that he
discovered that complainant was no longer a virgin. They had their sexual escapades
usually in the mornings, either in his house or in complainant’s house, whenever his wife
was at work.

He narrated a different version of the incident. He stated that in the early morning of June
15, 1992, he arrived home from work and was allowed entry by complainant into her
sister’s house. He walked into the kitchen, where they voluntarily engaged in sex.
Complainant’s nephew, Mark Figueroa, later came down from upstairs and saw them in
the act of intercourse. At this instance, appellant and complainant stood up. He went to
the door, while complainant approached her nephew. He, thereafter, went home. He said
that contrary to complainant’s claim, she never lost consciousness while they were
having sex. He also denied threatening Mark, asserting instead that it was complainant
who talked to the child.

To bolster his defense, he further testified that even after the date of the alleged rape, he
and complainant continued with their illicit sexual affair. In fact he recounted that on June
28, 1992, they again engaged in sex in the house of complainant’s parents in Apalit,
Pampanga, where appellant stayed overnight on the occasion of the town fiesta. He
alleged that complainant’s shame for having been caught by her nephew, who later
spread the word about their sexual relations, must have moved her to accuse him of
rape.

Daisy Mendigurin also testified13 in defense of her husband, appellant herein. As a fish

vendor, her usual routine was to leave for work at 9:00 p.m., and to come home at 9:00
or 10:00 a.m. Most of the time, she was also away in the afternoon to sell more fish in the
market. Whenever she arrives home from work, she would often see her husband and
complainant talking and teasing each other, which caused her to suspect that they were
having an affair. However, because she treated complainant as her sister, she kept silent
and waited for proof to confirm her suspicion. Eventually, in September, as complainant
was rushed to the hospital for having slashed her wrist, her husband talked to her and
admitted the affair. As a natural reaction, she got mad and lost control of herself in rage.

In rebuttal, the prosecution recalled complainant to the witness stand, and also presented
a new witness, complainant’s father, Federico Sebastian.

Complainant Elena Sebastian in her testimony14 on rebuttal denied appellant’s claim that

she and appellant had an affair and that what occurred on June 15, 1992 was
consensual. She admitted that on June 28, 1992, appellant did stay overnight in her
parents’ house in Pampanga, but denied that they had any sexual contact. She clarified
that although they both slept on the same floor of the house, they were about ten feet
apart from each other, in different rooms. At the time, she did not have the strength to
report the rape incident to her family because she was afraid of appellant’s threat.

Federico Sebastian testified15 that on the night of June 28, 1992, while his daughter, his
grandchildren and appellant were asleep on the second floor of their house in
Pampanga, he went up to check on them and noticed nothing unusual.

The trial court lent credence to the prosecution’s version of the incident. Observing that
complainant appeared to be the "Maria Clara" type, it rejected appellant’s claim that the
sexual intercourse that occurred on June 15, 1992 was out of an illicit affair. It concluded
that the medico-legal finding that the hymenal laceration of the complainant was about
four months old strongly negated appellant’s claim that they had had sexual contact as
early as March of 1992. It further found that appellant’s act of sudden entry into the

15
house and pushing the victim to the door sufficed to be considered as an employment of
force, threat, and intimidation to consummate the rape. 16

Hence, this appeal.

Appellant alleges the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF ELENA SEBASTIAN.

II

THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.

III

ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED WAS INDEED GUILTY,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE
ALLEGATION FOUND IN THE INFORMATION THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED BY
MEANS OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH IS NOT FOUND ON THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.17

It is constitutionally mandated that the accused be accorded the presumption of

innocence. The burden of proof rests on the State to establish every circumstance which
proves his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 18 This exacting standard of proof acquires
more relevance in rape charges which are easy to make but hard to prove and harder still
to defend by the party accused who may be innocent. 19 Thus, we have exhorted courts to
keep in mind settled principles in the decision-making process: (1) to accuse a man of
rape is easy but to disprove it is difficult although the accused may be innocent; (2)
considering the nature of things, and that only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 20

On the other hand, it is the general rule that factual findings by the trial court deserve a
high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could alter the result of the case. 21

In the present case, however, a careful review of the evidence compels us to take
exception to the aforesaid rule.

We have repeatedly stressed that the resolution of a rape case often hinges on the
credibility of the victim. If her testimony does not meet the test of credibility, the acquittal
of the accused is inevitable.22

After thoroughly examining complainant’s testimony, along with the other evidence at
hand, we find glaring inconsistencies therein which constrain us to entertain a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of appellant. As principal evidence, the prosecution proffered the
testimony of complainant, who attested that she was raped while she was unconscious
and that the only thing she could remember upon regaining consciousness was seeing
appellant putting on his shorts. Of equal significance is Mark Figueroa’s testimony, which

16
the prosecution presented as an eyewitness account of the incident, and which, upon a
closer scrutiny, fails to corroborate complainant’s testimony. Mark’s narration of what he
saw that fateful morning of June 15, 1992 belies complainant’s claim that she was
unconscious:

Q.         You testified that sometime on June 15, 1992 between the hours of 5:00 to 6:00
a.m., when you woke up and while descending the stairs you saw your uncle, who
happens to be your godfather, on top of your Ate Lena is that correct?

A.         Yes sir.

Q.         Now, before you descended the stairs did you hear any outcry from downstairs
coming from your Ate Lena?

A.         Yes sir.

Q.         You mean to say you heard your Ate Lena making a loud outcry?

A.         Little bit soft, sir.

Q.         But why did you descend from your upper house?

A.         Because it[’]s as if I heard something, sir.

Q.         You heard murmur?

A.         No sir.

Q.         You heard what, what more did you hear?

A.         I heard an angry voice, sir.

Q.         Do you hear the words being uttered by someone whom you heard?

A.         None sir.

Q.         When you saw your uncle atop your Ate Lena, did you hear any outcry from your
Ate Lena?

A.         Yes sir.

Q.         Was the cry loud?

A.         No sir.

Q.         And you testified that immediately your Ninong stood up[,] is that correct?

A.         Yes sir.

Q.         What if any did your Ate Lena do after your Ninong stood up?

A.         She dressed up, sir.23

xxx           xxx           xxx

17
COURT:

When you saw your godfather, the accused herein, on top of your Ate Lena, will you
please tell the Honorable Court whether at that time your Ate Lena was moving?

A.         Yes sir.24

It is worth noting that Mark is related to both appellant and complainant. Considering this
and the fact that he was only eleven years old at the time he witnessed the incident, we
give full weight to his testimony.

Moreover, we cannot help but notice that complainant’s testimony and affidavit failed to
mention the presence of Mark during the incident. When asked, she even denied
knowledge as to when her nephew woke up that morning. 25 In comparison, except as to
who approached and talked to the child, appellant’s account on this point conforms with
Mark’s testimony.26

In addition, complainant’s claim that she has a heart ailment which caused her to faint
under extreme emotional condition was unsupported by any medical finding. The
prosecution only presented the testimony of Dr. Puentespina, who stated that the results
of the two examinations conducted on complainant both proved negative for any heart
disorder. She testified that she only prescribed medicines to calm her, as she observed
complainant to be frequently emotional each time she consulted her. 27

Complainant’s failure promptly to report her agonizing experience to the authorities, or at

the very least to her family, despite all the opportunities to do so, also seriously affects
the veracity of her narration. 28 She stated that it took her four months before divulging the
incident because she feared appellant’s threat to kill her elder sister. 29 However, she
admitted that she had many relatives living in the same neighborhood where she
resided.30 She also admitted that just a week after the date of the alleged rape, she spent
one week in her family’s home in Pampanga, away from the watchful eyes of
appellant.31 Considering that appellant was many kilometers away in Manila and the
protection afforded by her household, her life cannot be said to have been in danger
then. Furthermore, she kept silent and did not protest when appellant slept overnight in
their house on the same floor where she slept, while her parents slept downstairs. 32

In view of the foregoing, we find the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to prove

appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

And even assuming, for argument’s sake, that the evidence at hand suffices to prove the
alleged rape, still, conviction of appellant under the information filed herein cannot stand.

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, the governing law in this case, provides that the
crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The information herein specifically alleged that appellant succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with the complainant "by employing force, threat, and intimidation," thus
invoking paragraph 1 of Article 355. It was also on this ground that appellant was

18
convicted by the trial court. After painstakingly searching through the records, however,
we find no evidence of force, threat, or intimidation used by appellant to consummate the
alleged rape. On the contrary, what we found were complainant’s admissions that no
such means attended the sexual act:

Q.         Now, it states here, that the accused did, then and there will fully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd design, have sexual intercourse with Elena Sebastian and
[successfully] did so by employing force, threat and intimidation with you, my question to
you Miss Sebastian [is], what kind of force was made to you by the accused?

A.         None, Sir, he only pushed the door.

Q.         And what kind of threat [or] intimidation [was] perpetrated or done to you by the
accused?

A.         After he raped me, [he] told me that he would kill me if I complain to anybody.

Q.         But that threat or intimidation happened, according to you, after you have been
abused by the accused?

A.         Yes, Sir.33

xxx           xxx           xxx

Q.         You also testified on rebuttal that what happened to you on June 15, 1992 was
no[t] voluntary but by means of force and intimidation, my question is, how were you
forced and intimidated by the accused?

A.         He told me that if I tell what happened to anybody, he will kill my sister, sir.

Q.         Is it not a fact that [those] utterances, according to you, [were] made by the
accused after you woke up and found yourself to have been molested by the accused in
this case?

A.         Yes sir.

Q.         So the intimidation happened after you found and discovered yourself to have
been abused by the accused in this case?

A.         Yes sir.34

As clearly shown from the foregoing, complainant herself attested that no force was
employed on her by appellant. The threat and intimidation, on the other hand, were
claimed to have been used by appellant only after consummating the sexual act. This is
not what is contemplated by Article 355 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. To convict under
this mode, the accused must have used force or intimidation to compel complainant into
having sexual relations with him.35

As the prosecution failed to present evidence to substantiate the charge of rape through
force, threat and intimidation, we are duty-bound to uphold appellant’s innocence. It is an
elementary rule in criminal procedure that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense
unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. 36 If the prosecution in this
case sought to convict appellant by proving that complainant was violated while in a state
of unconsciousness, as provided under the 2 nd paragraph of Article 355, the information
should have stated so. We find, however, that the element of unconsciousness was not

19
alleged much less specified in the information, which charged appellant for rape under
the first circumstance. Hence, it cannot be made the basis of conviction without violating
appellant’s right to due process, in particular to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.37 We have ruled that this right is accorded by the Constitution so
that the accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him.
Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the
ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. 38

The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the praesumptio hominis that no young
Filipina would cry rape if it were not true. However, its decision totally disregarded the
paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven
otherwise.39 Where the evidence gives rise to two possibilities, one consistent with the
accused's innocence and the other indicative of his guilt, that which favors the accused
should be properly considered. 40

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 12501-MN is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant Roel Mendigurin y Canlas is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED forthwith
from confinement, unless held for another cause. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is further ordered to report to us, within five days from notice, his compliance
with this decision.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

20
4. G.R. No. 148144             April 30, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO CADAMPOG, appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Branch 9, in Criminal Case No. 7823-96, finding the appellant Florencio Cadampog guilty
of rape committed against complainant Prudencia Lasara, 2 and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the sum of ₱50,000 as moral damages and
₱10,000 as actual damages.

The Information filed against the appellant reads:

That on or about the 14th day of January 1996, in the afternoon, at Sitio Himaya,
Barangay Kuya, Municipality of Maramag, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused prompted by lewd
design entered the house of Prudencia Lazara and once inside, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, wrestle, kiss, remove the panty of PRUDENCIA
LAZARA and accused remove also his pants and have sexual intercourse with the latter
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of PRUDENCIA LAZARA in such amount
as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7659.3

Upon arraignment on April 10, 1996, the appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 Trial thereafter ensued.

The Case for the Prosecution5

The spouses Felipe and Prudencia Lasara were farmers who lived in Sitio Himaya,
Barangay Kuya, Municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon. Felipe was 41, while Prudencia was
33. They had four children, namely, seven-year-old Jimmymar, six-year-old Jaypee, five-
year-old Gemma and one-year-old Jovilyn.6

21
At about 12:30 p.m. on January 14, 1996, a Sunday, Felipe with his brother-in-law Paul,
and his friends Berting and Dodoy, went to the neighboring Barangay Dagumbaan to
attend the festivities, as it was the eve of the fiesta.7 Prudencia was left alone in the
house with her young children.

At around 2:30 p.m. of the same day, Prudencia heard the voice of a man asking her two
children, who were then playing downstairs, where she was. The children replied that
their mother was upstairs. Momentarily, she heard footsteps going up the house.
Suddenly, the person, who turned out to be the appellant Florencio Cadampog, their
neighbor and her husband’s friend, rushed towards her. 8 The appellant immediately
grabbed her by the arm and hooked his other arm around her neck. She maneuvered to
back away but the appellant started kissing her. She wanted to shout, but relented when
she noticed that the appellant had a sheathed bolo dangling at his waist. Nevertheless,
she struggled and vigorously resisted his advances, to no avail. The appellant pushed
her against a wall, stripped her of her panties, causing her to be thrown off-balance.
Prudencia fell on a bench, astride and supinely flat on her back. The appellant then
unzipped his trousers, pulled out his erect penis and inserted it into her vagina. He then
made push-and-pull movements. Prudencia continued resisting the bestial assault on
her. The appellant retaliated and scratched her face and neck. 9 Prudencia managed to
push the appellant away, causing him to withdraw his penis and ejaculate outside. 10 The
appellant’s lust deflated when his semen splattered all over Prudencia’s upper
thigh.11 The appellant dressed himself and warned Prudencia to keep the incident to
herself, otherwise, he would kill her.12 The appellant then left.

Prudencia immediately proceeded to the barangay secretary and the barangay captain,
Mrs. Raguro. She reported the incident to them. The barangay captain told Prudencia
that there would be a settlement at 2:00 p.m, but the latter did not agree. She then
returned home.13 Back home, she hid her husband’s bolo in a safe place, and thereafter,
patiently waited for her husband to return. 14

When Felipe arrived home at around 11:00 p.m., Prudencia told him that the appellant
had raped her.15 Felipe was so enraged that his initial reaction was to look for and kill the
appellant, but he relented when he realized that he had no right to take the law into his
own hands.16

The following morning, January 15, 1996, Prudencia reported the incident to the
police17 and gave a sworn statement. Dr. Venus Tagarda of the Maramag District
Hospital examined her and issued a Medical Certificate with the following findings:

- Linear abrasions left zygomatic

PROGNOSIS/FINDINGS Multiple linear abrasion to upper part of anterior chest
-
and neck
OPERATION
- Introitus-multiparous
PERFORMED
Sperm identification: Vagina smear done -
REMARKS - negative for spermatozoa
slide I, slide II18

Dr. Tagarda testified that there were no traces of semen found in the offended party’s
vagina due to the intervening period from the date of the rape and the physical
examination. The linear abrasion located at the complainant’s left cheekbone, and the
multiple abrasions on her chest and neck could have been caused by sharp objects such
as fingernails or other sharp instruments.19

22
 The Case for the Appellant20

The accused denied the charge. He interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he
lived with his wife, Liza, and their four children in Sitio Himaya, Barangay Kuya,
Municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon. They resided in a house built on a farmland owned
by Constancio Paragoso, roughly 500 meters from where the spouses Felipe and
Prudencia Lasara lived.21 On January 14, 1996, the accused, along with his wife and
eldest daughter, Lady Rose, were at the farmland’s grassland all day long, cutting cogon
grasses to be used for Paragoso’s house roofing. They started working from 7:00 a.m.
until 5:00 p.m. without let up, except for a short lunch break. He chopped firewood upon
returning to the house.22 The following day, at around 11:00 p.m., lawmen came to his
house and arrested him. He was brought to the municipal jail and there he learned of the
charge for the first time.23

The appellant claimed that the charge was merely Prudencia’s concoction because he
refused to be a witness against a certain Romeo Alinas, against whom Prudencia had
contemplated filing a criminal charge for rape. 24 The appellant recalled having a meeting
with the spouses Felipe and Prudencia Lasara at their place days before January 14,
1994, where Prudencia asked him to testify in her behalf. For his refusal to do so, he
ended up in jail.25

The appellant’s wife, Liza, corroborated his story, claiming that her husband was with her
and their daughter, Lady Rose, cutting cogon grasses in Paragoso’s farmland the whole
day of January 14, 1996. Her husband never left the place. 26 Liza recalled that after the
alleged rape, she went to Prudencia, they being close friends, and requested her to
withdraw the case. Prudencia however, refused to agree unless given ₱80,000. 27

Constancio Paragoso, a septuagenarian farmer, also corroborated the appellant’s alibi.

He testified that he hired the accused and his wife to cut cogon grasses for the roofing of
his house and paid them ₱1.00 per bundle. He claimed to be with them. He also vouched
for the appellant, claiming that the latter was present at the cogonal area during the
whole day of January 14, 1996. 28

On January 12, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of
rape. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, this court, for the foregoing reasons, finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape as defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code and pursuant thereto is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together will all the accessory penalties included thereunder and to
pay the offended party the sum of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages and actual
damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00.

By virtue of this conviction and pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 114 of [the] 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure the accused shall continue to be under detention even if the accused
should appeal this decision to the proper appellate court. However, the accused shall be
entitled to the full credit for the period he is detained pursuant to Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code and subject to the restriction and limitation therein imposed.

SO ORDERED.29

The accused, now the appellant, contends that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE COMMITTED THROUGH FORCE
AND INTIMIDATION WHEN THE INFORMATION WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE.30

23
The appellant asserts that the Information against him does not charge him of rape
because it does not allege one of its elements, i.e, force or intimidation. He argues that
the Information is void. Even if the prosecution was able to prove that he forced
Prudencia to have sexual intercourse with him, he cannot be convicted of the crime
charged; otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge
against him and to prepare for his defense.31

The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the Information is not
defective; neither is it void. It argues that although the Information does not specifically
allege that the appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the victim with the
use of force, threats or intimidation; nonetheless, it alleges that the appellant succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with the victim after first wrestling with her and against her
will, viz:

Appellant argues that the information is defective since it failed to allege that [the]
appellant raped the victim with the use of force and/or intimidation (Appellant’s Brief, p.
4).

Appellant’s claim is bereft of merit.

Contrary to [the] appellant’s claim, a perusal of the information shows that force was
alleged therein.

As stated in the information "the above-named accused prompted by lewd design

entered the house of Prudencia Lazara and once inside, did then and there, unlawfully
and criminally wrestle, kiss, remove the panty of PRUDENCIA LAZARA and, accused
remove also his pants and have sexual intercourse with the latter against her will."

An information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the
statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. [Sta. Rita vs.
CA, 247 SCRA 484 (1995)].

In the case at bar, the failure of the information to state that [the] appellant raped
Prudencia "through force and intimidation" was not a fatal omission nor did it make the
information defective since the word "wrestle" was used in lieu of the word "force".

"Force" is defined as power, violence, or constraint exerted upon or against a person. It is

used to show that an unlawful or wrongful action is meant (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, West Publishing Co., Minnesota, 1979, page 644).

"Wrestle," on the other hand, is to engage in a violent or determined purposive struggle

to overcome an opposing force (Webster[‘s] Third New International Dictionary,
Massachusetts, 1993, page 2640).

In the case at bar, although the word "force" was not used in the information, the
prosecution used the word "wrestle" instead. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the
word "wrestle" synonymously connotes the use of force in the commission of the offense.

Moreover, the use of the phrase "against her will" in the information also implies that the
rape was committed with force.32

We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General.

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure re-enacted Section 6, Rule 110 of the old
Rules, thus:

24
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of Information - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information. (6a)

The Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense
charged. Thus, Rule 110, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting

the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment.

In the case at bar, the appellant is charged with rape through force, threats or intimidation
under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent. 33 We have
reviewed the Information34 and found that it contains all the elements of rape defined in
Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Information
against the appellant is quoted, viz:

INFORMATION

That on or about the 14th day of January 1996, in the afternoon, at Sitio Himaya,
Barangay Kuya, Municipality of Maramag, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused prompted by lewd
design entered the house of Prudencia Lazara and once inside, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, wrestle, kiss, remove the panty of PRUDENCIA
LAZARA and accused remove also his pants and have sexual intercourse with the
latter against her will, to the damage and prejudice of PRUDENCIA LAZARA in such
amount as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7659.35

Although the Information does not allege that the appellant used force, threat or
intimidation in having sexual intercourse with the victim, it alleges that the appellant
"criminally wrestled" with the private complainant and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her against her will. The import of such allegations is that the appellant
used physical force and intimidation in having carnal knowledge of her. To wrestle is to
contend by grappling with and striving to trip or throw down an opponent; or to combat or
overcome an opposing tendency or force, or an antagonistic person or group; or to
engage in or as if in a violent or determined purposive struggle. It applies to a struggling
for mastery by the use, mainly or solely of dexterous holds with the hands, arms or legs. 36

The appellant’s submission that the Information does not sufficiently charge him of rape
under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code or that the Information is
defective is but an afterthought. The appellant never filed a motion to quash the

25
Information or a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court before his arraignment. He was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and after the
Information was read and explained to him in a language or dialect known to him, he
entered a plea of not guilty. There was no complaint from the appellant, before he
entered his plea, that the Information was defective and that he did not understand the
charge against him. The appellant is, thus, deemed to have waived whatever objections
as to form or substance in the Information. 37 As the Court ruled in People v. Flores:38

If the complaint against the accused-appellant was afflicted by the vice of vagueness, his
remedy is to file a motion for bill of particulars. The record reveals that [the] accused-
appellant did not ask for a bill of particulars in accordance with section 10, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court. The failure to move for specifications or the quashal of the information
on any of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court deprives [the] accused of the
right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with
a definite crime. It is too late in the day for [the] accused-appellant to raise this issue now
because objections as to matters of form and substance in the information cannot be
made for the first time on appeal. 39

Although the appellant failed to raise, as an issue, the matter of whether the prosecution
was able to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, we reviewed
the records to ascertain whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum
of evidence to prove the crime charged to avert a miscarriage of justice. It is a well-
settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct any errors as may be
found in the appealed judgement, whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of
errors.40 We are convinced that, indeed, the prosecution discharged its burden.

The private complainant vividly recounted before the trial court how the appellant
bestially ravished her. She positively identified the appellant as the rouge who raped her
on January 14, 1996.41 She testified as follows:

...

PROS. CHING:

Q And then what did he do when he was inside your house together with your infant baby
(sic)?

A He immediately held me and embraced me.

Q And then when he embraced you what was your position?

A He kept on kissing me.42

...

Q Then after the accused held your right arm and encircled his right arm on the (sic)
neck, what then did he do to you? or what did he do with (sic) your face?

A He kept on kissing my face.43

...

Q Were you able to successfully resist?

26
A I kept on moving backward so that my face could not touch his face.

Q Then because you were trying to avoid his advances on kissing you, what then
immediately happened to you? What position did you have because of the attack?

A I was able to lean on the wall and bench.44

...

Q In that position, what then did he do to you?

A He removed my panty.45

...

Q Now, when he removed your panty, did you not resist?

A I was afraid to resist because he was carrying with him a bolo. He had a bolo.

Q Where was the bolo at that precise time?

A On the side of his body.

Q Did it have a scabbard?

A Yes.

Q And you mean the bolo was strung around the waist of the accused Florencio
Cadampog?

A Yes.

Q Then you said your panty was removed, what then did the accused do next?

A He unzipped the zipper of his pants and he pulled out his penis.

Q When he pulled out his penis, what did you notice? You are a married woman, you
should know. Was it erect or not?

A Yes, it was erect.

Q And then after he opened his zipper and pulled out his erect penis, what then did he do
next?

A He inserted his penis to my vagina. 46

COURT:

...

Q Did you resist his advances?

A I resisted, that is why he scratched my face.47

27
 ...

PROS. CHING:

Q You said that he scratched your face. Did you suffer any injury on your face?

A Yes.

Q What part of your body was scratched?

A Here.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to the left side of her face, the neck and the chest.48

...

PROS. CHING:

Q In that position, when he inserted his penis into your vagina, did you not resist him?

A I kept on resisting.

Q But he was able to penetrate your vagina?

A Yes.

Q And when his penis was already inserted into your vagina, what then did he do?

A He made a push and pull movement of his buttocks. He made a pumping motion of his
buttocks.

COURT:

Q How about you, what was your reaction when he kept on pumping?

A I was afraid.

Q Did you come to like it?

A No, Sir.

PROS. CHING:

Q Now, when he had that pumping motion at that time, the accused had sexual
intercourse with you, what then did you do?

A I suddenly pushed him away.

Q And what happened after you pushed him away?

A He was pushed away from me.

28
Q And what happened to his penis when you pushed him?

A It was withdrawn from my vagina.

Q When it was withdrawn from your vagina, what happened next?

A He had an ejaculation.

Q How do you know that he had an ejaculation when the penis was pulled out from your
vagina?

A Because it spurted towards my upper thigh.

Q Then when the penis was pulled out and the accused had an ejaculation and spurted
spermatozoa (sic) in your thigh, what did he do next?

A He then left our own house.49

The linear abrasion on Prudencia’s left cheekbone, and the multiple abrasions on her
chest and neck were eloquent testimonies of the force employed by the appellant. In rape
case, the physical evidence showing use of force speaks louder than words. 50 It bears
stressing that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings,
sufficient basis exist to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge has thereby been established. 51

It has been held that the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual
assault is of utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of
rape.52 Thus, further strengthening this Court’s conviction that the appellant is guilty of
raping Prudencia is the fact that she wasted no time in reporting her ordeal to the
authorities. As we have held in the case of People v. Grefiel:53

…[D]espite the outrage and shame, she lost no time in reporting the incident to the
barangay captain. In less than twelve (12) hours from the commission of the crime, she
narrated the sordid details of her horrifying and harrowing experience in a statement
given to the police authorities, submitted to a medical examination and signed a criminal
complaint for forcible abduction with rape against the accused-appellant. Not only did
these acts demonstrate courage of the highest order, they also enhance the
complainant's credibility. It has been repeatedly said by this Court that when a woman
admits that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has been committed; if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof ...54

Thus, the veracity of Prudencia’s testimony cannot be doubted. In People v. Jaca,55 we

said:

The credibility of the victim is further strengthened by the spontaneity of her act
immediately after the incident. We note her courage in reporting the rape, unmindful of
what the incident could do on her reputation in their barrio. We fully concur with the
opinion of the lower court, viz:

"The fact that, the offended party, after the beastly attack, immediately left her house to
report the molestation against her honor, is a clear manifestation that she was indeed
raped. ...

29
Her immediate response (reporting the incident) carries the stamp of truth. This is a
natural reaction of a virtuous woman who had just undergone sexual molestation against
her will.…"56

The appellant’s imputation of ill motive on the part of the private complainant is absurd.
The appellant alleged that he was charged with rape because of his refusal to testify in
Prudencia’s behalf against a certain Romeo Alinas, who is Prudencia’s alleged real
rapist. This reason posited by the appellant is too chimerical. Prudencia does not need
the appellant, much less his testimony. She could have charged Romeo Alinas of rape
with dispatch if he, not the appellant, was the culprit. She did not do so.

Anent the appellant’s assertion that Prudencia demanded ₱80,000 from his wife in
consideration of Prudencia’s desistance from charging him with rape, the latter offered no
evidence to prove his allegation other than the bare claim of his wife, Liza. Besides, the
evidence shows that it was Liza who approached Prudencia, not the other way around.

The Court does not see how Prudencia, a married woman, and mother of four children,
could demean her womanhood, risk public censure, and expose herself to the rigors,
embarrassments and headaches of a public trial, if her motive was other than to secure
justice. As aptly pointed out in People v. Dagami57 –

…[A] married woman with a husband and three daughters would not publicly admit that
she had been criminally abused unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in
this case why a mother of four would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination
of her private parts and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive
were other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her.
Pertinently, it stands to reason that Visitacion would not bring herself, her family and her
husband to embarrassment, to public scrutiny and being the talk of the community unless
what she had testified that she was raped is true. It is settled that where there is no
evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness
would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 58

It bears stressing that when it comes to the issue of credibility, the trial court judge is in
the best position to rule on the matter, considering that he has the vantage point of
observing first hand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses. In the absence of
proof that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and
circumstances of significance in the case, as in the case at bar, its appreciation of the
credibility of witnesses will not be altered on review.

The appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration, in view of
Prudencia’s positive identification of the appellant as the one who defiled her, coupled
with Dr. Tagarde’s testimony and medical findings.

The appellant’s denial of the charge against him is futile, in light of Prudencia’s positive
testimony that he raped her on January 14, 1996. Denial is inherently a weak defense. It
cannot prevail over positive identification, unless buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability.59

The appellant’s defense of alibi must also fail. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an
inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the victim.60 Prudencia has positively identified the appellant as the one
responsible for the assault on her chastity. 61 His alibi cannot, thus, exculpate him from
liability.

30
In addition to the positive identification made by Prudencia, the appellant’s alibi placed
him within the periphery of the locus criminis. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper,
it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the offense was
committed; it must, likewise, be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not
possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.62 In People v. Bracamonte,63 we said –

Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the
commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake
about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But to be valid for
purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it
would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at
the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be
in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no
exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused’s presence at the crime scene,
the alibi will not hold water.64

The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 765965 reads:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

The trial court is mandated to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua regardless of any
attendant generic aggravating circumstance as provided for in Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Nevertheless, generic aggravating circumstances may be appreciated as basis for an

award of exemplary damages, in line with prevailing case law. 66 In this case, the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling is attendant because the appellant raped the victim
in her house.67 Hence, the victim is entitled to an award of exemplary damages.

