Montebon vs Comelec

Facts: 

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections.
However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the
incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007 elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. In his answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified on the
ground of the 3-term limit rule because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice- mayor due to the retirement of
elected vicemayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintained that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should
not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. 

Issue:

Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance or interruption?

Held: 

Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.  Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government
Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate
succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the
contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of
succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty
by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of
duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Montebon, being
the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004
term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.  (Montebon vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 180444.  April 9, 2008)

Note:

● Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vicemayor, his occupation of the
higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

Aldovino vs ComelecG.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

Facts:

T h e r e s p o n d e n t C o m m i s s i o n o n Elections (COMELEC) ruled that

preventivesuspension is an effective interruption becauseit renders the
suspended public official unableto provide complete service for the full
term;thus, such term should not be counted for thepurpose of the term
limit rule The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo waselected councilor of
Lucena City for threeconsecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. InSeptember 2005 or during
his 2004-2007 termof offi ce, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with acriminal case
he then faced.This Court, however,subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayan‘s s u s p e n s i o n o r d e r ; h e n c e , h e
r e s u m e d performing the functions of his offi ce and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo fi led his certificate of candidacy for the
same position.The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B.Fa l l e r , a n d
F e r d i n a n d N . T a l a b o n g ( t h e petitioners) sought to deny due course to
Asilo‘scertificate of candidacy or to cancel it on theground that he had
been elected and hadserved for three terms

Issue:WON the suspensive condition interruptsthe three-term limitation rule

of COMELEC?

Ruling:NO. The preventive suspension of public officialsdoes not interrupt

their term for purposes ofthe three-term limit rule under the
Constitutionand the Local Government Code (RA 7160).As worded, the
constitutional provision fixes theterm of a local elective offi ce and limits
anelective official‘s stay in office to no more thanthree consecutive terms.
This is the first branchof the rule embodied in Section 8, Article
X.Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" asa period of time – three
years – during which anofficial has title to office and can serve. The word
"term" in a legal sense means a fixedand defi nite period of time which
the lawdescribes that an officer may hold an office.

BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

7/17/2010
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Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT
filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in
the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
     BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. 
     On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veteransformula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veteransformula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
 

Issue:  Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
     1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
     2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
     3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
     4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
     5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections?
If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
 
Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDEthe Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in
NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional
party-list seats.
 
Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation
of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that
a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections. 
     We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissiveceiling. 
     In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional
seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole
integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s
share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the
second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. 
     Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)

     The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the
computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I
vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my
interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major
political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence  
     There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties
in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties
were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political
parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number
of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those
whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these
seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total
number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list
representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of
the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.
     In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of
the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought
to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of
our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the
machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the
marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That
opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
     IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the
party-list system. 
  
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)
     However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote
required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the
people’s broadest representation in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system. 
     Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that
in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But
that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it
mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system can never exceed 100%.
    Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement.
The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief
Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a
minimum vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position; 
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low,
from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in
the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an
outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not
really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they
will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9
     However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as
it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list
groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable
changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the
fundamental law from ever being fully operative. 
     It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list
seats in Congress.But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose
of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending
condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the
legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain
effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that
renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual. 

 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No.

179271 - BANAT(Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs
COMELEC..

COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely
in point, asMINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the
2004 elections.

Issue:Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.Held:According
to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence,it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties,organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.First the law is clear in
that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independenceof one thing
from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which
itordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.Second, MINERO is
diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 andtherefore,
simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation
of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-
list vote.What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate
in an electionnecessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a
confused interpretationof the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the
legislative intent to treat the two scenariosdifferently. A delisting based on a mixture or
fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation notwithin the contemplation
of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.

 
Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2%
party-listvote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.The Court rules that, in
computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematicallyimpossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when
the number of available partylist seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of theadditional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist
of party-list representatives.To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votesin two preceding elections should now
be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure toqualify for a party-list seat
in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This ishow Section
6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of the Supreme Courtto
state what the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established).The most compelling
reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that it wasclearly an
erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability
of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law,
the intent of the legislature and to the rule of law in general.Therefore, the Supreme Court grants
PGBI’s petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No.8679 dated October
13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution datedDecember
9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon asa
party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections.

