BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0008 - Rev 0 - Safeguarding Memorandum

BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-
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PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD

PLATFORM, INFIELD PIPELINES AND HOST TIE IN
Page : 1 of 49
MODIFICATION FOR BUKIT TUA PHASE 2B
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
PROJECT : PROVISION OF ENGINEERING, PROCUREMENT,

CONSTRUCTION, INSTALLATION AND
COMMISSIONING OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD
PLATFORM, INFIELD PIPELINES AND HOST TIE
IN MODIFICATION FOR BUKIT TUA PHASE 2B
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CLIENT : PC KETAPANG II LTD
CONTRACT NO. : 4850000373
DOCUMENT TITLE : SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
0 06-Mar-20 Approved for Construction SBG RAW/TDT/RSD AS EDS SAE/IG

B 31-Jan-20 Issued for Approval SBG RAW/TDT/RSD AS EDS SAE/IG
A 10-Dec-19 Issued for Review SBG RAW/TDT/RSD AS EDS SAE/IG
Prepared Approved Reviewed Approved
Reviewed By
Rev Date Description By By By By
PT. MEINDO ELANG INDAH PC KETAPANG II LTD
© 2019 PC KETAPANG II LTD (PCK2L), All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the
permission of the copyright OWNER.
[Safeguarding Memorandum]
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
REVISION LIST
SECTION REV DATE DESCRIPTION

3 0 06-Mar-20 Update reference documents.
Provide additional statement on Section 5.2
5.2 0 06-Mar-20
Abbreviations.
6.1 0 06-Mar-20 Revise and update Figure 6-1 BTJT-B Facility.
6.6 0 06-Mar-20 Revise typo word.
Revise and update Table 7-1 BTJT-B WHP PSV
7.1.1 0 06-Mar-20
Summary Data.
Revise and update PSV description and provide
7.1.2 0 06-Mar-20
additional PSV.
Provide column for P&ID No. on Table 7-2 BTJT-B WHP
7.2.1 0 06-Mar-20
ROV Summary Data.
Provide column for P&ID No. on Table 7-3 BTJT-B WHP
7.2.3 0 06-Mar-20
SDV Summary Data.
Provide new class 1 check valve on Table 7-4 BTJT-B
7.2.4 0 06-Mar-20
WHP Class 1 Check Valves Summary Data.
Update Table 7-5 Penultimate Safeguards for
7.3 0 06-Mar-20
Overpressure Protection.
8.1 0 06-Mar-20 Revise and update Table 8-1 Isolatable Sections.
Revise and update Table 8-2 Pump Backflow Protection
8.2 0 06-Mar-20
Summary Data.
Provide equipment tag no. and update statement on
8.3.2 0 06-Mar-20
Section 8.3.2 Fuel Gas System.
Revise and update Section 8.3.3 Instrument and Utility
8.3.3 0 06-Mar-20
Air System.
Provide equipment tag no. and update statement on
8.3.4 0 06-Mar-20
Section 8.3.4 Interfaces with Drain System.
Provide additional PSFS on Table 10-1 Process
10 0 06-Mar-20
Safeguarding Flow Scheme (PSFS) List
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
COMMENT RESPONSE SHEET
Document/
No. Owner Comments Contractor Response Remarks
Page Ref.
Revise Figure 6-1 BTJT-B
1 12 Comment is incorporated. -
Facility.
Revise typo word in Section
2 15 Comment is incorporated. -
6.6 Administrative Controls.
Complete HOLD data in Table
3 16 7-1 BTJT-B WHP PSV Comment is incorporated. -
Summary Data.
BDV-6061/6062 are updated to
Add BDV-6061/6062 at GTG
4 30 BDV-7510/7520 based on P&ID -
A/B.
Rev. B1.
Check valve at Liquid Transfer
Check valve at Liquid Transfer
Pump is added in Table 7-4
5 32 Pump discharge, include class -
BTJT-B WHP Class 1 Check
1 or not?
Valves Summary Data.
BDV-6061/6062 are updated to
Add BDV-6061/6062 at GTG
6 37 BDV-7510/7520 based on P&ID -
A/B.
Rev. B1.
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
TABLE OF CONTENT
1. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................6
2. PURPOSE......................................................................................................7
3. REFERENCE ..................................................................................................7
4. DOCUMENTS ORDER OF PRECEDENCE ..........................................................8
5. TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................9
5.1 TERMS ..................................................................................................9
5.2 ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................9
6. PROCESS DESIGN, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ..................................11

