Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
BUDDHA NATURE
Sallie B. Kin$
Publishedby :
SRI SATGURUPUBLICATIONS
IndologicalAnd OrientalPublishers
A Division of
IndianBooksCentre r- I f / n F
40/5,ShaktiNagar, >bt'ol-J
', *!
Delhi-110007 :'.. , '
' : -' *
(INDIA) ,t-"'i,
'oU-/
A,
'.
".ue/b r
' ' ,
O 1991StaleUuiverstiyof New York {/i},. .u,,,,.
' U*F, ,n
'
All RightsReservetl 'tru
U i-r- -
ISBN 8r-7030-308-9
Frinteclat:
D.K. FineArt hess, Delhi.
PRINTEDIN INDIA
For mY Parents,
JamesForrest Kin$, Sr.
and
Carolyn Prout Kin$
CONTENTS
Preface lx
Ahlrreviations xi
vll
BUDDHANATURE
Notes t73
Glossary 185
Index 201.
vlll
Preface
lx
PREFACE
Ratna!,otra Ratnap,otravibhdga
xl
CTHPTER ONE
Introduction
2
INTRODUCTION
B. Terms
Any discussion of the term Buddhcr n&ture must beg,in with
consideration of the term tuthdganEqrbha, to which it is closely
'1 n
rl
,l
BUDDHANATURE
4
INTRODUCTION
C. History
Buddha nature thought is rooted in the Indian Mahiydna
doctrinal tradition. It will be helpful for a proper understandin$ of the
Buddhn Nature Trestise to place it historically in the context of the
history of Yo$flciira, praifid,paramitd., Mddhyamika, and tat@a-
togarbha thought.
6
INTRODUCTION
I
INTRODUCTION
and cog,nize. We do not see the thing as it really is; we see only a
conceptualized thing. And this is precisely Vasubandhu's point (as it had
been Asand,a'salso). All that we commonly perceive is vijfiaptintdtra. It is
only "representation" or "just conceptualization."And becauseof this, it is
not ultimate realiw.I3
l0
INTRODLTCTION
1l
NATLIRE
BLTDDHT\
t2
INTRODLICTION
as an
much of the tathdgutc@arbha literature and often is seen
important foundation of lr'lahdydnadevotionalism'
Ttre Anuncltvclpurnlttq-nirdeict is a short text with a simply
nf
statecl bitt paradoxical theme: the absolute identification
all sentient bein$,s in
t(fihcrlatugarbha, sattvadhatu (the totality of
The text
their essential nature), and dharmakdrya or dhqrntadhdfu'
one thing
emphasizes that in order to become free of rvron$ views'
is
must be known; namely, the sin$le dhqrmadhatu' The latter
This
identified with the tathAgatug&rbha and the dhs'rmakdya'
rvaves of
dharmakd;to, when bounJ by defilements. "drifting on the
beings. This same dharmakaya' when
sarysd,ra," is called sentient
sufferin$ oL sarysd'ra, in putting aside
filled with repugnance for the
pAramitd, embracin$ the 84'000
all desires, practicin$ the ten
is called
Dharma $ates, and cultivatin! bodhisattva practices,
when free from all
brsdhiscttrca.s.A$ain, this same dhannakaya,
Thus tbe
defilements and utterly pure' is called Tath'dgata'
the realm of
dharmakdyo is the realm of sentient bein$s, and
with one
sentieni bein$s is the dhsrmakdya' These are two names
the
meanin$.l7 llence, whereas the Srimfrla-sd'trcl emphasizes
this text
trurrr"*nd"nce of the t&thcigangarbha in the Buddha'
immanence of tathdeat&garbha' in ordinary sentient
emphasizes the
course, are not contradictory positions but
beings. These, of
l"-"rltary emphases, f,iven the basic t&thcig&tu9p'rbho doctrine
"ornf, joined with
of concealed immanence; that is, ontolo$ical immanence
eXistentialtranscendence'
the
The Ma'hdparinirnana-sutro is a Mahayana alternative to
The former text's
Mahd.oarinibbclncr'suttanta ol early Buddhism'r8
on the
teachinglson the Buddha nature exerted enormous'influence
the question of
history of g,raahu nature thou$ht in China, especially
on the
the universality of future Buddhahood. The Chinese debate
quesrion was framed by the fifth century translations of the Ma'hd'pa-
first
rinirrcan}a-suta by Dharmakgema and Fa-xian (Fa-hsien)' The
not
translation. that of Fa-xian, indicated that the icchantika, would
attain Buddhahood. Despite the authority of this scripture, the $reat
Bud-
monk Dao-sheng (Tao-shen$) do$$edly insisted upon universal
was ostracized from the San$ha' He later
dhahood and consequently
was vindicated and elevated to prominence when the much lon$'er
translation by Dharmakgema was seen to include passa$essupporting
universal Buddhahood, even for theicchantiko.le with this resolved,
13
BUDDHANATURE
chinese scholars settled into careful and extensive study of the text's
teachings about what Buddha nature is.
Despite this important historical role, the Mahdparinirwa4a-
sutro does not present any important innovation in t&thdgqtaga,rbha
theory comparable to the three texts already discussed. As rve ha'e
seen, it tends to be rather unsystematic and seems to speak with
many voices. This very irnprecision, however, made the text a fruitful
one for later students and commentators, who were obliged to create
their own order and bring it to the text. substantively, the text
emphasizes the eternity of the Buddha, implicitly criticizing the idea
that ninsdqa means extinction, and linking this belief with the idea of
the tathdgatagarbha.2o Within this framework, however, the text
speaks of Buddha nature in so many different ways that chinese
scholars created a variety of lists of types of Buddha nature that they
discerned in the course of their studies of the text.2l
The most important innovation of the text in the context of the
development" ol ta,thd,gatasarbha-Buddha nature thought is its
linking of the term buddhqdhd"tu or tathdeatadhatu, which appears
to be used for the first time in this text, with the tathagatap,arbha.22
we saw earlier that the chinese term fo rin6f best translates the
sanskrit buddlwdhdtu or tathd,gatadhdtu, so this is a crucial point
for Chinese Buddha nature thought.
These are the four most important tctthagatugarbha sutros of the
early period. This early tradition is summarized by an inportant ddsrrcr,
the Ratnagotrursibhdga, also know as the Mahayan6ttarcttantresd,s
tr& ar simply [Jttqrq,tantrq. In the west this text is perhaps the best
known of the early tctthdgatugarbhq, texts (with the arguable excep-
tion of the Srtmalada,sr-siltra, which has received recent attention).
having been translated into English and studied by both obermiller
and rakasaki.23 Modern scholarship has revised our beliefs about the
text of the Ratna,gotr(1. As we have seen, Tibetan tradition attributes
the Ratnapotrq to Maitreya, as one of the Five Books of the latter. on
the basis of his studies, Takasaki leaves the attribution of the Rqurc,e-
otr@'sverses to Maitreya intact (thou$h unsure) but names sdramati
as the author of the prose commentary of the text.2a He dates the text
as we have it tc-rthe early fifth-century c.E. and places the verses
sometime between Ndgdrjuna and Asanga.2sSanskrit, Tibetan, and
chinese versions of the text all exist, thoug$r the sanskrit text was
discovered only recently, with the edited version published in 1950.26
T4
INTRODUCTION
t5
BUDDIIANATURE
16
BLTDDFIA
NATURD
18
F
I
II INTRODTICTION
I
tathctgatagarbha,, or Yopacara-tathdgata$arbha texts. These men,
Ratnamati (fifth-sixrh-centuries), Gunabhadra (394-468). Bodhiruci
.(sixth-century), and Paramartha (499-569), demonstrared in their
life's work that they highlv valued this double srream..r8
Grosnick isolates three factors in non-Dharmapdla yogdcara that
rvere strfficiently compatible with t&thag&t&Earbha ideas to pave the
way fbr syncretism.se All three are central features of yogacara
thought, and all are prominent in the Bi{?. The first is the belief that
Stanyateachings leave themselves open to a nihiiistic misunderstand-
iqg and are incomplete as found in prajfid and N{ddhyamika rexts. As
discussed earlier, Yogacdra and ta,thdgatagarbhe, thinking on this
point is remarkably close: They agree that it is vital ro convey that
Buddhist practice not onl)'frees one from delusion but also frees one
to realize Truth, Truth that is not nihilistic but atTirmative of that
which one will discover.
The second feature of Yogdcdra that Grosnick cites as opening it
to tqthdgata4&rbhcl thought is subject-object nondualism. In
Yo$acara, subject-object nondualism is a feature of Thusness
(tcnhatd). and Thusness is an expression for what one realizes at the
end of the Path. It is in this affirmative function that both
subject-object nondualism and Thusness are identified with Buddha
nature in the Bi[?.
Finally, the Yogdcdra doctrine of trisv&bhanrc, the three natures,
also appears prominently in a number of syncretic texts, including
the BN?. Ttris docrrine in its Yogacira contexr explains the
relationship between delusion and enlightenment. parikatpita-
i
st:ab hcnsa is delusion experi en ce, parini gpanna- srsabhctvct is enli$ht-
enment experience, or seein$ thin$s as they are. Pqratqntra-
svabhava, the dependent nature, is the $iven: When seen throu$h
delusion, it is purikalpita; when seen without delusion, it is
parhiqpanna. Because the relationship between delusion and
enlightenmenr is a weak point ol tathdgatagarbhct rhought (the
Snmata-sntro is typical of nthagatagarbha literarure in avoicling
this issue by stating "only a Buddha undersarrds this"). the
trisvabhdqrq, doctrine strengthened tathAgatagarbho thought by
supplementing its account of delusion and enlightenment. Moreover,
used in this way, the trisrsobhdpo doctrine integrates perfectly rvith
the dual Yogacdra-tathdgatagurbha insistence upon confirming the
positive nature of what one attains through Buddhist practice: One
T9
BUDDI-IANATURE
20
INTRODUCTION
Paramrtrtha
21
BUDDFL\NATURE
22
INTRODUCTION
23
BTIDDTTA
NATURE
24
INTRODLTCTION
25
BUDDHANATIIRE
26
INTRODUCTION
27
BLIDDI{ANATURE
them in the Bi[T at the point of their importation from India to China
(via Paramartha), prior to their appropriation by Chinese Buddhist
thinkers. Becausethese ideas were established at the ground of the
then-emerging indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools and u'ere nor
the exclusive property of any one of these schools, the importance ot'
these ideas for Chinese Buddhism is unusually broad. The elucidation
of these thernes is one purpose of this book.
A second purpose of this book is to grapple u'ith the cornrnorl
charge that the notion of Buddha nature (or tathagatugarbhal
introduces into Buddhism the non-Buddhist, crypto-Hindu elemenr ot
atnntsctda (a vierv of an entitative, metaphysical self or soul) or
idealistic monism. I will explore the extent to which it is possible to
defend the Buddha nature concept from a purell' Buddhist
perspective, in terms of purely Buddhist philosophical principles. I
believe this reflects the author's orvn understandinA of the Buddha
nature.
I begin this project by discussing the Buddha nature concept in
the jarSon of the text itself. I hope to show in this u'a;- that the author
simply does not think in either entitative or monistic terms, but bases
his philosophy from the ground up on entirel-v other principles. .\s m1'
"Buddhistic" defenseof Buddha nature relies upon my explanation of
the latter in terms of action and practice, I also consider rvhat kinds
of action and practice are considered especiallydisclosive of Buddha
nature.
A final goal of the book is to engage the BN? in dialogue rvith
current Western thinkinS on the concept of human personhood. The
concept of Buddha nature is probably the sing,le mosr importanr
component of East Asian Buddhist concepts of human personhood.
As such, to the extent that it is possible to overcome the cultural $ap
between us, we could profit by hearing tliis Buddhisr response to the
perennial and universal question of human being, In Chapter 7 I rvill
engage in cross-cultural philosophy by addressing Western philosoph-
ical questions about human personhood to the BNT's Buddha nature
concept.
28
CHAPTERTWO
The Conceptof BuddhaNature
29
t]T'DDII.\
NATI'RE
The author of the BN? is concerned that his readers' minds mav
be tull of notions ol atman and ancttmctn, misconceptions of Buddha
nature, and so on and that these ideas n'ill interfere with the correcr
understanding of Buddha nature he rvants to preserlt. Thus he begins
by contrasting Buddha nature with such competing conceptions and
criticizing rhe latter, thereby clarili'ing what Buddha nature is not.
only on this basis,he feels, can he go on to discuss in a constructi'e
manner horv the term Buddhq nature actually does function. Thus
we begin with a discussion of u'hat Buddha nature is not, argued in
the context of a refutation of competin$ views.