While the trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000, it failed
to award civil indemnity to the victim. The award of civil indemnity ex delicto of ₱50,000
to a rape victim is mandatory upon the finding of rape. 68 Civil indemnity is distinct from
and must not be denominated as moral damages, which are based on different jural
foundations.69 The victim is entitled to ₱25,000 as exemplary damages. 70

The trial court’s award of ₱10,000 as actual damages should be deleted for lack of
factual basis. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. 71 The Court can only grant such
amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts. 72

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Malaybalay City, Branch 9, convicting appellant Florencio Cadampog guilty beyond

31
reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant is directed to pay the victim
Prudencia Lasara the amount of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000 as moral damages;
and, ₱25,000 as exemplary damages. The award of ₱10,000 as actual damages is
deleted for lack of proof thereof.

SO ORDERED.

5. [G.R. No. 134730. September 18, 2000.]

FELIPE GARCIA, JR, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

In two separate Informations filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, petitioner
Felipe Garcia, Jr. was charged with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 91-93374 and
with murder in Criminal Case 91-93375 committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Criminal Case No. 91-93374:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about November 3, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with two others who[se] true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and treachery, attack assault and use
personal violence upon one REYNALDO BERNARDO Y DEL ROSARIO @ "BOY
PANCHANG", by then and there shooting the latter with a revolver, hitting him on the
neck, thereby inflicting upon the said REYNALDO D. BERNARDO @ "BOY PANCHANG"
physical injuries which was necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said REYNALDO D. BERNARDO @
"BOY PANCHANG" which prevented his death.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Contrary to Law. 1

x       x       x

Criminal Case No. 91-93375

That on or about November 3, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with two others whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery attack, assault
and use personal force upon one FERNANDO B. LEAÑO Y BERNARDO @ "BAGGING",

32
by then and there shooting the latter with a revolver, hitting him on the head, thereby
inflicting upon the said FERNANDO B. LEAÑO @ "BAGGING" gunshot wounds which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to Law.

x       x       x 2

The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.

Upon arraignment on 24 May 1991, the petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte entered a
plea of "Not Guilty" to both charges. 3

Trial on the merits then ensued. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court
summarized the events that led to the killing of Fernando Leaño and the near fatal
injuries sustained by Reynaldo Bernardo as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On November 3, 1990, at about 11:30 o’clock in the evening, Arnold Corpuz and
Fernando Leaño, a 15-year old student, and their friends, were conversing along Mataas
na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila. Fernando Leaño was on the side of the street.
Momentarily, a pedicab, with Renato Garcia (Reneng Palayok), on board, passed by and,
in the process, the right wheel of the pedicab ran over the right foot of Fernando Leaño.
The pedicab failed to stop and continued on its way. Incensed, Fernando Leaño ran after
the pedicab. Arnold Corpuz followed suit, at a distance of about three (3) meters away
from the pedicab. When Fernando Leaño was about abreast with the pedicab, he uttered
invectives but Renato Garcia retaliated and hurled invectives, too, at Fernando Leaño,
saying ‘Putang ina ninyo.’ Fernando Leaño was then ahead of the pedicab when he
looked back and saw, to his consternation, Renato Garcia placing his right hand on the
right side of his waistline and about to pull out his gun. Afraid for his life, Fernando Leaño
sped away from the pedicab, turned to an alley and ran to Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco,
Manila, direct to the house of his uncle, Reynaldo Bernardo, at No. 1281 Mataas na
Lupa, Paco, Manila (Exhibit ‘E-1’). The pedicab slowed down a bit and then turned
towards F. Muñoz Street, Paco, Manila. Arnold Corpuz followed Fernando Leaño to the
alley and, when he saw him again, Fernando Leaño was conversing with his uncle,
Reynaldo Bernardo, by the gate of the latter’s house (Exhibit ‘E-1’). Fernando Leaño
reported to his uncle that Renato Garcia earlier uttered invectives at him and even tried
to pull out his gun from the back portion of his waistline. Reynaldo Bernardo decided to
have the incident reported to Police Station No. 5 of the Western Police District.
Reynaldo Bernardo changed clothes, put on his shoes and, with Fernando Leaño and
Arnold Corpuz, proceeded to the house of his mother, Esperanza del Rosario Bernardo
(Exhibits ‘E-2’ and ‘O-2’) to borrow the latter’s jeep, parked near the basketball court,
along Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila, which they will use in going to the police
station. The house of Reynaldo Bernardo was about twenty (20) meters away from the
house of his mother.

The three (3) then turned left along Mataas na Lupa Street, towards the direction of the
house of Esperanza del Rosario Bernardo. However, before they could reach her house,
they had to pass by the intersection of F. Muñoz Street and Mataas na Lupa Street,
Paco, Manila. The intersection was about twenty-five (25) meters away from the house of
the Accused and Renato Garcia and about fifty (50) meters away from the house of
Gerardo Lugos, which was near the South Superhighway already.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leaño and Arnold Corpuz were near the corner of
F. Muñoz and Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila, Reynaldo Bernardo saw the head of
Gerardo Lugos who was peeping on the side corner of the vacant store, at the said

33
corner of the street. However, Reynaldo Bernardo gave no significance to the incident,
there being no feud or misunderstanding between him and Gerardo Lugos. When
Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando Leaño and Arnold Corpuz continued on their walk,
Fernando Leaño and Reynaldo Bernardo were walking side by side, Fernando Leaño on
the right side of his uncle, while Arnold Corpuz was three (3) meters behind the two (2)
but tried to overtake them. When the three (3) passed by the first corner of F. Muñoz
Street, Paco, Manila and Mataas na Lupa Street, Paco, Manila, Arnold Corpuz saw three
(3) male persons, about seven (7) to ten (10) meters away on their left side, walking
along F. Muñoz Street, Paco, Manila, going towards their direction, but did not as yet
recognize them at the time. However, when the three (3) male persons were near the
portion of the street near the store, which was lighted by the lights emanating from the
Meralco post (Exhibit ‘E’), Arnold Corpuz recognized the three (3) male persons. The first
was Renato (Reneng Palayok) Garcia, who was then holding a .38 caliber revolver, with
his two (2) hands raised on the level of his abreast, aimed at them. Behind Renato
Garcia, towards his right side, was his younger brother, the Accused and behind the
Accused, to his right side, was Jerry Lugos. The Accused and Jerry Lugos were armed
with handguns, also aimed at Reynaldo Bernardo. When Reynaldo Bernardo, Fernando
Leaño and Arnold Corpuz were about two (2) to three (3) meters from the intersection of
F. Muñoz and Mataas na Lupa Streets, Paco, Manila, Reynaldo Bernardo turned, looked
towards his left, and saw Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos, all armed and
their guns aimed at him. Reynaldo Bernardo then started to sprint toward where Renato
Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos were but barely had Reynaldo Bernardo taken off
when Renato Garcia fired his gun, once, at Reynaldo Bernardo and hit the latter on the
left side of his neck (Exhibit ‘B’). Renato Garcia was then only about two (2) meters away
from Reynaldo Bernardo. When Renato Garcia fired at Reynaldo Bernardo, the Accused
and Jerry Lugos looked around as if acting as lookouts. Reynaldo Bernardo placed his
left palm on the left side of his neck which was hit, fell, at first, on a kneeling position and
then, on the ground, face down (Exhibits ‘E-3’ and ‘O’). Instinctively, after Reynaldo
Bernardo was hit, he flung and swung his hand inward, outward and sideward and, in the
process, hit Arnold Corpuz who was then about to give succor to Reynaldo Bernardo.
Arnold Corpuz then fell on the ground, on a sitting position. Arnold Corpuz then stood up
and then fell again on a kneeling position (Exhibit ‘E-4’). In the meantime, too, Fernando
Leaño rushed to his uncle and tried to lift him (Exhibit ‘E-5’). Fernando Leaño was then
on a kneeling position. In the meantime, too, Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry
Lugos continued walking towards where Reynaldo Bernardo was sprawled and Fernando
Leaño beside him and Arnold Corpus in front of Fernando Leaño. The body of Reynaldo
Bernardo was between them. Three (3) successive shots then ensued. Arnold Corpuz
then decided to lie down on the ground, face down, his face on the feet of Reynaldo
Bernardo, to avoid being hit with his two (2) hands under his breast. Arnold Corpuz then
raised his head a little and noticed that the front portion of the head of Fernando Leaño
was bulging and Fernando Leaño falling down. It turned out that Fernando Leaño was
felled (sic) by a gunshot wound at the back of his head. In the process, Arnold Corpuz
saw Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos behind Fernando Leaño, still holding
their guns. Renato Garcia, the Accused and Jerry Lugos then fled from the scene
together. Arnold Corpuz also fled from the scene towards the house of Esperanza del
Rosario Bernardo to plead for help. On the way, Arnold Corpuz met Dominador
Bernardo, Jr., the brother of Reynaldo Bernardo who came from the basketball court.
Dominador Bernardo, Jr. inquired why Arnold Corpuz was running and Arnold Corpuzz
(sic) replied, thus: Tinamaan si Kuya Boy at Ferdie.’ (pp. 214-216, id.) 4

The victims were taken to the Medical Center Manila at about 12:00 midnight.
Subsequently, Leaño was transferred to the Orthopedic Hospital, where he died in the
morning of November 4, 1990. 5

Dr. Marcial Cenido performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Leaño and prepared a report
with the following Post Mortem Findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

34
EXTERNAL INJURIES AND EXTENSIONS INTERNALLY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Gunshot wound, thru and thru with the following points of entry and exit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Point of Entry — right occipital region, head, 58.5 inches from the heel, 3 cm. from the
posterior midline, measuring 0.5 cm. x 0.3 cm. and with the contusion collar measures 1
cm. x 0.7 cm. and

Point of Exit — right forehead, 5 cm. from the anterior midline, 58 3/4 inches from the
heel, and measures 1.3 cm. x 0.5 cm.

Course: Forwards, very slightly upwards and very slightly towards the lateral penetrating
the cranial cavity and lacerating the right occipital, parietal and frontal lobes of the brain.

2. Hematoma, below the right eyebrow.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Laceration of the right occipital, parietal and frontal lobes of the brains and
subrachnoid hemorrhage, and generalized pallor of the internal organs and tissues; and

2. Recovered from the stomach about a glassful of dark liquid with some rice and
vegetables and without alcoholic odor.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Gunshot wound, right occipital region, head. 6

On the other hand, Dr. Pedro P. Solis, Medico-Legal Officer of the Medical Center
Manila, performed an operation on and gave medical treatment to Reynaldo Bernardo.
The report he prepared showed the following findings:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Abrasion, 3 cm. x 2 cm. scalp, frontal region, left side; 3 cm. 3.5 cm x 1 cm. loyal aspect,
frontal region, left side. Wound, gunshot, circular in shape, 0.9 cm. in diameter, lateral
aspect, neck left side, indise anterior triangle, directed medially, downwards and slightly
backwards, penetrating soft tissues of the neck, involving external jugular vein, then
making wound exist at right paravertebral area that the level of T3-T4 and 3 cm. below
the highest point of the shoulder. 7

Based on the above established facts, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion reading as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the following cases to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In people versus Felipe Garcia, Jr., Criminal Case No. 91-93374, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Frustrated
Homicide" and hereby sentences said Accused to an indeterminate penalty of from Four
(4) Years and Two (2) mouths of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as Maximum, and to pay to Reynaldo Bernardo the
amount of P115,631.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

2. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr. Criminal Case No. 91-93375, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Homicide"
and hereby metes on him an indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) Years and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1)

35
Day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to pay to the heirs of Fernando Leaño the
amount of P10,040.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 by way of indemnity. 8

Petitioner elevated his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which on 21 May 1998,
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 9 Hence, the present case, petitioner raising
the following assignment of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN EVALUATING EVIDENCE DIRECTED

AGAINST SUSPECTS GERRY LUGOS AND RENATO GARCIA — INFERENTIALLY
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT FELIPE GARCIA, JR, UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONSPIRACY SO-CALLED.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE FACTS

AND CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHED IN THE TRIAL AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS CO-CONSPIRATOR THEREOF, AND,

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY AS CO-PRINCIPAL IN HOMICIDE AND FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
GROUNDED ON CONSPIRACY WITH THIRD PERSONS" (GERRY LUGOS AND
RENATO GARCIA) WHO ARE MERE SUSPECTS AND ‘STRANGERS’ IN THE TWO
CASES AS THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED THEREIN NOR CHARGED AS JOHN AND
RICARDO DOES IN EITHER OR BOTH INFORMATIONS." 10

Petitioner asserts that since he alone was named in the information, "it would seem by
implication from the narration in the information that it was being made to appear that the
accused was in fact the gunman who acted in conspiracy with unknown persons. The
evidence later presented proved otherwise and it turned out that it was Renato Garcia
alone who shot and wounded Reynaldo Bernardo and shot and killed Fernando Leaño. It
was not, therefore, in keeping with the evidence on record proper to convict the accused
based merely on the theory that there was conspiracy when no sufficient evidence to
support such fact exist." 11

Contrary to petitioner’s argument, there is no irregularity in the information to warrant a

reversal of the conviction. All material facts and essential elements of the crimes, for
which petitioner is charged, were alleged therein. Conspiracy was alleged in the
information. Thus, it is not necessary to allege with exactitude the specific act of the
accused, as it is a well-settled doctrine that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
12

Neither is the fact that the two others allegedly in conspiracy with the petitioner were not
named with particularity, nor tried and convicted, of any moment. An information alleging
conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot
pass verdict on the co-conspirators who were not charged in the information. 13

This Court does not doubt the guilt of the petitioner. The findings of a trial court on the
credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge
over an appellate magistrate in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. Absent any
showing that trial court’s calibration of the credibility was flawed, we are bound by its

36
assessment. 14

An examination of the records will reveal that the prosecution witnesses positively
identified the accused. Reynaldo Bernardo, who sustained injuries from a gunshot
wound, narrated the incident as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Where were you when this Fernando Leaño told you that a gun was poked on (sic) him?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I was in our house, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Can you still recall that (sic) time it was when this Fernando Leaño told you that a gun
was poked on (sic) him?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I think about 11:30 o’clock, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And did you come to know as to what time or that date was that poking incident took
place.

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On November 3, 1990, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At what time was it, if you know?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I was told at about 11:30 o’clock, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

You said that at around 11:40 o’clock in the evening at the corner of Mataas na Lupa and
F. Muñoz street, you were with two (2) men, can you recall of any unusual incident that
happened at that corner?cralaw : red

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We were shot sir. "Pinagbabaril kami."cralaw virtua1aw library

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Who shot you if you can still recall?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Reneng Palayok and his two (2) other companions by the name of Peping Palayok and

37
Jerry Lugos, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

How far were you in relation to the place where these men shot you?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

About seven (7) meters away, sir, it is very near.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Can you still recall the relative positions of these men whom you said shot you and your
position at the time that (sic) shots were fired?

ATTY. UY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I object to the question, Your Honor, on the ground that the same is very leading.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I will reform, Your Honor. You said that you were about more or less seven (7) meters
away from the men. Now, my question to you is, were you hit?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And where were you hit?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At my (sic) left side of my neck, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And at the time that you were hit on the neck, where were these three (3) men at that
time?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

They were on my left side, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And what were these three (3) men actually doing at the time that they shot you?
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

They were armed with guns, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Have you known this Rene Palayok even before November 3, 1990?

38
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, sir, since we were young.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What about this Peping Palayok, have you known also this Peping Palayok?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, sir, I have known him also since we were young.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

How about this Jerry Lugos?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, sir, he is my childhood mate.

x       x       x

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Granted.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Now, Mr. Witness, after you were hit on the left side of your neck, what happened next?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I fell down, sir, face down.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And when you fell down, face down, can you still recall what happened next?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After that, sir, I heard shots.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Now, if you see again that Peping Palayok whom you said was one of those who shot
you, will you still be able to recognize him?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Will you please look inside the Court and point to him?

39
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That person, sir.

INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Witness pointing to a person who, when asked, stated his name as Felipe Garcia, Jr. 15

One of Bernardo’s companion, prosecution witness Arnold Corpuz, testified in this

wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Could you please tell to this Honorable Court why you were not able to reach the house
of Reynaldo Bernardo?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Because there were three (3) male persons who were waiting "nakaabang" for us, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Why did you say that these three (3) men were waiting or "nakaabang" for you?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Because while we were walking, they were already there holding guns, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Do you know these persons who were holding guns?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And who were these persons whom you said were waiting for you and holding guns?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Reneng Palayok, Peping and Jerry Lugos, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What is again the full name of this Rene(ng) Palayok, if you know?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Renato Garcia, sir.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What about this Peping?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

40
Felipe Garcia, sir. 16

In the face of petitioner’s positive identification, petitioner’s defense of alibi cannot hold
water. No jurisprudence in criminal cases is more settled than the rule that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses, and the same should be rejected when the identity of the
accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime. 17

The factual findings of the trial court that petitioner participated in the perpetration of the
crime, such being supported by evidence on record, will not be disturbed by this Court.
However, we are of the persuasion that the prosecution failed to prove with positive and
competent evidence the fact that the act of the petitioner was direct or actually necessary
to the commission of the crime.

The existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting
the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubts.
18 The mere fact that the petitioner had prior knowledge of the criminal design of the
principal perpetrator and aided the latter in consummating the crime does not
automatically make him a co-conspirator. Both knowledge of and participation in the
criminal act are also inherent elements of an accomplice. 19 In his commentaries on the
Revised Penal Code, Chief Justice Ramon Aquino explains:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

The guilt of an accomplice should be predicated on an act that was done in furtherance
of the commission of the crime by the principal. The accomplice must have known that
the principal intended to commit a particular crime. In other words, he should have
community purpose with the principal. . . 20

In the case of People v. Tamayo, 21 citing the Supreme Court of Spain, this Court made
the following exposition on the characteristics of an accomplice:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

. . . It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be
a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice, but it is furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of
the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid
in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.

In cases of doubt as to whether persons acted as principals or accomplices, the doubt

must be resolved in their favor and they should be held guilty as accomplices. 22

Such principle was applied by this Court in the case of People v. Clemente:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

In the case of appellants, Carlos and Pascual Clemente, while they joined their brother in
the pursuit of the fleeing Matnog, and in the attack on him as he fell, yet the prosecution
eyewitness was unable to assert positively that the two managed to hit the fallen man.
There being no showing of conspiracy, and the extent of their participation in the
homicide being uncertain, they should be given the benefit of the doubt, and
consequently they are declared to be mere accomplices in the crime. 23

After a circumspect examination of the evidence, we find that other than a showing that
petitioner assisted Renato Garcia in the slaying of Fernando Leaño and the infliction of
injuries upon Reynaldo Bernardo, the prosecution failed to present other evidence which
would positively establish the existence of conspiracy. Thus, this Court is of the belief
that petitioner-accused should only be held liable as an accomplice. This seems to be the
more reasonable and safer course.

41
Even if we were to agree with the trial court that conspiracy existed between accused-
petitioner and two other malefactors, in particular Renato Garcia, who was positively
identified as the gunman, still this Court is of the conviction that the petitioner should only
be held liable as an accomplice. Petitioner’s participation was hardly indispensable. As
the trial court pointed out, the petitioner merely acted as a lookout." The testimony of
Arnold Corpuz is telling:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And what happened after you saw these three (3) men waiting for you armed with guns?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

They fired a gun once and "Kuya Boy" was hit, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What part of the body of Boy was hit?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Here, sir.

INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Witness pointing to the left portion of his neck.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I cannot understand that. You said that they fired once. How many fired?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Only one, Your Honor.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Who was that person who fired the gun?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Mang Rey or Rey Palayok, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And you said that there were three (3) of them. What did these Peping and Jerry Lugos
do when Rene Palayok fired a gun that hit your "Kuya Boy" ?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

They were behind Mang Rene, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

You said that they were behind Rene Palayok. What did they do afterwards after Rene

42
fired a gun that hit your "Kuya Boy" ?

ATTY. UY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Very leading, Your Honor.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

May answer.

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

They were looking around holding their guns as if they were acting as look outs, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After your Kuya Boy was hit on the neck, what happened next?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I saw Fernando went (sic) near his uncle so that he could lift his uncle, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Was he able to lift his uncle Reynaldo Bernardo?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Not anymore, sir, because there were continuous firing of guns about three (3)
times.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What happened to Fernando Leaño when there was a continuous firing for at least three
(3) times?

ATTY. UY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Leading, Your Honor.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

May answer.

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

He was hit on the back of his head, sir.

INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Witness pointing to the right back portion of his head just behind his right ear.

FISCAL PERALTA: ]

And do you know who shot this Fernando Leaño?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

43
Yes, sir. It was Mang Rene.

FISCAL PERALTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What did the companions of Rene Palayok do when Rene Palayok shot Fernando
Leaño?

ATTY. UY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Very leading, Your Honor.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

May answer.

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

They were acting as aide and they were following Rene Palayok, sir. 24

As can be seen from the above testimony, petitioner’s participation was hardly
indispensable. In the case of People v. Nierra, 25 this Court made the following
ruling:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached
the conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking,
that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-principals. However, since their
participation was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the
rule that the court should favor the milder form of liability may be applied to
them.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not
prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration
of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character.

WHEREFORE, the herein questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

1. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr., Criminal Case No. 91-93374, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an ACCOMPLICE in the
crime of "Frustrated Homicide" and hereby sentences said Accused to an indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) months of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to Four (4) years and One (1)
Day of Prision Correccional, as Maximum;

2. In People versus Felipe Garcia, Jr. Criminal Case No. 91-93375, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an ACCOMPLICE in the
crime of "Homicide" and hereby metes on him an indeterminate penalty of Two (2) Years
of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor, as Maximum.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

44
6. G.R. Nos. 135554-56 - June 21, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DANILO DELA CRUZ y

CARIZZA, Accused-Appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision dated August 13, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R, 15164-R
and 15368-R finding accused-appellant Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty of two (2)
counts of rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.

On August 29, 1997, two informations for rape were filed against accused-appellant in
the RTC of Baguio City. The informations alleged:

Criminal Case No. 15163-R -

That sometime in the month of September, 1990, in the City of Baguio,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a
minor, then 11 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Criminal Case No. 15164-R -

That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in the City of Baguio,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 16 years of age,
against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

On December 11, 1997, another information was filed against accused-appellant

charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The information stated:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her or committing
acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN
DELA CRUZ as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15368-R.

45
Upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the three
cases. When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the
charges. Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.

The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jeannie Ann dela Cruz; Dr.
Ronald R. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-
Cordillera Administrative Region (NBI-CAR); Mrs. Jean dela Cruz, mother of complainant
and spouse of accused-appellant; and SPO2 Melchor Ong of the Baguio City Police.

The prosecution established that accused-appellant married Jean dela Cruz in civil rites
on 14 April 1977 and again in Catholic rites on 27 December 1978. They begot four
children, namely: Jeanie Ann (the private complainant), Divine Grace, Daniel Jay and
Gerard Niño.4

Accused-appellant, a teacher, worked at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from
1978 to 1986. He transferred to the Don Bosco Elementary School in Baguio City
sometime in 1986 and taught there until the following year. In 1987, he worked at the
Saint Louis Center in Baguio City until his dismissal therefrom in 1993. Accused-
appellant again taught at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1993 until his
arrest in August 1997. 5 While working there, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo,
Tarlac on weekdays and went home every 15 days or every payday. They would go
home to Baguio City, where the rest of their family stayed, on Friday evening and return
to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.6

Jeannie Ann dela Cruz ("Jeannie Ann") testified that she was born to accused-appellant
and Jean Aqui-dela Cruz on April 18, 1979 in Tarlac, Tarlac. Not long after her birth, her
family transferred to the house of her maternal grandmother in No. 2 Sumulong Street,
Baguio City. Her family lived in an extension of her grandmother's house which had a
basement, a second floor and an attic. The second floor had four rooms and a stairs
leading to the attic, which served as a stockroom. Jeannie Ann's parents and her two
brothers, Daniel and Niño, stayed in the basement while she and her sister, Divine
stayed in the second floor.7

Jeannie Ann revealed that accused-appellant started molesting her when she was seven
years old. While he helped do her homework at night, accused-appellant would on
occasion make her hold his penis and masturbate him. There were also instances when
he would put his penis inside her mouth and withdraw the same when a white liquid
came out.8 Accused-appellant warned Jeannie Ann not to tell her mother what he was
doing to her and told her that it was a normal thing between father and daughter. He
further warned Jeannie Ann that her mother might kill them should she learn about the
things that they did. Jeannie Ann believed accused-appellant and did not tell anyone
about the sexual acts he performed on her. As she was growing up, accused-appellant
continued to engage in the aforementioned sexual activities with her, and continuously
threatened to hurt her, her siblings or her mother if she did not give in to his desires.
Jeannie Ann still refrained from complaining because she was convinced by the accused-
appellant that the sexual activities which he performed on her were proper. 9 She
recounted before the trial court three particular occasions when accused-appellant
molested her.

Jeannie Ann said that sometime in September 1990, she was sexually abused by
accused-appellant in their house in No. 37 Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City. She was
only 11 years old then. According to Jeannie Ann, their family had moved to said house
when her grandmother's house in Sumulong St. was destroyed in the July 16, 1990
earthquake that hit Baguio City.10 They occupied the basement of the house in Leonard
Wood Road. The basement had two bedrooms, a comfort room and a living room.
Nobody stayed in the second floor thereof but during the day they stayed in the main

46
house.11 Sometime that month, Jeannie Ann, her three year-old brother Niño and
accused-appellant were left in the house while her mother and her sister Divine went to
market. She was in the living room with Niño when her father undressed her. Her father
removed his pants and she was made to lie down on a cushion. Her father played with
her genitalia and rubbed his penis against her private part until a white liquid came out of
his penis. Jeannie Ann said that after said incident, she felt pain in her vagina whenever
she would urinate (mahapdi). She did not resist because she thought that what her father
was doing to her was a normal act.12

Jeannie Ann narrated that accused-appellant again abused her one night in July 1995
when she was 16 years old. She was watching television with her siblings in the living
room. At that time, their mother was attending a meeting in church. Accused-appellant
called her three times but she refused to respond to his call as she was watching
television. Exasperated, accused-appellant pulled her inside one of the bedrooms and
asked her to lie down on the bed saying, "This is only for a while." Accused-appellant
then undressed her, removed his pants and underwear, inserted his finger inside her
vagina, mashed her breasts and licked her vagina. Accused-appellant proceeded to rub
his penis against her vagina and thereafter inserted his penis therein and kept it there
until his semen started to come out. Accused-appellant placed his penis on Jeannie
Ann's stomach where he made his semen flow. While all this was happening, Jeannie
Ann could only cry, as she was afraid of accused-appellant, because he threatened her
that he would kill her or her mother and siblings.13

The third incident recounted by Jeannie Ann occurred in their house in No. 2 Sumulong
Street, Baguio City on August 2, 1997. She was then 18 years old. When she came
home at around 10:30 in the morning after her classes at Saint Louis University, she saw
accused-appellant at the door. He told her to proceed to the attic shortly. She ignored
him and went directly to her room and started cleaning the same. While she was cleaning
the outer portion of her room, she saw accused-appellant go up the attic. While he was
there, he repeatedly called her and asked her to go there. When Jeannie Ann
remembered that her mother had earlier instructed her to clean the attic, she went up
when she was done cleaning her room. 14

Accused-appellant lay on the bed in the attic as Jeannie Ann swept the floor. When she
was done, accused-appellant asked her to join him on the bed. He went near her and
again asked her to sit on the bed when she refused to heed his call. Accused-appellant
whispered to her that he was running out of time. He talked in whispers so that the other
people in the house at that time would not be able to hear what he said. Sensing that
accused-appellant would again molest her, Jeannie Ann became nervous and started to
cry. He told her to stop crying and to relax, as what he was about to do would only take a
while. Accused-appellant then lifted Jeannie Ann's t-shirt and brassier, mashed her
breasts with his left hand and inserted his right hand inside her pants. Jeannie Ann
resisted, but accused-appellant proceeded to insert a finger of his right hand inside her
vagina. While he performed the aforementioned acts on his daughter, accused-appellant
told her, "I love you very much. Promise me that I will be the only one who will do this to
you."15

Accused-appellant only stopped what he was doing when he heard Aileen, a boarder in
their house, calling Jeannie Ann. He immediately fixed her clothes and hair, then moved
away from her. Accused-appellant instructed Jeannie Ann not to go down and to keep
quiet about the incident. When accused-appellant noticed that Aileen had left because
Jeannie Ann did not respond to her, accused-appellant embraced Jeannie Ann and said:
"Please cooperate with me and trust me. I have given you my life. Promise that I will be
the only one who will touch you." Accused-appellant began touching her again. He
inserted his fingers inside her vagina. As he touched her, he said, "Please cooperate with
me and trust me. This is for your own good and for the good of our family. If you will not
follow me, you might regret it. I want you to have a bright future. And after you finish, I

47
can already die and you will no longer have any problem." 16 Although Aileen, Divine, Niño
and Rogel, another boarder in their house were also there at the time of the incident,
Jeannie Ann did not have the courage to call for help because she was very much afraid
of accused-appellant, and she saw anger in his eyes.17

When accused-appellant was done with her, Jeannie Ann insisted on going down. She
cried as she returned to her room to fix herself. Thereafter, she went out of the house to
deal with what had just happened to her. While walking outside toward the bridge, she
saw a white L-300 van belonging to the police. She flagged down the vehicle and
narrated to the two police officers riding therein, SPO2 Bravo and SPO2 Ong, what
accused-appellant had just done to her. The policemen accompanied her back to their
house where they met accused-appellant whom Jeannie Ann identified as the person
who had raped her. Accused-appellant voluntarily went with the policemen to the Baguio
City Police Station.18

When they arrived at the Baguio City Police Station, Jeannie Ann narrated her
experience to the police officer stationed at the Women's Desk. In her statement, Jeannie
Ann described what accused-appellant did to her on August 2, 1997. 19

Jeannie Ann also denied accused-appellant's claim that she had sexual relations with her
boyfriend Charles, and that she accused her father of rape to get back at him for causing
her breakup with Charles.20

Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the NBI-CAR medico-legal officer who conducted a physical
examination of Jeannie Ann on August 8, 1997, testified that he found two old healed
lacerations at 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions on Jeannie Ann's hymen. He said that the
lacerations could have been inflicted more than three months prior to the date of the
examination and considering the proximity of their location, could have been inflicted at
the same time. A hard rigid instrument like an erect male organ, a rigid wood or a finger
could have caused these lacerations. Dr. Bandonill also opined that the positions of the
lacerations did not rule out the possibility that the victim had sexual intercourse less than
three months prior to his examination of her, since intercourse would not create further
lacerations when done in the same position. He likewise noted that the vaginal walls
were lax and the vaginal rugosities were slightly flattened and smoothed. The victim's
hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.4 cm. in diameter with ease. Dr. Bandonill said it was
possible that penetration happened several times. He further testified that the frequent
insertion of a finger or other rigid object, with a diameter of more than an inch, could
cause the lacerations as well as the lax condition of vaginal walls. 21

Jean dela Cruz ("Mrs. dela Cruz"), Jeannie Ann's mother and wife of accused-appellant,
testified that she learned that accused-appellant had sexually abused their daughter
Jeannie Ann on August 2, 1997 when she arrived at home after her marketing chores.
She was told by her daughter Divine that accused-appellant was picked up by the police.
Mrs. dela Cruz followed accused-appellant to the police station and found Jeanie Ann
crying while the latter was reporting what had happened to her at the Women's Desk.
Upon seeing her daughter, Mrs. dela Cruz hugged her and they cried together. 22

Mrs. dela Cruz further stated that she was shocked upon hearing Jeannie Ann's
statement before the police that accused-appellant had been performing oral sex on their
daughter Jeannie Ann since the latter was seven years old, as it was the first time that
she learned about it. In her anger, she rushed to the other room where the accused-
appellant was being questioned and slapped him, kicked him and scratched his face. She
said accused-appellant denied all the accusations against him. When accused-appellant
was already incarcerated, Mrs. dela Cruz received several letters 23 from him asking for
forgiveness from her and from Jeannie Ann. 24 She also informed the trial court that after
accused-appellant's incarceration, she went to Tarlac to get her husband's things since

48
he usually stayed there on weekdays while he taught at Don Bosco. 25 She discovered
several love letters by a certain Emily addressed to accused-appellant, 26 Emily's
photograph27 and accused-appellant's draft love letters to Emily, dated March 21,
1995,28 September 4, 1995,29 and March 7, 1996.30 Mrs. dela Cruz also found a letter
from a certain Maureen telling accused-appellant that he had a chance of winning her
heart,31 and a photograph of Maureen. 32 She said that the tenor of the letters indicated
that accused-appellant was having relations with other women. 33 Mrs. dela Cruz also
denied accused-appellant's claims that she had a paramour and that she helped Jeannie
Ann file the complaints against him because she (Mrs. dela Cruz) wanted to get back at
him for being unfaithful to her.34

SPO2 Melchor Ong, the police officer assigned to the Baguio City Mobile Group, also
testified that on August 2, 1997, between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon, while he and his
companion inside an L-300 van of the Baguio City police were passing along Sumulong
St., Baguio City, they saw Jeannie Ann walking towards them. The latter stopped them
and tearfully reported to them that her father had just sexually molested her. They
accompanied Jeannie Ann to her house and there the latter pointed to accused-appellant
as the person who mashed her breasts and inserted his finger inside her vagina. SPO2
Ong and his companion approached accused-appellant, introduced themselves as
policemen and invited him to the police station. He said that accused-appellant readily
agreed to go with them to the police station. 35

The defense presented as witnesses the accused-appellant, Camilo Estepa, Barangay

Chairman of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don
Bosco Technical Institute, and Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco in
Trancoville, Baguio City.

