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Vallarta us. Court of Appeals

*
No. L-40195. May 29, 1987.

VICTORIA R. VALLARTA, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
HONORABLE JUDGE FRANCISCO LLAMAS, Pasay City
Court, respondents.

Civil Law; Estafa; Requirements to constitute estafa under

Republic Act 4885.—To constitute estafa under this provision the
act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should
be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The
offender must be able to obtain money or property from the off
ended party because of the issuance of a check whether postdated
or not. That is, the latter would not have parted with his money or
other property were it not for the issuance of the check. Likewise,
the check should not be issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation (People v. Lilius, 59 Phil. 339 [1933]).
Same; Same; Transaction entered into by the parties not a
"sale on return" but a "sale on approval"; Effects of "sale on
approval" transaction.—Properly, then, the transaction entered
into by Cruz and Vallarta was not a "sale or return." Rather, it
was a "sale on approval" (also called "sale on acceptance," ' sale on
trial," or "sale on satisfaction" [CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). In a Sale
or return," the ownership passes to the buyer on delivery (CIVIL
CODE, art. 1502). (The subsequent return of the goods reverts
ownership in the seller [CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). Delivery, or
tradition, as a mode of acquiring ownership must be in
consequence of a contract (CIVIL CODE,

___________

* EN BANC.

337

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art. 712], e.g. sale.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since ownership over the jewelries
passed to the buyer, it was a "sale on approval" transaction.—lf
there was no meeting of the minds on November 20,1968, then, as
of that date, there was yet no contract of sale which could be the
basis of delivery or tradition. Thus, the delivery made on
November 20, 1968 was not a delivery for purposes of transferring
ownership—the prestation incumbent on the vendor. If ownership
over the jewelry was not transmitted on that date, then it could
have been transmitted only in December 1968, the date when the
check was issued. In which case, it was a "sale on approval" since
ownership passed to the buyer, Vallarta, only when she signified
her approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the price was
agreed upon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the check which later
bounced was issued, it was not in payment of a pre-existing
obligation.—Thus, when the check which later bounced was
issued, it was not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Instead
the issuance of the check was simultaneous with the transfer of
ownership over the jewelry. But was the check issued
simultaneously with the fraud?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 4885 amending Art.
315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, establishes a prima facie evidence
of deceit; How deceit established—Republic Act No. 4885,
amending Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, establishes a
prima facie evidence of deceit upon proof that the drawer of the
check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or
insufficiency of funds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Deceit presumed in case at
bar.—Admittedly, (1) the check was dishonored as Vallarta's
account had been earlier closed; (2) she was notified by Cruz of
the dishonor; and, (3) Vallarta failed to make it good within three
days. Deceit is therefore presumed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Complainant parted with
the jewelries to the accused not because she is rich but because of
the check issued by the accused which later bounced; Accused's
failure to deposit the necessary amount to cover it within 3 days
from notice of dishonor created the prima facie presumption under
the amendatory law.—Did Cruz part with the jewelry solely
because she knew Vallarta to be rich, or did she do so because of
the check issued to her? As

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the trial court and the Court of Appeals found, petitioner was able
to obtain the jewelry because she issued the check. Her failure to
deposit the necessary amount to cover it within three days from
notice of dishonor created the prima facie presumption
established by the amendatory law, Rep. Act No. 4885, which she
failed to rebut.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption of deceit under
RA 4885, not conclusive but rebuttable; Good faith is a defense to a
charge of estafa by postdating a check.—Contrary to petitioner's
assertion, the presumption of deceit under Rep. Act No. 4885 is
not conclusive. It is rebuttable. For instance, We ruled in the case
of People v. Villapando (56 Phil. 31 [1931]) that good faith is a
defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check, as when the
drawer, foreseeing his inability to pay the check at maturity,
made an arrangement with his creditor as to the manner of
payment of the debt.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; No constitutional objection
to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of
innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct—Moreover, it is now well
settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of
a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be
overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience
of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient
to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People v. Mingoa, 92
Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing I COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the
"legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved
they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of
the accused and shif t the burden of proof provided there be a
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others
is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience" (People v. Mingoa, supra.
See also US v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 [1916]).
Same; Same; Same; Postdating or issuing a check in payment
of obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check is a false pretense or a fraudulent act—There can be no
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doubt that the "postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an

obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check," is a

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Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals

false pretense or a fraudulent act. It is so characterized by Art.