The author's first mo'e is to refute both the vierv that the Buddha
nature exists and the vieu'that it does not exist. The way in which
this is done is epical of the logic of the BN?. \vith respect to Buddha
nature, sa1'sthe author, if you say either that it exists
fu,,ou)or that it
does not exist (tcru) you go astray. Let us consider these imporiant
terms.
You and wu are two of the most thoroughlv studied u.ords in the
classical chinese language, especiallf in their philosophical mean-
in$s. Basically,you means "ha'e" or ,,there is.,' Wu is the opposrte,
meanin$ "lack" or "there is not." Thus the terms indicate the
presenceor absenceof a thing or things. philosophicalll"
1'ou and te,u
early took on the extended, abstracr" senses of existence and
nonexistence, something and nothin$. These are used, tor example,
30
NATI.,RE
OF BLIDDTL{
THE CONCEPT
31
'DDIIA
BI N.\TURE
inherent in practice *'ill be lost. \\4r-vpractice the Buddha way it' o'e
already is Buddha? Thus. the ideas of both there being and not being
a Buddha nature rnust be rejected, as either equalll, rvould lreeze
realitl" into a static state of being.
Bein€ and nonbeing are seen as static categories in Buddhist
thought' As such thev are unacceptable terms tbr explaining reality
becausethev do not allorv for the self-transformation,hut
the Buddha Wav. As our author puts it, neither existence"nirtir,rt".
(!ou) nor
nonexistence (.o'u) can be "transformed." "\\'hat is cannot
be
destrol'ed, *'hat is not cannot be produced" (7BBc). This, of course.
applies to Buddha nature as rvell. Thus, the author sa},s, Buddha
nature is nothin6i "fixed" (dinE). Reality, and that rvhich constirures
reality, is ot' a dynamic, everchan6lingnature. To think of
rt as
"fixed"-u'hether as bein$ or as nonbeing-is a basic
mistake.
Ontology takes second place to practical necessity; primary
importance is given to rvhat is soteriological,the self-transtbrmation
of liberation. ontological notions sen,e primarily to provide
a
theoretical explanation as to horv self-transformation or chan$e
is
possible.In the B-\?, the basis of this explanation is establishecl
with
the rejection of the static notions of being and nonbeing.
so far this t.vpe of logic souncls like l{iddle path logic-the two
extremes of being and n,nbein$, eternalism and annihilationism. are
denied. Horve'er, rvhereas in sinyuvurla thought the rrroblem of
beirrg a.nd nonbeing is resol'ed in tire dialectics of itny'ta or
emptiness, here in tathagatagarbha_Buddha nature thought, the
case is rather different. The issue of the being or nonbeing of tsuddha
nature is concluded in the BN? as follows: "ln accordance with
principle (Dao li), all sentienr beings universally and aboriginally
possess the pure Buddha nature. That there should be one
who
eternalll' failed to obtain parinit-oana is not the case. This is why
Buddha nature most assuredly aboriSinally exists (ben you); the
reason being, that is, that it has nothing to do with either being or
n o n b e i n g "( 7 8 8 c ) .
The author begins this passage by appealing to ,,principle,"
literallr' "wa1'-principle." Thus, thou$h the statement does, as the
author notes, refer to scripture (Tathagatagarbha Sutrq,.\,the author
also u'ants to ground his teachings in what he feels simply is true, the
rval'things are. n4rether or not a Buddhd had come into the worid to
point it out to us. This is ti?ical of tq,tha^ataAarbha literature.6
32
NATLIRN
TTIECONCEPTOF BLIDDFLA'
The author also rvants to indicate with this that rvhat he is sayin$
is an actively affirmative truth; that is, a positive qualitl' of reaiity,
which may be spoken of in affirmative lan$ua$e' hon'ever obliquely'
He is sayin$,in effect: The world is not chaotic, rve need not be lost in
i t . T h e r e i s a p r i n c i p l e . d i s c o v e r a b l eb v h u m a r t s . m a n i i e s t i n B t, h e
order of the universe. llv realizinp this principle (rnore closelv, b;-
bringin$ ourselves into accordance rvith this principie) rve ma1'
discover this truth of the ur.riverse,which also is the truth of our on'n
nature. This is a reason for rejoicin$, and the author of the BArTfelt it
imperative that this be made clear.
What is the meanin$ ot the statement that tsuddha nature "most
assuredly abori$inally exists"? The abori$inal existetrce, berr 1'otr,
spoken of here, is altogether different trom ordinary existence.
-
Literally, ben - "root, source,ori$in" - plus -l'ou- "existence,bein$"
the term conrrasts rvith you in the sense ot' finite existellce; that is,
the processof cornin$ into bein$ and perishinp,in time. Ben ltru thus
contrasts with both existence' or bein$ Ll'orr)' artd nonexistence' or
nonbeing (tou), both in the finite sense.An ir.lterestingparallel carr be
found in the Daoist concept of to'u. Daoist rhirrkers distin$uished nvo
senses of the term vru.. (1) "that primal uldift'erentiated state that
preceded the later state of manifested thin$s (r'u)[r'ou]" and (2) "the
perpetual alternation of the absence of somethip$ (tc'u) as coltrasted
to the presence of something t)tu) [r'oul'" The former "tt'as not a
,nothing' for it contained all future possibilities for $'orld
mere
manifestation."T This sense of tctu also rvas called ben w'u, "ori$inal or
root nonexistence" to distin$uish it from the second sense of merell'
contin$ent nonexistence.
The term ben you used in the BN? may have been int'luenced by
the Daoist ben wu. In both, the term tren is attached to the verb to
distinguish the existence or nonexistence in question from the
merely contingent variefy. Both ben you andben tou (independently)
stand opposed to the existence-nonexistence pair. Benyou, however,
does not carry the connotation carried by ben to'u in the Daoist usage;
namely, the sense of referrin$ to that out of which all else emer$,eciin
a temporal sense.
Ben you, moreover, plays a role in tctthdg&tqgqrbhq-Btddha
nature thou$ht similar in an imporlant way to that which 9ilnyatd'
plays in Sfirrya thou$ht. In both cases, the two extremes of bein$ and
nonbeing are rejected, and we are lgft with a term that indicates the
33
BUDDHANATURE
34
THE CONCEPT OF BLIDDIL\ N.\TL'ITE
the cause, you cannot sa-v it does not exist. In this .sense, culrse and eftcct.
reflection and understandin$ reach completion toAether. ancl therefore *-e
say there is no o\4'n-nature. (793a)
The idea of own-nature is refuted because it does not alloli, tbr the
process of chan$e as seen in the $rowth ot' a plant or in an), process
havin$ a former and a subsequent stage. The author, as a Buddhrst,
conceives of an own-nature as bein$ eternal precisely in the sensc ot
unchan$in$.Therelbre any phe:romenon or event that in an1,\\.avrs
dynamic or in process is judged to be empty' of an own-nature.
Because,according to Buddhism, all is in f'lux, nou,here rvill one find
an own-nature. Buddha nature is no exception to this all-
encompassin$rule.
The author offers us here no new ideas or perspectives. \Vhat he
gives us is straight Middle Path logic emphasizing the process of tlux
and the interdependence of cause and eft'ect, of former and
subsequent stages.He concludes the section by affirming in the most
orthodox manner, "Know, therefore, that all thin$s are Thus trul5,
without own-nature. only true emptiness is their essential nature"
(793c). In this way the author affirms that his forthcoming teachings
concerning the Buddha nature do not trespass on the inviolable
teaching that there is no own-nature. He anticipates that his
teachin$s may resemble an own-nature view. Hence, early in the
treatise he discredits this view in order that such a misunderstandina
not develop.
The auth6r next prepares the reader to understand the status of
his Buddha nature teachings in the context of the Mahayana
emptiness doctrine, specifically, the emptiness doctrine of the
Nlddhyamika two truths (satyadvaya) theory. To do so, he must first
discredit a certain misunderstanding of the two truths doctrine and
then offer his own interpretation of that doctrine. His interpretation
is presented in the form of a synthesis of Madhyamika two truths
theory and Yogdcdra three natures (trisrsabhdva) theory.
The Madhyamika two truths theory teaches that all of reality is
encompassed by two levels: the relative or worldly (samvrti) and the
ultimate or supreme (pa,ramdrtho). Though ordinarily translated as
"truth," the sagta of sa,tyadzsayaembraces both epistemolo$ical and
ontological qualities; it is the key rerm in a theory of experiential
reality. Saryooqti-saiyo is said to be whatever is enveloped and
.)J
BUDD}IANATURE
36
THE CONCEPTOF BUDDHANATURE
the a,bsenceof own nature, we are still speaking and thinkin$ on the
level of worldly truth, on the level of the duality of the presence and
absence of thin$s, includin$ own-nature. Given that the lan$ua$e and
concepts of worldly truth are inherently deficient, they rnust
represent a deficient perspective frorn which to speak of supreme
rruth. Therefore, this second-level understanding of the two truths
also must be transcended.
We thus are brought to the third and final position, representing
rhe author's o*'n understandin$ of the two truths. Especially
important is his understanding of supreme truth. In expressing this
understanding he rejects the dualistic lan$ua$eof bein$ and nonbein$
characteristic of the position of worldly truth in favor of his own
characteristic formulation: Neither bein$ nor nonbein$ is the case.
37
BUDDTL\
NATLIRE
3B
THE CONCEPTOF BLTDDHA
NATURT)
you bu you). This is the final salvo against an1'who might mistake
emptiness for nonbeing. The treatment of emptiness in this text both
argues against this particular mistake and opens the way for a
discussion of emptiness in positive terms. For the BN?,s author,
emptiness, or supreme truth, has a positive, "being,ful" quality to it. It
is not just the negation of worldly truth; it also functions positively to
"reveal" somethin$.
In sum, three points have been established in this section.
1. It is incorrect to say either that Buddha nature exists or does
not exist, though it is correct to say Buddha narure
aboriginally exists, as long as this is undersrood as an
affirmation of each person's potential to realize Buddhahood
and not as a kind of existence that can stand in contrast to
nonexistence.
2. Buddha nature is not an owrr-nature; an own-narure cannot be
found where a phenomenon, such as a person, is in process.
The idea of an own-nature therefore is to be discredited and
thoroughly distinguished from the notion of Buddha nature.
3. Emptiness is not merely a matter of negation; supreme rruth
does not merely negate worldly truth. The contents of
emptiness or supreme truth cannot be so limited as to be
exhausted by functioning in a destructive manner; there also
must be a positive revelation in emptiness. Therefore,
(implicitly) because emptiness is not exclusively negative, it
need not conflict with a Buddha nature that, though not an
own-nature, is affirmed as existing aboriginally.
39
BUDDFL{NATLIRE
the same void and filled it with a very different kind of language, a
language that could speak positively of such things as Buddha narure
and tathdgatafprbha. The author makes his point clearly and
succinctly in this key passa$e:"Attachments are not real, therefore
they are called vacuous. If one $ives rise to these attachments, true
wisdom will not arise. When one does away with these attachments,
then we speak of Buddha nature. Buddha nature is the Thusness
(zhen ru) revealed (xian) bv the dual emptiness of person and things.
. . . If one does not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not
understand emptiness" (787b). The author is uncompromising on
this point. Emptiness is not limited to a negative function. it clears
the way only so that something positive, Buddha nature, may be
revealed. One who does not affirm Buddha nature simply has not
sufficiently penet4ated emptiness.
40
THE CONCDPTOF BUDDHA NATURE
41
BIJDDTIANATURE
42
NATURE
THE CONCEPTOF BUDDTTA
43
BUDDH,A
NATURE
44
THE CONCEPTOF BUDDHANATURE
45
I]UDDFIANATURE
46
OF BUDDHANATURE
THE CONCEPT
the text: "The relative nature is of two kinds: pure and impure. The
impure relative nature comes into bein$ on the basis of discrimina-
tion. The pure relative nature comes into being on the basis of
Thusness" Qgac). We have here a rather different perspective from
that just discussed. The first analysis establishes a pt'ogression: The
relative nature is relatively more real than the discriminating nature
and relatively less real than the true nature. According to the present
analysis, however, the relative nature, or conditioned ori$ination,
actrrally is the only realiqv. Insofar as one experiences it in the mode
of discrimination, the discriminating nature is operative; insofar as
one experiences Thusness, the true nature is operative. In other
words, the relative nature, which is the only possible given, is purified
by Thusness and sullied by discrimination.