Accused-appellant testified that he was a teacher at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in
Tarlac, Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. In 1987, he transferred to Don Bosco in Trancoville,
Baguio City and worked there for a year. From 1988 to 1993, he taught also in Saint
Louis School Center. In 1994, he went back to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in
Tarlac, Tarlac and had taught there until his incarceration in August 1997. 36 On
weekdays, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac, Tarlac and they would go
home to their family in Baguio City every 15th and 30th of each month to give his salary
to his wife. When these dates fell on a weekday, they would go home to Baguio City the
following Friday and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon. 37

He denied all the accusations hurled against him by his daughter Jeannie
Ann.38 According to him, he tried to provide for the needs of his family, especially his wife
whom he loved very much. He maintained that even when he was already in jail, he
asked his mother and his sister to support his daughter's education.

He admitted to having gone home to Baguio City in the evening of August 1, 1997, which
he recalled was a Friday. That night, his wife asked him to clean the attic the following
day as there was a dead rat therein. 39

The following day, August 2, 1997, accused-appellant removed the decomposing body of
the rat from the attic as requested by his wife. He called his daughter Jeannie Ann who
was cleaning her room on the second floor of the house to come to the attic and help
him. It took a while before Jeannie Ann heeded his call. When she finally went up, she
merely swept one third of the floor area of the attic, away from where the dead rat was.
When she was done sweeping the floor, accused-appellant asked her to come near him,
as he wanted to apologize for having scolded her earlier and to remind her that she
should not have ignored him when he commanded her to go up the attic, or to at least tell
him that she could not obey his command immediately. While he was talking to her, they
heard someone calling her name. Jeannie Ann told accused-appellant that that person

49
was her classmate. She then went down while accused-appellant stayed on to fix the
things in the attic. Not long afterwards, his daughter Divine informed him that they had
some visitors downstairs. On his way down from the attic, he looked out of the window
and saw Jeannie Ann walking beyond the bridge. 40

Accused-appellant went down to meet the visitors who were looking for Rogel, one of
their boarders. After leading these visitors to Rogel, two policemen arrived in their house
with Jeannie Ann. Accused-appellant identified the policemen as SPO2 Leonardo Cruz
Bravo and SPO2 Melchor Ong. The former asked for accused-appellant's name and
thereafter invited him to the police station. He freely went with them, without asking the
purpose of the invitation.41

At the station, SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo interviewed accused-appellant. The interview
was reduced to writing and he was asked to sign the same. He did not read the
document, as he did not have his eyeglasses with him at that time. At first, accused-
appellant refused to sign the document without the presence of his counsel. SPO2
Leonardo Cruz Bravo, however, told him that his refusal to sign the document may be
interpreted as a sign of resistance on his part. Accused-appellant thereafter decided to
sign the document.42

Accused-appellant admitted that he transferred to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in

Tarlac, Tarlac because he was dismissed from the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City. He
acknowledged that while teaching in Saint Louis Center, a student named Freda Miguel
filed a case43 against him because accused-appellant allegedly embraced her (Miguel) in
the Science Laboratory Room of the school, and that he signed an amicable settlement
of the complaint. However, he denied the truth of that complaint against him and said that
the filing thereof was not the cause of his dismissal from Saint Louis Center. 44

He also admitted that the letters from Emily and Maureen addressed to him were his but
insisted that they were only his friends, and that Emily's reference to him as her boyfriend
in one of her letters45 was only a joke.

Accused-appellant claimed that his wife and Jeannie Ann conspired to file the cases
against him because they had resentments against him. He said Jeannie Ann blamed
him for having caused her breakup with her boyfriend Charles. His wife, on the other
hand, wanted him out of her life because she had a paramour. According to him, his wife
admitted to him that she had an illicit relationship with a man named Alfredo dela Cruz, a
namesake of his brother. His wife had a second relationship with a person named Alfredo
Aquino against whom he filed a case before the barangay. 46

Camilo Estepa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, told the trial
court that sometime in 1993, accused-appellant filed a case for malicious mischief
against a certain Alfredo or Federico Aquino, a boarder in the house of Mrs. Aqui, the
mother of Mrs. dela Cruz. Accused-appellant alleged that Aquino was courting his wife.
However, the case was settled amicably when Aquino agreed to leave the boarding
house of Mrs. Aqui.47

Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1994 to
1998, testified that he had known accused-appellant since 1994 and was not aware of
any untoward incident involving the latter. He said that accused-appellant and his son
Daniel would go home to his family in Baguio City every weekend and returned to Tarlac
either on Sunday evening or Monday morning. He would come to school on time and
attended the flag ceremony regularly. Fr. Veloso said that none of the lady teachers ever
complained about accused-appellant.48

50
Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco Elementary School in Trancoville,
Baguio City, testified that accused-appellant was a very competent teacher in Science
and had a very good relationship with the other teachers. He said he regretted that
accused-appellant left his teaching job at the Don Bosco Elementary School after only
one year.49

On August 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela
Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape
(committed in September 1990) as charged in the Information defined
and penalized under paragraph No. 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code (Statutory Rape) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the offended party, Jeannie Ann dela
Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be

credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence
in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela
Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of incest
rape (committed in July 1995) as charged in the Information defined and
penalized under Section 11 of Republic Act 7659 (Heinous Crime Law)
which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death to be implemented
in accordance with law; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela
Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

3. In Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela
Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Acts of
Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code instead of violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law) as
charged in the Information and hereby sentences him, applying the
indeterminate sentence law, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from two (2) months and one (1) day of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to two
(2) years four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
Maximum; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the
sum of P5,000 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be

credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence
in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Law.

SO ORDERED.50

In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of Jeannie Ann and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of rape and acts of lasciviousness. He alleges that Jeannie Ann's testimony was
fabricated and inconsistent.51

51
Accused-appellant points out that Jeannie Ann failed to immediately notify the authorities,
or at least her mother, of her harrowing experience. Notwithstanding the fact that he was
often away from their home because he stayed in Tarlac where he worked on weekdays,
and Jeannie Ann was with her mother in Baguio City, it took her eleven years to disclose
the sexual abuses which accused-appellant allegedly committed against her. 52 Moreover,
he claims that considering Jeannie Ann's tender age at the time he allegedly raped her,
she must have suffered great pain and should have complained about it to her mother or
told the latter what accused-appellant had been doing to her. Accused-appellant argues
that the delay in the reporting of the sexual acts he performed on his daughter is not
normal and is indicative of the untruthfulness of complainant's charges. 53

The Court finds that the trial court did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping his daughter Jeannie Ann in September 1990 and July 1995.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defined the crime of Rape prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (the Anti-Rape Law of 1997), and which is the
applicable law for the rape incidents of September 1990 and July 1995, states:

When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal

knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx

In reviewing the cases at bar, the Court observed the following guidelines it had
previously formulated for the review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility, but it is difficult to prove, and even more difficult for the accused to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 54

In rape cases, the issue invariably boils down to the credibility of the victim's testimony.
The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the victim's statements is accorded great
weight because it has the unique opportunity of hearing the witnesses testify and
observing their deportment and manner of testifying. The trial court judge is indisputably
in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the complainant's testimony. Thus,
unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of the
case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal. 55

The Court has adhered to the rule that when the testimony of a woman who states under
oath that she has been raped meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
on the basis of such testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and who remains consistent, is a
credible witness.56

52
In the cases at bar, the trial court found Jeannie Ann's testimony to be "natural, coherent
and touching as she recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of her father," 57 as
follows:

xxx

q         Now, sometime in the month of July, 1995, Madame Witness, do

you remember if there was anything unusual which took place again in
your house at Sumulong St., Baguio City?

a         There was, sir.

q         What was that incident?

[a]         On that night I was watching TV with my brothers and sisters.

While I was watching TV my father was calling me but I did not heed his
call because I said I was watching TV. So, three times he called me and I
know that he was already angry. Then he went near me and pulled me
into the other room. And in that other room, he did bad things that I
cannot imagine.

q         Now, you said that you and your brothers and sisters were
watching TV on that night of July, 1995. Where was your mother at that
time?

a         She was not in the house at that time because she attended a
meeting in our church.

COURT: (to witness)

q         That is why we already excluded the public. Don't let the Court
speculate. Will you tell us straight. What did your father actually do which
you said (sic) he did things which you cannot imagine?

a         When we were in the room he let me sit on the bed. And he asked
me to lie down. And he said, "This is only for a while". And after that he
put down my pants and my underwear. Then he undressed, lowered his
pants and removed his brief. Then he started touching my vabina (sic).

COURT:

Continue from there. Make it of record that at this point

the witness is crying.

PROS. CENTENO:

q         Now after your father had removed your pants and your underwear
as you said, and he also removed his pants and his brief and started
holding your vagina, what else happened?

a         He fingered my vagina and also mashed mybreasts (sic). And with

his tongue he licked my vagina. After that he used his penis and rubbed it
into my vagina. And he played with my vagina.

q         What did you do when your father was doing that to you?

53
a         I was just crying, sir.

q         Did you not fight back?

a         No sir, because I was afraid of my father.

q         Why are you afraid of your father?

a         Because when I was still young, one time he told me that either I
will be killed or our family will be killed.

q         On what occasion was that when your father old (sic) you that it is
either you or the family that will be killed?

a         I cannot remember, sir. But that was when I was still young.

q         Now, aside from rubbing his penis to your vagina, what else did
your father do?

a         When he was rubbing his penis against my vagina there was a

white liquid that came out. And when that white liquid came out he placed
his penis on my stomach where the white liquid was placed.

COURT: (to witness)

q         Will you tell us what you mean by his rubbing his penis to your
vagina? What was being done actually?

a         I felt that half of the head of his penis was inside my vagina. That
is what I felt. (At this point the witness again broke into tears)

COURT:

Continue.

PROS. CENTENO:

q         Now, when you felt that as you said half of the penis of your father
was inside your vagina, what did you do?

a         None, sir.

q         Why did you not do anything?

a         Because I didn't know what to do, sir.

q         Did you not try to fight your father?

a         No, sir, because I am really afraid of my father. Because when he

gets mad at my mother, my brothers and sisters would be involved.

q         Now, before July 1995, Madame Witness, particularly in

September of 1990, several months after the earthquake of July 16, 1990,
will you tell us where you were residing?

54
a         We were residing then at No. 37 Leonard Wood Road, sir.

q         How old were you?

a         I was 11 years old.

xxx

q         When you were staying at Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City,

together with your father, your mother, your sister and your brothers in
September of 1990, do you remember if there was any unusual incident
which happened to you?

a         Yes, sir.

q         What was that incident?

a         I was with my father and brother Niño at the sala. And at the sala
he undressed me and did the same. He removed his pants. Then he took
a cushion from the sala and asked me to lie down. And there he played
with my vagina. Then he rubbed his penis against my vagina. Niño was
still a baby at that time.

q         Where was your mother at that time?

a         My mother was not in the house at that time. What I know is that
she went to the market.

q         How about you sister Divine?

a         She was with my mother, sir.

COURT: (to witness)

q         Again, in this incident will you describe actually to us the motions

that took place with the rubbing of his penis into your vagina?

a         It is like this, sir. For example this is my vagina (witness showing

her left hand, palms up) and this is his penis (witness demonstrating with
her right forefinger), he made a push and pull movement on my vagina.

PROS. CENTENO:

q         What did you feel while your father was doing that to you which
you term as "rubbing his penis into your vagina"?

a         I felt pain, sir.

PROS. CENTENO:

May we put the word "mahapdi" which was the term used
by the witness, in the record.

(to witness)

55
 q         How long did your father rub his penis into your vagina?

a         It was for quite a long time until a white liquid came out.

q         Did you not fight back when your father did that to you?

a         No, sir.

q         Why did you not fight back?

a         Because I thought that what he was doing to me was a normal act.

xxx58

The trial court judge saw "from the face of the victim the anguish and the pain and the
shame and the embarrassment as she broke down and cried several times in the course
of her testimony every time she was asked [about] the despicable acts of her father." 59

Moreover, no woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse, allow an examination of

her private parts and endure the humiliation of a public trial where she would be forced to
recount the details of her unfortunate experience had she not really been raped. This is
especially true in cases of incestuous rape, as in these cases where Jeannie Ann
accused her own father of abusing her, since reverence and respect for one's parents
and other elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children. 60

The delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily impair the credibility of the
victim where the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of
bodily harm, especially when made by a person who exercised moral ascendancy over
the victim. It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for sometime the assault on her
virtue because of the rapist's threat on her life, or on the life of the other members of her
family.61

In the cases at bar, Jeannie Ann repeatedly explained that accused-appellant threatened
to hurt her, her mother or her siblings if she did not give in to his desires. 62 Her fear of
what accused-appellant would do to her, her mother and siblings if she revealed his evil
deeds was what compelled her to suffer in silence for a long time. In People v.
Nicolas,63 the Court stated:

The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape

to intimidate his victim into submission, is evident in virtually all cases that
have reached this Court. It is through this fear that the perpetrator hopes
to create a climax of extreme psychological terror which would, he hopes,
numb his victim into silence and force her to submit to repeated acts of
rape over a period of time. The relationship of the victim and the
perpetrator magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person
normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. 64

On the other hand, the trial court found accused-appellant to be evasive in his narration
of his story. All that he offered in his defense were his bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is
an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony
of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. A mere denial
constitutes negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than
the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. 65

56
Accused-appellant's assertion that his daughter made up the charges against him to get
back at him for causing her breakup with her boyfriend Charles is likewise unbelievable.
It is not likely that a complainant in a rape case would fabricate a story of defloration
against her own father and put to shame not only herself but her whole family as well,
unless it was the plain truth and her motive was purely to obtain justice. 66 Neither does
the Court believe accused-appellant's claim that his wife urged their daughter to file rape
charges against him because she (his wife) wanted to get him out of the way of her extra-
marital relationship. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of
malice, especially if it will subject them to embarrassment and even stigma. 67 No mother
would have the courage to expose an ignominious act of her husband that could lead to a
breakup of the family unless she was prompted by a desire to obtain justice for her
daughter.68

The trial court committed no error in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for the rape he committed in September 1990, since the offense was
committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law). 69

However, the Court finds that the lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of
death upon him for the rape committed in July 1995. R.A. No. 7659, which was already in
force at that time, requires that the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender must concur for the death penalty to be imposable. Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 provides:

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances.

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx

The Court has previously explained that the circumstances of minority and relationship
are considered as special qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the
crime of rape and thus warrant the imposition of the death penalty. These circumstances
must be alleged in the information and established during trial for the court to be able to
impose the death penalty.70 It was, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to
satisfactorily prove both circumstances of minority and relationship.

In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the father-daughter relationship was alleged in the
information and proven in the course of the trial. However, Jeannie Ann's minority,
although likewise alleged in the information, was not sufficiently proved. All that was
offered to establish her age was her bare testimony that she was born on April 18, 1979.
The prosecution failed to present her birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, other
documentary evidence such as her baptismal certificate, school records which would
have aided the court in verifying her claim that she was a minor when she was raped by
accused-appellant in July 1995.

In the absence of adequate proof of Jeannie Ann's minority, the penalty imposable for the
offense in Criminal Case No. 15164-R is reclusion perpetua. 71

The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of
lasciviousness under the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges

57
accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness."72

It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an
offense. The information does not cite which among the numerous sections or
subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant. 73 Moreover, it
does not state the acts and omissions constituting the offense, or any special or
aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of criminal
procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:

Designation of the offense. -The complaint or information shall state the

designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts
constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not
facts.74 The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being violative
of the accused-appellant's constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. 75

Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both the trial court and this
Court regarding the defects of the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court
may motu proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its ruling in Suy Sui
vs. People,76 because the information is a patent violation of the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of the basic
principles of due process. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review, and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as
might be found in the appealed decision, whether these errors are assigned or not.

It is likewise necessary to increase the award of damages by the trial court. The lower
court in its decision ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) only in each of the cases, representing
moral damages. It failed to award the prescribed amounts for civil indemnity, the award of
which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. 77 This civil liability ex delicto is
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. 78 It is not to be confused with
moral damages, which is awarded upon a showing that the victim endured physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. 79Under prevailing
jurisprudence, when the penalty imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua, the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) should be awarded as civil indemnity to
the rape victim.80 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, an award of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for each count of rape is proper.

In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages are automatically granted to the victim in
rape cases without need of proof for it is assumed that the private complainant has
sustained mental, physical and psychological suffering. 81 The Court affirms the award by
the trial court of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages in Criminal Cases
Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, since said amounts are in accord with its current rulings. 82

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6 in

Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:

58
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amounts of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.

3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is declared null and void for being
violative of the accused-appellant's constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the case against him is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. 142740            August 6, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO TAMPOS Y AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision 1 dated January 3, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 42,631-99. Appellant ROBERTO TAMPOS Y
AGUSTIN was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Appellant was charged in an information 2 containing the following allegations:

The undersigned, at the instance of the offended party HAPPYLEN ORTEGA Y RIOS,
whose affidavit hereto attached and form part of this Information accuses the above-
named accused of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE, under Art. 335, Par. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610 and R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313 it being a
heinous offense, committed as follows:

That on or about February 18, 1999, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal

59
knowledge with the complainant HAPPYLEN ORTEGA Y RIOS, who is six (6) years old,
against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Assisted by counsel on arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the
trial, the prosecution presented five witnesses, namely private complainant Happylen
Ortega, her mother Lady Lewin Ortega, security guard George Amigable, Ms. Benaranda
V. Orosco, and Dr. Samuel Cruz.

Complainant HAPPYLEN3 ORTEGA testified4 that on February 18, 1999, while on her

way to the house of an Uncle George, she noticed appellant Roberto Tampos staring at
her. She knew Tampos and even knew where he lived. 5 Appellant suddenly pulled her by
the right wrist and, using his two hands, lifted and carried her. Appellant brought her to an
unlighted area at the back of Almendras Gym where a junked ambulance 6 was parked.
Appellant then forced complainant to lie on the plywood flooring and proceeded to
remove her short pants. She was not wearing any panty at that time. Appellant then
removed his own short pants and brief. It was then that she was raped. 7 While placing
himself on top of Happylen, appellant's erect penis was placed in her vagina.
Complainant illustrated this by thrusting her right forefinger towards a circle formed by the
fingers of her other hand.8

According to Happylen, appellant covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. He
warned her not to tell her parents about what he did, otherwise, appellant would kill
her.9 Appellant then stood up to urinate and it was then that the guard on duty at the
Almendras gym apprehended him. At first, Happylen did not tell her mother about what
happened but eventually had to since her Auntie Betty and two of the latter's children
saw her and they had already related the incident to her mother. Her mother
accompanied her to the police where she executed an affidavit detailing what had
happened. They also went to the doctor where Happylen submitted herself to a medical
examination.

During cross-examination, complainant testified that appellant's penis did not penetrate
her organ.10 On re-direct, however, she said that there was actual contact of the penis
and her vagina.11 When asked to point to the part of her body that was touched by the
penis, complainant pointed to a part a little above the vagina.

On query by the court, however, Happylen clarified that appellant's organ did not "pass"
her vagina but only its lower portion. She stated that it was "not on the middle but on the
lower portion" or on the lower tip of the vagina. 12

GEORGE AMIGABLE13 was the security guard on duty at the Almendras Gym when the
incident occurred. He testified that on February 18, 1999, at past 7:00 p.m., while he was
roving around the compound of Almendras Gym, two women reported to him that a child
was being raped in the junked ambulance. He rushed to said place and found appellant
and complainant both standing up. The witness saw appellant putting his shirt on. 14 He
then asked the appellant and the child their names which they promptly gave him. The
girl appeared to be normal but then she cried when she told him that appellant had raped
her.15 He held appellant at once, to prevent him from running away. The other security
guard on duty assisted him. He turned over custody of appellant to PO3 Romeo
Autor,16 a policeman living nearby. Thereafter, the girl's parents arrived.

Complainant's mother, LADY LEWIN17 ORTEGA18 testified that her daughter was only six
years and nine months at the time of the incident. She presented Happylen's Birth
Certificate,19 indicating that the child was born on July 4, 1992. Mrs. Ortega knew
appellant because he had been a neighbor for three months. 20 The children in the area

60
were likewise familiar with appellant since he used to hang out in the vicinity of the
chapel where the children usually played.21

A witness told Mrs. Ortega about the rape. Later on, Happylen also told her about
it.22 The child was crying while relating to her what she suffered at the hands of
appellant.23 Mrs. Ortega then assisted her daughter in filing a complaint with the police
and accompanied her to the doctor for physical examination.

BENARANDA24 V. OROSCO25 also testified for the prosecution. On the date and time in
question, she was asked by one Beatriz 26 Danuco to accompany the latter to the
Almendras Gym. Betty said her son Marvin told her there was a little girl at the gym and a
man was doing something bad to her. 27 Upon reaching the back of the gym, and from a
distance of about 4-5 meters, they saw appellant Roberto Tampos. The witness
demonstrated how appellant was bending up and down. 28 She did not actually see the
child at that time because it was dark. 29 Thereafter, a security guard arrived and she went
home. When she returned to the gym, appellant was already being held by the security
guard and surrounded by many people. It was only then that she saw Happylen.

Dr. SAMUEL CRUZ30 testified that he conducted the physical/medical examination of

complainant on February 19, 1999 or a day after the incident. His findings were reduced
to writing as follows:

GENITAL EXAMINATION

Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping. Fourchette, tense. Vestibule,
pinkish, smooth. Hymen, thick, tall, intact. Hymenal orifice, annular, 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Vaginal walls and rugosities, can't be reached by examining finger.

CONCLUSIONS:

1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the
time of examination.

2.) Hymen, intact and its orifice, small as to preclude complete penetration by an
average-sized male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.

REMARKS: Semenology: Positive for Spermatozoa31

According to Dr. Cruz, his findings indicated that no male organ had penetrated the
child's vagina, otherwise, hymenal lacerations would have been present. 32 However, he
stated that this would not negate the possibility of partial penetration or of contact
between the penis and the vagina. Further, Dr. Cruz testified that he took a sample from
the opening of the vagina by dabbing a cotton swab therein. Upon laboratory
examination33 of the sample conducted by a medical technologist, it was found to be
positive for spermatozoa.

The lone testimony of the appellant was presented in his defense.

ROBERTO TAMPOS34 testified that he did not know complainant's name, but he

recognized her only by face. He admitted that he was with complainant at around 6:00 to
7:00 p.m. of February 18, 1999.35 He saw her playing on the road leading to the back of
Almendras Gym at around 6:00 p.m., while he was on his way to the house of his
foreman.36 He said he was a bit drunk at the time. 37 He brought her to the back of
Almendras Gym, made her sit on a plywood near the junk vehicle and gave her
P1.00.38 People were passing by at the time. He placed the girl on his lap and in the

61
process touched her side. He admitted that he intended to touch the girl and then
masturbate, which was what actually happened. He slipped his penis out at the side of
his brief and shorts. Appellant denied removing Happylen's shorts but said he only
lowered them.39 He then saw the girl's vagina but denied that he ever touched it. He did
not place himself on top of the girl when he masturbated. He only knelt beside her while
Happylen lay on the plywood. He touched the girl's thigh but not her private parts. As he
was ejaculating, he actually touched Happylen's hips. He directed his semen above the
hips of the girl.40 Nothing more happened after that. He then left the girl behind and went
home. However, he was immediately apprehended by the security guard of Almendras
Gym, brought to the guard's office, and taken to the barangay captain.

After trial, the RTC rendered its assailed decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient to prove the
guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused ROBERTO
TAMPOS is sentenced to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to Lady Lewin Ortega, another
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity together with all accessory penalties as provided
for by law. (PP vs. Romeo Ambray y Luterio GR 127177 promulgated on February 25,
1999; PP vs. Melanio Bolatete y Melon GR 127570 promulgated on February 25, 1999).

SO ORDERED.41

Aggrieved, appellant interposed the present appeal, with the following assignment of
errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE NOTWITHSTANDING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE CHILD HERSELF THAT THE ACCUSED PENIS (sic) DID NOT
GO INSIDE HER VAGINA BUT MERELY ON HER NAVEL, ABOVE HER VAGINA AND
THE LOWER PORTION OF HER VAGINA.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT HE MERELY MASTURBATED AND THIS FACT IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE MEDICAL FINDINGS ON THE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE GIRL RIGHT AFTER THE INCIDENT AS WELL AS TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
OTHER WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.42

More specifically, the issues are: (1) whether appellant had "carnal knowledge" of
complainant; and (2) whether the penalty imposed on appellant is appropriate.

Appellant is charged of STATUTORY RAPE under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the

Revised Penal Code. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. 43 Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code is now in Article 266-A, par. 1-d, in view of the
amendments introduced by R.A. 8353. Statutory rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under par. d, "when the offended party is under 12 years of age."

In this case, the victim's age is undisputed. She is below 12 years old. Her Birth
Certificate shows that she was born on July 4, 1992. Thus, on February 18, 1999,
Happylen was exactly six (6) years, seven (7) months and fourteen (14) days old. Her

62
mother confirmed this in open court. Hence, the issue is whether there is sufficient
evidence to prove carnal knowledge between appellant and Happylen beyond
reasonable doubt.