6.1 PROCESS UNIT DESCRIPTION ............................................................ 11
6.2 PROCESS UNIT DESIGN BASIS ...........................................................13
6.3 OPERATOR INTERVENTION ................................................................13
6.4 CONTROL VALVE BYPASS .................................................................... 14
6.5 MAINTENANCE STRATEGY FOR RELIEF VALVE .................................... 14
6.6 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS .............................................................14
7. SAFEGUARDING ELEMENTS ........................................................................16

7.1 ULTIMATE SAFEGUARD – SUMMARY OF RELIEF DEVICES AND
INSTRUMENTED PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS ................................................. 16
7.1.1 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES SUMMARY DATASHEET.......................16
7.1.2 ULTIMATE SAFEGUARDS – DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL RELIEF CASES ...... 18
7.2 MITIGATION SYSTEM .........................................................................29
7.2.1 REMOTE OPERATED VALVES (ROV) .......................................... 29
7.2.2 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZING SYSTEM ................................... 30
7.2.3 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM ............................................ 32
7.2.4 CLASS 1 CHECK VALVES ........................................................... 33
7.2.5 LIQUID BLOWDOWN SYSTEM ...................................................35
7.2.6 WATER/SPRAY/DELUGE SYSTEM ............................................. 35
7.3 PENULTIMATE SAFEGUARDS – DESCRIPTION OF INSTRUMENTED
PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS (IPF) ..................................................................35
8. INTERFACES BETWEEN SYSTEMS AND UNITS ............................................37

8.1 UNIT ISOLATION ................................................................................ 37
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
8.2 INTERFACES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE SECTIONS ...........40

8.3 INTERFACES WITH UTILITY SYSTEM ..................................................43
8.3.1 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM ................................................... 43
8.3.2 FUEL GAS SYSTEM .................................................................... 43
8.3.3 INSTRUMENT AND UTILITY AIR SYSTEM ..................................44
8.3.4 INTERFACES WITH DRAIN SYSTEM .......................................... 44
9. MISCELLANEOUS ........................................................................................45
9.1 OPERATION OF INTERLOCKING SYSTEM FOR PSV ..............................45
9.2 OPERATION OF LOCKING SYSTEM FOR PIG LAUNCHER/PIG RECEIVER .........45
9.3 OPERATING PROCEDURES ..................................................................46
9.4 EQUIPMENT ISOLATION, START UP, AND SHUT DOWN PROCEDURES 46
9.5 FLAME AND DETONATION ARRESTORS ...............................................47
9.6 OTHER SAFEGUARDING ISSUES.......................................................... 47
10. PROCESS SAFEGUARDING FLOW SCHEME (PSFS) ......................................48

APPENDIX A ..................................................................................................... 49
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PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