These two perspectives seem somewhat irreconcilable. The
author's intention, however, may be within the reach of speculation.la
The first analysis clearly shows the author's interest to establish the
true nature as supreme, to portray the enli$htenment it represents as
superior to the other two natures. The second analysis returns us to a
basic Mahayana tenet: There is only one world, the world of
interdependent phenornena, which can be experienced in an entirely
delusory, part.ially delusory, or enlightened fashion. The ordinary
world is not to be left behind; there is no superior, hidden world of
purity to be attained. If the author's concern is to maintain both of
these positions, then this awkward double analysis of the relative
nature becomes comprehensible. Such reconciliation as there is in
the text for these two analysesis.found in the statement that the pure
aspect of the relative nature is equivalent to Thusness, or the true
nature. In this way the relative natlrre may remain the only reality,
rvhereas in its pure aspect (as supreme Thusness) it in effect
transcends itself in its impure aspect.
Finall-v,the true nature is the "Thusness in which being and
nonbein$ are real," due to the very fact that "neither bein$ nor
nonbeing is the case." The dualistic categoriesof being and nonbeing
both are neS,atedas a preliminary step, but in the end they are
reaft'irmedvia the Thusnessintrinsic to them both. That is, being and
nonbeinp are emptied of any intrinsic reality. What one can see when
those cate$ories are out of the way is the Thusness of what is or, in
other words, the Thusness of the reality flux. In this way, the
discussion of the true nature itself noints back to the fundamental
47
BLTDDHA
NATURE
Tuthfrgatagarbha
The final constituent of the essentials of Buddha nature is the
tuthfug,&tagarbhct. Because the latter is itself a close synonym of
Buddha nature, this is a crucial component for our understandin$ of
the Buddha nature. For this reason, the entire text on the subject will
be presented. interspersed with interpretation. The text reads:
48
T
49
BUDDHA NATURE
As for the term garbha (zang), a"ll sentient beings universally exist
within the Tathdgata's wisdom (za,i nt-lai zhi nei) and therefore it is called
50
THE CONCEPTOF BUDDHANATURE
I 51
I
I
I
BUDDTIANATURE
52
THE CONCEPTOF BUDDHANATURE
53
BUDDHANATURE
The two kinds of Buddhanature are also like this. Both are the
same
Thusness. Thereis no differencein their essence.It is just that when one
abandonsthe principle of emptiness,one arousesdoubt and atrachmenr.
Becauseof impurity and confusiondue to the kre6a,it
IBuddha'at'rej is
called.polluted.Whenone doesnot abandonthe two kinds of emptiness
and
the sin$e markof Thusness, thenonedoesnot giveriseto ignoranceanc the
kle6ado not pollute;thereforeoneprovisionalrydesignates i aspure.(796a)
This paralleis the discussion of the pure and impure relative natur.e
in
the tnsvabhZoc section. There is one basic given_here, Buddha
nature (or tathagaagarbha); there, the reiative nature. Xf
one
abandons the all-important princiRle of emptiness, one procluces
delusion and thereby effectively liies in pollution. The essential
54
T
I THE CONCEPTOF BTJ'DDHA
NATURE
)5
BUDDTIANATURE
56
CHAPTERTHREE
Soteriology:Buddha Nature as the Practice
of Buddhism
J/
BUDDHANATURE
A. ASrayapardt:qtti
The term d9r ay a7tar avqtti (xhuan -yi). literally,, transfo rmation of
the basis," is a Yo$6cdra term. In that context, its meanin$ is
explairied as follows. Transformati,on (zhrnn, also ,,turning,"
"revolution") has two meanin$s: "transformin$', in the sense of
getting rid of something, and "transformation" in the sense of
attaining something. Basis (p) refers to the eighth consciousness in
Yogdciira theory, the d,layavijft.d,na. The latter is the ,,storehouse"
consciousness that stores the karmic seeds produced by past actions,
which in turn determine the future dispositions of individuals. In the
"transformation" of the dlayavijfidtw, the seeds of defilements
(kleia) and discriminatory knowledge are discarded, whereas the two
"fruits" of bodhi (wisdom) and nirtsana are attained. Thus for the
Yogdcdrin, the storehouse, or dlayavijfifilw itself is what is
transformed, or in some understandin$s, destroyed.
The meaning of a*ayapardrsqtti in the present text is rather
ditferent. The author of the BN? introduces the d.Sra1;apard$ftti into
his discussion by describing it as the supreme purity revealecrwhen
all limitations on the understanding have been removed; it is the
"purity of the original nature" (ben xirtg); that is, the Buddha nature.
(801b) Thus what is undergoing transformarion in the understanding
of the BN?'s author is not the dlayatijmana but a person's
relationship to the Buddha nature. The author builds on this
beginning to produee a complex account of the d9rryap&rtu)ftti
notion within the context of Buddha nature thought. We begin with a
discussion of four characteristics of dsrayapardvqtti.
58
SOTERIOLOGY: BLTDDHANATURE AS THE PMCTICE OF BLIDDHISM
4. The dhamnd.fuiru's mark of purity. Because all false thoughts are utterly
extinsuished in it. this dharmrtdhaat, surpasses that which can be
e-rpressed in reasoning or in speech. Therefore, we take purity to be a
characteristic of the dhannadhatu. This is the extinction of the activities
of the mind and the cutting off of the way of speech. It is ineffable,
because it is the attainment of the unattainable principle of Thusness
(z,hen-ntli). (801b)
59
BUDDHANATURE
60
\=--
of seven
This theme is further emphasized in a discussion
dhsnnakdya' Dharmakdyu ls a
"names" given the asrayapardryrtti
the Buddha nature in its stage of
term lrsed irt this text to represent
discussed in this passa$'e,
fruition. In examinin$ the seven "narnes"
dharmakdya is a
we will see once again that the dsrayapardwTtti
in this case as the
term expressive of buddhist practice, understood
nature'
transformation inherent in realizin$, one's Buddha
perishin$ of
(1) The first name is perishin6l Ghen mo); that is' the
five skq,ndha $ive rise
the skandhq,-attachment -skandha cycle. The
rise to new skandha'
to the four attachments2 and these in turn $ive
This is a cycle that can continue
or in other words, rebirth.
the dharmctkaya' neither cause nor
indefinitely. However. "Within
'perishin$' (chen mo)' Attachments
fruit exists; therefore we speak of
(chen)' As for the
are opposed and cured and thet"fore are defunct
and so we say they'are
skandhct, the fruit of retribution is exhausted
- one'(mor)" (802c).
g
that is' the stillness of
6 The second name is stillness Ai iing);
all actions.
called
All snryskr:ta dharmct [conditioned' thin$s] are
they are conjoined with the four
&ctians {xfngz\, because
abidin$' and destruc-
states. These four are birth, chan$e,
past are
tion. All saryskqtd dharma, irr relation to the
conjoined with birth' in relation to the future are con'ioined
present are
with destruction, and in relation to the
conjoined with chan$e and abidin$' They ate called,qctions
becatlse they never rest from activity' The Tathdgata's
was not
dhannakdycl, thou$h' is not like this' In the past it
it will not be destroyed' In the present
born, in the future
there is no illness and oid a$e. It eternally and tranquilly
it is
abides. unborn. it is called still (Jil); undestroyed,
called quiet Aingt ). (802c)
discardinS
(3) The third name is discarding (qi she\; t.hat is'
several remnants
remnants. The Srdvaka and pratyeknbuddhct have
specifically kle6a and karma' The Tathdgata's
attached to them,
has alread-v "crossed over" s&n'tsdra
asrayapardvqtti d'harrnakaya
(i.e., discarded karma) and utterly extin$uished all kle$a and delu-
cultivation have been tread' Thus with
sion. All paths of spiritual
putting aside (she) the Path (in the sense
sctntsctracast aside (qi) and
61
BIIDDTIANATURE
62
SOTERIOLOGY:BUDDIIANATURDASTHEPRACTICEOFBI.IDDHISM
(6) The sixth name is relietsing Qi2); that is, relievinS, the five
fears. The five fears are (a) Suilt, as when a person does somethin$
evil and is filled with dread day and night; (b) fear of the blame of
others, as when a person has done something wron$, and fears that
other persons or gods saw it; (c) fear of punishment; (d) fear of bein$
born into an evi! birth, on the basis of one's present evilness; (e) fear
of the many r/irtuous ones-because one's own karma is impure and
one's discernment is not deep, one fears those who have accumulated
virtue. However, "one who has realized the dhsrm,akdya is free of the
five fears; thus we say the dhannakaya is the relievin$ of the five
fears" (803a-b).
(7) The final name is severin$ (duan); that is, severin$ the
retribution of the six destinies or $nti.3 "The term fati has many
rneanings; we will briefly speak of two: . ' (1) the place where
sentient beings are reborn; (2) the place where karma acts. With
these two meanin$s the term pati is established. The Tathagata's
d,harmakd,ya does not return to these Eclti . .. therefore we name it
setsering the six 6iati. we speak of the Tatha$ata's dharmakctya when
there is this condition" (803b).
All of these seven names express the ne$ation of various aspects
of the life of bonda$e and sufferin$. severed, undone, extin$uished,
and overcome are (1) the skandha-attachment'skandha cycle, (2)
determination by the condition of time, (3) karma and kle6a, (4)
as the sourae oI sarysara, (6) fear,
suffering, (5) the d,lu;;^avi.iii.d.na,
and (7) rebirth amon$ the six destinies. These acts of severin$ and
extinf,uishing constitute the d{ra5tltparavqtti' A$ain its active nature
is readily apparent. In fact, all but one of the seven "nanles" is itself a
verb. These seven, then, are names for actions that Buddhist
practitioners undertake to achieve.
The d'h,armakaya,, on the other hand, represents the sta$e in
which these seven categories of suffering and fear are undone or
rernoved. Horv is the clhartnakaya described herein? (1) It has no
relationship to causation; (2) it has no relationship to timei (3) it is
utterly free of rebirth, klcia, or delusion: (4) it is utterly free of all
suffering; (5) freedom from delusion is its purification and its
fulfillmejrt; (6) it relieves the five fears; and (7) it is cut off from
rrbirthlAlthough all of this is expressed'ne$atively,there are also the
statements that (3) the d.hqrmakaya alone abides in the fulfillment of
63
BUDDHANATURE
64
NATURE,{,S
BUDDFIA
SOTERIOLOGY: OF BUDDHISM
THE PRACTICE
65
BIJ'DDFIA
NATURD
67
NATURE
BUDDFI,A
68
NATUREAS THE PMCTICE OF BLTDDHISI'I
BLTDDFIA
SOTERIOLOGY:
69
BUDDTL{NATLTRE
70
SOTERIOLOGY:
BLDDHANATUREAS THE PMCTICD OF BUDDIIISM
7l
BIIDDFIA NATURE
as does gold; (b) the cssence of puritf is limpiditl', like that of u"ater; (c)
the virtue of eternitv is indestructibilit""", like that of space; and (d) the
meaning of sef (uro) is nonattachnleni, as in bodhi. (810a-b)
72
NATLIREAS THE PMCTICE OF BLIDDHISM
SOTERIOLOGI':BLTDDFL{
Becauseof the breadth and greatnessof its power and functions, this
krlya aboriginally possessesthree virtues: great wisdom (praifia), Sreat
meditation (samadhi), and great compassion (karu4a)Jt The essential
characteristic of great u'isdom is nondiscriminative knowledge$nnrw). The
essentialcharacteristic of great meditation is uncreated mentation (tut nn
ln); i.e., mentation that has left behind [the dualir,vofl leavin$ [the world;
i.e., saving oneselfl and entering [the world; i.e., savin$ others]. The
essentialcharacteristic of great compassionis the abilitv to remove Isentient
beingslfrom [sufferingl and save them.