Appellant submits that, assuming arguendo that Happylen's testimony were true, he

could not be convicted of rape but only acts of lasciviousness. He insists that there was
no penetration of the vagina. He points out that the medical findings show that the hymen
was intact and, had there been penetration, hymenal lacerations would have been
present. Appellant contends that the acts described do not constitute "carnal knowledge"
as the essential element of rape. He sticks to his claim that he merely masturbated. He
adds that he only held on to the hips of complainant at that time, without touching her
private parts.

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General argues for the affirmation of the trial
court's judgment finding appellant guilty of rape. However, the OSG recommends that the
penalty of death be imposed on appellant instead of reclusion perpetua only.

Considering the evidence on record, we are one with the trial court in giving credence to
the testimonies of the complainant and the other prosecution witnesses. The trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect on appeal, for it had
the opportunity to closely observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand.44 The trial court found that "the complainant acted without malice in
reporting the alleged abuses of accused on her person." In contrast, according to the trial
court, appellant's "unsubstantiated and self-serving" denial could not hold up against the
"positive declaration and frank manner" by which the victim recounted her ordeal. 45 A
careful scrutiny of the records leads us to the same conclusion, that the prosecution
witnesses and their testimonies are logical and more credible than that of the defense.
We have no hesitation in rejecting the testimony of the appellant for being less than
candid and truthful.

Instructive is complainant's testimony, which we find worth excerpting, to detail what

appellant did to her:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

x  x  x

Q:         Now, Hapilyn Ortega, tell the court, how did he rape you?

A:         He placed his organ to me. (witness demonstrating her right forefinger thrusting it
towards the circle of her other finger as if penetrating inside).

Q:         What was the position of the accused when he inserted his penis to your private
part?

A:         His penis erected.

Q:         Precisely, was he on top of you at that time?

A:         Yes, sir.

x  x  x

63
Q:         Going back to the testimony, that his penis (sic) the accused inserted his penis to
your vagina, in the course of sexual contact made to you by the accused, what did you
feel if any, coming from the penis of the accused?

A:         I cried.

Q:         The question is what did you observe if any, coming from the penis of the
accused?

A:         None.

x  x  x

CROSS EXAMINATION

Q:         You testified that earlier, that you were raped by the accused by placing his
organ to your organ, is that correct?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Was the penis of the accused able to penetrate your organ?

A:         No, sir.

Q:         Now, when he (sic) accused removed your shortpants, what did the accused do
with is penis?

A:         He let it out.

Q:         Did he hold his penis? Did he push and pull it with his hands?

A:         No.

x  x  x

RE-DIRECT

Q:         Hapilyn Ortega, you said the organ of the accused did not penetrate your organ,
do you mean to say that there was an actual contact of the penis in your vagina?

A:         Yes, sir.

x  x  x

RE-CROSS

Q:         Can you point out to this court, what portion is that which was touched by the
penis of the accused?

A:         (witness pointing to her vagina).

x  x  x

COURT:

64
Q:         Hapilyn Ortega, you testified before, you are pointing in your finger like this, is
that correct?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         You are referring to the one of your finger like this, as the organ of the accused?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And the one you are forming in your finger a ring symbolizes your vagina?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Now, when the accused raped you, is it that his organ passes to your vagina?

A:         No.

Q:         Where is that part in your vagina here in your circle that the penis of the accused
was pointed?

A:         To the lower portion.

Q:         It did not go inside here?

A:         Yes, not on the middle but on the lower portion.

Q:         Where in this vagina where the penis of accused penetrated?

A:         Lower portion.

Q:         Only on the lower tip of the vagina?

A:         Yes sir.46

From the foregoing, we resolve the crucial issue: Did the acts described above constitute
the essential requisite of "carnal knowledge" in a case of rape?

In People v. Lerio,47 we stated:

In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, 'carnal knowledge,' unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured (6 WORDS AND PHRASES 273 citing Walker
v. State, 273 S.W. 2d 707, 711, 197 Tenn. 452). The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female
organ (People vs. Cabebe, G.R. No. 125910, May 21, 1998) or, as once so said in a
case, by the 'mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating
the sexual act.' (People v. De la Peña, 233 SCRA 573 cited in People v. Castromero, 280
SCRA 421.)

Appellant's counsel, in his brief, admits that the foregoing testimony of Happylen "clearly
demonstrated that appellant's penis, indeed, touched the victim's vagina." 48 However, he
contends that, much like the case of People v. Campuhan,49 the touching was merely an
epidermal contact or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victim's vagina or the mons pubis. To bolster defense counsel's claim that there was no

65
penetration, he cites the result of the medical examination that shows no extragenital
injury and no hymenal lacerations.

Complainant herself testified that there was no penetration of her organ. However, she
indicated at least two areas where the penis of the appellant touched her vagina: (1) the
one she pointed to above her vagina; and (2) the lower portion or lower tip of the vagina.
But even if we consider only the second spot, the lower portion or tip of her vagina, which
she categorically indicated during counsels' examination and upon inquiry by the court, in
our view, sexual contact has been indubitably established. That appellant's penis only
touched the lower tip of the victim's vagina without any resulting external genital injury or
laceration of the hymen would not preclude a finding of rape.

In several cases, we have held that rupture of the hymen or vaginal lacerations are not
necessary for rape to be consummated. 50 An intact hymen does not negate a finding that
the victim was raped. To commit the crime of rape the rupture of the hymen is not
indispensable.51

Significantly, in a number of cases 52 we held that "where penetration was not fully
established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that the rape was nevertheless
committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of
discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia majora was already gaping with
redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible." 53

Thus, contrary to appellant's assertion, we are convinced that appellant's penis came in
contact with complainant's vagina in a way much more intense than mere epidermal
contact or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis which the defense wants us to accept.
The victim felt pain in her sexual organ; 54 the doctor found both the labia
majora and minora to be "gaping."55 These, in our view, are external indicia of "carnal
knowledge."

As we stated in People v. Ayo:56

While it may be granted that penetration may not have been accomplished as the girl's
hymen was shown to have remained intact and the orifice too small to preclude full
penetration, jurisprudence recognizes that slight penetration of the labia by the male
organ still constitutes rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within
the labia of the pudendum. Absence of hymenal laceration does not disprove sexual
abuse especially when the victim is of tender age. Mere touching, no matter how slight, of
the labia or lips of the female organ by the male genital, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is sufficient to consummate rape.

The presence of appellant's spermatozoa in her genitalia, established by medical

evidence, adds to the credibility of the prosecution's stance that carnal knowledge did
take place.

Jurisprudence requires that, to be considered consummated rape, an erect penis capable

of penetration57 must have touched, at the very least, the area of the labia of the
pudendum. In the present case, Happylen testified that contact was made "on the lower
tip" of her vagina. A six-year- old girl might have difficulty pinpointing which part of her
vagina was actually touched. But Happylen had no such difficulty. Clearly, there was
sexual contact, for spermatozoa was found present in her vagina. The trial court is
convinced as we are that the "lower tip" of her vagina testified to by complainant as the
point touched by appellant's organ is the vaginal opening or the area between the labia
through which the semen (spermatozoa) traveled and therein found the following day
when the gynecological examination was performed.

66
Now, as to the imposable penalty in this case. The OSG contends that the trial court
erred in imposing on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The OSG argues that
the offense committed is the heinous offense of child-rape, where the victim is less than
seven years old. Hence, the OSG recommends that the penalty should be death.

At the outset, we find that the appellant is being charged of STATUTORY RAPE as
defined in Art. 335, Paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This provision
reads:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. 58

The phrase "under twelve years of age" makes the offense STATUTORY RAPE as well
understood in our jurisdiction. It is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible
penalty, under Art. 266-B, RPC, now. In our view, the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the charges against him would be violated if, as the OSG argues, we
should convict him on the basis of a provision of law, R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, which imposes death. True, the information mentions confusedly Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, "in relation to R.A. 7610, R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313, it being a
heinous offense." Note that the information does not mention R.A. 8353. The visible
emphasis of the present charge, clearly, is on STATUTORY RAPE, which the Prosecutor
spelled in capital letters.

The Information first and foremost refers to the crime of rape defined in Paragraph 3 of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, now Article 266-A, where the "woman is under
twelve years of age," which is statutory rape. It is this specific provision of the Code,
favorable in this context to the appellant that we should apply. To convict an accused of a
higher or more serious offense than that specifically charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried would be an outright violation of his basic rights. 59 It is
well settled that an accused may only be convicted of a crime charged against him in the
information or those necessarily included therein. 60 The information herein charging
STATUTORY RAPE could not be validly converted to a charge of CHILD-RAPE. The
latter charge constitutes a greater offense punishable by death, quite distinct from
statutory rape. Having been specifically arraigned on the charge of STATUTORY RAPE,
appellant could not after trial be held to answer for child-rape. To do so would raise
infractions of due process and other guarantees in favor of appellant, particularly his right
to be informed, and not misinformed, of the offense charged.

Moreover, the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once
carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. 61 The OSG's prayer to increase
appellant's culpability to a capital offense cannot, in our view, be granted now without
also fracturing our present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. For now, in Rule 110
made effective on December 1, 2000,62 we find strict requirements for the State
Prosecutor to observe faithfully, thus:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting

67
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

The prosecution must avoid ambiguity, vagueness or uncertainty as to what offense is

being charged. The allegation in the information states that the appellant is being
charged with "the crime of STATUTORY RAPE, under Art. 335, Par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code." Mention of its "relation to R.A. 7610, R.A. 7659 and R.A. 8313 it being a
heinous offense..." need not confuse us. It should not now appear that alternative
offenses are charged, which could void the information. To forestall that eventuality, the
charge should be read as referring to statutory rape and no other kind. Given that charge,
we agree with the trial court's imposition of reclusion perpetua as the appropriate penalty
on appellant. Prudence counsels us to avoid pronouncing a sentence of death where law
and the evidence do not clearly and indubitably call for it.

As to damages, civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000
are also properly awarded in favor of private complainant, on the ground that victims of
rape suffer psychological and moral injuries sufficient to justify the award, without
necessity of further proof.63

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
17, is AFFIRMED. Appellant ROBERTO TAMPOS Y AGUSTIN is declared GUILTY of
statutory rape, and he is sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all its accessory
penalties. The appellant is likewise ordered to pay private complainant, Happylen Ortega,
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages, together with the costs.

SO ORDERED.

8. G.R. No. 129299.   November 15, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO OLING

MADRAGA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

68
 Before the Court, for its automatic review, is the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Isabela, Basilan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 2511-599, which has found
herein accused-appellant, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against his 16-year old daughter.  The death sentence having
been decreed by the trial court, the records of the case have, accordingly, been elevated
to this Court.
Rodolfo Oling Madraga was charged with two (2) counts of rape committed against
his own 16-year old daughter, Fe C. Madraga.  One was committed on May 19, 1995
(Crim. Case No. 2511-599), and the other one on August 24, 1996 (Crim. Case No.
2515-602).[2]
At the arraignment on November 4, 1996, accused-appellant, with the assistance of
Atty. Antonio D. Banico, entered separate pleas of not guilty for each case.  Thereafter,
the trial proper of the cases was set to November 18, 19, and 20, 1996. [3]
On November 18, 1996, Atty. Banico, counsel for the accused, moved that they be
given time up to December to talk with complainant’s mother so that the accused will
plead guilty to the first case, but will seek for the dismissal of the second case.   The
complainant’s mother, who was in Court, manifested that she does not agree to the
proposition.  Trial of the cases was re-set to December 2, 3 & 4, 1996. [4]
On December 2, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested that the accused was
willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crime of rape, which was committed in the month of
May, 1995, provided that the other case be tried on another date.
Thus, accused pleaded guilty in Criminal Case No. 2511-599 upon the following
complaint:

“The undersigned complainant, a minor of sixteen (16) years of age, under oath, accuses
her father, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

“That sometime in the month of May, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, viz., at Barrio Militar, Barangay Menzi, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above-named accused who was under the influence of liquor, entered
the room of the undersigned complainant, who was then sleeping, and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously remove the short
pant (sic) and panty of the undersigned complainant, lay on top of her and insert his
penis inside her vagina, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant, against her will.

“Contrary to law.”[5]

Thereafter, the prosecution presented its evidence which consisted of the private
complainant’s testimony and the medical certificate issued by Dr. Nilo Barandino.
Private complainant’s testimony revealed that:

“Fe Madraga, 16 years old, is the daughter of Rodolfo Madraga, a tricycle driver (TSN,
December 2, 1996, pp. 4-5).  Her mother, Flordelina Madraga, was in Sabah, Malaysia,
working as a domestic helper.

“When her mother left for Malaysia, Fe and her brothers and sisters stayed with their
grandfather, Luis Cotamco Sr., at Calle Bisaya (Ibid., p. 5).  On the other hand, Rodolfo
Madraga remained at the family residence at Barrio Militar, Menzi, Isabela, Basilan
Province (Ibid, p. 6).

“Sometime in January 1995, Rodolfo Madraga took his children from their grandfather
and forced them to stay with him at the family residence (Ibid, pp. 6 & 7).

69
“Sometime in May 1995, at 12:00 midnight, Rodolfo Madraga sexually abused her (sic)
16-year old daughter, Fe Madraga, in one of the rooms of the family residence.  (Ibid, pp.
7-8)

“On the third night after the rape, Rodolfo Madraga repeated his bestial act toward her
(sic) own daughter and did it every night thereafter (Ibid, p. 9).

“On August 24, 1996, Flordelina Madraga arrived from Malaysia (Ibid, p. 10).  The
presence of her mother gave Fe Madraga enough courage to report to her the sexual
abuses committed against her by her father (Ibid).

“Fe Madraga was brought to the doctor, and her medical examination confirmed that she
was sexually molested (Ibid;  Exhibits  A, A-1, A-2 and B).

“Fe Madraga, reported the matter to the police authorities (Ibid, p. 13).” [6]

On December 10, 1996, the trial court rendered its Decision, [7] the dispositive portion
of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused, RODOLFO OLING
MADRAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of committing the said crime of RAPE
against his own daughter, who is only more than 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense.  And hereby sentences said accused to suffer the extreme
penalty of DEATH.

“The plea of guilty of the accused being offset by his being drunk during the commission
of the crime, which according to the complainant, her father is not a habitual drinker,
cannot be taken into consideration in his favor.

“The penalty imposable for the crime of Rape especially if it is committed by the accused
against his children is really harsh.  In fact this Presiding Judge was a little bit reluctant to
impose that extreme penalty of death upon the accused, but since it is the mandate of
the law, then the Court when the evidence warrant must have to obey its command.  And
besides, the Court cannot cleanse its conscience if the perpetrator of the crime of rape
committed against his own blood would be able to escape the punitive sanction of the
law.

“And as this Court had repeatedly pronounced over and over again, under no
circumstance, shall a father use his own daughter as a vehicle to satisfy his bestial
instinct for it is his moral and legal responsibility to take care, to nourish, and to educate
his children to become useful citizens of this country.  But since the accused herein had
chosen to place the honor and the dignity of her (sic) daughter into shame, into disgrace,
and into ill-repute, then the heavy burden of the law that catches upon him cannot show
him any mercy.

“With respect to Criminal Case No. 2515-602, for the same offense of Rape committed
by the same accused, against the same complainant, the hearing thereof is hereby set to
the January calendar of this Court.

“SO ORDERED.”

Two Appellant’s Brief were filed with this Court -- one filed by the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti Death Penalty Task Force, and another one filed by
Public Attorney Antonio D. Banico, appellant’s counsel, before the court a quo.

70
 The Appellant’s Brief filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), submits the
following assignment of errors:
I

Accused-appellant was denied due process.

II

The plea of guilt of accused-appellant is null and void as the trial court violated Section 3,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

On the first assigned error, appellant contends that he was illegally arrested,
because there was no warrant of arrest issued for his arrest.  Worse, appellant avers, his
right to preliminary investigation was not observed, although there is no showing that he
waived his right thereto.  Appellant further alleges that there was irregularity in the filing
of the information in that a criminal complaint was filed on September 10,
1996.  However, in the Order of the Court dated October 7, 1996, it mentioned an
information not attached to the records of the case.  The trial court directed the
prosecution to submit the resolution which became the basis for the filing of the alleged
information.  A resolution dated October 8, 1996 was submitted by the prosecution on
October 17, 1996 in compliance with the Order dated October 7, 1996.  The resolution
was issued only on October 8, 1996, hence, appellant concludes that the same could not
have been the basis for the alleged information (assuming such information exists) which
was obviously filed earlier.[8]
The contentions have no merit.
In the recent case of People vs. Galleno, [9] this Court held that an accused, as in this
case, is estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest if he fails to
move for the quashing of the information before the trial court, or if he voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea, and by participating in the trial.
With regards to the absence of preliminary investigation, this Court ruled
in Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People[10] and cited in Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, [11] that “the
absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the
case.  Nor does it impair the validity of the (complaint) or, otherwise, render it defective.”
On the second issue, appellant, through the FLAG, argues that the trial judge failed
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
accused’s plea of guilty to the capital offense, as mandated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 [12] of the
New Rules on Criminal Procedure.  Thus, this case should be remanded to the court of
origin for further and appropriate proceedings, citing People vs. Estomaca.[13]
This contention[14] of the FLAG would have been correct were it not for the
circumstance that accused-appellant did not, in fact, plead guilty to a capital offense in
the first place.  On this matter, Atty. Banico correctly pointed out that only the first
paragraph of the complaint mentions the age of the private complainant and the
relationship of the accused to the private complainant, i.e., that the accused is the father
of the private complainant.  Atty. Banico is correct in arguing that the first paragraph of
the complaint is not part of the allegation of the charge for rape to which appellant
pleaded guilty.  Therefore, said complaint charges only simple rape under Art. 335, for
which the penalty is only reclusion perpetua, and not for rape under R.A. 7659, qualified
by the circumstance that the offender is the father of the victim who is a minor, for which
the penalty is death.[15]
In other words, since the appellant did not plead guilty to a capital offense, he cannot
properly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 116, and People vs. Estomaca, to have this case
remanded to the trial court for compliance with said rule.

71
 In order for rape to be punishable with death, the information/complaint must
properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the
victim, and the latter’s minority, and the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt,
in the same manner that circumstances that qualify a killing to murder, must be alleged in
the information, and also proved beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.  Failure to
allege the fact of filiation and minority in the information for rape is fatal and consequently
bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable with death. [16]
In the case at bar, such relationship is not stated in the “cause of the accusation,” or
in the narration of the act or omission constituting the offense, but only in the preamble or
opening statement of the complaint.  The complaint upon which the appellant was
arraigned does not state in the specifications of the acts constitutive of the offense, that
he is charged as the father of the victim.  Such omission is prejudicial to the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the accusations against him.
In the recent case of People vs. Bali-Balita,[17] the Court, through Madam Justice
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, reiterated the ruling in Buhat vs. Court of
Appeals[18]that:  “xxx the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or the preamble of the information, nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated xxx, but from the actual recital of the facts as alleged in
the body of the information.”
We should now discuss the issue of whether or not the prosecution was able to
prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the appropriate penalty to be
imposed on appellant.  But first, the manner in which appellant entered his plea of guilt
should be tackled.
Accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty, but it appears from the records of the
proceedings before the court a quo that the same was a conditional plea, because
appellant’s counsel argued that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
drunkenness should be appreciated in favor of the appellant. [19] Said counsel was
apparently unaware that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, and the fact that
the appellant was drunk when he committed the crime, cannot be appreciated in the
latter’s favor because a plea of guilty would not, under any circumstance, affect or reduce
the death sentence.
As heretofore discussed, the appellant pleaded upon a charge of simple rape.  The
penalty for simple rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, a
single indivisible penalty.  It appears that said counsel is also not aware that under Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed (except where there
is a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused under Art. 68, and when
the crime committed is not wholly excusable under Art. 69 – neither of which is the case
here[20]).  While the records do not show that appellant entered his plea with the
proviso  that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, this can be inferred from the
arguments made by his counsel during the hearing on December 2, 1996, and in the
appellant’s brief  filed by said counsel, asking that appellant be entitled to the benefit of
the plea.[21]
We would, thus, assume that appellant made a conditional plea because this
assumption would be more favorable to the accused.  A conditional plea of guilty, or one
entered subject to the provision that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent
to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may
be rendered.[22] The question now arises: Was a full-blown trial conducted?
We answer in the affirmative.  The prosecution presented evidence to prove the
commission of the crime as charged in the Complaint.  The victim testified and was
cross-examined.  An examination of the victim’s testimony shows that she testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remained

72
consistent.   Also, we find the victim’s testimony to be natural and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.  A rape victim who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible
witness.[23] Although no other evidence was presented by the prosecution, in rape cases,
the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. [24] We, therefore, find that the trial court correctly found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The victim is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence[25] in addition to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.  Award of
moral damages to a rape victim is proper even if there was no proof presented during the
trial as basis therefor.[26]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar as it finds the
accused-appellant Rodolfo Oling Madraga guilty of the crime of rape, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the
accused-appellant is directed to pay the victim P50,000.00 by way of indemnity, in
addition to P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

73
9. G.R. Nos. 132625-31               December 18, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NOEL SANDOVAL, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For ravishing his two (2) minor step-daughters, Noel Sandoval was charged in seven (7)
separate Informations with seven (7) counts of Rape, five of which were committed
against Teresa Micu, then thirteen (13) years old, and two counts of statutory rape
committed against Victoria "Rhea" Micu, then only eleven (11) years old as evidenced by
her Birth Certificate.1 The Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan, Pangasinan, Branch 42, and allege as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 97-01815-D

That on or about May 5, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto,

province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will and consent, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

74
In Criminal Case No. 97-01816-D

That on or about May 9, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto,

province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will and consent to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. 97-01817-D

That on or about April 24, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will and consent, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. 97-01818-D

That on or about April 18, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will and consent to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. 97-01819-D

That on or about May 5, 1995 at barangay Casibong, municipality of San Jacinto,

province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
complainant TERESA MICU y FERNANDEZ, against her will and consent to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. 97-01820-D

That sometime in April 2, 1997 in the evening thereof, at barangay Casibong,

municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the stepfather,
by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse in their conjugal house with VICTORIA "RHEA" F.
MICU, who is under twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. 7659.

75
In Criminal Case No. 97-01821-D

That sometime in April 5, 1997 in the evening thereof, at barangay Casibong,

municipality of San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the stepfather,
by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse in their conjugal house with VICTORIA "RHEA" F.
MICU, who is under twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. 7659.

Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 23, 1997 for the first five (5) counts of rape,
wherein he pleaded NOT GUILTY. The following day, the Public Prosecutor filed a
Motion for Leave to Amend the five (5) criminal complaints to allege the relationship of
the victim and the accused. On July 31, 1997, accused-appellant was scheduled to be
arraigned for the other two (2) counts of rape but he failed to appear because of lack of
notice on the Provincial Warden. At this point, the Public Prosecutor called the attention
of the Court to the Amended Informations he filed in the first five (5) cases, to which
accused-appellant has already been arraigned and has pleaded not guilty on July 23,
1997. Counsel for the defense objected on the ground that the amendment would
prejudice the right of accused-appellant.

The court a quo ruled that since there was no evidence yet presented, the matter of
amendment should be brought at the proper time after the prosecution has presented its
evidence. Thus, the resolution of the Motion to Amend Information in Criminal Cases
Nos. 97-01815-D, 97-01816-D, 97-01817-D, 97-01818-D and 97-01819-D was held in
abeyance. Meanwhile, on August 7, 1997, accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded
NOT GUILTY to the two (2) counts of statutory rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-01820-D
and 97-01821-D. Thereafter, a joint trial of all the seven (7) cases was conducted. The
prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, including the two (2) complainants while on the
other hand, the defense presented three (3) witnesses including the accused-appellant.

On January 9, 1998, the court a quo rendered its decision,2 the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused NOEL SANDOVAL is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos.
97-01815-D, 97-01816-D, 97-01817-D, 97-01819-D, 97-01820-D and 97-01821-D and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the mandatory penalty of DEATH for each act of rape. In
addition, he is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages for each case or a total of
P300,000.00. Also for each count of rape, he is further ordered to pay P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages as example for the public good or a total of P30,000.00. He is
however acquitted in Criminal Case No. 97-01818-D for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

In view of the penalty imposed, the records were elevated to this Court for automatic
review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court.

Accused-appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:

76
The court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Rape on the
person of Teresa Micu and imposing the death penalty upon him notwithstanding the fact
that, at the time of the alleged commission, he was not yet married to the victims’ mother.

II

The court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Rape over
Rhea Micu, considering her lack of credibility which finds support in the medical findings
of the physician who examined her.

III

The court a quo erred in awarding damages to the complainants notwithstanding that the
latter never testified to establish the same and the only basis of such on record is the
testimony of their aunt, Perlita Fernandez, who is not their legal guardian.

After a thorough scrutiny of the records of the case at bar, this Court finds that the trial
court did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape on the person of
Teresa Micu. During her testimony, she clearly and convincingly established before the
court a quo the facts and circumstances that transpired during the several occasions
when accused-appellant raped her.3

The rule has always been that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, factual findings of
the trial court should be highly respected. The trial judge is in a better position to pass
judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having had the opportunity to personally hear
them, observe their deportment and manner of testifying and detect if they were telling
the truth.4 We find no reason to depart from this rule in this particular case. It should be
remembered also that courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a
victim of sexual assault because, ordinarily, no person would be willing to undergo the
humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal were it not to
condemn an injustice.5

However, we cannot agree with the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty on
accused-appellant for the rape of Teresa Micu. The pertinent law in effect at the time of
commission of the crimes in this case, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659, provides:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

x x x           x x x          x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x. (Underscoring ours)

The above-quoted provision states, inter alia, that where the victim of the crime of rape is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed. This is one of the seven (7) modes
enumerated in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which are considered special circumstances

77
specifically applicable to the crime of rape. In the subsequent cases of People v. Ilao6 
and People v. Medina,7 it was ruled that the seven new attendant circumstances in
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 "partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and not
merely aggravating circumstances," since said qualifying circumstances are punishable
by the single indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death. A
qualifying circumstance increases it to a higher penalty while an aggravating
circumstance affects only the period of the penalty but does not increase it to a higher
degree. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not
alleged, a qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged
in the information.

A reading of the Information for the rape of Teresa Micu filed against accused-appellant
reveals that he was merely charged with the crime of simple rape. The fact that accused-
appellant is the common-law spouse of the victim’s parent is not alleged in the
Information. What was stated therein was only the minority of the victim. As we have
emphasized, the elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender
must be both alleged.8 As such, the special qualifying circumstance stated in Section 11
of RA 7659 was not properly pleaded in the Information. Thus, the penalty of death
prescribed in RA 7659 can not be imposed on accused-appellant. Indeed, it would be a
denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted
of its qualified form punishable with death although the attendant circumstances
qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned. 9

The amendment sought by the prosecution of the five informations, in order to allege the
relationship of accused-appellant to the victim, were clearly substantial in character as
they had the effect of changing the crime charged, thereby exposing accused-appellant
to a higher penalty. Such amendment can no longer be done after accused-appellant has
pleaded to the Information for simple rape on July 23, 1997, 10 without violating his
constitutional rights. Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, provides:

The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of

court, at anytime before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done,
without prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x.

In sum, the failure of the prosecution to allege the relationship of the accused to the
victim has effectively removed the crime from the ambit of Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659, which prescribes the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.11 In the recent cases of People v. Calayca,12 People v. Tabion13 
and People v. Acala,14 where the prosecution failed to allege the fact of minority of the
victim in the Informations, we reduced the penalty imposed from death to reclusion
perpetua.

Anent the second assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to discredit Rhea Micu, the
second victim, by invoking the findings of the examining physician, Dr. Luisa Cayabyab,
to the effect that she could not tell whether force attended the laceration of Rhea’s organ
and that even the tip of her finger could not reach the said complainant’s cervix when she
attempted to check the same.15 According to accused-appellant, this shows that the
victim had never experienced sexual intercourse.

Appellant’s claim is without merit.

78
A circumspect scrutiny of Dr. Cayabyab’s testimonial declarations discloses that they
were not conclusive. As a matter of fact, the medical examination, standing alone, is not
sufficient to prove nor disprove the fact of rape. On the contrary, her testimony even
tended to clarify the apparent conflict pointed out by accused-appellant, viz:

Q Likewise one of your findings is that her vagina admits one finger, in this finding of
yours, it does not show any force or can be interpreted that there was no force of
inserting something on the vagina of the patient, is that right?

A I cannot say directly that there was no force because the vagina is so elastic like a
rubber, sir.

Q And so you can conclude that there was really no force?

A I cannot say that there was no force because as I have said the vaginal canal is so
elastic, sir.

COURT

Q There may be force or no force?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Proceed,

ATTY. TAMINAYA

Q When you stated in your findings, "admits one finger", could you tell this Court that
there was no penis yet or any object that was inserted?

A As I have said, the vaginal canal is so elastic so I cannot say if there was or there was
no object that was inserted, sir.

COURT

Q Was there something introduced into the vagina or inserted inside?

A Maybe yes, maybe no, sir.

Q I think that the hymen can tell you that something was inserted into the vagina because
of the laceration?

A It is possible, sir.

Proceed.

ATTY. TAMINAYA

Q In this case, there was no showing that the hymen was lacerated?

A There was healed laceration, sir.

COURT

79
Q But whether or not the laceration was caused by force or no force, you could not tell?

A Yes, Your Honor.16

In the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the complainant’s private part is not
necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the
entrance or at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is
proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the victim’s
genitalia and not the full penetration of the complainant’s private part consummates the
crime.17 More importantly, it has been ruled in People v. San Juan18 that in crimes against
chastity, the medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable element for the
successful prosecution of the crime, as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to
convict the accused thereof.