 
Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction Inc. (ARAROpartylist) vs.
Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013Petitioner:
 ARARO Partylist
Respondent:
 Commission on Elections (COMELEC)This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by a party-listgroup that ran for the 2010 national elections. The
petitionerquestions the validity of the formula used by the Commissionon Elections
in determining and proclaiming the winningparty-list groups. 
FACTS:
1)
 
Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a total of 147,204
votes in the May10, 2010 elections and ranked 50th. TheCOMELEC En Banc sitting
as the National Boardof Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight(28) party-list
organizations as winners involvinga total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed
andadditional seats. The petitioner (ARARO)questioned the formula used by the
COMELECand filed the present Petition for Review onCertiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunctionand Temporary Restraining Order.
2)
 
The petitioner suggests that the formula used bythe Commission on Elections is
flawed becausevotes that were spoiled or that were not madefor any party-lists
were not counted. According tothe petitioner,around seven million
(7,000,000)votes were disregarded as a result of the
Commission on Elections’ erroneous
interpretation.
3)
 
On the other hand, the formula used by theCommission on Elections
En Banc
 sitting as theNational Board of Canvassers is the following:
4)
 
The National Board of
Canvassers’ Resolution No.
10-009 applies the formula used in BarangayAssociation for National Advancement
andTransparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC to arrive atthe winning party-list groups
and theirguaranteed seats, where:
5)
 
The Commission on Elections through the Officeof the Solicitor General took the
position thatinvalid or stray votes should not be counted indetermining the divisor.
The Commission onElections argues that this will contradict
Citizens’
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
v.COMELEC and Barangay Association forNational Advancement and
Transparency(BANAT) v. COMELEC
.
 It asserts that: Neither canthe phrase be construed to include the number
 
of voters who did not even vote for any qualified
 
party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be
 
considered to have cast any vote "for the party-
 
list system."
ISSUES:
1)
 
Whether the case is already moot and academic2)
 
Whether petitioners have legal standing3)
 
Whether the Commission on Electionscommitted grave abuse of discretion in
itsinterpretation of the formula used in
BANAT v.COMELEC 
 to determine the party-list groups thatwould be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
RULING:
1)
 
This case is moot and academic, but theCourt discussed the issues raised by
thepetitioner as these are capable of repetition yetevading review and for the
guidance of thebench, bar, and public. 2)
 
The computation proposed by petitionerARARO even lowers its chances to meet
the 2%threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat.Its arguments will neither
benefit nor injure theparty. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise theargument in
this Court. 3)
 
The Court agree with the petitioner but onlyto the extent that votes later
determined to beinvalid due to no cause attributable to the votershould not be
excluded in the divisor. In otherwords, votes cast validly for a party-list
grouplisted in the ballot but later on disqualified shouldbe counted as part of the
divisor.To do otherwisewould be to disenfranchise the voters who votedon the
basis of good faiththat that ballotcontained all the qualified candidates.
However,following this rationale, party-list groups listed inthe ballot but whose
disqualification attainedfinality prior to the elections and whosedisqualification
was reasonably made known bythe Commission on Elections to the voters priorto
such elections should not be included in thedivisor.Section 11(b) of Republic Act
No. 7941/Party ListSystem Act is clear that only those votes cast forthe party list
system shall be considered in thecomputation of the percentage ofrepresentation:

 
(b) The parties, organizations, andcoalitions receiving at least twopercent (2%) of
the total votes castfor the party-list system shall beentitled to one seat each:
Provided,that those garnering more thantwo percent (2%) of the votes shallbe
entitled to additional seats inproportion to their total number ofvotes:
Provided, finally, That eachparty, organization, or coalitionshall be entitled to
not more thanthree (3) seats

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:
 The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire
to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
 December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution
to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on
7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official.
 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent
to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the
elections.
 Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 

ISSUE:
 Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:
 No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts new
parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions
applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
 Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list
system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
 First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open
to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
 Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the
first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the
party-list system.
 Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only,
but also for non-sectoral parties.
 R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-
list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To
exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the
clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941