For the mentation of sentient bein$s to be caused to attain perfect
fulfillment, three thing,sare necessary:pleasurein the Dharma, the six super
. powers (sbhi.irta),rj and the giving of aid by removin$ [sentient bein$s from
their sufferinf1. Thus great compassion removes [sentient bein$sl from the
three evil paths of sufferingrr and establishespeople and detsas in great
peace. Great meclitation brings about the arisin$ of faithful joy by
manit'estinpthe six super powers.Wisdom takes pleasurein the Dharma and
realizes liberation. This is what is calied the sambhofafuiyo. (810c)
73
BUDDFIANATTIRE
74
SOTERIOLOGY:
BLIDDFI-A
NATURE
AS THEPMCTICE OF BUDDHISM
/J
BUDDHA NATURE
This is why we
such a lon$ life and widely deliverin$ sentient bein$s'
sPeakof eternirY''
of nondiscriminative
5. They are eternai becauseof the boundlessness
as two' they are
wistiom. Far from $raspin$ sa'msdra arrd nircd4a
tttpi"*e truth' They are both unmovin!' [a
always united i., tii"
oi ninsar]al and not dep{rting [from sar.nsara] and
characteristic
thus w€ know theY are eternal'
Even in the
6. They are eternal b""ut"" they are always in sc;mfirlhi'
are impervious to
world there are those who, obtainin[ samid'hi,
knives' and arrows' llow rnuch more
water, fire, embers, drowninp,,
of sufferin$
will the Tathd$ata,constantly in samd'dhi' be incapable
harm! This is why we speak of eternity'
pure' Serenity is the
7. They are eternal because they are serene and
Diamond Mind, able to do away with the dwelling place of
final thought enterin! nirt:d4al' with
ignorance, with the [upon
and with sufferin$' Because there is no sufferin!'' it
impermanence
manifested, it is
is called serene. As the Buddha fruit is completely
path of liberation is therefore called eternal'
. called pure. This
the world' the
8. The-v are eternal because' althou$h actin$ within
the Buddha bodies
eight essentialthin$s17are not sullied' Althou$h
of those who havel not yet completed.the path
return to [the realti
are not sullied by defilements
and are joined with sarysdra, they
we say they dwell
nor do they have false thou$hts' This is why
eternallY.
dew of immortality
9. They are eternal because they are the sweet
they are still, and are far distant from Mdra [the Lord of
lamTtal;
superhuman'
beathl. The sweetdew causespeople to be longJived'
Diamond Minc discards ignorance, the final
and immortal. The
obtains the
thought [before niruar't'al and delusion' and thus
Buddhafruito{eternalbliss.Becausethereiseternalbliss,thereis
distant from
stillness; and because there is stillness' they are far
MZra. To be far distant from tr{6ra is to abide eternally'
nature of production
10. They are eternal because they are not of the
It is not the case that the dfumna'kA'ya ori$inally
and destruction.
is producedl' nor did it ori$inally
did not exist but now exists [i'e',
does not exist is destrol;edl' Although it acs
exist but now, [i'e''
("l"gtl within the three periodsls it is not o/ the three periods (/ei
dhannakaya abori$inally exists; it is not the
san shifa).Why? The
periods and
case that it begins now to exist' It transcends the three
so we call it eternal (811a-b)
Forthemostpart'theten..Qausesandconditions''forthe
eternityofthethreeBuddhabodiesemphasizesoteriologjcal
fu"ror*-pructice and action-as thd foundation of this eternity' The
of the Buddha bodies
second and third examples have the eternity
76
OF BUDDHISM
BUDDI{ANMURE AS THE PRACTICE
SOTERIOLOGY:
Buddhas'
rest on the eternity of salvific acts performed by the
bein$,s is inexhaustible' the
Assumin$ that the number of sentient
require him to en$a$e in
vows ancl $reat compassion of a Buddha
help. These acts bein$
endless aci. of teaching and other forms of
a Buddha is
endless, so are those Buddhas, but only in the sense that
is not different
an endless series of acts for the welfare of others. This
over time of
in the Buddhist context, from pointin$ to the continuity
without
an ordinary person, rvho also is constituted by his or her acts,
the need to assume an underlyin$ thin$ performin$ those acts'
the
The fourth and sixth examples are alike in invokin$
demonstrating transcendence of physical
performance of man'els
of yoga
to'do as proof of eternity. This assumes that the practice
(to the enli$htenment which is its aim)
develops as a b-v-product
longevity and impervious-
certai; supernormal conditions, includin$
poor demonstration of
. ness to accidental harm. This, of course, is a
as it
eterniqv and only tan$entially relevant to this discussion insofar
implies the Buddhas' freedom from the ordinary limitin$ conditions
point to the
of embodiment. This freedom, however, need not
be so
existence of any statie, entitative thin$ and should not
compati-
unrJerstood. Freedom from ordinary physical limitations is
understood as dynamic series of acts realized in a
ble with Buddhas
(which, indeed, the trikdya doctrine already
nonordinary manner
assumes).
from
The seventh and ninth examples to$ether equate freedom
delusion with the eternity of the Budclha bodies. The seventh example
the
identifies eternity with the serenity and purity consequent upon
vanquishin$ of ignorance' impermanence, and sufferin$' This means
of
that eternity is a synonym f.or nirwfu.tn simply as the ne$ation
confirmed by
samsaric delusion and sufferin$. This interpretation is
of
the identification of this nirvanic condition with the "path
liberation" (jie tuo Doo). we rnay recall in this context the important
fruit;
BN? theme that States that Buddha nature is both cause and
afuryclparavrttiisboththeabandonmentofdesire(theTruthof
desire
Cessation; i.e.,nit'octrw) and the cause of the aband<lnment of
(the Truth of Path).
The ninth example repeats the theme of identifying eterniqv with
of the
freedom from i$norance, addinS, the metaphorical element
,,sweet <lew" of immortality and the mltholo$ical figure of Mara, the
Lord of Death. The "sweet dew" of immortality is the food of the $ods.
II
BIJDDHANATURE
78
SOTERIOLOGY:
BLTDDHA
NATUREA"STHE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM
79
BLTDDHA
NATURE
80
BLIDDTIA
SOTERIOLOG\': AS TIIE PMCTICE OF BUDDHISM
N,\TTIRE
and realize the lluddha nature--these are called sages; (3) those
rvhose realization reaches the ultimate purit-v of this principle-these
are called the Thus Come (Tathaq,ata)" (805c-806a). Clearly this
categorization scheme is not a gotru.r-t)rpetheory in which some
persons are innately capable cf realization and others are not. It was
established in the discussion of the pen'asivenessof Buddha nature
that Buddha nature is omnipresent; all share in it, and all share
equaliy in Thusness. The present differentiation of Buddha nature
amdng classes simpl-v recognizes the realitl' of different stages of
awareness amon$ humanity and explains it in terms of the de$ree to
which one has reahzed one's oln Buddha nature.
Elsewhere, the text speaks of three "stages" rather than three
classesof sentient beings; rramely, (l) the impure (i.e., sentient be-
ingp), (2) the pure (i.e., bodhisottvas), and (3) the supremeiy pure
(Buddhas).To dernonstrarethat this does not conflict with the asser-
tion of the universal pen'asivenessof Buddha nature, a quotationle
follorvs, indicating that all three "stages" are constituted by the
dharrnadhatu (the realm of Truth, equivalent to Thusness). The realm
ol"serrtient beings, it states, is this dharrnadhatu when covered by
defilements and suffering rebirth. The realm ol bodhiscttarcs is this
sanre realm of sentient bein{,s 'rvhen they have beccme averse to the
sufferings of samsaru and practice the bodhiscttt.vctpath irr reliance
on the 84,000 doctrines of the Buddha and all pararnita. Finally, the
third stage (that of the Buddhas) is described as tbllows:
This realnr of sentient beings, havinS cast off all kleda coverings, gone
beyond all sutfering and rvashcda*'ay all defilernents,beinEinaturally and to
the utmost degreeclean and pure, being that which all bein$s desire to see,
having entered and dwelled in the subtle and superior ground, the ground of
all-knowledge,and of universal nonobstruction Ior harmon-v].,havin$ arrived
at incomparable abiliry, and having attained rhe !,reat, spontaneouspower of
the Dharma King-l call [beingsrvho achicve this] ?hus Come (Tathdgata).
(306b)
81
BUDDHANATLTRE
82
CTLAPTDR
FOUR
Dereification of Self and Mind
83
N,\TLIRE
BUDDFTA
84
OF SELFAND i{IND
DEREIFICATION
lacking in virtue, he does mean to say that its virtue lies precisely in
the freedorn constituted by its emptiness.
This reading is corroborated by the following excerpi, taken from
the same passage. Subsumed within the discussion of the Buddha
nature's own-nature, the tathag&ta1qrbh(l is discussed as follows:
"Tathdgatagarbhu: the meaning of this {arbha is own-nature. No
d,hqrmas are outside the Tathagata's own-nature because its mark is
arurtmun. Therefore it is said, all dharmas are the tathdgqnectrbhct"
(796b). In this passa$e, far f'rom representing a substantive entity,
own-nature is identified with the very contrary of substantive
self-identity, not-self or Q,natm(tn It is this very lack of a substantive
self that makes possible the ttniversality of the tathdqcltagctrbha. lt is
implied that if the nthdgatugarbha had a nature of its own of any
kind, this nature would differentiate it from other things. Thus its
universal nature, paradoxically, rests upon its lack of nature or
emptiness and it is this quality which represents its "own-nature."
These three characteristics of the own-bein$ of Buddha nature
are further S,lossedin the text as expressin$, respectively' (1) the
inconceivability ot'the Buddha nature, (2) that one should realize it,
and (3) the infinity ol its virtues (797a). This conveys the idea of the
Buddha nature from the perspective of the ordinary person. One
understands that one cannot comprehend it, and yet that it is
desirable that one realize it, inasrnuch as to do so will transforrn one
into an infinitely virtuous (wise and compassionate) person.
We have seen the term own'nature tsed in one other place al-
ready; namely, in the analysis of the purify of the dhqrmakdyadh.dtu.l
One meaning of this purity was $iven as "own-nature [which I $oss as
Buddha naturel, like space,does not reject sentient bein$s (810a)." Here
again we simply see own-nature identified with an essential' character-
istic behavior of Buddha nature, compassionate action on behalf of sen-
tient bein$s.
In the BN?, then, no connotation of substantiveness is attached
to the own-nature concept. This nonsubstantiveness is a function of
understandin{ Buddha nature as Buddhist practice. The Buddha
nature concept sen'es both to entice people to engage in Buddhist
practice and to represent the potential, activity, and fruition of that
practice itself. The "own-bein$" of Buddha nature perhaps is best
understood as the distillation of that practice; in representin$ the
essence of Buddha nature, it manifests the essentials of Buddhist
d5
BI:'DDH.ANATLIRD
B. Atmapdramitq
Some of these themes are developed in a more complete form in
our second case, the discussion ol d,tmaptiramitd,, or self pa,ramitd.
The self paramitd is one of four pdram,itd-purity, self, bliss, and
eternity-that are understood as meritorious qualities inherent in the
dharmakaya. The f,our paramit& ^re found in tc.tlfi4&n1&rbha
'literature, where they are explained as an extension of early Buddhist
teachings, as follows. Theravdda Buddhisrn characterizes reality with
the Three Marks of impermanence (anitya), sutfering (duhkha), and
not-self (andtman). These were sometimes accornpanied by a fourth
characteristic, impurity (asubha). The reaching of the Four Marks by
the Theravada was the correction of four "upside-down" views held by
the ignorant, who believed that permanence, bliss, self, and purity
could be found in samsara. Tathagatagartrha theorists accepted this
tradition as far as it went, but asserted that it was incornplete. They
then extended this teaching, with a twist characteristic of their logic.
86
DEREIFICATIONOF SELF AND MIND
87
BUDDHANATURE
Fruit
Person Type Obstacle Cure = Cause (Pdramitd)
All non-Buddhists,
in their variousways,eonceiveand graspa self(uro)
in thosethingsthat lack selflnamelythe five skantlhas,a
e.6i.,form, etc.yet
thesethingssuch as form ditfer from what one graspsas the mark of selfl
therefore,they are eternallylackingin self.IHowe'er,lu.ith the wisdonrof
Thusness, all Buddhasand bodhis^ttoasrealizethe perfecrionof not-self
(antttmapdramita) of all things. Becausethis pert'ecti.n of not-ielf arrd that
'which
is seen as the mark of not-self are nor ditTerent,the Tathagatasa.vs
that this mark of the eternal not-seli is the true, essential nat're
lzhen ti
xint) of all things. Thereforeir is said thar the perfection of not-self is self.As
the srtro verse says,s
The dual emptiness is already pure;
[In thisl is realized the not-self, rhe supreme self.
88
DEREIFICATION
OF SELFANDNIIND
89
BUDDHANATURE
90
OF SELFAND MIND
DEREIFIC,ATION
91
BUDDIIANATURE
C. Self
A different, but also striking, use of the term sef already was seen
in the discussion of the purity of the dhnrmahayadhaal3 rhere one
of the meanings of ttris purity was given as ,,the meaning of sef (uo)
is nonatrachmenr, as in bodhi" (810b). The thinking behind this
staternent seems to be closely related to that of the d.tmapdramitd., in
which "self is identified as "the perfection of not-self," via the power
of prajtulpdramitA, meaning the realization of the emptiness of
things. The author of the BIV'?seems to want to ,,sunyatize,'or negate
the theory of and"tman just as prajfi.d,pdramitd negates any
possibiiity of a self theory. In both of these explanations, the term sef
is identified rvith intellectual and emotional nongrasping; that is, acts
of mental freedom. one implication of this position is that grasping a
doctrine oi anrttnzcrn as Truth is not representative of liberation-
hence the tendency in this text to play rather freely with words like
Atnlan, andtman, o,ntttmaparamitd, and dtma,pd,ramita.