As found by the court a quo, Rhea’s testimonies were overwhelmingly straightforward,

logical and convincing as to be worthy of belief and impervious to a mere denial by
accused-appellant Noel Sandoval, to wit:

Q Sometime in the evening of April 2, 1997, do you remember where you were?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was in Brgy. Casibong, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, sir.

Q Where in Brgy. Casibong were you staying?

A In the house of my step-father, sir.

Q Your step-father, you are referring to the accused in this case?

A Yes, sir.

Q While you were in the house of your step-father in the evening of April 2, 1997, where
were you in relation to that house?

A I was inside the house, sir.

Q What were you doing at that precise time?

A I was tending the small child to sleep, sir.

Q What is the name of that small child?

A John, sir.

Q While you were tending the small child by the name of John, what happened next after
that?

A While tending, I was able to sleep, sir.

Q Were you awakened?

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A Yes, sir.

Q Why were you awakened, could you explain to the Honorable Court?

A I was awaken because somebody went on top of me, sir.

Q When somebody went on top of you, who was that person?

A Noel Sandoval, sir.

Q When Noel Sandoval went on top of you, what happened next after that?

A He removed my shortpant and my pantie, sir.

Q After Noel Salvador removed your shortpant and pantie, what did Noel Sandoval do, if
he did anything?

A After he removed my shortpant and my pantie, Noel Sandoval also removed his pants
and brief and thereafter, he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q After Noel Sandoval inserted his penis to your vagina, what did Noel Sandoval do, if he
did anything?

A He kissed me, sir.

Q What part of your body did Noel Sandoval kiss you?

A My neck, sir.

Q What else?

A Only my neck, sir.

Q On April 5, 1997, do you remember where you were?

A I was also in the house of my step-father, sir.

Q What were you doing in that precise time of the day?

A I was already asleep then, sir.

Q Were you awakened?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why? Could you explain before the Honorable Court why you were awakened on the
evening of April 5, 1997?

A I was awakened because I felt pain, sir.

Q Why did you feel pain.

A I felt pain inside my vagina, sir.

81
Q Why? Can you explain before the Honorable Court why you felt pain in your vagina?

A Because my step-father inserted his penis inside my vagina, sir.

Q What part of the house of your step-father did he insert his penis?

A Inside the house, sir.19

It is a well-settled rule that an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative

testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 20

We agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Noel Sandoval is guilty of the rape of Rhea Micu. However, as in
the other four cases, the death penalty can not be imposed on him. The prosecution
failed to prove that accused-appellant was legally married to the victim’s mother, in order
to substantiate the allegation in the Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
01820-D and 01821-D that the accused-appellant is the stepfather of the victim. In
People v. Brigildo,21 a stepdaughter was defined as the daughter of one’s spouse by a
previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a previous marriage. It is the
burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was the
stepdaughter of the accused-appellant to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Corollarily, the prosecution must establish that accused-appellant is legally married to the
victim’s mother. In order that the qualifying circumstances under Section 11 of R.A. 7659,
which raises the penalty of rape to death, can be appreciated, the circumstances must be
both alleged and proved. Accordingly, the proper penalty for the two counts of rape
against Rhea Micu is reclusion perpetua.

Finally, we affirm the trial court’s award of moral and exemplary damages to the
complainants notwithstanding that the latter never testified to establish the same.

The award of moral damages for rape is proper as it is provided in Article 2219 (3) of the
Civil Code. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, accused-appellant should be
made to pay P50,000.00, especially considering that the offended parties were of tender
age at the time of the crime. 22 In People v. Prades,23 it was ruled that the award of moral
damages to the victim is proper even if there was no proof presented during the trial as
basis therefor. The fact that the complainant suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even
assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. 24 
1âwphi1

On the other hand, exemplary damages may also be awarded in criminal cases as part of
the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.25 Accused-appellant being the stepfather of the victims, relationship
should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In addition to moral and exemplary damages, civil indemnity must also be awarded to the
victims since it is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. 26 The recent judicial
prescription is that the indemnification for the victim shall be in the amount of P50,000.00
for each count of rape if the death penalty is not imposed. 27

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan, Pangasinan, Branch
42, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Noel Sandoval is
found guilty of four (4) counts of simple rape committed against Teresa Micu and two (2)

82
counts of simple rape committed against Victoria "Rhea" Micu, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each of the six (6) counts.

Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 for each of the six (6) counts of
rape, or a total of P300,000.00, as moral damages; P10,000.00 for each of the six (6)
counts of rape, or a total of P60,000.00, as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 for
each of the six (6) counts of rape, or a total of P300,000.00, as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

10. G.R. No. 124036            October 23, 2001

FIDELINO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC, GUMACA,
QUEZON, BRANCH 62, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal by certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 22, 1996,
in CA-G.R. CR No. 13358. The decision affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 in Criminal Case No. 2307-G, finding petitioner
Fidelino Garcia with his co-accused Leopoldo Garcia and Wilfredo Garcia guilty of
homicide.

In an Information dated December 13, 1983, Fidelino Garcia, Leopoldo Garcia, and
Wilfredo Garcia were charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of July 1983, at Barangay II, in Poblacion, Municipality of
Mulanay, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a knife, a piece of wood and a broken bottle with
intent to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and with treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, hit with said piece of wood and stab

83
with the said knife and broken bottle one Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena, thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:

"Wound lacerated mid parietal area 4cm with linear fracture of underlying skull;

Wound lacerated 3 cm mid frontal area;

Wound lacerated T shape right frontal ½ cm;

Abrasion right nasolridge;

Contusion with laceration nose;

Multiple contusion chest right #3 6cm deep non-penetrating;

Wound lacerated left temporal 1 cm;

Wound stab left arm medial aspect 1½ cm."

which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.1

Petitioner and Wilfredo Garcia are brothers, while their co-accused in Criminal Case No.
2307-G, Leopoldo, is their first-degree cousin.2

Earlier, a separate charge sheet docketed as Criminal Case No. 2165-G had been filed
against petitioner Fidelino Garcia, charging him with direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority. On March 8, 1984, he was arraigned in said case and entered a plea
of not guilty.

In 1985, the accused in Criminal Case No. 2307-G were separately arraigned. All
pleaded not guilty to the charge. As Criminal Cases Nos. 2165-G and 2307-G arose from
the same incident, a joint trial ensued.

The facts, as established by the prosecution before the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court, are as follows:

At around 2:30 P.M., July 30, 1983, P/Cpl. Francisco Rollera was on his way to mail a
letter. He was waiting at the crossing near the police outpost in the town proper of
Mulanay, Quezon, when he saw petitioner, Wilfredo and Leopoldo, ganging up on
Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena. 3 While Leopoldo held the victim, petitioner hit him with an
empty bottle. Wilfredo then stabbed the victim once with a stainless steel fan knife
(balisong). The knife got stuck in Paulino’s body. Paulino succeeded in wrestling free
from Leopoldo’s grasp and pulling out the knife from his body. He used the knife to stab
petitioner in the stomach.

Rollera tried to stop the fight. He pulled out his service pistol and fired three successive
warning shots, calling upon the combatants to stop their fight, but to no avail. Still holding
Wilfredo’s knife, the wounded Paulino beat a hasty retreat to the store of one Manuel
Roberto. Wilfredo pursued him. Inside the store, Paulino stabbed Wilfredo twice in the
neck and stomach. Unable to stop the affray, Rollera then asked the other people around
to summon other policemen.

84
Paulino went back to the street. Seeing that Wilfredo was about to hit him with a piece of
wood, Rollera stepped in and wrestled the stick away from Wilfredo. The latter, however,
managed to get hold of an empty bottle. Before Rollera could react, petitioner
approached him, holding a broken bottle. Rollera moved back and Fidelino chased him
around a parked vehicle.

At this point, two other policemen arrived and pacified the antagonists. A third responding
policeman grabbed and caught petitioner chasing Rollera around the parked vehicle.

Paulino Rodolfo subsequently died. The medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Mario A.
Cuento of the Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital at Catanauan, Quezon, revealed that
the cause of death was "cerebral hemorrhage."4

Predictably, the defense gave a slightly different version of the incident. Wilfredo testified
that between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. of July 30, 1983, he was on his way to the tricycle
parking space in Nanadiego St., Mulanay, Quezon, with his two co-accused following a
short distance behind him. He met P/Cpl. Rollera and Paulino, both of whom appeared to
be intoxicated. Paulino put an arm around Wilfredo’s shoulder and invited him to have a
drink. The latter removed Paulino’s arm and refused, explaining that he had to go to the
barrio. Wilfredo was about to leave, when Paulino suddenly collared him and poked
a balisong at his throat. Wilfredo stepped back, but Paulino nonetheless succeeded in
stabbing him in the neck, chest, and stomach. He did not know what transpired next as
he lost consciousness as a result of his wounds, regaining it only next morning when he
found himself at the Quezon Memorial Hospital where he was confined for four (4) days.

Although petitioner and he were closely following Wilfredo, Leopoldo claimed that he did
not actually see how Paulino attacked Wilfredo. What he heard were the voices of
persons heatedly arguing. When he advanced to investigate, he saw Wilfredo already
wounded. Leopoldo ran towards the municipal hall to get police assistance. On his way,
he met police officers Pobeda and Roadilla and he told them what happened. They then
proceeded to the scene of the incident where Leopoldo allegedly saw Rollera chasing a
wounded Fidelino around a parked vehicle. Pobeda and Roadilla then pacified Rollera
and petitioner. Because Leopoldo and petitioner were both wounded, the peace officers
brought them to the Catanauan Hospital. Leopoldo claimed that he never saw the victim
at the scene.

On February 14, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision and disposed of the two cases
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, on ground of reasonable doubt, accused

Fidelino Garcia is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged under Criminal Case No.
2165-G for Direct Assault Upon An Agent of a Person in Authority.

In Criminal Case No. 2307-G, the judgment of conviction is hereby entered. Accused
FIDELINO, WILFREDO and LEOPOLDO, all surnamed GARCIA are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, and this Court hereby sentences them,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Furthermore, all the accused are solidarily liable and are ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the late Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
plus the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as actual damages and to pay
the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.5

85
The accused seasonably filed their respective notices of appeal to the appellate
court.6 The Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated May 17, 1994 ordered Wilfredo
Garcia’s appeal deemed "abandoned and ordered dismissed for failure to furnish the
Court (with) his forwarding address."7 On September 3, 1994, the resolution dismissing
Wilfredo’s appeal became final and executory. The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No.
13358, thus resolved only the appeals interposed by Leopoldo and Fidelino Garcia.

On February 22, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, thus:

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indeterminate sentence should be from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED in all respects.

Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.8

Although the three accused were represented by one counsel before the trial court, said
counsel filed an appellant’s brief only for accused Leopoldo Garcia. Before us now is the
separate appeal of petitioner Fidelino Garcia filed by a court appointed counsel de
oficio from the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG). 9 In his brief, petitioner Fidelino
Garcia assigns the following as errors committed by the appellate court:

First Assigned Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR

CONSPIRACY WHEN IT WAS NEVER ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION NOR
PROVEN DURING TRIAL.

Second Assigned Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONER’S CONVICTION IN

THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE REGARDING THE FACT, MANNER AND CAUSE
OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM’S DEATH.

Third Assigned Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION AND FINDING NO ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.

Fourth Assigned Error

PETITIONER SHOULD BE ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT

ESTABLISH HIS CULPABILITY AS A PRINCIPAL, CO-CONSPIRATOR OR
ACCOMPLICE.10

In sum, the issues for our resolution are: (1) Whether the appellate court erred in
convicting petitioner as a conspirator in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo y Olgena; and (2)
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to establish petitioner’s guilt with moral
certainty.

86
On the first issue, petitioner contends that an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense not alleged in the information, as he has the right to be informed of the nature of
the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. He points out that the
Information in Criminal Case No. 2307-G did not allege that he conspired, confederated,
mutually helped, and/or acted in concert and with consent in committing the offense
charged. He submits that an allegation of conspiracy cannot be presumed or implied in
an information. In finding him to be a conspirator in the killing of the victim, appellant
claims that his rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him; to a fair trial; to due process of law; and to equal protection of law were violated by
respondent appellate court.

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that it is not essential
that the allegation of "conspiracy" be expressly stated in the indictment. It is enough that
the narration in the Information shows that the accused acted in concert in the
commission of the crime.

On this point, we are not in agreement with the OSG.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.11 The right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him is explicit in Sec. 1(b) Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 12 To
ensure that the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must
embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to
the name of the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the
circumstances thereof. One such particular circumstance is conspiracy where two or
more persons are charged in an information. Conspiracy denotes an intentional
participation in a criminal transaction, with a view to the furtherance of a common design
and purpose. It imputes criminal liability to an accused for the acts of another or others,
regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation. In a conspiracy, the act of
one becomes the act of all and the particular act of an accused becomes of secondary
relevance. Thus, it is essential that an accused must know from the information whether
he is criminally accountable not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as
well.13 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient if: (1) it follows the words of the statute
creating the offense and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense
he is charged with conspiring to commit; 14 or (2) following the statute, contains a
sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy; 15 or (3) alleges
both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective
statutes defining them.16

In the present case, the appellate court held that an allegation of conspiracy is implied in,
or may be inferred from, the statement that "the said accused, armed with a knife, a piece
of wood and a broken bottle, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of their superior
strength and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
hit with said piece of wood and stab with the said knife and broken bottle one Paulino
Rodolfo y Olgena." But we agree with appellant that here the information does not satisfy
the requirement that the conspiracy must be conveyed in "appropriate language." 17 The
words "conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or
their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. 18 The language used by
the prosecution in charging the three accused contains no reference to conspiracy.
Conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the information. Absence of a
particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any
definitive act constituting conspiracy in Criminal Case No. 2307-G renders the indictment
insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts of his co-accused. An
accused must be furnished with a description of the charge against him to enable him to
make a proper defense and, later, to avail himself properly of either a conviction or
acquittal for his protection against further prosecution for the same cause. 19 In our view,
petitioner Fidelino Garcia cannot be convicted as a conspirator in the killing of Paulino

87
Rodolfo, for the simple reason that the information against the accused contained no
clear and definite allegation of conspiracy.

It follows that in Criminal Case No. 2307-G, petitioner can only be held responsible for an
act as could be proved to have been committed by him personally. Stated otherwise, his
criminal accountability, if any, should be determined on an individual rather than on a
collective basis. Responsibility for acts done by his co-accused could not be heaped on
the shoulders of appellant unless it be shown that he participated directly and personally
in the commission of those acts.

Thus, anent the second issue, we find merit in petitioner’s argument that the
prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for homicide. There
appears no proof to show the connection between the acts he allegedly committed and
the lethal injuries sustained by the victim. Petitioner points out that the only act he
allegedly did was that of hitting the victim with an empty bottle while the latter was being
held down by Leopoldo Garcia and stabbed by Wilfredo Garcia. He submits that there is
no showing whatsoever that his blow caused any injury to the victim, much less caused
his death. He stresses that the medico-legal certificate prepared by one Dr. Mario
Cuento, marked as the prosecution’s Exhibit "B" cannot even be found in the record, nor
did the doctor take the witness stand to identify it. The medical certificate in effect has no
probative value.

The OSG counters that while Exhibit "B" cannot be found in the records, nonetheless, the
fact stands that the number and nature of the victim’s injuries are enumerated in the
Information, which the petitioner failed to rebut or object to during the trial. Moreover,
petitioner did not object when Exhibit "B" was offered in evidence by the prosecutor
before the trial court to prove the victim’s injuries causing his death.

In general, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court.20 The rule, however, does not apply in the
present case. For one, the judge who penned the trial court’s judgment was not the same
one who heard the prosecution witnesses testify. 21 For another, our review of the records
indicates that both the trial court and the appellate court have overlooked some material
facts and circumstances of weight which could materially affect the result of this case.

First, the Court of Appeals heavily relied on the testimony of prosecution eyewitness,
P/Cpl. Francisco Rollera. However, we find his testimony riddled with inconsistencies,
particularly the exact role played by petitioner in the affray leading to Paulino Rodolfo’s
death. On direct examination, Cpl. Rollera averred that petitioner struck the victim with a
bottle while his co-accused were ganging up on the latter, thus:

Q     –     Now, you stated a while ago that the accused in this case ganged up on the
deceased Rodolfo Olgena. Will you please tell before this Honorable Court how the
accused ganged up on him?

A     –     While Leopoldo Garcia was holding Rodolfo Olgena, Rodolfo Olgena was hit by
a bottle by Fidelino Garcia and Wilfredo Garcia stabbed him on the lower groin with a
stainless [f]an knife, sir. (Stress supplied) 22

The cross-examination of Rollera, however, reveals a contradictory version in that

apparently, petitioner Fidelino Garcia was not the aggressor but the victim of stabbing by
the deceased Paulino Rodolfo. Thus, Cpl. Rollera testified on cross:

Q     –     According to you, the three were ganging up on Rodolfo Olgena until Wilfredo
Garcia stabbed him. As the three were ganging up on Rodolfo Olgena, where were
Fedelino Garcia and Leopoldo Garcia when Rodolfo Olgena was stabbed by Wilfredo?

88
A     –     Leopoldo was holding Olgena while Fedelino was approaching Olgena when
Wilfredo stabbed Olgena, sir. When Rodolfo Olgena was stabbed by Wilfredo, as
regards Fedelino, he was then also approaching Rodolfo Olgena and that was the
reason why he was also stabbed by Olgena. Because when Fedelino approached
Rodolfo Olgena, the latter had pulled the knife, so that when Olgena pulled out the knife,
he was able to stab Fedelino, sir.

ATTY. CERILLA:

Let us straighten this out. Correct me if I am wrong. This, according to you, took place.

Q     –     Rodolfo Olgena while being held by Leopoldo Garcia was stabbed by Wilfredo
Garcia, is that correct?

A     –     Yes, sir.

Q     –     The weapon which was used by Wilfredo Garcia got stuck in that portion of the
body of Rodolfo Olgena that was hit?

A     –     Yes, sir.

Q     –     And Rodolfo Olgena was able to pull out that knife and while Fedelino Garcia
was approaching he stabbed the latter?

A     –     Yes, sir.

Q     –     Now, are you telling us that although Rodolfo Olgena was being held by
Leopoldo Garcia he was still able to pull the knife from his thigh and then used it in
stabbing Fedelino Garcia?

A     –     Rodolfo Olgena was able to get loose from the hold of Leopoldo that was
why when Fedelino approached Olgena the latter who had pulled out the knife from his
body was able to stab Fedelino, sir. (Stress supplied).23

That petitioner Fidelino Garcia was stabbed by Paulino Rodolfo is perfectly clear to us.
What is doubtful is whether he had an active, direct and personal role in the killing of
Paulino Rodolfo. On cross-examination, it appears petitioner was still approaching the
deceased when the latter was stabbed by co-accused Wilfredo Garcia. Cpl. Rollera
stated under direct examination that Fidelino had hit Rodolfo with a bottle. But Cpl.
Rollera did not say where and when petitioner struck the victim with a bottle, or if the
blow was hard or not. Further, the prosecution’s evidence does not establish any direct
link between the petitioner’s act with the bottle and any injury suffered by the deceased,
much less the mortal wound which caused his death. If we are to believe Cpl. Rollera’s
account, petitioner was merely approaching the victim, who was then trying to get loose
from Leopoldo’s hold and ward off Wilfredo’s attack. It appears unclear to us, however,
whether petitioner succeeded to hit the victim, Rodolfo, with a bottle. As it turned out, it
was petitioner who was stabbed by Rodolfo, using Wilfredo’s balisong, with the result that
petitioner was hospitalized.

Second, the Court of Appeals likewise heavily relied upon Exhibit "B" to establish the
injuries suffered by Paulino Rodolfo. As stated earlier, Exhibit "B" is nowhere in the
records.24 The only mention we find of it is in the transcript of stenographic notes of
November 19, 1987.

FISCAL ENCOMIENDA:

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We will now be resting our case.

COURT:

Go ahead.

FISCAL ENCOMIENDA:

But before we do so, we would like to prove the existence of the medico legal certificate
although it has been admitted by the defense counsel and likewise the fact of death. We
would like to request the same to be marked as Exhibit "B" in both cases and the findings
therein as stated as Exhibit "B-1" and the signature of Dr. Mario Cuento as Exhibit "B-2."
We are offering, Your Honor, Exhibit "A" and "A-1" the affidavit of Francisco Llorera
[should read Rollera] as part of his testimony. And we are likewise offering Exhibits "B",
"B-1", and "B-2" to show the fact of death and the nature of the wounds sustained by the
victim.

COURT:

Is that all? Any objection to the annexes of the exhibits?

ATTY. CERILLA:

No objection, Your Honor, except to the affidavit of the policeman.

COURT:

The Court will admit all these exhibits in evidence. 25

Notwithstanding its absence from the records, the Court of Appeals held that said Exhibit
"B" "sufficiently indicates the nature, number, location, and extent of the injuries
sustained by the victim. The cause of death stated therein is purportedly ‘cerebral
hemorrhage.’"26 The appellate court likewise held that "These were deemed admitted by
the accused-appellants for their failure to make a timely objection at the time the offer
was made."27 We find nothing in the record, however, to support the prosecution’s
sweeping statement that the "existence of the medico-legal certificate had been admitted
by defense counsel and likewise the fact of death." In fact, per the transcript quoted
above, Atty. Cerilla’s response has a reservation, "except to the affidavit of the
policeman," when asked about the annexes of the exhibits. But we shall not belabor this
point, for the decision of the trial court is barren of any reference to admissions or
stipulations. On record now, the medico-legal report is missing. And we find that the
prosecution’s evidence nowhere shows that petitioner by his own act killed the victim or
contributed directly to his death.

To conclude, there is a dearth of evidence as to the specific role played by petitioner

Fidelino Garcia in the commission of the crime charged. Petitioner enjoys the
presumption of innocence, which can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Mere conjectures, no matter how strong, can never substitute for this required
quantum of proof.28 Failing to meet the needed quantum of proof, petitioner’s conviction
as principal in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated February 22, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 13358, which had affirmed that of the
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Branch 62, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence to convict petitioner Fidelino Garcia beyond

90
reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

11. G.R. No. 123070             April 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CASIANO BUNTAG alias "CIANO" and DIEGO BONGO, appellants.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 7729, convicting the appellants Casiano Buntag alias
"Ciano" and Diego Bongo of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, and
directing them to jointly indemnify the heirs of the victim Berno Georg Otte the sum of
P50,000 as moral damages.

The Indictment

The appellants were charged with murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of February, 1992, in the municipality of Panglao, province
of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery by the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the acts, the victim who was unarmed being then unaware thereof,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
use of a bladed instrument one Berno Georg Otte (a German national), hitting and
injuring the latter on his chest, thereby causing his immediate death; to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount to be proved during the trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 248 in relation to Art. 14 all of the
Revised Penal Code as amended.2

The Case for the Prosecution

Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte, 3 a German national and a tourist, checked in
at the Alona Ville Beach Resort located in Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma
Clarabal Bonga,4 assigned Otte to Room No. 95 and gave the latter his room key.

On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resort’s restaurant. Bonga talked to him
regarding the disco which was about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo
Chapel.6

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At about 10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of
the tables.7 She noticed that he had some companions whom she failed to recognize. 8

Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno "Ninoy" Guigue were also at the
disco. At around 2:00 a.m. of February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a
night and walked home, with their respective bicycles at their sides. 9 At the crossing to
the Alona Beach, they saw a man lying on the road but did not recognize him. They
walked past the prostrate man. When they were about twenty-five meters 10 away from
the body by the road, they met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barriomates. 11 11
Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo jointly and simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their
lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigue’s uncle,
Aquilino Bongo.12 12 In the process, they left their bicycles behind. Aquilino Bongo then
accompanied Mihangos and Guigue to where they left their bicycles. Mihangos and
Guigue retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag and Bongo were no longer there.

At around 5:30 a.m. of February 9, 1992, the police station of Panglao, Bohol, received a
report by radio call about a man, believed to be dead, lying at the side of the crossroad
near the Alona Beach.13 13 PO1 Yolando E. Hormachuelos, together with PO1 Mauro
Sumaylo and PO1 Dominie Ragusta, 14 14 proceeded to the crime scene. They were
accompanied by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Julita L. Cogo, who confirmed that the
man died due to a stab wound. 15 15 The policemen found a hunting knife about one
meter away from the body.16 16 Constancio Geoivencal took pictures of the cadaver.
Hormachuelos took custody of the knife.17 17

In the course of their investigation, the policemen learned that Mihangos and Guigue had
seen the dead body by the road. Hormachuelos fetched Mihangos and Guigue from their
houses and brought them to the road where the body of Otte was found. Mihangos and
Guigue narrated how they found the body at around 2:00 a.m. that day, as well as their
encounter with Bongo and Buntag.

At about 1:00 p.m. that day, Hormachuelos took appellant Bongo to the police station and
investigated him without the assistance of counsel. Bongo admitted that he took Otte’s
key to Room No. 9 and hid it near their house. He then drew a sketch showing the place
where he hid the key, at the back of their house. Bongo also admitted that he was with
appellant Casiano Buntag. The policemen went to Bongo’s house and recovered the key
to Otte’s room as indicated by Bongo in his sketch.

At 2:00 p.m., Guigue arrived at the police station and gave his statement to
Hormachuelos.18 18 At 3:00 p.m., Mihangos gave his statement to SPO1 Proculo
Bonao.19 19 Hormachuelos then took custody of Casiano Buntag and brought him to the
police station where he was asked about his involvement in the killing of Otte without the
assistance of counsel. However, Buntag opted to keep silent. When apprised that Diego
Bongo had implicated him, Buntag, this time with the assistance of his counsel, Atty.
Nerio G. Zamora, gave a statement on February 13, 1992 to a police investigator. He
stated that at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was walking back home from the disco
place where he caught up with Diego Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He
saw Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo then ordered him to box Otte but he refused, and
moved back about three meters. Bongo himself then boxed Otte three times on the face.
When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the chest. Buntag also stated that
he then ran back home, but Bongo followed him and cautioned him not to reveal the
incident to anybody or else he would be implicated. 20 Buntag subscribed and swore to the
truth of his statement on February 21, 1992 before Judge Antonio Sarce of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.

92
In the meantime, Municipal Health Officer Dr. Julita Lood-Cogo performed an autopsy on
the cadaver of Otte and submitted her Post-Mortem Report which contained the following
findings:

Stab wound, anterior chest, right, at the level of the 4th rib, approx. 2 cms. x 1 cm. in
size, with a depth of approx. 12 cms., directed upwards and medially, with a complete
fracture of the 4th rib, right, involving a portion of the right lung and base of the heart.

Cause of death:

CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO HEMORRHAGE, SECONDARY TO STAB

WOUND, ANTERIOR CHEST, RIGHT.21

On March 7, 1992, a criminal complaint for murder was filed against appellants Bongo
and Buntag with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Attached to the records was Buntag’s
sworn statement dated February 21, 1992. Only appellant Bongo submitted his counter-
affidavit on February 27, 1992, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Antonio Sarce, 22 
where he confirmed (a) Buntag’s account in his sworn statement before Judge Sarce that
they were with Otte at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992 at the crossing towards Alona
Beach Resort, and (b) that he was armed with a hunting knife. He further stated therein
that while at the crossing, Buntag and Otte, who were both drunk, had an altercation and
that he tried to pacify them but in the process, Buntag pulled out his (Bongo’s) hunting
knife from his waist and stabbed Otte with it.23

After the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a resolution finding
probable cause against the appellants for murder and issued warrants for their arrest.
The court found Buntag’s sworn statement and Bongo’s counter-affidavit self-serving.

On June 4, 1992, the day of the appellant’s arraignment in the Regional Trial Court,
appellant Buntag, through counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, filed a "Motion to Discharge
(him) to be a Witness for the Prosecution," alleging inter alia:

1) That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of said accused whose discharge is
requested;

2) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused, as can be shown by the
affidavit of said accused in relation to the affidavits or sworn statements of Ponciano
Horcerada, Isidro Mihangos, Benigno Guigue, Alfredo Guioguio, and PO1 Yolando [E.]
Hormachuelos;

3) That the testimony of herein accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;

4) That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

5) That the said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude;

6) That herein accused-movant hereby expresses his consent to be a witness for the
government.24

However, the prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that both accused were
equally guilty. On June 8, 1992, the court issued an Order denying the motion, and the
appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, entered pleas of not guilty. 25

93
During the trial, the prosecution presented Judge Antonio G. Sarce who testified that he
conducted the preliminary examination of the case and identified both Buntag’s sworn
statement and Bongo’s counter-affidavit as subscribed and sworn to before him (Judge
Sarce) in his chambers.

After presenting all its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence the hunting knife, 26 
the key to room no. 9 of the beach resort,27 the sworn statement of Buntag, 28 and Bongo’s
counter-affidavit29 to prove that both appellants conspired to kill the victim and that they in
fact killed the victim, and as part of the testimony of Judge Sarce. Both appellants
objected to the admission of the said sworn statements and counter-affidavit solely on
the ground that the statements executed by one accused was hearsay as to the other
accused.30 By way of rejoinder, the prosecution alleged as follows:

1. That exhibits A, B, C, D, E and all its submarkings are all relevant, pertinent and
material evidence against the accused in the above-entitled case, therefore, admissible
in evidence;

2. That exhibits F and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter
alios acta rule because they are principally offered against accused Casiano Buntag, the
affiant. The sworn statement of Casiano Buntag is offered mainly as admission of said
accused Casiano Buntag;

3. That exhibits G and all its submarkings are not hearsay and do not violate the res inter
alios acta rule because they are principally offered against accused Diego Bongo, the
affiant. The counter-affidavit of Diego Bongo is offered mainly as admission of said
accused Diego Bongo.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to admit in evidence

all the prosecution’s exhibits formally offered, for the purpose for which they are being
offered.31

The court admitted the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution. The
appellants opted not to adduce any evidence on their behalf. Instead, they filed, without
leave of court, a "Motion to Acquit." On June 7, 1993, the court issued an Order denying
the motion.