315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code. Republic Act No. 4885 does
nothing more than limit the period within which the
drawer/issuer must pay the creditor.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional injunction against
imprisonment for non-payment of debt; RA 4885 merely
established the prima facie evidence of deceit and eliminated the
requirement of notice to the payee that he had no funds in the
bank; With the amendment introduced by RA 4885 it is still
criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and not the non-
payment of the debt.—ln People v. Sabio (No. L-45490, November
20, 1978, 86 SCRA 568), this Court ruled that Rep. Act No. 4885
has not changed the rule established in Art. 315 (2) (d) prior to
the amendment; that Republic Act No. 4885 merely established
the prima facie evidence of deceit, and eliminated the
requirement that the drawer inform the payee that he had no
funds in the bank or the funds deposited by him were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. Thus, even with the
amendment introduced by Rep. Act No. 4885 it is still criminal
fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-
payment of the debt.

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Francisco G.H. Salva for petitioner.

CORTES, J.:

The petitioner seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals

decision dated December 13, 1974 affirming the Trial
Court's judgment convicting her of estafa. We denied the
petition initially but granted a motion f or reconsideration
and gave the petition due course.

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As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals,

Rosalinda Cruz, the private offended party, and accused
Victoria Vallarta are long time friends and business
acquaintances. On November 20, 1968, Cruz entrusted to
Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry. In December of
the same year, Vallarta decided to buy some items,
exchanged one item with another, and issued a post-dated
check in the amount of P5,000
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dated January 30, 1969. Rosalinda Cruz deposited said

check with the bank. However, upon presentment, the
check was dishonored and Cruz was informed that
Vallarta's account had been closed. Cruz apprised
Vallarta of the dishonor and the latter promised to give
another check. Later, Vallarta pleaded for more time. Still
later, she started avoiding Cruz. Hence, this criminal
action was instituted.
Based on the foregoing facts, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found Vallarta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa. WE affirm.
Petitioner is charged under Art. 315 (2) (d) as amended
by Rep. Act No. 4885, of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes any person who shall defraud another "(b)y
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check."
By virtue of Rep. Act No. 4885, "(t)he failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice
from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds" is
deemed prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act.
To constitute estafa under this provision the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it
should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of
fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or
property from the offended party because of the issuance of
a check whether postdated or not. That is, the latter would
not have parted with his money or other property were it
not for the issuance of the check. Likewise, the check
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should not be, issued in payment of a pre-existing

obligation (People v. Lilius, 59 Phil. 339 [1933]).
In seeking acquittal, petitioner stresses that the
transaction between her and Cruz was a "sale or return,"
perfected and consummated on November 20, 1968 when
the seven pieces of jewelry were delivered. The check
issued in December 1968 was therefore in payment of a
pre-existing obligation. Thus,
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even if it was dishonored, petitioner claims that she can

only be held civilly liable, but not criminally liable under
Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code. She also argues that
at any rate, what prompted Cruz to deliver the jewelry was
the social standing of petitioner Vallarta and not the
postdated check.
She thus assigns as errors the finding of the Court a quo
that the jewelries were entrusted on November 20, 1968,
but the sale was perfected in December 1968, and the
finding that there was deceit in the issuance. of the
postdated check.
In order to arrive at the proper characterization of the
transaction between Vallarta and Cruz, that is, whether it
was a "sale or return" or some other transaction, it is
necessary to determine the intention of the parties.
The following excerpts from the transcript of
stenographic notes are significant:

I. Direct Examination of Rosalinda Cruz:

Q: Now, what happened with that business
transaction of yours with Mrs. Vallarta?
A: After that and after she finally agreed to buy two
sets and changed the ruby ring with another
ring, she gave me postdated check; I waited for
January 30, 1969. I deposited the check in the
Security Bank. And after that I knew (learned)
that it was closed account (TSN, June 29, 1972,
p. 9) (Italics supplied).
II: Cross-Examination of Rosalinda Cruz
Q: Now, you mentioned about certain jewelries in
Exh. "A." Could you tell under your oath whether
all the jewelries listed here (Exh. "A") were taken
by Mrs. Vallarta at one single instance?
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A: Yes, Sir. It was on one (1) day when I entrusted

them to her so she can select what she wants (Id.
at p. 22) (Italics supplied).
III. Cross-Examina tion of Rosalinda Cruz
COURT: But could you still recall or you cannot recall

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  whether you agreed to reduce the cost to Five Thousand

Eight Hundred (P5,800.00) Pesos?
A Yes, Sir. I agreed to reduce it to Five Thousand Eight
Hundred (P5,800.00) Pesos, Sir, when I went to see her
in her house to finalize what jewelries she wanted (Id.
at p. 26).

Note that Vallarta changed the ruby ring because it was

not acceptable to her, and chose another ring. Likewise, the
price to be paid for the jewelry was finally agreed upon only
in December 1968. Thus, there was a meeting of the minds
between the parties as to the object of the contract and the
consideration therefore only in December 1968, the same
time that the check was issued. The delivery made on
November 20, 1968 was only for the purpose of enabling
Vallarta to select what jewelry she wanted.
Properly, then, the transaction entered into by Cruz and
Vallarta was not a "sale or return." Rather, it was a "sale
on approval" (also called "sale on acceptance," "sale on
trial," or "sale on satisfaction" [CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). In
a "sale or return," the ownership passes to the buyer on
delivery (CIVIL CODE, art. 1502). (The subsequent return
of the goods reverts ownership in the seller [CIVIL CODE,
art. 1502]). Delivery, or tradition, as a mode of acquiring
ownership must be in consequence of a contract (CIVIL
CODE, art. 712], e.g. sale.
If there was no meeting of the minds on November 20,
1968, then, as of that date, there was yet no contract of sale
which could be the basis of delivery or tradition. Thus, the
delivery made on November 20, 1968 was not a delivery for
purposes of transferring ownership—the prestation
incumbent on the vendor. If ownership over the jewelry
was not transmitted on that date, then it could have been
transmitted only in December 1968, the date when the
check was issued. In which case, it was a "sale on approval"

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since ownership passed to the buyer. Vallarta, only when

she signified her approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz,
and the price was agreed upon.
Thus, when the check which later bounced was issued, it
was not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Instead the
issuance of the check was simultaneous with the transfer of
ownership over the jewelry. But was the check issued
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simultaneously with the fraud?

Republic Act No. 4885, amending Art. 315 (2) (d),
Revised Penal Code, establishes a prima facie evidence of
deceit upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or
insufficiency of funds.
Admittedly, (1) the check was dishonored as Vallarta's
account had been earlier closed; (2) she was notified by
Cruz of the dishonor: and, (3) Vallarta failed to make it
good within three days. Deceit is therefore presumed.
Petitioner lays stress on her being an alumna of a
reputable school, on her having a husband who is a bank
manager, and on the big land-holdings of her father, and
argues that it was these qualifications and not the post-
dated check which prompted Cruz to deliver the jewelry
(Rollo, pp. 78-79: Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 10-11).
Hence, there was no deceit. It is thus suggested that a
person of petitioner's social standing cannot be guilty of
deceit, at least in so far as issuing bouncing checks is
concerned. This reasoning does not merit serious
consideration. If accepted, it could result in a law that falls
unequally on persons depending on their social position.
Did Cruz part with the jewelry solely because she knew
Vallarta to be rich, or did she do so because of the check
issued to her? As the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found, petitioner was able to obtain the jewelry because she
issued the check. Her failure to deposit the necessary
amount to cover it within three days from notice of
dishonor created the prima facie presumption established
by the amendatory law, Rep. Act No. 4885, which she failed
to rebut.
Petitioner, however, contends that Rep. Act No. 4885 is
unconstitutional. She claims that even as the presumption
of deceit established by Rep. Act No. 4885 is stated under
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the guise of being prima facie. It is in effect a conclusive