The most important point to be made about this passagefor our
purposes is that sef consists in the act of nonattachment. Though
negatively stated, this is an act insofar as it is composed of the
propensity fo behave in a nonattached manner. It should be recalled,
rnoreorrer,that this "perfection of self" languagieis used in the context
of a discussion of practice, and in fact the "perfection of self is
$iven
as one of the fruits of practice. Hence, the perfection of not-self that
is self is the person (as series of acts) transformed by virtue of
Buddhist practice culminating in realization.
D. Pure Mind
Our fourth case concerns the notion of ,,pure mind" and its
substantiality or lack thereof. we may examine this notion in the
context of a discussion of two practices, the cultivations of the
Principle of Thusness and of the Plenary Thusness. Here we will see
the interrelatedness of the teachings concerning Thusness, Buddhist
practice, the true understanding of mind, and the positive vaiue
readily ascribed to realiry-.
9'2
DEREI}-ICATION
OF SELFAND MIND
93
BIIDDHANATURE
94
OFSELFAND
DEREIFICMION MIND
4. The theory that the self will not be reborn. This is a nihilistic
view.
5. The theory that in the realms of desire and form the self exists
as fdrm (se). This is an eternalistic view.
6. The theory that in the formless realm the self exists as either
perception, mind, or Dharma. This is an eternalistic view.
7. The view that in all three realms (desire, form and the
formless),with the exception of the heavensof no thought and
neither thought nor nonthought, thought is the self. This is
an eternalistic view.
8. The view that nonthought is self; that is, in the heaven of no
thought, the ggasses,and trees, and so on are self. This is an
eternalistic view.
9. Taking the AkaniSthaheaven (the last dhyana' heaven) as self.
The section concludes: "Because [persons] with these variously
deluded minds will not ^ttain nircdr.tn, these [viewsl are called
prapafwa. When one gains insight into and realizes the d'hamuhdya,
no further prapa:fi.ca,arises" (803c).
Here we see the dhamwh,aya as freedom from views of self. In
each of the nine cases, it is the self view that binds. The
dlwrmakayg, then, is in effect the Noble Truth of Cessation with
respeetto any and all f.ormsof pra,pa,fico,which here meansself view.
Thus here in the BN? with its affirmation of dtma@ramitrt, as in the
most orthodox Nikdya or prqifrdpdro,mitn text, it is theories of self
and attachment to self that bind us. Buddha nature thouglht,like the
rest of Buddhism, aims to release us from this bondage. The
d,harmaknya (or Buddha nature), as the Truth of Cessation,
represents the active releasing from bondage that constitutes the
Buddha Way. Hence not only is Buddha nature not a substantive
entity, not a self or an entitative mind, but the cessation of all self
views. As such, its character is active and soteriolo$ical.
F. Mind
Sixth,.we need to look at the BN?'s use of the term mind (xin).
This text does not often use this term and where it does, it often
could substitute a term such as person without any appreciable
change in meaning. For example, in the discussionof the eternity of
95
T]IIDDTIA
NATLIRI]
the trikayall the phrase Diamoncl Mind u,as rrsed. Ler us look ar that
passageagain. "[The trtkdyal are eternal because the-vare the srveer
dew of imrnortality (am1ta); they are still, and are far distant from
lvfdra.The sweet dew causes people to be long-li'ed, superliunran, and
immortal. The Diamond Mind discards ipnora'ce. the final thought
[before niraanal and delusion. :rnd thus obtains the Ruddha fnrit oi
eternal jov" (811b).
The Diamond lvlind here nientioned is evidentll- no "Nlind" srrch
as is construed in an idealistic monism, but on the trasisof the textual
evidence appears to represent the person of realization; that is, the
person fulfilling the Buddha Path. This "mind"--or person-is sbown
solely in the acts of dispelling igrrorance and sufferinS and enjoving
the fruits of serenitl- and jo;* that result. Thus we are not presented
here with a monistic r{ind of idealist metaphysicsnor with a dualistic
mind opposed to a bodl'. \Vhat is portrayed is a,n acting person.
Another exarnple aflain requires us to look at a passa$e already
seen. "The own-nature, pure mind is called the Noble Truth of l,ath.
The nongraspinp of the pure mind in rvhich delusion never arises rs
called the Noble Truth of Cessation" (BrJ2a).In this case, though
something called a pure mind is rnentioned, it is imme<liately
identified with two of the Noble Truths, already indicating that it
cannot be taken as a substantial thing. Rather, b). r'irtue of the two
Truths that it represents,it is an expressionfor rhe seriesof acts that
constitute engaginS in practice of the Buddha Way" and for the
"nonact" of non{,rasping. The identification of pure mind with
nongrasping is an echo of the equation of true self and nongrasping
noted earlier. In both cases, a substantial sounding ternr, mfnd or
.sefi is rendered nonsubstantial b-v its identification x,ith beha'iors
and actions.
The single instance of use of the term minc! that is the mosr
difficult to explain as nonsdbstanf ial is found in a passageof the BN?
borrowed from the TathagaruEarbhct s.utrct. giving nine similes for
the corrdition of the t&thag&tugqrbha in the midst of defilement. The
fourth of these similes likens the "mind" covered by defilement to the
conditions of pure gold I'allen into filth (807c). This simile. taken
from n'hat is considered the earliest text ot' t(rthegqtalarbha thought,
reflects the lack of sonhisticarion of that text, the similes it emplirys
bein$ somervhatclumsy attempts at conveyin{ a doctrine so difficult
that the Sri.'ze,lade,urSfitru. simpil,- labels the problem ,,inconceiv-
96
OF SELFANDMIND
DEREIFICATION
able" and $oes on: the doctrine, that is, of the relationship between
wisdom and ignorance. hr this simile, the "pure mind" does seem to
bear substantial qualities, especially in its comparability to pure $old
as a thing occupying space and capable of bein$ physically covered.
By borrowing this simile, the BN? inherits the problems associated
rvith it, including the implication that it affirms a substantive mind.
However, imrnediately followin$ the statement of the sirnile, a few
remarks are added that make it clear that no substantialiry should tre
assumed here. After renderin$ the simile of the pure $old fallen into
filth, the text continues, "The person free of desire is also like this;
the defilements oh the surface of the mind (shan6i xin fun'nao)
pervert the mutas. That is rvhy this simile is related" (807c). In
characteristic t'ashion, the author of the BNT relates the simile of the
gold co the condition of the practicinS Buddhist, explainin$ the
former as a metaphor lbr the latter. It is the teachin$ about the
hurnan condition that is bein$ promoted here, whereas the simitre
with its apparent metaphysical implications is not to be taken as any
rnore than an attelnpt to clarify the former. \\here it rnisleads (and it
does mislead to the exterrt that it implies substantiality) it is not to be
adhered to. As a carryover from the clumsy rnode of expression of the
Tathdgatagarbha Silrra it is incorporated into the BN?. Horvever, the
author of the BN? attelnpts to brin$ the simile into line with his effort
to clarify the human condition and the path of Buddhahood. Thus,
the example of pure gold fallen into filth likened to the "mind" amidst
defilements is an apt simile insofar as it sheds light on the human
existential condition. However, like all similes, its fit is not perfect,
and we should not permit the simile to extend so far as to indicate
any substantiality to a human "mind," a notion that runs eounter to
the teaching and perspective of the BN?.
97
CHAPTER FN'E
Ontology:Monism vs. Nondualism
99
BLI)DTL\NATUT{E
100
ONTOLOGY:
MONISI{VS.NONDUALISM
These indicate the locus of the issue; all five themes are to be
found in the Blf?. Although initially they do seem to indicate that the
Buddha nature (or its equivalent, t&thAgatagqrbha, dharmakAya,
dharmndhAtu, etc.) is a substantive absolute, I will argue against this
interpretation. How then are these passages correctly to be
interpreted? I will sr'g€est three kinds of readings appropriate to
these passages:(1) Some will appear to be fundamentally soteriolog-
ical in intent, and thus have nothin$ to do with either nlonism or
nonmonism; in other words, some passa$esmay earry no ontological
import at all, but may be of an entirely different order. (2) Other
passa$es that do have ontological import may be understood as
nondualistic,e rather than monistic. (3) Finally, some passagesmay
be seen as diseussin$, actions, rather than substances, and thus,
101
BUDDTIANATURD
r02
ONTOLOGY:MONISMVS. NONDUALISM
103
BUDDHANATURE
B. The Pdrqmitd
104
MONISMVS.NONDUALISN,l
ONTOLOGY:
105
BLDDFIANATURE
106
ONTOLOGY:MONISMVS. NONDUALISM
C. Sanya-Afunya
Our third problern area concerns the pair of terms 9fi.nya (empty,
and in this context, "unreal") and a9urryta (nonempty, and here,
"real"). The latter term is associated in the BN? and other
tathdgctt&g{rbha-Buddha nature texts with the tathd,gataEarbhs,
the Buddha nature, and the dharmakEtn, which are said to be
innately "pure." In addition, to explain the condition of ordinary
persons who are ignorant, confused, anci greedy, the concept of the
dfantukakle1a, or foreign. adventitious defilements, is used. Al-
though the tathdgataparbha (Buddha nature, dhannakdryo) and the
agantukakleSa have existed agelessly in conjunction, they have no
essential relationship with each other. Persons'delusions and hatred
are said to have no basis in reality, but to be the unreal products of
i$norance. Thus, a person is "really" the pure tclthdgataearbhrt or
Budriha nature, but falsely ("unreally") thinks of himself or herself
otherwise because of the activities of tlie unreal kle6o.
Some examples of this kind of thing in the BN? follow. In the very
107
BUDDFIT\
NATURE
108
ONTOLOGY:MONISMVS. NONDUALISM
reqlity of this property that one may speak of the self pdramitd. ln
this sense, the Sttnya-a9ilnya concept presents nothing philosophi-
cally new that w-asnot already present in the notion of the paramita.
Whereas the paramitd express the contents of the culmination of
practice, the a*unya notion is a linguistic tool used to further
emphasize the reality of the fruits of that practice.
Another way to understand the term a*ilnya is to realize that the
logic of the Bt{? follows rhe patrern of Silnya thought, but adds a
characteristic twist of its own. According to *tirrya thought, Silnya is
empty of any own-mark; that is, {finya is empty of the mark of 1ilnya,
and therefore it is not graspable as such.la Mddhyamikans use 6dnya
to destroy all views; they "sunyatize" Sunyata to deconstruct the
latter, to be clear that 9finyata is not Truth nor a valid view.
Tathd,gatagarbha-Buddha nature theorists, in contrast, say that
because Silnya is empry of the mark of *ilnya, it must be said of
9funya that its emptiness is real. This strikes one as exceedin$y
Strangelogic at first. Yet the move made by these theorists parallels in
form, though not in content, that of the. Madhyamika: In both, *ilnya
is "sunyatized." For tatha$&t&gctrbhc-Buddha nature thought,
thou$h, when one "sunyatizes" Silnya, one inevitably ends up with
a*d,nya. The logic is strai$htforward: to "sunyatize" drinya is to
introduce a9ttnya.
In other words, it is by virtue of the very unreality of all things
that one must say that their unreality is real. The two are two sides of
one coin. It is by virtue of the dynamics of emptiness that we must
speak of the nonempt.v; the former necessitatesthe latter. In my view,
there is no distinguishing this kind of dvnamic from the Mddhyamika
dynamic that equates ninldqrt and sanlsara. There too it is not a
matter of substantialist monism, because emptiness is and must be
form, every bit as much as the reverse is true. It is not a matter of one
reducing to the other, but of each indicating the necessity of the
other. The dynamics of ta,thd,gatagarbha-Buddha nature thought are
virtually the same as in 6unya thought, though the particular forms
these take appear at first to be diametrically opposed.
As for the relationship between the "pure," not-empty Buddha
nature or d,harmakaya and the empty (unreal), adventitious
defilements, it may not be out of place here to comment briefly on the
philosophical status of this relationship. The relationship between
the pure Buddha narure or tathagatagarbha and the impure
109
BUDDH,A
NATLIRE
110
ONTOLOGY:MONISMVS. NONDTIALISM
111
BUDDHANATURE
t12
ONIOLOG\': MONISMVS. NONDLTALISI\,{
113
BUDDHANATURE
TT4
ONTOLOGY:MONISMVS. NONDLIALISM
115
CTAPTERSIX
Engagingin Spiritual Cultivation
717
BUDDTIANATURE
there throu$hout the rext, I propose to be$in with the advice given to
the beginner and then focus on the material that seems to be the
focal point of the author, the material that seems direcced to the
audience of Mahayana practitioners to whom he addressed himself. I
intend to select the most practically oriented rnaterial of this
sometimes quite abstract discussion.
To begin, the foundations of successful Buddhist practice are
quite straightforward and commonsensical.