On August 14, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment finding both the appellants guilty
of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision of the trial court reads:

FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this Court renders judgment finding the two (2)
accused Casiano Buntag, alias Ciano, and Diego Bongo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER, an act committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248, in
relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and does hereby
sentences each one of them to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accusatory
penalties imposed by law.

There being no evidence disclosed as to the civil liability, this Court, therefore, limits in
providing that the accused shall pay jointly the heirs of the deceased Berno Georg Otte
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), by way of moral damages, but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.32

94
The trial court relied, inter alia, on the sworn statement of Buntag dated February 21,
199233 and the counter-affidavit of Bongo 34 in convicting them of the crime charged. Both
the appellants appealed the decision.

Although the appellants enumerated separate issues in their briefs, the same may be
synthesized into three issues, namely: (a) whether or not the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that they conspired to kill the victim Otte and that they, in fact, killed
him; (b) whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder; and, (c) whether or not the
appellants are liable for moral damages to the heirs of the victim. Appellant Bongo’s
contention that he was deprived of his right to due process on his claim that the
transcripts of the respective testimonies of Dr. Julita Cogo, SPO1 Bonao and resort
manager Bonga were not transmitted to this Court is belied by the records. In a
Resolution dated September 11, 2000, the Court declared that, based on the records, the
transcripts of stenographic notes in this case were already complete. 35

The appellants contend that the prosecution failed to adduce direct or circumstantial
evidence to prove that they conspired to kill the victim, and that they, in fact, killed him.
They argue that although the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence consisting of
the extrajudicial sworn statement of appellant Buntag and the counter-affidavit of
appellant Bongo, such evidence is utterly insufficient to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, according to the appellants, the admissions made by appellant Buntag in

his sworn statement are binding on him only. Being prejudicial to appellant Bongo, such
admissions are not inadmissible against the latter unless repeated in open court by
appellant Buntag, thus, affording appellant Bongo the right to cross-examination.
Likewise, the admissions of appellant Bongo in his sworn statement are inadmissible
against appellant Buntag, unless the former repeated his admissions during the trial,
affording the latter an opportunity to cross-examine the said appellant. The appellants
further aver that since they opted not to testify on their respective statements, there was
no opportunity for cross-examination. Consequently, the admissions made by one
appellant in his sworn statement are hearsay evidence against the other appellant,
and vice versa. In fine, the appellants contend that the trial court should have acquitted
them of the crime charged.

We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that
they conspired to kill Otte and that they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However,
we find and so hold, after an incisive review of the records, that the prosecution adduced
sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable
doubt.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to
establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime. 36 Conspiracy can be presumed from and
proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interests. 37 It is not necessary to show that all
the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators
as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. 38

The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred
to as indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction if the following requisites are established: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have

95
been established; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 39

In People v. Delim,40 we held, thus:

The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact
mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of
the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the
guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution. 41

In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the trial court relied not only on the
counter-affidavit of appellant Bongo 42 and appellant Buntag’s sworn statement, 43 but also
on the other evidence on record, namely, the knife used in killing the victim, 44 the key to
Otte’s room,45 and the collective testimonies of the other witnesses of the prosecution.

The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is
admissible only against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused. 46 
The same rule applies if the extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the
conspiracy has ceased. However, if the declarant/admitter repeats in court his
extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to
cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible against both
accused.47 The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission when repeated during the
trial is transposed into judicial admissions.

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement

of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which he
is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged. 48 It is an
acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. 49 A
confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the
crime charged.50

In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest in his
sworn statement, and not a confession. So did appellant Bongo in his counter-affidavit.
Such admissions in the form of affidavits, made in the Municipal Trial Court in the course
of its preliminary investigation, are high quality evidence. 51 MCTC Judge Antonio Sarce
testified on the said sworn statement and counter-affidavit and was cross-examined. 52 
Moreover, some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one appellant are identical
with some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of the other, and vice versa. This
corroborates and confirms their veracity. Such admissions, made without collusion, are
akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are admissible as circumstantial
evidence against the other appellant implicated therein to show the probability of his
participation in the commission of the crime and as corroborative evidence against him. 53 
The Court rejects the appellants’ contention that they were deprived of their right to
cross-examine the other on the latter’s admissions against the other. Through their
common counsel, they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their respective
statements by the prosecution. They opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides, they had
opportunity to cross-examine Judge Sarce before whom they swore to the truthfulness of
their statements.54

96
In this case, the prosecution adduced the following circumstantial evidence which
constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, indeed, conspired to kill
and did kill the victim:

1. Appellant Buntag admitted, in his sworn statement, 55 that, at about 1:00 a.m. on
February 9, 1992, he was in the company of appellant Bongo and the victim Otte at the
crossing of Alona Beach, and that appellant Bongo was armed with a hunting knife.
Appellant Buntag identified the victim through the latter’s picture, as well as the hunting
knife used in the killing. 56 Appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, confirmed the truth of
appellant Buntag’s admissions and also admitted that on the said date, time and place,
he was with appellant Buntag and the victim, and that he was armed with a hunting knife
which was tucked on his waist.

2. The appellants admitted in their respective statements that on the said occasion, Otte
died from a stab wound caused by a hunting knife.

3. Appellant Bongo admitted in his counter-affidavit that he took the key to the victim’s
room and hid it near their house where the policemen found it.

4. While both appellants were within the periphery of the situs criminis, Mihangos and
Guigue sauntered by with their bicycles at their sides. Suddenly, the appellants jointly
and simultaneously lunged at them, causing Mihangos and Guigue to believe that their
lives were in peril, impelling them to run for their lives and seek sanctuary in the house of
Guigue’s uncle, Aquilino Bongo. By the time Mihangos and Guigue returned to the situs
criminis to retrieve their bicycles, the appellants had already left.

5. In his sworn statement, appellant Buntag admitted that after the victim was stabbed,
he and appellant Bongo fled from the situs criminis. This was corroborated by the
testimony of Mihangos. The presence of both appellants at the situs criminis and their
flight from the scene are strong indicia of their participation in the commission of the
crime and their complicity therein. 57 Appellant Bongo opted not to testify or adduce
evidence to controvert the testimony of Mihangos and the admissions of the appellant
prejudicial to him.

6. The hunting knife of appellant Bongo which was used to kill the victim was left at the
scene of the crime where the policemen recovered it shortly thereafter.

7. The appellants admitted in their respective sworn statements that the victim was
stabbed once with a hunting knife. These admissions were corroborated by Dr. Julita
Cogo’s finding that the victim was stabbed once on the anterior chest area. 58 The doctor
testified that the stab wound could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon. 59

8. Neither of the appellants brought the victim to the hospital for immediate medical
attendance and operation.

9. Although the appellants pointed to the other as the assailant in their respective
statements, neither of them reported the stabbing to the police authorities and claimed
that the other killed the victim.

10. Neither of the appellants took the witness stand to deny any involvement in the killing
of the victim. The evidence of the prosecution, thus, stands unrebutted.

The appellants cannot rely on the exculpatory portions of their respective statements as
basis for their acquittal of the crime charged. In the case of appellant Buntag, he avers in
his sworn statement that he was ordered by appellant Bongo to box the victim and when

97
he refused, appellant Bongo himself boxed and stabbed the victim with the hunting knife.
When appellant Buntag fled from the scene and went back home, appellant Bongo
followed and warned him not to divulge the incident so that he would not be implicated.
For his part, appellant Bongo turned the tables on appellant Buntag and claimed in his
counter-affidavit that the latter snatched the hunting knife from his waist and stabbed the
victim in the heat of their altercation. The stabbing was so sudden, he insists, that he was
unable to stop appellant Buntag from stabbing the victim.

We are not persuaded by the claims of the appellants for the following reasons:

First. Contrary to the claim of appellant Buntag that appellant Bongo boxed the victim, the
necropsy report of Dr. Cogo failed to show that the victim’s body sustained hematoma,
bruises or contusions. The findings of the doctor must prevail as against the bare
statements of the appellants.

Second. Appellant Buntag admitted in his sworn statement that before he and appellant
Bongo could leave the situs criminis after the victim was stabbed, Mihangos and Guigue
arrived. The appellants lunged jointly and simultaneously at the two teenagers which so
terrified the latter that they fled for their lives. If, as appellant Buntag claims, he had
nothing to do with the stabbing of the victim, he should have sought the help of the
teenagers, brought the victim to the hospital and reported to the police authorities that it
was appellant Bongo who stabbed the victim. Appellant Buntag failed to do so. Neither
did appellant Bongo seek the help of the two teenagers and report the stabbing to the
police authorities. Both appellants’ unexplained omission is another indication of their
conspiracy and complicity in the crime charged.

Third. Appellant Bongo took the key from the body of the victim and hid it near their
house where the policemen found it. The appellant has not explained why he had the key
to the victim’s room and hid it near their house. He owned the hunting knife used in
stabbing the victim. He knew or should have known that sooner or later, the policemen
would trace the knife to him; and yet, appellant Bongo failed to report the incident to the
police authorities and surrender the knife to them.

Fourth. Appellant Bongo denied involvement in the killing and pointed to appellant
Buntag as the assailant only after the latter had executed his own sworn statement
pointing to appellant Bongo as the victim’s assailant. We are convinced that appellant
Bongo’s denial of any involvement in the killing is but a belated afterthought to escape
criminal liability for the victim’s death.

The trial court convicted the appellants of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua. We note,
however, that the trial court, in its amended decision, made no finding on any attendant
circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder. It bears stressing that under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, any qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of
a crime must be alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution, conformably to
the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against
him.

In this case, the Information alleged that treachery was attendant in the commission of
the crime. The prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only
the crime itself, but also the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.60 Treachery cannot be
based on speculations and surmises. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is
burdened to prove that (a) the malefactor employed means, method or manner of
execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate

98
and, (b) the means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender. In this case, there was no eyewitness to the crime.

On the other hand, appellant Buntag, in his sworn statement, claimed that before the
victim was stabbed, appellant Bongo and the victim had an altercation; appellant Bongo,
in his counter-affidavit, stated that it was appellant Buntag and the victim who had an
altercation before the victim was killed. There is no evidence that the appellants
deliberately or consciously adopted a method or means of execution to insure the death
of the victim.

In fine then, the appellants are guilty only of homicide, punishable under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full range, which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no modifying circumstance
attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be in its
medium period.

The trial court awarded moral damages to the heirs of the victim, although the
prosecution failed to present any heir of the victim as witness. The trial court, likewise,
failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim. The decision of the trial
court shall, thus, be modified accordingly.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 7729 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Casiano Buntag alias "Ciano" and Diego Bongo are found
guilty, as principals, of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, each of the appellants are
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its
medium period, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The award of moral damages is deleted.
The said appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim
Berno Georg Otte, P50,000 as civil indemnity, conformably to current jurisprudence. 61 
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

99
12. G.R. No. 131806               October 20, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LIBERATO CABIGTING y SARMIENTO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal filed by accused Liberato Cabigting y Sarmiento from the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan Branch 19, Malolos convicting him of rape,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify Sheryl M. de Ocampo in the sum
of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos as exemplary damages, and to pay costs of suit. 1

On April 23, 1996, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, with the assistance of her mother, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos, a criminal complaint alleging, to wit:

"That on or about the 23rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Norzagaray,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs have carnal knowledge of one
Sheryl M. de Ocampo, against her will and without her consent.

"Contrary to law."2

At the arraignment on February 25, 1997, accused Liberato S. Cabigting pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged.3 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The facts are as follows:

Sheryl M. de Ocampo, eleven years old at the time of the incident, was a Grade 4
student of accused Liberato S. Cabigting in Tigbe Elementary School, Norzagaray,
Bulacan.

In the morning of November 23, 1995, Sheryl, together with her classmates, Janet C.
Gojo Cruz and Zemonette4 C. Valenzuela went to the house of their teacher, accused
Liberato Cabigting, to clean his house. Upon their arrival, the three children saw accused

100
Cabigting outside his house. They approached him and asked what they were supposed
to do. He instructed Janet and Zemonette to clean the front yard of the house while
Sheryl would clean inside.

When Sheryl entered the house, accused Cabigting asked her to go inside a room.
Sheryl proceeded to a room on the ground floor. The room was about 3 to 4 meters in
length and 2 meters in width. Accused Cabigting followed Sheryl and closed the door and
the window of the room. He took off her sando, t-shirt, panty, and skirt. Sheryl did not
move. Then, accused Cabigting took off his polo shirt, shorts and brief. He told her to kiss
and hug him. She refused. He kissed and hugged her. Then, he pushed her to a bed,
spread her thighs and went on top of her. She tried to kick him but he continued to stay
on top of her. Accused Cabigting held her two hands with his two hands. Later, he held
his penis and inserted it into her sex organ. She felt pain in her sex organ. 5

Suddenly, Janet and Zemonette knocked on the door. Accused Cabigting got off Sheryl
and dressed quickly. Sheryl also put on her clothes. Accused Cabigting opened the door
and led Sheryl out of the room. They all went to school. Sheryl attended morning and
afternoon classes. She did not reveal to her friends what had occurred that morning. 6

Sheryl claimed that she found bloodstain on her panty after the incident. 7 She felt pain for
about three days.

On November 27, 1995, five days after the incident, Sheryl refused to go to school.
Antonia de Ocampo, Sheryl's mother, wrote the accused Cabigting to inform him that
Sheryl had LBM and would not be able to attend classes that day. Sheryl, accompanied
by her sister, Victoria de Ocampo went to Dr. San Pedro at Sapang Palay Emergency
Hospital for treatment of the LBM. The doctor, after examination, advised Sheryl to go to
the National Bureau of Investigation to report the rape incident. 8

The following day, Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas, Jr., medico-legal officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation, conducted a medico genital examination of Sheryl and issued an official
report, stating his conclusions as follows:

"1) No evident sign of extra-genital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at
the time of examination.

"2) Hymen intact and its orifice wall (2.0 cm. in diameter) as to preclude complete
penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without
producing any genital injury."9

Dr. Vargas testified in court that "there was no destruction on the hymen" and that there
was "no laceration".10 However, he did not discount the possibility that there could have
been inter-labial insertion even if there was no full penetration of the organ of the male. 11 
He noted that the examination took place five days after the reported incident and that a
contusion in the vaginal canal heals after four days.12

Accused Liberato S. Cabigting 13 denies ever asking Sheryl and her two classmates,
Janet and Zemonette, to clean his house in the morning of November 23, 1995. He
admits, however, that his pupils normally come to his house, which is 100 yards from the
school, to watch television, to fetch him or to bring his things to school.

Accused Cabigting alleged that at 7:00 in the morning of November 23, 1995, he left his
house to walk to school with his daughter, who was also going to school. Ten minutes
later, he reached the school. He signed the attendance logbook at the office of the Head
Teacher and then prepared his lesson for the day's classes. Later, he proceeded to the
playground to attend flag ceremony with his class, consisting of fifty students. Afterwards,

101
he returned to the classroom for morning classes. Sheryl and the two other girls were
present in school at that time. Lunch break came at 11:45, then classes resumed at 1:00
in the afternoon. Sheryl and her two classmates also attended the afternoon classes.
Classes ended at 4:30 or 4:45 in the afternoon.

Accused Cabigting avers that he has been a teacher for 23 years in Malolos, Bulacan,
and in Bayabas, Norzagaray, Bulacan and that he has never been charged with any
offense. He does not know of any reason why his student, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, would
testify falsely and impute such a crime against him.

Teresita Lo, head teacher of Tigbe Elementary School, testified that accused Cabigting
signed in the attendance logbook at 7:15 in the morning of November 23, 1995. 14

Janette C. Gojo Cruz and Zemonette C. Valenzuela testified that they went to the house
of accused Cabigting at around 7:00 in the morning of November 23, 1995. 15 Janet stated
that while she was cleaning the front yard of the house with Zemonette, accused
Cabigting was cleaning the pigpen.16

Michael Bayumbong, another student of accused Cabigting, testified that he, together
with Jonjon Hernandez and Ronald Hernandez, accompanied Sheryl, Janet and
Zemonette to the house of accused Cabigting on November 23, 1995, at around 7:00 in
the morning. The three boys stayed in the backyard near the pigpen of the house to pick
up dried leaves and plastics. Thereafter, they left for school, leaving Sheryl, Janet and
Zemonette behind.17

On October 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, 18 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING, this Court finds accused LIBERATO S.

CABIGTING guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences
him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the victim,
Sheryl de Ocampo, in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay costs of suit.

"SO ORDERED.

"Malolos, Bulacan, 3 October 1997.

"RENATO C. FRANCISCO
Presiding Judge"19

Hence, this appeal.20

Accused-appellant Cabigting questions the credibility of Sheryl M. de Ocampo, citing

inconsistencies in her statements and lack of evidence to support her assertions.

The appeal lacks merit.

It is settled doctrine that evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court is accorded
great respect by this Court because the trial court is in the advantageous position of
personally observing the demeanor of witnesses. Absent any showing that certain facts
of substance and significance have been plainly overlooked or that the trial court's
findings are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the trial court must be
respected.21

102
Accused-appellant contends that Sheryl was inconsistent regarding the actual time when
the rape took place. According to Sheryl, she went to the house of accused-appellant
Cabigting at around 8:00 in the morning of November 23, 1995. However, her classmates
testified that they went there at around 7:00 in the morning.

The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape and it
has no bearing on its commission.22 The important thing is, it was established that Sheryl
went to the house of accused-appellant on the date reported and this allegation was
corroborated by the classmates of Sheryl who went there with her.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim does not necessarily render such testimony
incredible. In fact, minor inconsistencies strengthen the credibility of the witness and the
testimony, because of a showing that such charges are not fabricated. What is decisive
in a charge of rape is the complainant's positive identification of the accused as the
malefactor.23

Accused-appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to establish beyond

reasonable doubt the occurrence of carnal knowledge of the victim. Medical findings
were inconclusive as to the finding of rape. No sign of violence or any form of injury was
detected on the body of the victim.

However, it is undisputed that the victim underwent medical examination five days after
the incident, by which time, any form of slight contusion in the vaginal canal may have
healed already. The absence of any external sign or physical injury does not necessarily
negate the occurrence of rape, proof of injury not being an essential element of that
crime.24 Lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. 25 Even the
slightest touching of the female genitalia, or mere introduction of the male organ into the
labia of the pudendum constitutes carnal knowledge. 26

Moreover, when a woman, in this case a girl barely in her teens, says she has been
raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that she has been raped, provided
her testimony is credible. 27 It is highly inconceivable that a young girl of eleven years
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely
by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. 28

Accused-appellant contends that any incident occurring within the house would have
been noticed by the classmates of the victim, who were just outside the house at that
time.

The fact that Sheryl's friends were outside the house and she was inside the house does
not remove the possibility for the rape to occur. Rape can be committed even in places
where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a
house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping, for lust is no respecter of time and place. 29

At least four children, excluding Sheryl M. de Ocampo, confirmed that accused-appellant

was at home that morning of November 23, 1993. Mere denial cannot overcome such
positive testimony.1âwphi1

Although accused-appellant presented the head teacher in charge of the attendance

logbook to declare that she saw accused-appellant signing in the logbook at 7:15 that
morning, said witness could not account for the time of accused-appellant afterwards.

103
With the positive testimony of the victim, Sheryl M. de Ocampo, accused-appellant is
liable for rape under Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in effect at the time the
crime was committed, for the carnal knowledge of a girl under twelve years of age.

Regarding the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, the Court notes that the
trial court awarded moral damages in favor of the victim and failed to award civil
indemnity. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of
proof other than the fact of the commission of the offense and is separate and distinct
from moral damages.30 Hence, in addition to the fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
awarded as moral damages, accused-appellant must be sentenced to pay an additional
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

The award for exemplary damages is deleted as no aggravating circumstance has been
proved to have attended the commission of the crime. 31 Exemplary damages, under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, may be imposed only when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.32

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 19, convicting Liberato Cabigting y Sarmiento of rape and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, with the modification that he shall indemnify the victim, Sheryl
M. de Ocampo, in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity, not
as exemplary damages, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, and
costs.

SO ORDERED.

104
13. G.R. No. 124342 December 8, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDWIN LADRILLO, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 1 The prosecution must demonstrate
the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. Only when the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction exists that
the liberty, or even the life, of an accused may be declared forfeit. Correlatively, the judge
must examine with extreme caution the evidence for the state to determine its sufficiency.
If the evidence fails to live up to the moral conviction of guilt the verdict must be one of
acquittal, for in favor of the accused stands the constitutional presumption of innocence;
so it must be in this prosecution for rape.

Jane Vasquez, the eight (8) year old complaining witness, could not state the month and
year she was supposedly abused by her cousin Edwin Ladrillo. She could narrate
however that one afternoon she went to the house of accused-appellant in Abanico,
Puerto Princesa City, which was only five (5) meters away from where she lived. There
he asked her to pick lice off his head; she complied. But later, he told her to lie down in
bed as he stripped himself naked. He removed her panty and placed himself on top of
her. Then he inserted his penis into her vagina. He covered her mouth with his hand to
prevent her from shouting as he started gyrating his buttocks. He succeeded in raping
her four (4) times on the same day as every time his penis softened up after each
intercourse he would make it hard again and insert it back into her vagina. After
successively satisfying his lust accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo would threaten to "send
her to the police" if she would report the incident to anyone. 2

Sometime in 1994 Salvacion Ladrillo Vasquez, mother of Jane, noticed that Jane had
difficulty urinating and kept pressing her abdomen and holding her private part. As she
writhed in discomfort she approached her mother and said, "Ma, hindi ka maniwala sa
akin na 'yung uten ni Kuya Edwin ipinasok sa kiki ko" (Ma, you won't believe that Kuya

105
Edwin inserted his penis into my
vagina). 3 Perturbed by her daughter's revelation, Salvacion immediately brought her to
their church, the Iglesia ni Kristo, where she was advised to report to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). At the NBI Salvacion was referred to the Puerto Princesa
Provincial Hospital so that Jane could be physically examined.

Dr. Danny O. Aquino, the examining physician, reported in his medico-legal certificate
that Jane had a "non-intact hymen." 4 He later testified that a "non-intact hymen" could
mean either of two (2) things: it could be congenital, i.e., the victim was born without a
fully developed hymen,5 or it could be caused by a trauma, as when a male organ
penetrated the private organ of the victim. 6

On 3 February 1995 Jane Vasquez with the assistance of her mother Salvacion Ladrillo
Vasquez filed a criminal complaint against accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo.

The defense is anchored on alibi and denial. Accused-appellant claims that in 1992, the
year he allegedly raped Jane as stated in the Information, he was still residing in Liberty,
Puerto Princesa City, and did not even know Jane or her mother at that time. That it was
only in 1993, according to him, that he moved to Abanico, Puerto Princesa City. To
corroborate his testimony, the defense presented as witnesses, Wilfredo Rojas and
Teodoro Aguilar, both of whom were neighbors of accused-appellant in Liberty, Puerto
Princesa City. They testified that in 1992 accused-appellant was still their neighbor in
Liberty and it was only in 1993 when accused-appellant and his family moved to
Abanico. 7

Edito Ladrillo, accused-appellant's father, testified that his family lived in Abanico for the
first time only in 1993; that when he and his sister Salvacion, mother of Jane, had a
quarrel, he forbade his son Edwin from attending church services with Salvacion at the
Iglesia ni Kristo, which caused his sister to be all the more angry with him; and, the
instant criminal case was a means employed by his sister to exact revenge on him for
their past disagreements. 8

The trial court found accused-appellant Edwin Ladrillo guilty as charged, sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify Jane Vasquez the amount of
P100,000.00, and to pay the costs. 9 Thus, the court rationalized —

The crux of accused's defense is that he was not in the place of the alleged rape in
Abanico, Puerto Princesa City when this allegedly happened. He denied committing the
crime of rape against the young girl, Jane Vasquez. After having carefully examined and
calibrated the evidence on record, the Court is convinced more than ever that the
accused Edwin Ladrillo indeed repeatedly raped or sexually abused Jane Vasquez, a girl
who was then only five (5) years old. This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of
the testimony of Jane Vasquez given the straightforward clarity and simplicity with which
it was made. It is highly improbable that a young, 8-year old girl would falsely testify that
her own cousin, the accused herein, raped her. She told her mother: "Ma, hindi ka
maniwala sa akin na ang utin ni Kuya Edwin ay ipinasok sa kiki ko." Jane also described
that after the intercourse and as the penis of the accused softened, the latter would make
it hard again and then inserted it again into her vagina and this was made four (4) times.
Jane's testimony has all the characteristics of truth and is entitled to great weight and
credence. The Court cannot believe that the very young victim is capable of fabricating
her story of defloration.

Accused-appellant contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in: (a) not giving
credence to his defense that at the supposed time of the commission of the offense he
was not yet residing in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, and did not know the complainant
nor her family; (b) finding him guilty of rape considering that the prosecution failed to

106
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (c) not finding that the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish with particularity the date of commission of the offense; (d) giving
great weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant; and, (e) failing to
consider the mitigating circumstance of minority in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, assuming for the sake of argument that indeed the crime of rape was
committed. 10

A careful study of the records sustains accused-appellant's plea that the verdict should
have been one of acquittal.

Preliminarily, the crime was alleged in the Information to have been committed "on or
about the year 1992" thus —

That on or about the year 1992 at Abanico Road, Brgy. San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City .
. . . the said accused, with the use of force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned five (5) years of
age, minor, against her will and without her consent.

The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of
the Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be
alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More
importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 11 The Information is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on
which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.

The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of
1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for
which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure
of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense
and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the offense
as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to intelligently
prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most,
accused-appellant could only establish his place of residence in the year indicated in the
Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.

In United States v. Dichao, 12 decided by this Court as early as 1914, which may be

applied by analogy in the instant case, the Information alleged that the rape was
committed "on or about and during the interval between October 1910 and August 1912."
This Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on a demurrer filed by the accused,
holding that —

In the case before us the statement of the time when the crime is alleged to have been
committed is so indefinite and uncertain that it does not give the accused the information
required by law. To allege in an information that the accused committed rape on a certain
girl between October 1910 and August 1912, is too indefinite to give the accused an
opportunity to prepare for his defense, and that indefiniteness is not cured by setting out
the date when a child was born as a result of such crime. Section 7 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its purpose is to permit the
allegation of a date of the commission of the crime as near to the actual date as the
information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and when that has been done any date
may be proved which does not surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. It does
not authorize the total omission of a date or such an indefinite allegation with reference
thereto as amounts to the same thing.

107
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness' testimony that
militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court.
Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's
judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the
testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful
compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.

First, complainant had absolutely no recollection of the precise date she was sexually
assaulted by accused-appellant. In her testimony regarding the time of the commission of
the offense she declared —

Q: This sexual assault that you described when your Kuya Edwin placed himself on top
of you and had inserted his penis on (sic) your private part, when if you could remember,
was (sic) this happened, that (sic) month?

A: I forgot, your Honor.

Q: Even the year you cannot remember?

A: I cannot recall.

Q: But is there any incident that you can recall that may draw to a conclusion that this
happened in 1992 or thereafter?

A: None, your Honor.

Q: About the transfer of Edwin from Abanico to Wescom Road?

A: I don't know, your Honor (emphasis supplied). 13

In People v. Clemente Ulpindo 14 we rejected the complaining witness' testimony as

inherently improbable for her failure to testify on the date of the supposed rape which
according to her she could not remember, and acquitted the accused. We held in part —

While it may be conceded that a rape victim cannot be expected to keep an accurate
account of her traumatic experience, and while Regina's answer that accused-appellant
"went on top of her," and that she continuously shouted and cried for five (5) minutes
may have really meant that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her for five (5)
minutes despite her shouts and cries, what renders Regina's story inherently improbable
is that she could not remember the month or year when the alleged rape occurred, and
yet, she readily recalled the incident when she was whipped by accused-appellant with a
belt that hit her vagina after she was caught stealing mangoes.

Certainly, time is not an essential ingredient or element of the crime of rape. However, it
assumes importance in the instant case since it creates serious doubt on the commission
of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The Information
states that the crime was committed "on or about the year 1992," and complainant
testified during the trial that she was sexually abused by accused-appellant in the latter's
house in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City. 15 It appears however from the records that in
1992 accused-appellant was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, a town
different from Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, and had never been to Abanico at any time
in 1992 nor was he familiar with the complainant and her family. He only moved to
Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, in 1993. 16 It was therefore impossible for accused-
appellant to have committed the crime of rape in 1992 at his house in Abanico, Puerto
Princesa City, on the basis of the prosecution evidence, as he was not yet residing in

108
Abanico at that time and neither did his family have a home there. The materiality of the
date cannot therefore be cursorily ignored since the accuracy and truthfulness of
complainant's narration of events leading to the rape practically hinge on the date of the
commission of the crime.

The ruling of the trial court to the effect that it was not physically impossible to be in
Abanico from Liberty when the crime charged against him was committed, is manifestly
incongruous as it is inapplicable. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that Liberty
and Abanico were not far from each other, both being within the city limits of Puerto
Princesa, and could be negotiated by tricycle in less than thirty (30) minutes. 17 But
whether or not it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to travel all the way to
Abanico from Liberty to commit the crime is irrelevant under the circumstances as
narrated by complainant. Truly, it strains the imagination how the crime could have been
perpetrated in 1992 at the Ladrillo residence in Abanico when, to repeat, accused-
appellant did not move to that place and take up residence there until 1993.