presumption, because after the prosecution has proved
that: (1) the check has been dishonored; (2) notice has been
given to the drawer; and, (3) three days from notice, the
check is not funded or the obligation is not paid, the
accused is held guilty. Thus, it is alleged, the constitutional
presumption of innocence is violated

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Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the presumption of

deceit under Rep. Act No. 4885 is not conclusive. It is
rebuttable. For instance, We ruled in the case of People v.
Villapando (56 Phil. 31 [1931]) that good faith is a defense
to a charge of estafa by postdating a check, as when the
drawer, foreseeing his inability to pay the check at
maturity, made an arrangement **
with his creditor as to the
manner of payment of the debt.
Moreover, it is now well settled that "there is no
constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a
contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence"
(People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing I
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact
that when certain facts have been proved they shall be
prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a
rational connection between the facts proved and the
ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one
from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common
experience" (People v. Mingoa, supra. See also US v.
Luling, 34 Phil. 725 [1916]).
There can be no doubt that the "postdating or issuing of
a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check," is a false
pretense or a fraudulent act. It is so characterized by Art.
315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code. Republic Act No. 4885 does
nothing more than limit the period within which the
drawer/issuer must pay the creditor.

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Petitioner also argues that Rep. Act No. 4885 violates

the constitutional injunction against imprisonment for non-

_____________

** See also People v. Lilius, supra, where the drawer, upon issuing the
check, stated that he was not sure whether he had sufficient funds in the
drawee bank, and that if he did not have, he would cable to have sufficient
funds placed to his credit.

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payment of debt. Ironically, she does not question the

constitutionality of Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code,
which defines the crime she is being accused of, and
provides for its punishment. In fact, she concedes the
constitutionality of the latter statute. She further concedes
that a person may be imprisoned for "criminal fraud"
covered by Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Sabio (No. L-45490, November 20, 1978, 86
SCRA 568), this Court ruled that Rep. Act No. 4885 has not
changed the rule established in Art. 315 (2) (d) prior to the
amendment; that Republic Act No. 4885 merely established
the prima facie evidence of deceit, and eliminated the
requirement that the drawer inform the payee that he had
no funds in the bank or the funds deposited by him were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. Thus, even
'with the amendment introduced by Rep. Act No. 4885 it is
still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check
which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
and not the non-payment of the debt.
Petitioner also assigns as error the denial by the trial
court of her motion for reconsideration. Her motion was
directed at the finding of the trial court that no payments
were made. Alleging that a check drawn by one Sison was
given by petitioner to Cruz in payment of the rubber check,
petitioner claims that had her motion for reconsideration
been granted, she would have called to the witness stand
the Branch Manager of Security Bank and Trust Company,
Pasay City, where the check was allegedly deposited by
Cruz, for said bank manager to identify the owner-holder of
the savings account to which the amount in Sison's check
had been credited (Brief for Petitioner, p. 46).
Granting that the bank manager's testimony would have
been as alleged by petitioner, Our decision would remain.
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As correctly observed by both the trial court and the Court

of Appeals (Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 2-3), the
payments petitioner allegedly made were not shown to
have any relevance to the obligation in question.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
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Decena vs. Administrator, PVAO

SO ORDERED.

          Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-

Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
     Feliciano, J., on leave.

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—Misappropriation of funds received in trust for

the purpose of buying commercial goods for another
constitutes estafa. (Panlilio vs. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA
182.)
The failure to turn over the proceeds of a sale of goods
covered by trust receipts or to return the said goods
constitutes estafa. (Samo vs. People, 5 SCRA 354.)

——o0o——

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