118
ENGACINGIN SPIRITUALCULTIVATION
(3) [The third cakra isl to possessself-discipline of one's own mind. The
correct teaching and practice is at the time of hearin$, no scattered mind; at
the time of thinking, no disparaging mind; at the time of cultivating spiritual
practice, no inverted mind. If one doesn't discipline one's own mind, a !,ood
[dwellingf place and a kalyd4amita are of no use.
(a) [The fourth cakra,l to have planted good roots [i.e., meritl in the
past, is the constituent of liberation. Cultivate good roots. Good roots are
faith, 6iro, hearing, giving, and wisdom. Faith is fught Mindfulness
(samyaksmrti) of the Three Jewels. Stla means not to stray from the good
Path. Hearing [encompasses]one's own hearin!, causin$ olhers to hear, not
causing others to hear what is contrary [to the Truth], and not being an
obstacle to others'hearing. Becauseof these four kinds of hearing, today the
world is able to hear [the Dharma], reflect upon [the Dharma], and cultivate
spiritual practice. [HearingJ can be a sufficient Dharma vessel for [these]
three modes of attaining wisdom. [Next,l giving is of two kinds. Becauseone
has in the past given material things to others, today one's desire is
vanquished. Because one has in the past given of the Dharma to people,
today one's ignorance is destroyed. Therefore by this cause and
condition, one attains the fruit of liberation. [Finally,] regarding wisdom,
because in former lives this person has already chosen, reflected upon, and
understood the Three Jewels and the Four [Noblel Truths, in this iife she or
he attains [the ten knowledges, froml worldly knowledge through erhaustive
knowledge and no-birth knowledge.3 (800b)
The text goeson to say that without merit from past lives, the other
three cakras are ol'no use. Moreover, if any of these four.cakras is
lacking, liberation will not be attained (800c).
The first two cqkras indicate the importance of having both a
teacher and apracticin$ community, howeversmall, around one. One
needs exposure to the Dharma from such people, instruction by
example as much as by word. Although Sakyamuni is the
119
BI-IDDTIA
NATURE
L20
DNGAGINGIN SPIRITUALCULTIVATION
127
BI]DDTIA NATURE
122
ENGAGINGIN SPIRITUALCULTTVATION
t23
BLIDDIT{NATURE
t24
ENGAGING
IN SPIRITLIAL
CI,ILTN'ATIO){
125
BUDDIIA NATLIRE
this cmptiness view of the arro$anr person is like onc-quarter 0i tlte tip of n
hair. I quickly rebuke it and certainly do not promise sanction."'r (797b)
126
CULTTVATION
IN SPIRITUAL
ENGAGING
gate (thanks
Thus when one passesthrou$h the emptiness liberation
mahakant4a lies
to the samaclhi that destroys false emptiness),
directly ahead.
to
Mahdkantryo is "great compassion'" It is linked, aPProPriatelY,
(en\ and is likened to Pure
the Buddha's virtue of lovin$ kindness
water, dtre to its ability to nourish all. I will postpone further
discrrssion of this term until the rest of the textual material on
mnhakctntna is introduced later'
The set of four practices is further elucidated as follows:
cause'
There are four aspectsto the meanin$of child of the Buddha:
condition,basis,andccrmpletion.(1)Therearetwocauses[ofrealiz
,,childof the Buddha"l:Buddhanatureand faithfuljoy. of these
srarusas
two.Buddhanatureis unconditioned; faithfuljoy iSconditiohed.Faithfuljoy
becauseit
as that which attainsBuddhanatureis the causeof completion
manifestsand completes the true cause nature [i.e., Buddha naturel'
jo,v as prnyo{a is the productive cause because it givesrise to all
Faithfui
practices. (798a)
between
Note here the sensitive and useful distinction drawn
Buddha nature, and sq,ryskrte, condi-
asarr.tskrta, unconditioned
joy. This distinction holds in fruitful tension two
tioned faithful
that could seem mutually
aspects of Buddha nature theory
nature
contradictory.6 On the one hand, the identification of Buddha
oL realization (of Buddha
as unconditioned and as the ultimate source
with the
nature) is funtlamental to this text. Moreover, it is consistent
idea that Bucldha nature is both cause and effect and as cause already
of this text
is perfect and complete. On the other hand, the author
very much wants to validate Buddhist practice in the ordinary'
of
mundane sense,and this is nicely accomplished with the validation
that
conditioned faithful joy-the acknowledgement, in other words,
the practitioner is intentionally en$a$in$ in specific acts chosen
by
because they promise to lead one to the desired $oal, acts tested
tradition and found to be effective to that end. This tension between
for
the inherent perfection of the Buddha nature and the necessity
.practice becomes, of course, a major paradox in Chan' resulting
pole of the
Lccasionally in a breakdown of the tension such that one
paradox, the necessity of practiea is rejeated' As we have seen' in the
blff guaanu nature is identified with Buddhist practice; thus neither
of
the inherent perfection of Buddha nature nor the necessity
t27
BUDDHANATURE
L28
ENGAGINGIN SPIRITUALCULTIVATION
729
BUDDTN NATURE
130
C]I'LTNATION
ENCACINGIN SPIRITUAL
in
however, various conditions can interfere rl'ith the expression
sincerely felt' There are plenq' of cases
action of a compassionthat is
b-v
in which u p"rron ieelskantrw but does nothin$' This is explained
of mahah'oruno be$an: the
the point with which this discussion
the
ol mrthdkqru,4fr is prajfid' What could interfere with
"rr"rr"" feelin$? contradictor,v
expression in action of a cornpassionate
perhaps the
feetings, such as one of many fornrs of self-interest' or
of such
inability to determine a useful course of action are sources
praiiiu *'ould
blockage, and these are the kinds of thin$s that
eliminate.Theei$hthpointtssimilar:alithecompassionintheworld
worldly
is no guarant"" Li effective actio'; prajfiii-d\scriminatin$'
to know the ri$ht action to tahe under
wisdom, that is-is necessary
in order to help others alon$ the Path
the circumstances ar hand
toward ultimate liberation.
with
[iut please ncrte, though karunfr is throu$hout compared
m;ohf,kanryd'tothedeirinrentoftheformer,norvhereisitsaidthat
never occur
kantndas such should be dismissed' Such an idea would
rnay be inferior but
to the au'.hor of the BN'?. To the contrary,kctrunct
persons'
it is still "boundless." It may be the practice of orciinary
is still
Srdr>akq. and praryekabuddhs, but its expression in action
sarybhdra.ltmaybearelativelyearlysta$e,butitisstillpartofthe
Buddhistpath;itconstitutes..$oodroots''plantednowthatwilibear
trruit in one's own spiritual practice in the future'
131
BUDDHANATURE
r32
ENGAGINGIN SPIRITUALCULTIVATION
133
NATURE
BI.]DDTL\
is
the knou'ledge
Theset*'o [t'ormsofl knosledgeare seli-realized:
attained b1'oneselfhavin$ attained understanding.it is not zrttainedirom
another. Onll' bv oneselt'does one attain realizaticrntit is rrot caused by
another. This is called self-realizationof knou'ledgeand correct vie*'s.
lforeover, these trvo Iforms of] knou'ledge have tsrt nlarks
Nonattachment is to see the inherent puritl' of the realm of sentient bein!,s.
It is the mark of the knorvledgeof the Principle of Thusness.Nonobstruction
meanslimitlesspenetrationof all realmsand limitlessinsisht into them. It is
the mark of the knowledge of Plbnary Thusness.Again, these trvo Iforms of]
knowledge have tn'o meanin$s. The knou'ledge of the Principle of
Thusnessis the cause; it is the cause of the production of snrnsdro and of
ninsdr.w. The knowledge of Plenary Thusness is fruit insotar as in this
principle js completed all-sufficient knowledge of the Tath6$ata'sultimate
and n'orldly dharmas. (802b)
134
ENGAGINGIN SPIRITUALCULTTVATION
believes. With the realization of Thusness, one can see the lotus in
the mud. This realization is charaeterized by nonattachment, which I
interpret as meanin$ nonattachment to both nin:d,rya, and samsara,
due to the realization of their intrinsic nondifference. Nonobstruction
is described as the Tathagata's all.knowledge; it is knowledge of all
realms and all dharmas, on both the worldly and the ultimate levels.
In these two realizations, then, we see the characteristic BN?
emphases on the goodness of the world, the positive nature of
realization, and the harmonious mutual validity of worldly and
ultimate knowledge. This double validation of the worldly and the
ultimate results in practice in a person who would be nonattached
and nonobstructed in both the mundane and the supreme realms.
Such a person also would be adept in the practical wisdom of
mshdkarund.
135
CTL{PTERSEI'EN
137
CTHPTER SEVEN
137
BLIDDHT\
NATURE
138
NATURE
BUDDF{,\ OF PERSON
AND TTIECONCEPT
139
BUDDHANATURE
740
BI.IDDIIANATUREAND THE CONCEPTOF PERSON
makes the Buddha nature sound like an entitlr par excellence, the
text removes the possibility of such an understandin$ by explaining
cltmcrpclrcrmittr as the aetive realization of the emptiness of all thin$s;
in other words, it simply gives the name dtmdpd'ramita to
experiential praifid,pdramita. "Nl the non-Buddhists perceive and
grasp a seif within the five skandhas. Overturnin$ that attachment to
self as vacuous and cultivatins prajfidp&r&mitd, one realizes the
supreme not-self which is identical to the self-paramitcr'
(atmaporamita, wo bo-le-mi). This is the fruit [of the practice of
pr aj fid.gtd,ramitai" ( 798c ).
The second important theme concernin$ the ontolo$ical nature of
the person is the view that a person does not exist in any way
separate from a world. The perspective of the BN? is plainly opnosed
to any such subject-object split. In the BN?, personal bein$ always is
continuous with the bein$ of a world. The tristsabhdx:a are three ways
(actually two, insot'ar as the three reduce to a pure and an impure
paratantra) in which the person experiences what is $iven (the
world) and what is given (the world) presents itself to the person- In
fact, even this way of speakin$ fails to do justice to the continuity
between person anci world. A person is a series of events that, in the
lansua[e of subjectivity, are called experiences. But experience, in
fact, is not a matter of pure subjectivity. Experience is always
"experience of' somethin$. Dxperience ordinarily is conceived as the
point of contact between a subject and an object. But in the BN?
these two are portrayed as a sin$le, primitive $iven, unified in itself,
and divisible only upon secondary analysis. Ontolo$ically, then, a
person is this primitive $iven: an experiential world or a personal
world.
The inseparability of subject and world is conveyed also in the
concept of Thusness. This is captured rather nicely in the following
passage: "All sentient beings ^re (shiz) the teth$atclgarbhq
'Thus' (nt in nt'Iai-zan!).
(nrlai-zang). There are two meanin$s of
The first is the knowledge of Thusness (ru-'ru'-zhi) and the second is
the realm of Thusness (n"t-ru-iinE). Because the two stand together,
we speak of the Thusness of Thusness (nt-nt)" (795c). Here we see
the conjunction in the sin$,le term n -nr of the knowledge of
Thusness (zhi, a standard term for the subjective) and the Thusness
"reafm" Qin!, a standard term for the bbjective). Althou$h ordinarily
the zhi is the cognizer and the jin{, the co$nized, in the case of
t4l
i}['DD}{]\N,\TLTI{E
742
BIIDDHANATIIRE,\ND
THECONCEPT
OF PERSON
143
BLIDDFIA
NATURE
744
PDRSON
NATUREANDTHDCONCEPT.OF
BLIDDFIA
r45
BIJDDI{ANATURE
146
I
i
BIJDDTIA
NATUREAND THE CONCEPTOF PERSON
747
NATURE
BLTDDHA
148
BUDDHANATUREAND THE CONCEPTOF PERSON
t49
BUDDHANATURE
C. A Final Question
150
BUDDHANATUREAND THE CONCEPTOF PERSON
151
BUDDTIANATURE
r52
CHAPTEREIGHT
Retrospectiveand Prospective
153
I]LDDFIANATURD
154
RETROSPECTNIE
AND PROSPECTN'E
Becarrseadventitiousdefilementsare empty,
They haveno connectionwith the dhannadhatu.
The Supremedharmas, not bein$ empty,
Are inseparablefrom the dharmadhatu. (8I2b)
t5J
BLTDDFL\NA'IURE
Buddha nature ideas are found in all the four major indigenous
schools of Chinese Buddhism: Tian-tai, Hua-yan, Chan, and Pure
Land. The concerns of the Pure Land school, however, diver$ed
considerably from those of the former three schools, and conse-
quently there is much less direct attention given to Buddha nature
thought (as well as other important philosophical principles) in this
school. In Tian-tai, Hua-yan, and Chan, thoug,h, Buddha nature
thought plays a rnajor role.
The first of these schools to develop as a school, the Tian-tai of
the Sui dynasty, affirmed Buddha nature as one of its focal tenets.