To complicate matters, we are even at a loss as to how the prosecution came up with
1992 as the year of the commission of the offense. It was never adequately explained nor
the factual basis thereof established. The prosecutor himself admitted in court that he
could not provide the specific date for the commission of the crime —

COURT: Wait a minute. (To witness) How many times did your Kuya Edwin placed (sic)
himself on top of you and inserted (sic) his penis to (sic) your private organ?

A: Four (4) times, your Honor.

COURT: You demonstrate that with your fingers.

A: Like this, your Honor (witness raised her four (4) fingers).

COURT: Fiscal, did you charge the accused four (4) times?

PROS. FERNANDEZ: No, your Honor because we cannot provide the dates (emphasis

supplied). 18

Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that
accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture,
and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence
required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.

Second, neither did the testimony of Dr. Danny O. Aquino, the medico-legal officer, help
complainant's cause in any way. In his medico-legal certificate, Dr. Aquino concluded on
examination that complaining witness' hymen was not intact. When asked by the trial
court what he meant by "non-intact hymen," Dr. Aquino explained that it could be
congenital, i.e., natural for a child to be born with a "non-intact hymen." 19 However, he
said, he could not distinguish whether complainant's "non-intact hymen" was congenital
or the result of a trauma. 20 When asked further by the public prosecutor whether he
noticed any healed wound or laceration in the hymen, Dr. Aquino categorically answered:
"I was not able to recognize (healed wound), sir," and "I was not able to appreciate
healed laceration, sir." 21 The answers of Dr. Aquino to subsequent questions
propounded by the prosecutor were very uncertain and inconclusive. To questions like,
"Is she a virgin or not?" and "So you are now saying that Jane Vasquez was actually
raped?" the answers of Dr. Aquino were, "I cannot tell for sure, your Honor." "That is a
big probability," and, "Very likely."

109
It is clear from the foregoing that the prosecution likewise failed to establish the medical
basis for the alleged rape. The failure of Dr. Aquino to make an unequivocal finding that
complainant was raped and that no healed wound or laceration was found on her hymen
seriously affects the veracity of the allegations of the prosecution.

Third, from her testimony, complainant would have this Court believe that while she was
being raped accused-appellant was holding her hand, covering her mouth and gripping
his penis all at the same time. Complainant's narration is obviously untruthful. It defies
the ordinary experience of man. The rule is elementary that evidence to be believed must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.

And fourth, complainant reported the alleged rape to her mother only in 1994 or two (2)
years after its occurrence. It hardly conforms to human experience that a child like
complainant could actually keep to herself such a traumatic experience for a very long
time. Perhaps it would have been different if she were a little older and already capable
of exercising discretion, for then, concealment of the rape committed against her would
have been more readily explained by the fact, as in this case, that she was probably
trying to avoid the embarrassment and disrepute to herself and her family. Children, on
the other hand, are naturally more spontaneous and candid, and usually lack the same
discretion and sensibility of older victims of the same offense. Thus, the fact that
complainant, who was only five (5) years old when the supposed rape happened,
concealed her defilement to her mother for two (2) years seriously impairs her credibility
and the authenticity of her story.

We are not unmindful of the fact that a child of tender years, like complaining witness
herein, could be so timid and ignorant that she could not narrate her ordeal accurately.
But the mind cannot rest easy if this case is resolved against accused-appellant on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution which, as already discussed, is characterized
by glaring inconsistencies, missing links and loose ends that refuse to tie up. The rule
that this Court should refrain from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, does not apply where, as in the instant case, the trial court
overlooked certain facts of substance or value which if considered would affect the
outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on misapprehension of
facts.

Denial and alibi may be weak but courts should not at once look at them with disfavor.
There are situations where an accused may really have no other defenses but denial and
alibi which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor,
especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak.

Let it be made clear, however, that this opinion does not necessarily signify acceptance
of accused-appellant's version of the incident. If complainant was indeed sexually
abused, this view should not be considered a condonation of what was done, as it was
indeed reprehensible. This only indicates that reasonable doubt has been created as to
accused-appellant's guilt. Consequently, under the prevailing judicial norm, accused-
appellant is entitled to acquittal. To reiterate, there is in his favor the constitutional
presumption of innocence, which has not been sufficiently dented.

Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical:
sympathy for the victim and admiration for her in publicly seeking retribution for her
outrageous misfortune, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of
the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those
proclivities and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free
themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her
having been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they
ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she

110
demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law. 22

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of RTC-Br. 47, Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
is REVERSED. Accused-appellant EDWIN LADRILLO is ACQUITTED of rape based on
insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. Consequently, his immediate release
from confinement is ORDERED unless he is otherwise detained for any other lawful or
valid cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

14. G.R. No. 133925               November 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AGUSTIN GOPIO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Bulacan,
finding accused-appellant Agustin Gopio guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of ₱3,727.00 as actual damages, ₱30,000.00, as moral damages, and to pay the
costs of the suit.

The information against accused-appellant charged: 2

That sometime in the year 1995, in the municipality of Obando, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Agustin
Gopio y Arcillas, by means of violence, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the said Ma. Princess Millano y San
Diego, 11 years of age, against her will.

Contrary to law.

Trial proceeded as accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 7,

1997. The prosecution presented as witnesses the victim, Ma. Princess Millano, her

111
mother, Luzviminda Millano, and the Municipal Health Officer of Obando, Bulacan, Dr.
Rufino Bautista.

The offense charged was committed by Agustin Gopio, 3 in Brgy. San Pascual, Obando,
Bulacan sometime between the months of May and June 1995. At that time, the
barangay was celebrating its fiesta. The victim stepped out of their house around 10:00
a.m. to buy cooking oil from accused-appellant’s store. However, it was closed. 4 As she
was about to leave the store, accused-appellant called her. When she came near him, he
suddenly seized her and brought her inside the house. There was nobody inside the
house when the victim was taken by accused-appellant to the bedroom. The victim
resisted and screamed but accused-appellant threatened to hurt her and her family.
Accused-appellant laid the victim on the bed in such a way that her feet were dangling on
the floor. Then, he removed her underwear, bent over the victim, and started licking her
vagina. Later on, accused-appellant removed his briefs, knelt on the floor, and placed his
penis in the victim’s vagina. The victim cried in pain as accused-appellant penetrated her.
As the victim would not stop crying, accused-appellant let her go. 5

The victim immediately went outside accused-appellant’s house and rushed home. On
the way to her house, she felt intense pain in her vagina and noticed that she was
bleeding. As soon as she reached home, she changed her clothes. She was confused
and afraid her mother would get angry because of what happened to her. When her
mother saw her inside the house and asked her if she was able to buy cooking oil, the
victim told her mother that the store was closed. So, she was again sent out to buy
cooking oil from another store.

The victim related that on two other occasions after the incident, also in 1995, she was
again molested by accused-appellant. On one occasion, the victim stated that she went
to the house of her godsister, Rachel, also in San Pascual, Bulacan, to invite the latter to
play, but Rachel was not around. Inside the house were several men playing tong-its.
Among them was accused-appellant. When the victim was about to leave, she saw
Rachel’s younger brother inside the bedroom crying, so she went there and picked him
up. To the victim’s surprise, accused-appellant went to the bedroom and closed the door
behind him. The victim tried to cry out for help but accused-appellant tightly covered her
mouth and ordered her to put the child down. When she did so, he lowered her shorts
and panty and started caressing her vagina. After more or less one month had elapsed,
accused-appellant once again molested the victim when she went to her grandfather’s
abandoned house to get the pail requested by her aunt. She did not know that accused-
appellant followed her to the house and she was too afraid to resist the sexual advances
by accused-appellant.

The victim did not confide to her family about these incidents because she was very
afraid of accused-appellant and of what her parents would do to her. Likewise, the victim
was ashamed and worried that her friends would spread the news regarding her
unfortunate experience.6

To corroborate the testimony of the victim, Luzviminda Millano initially testified that her
daughter, who was born on February 7, 1985, was 10 years old at the time of the rape
incident, as evidenced by the victim’s birth certificate (Exh. D). 7 On cross-examination,
Luzviminda recalled that when the victim came back from the store, she observed that
her daughter looked pale and worried. She also noticed that her daughter had changed
her clothes. However, Luzviminda did not bother to ask her daughter what happened to
her because she had several things to do and was very busy preparing for lunch. The
victim did not eat lunch on that day and ate supper ahead of them. Luzviminda added
that since the time of the incident, the victim had become inattentive and withdrawn. She
started getting noticeably low grades in school.8

112
In November 1996, Luzviminda brought the victim to the Municipal Health Center of
Obando, Bulacan because the latter had been experiencing pain in her navel. The health
officer of Obando, Dr. Rufino Bautista, conducted the physical examination of the victim
and made the following findings in his report: 9

On external examination of the genital organ -

Presence of irregular and hardened surface of both labia majora and labia minora,
around the edges of both labia

On internal examination -

a) easily admits size of thumb without any resistant (sic)

b) ruptured hymen with hard edges (scar)

Medical Opinion:

Virginity was destroyed, sexual intercourse was consummated.

Dr. Bautista’s findings showed that the victim’s hymen had been ruptured, caused
possibly by the insertion of a male organ. He concluded that the victim had already lost
her virginity and explained that the looseness of the vaginal canal could not have been
caused by strenuous physical activities or accidental falling. 10

Based on the result of the physical examination, Luzviminda, with the help of her brother-
in-law, asked her daughter if something happened to her. At first, the victim was hesitant
but, later on, she finally told them that she was raped by their neighbor, accused-
appellant Agustin Gopio.11 Thereafter, on November 25, 1996, Luzviminda filed a criminal
complaint in behalf of the victim charging accused-appellant with rape. The information
for rape was formally filed on February 12, 1997.

Luzviminda presented several receipts covering medical, transportation, food, and other
expenses which she allegedly incurred on account of the incident. 12

The defense, on the other hand, presented accused-appellant Agustin Gopio and his
wife, Susita Gopio, as witnesses. Accused-appellant testified that he knew the victim and
her family because they were neighbors in Obando, Bulacan. He testified that it was
impossible for him to commit the crime of rape against the victim in May and June of
1995 because he was then in Novaliches, Quezon City. Accused-appellant explained that
he has been selling fish there almost everyday since 1994. He said that he usually left his
house at 1:00 a.m. to buy fish from the "pondohan" and sell them in the market from 7:00
a.m. until 11:00 a.m. Accused-appellant would then go home and reach his house
between 12:00 noon to 1:00 p.m. Afterwards he would usually go to the cockpit between
1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Moreover, accused-appellant alleged that the victim’s father told
him that, sometime in 1995, the victim and the other members of her family were in
Quezon. Accused-appellant stated that he last saw the victim in 1994 although he
admitted that she used to go to their store either to buy food or play with one of his
daughters.

Accused-appellant further declared that at one time he failed to bring along the victim’s
mother to the market to sell fish and his failure to do so started the animosity between
their families. Accused-appellant testified that it could be why the victim’s family filed a
case against him.

113
Accused-appellant’s wife, Susita Gopio, testified that they had a retail store at home. She
opened the store at around 7:00 a.m. and closes it at 10:00 p.m. everyday. Hence, it was
unlikely that there was nobody in the house at the time of the alleged incident. 13

On November 23, 1996, several policemen came looking for accused-appellant in his
house. When accused-appellant arrived and learned about this, he went to their
barangay captain for assistance. Thereafter, the barangay captain accompanied
accused-appellant to the police station to clear his name. However, when they arrived at
the police station, accused-appellant was informed of the charges against him. He was
then placed in jail despite his protests. Moreover, while he was imprisoned, accused-
appellant executed a sworn statement denying the charges against him. 14

After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, dated April 6, 1998, finding accused-
appellant guilty of rape. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: 15

WHEREFORE, finding accused Agustin Gopio y Arcillas guilty as principal beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape as charged in the information, there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of said crime, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the private
offended party in the amount of P3,727.00 as actual damage, and in the further sum of
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and pay the costs of the proceedings.

In the award of the above moral damages the filing fee corresponding thereto shall
constitute a first lien on said judgment.

In the service of his sentence the accused who is a detention prisoner shall be credited
with the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to Art.
29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant assigns the following errors as having been
allegedly committed by the trial court:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATION IS

INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR ITS FAILURE TO
STATE THE PRECISE DATE OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

In the prosecution for rape cases, this Court has been guided by the following principles
in its review of trial court decisions: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it
is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 16

In the case at bar, our review of the evidence confirms the finding of the trial court that
accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape. The two elements that must be established

114
to hold the accused guilty of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Thus, the age
of the victim, as an essential element for the conviction thereof, must unquestionably be
proved by the prosecution.17

The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of the victim. In the sworn statement, dated November 23, 1996, which the
victim executed and properly identified during the trial, she stated: 18

T: Ano ba ang ginawa sa yo ni Jhun Gopio at gusto mong makulong ito?

S: Dahil po sa ginawang panghahalay niya sa akin.

T: Ano bang klaseng panghahalay ang ginawa sa iyo ni Jhun?

S: Ginahasa po niya ako.

T: Maaari mo bang sabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito kung paano ka ginahasa ni Jhun?

S: Opo, hinubaran po ako ng panty, pinahiga po ako sa kama, dinila-dilaan po ang ari ko
(kiki) at tapos po ay naghubad po siya ng short at brief pinasok po niya ang ari (titi) niya
sa kiki ko.

T: Ano pa ang ginawa ni Jhun ng nakapasok na ang titi niya sa ari mo?

S: Hindi ko na po matandaan.

T: Ano ang ginawa mo ng nakapasok na ang titi ni Jhun sa ari mo?

S: Umiiyak po ako at sinasabi ko na "Huwag po, tama na po," pero hindi po siya nakikinig
sa akin.

T: Ang ibig mo bang sabihin ng ikaw ay pinahiga sa kama ay pumatong ba ang katawan
ni Jhun sa katawan mo?

S: Hindi po, nakaluhod po siya sa sahig at ang dalawa ko pong paa ay nasa sahig.

T: Ikaw ba ay nakakaintindi sa orasan?

S: Opo.

T: Humigit-kumulang, gaano ba katagal na ginawa sa iyo ni Jhun ang bagay na yun?

S: Humigit kumulang po sa isang (1) minuto.

T: Nang pinasok ni Jhun ang kanyang ari sa iyong ari ano ang naramdaman mo?

S: Masakit po ang ari ko.

T: Hindi ka ba sumigaw o humingi ng saklolo para matigil ang gingawa sa iyo ni Jhun?

S: Hindi po dahil natakot po ako sa kanya.

T: Hindi ka ba tinakot ni Jhun?

115
S: Tinakot po ako pagkatapos ng ginawa sa akin ng "Huwag daw po akong
magsusumbong kahit kanino dahil may masamang mangyayari sa akin."

T: Papaanong natapos ang ginawa sa iyo ni Jhun?

S: Yun pong kahulihulihan ko pong sinabi sa kanya na "Tama na po" tapos saka lang po
siya tumigil, pinagbihis po niya ako ng short ko at panty at tapos pinauwi na po ako.

T: Paano ka naman ba napunta sa bahay ni Jhun?

S: Bibili po ako sa tindahan nila at nakita ko po na sarado ang tindahan tapos po pauwi
na po ako tinawag po ako ni Jhun at pinapasok ako sa bahay nila at may sasabihin daw
po siya sa akin.

T: Natatandaan mo ba kung saan, kailan at kung anong oras nangyari ito?

S: Natatandaan ko po nangyari ito duon po sa bahay nila sa Brgy. San Pascual, Obando,
Bulacan, hindi ko na po matandaan ang buwan, araw pero ang oras po ay alas 10:00 ng
umaga noon pong 1995.

....

T: Minsan lang ba ito ginawa sa iyo ni Jhun Gopio?

S: Isang (1) beses lang po yun panghahalay sa akin pero dalawang (2) beses pong naulit
ang panghihipo po sa ari ko (kiki).

The victim consistently testified: 19

FISCAL:

Q: Madam witness, do you know of any unusual incident or any unusual thing that has
been done to you by this accused if any?

A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: What was that?

A: When he inserted his penis inside my vagina, Ma’am.

Q: Do you know as to when was this or when did this take place?

A: That was in 1995, Ma’am.

Q: Around what month?

A: Between the months of May and June, Ma’am.

Q: Why do you know that this incident took place between the months of May and June,
1995?

A: Because there was an occasion then, Ma’am.

Q: What occasion?

116
A: Our barangay fiesta, Ma’am.

....

Q: So what happened when he dragged you inside his bedroom?

A: He advised me to undress, Ma’am.

Q: When he advised you to undress, did you follow his order?

A: Yes, Ma’am, because he threatened me.

Q: What did he tell you as a means of threatening?

A: He told me not to tell that matter to anybody or else something bad would happen to
my family, Ma’am.

Q: After he threatened you with those words and after ordering you to undress which
according to you, you followed, what happened next?

A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina, Ma’am.

Q: What did you do when he inserted his penis inside you vagina?

A: I was then crying.

Q: Why were you crying?

A: Because it was painful, Ma’am.

Q: What happened next after that?

A: When I was then crying and told him to stop it, he stopped and he let me go outside
his house, Ma’am.

....

Q: What happened to your vagina after the accused finished inserting his penis in your
vagina?

A: There was blood, Ma’am.

The victim was unshaken by her cross-examination. She testified: 20

ATTY. JOSON:

Q: Madam witness, you also stated that you are going to buy cooking oil and you saw
that the house of the accused was closed. Now, why despite the fact that the house of
the accused was closed then you still went there at his store?

A: I was about to go back home when he called me and when I came to him, he suddenly
pulled me inside his house, sir.

117
Q: Miss witness, you said that the accused called you. Where was the accused then
when he called you at that time?

A: By the door of his house, sir.

....

Q: Madam witness, you also stated that your vagina bled. Is it not a fact that you were
very afraid at that time?

A: I became afraid because of his threat not to tell my family or bad things will happen to
me and to my family, sir.

Q: What did you think of your blood coming from your vagina at that time, Madam
witness?

A: I became very afraid worried that something might happen to me which was bad, sir.

....

Q: Madam witness, when you went back home and bought again another cooking oil as
your mother have told you at that time, were you wearing the same clothes at that time -
were you wearing the same clothes when you came from the house of Gopio back to
your house and then went out again to buy cooking oil?

A: No, sir, I changed my clothes.

COURT:

Q: Why did you change your clothes?

A: My mother might notice the blood on my panty and she might scold me, your honor.

The age of the victim at the time was likewise proven by the prosecution. In fact, it has
not been raised as an issue in this case.

The trial court in its decision observed:21

. . . . The penal code penalizes carnal knowledge by a man of a woman under twelve
years of age, under any circumstance, whether force or intimidation is used or not,
whether or not she is deprived of reason or consciousness, or even if the girl consented
or herself was the one who initiated the act. She is presumed by law not in any position
to give either consent or resistance because of her young age, and no man is allowed by
law to have sex with her unpunished.

In People v. Alegado,22 it was held that, under §§39 and 40 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, the reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy in
respect to the pedigree of any of its members may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, and the
dates when, the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives.
Hence, the testimonies of the victim and her mother are sufficient to prove the victim’s
age. In addition, aside from the testimonies of the victim and her mother that the former
was born on February 7, 1985 and was 10 years old when the incident took place, the
prosecution also presented the birth certificate of the victim.

118
Accused-appellant interposes a number of defenses.

First. Accused-appellant claims that in May and June of 1995, he was in Novaliches
selling fish. This defense merits no consideration. Accused-appellant has not shown that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. Moreover, other than the testimony of accused-appellant and his wife
that the latter never leaves their house, no evidence was presented to substantiate his
defense of alibi.

In contrast, the victim positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the

crime and categorically testified that she had been raped by accused-appellant in the
latter’s house to which she was taken between the months of May and June 1995. It has
been held that when a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by
rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material
points, the same must be given full faith and credit. 23 Thus, this Court said in one case:24

Alibi as a means of defense is weak when not substantiated by the testimony of a

credible witness. Courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and
have always received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable
but also because it is easily fabricated. Alibi as basis for acquittal must be established
with clear and convincing evidence. The accused must convincingly demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. And, where accused was positively identified by the victim herself who
harbored no ill motive against the rapist, as in this case, the defense of alibi must fail.

Between the positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
averments of accused-appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are
entitled to greater evidentiary weight. 25

The defense further argues that accused-appellant could not have committed the crime in
his house between those months because, as testified to by accused-appellant’s wife,
she was always there tending the store and taking care of their two small children. The
trial court correctly gave credence to the victim’s testimony that there was no one in
accused-appellant’s house when she was raped by the latter. As she testified: 26

FISCAL:

....

Q: You said that he inserted his penis inside your vagina and you said that it took place
between May and June. My question to you now is, where did this takes place?

A: In his house, Ma’am.

Q: And when you said in his house, where is his house? Where is this house located?

A: At Brgy. San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan, Ma’am.

Q: Now, how come that you were in his house at this time?

A: I was then going to his house because he has a store, Ma’am.

Q: And what will you suppose to do in that store?

A: I would buy something, Ma’am.

119
Q: And do you still remember what you were suppose to buy that time?

A: Yes, Ma’am.

Q: What will you suppose to buy?

A: Cooking oil, Ma’am.

Q: Were you able to buy this cooking oil?

A: No, Ma’am.

Q: Why were you not able to buy the cooking oil?

A: Because his house was then closed and nobody [was] inside, Ma’am.

Q: How were you able to go inside his house which according to you were just to buy
from the store? (sic)

A: When I was about to leave the store, I did not see him but he immediately grabbed me
inside the house, Ma’am.

Q: When you were immediately grabbed inside his house, to what part of his house were
you brought to?

A: At his bedroom, Ma’am.

Q: Did you notice if there were other persons inside the house or in the bedroom?

A: Nobody, Ma’am.

The evaluation of testimonies rests primarily on trial courts.1âwphi1 Our function is to

review the testimonies only if it is shown that the trial court has overlooked a matter of
substance which, if considered, is likely to result in a different conclusion. We have not
been shown any such evidence in this case.

And even assuming that accused-appellant’s family members were around at the time,
this does not discount the possibility that a rape was perpetrated inside the house. It has
time and again been said that rape is no respecter of time or place as it can be
committed in small, confined places or in places which many would consider as unlikely
and inappropriate, or even in the presence of other family members. 27

Indeed, the testimony of Susita Gopio is rendered suspect because of her relationship to
accused-appellant. In one case, it was contended that the trial court should have given
more weight to the testimonies of the defense witnesses which uniformly provided them
with convenient alibis. This Court held that these witnesses were either wives or mothers
of the accused who, in almost all instances, would freely perjure themselves for the sake
of their loved ones. The defense of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by the
accused themselves and their relatives and not by credible persons. 28

Second. Accused-appellant likewise questions the veracity of the victim’s charges

against him because of her failure to immediately report the incident to the authorities.
This, too, deserves scant consideration. It has been ruled that the victim’s delay in
reporting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. 29 In this case, it has not
been established that the victim, of tender age, has any ill motive to falsely testify against

120
accused-appellant.30 As the records show, the victim had no intention at all to report the
incident even to her parents for fear that accused-appellant would hurt her and her family
and that her friends would spread the news about her plight. In fact, by reason of such
immense fear on the part of the victim, accused-appellant succeeded in molesting her on
two other occasions after the incident.

What accused-appellant did to complainant would not have been discovered by the
latter’s parents were it not for the fact that she complained of pains in her navel which
prompted her mother to bring her to Dr. Bautista for a medical check-up. There it was
found that the victim was no longer a virgin. Only then did the victim confess that she was
raped by accused-appellant. Had it not been for that medical examination, the victim
would not have told them about the rape committed by accused-appellant. This explains
the delay in reporting the crime in this case.

Nor can this Court consider the victim’s charges as purely fabricated or maliciously
motivated. A young girl’s revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her willingness
to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out details of an assault on
her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as a mere concoction. For it is difficult to imagine
that she would undergo the indignities and hardships concomitant to a prosecution for
rape unless she was motivated by a desire to have the offender apprehended and
punished.31

Neither can any ill motive be ascribed against the victim’s mother based on accused-
appellant’s testimony that he was being charged because he failed to bring along the
victim’s mother at his place of business. No mother would sacrifice her own daughter, a
child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of a public trial
for rape if she was not driven by an honest desire to have her daughter’s transgressor
punished accordingly.32 This futile effort to extricate himself from the charge is so lame
for such omission on the part of accused-appellant would not have impelled the victim
and her family to impute so grave a crime against accused-appellant were it not the truth.
Thus, in one case, this Court ruled: 33

The absence of any ill motive on the part of a rape victim to institute charges does not
render her testimony less credible, for no woman, especially one of tender age, will agree
to undergo the trouble of having her private parts medically examined and the humiliation
of a public trial if she had not been raped. The only clear and evident reason for her to
institute rape charges is to get justice for her plight. Besides, a mother like Thelma
Penafiel herein would not subject her child to a public trial, with its accompanying stigma
as the victim of rape, if the charges filed were not true.

Time and again when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, we have held that
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial courts, considering that
the latter are in a better position to decide the question as they have heard the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. 34 This Court has
said:35

We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an
accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their
testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. These
findings will not ordinarily be disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear showing
that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of the
case. The reason for the rule is an excellent chance on the part of the trial court, an
opportunity that is not equally open to an appellate court, of being able to personally
observe the expression of declarants on the witness stand and their demeanor under
questioning. And the Court agrees with the observation of the trial court that the

121
testimony of Maricris was straightforward, guileless and credible. She gave a plain and
candid account of her harrowing experience in a manner reflective of honest and
unrehearsed testimony. The rule is well settled that when the question of credence as to
which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense where a rape as
committed is in issue, the trial court’s answer is generally viewed as correct.

Third. Accused-appellant claims that he was denied his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him for failure of the information to indicate
the approximate time of the commission of the offense. This claim is not tenable. The
phrase in the information, "that sometime in 1995. . ." has sufficiently apprised accused-
appellant of the crime which he allegedly committed in 1995. It bears stressing that, in
the case of rape, the date of commission is not an essential element of the offense, what
is material being the occurrence thereof and not the time of its commission. In the case at
bar, a reading of the information would readily reveal satisfactory compliance with the
rules and that appellant unquestionably has been properly apprised of the charges
proffered against him. Thus, in People v. Isug Magbanua,36 it was held:

Although the information did not state with particularity the dates when the sexual attacks
took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were committed "on (sic)
the year 1991 and the days thereafter" substantially apprised appellant of the crime he
was charged with since all the essential elements of the crime of rape were stated in the
information. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be
informed of the nature of the case filed against him. An information can withstand the test
of judicial scrutiny as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.

The above ruling was reiterated in the case of People v. Pambid,37 where it was held that,
under Rule 110, §§6 and 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, an information is
sufficient as long as it states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constituting the same, since in rape cases, the time of commission of the
crime is not a material ingredient of the offense. It is thus sufficient if it is alleged that the
crime took place as near to the actual date at which the offense(s) are committed as the
information or complaint will permit. In this connection, this Court also ruled that in rape
cases, victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times, and
manner they were violated. In the same vein, to be material, discrepancies in the
testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which are determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused, not to mere details which are irrelevant to the elements of
the crime, such as the exact time of its commission in a case of rape.

In any event, it is now too late in the day to question the form or substance of the
information because when he entered his plea at his arraignment, accused-appellant did
not object to the sufficiency of the information against him. The rule is that, at any time
before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the information on the ground
that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The failure of accused-
appellant to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except when the
grounds are that no offense was charged, the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged, the offense or penalty has been extinguished, and the accused
would be twice put in jeopardy.38

Regarding his arrest, while accused-appellant claimed that he protested when he was
imprisoned by the police authorities, he failed to raise objections to his arrest at the
earliest possible opportunity. The record shows that he voluntarily entered a plea of not
guilty when he was arraigned on March 7, 1997, thereby waiving his right to question any
irregularity in his arrest. By pleading guilty, accused-appellant submitted to the

122
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest, for the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Furthermore, any such
irregularity will not negate the validity of his conviction duly proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution.39

Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that accused-appellant Agustin Gopio is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape.

The award of damages by the trial court in favor of the victim should, however, be
modified. The award of actual damages, in the sum of ₱3,727.00, must be deleted in the
absence of proof required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code. To be entitled to actual and
compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting evidence of the
actual amount thereof, such as receipts showing the expenses incurred on account of the
rape incident.40 In this case, only the laboratory fee issued by Our Lady of Salambao
Hospital in Bulacan amounting to ₱350.00 was duly receipted. The rest of the
documents, which the prosecution presented to prove the actual expenses incurred by
the victim, were merely a doctor’s prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses.
Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that the right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him. As has been held, "whenever there has been a violation of an
ascertained legal right, although no actual damages resulted or none are shown, the
award of nominal damages is proper." 41 In this case, the victim’s family clearly incurred
medical expenses due to the rape committed by accused-appellant. The victim suffered
from pains in her navel which required her physical examination. An award of ₱2,000.00
as nominal damages is thus appropriate under the circumstances.

On the other hand, based on our current rulings, the award of ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages should be increased to ₱50,000.00 irrespective of proof thereof. 42 In addition,
the victim is entitled to the award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity which must be given
even if there is neither allegation nor evidence presented as basis therefor. 43

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Bulacan, finding
accused-appellant Agustin Gopio guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the victim the amounts of ₱2,000.00, by way of nominal damages, ₱50,000.00, as
moral damages, and the additional amount of ₱50,000.00, as civil indemnity, plus the
costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

123
15. G.R. No. 126899            August 2, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELICITO BARBOSA Y TURALLO, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On January 30, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, in Criminal Cases
Nos. IR-3448, 3449, 3450 and 3451, found accused-appellant Felicito Barbosa y Turallo
guilty of four counts of rape, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count.

The conviction of the appellant stemmed from four separate informations all dated
September 15, 1993, which read as follows:

CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3450

That during the year 1988 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa who was then
eleven (11) years old, on nine (9) separate occasions, against her will and by means of
violence and intimidation, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in such
amount as maybe proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

124
 CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3448

That in or about November 1992 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of violence and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of said complainant in such amount as may be proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3449

That on or about February 6, 1993 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of violence and
intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of said complainant in such amount as may be proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

CRIM. CASE NO. IR-3451

That on or about May 8, 1993 in Barangay La Purisima, Iriga City, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of violence and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of complainant Analiza C. Barbosa, a girl of 15 years, against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of said complainant in such amount as may be proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. Thereafter, the
four cases were jointly heard. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FELICITO BARBOSA
y TURALLO —

1. In Criminal Case No. IR-3450, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code prior to its
amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information and despite the presence of
one (1) aggravating circumstance, and the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. IR-3448, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its
amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information, and despite the presence
of one (1) aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. In Criminal Case No. IR-3449, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its

125
amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information and despite the presence of
one (1) aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages;

4. In Criminal Case No. IR-3451, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its
amendment by Rep. Act 7659, as charged in the information and despite the presence of
one (1) aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the said accused to suffer in prison the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the private offended party, ANALIZA C. BARBOSA, the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

In all the aforesaid cases, to reimburse Juana Malate of the sum of P11,200.00 as
attorney's fee and litigation expenses, and to pay the cost of suit.

The accused, FELICITO BARBOSA y TURALLO shall serve the foregoing four (4) prison
terms successively or one after the other, subject to the provisions of the fourth, fifth and
sixth paragraphs of Article 70, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The accused shall be credited with the period of preventive imprisonment that he may
have undergone during the pendency of these cases in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.5

The facts in this case as presented by the prosecution are summarized by the trial court
as follows:

. . . [P]rivate offended party, Analiza C. Barbosa, was born on February 6, 1978. Her
father is Julio Abad and her mother is Juliana C. Barbosa. Her parents were not married,
so that she was registered in the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as Analiza Cornelio.
When she was already five (5) years old, her mother, Juliana Cornelio married the
accused, Felicito Barbosa. She continued using the surname Cornelio until she reached
Grade 2. Then her mother instructed her to use the surname Barbosa, instead of
Cornelio. Since then she has been using the said surname "Barbosa" and she calls her
stepfather, Felicito Barbosa "Papa". Sometime in 1988 (she cannot remember the month)
her mother went to Manila twice. The second time she went to Manila, her mother stayed
there for a month. It was already March 1988 when she returned. She, together with her
half sister Analyn who was then only one (1) year old, having been born on January 19,
1987, was left with her stepfather, the herein accused. They stayed at the house of the
parents of her stepfather situated at La Purisima, Iriga City, because the latter were also
in Manila at that time. The three of them, (Analiza, Analyn and Felicito Barbosa) slept
only in one room and on one bed. On the third night after her mother left for Manila and
they were already sleeping, she woke up and noticed that her short pants was already
removed. Her stepfather was standing beside the bed where she was sleeping. He was
holding a "Batangas knife" which was closed and which was poked at her side. When
she saw these things she cried but the accused told her not to make any noise and not to
tell her mother or he will kill her and he will not send her to school anymore. She then
stopped crying as she was afraid of what the accused has said. The accused then told
her to remove her panty which she did. The accused removed his shorts, reached for an
oil from the kitchen which was adjacent to the bedroom and after applying oil into her
vagina, the accused laid on top of her and inserted his organ into her organ. Analiza tried
to push the accused because she did not like what the accused was doing as she felt
pain. The accused, however, was too heavy for her and she did not succeed in
dislodging him from his position on top of her. The accused stayed on top of her for about

126
two (2) minutes. He then went to the sala, on her part, she put on her panty and short
pants and kept on crying until she fell asleep. She further testified that during that period
of one (1) month, the accused repeatedly abused her almost every night.

When her mother returned, Analiza Barbosa did not tell her about the abuses committed
by her stepfather because her stepfather repeatedly warned her not to tell her mother,
otherwise, he will kill her. But in the middle of 1990 Analiza ran away and stayed with her
classmate, Quennie Sanglay. After one (1) week her mother and stepfather went to the
house of Sanglay to fetch her. She refused to go with them. The following day her mother
and grandmother went back to fetch her. Her grandmother asked her why she refused to
go with her mother and stepfather. In answer, she told her grandmother of the abuses
she suffered from her stepfather. Her mother and grandmother brought her to San
Nicolas, Iriga City, where she stayed with her aunt Evelyn Cornelio. After one week she
was brought to Manila to stay with her natural father, Julio Abad. She stayed there up to
October 1992 and then she returned to Iriga City as her stepmother kept on scolding her.
In Iriga City she again stayed in the house of her aunt Evelyn Cornelio at San Nicolas,
Iriga City. After one week her mother got her again. Her mother told her that her
stepfather will no longer abuse her. However, as soon as she was again with her mother
and stepfather at their residence at La Purisima, Iriga City the evidence show that, in
more or less the same pattern and circumstances and while her mother was out of town
or just outside their house, her stepfather continued abusing her.

In November 1992, Analiza's mother again went to Manila. She stayed there for about
two (2) weeks. She returned before the Barangay Fiesta of La Purisima on December 7.
Her half sister, Analyn, was with her mother. On the third night after her mother left,
Analiza was watching television at the sala of their house at La Purisima, Iriga City at
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening and she fell asleep. When she woke up she noticed
that her shorts and panty were already removed. Her stepfather, the herein accused, was
standing beside her. She asked him why he removed her shorts and panty. He answered
that he will repeat what he had done to her before, and further told her to lie down and
not to make any noise otherwise he would kill her. She told him that she will not lie down
for she did not want to be repeatedly abused. The accused then got a knife from the
kitchen and showed it to her. She then laid down and the accused placed himself on top
of her and inserted his organ into her vagina. He stayed on top of her for about three
minutes. Then the accused left.

February 6, 1993 was the 15th birthday of Analiza. The previous month, January 1993,
her mother together with Analyn, again went to Manila to fetch Aljon, nephew of her
stepfather. Upon her suggestion, her mother invited Jonah Ocine, a girl of seven years
old, cousin of Analiza, to sleep in their house with her while her mother was away. Jonah,
however, stayed only for three days and she left. And so, Analiza found herself alone
again, with her stepfather, in their house at La Purisima, Iriga City. On that day, February
6, 1993, while Analiza was sleeping in the only bedroom in their house, at around
midnight she noticed that her panty and shorts were already removed and her stepfather
was standing beside the bed where she was sleeping. He was holding a knife which he
poked at her waist. He told her that he will do again what he did to her before. He told her
again not to tell her mother, otherwise, he would kill her. He then removed his short pants
and laid on top of her, Analiza tried to push him but he told her if she will not stop pushing
him, he will kill her. He inserted his penis into the vagina of Analiza. Then he left and
went to the sala.

On May 8, 1993, complainant was at their house at La Purisima, Iriga City. At about 8:00
o'clock in the evening of that day she was lying down on the sofa at the sala of their
house. She was alone. Her mother was at the house of her mother-in-law, helping in
preparing "ibos" (suman in Filipino) to be placed in the refrigerator and cooked the
following day. These "ibos" will be served during the baptism of the nephew of her
stepfather on the fiesta of San Nicolas, on May 10, 1993. Analyn was with her mother.

127
The accused then arrived. He told her to remove her shorts and panty as he again will do
to her what he did before. After some hesitation, Analiza obeyed as she was afraid since
appellant was again holding the "balisong" which the accused used to poke at her side
during the previous times he abused her. The accused then laid on top of her on that
sofa. He inserted his organ into the organ of Analiza. He stayed on top of her for about
two (2) minutes and then left her, but he stayed in the house.

On May 10, 1993, complainant went to the house of her grandmother, Juana Malate to
attend the Barangay fiesta of San Nicolas. After the fiesta she refused to go back to La
Purisima, with her mother and stepfather. She told her grandmother and her other
relatives that the accused continues to abuse her . . . .6

On May 12, 1993, accompanied by her aunt Evelyn Cornelio, complainant went to the
Iriga City Police headquarters where she revealed to the police officers the abuses
committed by her stepfather against her. She lodged complaints of four counts of rape
against appellant. Then she was taken by the police to the City Health Office.

Dr. Tita Lalaine Rito, a city government physician, examined complainant. Dr. Rito later
testified that she found old hymenal lacerations at 10:00 and 6:00 o'clock positions on the
hymen of complainant which appear to be months or even years back, and that
complainant was no longer a virgin. 7

On October 5, 1993, appellant was apprehended and detained in the city jail. 8

As summarized by the trial court, appellant's defense consisted of the following versions
of denial and alibi:

In Criminal Case No. IR-3450, the accused presented his wife, Juliana C. Barbosa. She
testified that the complainant, Analiza lied when she said that she was raped by the
accused in 1988 while she (Juliana) was in Manila, because she did not go to Manila the
whole year of 1988. She was all the time in their house in La Purisima, Iriga City. When
accused testified, he denied that he raped Analiza in 1988 and corroborated his wife's
testimony that she did not go to Manila in 1988.

In Criminal Case No. IR-3448, accused has similar defense. He and his wife testified that
the testimony of Analiza that she was raped by the accused in November 1992 at their
residence in La Purisima, Iriga City, while Juliana Barbosa, her mother, was in Manila,
was a lie, because Juliana Barbosa did not leave for Manila in November 1992. She was
always in their house at La Purisima, Iriga City. Moreover, the accused further argued in
his memorandum that this rape (in November 1992) could not have happened because
at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, when the crime took place, people were still up and
around. The house where it happened is very near several houses. It was by a pathway
leading to the river. Analyn was just downstairs and Analiza's friend, Benelyn, just went to
the house of the father of his stepfather. She may return at any time. And yet, Analiza did
not cry out.

xxx

In Criminal Case No. IR-3449, the defense of the accused is to the effect that he could
not have raped Analiza on February 6, 1993, at their house in La Purisima, Iriga City, as
she claimed in her testimony, because he went to Manila on February 1, 1993 and
stayed there until February 16, 1993. His alibi was corroborated by his wife and his
mother, Bibiana Barbosa.

In Criminal Case No. IR-3451, the defense put up was that the accused could not have
raped Analiza on May 8, 1993 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening because Analiza was

128
at the church attending El Shaddai prayer meeting. She was there from 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. The accused was in the town of Bula,
Camarines Sur, delivering candies. [H]e left about 8:00 o'clock in the morning and
returned to Iriga City at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. He was with his wife, Juliana, his
cousin, Clemens [Turallo] and Judith Ibarreta. This alibi of the accused was provided by
Joan Turallo, niece of the accused Juliana C. Barbosa, wife of the accused Clemens
Turallo, cousin of the accused and Bibiana Barbosa, mother of the accused. 9

After trial, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on his innocence,
appellant promptly filed his notice of appeal before us. In his brief, appellant faults the
trial court in:

. . . BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF APPELLANT IN ALL FOUR (4)

CASES ON THE BASIS OF ITS OBSERVATION ON THE MANNER AND DEMEANOR
OF THE COMPLAINANT WHILE TESTIFYING;

II

. . . NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS

CORROBORATED BY THE WITNESSES;

III

. . . RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION

RATHER THAN ON WEIGHING THE EVIDENCES DURING THE TRIAL IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLANT.10

At the heart of these assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the witnesses. It is
doctrinally settled that such issue is to be resolved primarily by the trial court because it is
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.

After trial, the court a quo gave full faith and credence to the testimony of the complainant
because it found her testimony positive, straightforward, natural and sincere. It ruled that
her testimony met the test of credibility. 11 In contrast, appellant failed to overcome the
overwhelming force of complainant's evidence against him. We shall now consider the
alleged errors of the trial court cited by appellant and his arguments raised in support of
his appeal.

In Criminal Case No. 3450, appellant seeks to discredit complainant's testimony by citing
her inability to recall the date when the sexual assaults were committed. He insists that
complainant could not have been threatened by a closed Batangas knife. According to
complainant, she was raped by appellant on the third night after her mother left for Manila
in 1988. She recalled that her mother stayed there for about a month and returned only in
March 1988.

But even if appellant could not recall the exact dates of the rape, it appears that
complainant was below twelve years old when she was ravished in 1988 because she
was born on February 6, 1978. Thus appellant would still be liable for statutory rape.

129
Sexual congress of a victim below twelve years is rape, as provided for in Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states that:

ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on

the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, R.A. 7659.)

Failure to recall the exact date of the crime is not an indication of false testimony.
Moreover, the precise date when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense.
The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is
alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date at which

130
the offense was committed an information is sufficient. The allegations that rapes were
committed "before and until October 15, 1994", "sometime in the year 1991 and the days
thereafter", "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent
thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient
compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 12

Although evidence with respect to the employment of force or intimidation upon

complainant is mere surplusage in a charge of statutory rape, the prosecution still
established its case against appellant by proving that the sexual assaults against
complainant were committed with the use of force and intimidation, alluding to appellant's
use of a closed Batangas knife, and stressing that intimidation must be viewed in the light
of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something dreadful would
happen to her. Even the use of a weapon is not necessary. Its use serves only to
increase the penalty.13

Furthermore, the stepfather of the victim enjoyed moral and physical ascendancy over
complainant sufficient to cow her into submission to his bestial desires. 14 Appellant's
moral influence over the complainant substitutes for violence and intimidation.

We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 3450 charges appellant with nine
counts of rape. This was objected to by appellant because the information charges more
than one offense violating the proscription against duplicity of offenses in Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, a complaint or
information must charge but one offense except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses. The aim of the rule is to give the defendant the
necessary knowledge of the charge to enable him to prepare his defense. The State
should not heap upon defendant two or more charges which may confuse him in his
defense. The trial court is correct in convicting appellant for only one count of rape under
this particular information.

In Criminal Case No. 3448, appellant avers that he could not have raped complainant at
around 6:00 P.M. sometime in November 1992 because his wife as always was at home
after 5:00 P.M. and Analyn, complainant's younger sister, as always played downstairs.
Moreover, Benelyn, complainant's friend, was just nearby and people were then still
awake. He insists that his wife did not leave for Manila in November 1992, contrary to
complainant's claim.

In a number of cases, the Court has observed that fear of discovery or the likely
appearance of other people does not necessarily deter the commission of rape. It is not
impossible to commit rape inside a house where there are several occupants and even in
the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. Lust does not respect
either time or place.15 Appellant's assertion that his wife did not leave for Manila in
November 1992 is immaterial.

In Criminal Case No. 3449, appellant contends that the identification of the perpetrator is
uncertain because of the poor light. He also claims the defense of alibi, in that he alleges
he was in Manila for medical treatment so he could not have committed the crime.

It is undisputed that complainant not only knew appellant personally; both she and
appellant lived in the same house. At the time of this offense, only the two of them were
home. Also, there was a vigil light in the altar which provided sufficient illumination in the
room to enable complainant to recognize her aggressor. A man and a woman cannot be
physically closer to each other than during the sexual act, 16 there is no doubt complainant
had identified appellant positively.

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Concerning appellant's alibi, it cannot prevail over the positive identification and
unequivocal declaration of complainant that appellant was the author of the crime. What
makes appellant's alibi weak is the fact that it is corroborated only by his wife and mother.
These testimonies of close kin are suspect and cannot prevail over that of the
complaining witness.17

In Criminal Case No. 3451, appellant asserts that complainant was in fact attending the
El Shaddai prayer meeting when the alleged rape happened at about 8:00 P.M. As
complainant explained during her cross-examination, she did not know what time they left
the prayer meeting. But she declared that when she arrived home it was not yet 9:00
P.M. Complainant might have failed to note the exact time of her itinerary but these are
minor details whose exactitude the victim could not be expected to remember. Her
inability to remember these details even tend to buttress complainant's credibility that her
testimony was not contrived.18

Appellant points out that while complainant's rape allegedly took place between 8:00
P.M. and 9:00 P.M. of that day in their residence, yet she admitted attending the prayer
meeting at around 8:00 P.M. Appellant seeks to discredit complainant's testimony
because of an obvious contradiction: she could not have been raped at home while
attending the prayer meeting at the same time elsewhere.

Appellant's assertion can not stand scrutiny. Appellant admitted that he returned home at
about 5:00 P.M. while complainant arrived home before 9:00 P.M. Complainant states
she was raped between 8:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. Clearly, it was not impossible for the
offense to have taken place in the indicated time frame, before 9 o'clock that evening.
Further, considering the proximity of their residence and the venue of prayer meeting,
according to complainant's testimony, it could have taken just a few minutes for her to get
home from the meeting.

Appellant surmises that complainant filed the cases against him to spite her mother who
banged her head on a wall. According to him, her grandmother, her auntie and she
herself concocted said cases. In brief, appellant attributes the rape charges to family
feud, resentment or vengeance. But, this attribution need not sway the Court from
lending full credence to the testimony of complainant who remained steadfast throughout
her testimony despite her minority, as in this case. 19 Nothing on record shows plausibly
that complainant has any improper motive to frame-up appellant.

That complainant did not cry for help while being raped is not too difficult to comprehend.
Complainant explained that her "uncles" are not her blood relations but relatives of
appellant. She feared that they might also do what appellant had done to her. Further,
she was cowed into submission by appellant's continuous threat that he would kill her,
and that she would not be allowed to attend school anymore.

With regard to appellant's claim that it was rather unusual for him to have sexual
congress with complainant without foreplay like kissing or caressing her, hence the
charges could not be true, suffice it to say that it is too trivial a matter to merit further
discussion.

More substantially, appellant argues that if indeed complainant was raped continuously
from 1988 until 1993, she should have not kept her silence until she was fifteen years
old, since she had all the available remedies for redress as well as relatives who could
help her. But as observed by the Court on numerous occasions, delay in reporting rape
cases may be justified if there are strong reasons like death threats against the victim.
Worth stressing, complainant was a girl of tender age who was completely under the
moral ascendancy and control of appellant. Fear alone of what appellant would do if she
exposed his evil deeds was reason enough for her to suffer in silence for a long time.

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Then too her mother's apathy after she told her about the abuses committed by appellant
was another reason explaining delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities.
That she did not file charges promptly against appellant could not diminish her
credibility,20 given her tender age, the moral ascendancy of appellant, and the continuous
threat on her life.

Appellant claims there was no tenacious resistance shown on complainant's part.

Physical resistance, however, need not be established in rape when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's
embrace because of fear for life and personal safety.21

Finally, appellant points out that the medical certificate, Exhibit "C", does not clearly show
that complainant was raped. It is settled that a medical report is not even necessary in a
prosecution for rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction
is proper.22 In this case, the examining physician found old lacerations on complainant's
hymen which appear to have been caused months or even years back. While hymenal
lacerations may also be caused by other factors such as extraneous physical activities,
no evidence was adduced by the defense to support this possibility. But note the
complainant testified that appellant succeeded in inserting his genital into her organ
during the times she was raped. Hence, the hymenal lacerations bolster complainant's
assertion that appellant raped her on several occasions.

Under the penal law then prevailing, whenever the crime of rape was committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, such as the knife used by appellant, 23 the penalty should
be reclusion perpetua to death, a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. In this
case, considering that there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

We note that the trial court awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to
complainant in each case. This however is inadequate. In addition, complainant must
also be awarded the amount of P50,000.00 in each case as civil indemnity in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence. 24

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case Nos. IR-3450, IR-3448,
IR-3449 and IR-3451 convicting appellant FELICITO BARBOSA of four counts of rape
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in each case is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that appellant shall also pay to the victim for each count of rape the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages,
P11,200.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and the costs.

SO ORDERED.

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16. G.R. No. 140406            April 17, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO DESUYO alias "TONY," accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

MARICEL PERU DESUYO was sleeping beside her younger sister Aisalyn one late night
in September 1996 when she was awakened by someone caressing her breasts. She
opened her eyes and saw her father, accused Antonio Desuyo, crouching before her. He
was naked except for his underpants to cover his private parts. Instinctively, she begged
her father not to touch her, reminding him that she was his daughter. But he paid no
heed; instead, he removed her underwear while threatening to kill her should she make
any noise. He mounted her, forced his penis into her vagina and gyrated his hips against
hers. She wept as she continued to beg him to desist from his fiendish assault on her
virtue. Meanwhile, Maricel did not tell her mother about the incident; instead, she kept the
ignominy and pain to herself.

Maricel's mother worked as a housekeeper in a faraway town and she did not want to
give her any trouble. Neither did she inform her relatives who lived nearby. She feared for
her life as her father had threatened to kill her should she speak to anyone about what he
had done to her.

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The accused would repeat his sexual molestation of Maricel almost everyday from
September 1996 to August 1997. His assaults on her virtue were always followed by
threats on her that she would be killed should she report these to her mother. The sexual
abuses of her father were so often that Maricel lost count.

On 14 August 1997, early dawn, as Maricel had been already accustomed to, she would
be roused from her sleep by her father fondling her private parts. Again, he undressed
her and unleashed his lechery on her. It was meant to be the last. In her young and
impressionable mind, Maricel vowed that it would not happen to her again.

On 18 August 1997 Maricel summoned enough courage to relate her ordeal to a police
officer who lived nearby. She bravely narrated to Police Officer Tito Ganggalang and his
wife Riza her sordid tale which was actually a confirmation of what was already
circulating around their neighborhood. She admitted that her father had been sexually
abusing her for close to a year already. Emboldened by the encouragement she received
from sympathetic neighbors, she next confided to Luisa Galit, Maricel's maternal aunt,
who could only commiserate with her.1âwphi1.nêt

Forthwith, Luisa Galit accompanied Maricel to a doctor who upon examination found
Maricel to have several old hymenal lacerations in her vaginal area. Thereafter, they
repaired to the municipal hall where Maricel instituted a complaint against her father,
accused Antonio Desuyo, for having repeatedly raped her.

In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the municipal trial court judge,
accused Antonio Desuyo asked forgiveness from his daughter and promised to leave her
alone should she withdraw the charge she filed against him. Maricel vehemently refused
as her father grovelled for forgiveness. 1 As a consequence, an Information was filed
against the accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old
daughter Maricel.

Maricel attested in court to the truth of her accusations. According to her, ever since her
mother worked in a faraway town, her father was dauntless and unrelenting in sexually
abusing her night after night within the confines of their home. She felt pain and cried
everytime her father would forcibly insert his penis into her vagina; however she kept her
ordeal to herself as she was afraid of him.

After having her first menstruation she became apprehensive that she might get
pregnant. Her father however was unperturbed and simply dismissed her fears by telling
her not to worry. A year after the first forced coition, Maricel decided to end her tribulation
by unburdening her grief to neighbors who readily sympathized with her. She felt relieved
after seeing her father locked up behind bars.2

The accused denied having raped Maricel. He affirmed however that he raised

singlehandedly his two (2) daughters Maricel and Aisalyn as his wife was serving another
household in a distant town. According to him, despite his guidance, Maricel turned out to
be a wayward daughter who entertained suitors at an early age. Once, his daughter
Aisalyn confided to him that Maricel was corresponding with a boy from another  barrio.
He immediately searched through her bag and found a letter intended for a certain Jerry.
Incensed by his daughter's behavior he mauled her expecting that she would atone for
her mistakes. However, instead of mending her ways, Maricel ran away from home and
instituted this unfounded charge for rape against him. He presented in evidence Maricel's
supposed letter to Jerry as well as a letter from his wife pledging her love and support.
He averred that Maricel was being inveigled by his sister-in-law Luisa and the latter's
boyfriend Boy into tormenting him for reasons which he could not fathom. 3

135
The trial court did not give credence to the bare denials of the accused. Solely on
account of Maricel's testimony, the court a quo found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of "multiple incestuous rape" and sentenced him to suffer
the supreme penalty of death, and to indemnify the offended party ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.4

Accused Antonio Desuyo assails in his brief his conviction for "multiple rape" essentially
on two (2) grounds, namely, that the Information is defective and that the court a
quo erred in imposing upon him the penalty of death despite the failure of the prosecution
to establish the age of Maricel with certainty.5

Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed against him is deficient since
by merely stating that the sexual assaults were repeated "within the month of September
1996 up to August 18, 1997," 6 it failed to state the exact dates when the alleged rapes
were committed. Quoting heavily from the early case of US v. Diacho,7 accused asserts
that unless he is informed of the precise "day, or about the day, he may be, to an extent
deprived of the opportunity to defend himself."8

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an indictment that fails to
allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill
of particulars. The records show that the accused never asked for a bill of particulars in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.9

The failure of the accused to move for the specification of the date when the alleged
crime was committed or for the quashal of the Information on the ground that it does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form10 deprives him of the right to object to
evidence which could lawfully be introduced and admitted under an information of more
or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime. 11 It
is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise this issue because objections to
matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. At any rate, it is settled that the exact date of the commission of rape is not an
essential element thereof and need not be stated in the information. 12 The Court has
sustained the following dates alleged in an information for rape as sufficient for purposes
of complying with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to wit: "from November 1990 up to
July 21, 1994,"13 "sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto,"14 "on or about and sometime in the year 1988," 15 "sometime in the
year 1987"16 and "before and until October 15, 1994." 17 In any event, a review of the
evidence presented by the prosecution more than establishes the guilt of the accused for
the rape of his daughter.1âwphi1.nêt

For one, it is highly inconceivable, if not completely preposterous, that Maricel, a

guileless barrio lass, would concoct a story of rape against her very own father, taking
into mind the societal humiliation and personal devastation which such a charge entails.
More so, no serious motive, apart from the beatings which she supposedly suffered in the
hands of the accused, was offered to satisfactorily explain why Maricel would come out
and undergo legal scrutiny of the unfortunate encounters with her father. Thus, if her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.

An analysis of the records reveals that Maricel testified in a straightforward, spontaneous

and consistent manner. Although Maricel expounded only on the first and last instances
of rape, failing thus to give an accurate account of the other sexual violations, her
testimony in its entirety was forthright, clear and free from any contradictions.

Maricel's failure to immediately inform her mother as well as her relatives about her
ordeal is consistent with reason. It must be remembered that Maricel depended on the

136
accused for existence and protection as her mother lived far. As to her total obedience to
her father and the stoic silence she kept about her sufferings, these were all brought
about by her genuine fear of a man who on account of his moral ascendancy needed no
weapon to instill such terror in her. 18 Maricel was convinced of a potential yet real danger
posed by a beast masquerading as the family's paladin.

Finally, we take into consideration Antonio's admission before the trial court that he wrote
his parents-in-law sometime in March 1998 to ask for their forgiveness. Antonio likewise
acknowledged when cross-examined that he begged for Maricel's mercy before the
municipal trial judge in the course of the preliminary examination. No compelling reason
was offered by the defense to explain Antonio's incriminating declarations. Verily, these
are judicial admissions which no man in his right mind would make unless they were true.

The court a quo convicted the accused of "multiple rape" without stating the counts of
rape involved. The records however show that the prosecution established beyond doubt
that accused was guilty of two (2) counts of rape. Although Maricel insists that she had
been raped almost everyday from September 1996 to August 1997 she was only able to
relate with clarity two (2) of the rapes, the first forced coition sometime in September
1996, and the last on 14 August 1997. She positively narrated in detail the surrounding
circumstances of the sexual assaults committed against her on those two (2) occasions.
Indeed, her recollection of these two (2) rapes was very vivid, leaving no doubt about its
credibility and truthfulness.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the guilt of the accused for two (2) counts of rape has
been conclusively established; however, the death penalty was erroneously imposed.
Under Sec. 11 of RA 7659, death shall be imposed if "the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent x x x of the victim."

In the instant case, the Information charging the accused with rape alleges that Maricel is
the fourteen (14)-year old daughter of the accused. However, it is significant to note that
other than the testimony of Maricel, no independent proof was presented to show that
she was a minor and that she was the daughter of the accused. Although Maricel's
relationship with the accused was not contested, nor her age refuted, proof of age and
relationship is critical considering the gravity of the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused.19

It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and her filiation to the accused when
properly alleged in the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt during trial
elevate the crime of simple rape to qualified rape and warrant the imposition of the
extreme penalty of death. As such, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged must be
established by the prosecution in order for the penalty of death to be upheld. In fine, the
minority of the victim as well as her relationship with the accused must be proved with
equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself; contrarily, the failure of the prosecution to
sufficiently establish the victim's age and relationship with the accused is fatal and
consequently bars conviction for qualified rape. 20

Perforce, in the present case, the death penalty imposed by the trial court should be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. Likewise, the award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity
should be modified and adjusted to ₱50,000.00 since the penalty is likewise lowered
to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, accused Antonio Desuyo
should also be ordered to pay Maricel Desuyo ₱50,000.00 as moral damages even if
there was no proof presented as basis therefor since the anguish and pain that
complaining witness endured are plainly evident. 21

137
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, San Jose, Southern
Leyte, finding accused Antonio Desuyo alias "Tony" guilty of "multiple rape" in its
qualified form and ordering him to pay complaining witness Maricel Peru Desuyo
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, is MODIFIED. The accused is instead found guilty of two
(2) counts of simple rape and, accordingly, sentences him to reclusion perpetua for each
count. In addition to paying Maricel Peru Desuyo civil indemnity in the amount of
₱50,000.00, instead of ₱75,000.00, for each count of rape, accused is further ordered to
pay moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 also for each count. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

138