Both the school's founder, Zhi-yi (Chih-i), and his teacher, Hui-si
(Hui-ssu), were very well versed in the tathdge,t&gqrbhe,and Buddha
nature literature, though the fortunes of Buddha nature thought
varied over the life of the school. Hui-si spoke directly and extensively
of Buddha nature as such; it clearly was a major component of his
world-r'ierv. Zhi-yi was less an advocate of traditional tsuddha nature
language, preferring to speak of arr all-embracing l{ind in which
subject and object arise together nondualistically, an idea that
nonetheless clearly is rooted in the farnily of ideas found in Yogacara
and Buddha nature thought. Zhan-ran (Chan-jan), the sixth Tian-tai
patriarch, revived the Tian-tai school in the eighth-century, again
emphasizing the idea of Buddha nature. His work was prized in
Tian-tai lineages throughout East Asia.
The Hua-yan school is very closely tied to t&thdgatugctrbhq*
Buddha nature thought. It incorporated several streams of thought,
one of which was the She-lun school, which itself had developed on
the basis of Paramartha's translation of the Mahayanasa,mpraha.
Moreover, its major thinker, Fa-zanS (Fa-tsang), was an expert on
teth&Ecttugarbha and Buddha nature literature, and wrote what is
re$arded as the most important comrnentary on the syncretic
Atoakening oJ tr'aith in the Mahdydna. He frequently cited this text,
along with others of.the tathagatugarbha tradition, as authorities for
his own ideas. In his commentary he hierarchicallv ranked what he
considered to be four schools of thought in Indian Buddhism
according to his assessment of their profundity and completeness.
The lowest rank was held by the Hinaydna, which was succeeded in
156
RETROSPECTN'E
AND PROSPECTN/E
157
BLTDDN{NATLTRE
158
RETROSPECTNEAND PROSPECTI\T
The first theme in importance for the Bl{? and for Chinese
Buddhism is the emphasis upon the positive nature of realization, the
view of enlightenment as an experiential reality that goes beyond
emptiness. In India, Ndgdrjuna \f,'asone of the $reatest ever followers
of the apophatic path. the path.of the vio netativa in religious
language use. With his commitment to helpin$ humanity to become
free of the bondage produced by thoughts, he directed Buddhists
away from any tendency to conceive of reality or liberation in any
159
BUDDHANATUFE
160
-
I RETROSPDCTN'EAND PROSPECTNE
l
now
Buddha nature. In Buddha nature theory no person, no nratter
be dismissed as morally, spiritually' r:r
depraved in behavior, is to
person is a Buddha, not only potentially'
humanly worthless. Each
but actuallY.
Againsi the Buddha narure tradition, Xuan-zang's Fa-xiang school
f'uture
endor,seda plurality of ineluctable spiritual destinies, includin$
a
Buddhahood for some, but prat-vekabuddhahood, arhathood, and
In this
hopeless destiny of endless wanderin$ in samstu'a for the res'..
of
vierv, humarl nature is. varied, and consequerltly the abiliqv
is
education arrd discipline to mold a person's future attainments
limited.
Jusr as the chinese carefully wei$hed the ar$,uments of Xun-zi
(Hsiirr-tzu) and lv{encius on the inherently bad or $ood morai nature
of humanity, so they also carefully rveif,hed the Fa-xian$ school's
theory of multiple destinies against the Buddha nature tradition's
as a
contrary endorsernent of universal Buddhahood' As they found'
people, in favor of Mencius' optirnistic view of 'fhe inherent human
gooirr"r., so they found in favor .f Buddha nature' acceptance of
Itr" universality of Buddha nature by the Chinese Buddhist
community as a whole contributed to a loss of status tbr Xuan-zan$'s
of
Fa-xiang school. Due to the latter's adherence to the theory
*rrltiptJ spiritual clestinies a'd its rejection of universal Buddha
by
.ru,,rrl, this school was relegatecito the status of "quasi-Mahayina"
he constructed his hierarchy of
a thinker such as Fa-zanf when
Buddhist teachin{,s.
I hasten to add that neither the Confucian nor the Buddhist
tradition is as naive as it mi$ht sound from this account. Althou$h
each claims, respectively, that we are born morally $ood or spiritually
is the
Buddhas, the importance of this position for both traditions
what is
resulting imperative to brin$ into tan$ible manifestation
of
present in our conceaied "nature"; hence, the importance in each
spiritual self-cultivation or education'
161
llt'[)i)ll,\ NAl'LrRl.]
762
AND PROSPDCTNts
RETROSPECTN'D
emptiness'
cosmology is based upolr an appreciation of the idea that
or the interrelatedness of things, inrplies an interdependent universe'
of those
Because the uliverse is the sum total of each and every one
a
interdepen<lent parts, a chan$e in any one of them would constitute
of the
change in the universe as a whole. In this sense, the value
resides in each individual component' or in other
unive-rseas a whole
inherently possesses supreme vaiue. As a
words, each component
thinkers are in a position to $lorify
result of this cosmolo$y, Hua-yan
the most mundane Particular.
ChanandZenmastersadoptvirtuallyallforrnsofexpression
one
without accepting any of them as final, emphasizin$ sometimes
teachin$ purposes'
aspect, sometimes another' as useful for
This
Sometimes, it must be admrtted, larr$ua$eof onetress appears'
is
reflects the fact that one crucial aspect of enlightenment
that is
overcoming the sense we have of bein$ selves separate from all
not-self. So the contemporary Japanese SdtO Zen master Shunrlrr
and you
Suzuki writes: "When you are you' you see thin$s as they are,
your surroundings'"r: Much more common is
become one with
Thusness, and the like are
lan$ua$e in which oneness' emptiness,
as
forgotten (as in Hua-yen) and ordinary phenomena are $iven
further ado, as we shall see in
e*Jmpla.. of ultimate reality without
embrace all these forms
the fiith theme. Still, the very willingness to
of discourse is evidence of the acceptance of a nondualistic
of
perspective. Shunryrr Suzuki has $iven a relatively direct statement
qualifying his above
,hi, p"r.p""tive, which should be understood as
quoted remark:
no
Eachexistencedependson somethin$else Stricrl-vspeakin$'there are
separate individual There
existences. arejust many names for one existence'
Sometimes peopleput stresson oneness'but this is not our understandin$'
We do not emphasize any point in particular'evenonenessOnenessis
valuable,butvarieryisalsowonderful'I$norin$variety'peopleemph
theoneabsoluteexistence,butthisisaone-sidedunderstanding
understandin$ thereis a $apbetweenl'arielYand onenessBut onenessand
each
variety are the same thing, so onenessshould be appreciatedin
existence.That is why we emphasize everyday life rather than some
particularstateof mind. We shouldfind the realiq'in eachmoment'and in
each phenomenon.ra
that
The influence of Hua-yan can be ."".r h"r" in suzuki's statement
163
NATURE
BUDDIL.\
1. Subject-Object Nondualism
16.t
RETROSPECTNE
AND PROSPECTND
experience in which "self' and "world" are not yet separated. This
done, "self' and "world" are no lon$er experienced as separate nor as
entities; in fact, the terms are rendered useless.Instead, one "is" this
moment of prereflective experience, u,hich is experienced as a
moment of action, of process. The content of the present moment of
experience is one's identity in the present rrroment.
This perspective is prominent in Chan; indeed, much of Chan
languageis incomprehensible without an appreciation of this concern
for a return to prereflective experience. The famous Chan master
Lin-ji (Lin-chi) developed a system for instruction in Chan called the
Jour processes of libercttion from subjectivity and objectiviry. These
are: take away the person but not the objective situation, take away
the objective situatiou but not the person, take away both the person
and the objective situation, and take away neither the person nor the
objective situation.ls In each c,f these, and indeed in this very
approach, we see the same kind of plafulness rve saw in Suzuki's
treatment of variety and oneness; by playing so freely with the
categories "person" and "objective situation" in this manner, we see
the nonabsoluteness of each and the incorrectness of each as
conceived from the perspective of subject-object nondualism.
Some illustrations of these four positions might be as follows.
First, the "objective situation only" approach can be seen in "when a
fro$ becomes a fro$, Zen becomes Zen."r6 In the absoluteness of a
frog fu It Is one finds Zen, or enlightenment, or Thusness. Second,
teaching wittr reference to person only is well-illustrated by Lin-ji's
famous challen$e, "Show me the true man without rank!" Third, the
use of blows and shouts to jolt the mind illustrates teaching with
reference neither to person nor objective situation. Finally, the fourth
approach, speaking of both person and objective situation, is
demonstrated in a poem by Ddgen:
Being-in-the-world:
To what might it be compared?
Dwellingin the dewdrop
Fallenfrom a waterfowl'sbeak,
The inraSeof the moon.r1
165
IIL'l)l)l l,\ .\"'\f t'ltl-l
ob.iectir;esituation. \\'e rttal' sar'. lttttvcvcr, tltrtt ;rll four ot' these
apprciachesare nleans of poiutirtg ut, attd trattscertclin$,the error of
the ordir.rarvdualistic c()ncepti()nof sulr.lectivitvand objectivity.
An<ltherillustratiort ot' the uoudualit;-ot' sutrjectand object in Zen
is found in Zen master Do$en's ShdbOgenzOgertjdkflan:
166
AND PROSPECTNE
R.ETROSPECTNE
r67
BUDDHANATURE
168
RETROSPECTNNAND PROSPECTN,ts
169
NATURE
BUDDTI,A
170
AND PROSPECTNE
RETROSPECTN'E
Chapter 1. Introduction
1. As discussedlater, the concept of Buddha nature is very closell- related to
that of the tathdgatagarblut, with which it is almost synonymous.
2. Takasaki Jikid6. "Stnrcture of the Anuttara6rayasttra (Wu-shan$-i-ching),"
Indogaku Bukky1paku Kenkyt [hereafter. IBKI B (March 1960): ,14.
3. For a discussion of thls point, see Alfred Bloom, Shinran's Gospel of Pure
Grace, Association for Asian Studies: Mono!,raphs and Papers No. 20
(Tucson: IJniversiry of Arizona Press. 1965), Chapter 4, "Faith: Its
Definition."
173
BUDDIIA NATURE
t74
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
17. Fo Shw Bu Zet$ Bu.liatt Jin$, Taish6 16, no. 6681 467b'
18. This text is extant only in Chinese and Tibetan but Sanskrit fra$ments have
been recovered.
19. The question of universal Buddhahood and the status of the iechantika in
the Lfoll:d,parinhx:dq*.sttr4 is still, for modern scholars, a moot point. It
may be detrated whether the siltro attains a consistent position on this issue.
22. See Takasaki Jikido, "The Tulfilatagarbha Theory in the Malti,?0,rifti'r',a, .na'
stiaro'." IBK 19, no. 2 (March 1971): f01f1024'
26. Ibid., p. 5.
175
BUDDHA NATURE
3 7 . I b i d . ,p . 8 3 .
, 1 8 . I b i d . .p . 7 7 .
176
I_
NOT'DSTO CTTAPTER2
45. For the following sketch of I'aram?irtha'slife, I relied heavily on the account
in Diana Y. Paul, Phil'osoplryo.fMind in Sixth-Century Chirn: Param.drtha's
'Etsolution ol Consciousness' (Stanford: Stanlbrd Unrversiry Press, 1984).
Chapter 1. The reader will find there a rnuch longer and more detailed
account of Paramdrtha'slife.
46. Kogen Mizuno, Buddhist Sutros: Origin, Derelr-tpment, Trsnsrnission
(Tokyo: Kdsei,1982), p.99.
4 7 . I b i d . ,p . 3 3 .
48. Paul lists thirry*-tx'oworks attributed to Paranrartha,togethei \\'ith textual
information, Philosopht-oJl,Iind, pp. 175-178.
49. Fo Xing Lun, Taish6 31, no. 1610: 787-613.
50. Takasaki Jikido, "structure of the Llltimate Value," p. .i5. His citation of
Hartori.
51. Talienrura Sh6h6, Bus.shSronKenkla (Tok-vo:Hyakkaenkan, i978), p. 37.
52. Lri Hakuju, HoshoronKenk5u (Tokyo: Iwanalnishoten, 196C),p. 366.
53. Takeinura, Busshoron Kenkyu, p. 6.
5'1. Takasaki Jikido,- "Bussh6ron," in trIizuno Kdgen, Nakamura Hajime,
HirakarvaAkira, and Tarnaki K6shiro, eds.,Buttenkaidaijiten,2d ed. (Tokyo:
Slrunjhsha.1,977),pp. 145-146.
55. Grosnick, "Dogen'sVieu'," p. 78. Takasaki,A Stud-1'on the Ratru4;otravibha{,a,
nH .(- 2- .
56. William H. Grosnick, "'Ihe Categories of I'i, Hsiar,.f, and Yunf: Evidence
that Paramirtha Composed the As'a&ening oj Fatth," Journal oJ the
lnternadornlAssosiationqf Buddhist Studies 12, no. I (1989):65-92.
57. Grosnick,"Dogen'sView," p. 120.
58. Takasaki, "Bussh6ron," p. 144. Extant is "Bussh6ron Setsugi" bv Kenshh.
59. Takemura, Busshdron KenkTw, pp 3-4.
60. William Grosnick gives three main themes of Buddha nature theory in
China: subject-object nondualiqv; the idea that the world of phenomena is
present within enli$htenment; and the coextensivenessof Buddha nature
and practice. He sees these expressed most clearly in Tian-tai and Chan.
Grosnick, "D6gen'sView," pp. 181-182.
'fhe
Chapter 2. Concept of Buddha Nature
1. The shift from talk of things to talk of words, recognized as freeing a
discussion from certain ontological presuppositlons. See Willard Van Orman
Quine, lVord and Object (Cambridge, lr{A: lvt.l.T. Press,1960), pp.27O If.
2. A. C. Graham, "'Bein!,' in Western Philosophy Compared with Shih/Fet and
Ylt/Wu in Chinese Philosophy," Asia Major 7 (December 1959): 99.
t77
BUDDTIA NATURE
1 Ibid., p, 100.
4 . Ibid.
Ibid., pp. r0G-101.
6 . The Tathngata.garblta s&tra, for example, states wheth€r or not a Buddha
comes into the world, all beings dwell in the tath.agatuEarbha. Da, Fang
Deng Ru I'ai ZanE Jing, Taishi 16, no. 666: 457c.
'7
Arthur E. Link, "The Taoist Antecedents of Tao-an's prajna Ontologl,"
History of Religitnrs 9 (1969-70): 187-188.
8 . Gilbert Ryle, ?he Concept ol Mird (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp.
22-23.
9 . Selected and condensed from the list of meanings in Mervyn Sprung, ed.,The
Problem of Two Tnrths in Buddhism and, Vedanta (Dordrecht. Hbiland: D.
Reidel, 1973), pp. 4344.
1 0 . The four subjects of contemplation, the four kinds of right effort, the four
steps to super powers, the five spiritual faculties and their five associated
powers, the seven levels of bodhd (wisdom), and the eight constituents of the
Eightfold Noble Path.
1 1 .Any supplementary aid to Buddhist practice, as opposed to a necessary
aspect of that practice.
12. Note the positive value assigned to conditioned action here. This point will
be discussed in Chapter 6.
1 3 . This use of the term prirnitive was suggested by P. F. Strawson in
Irdivi.dwls: An Essay in Descript&se Metaphysics (London: Methuen,
1959), pp. 101 ff., where he describes "person" as a "primitive concept" to
which both states of consciousness and bodily characteristics are ascribed.
14. For this analysis I draw from Alan Sponberg (who applies it to the same
problem in Kui-ji's writintp), "The ?rdsrcbhdoa Doctrine in India and China:
A Study of Three Exe$gtical Models," Buhhyi Bru*a KenbnTjo Kdy6 2l
(1982): 97-119.
1 5 . Clearly, @en was not the first to state that sentient beinlp "are" rather
than "possess" the Buddha nature.
2. The four attachments are desire, false views, false morals. and ideas of self.
178
NOTES TO CHAPTDR 3
The six destinies are hell, and the worlds of the hun$ry $hosts, animals,
n^sura (demons), humans, and dqsa (heavenly spirits).
Each of the five senses has its own consciousness, plus one for the
consciousness with thou$hts as its objects.
5 . Meritorious activities of body, mouth, and rnind; i.e., Buddhist practice'
6 . I have not been able to lorate the source of this quotation.
1 Dhi,rani embraces the practices of smrti (recollection)' meditation, and
wisdom.
8. Referred to as Ban Dirt$,JinE bfi meanin$ Boo J i Jing. Takemura, Bnsshoron
Kolhyfi, p. 157.
9. Compare this to the title and therne of the AnurwtvA'pinptvanirde{o (No
Irrcriase, No Decrea,se Suta) (Fo Shtut Bu ZenP Bu Jian Jin{, Taishi 16,
no. 668, pp. a66-a68).
13. The hells and the worlds of the hungry ghosts and animals'
14. To save all of the innumerable sentient bein$s, to eradicate all deiusions and
passions, to penetrate the infinite Dharma, and to fulfill the Buddha Way'
16. These are four bases of super powers, developed by unitint, intense
concentration and effort with (1) desire, (2) enerA/, (3) thought' and (a)
iovest{lation. See ibid., pp. 104 ff.
t79
BUDDTIANATURE
180
NOTES TO CIIAPTDR 6
7. The following is derived from Roland t{all, "Monism and Pluralism," in Paul
Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philsophy, Vol. 5, pp. 363-5.
B. Obermiller,The Sublime Scierrce,p.81.
9. In this I agree with Rue$tr|,whose work contributed to my vier'.
10. Graham, "Being in Western Philosophy," p. 102.
tt. Da Sheng Q, Xin Lun, Taishb 32, no. 1666; 576a. Cf. Yoshito S. Hakeda,
trans., The Awakenin{, oJ Faith (New York: Columbia Universiry Press,
1967), p. 33.
12. Discussedin Chapter Four.
13. Rue&!, Thenrie, pp.29l and 361.
14. Cf. ibid., pp. 379 f. RueSl,'sanalysiscontributed to my understanding here.
15. See Peter Gregory, "The Problem of Theodicy in the Awakening of Faith,"
Reli$iau.s Stu.dies22: 63-78.
16. Nagao Gadjin, "Amarerumono," In'dogakubukhryogakukenkyt 4l (1968):
2J-27. l$t En$lish version of this article is available as Na$ao, "'What
Remains'in S0nyat?i,"pp. 66-82.
17. "Amarerumono," ibid., p. 26b.
18. Ibid., p. 27b.
181
BLIDDiI\ NATURE
182
I.]
NOTESTO CFIAPTER
183
BUDDFI,\ NATLTRE
184
GLOSSARY
ba +fr,
ba chu fnffi
Bao DingJing H]Fffi
BaoJi Jing HEiffi
ben *
ben wu ftr
185
BIJ'DDHANATURE
benxing fffi
benyou *€'
bu 6
bu kong 4*,
bu kongguo 6*ffi
bu shi 6H
BusshOron
Setsugi ffifsffiffi#
Chan(Zen) ilH
chanding ilHE
chang ffi
changzhu ffi&
chen if
chenrno itH
186
GLOSSARY
weiShiLun ffiftrffiffi
Cheng
chul fr
chu2 ffi
Di-lun tr*
e
ding lts
dinghui €#
DOgen H,E
du H
,duan tr
en B
fa l*
fa shen l*g
Fa-xian i*F
Fa-xiang r*tH
Fa-zang l*tr
fan fu Fl,*
188
GLOSSARY
guan H
189
BUDDHANATURN
BaiLunBen Ftrffi6
Guang
suo ffi
suodu ffiH
Hong-ren 9AB
Hua-yan +ffi
huaiku ffig
Hui-ke ffiq
Hui-neng H(H)BE
Hui-si ffi,8
ji 1 ffi
ji2 w
.1ijing ffifi$
190
GLOSSARY
Jta /Jr
jia xinE Tfrt1
jianxing F,ff
jie ffi
jie tuo Dao ffiffiH
jing 1 ffi
f,#,
jing2 ,5I
Kensh0 HilII
kong E
kongyoubu You *a4a
ku ku ##
Kui-ji H#
191
BUDDTIANATURA
lai 7ft
Lao-zi #+
li you li wu #€'ffift
Lin-ji ffig
Ling-run !siH
mtao w
miaoji wtfi
mieyi ffi{*
mo1 p
mo2 x
ner ru
neng frE
192
GLOSSARY
nengshe HEffi
nengshezang fEtrffi
nengzang HEffi
PangYun ffiffi
pingdengzhi Dao +s2H
pu sa #ffi
ql !t
qi she !Fts
qu *
ru n
ru-lai fr,K
193
BI.IDDHANATURE
ru-laixing fr*ffi
ru-lai-zang fr]Kffi
ru qu fr*,
ru-ru NW
ru-rujing frfrffi,
ru-ruzhi frmg
sanxrng =ffi
sanwu xing =ffift
SE B
Seng-zhao {H#
shangxin fan-nao l',tlFfS
she f$
She{un ffiffi
194
CLOSSARY
shen H
shenjian HN
shengren
gA
shengyi e{fi
shi1 H
EI
shi'2 E,
shi3 s
shi-shi-wu-ai
gsffiffi
shiyou H€.
shizhengjian ff8.F,
Sh0bOgenz0
Geni0k0an fi,if;[EffinffiA*
su ru 6m
suoshechi Ffffif+
suo she zang Ffiffiffi
195
. BTIDDFIA
NATURE
suosheng ffiE
suozang. ffiffi
Tian-tai X€
tong E
wer f;
weishizhi rEffig
wo ft
wo bo le mi firfi#g
WU ft
wu mie ilftrt
Wu ShangYi Jing ff.hffiffi
196
GLOSSARY
wusheng ft4
wusuoyou ffiFf€
wu wei trF
wu yin ftEl
wu zuo ffitF
wu zuo yi tr{fH
xian ffi
xrn d.
xin le {H#
xing 1 f+
xing2
'11
xingku
'11F-
xiu-xi WH
197
BUDDTIANATURE
Xuan-zang s#
++-
Xun-zi Elf
yi {ft
yi shi Hffi
yi-ta t&tu
yi-ta-xing {fi{uffi
yi-zhi {*It
yinchuxing EItrH
you a
youbu zhenshi €.6HH
youzuo H#
Zhan-ran lEf*
+
zhen R
Zhen-di Hffi
zhen-ru HM
zhen-ruli Hfr4B
zhenshen Hg
zhenshi HH
zhen-shi-xing HHfS
zhenshiyou HH€
zhenti xing HHfE
zhenyou H€.
zhengjing IEH
zhengxing IE{T
zhi g
r99
BUDDHANATURE
zhihui HH
Zhi-yi Hffi
zhongsheng t*.
zhuzi xingru-ru ftHffifrfr
zhuzi xingxing EHffiffi
zhuan H
zhuan-yi ffi{ft
Zhuang-zi #T
zi xing Hffi
zi xingqingjingxin HffiiFi$,L.
zuo ff
yi
Zuo-chan SilHffi
200
INDEX
207
BUDDFIANATURE
202
INDEX
Icclnntika,l-21 in
M ahdp arinins dTta- siltr a, 13 Obermiller, Yevgenii,99, 100
Idealism, 7-10, 1'64 Ogawa lchiid, 99, 100
Individualiry, 746-148 Own-nature (x:a,bh.dtsa),34-35, 39
Insi$ht into universal sameness, Own-nature of Buddha nature, 83-86
132-133
Paramdrtha (Zhen-di): lite of ,21-22;
Kalydl.wmitra, 119 questions concernin$ his role,
KIe6o (defilements), 2, 50, 52-53, 25-26: translations by, 22-23; and
109-1 11 Yogdcdra history, 9-10; as Yogacara
thowledge of Thusness, 48-49, 51 interpreter, 17
Pdramitd,, four: and Buddhist
practice, 87-90; and monism,
Lai. \\rhalen. 5 1O4-107; and nondualism, 106-107
LanSua$e, positive,3,56, 103, 106 Parinircdna, \54
Lcthkdssatdra-siltra, 2O-21, | 57 Park, Sung Bae, 151
Lin-ji (Lin-chi), 165 Person: compared to sentient being,
Lin$-run (Lin$-jun),26 13&139; existential nature of'
144-150; ontolo$ical nature of,
Madhyamika: ne$ativity of, 7, 11; and 139-144 ; and subject-object
Yogdcdra. 6-11 nondualism, l4l-144
Maha.kanaa (great compassion), Phenomenal reality, positive view of,
122-t23,126. 127; and kan't4d', t66-167
129-131 ; and prajfid, 128-129 Plenary Thusness,93, 134-135
Mahaparininsdl.ta,- siltro, l3-l 4 Prajfid, discriminatin$, 12&-129, 17O
Maitreya (Miatreya-ndtha), 6, 8 Prajfiapdramitd: l2l, 128; as
Manovijfidna, 142-144 Buddhist practice, 8&90, 105,
N{arks. four. 86-87 t24-125
Meditative concerrtration (chan Prctti5)asanurtpdda, 7, 16, 99
ding), I23,724-L25 Prdyoea,4042
tr{iddle Path. 68-69. 91 Principle of Thusness,93, 13'1-135
203
BUDDHANATURE
204
INDEX
p-