INFIELD PIPELINES AND HOST TIE IN MODIFICATION Page : 6 of 49
FOR BUKIT TUA PHASE 2B DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
1. BACKGROUND
The Bukit Tua South and Southern of Bukit Tua Main are two fields to be developed
as part of the Ketapang block PSC commitment. Hence, a firm development plan has
now been undertaken by PC Ketapang II Ltd (PCK2L) to develop the field before the
PSC expires in 2028.
The field contains hydrocarbon reserve of oil and significant associated gas located
in Ketapang block, East Java basin. The field lies in the East Java Sea 100 km from
Surabaya at the North of Madura Island, in a water depth of 60 m. The nearest PC
Ketapang II Ltd operated infrastructures are BTJT-A Wellhead Platform and BT-FPSO
located at 3.6 km to the North West of this new field.
The existing facilities were developed as part of Phase 1 development with five (5)
single completion wells, two (2) future wells, one (1) future pilot water flooding well
and one (1) spare. Subsequently, two (2) additional infill wells were drilled at the
existing BTJT-A platform as part of Bukit Tua Field Development Phase 2A and
currently PC Ketapang II Ltd intends to drill four (4) additional wells and brownfield
modification at the existing BTJT-A platform as part of Bukit Tua Field Development
Phase 3. At the FPSO, gas is compressed, dehydrated and hydrocarbon dew pointed
prior to be exported to BTJT-A as gas lift and fuel gas. Then, the excess gas will be
exported to ORF. The liquid at the FPSO is separated with the oil stream is stabilized
and stored within hull storage tanks and the water is treated before disposal
overboard.
JAVA SEA
Pangkah PSC
Ketapang PSC
JS 2-1 JS 3-1
Ujung Pangkah
Bukit Tua-3A Garit-1
Field Bukit Tua-2
Bukit Tua-4
Jenggolo-1
JS8-1
Perawan-1
JS44A-1
JS19-1
MADURA
EAST
JAVA 20 km
The new facility Bukit Tua Phase 2B (BTJT-B) will be developed as a satellite Wellhead
Platform to the existing facilities. The BTJT-B platform will be unmanned with a single
Full Well Stream (FWS) of indicated 16-inch, 3.6 km pipeline tied back to the BTJT-
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A platform prior to be transferred to the BT-FPSO processing facility via the existing
pipeline. A 6-inch, 3.6 km pipeline will supply gas lift as selected method used to
artificially lift fluid from well at the new production facility.
The BTJT-B platform will be supported by a vertical four-legged substructure with the
well conductors are protected with the internal perimeter of the jackets. The
Wellhead Platform will accommodate up to nine (9) well slots with five (5) producing
wells and four (4) spares.
The production facility will be designed to handle plateau rate of 14,700 Stb/d liquid
and 40 MMSCFD gas and assuming BTJT-A arrival pressure at 160 psia.
Wellhead pressure will decrease rapidly during the first two years of production.
Subsequently, pressure will be maintained at low pressure approximately 120 psia
up to the end of PSC contract in 2028.
PT. Meindo Elang Indah has been awarded the Engineering, Procurement,
Construction, Installation and Commissioning of BTJT-B Wellhead Platform, infield
pipelines and host tie-in modification for Bukit Tua Phase 2B development project,
PC Ketapang II Ltd PSC, East Java, Indonesia under contract no. 4850000373.
2. PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to provide process description and safeguarding
philosophy to prevent failure and damage at Bukit Tua BTJT-B Platform.
3. REFERENCE
NO. DOC NO. REV. DOCUMENT TITLE
A. Indonesian Act and Regulations
N/A
B. Project Specifications and Datasheet

1. 11-BTJT-B-B-ESD-0001 B1 Process Emergency Shutdown Logic
Wellhead Production System
Shutdown Hierarchy
2. 11-BTJT-B-B-DWG-8000 B1 Safety Analysis Function Evaluation
(SAFE) Chart
3. 11-BTJT-B-I-DWG-5006 0 Cause and Effect Diagram
4. 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8001~8010 B1 Process Safeguarding Flow Scheme
5. BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0005 0 Operation and Maintenance

Philosophy
6. BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0006 0 Relief and Blowdown Philosophy
7. BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0007 0 Process Control and Safeguarding

Philosophy
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NO. DOC NO. REV. DOCUMENT TITLE

8. BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0009 0 Valve and Isolation Philosophy
9. 11-BTJT-B-B-PID-1501~1545 B1 Piping and Instrumentation

Diagram BTJT-B Platform
10. BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-RPT-0002 0 Equipment Sizing Report
11. As required - Equipment Vendor Documents
12. As required - Equipment Datasheets
C. Petronas Technical Standards (PTS) and Construction Standard Procedures (CSP)

1. PTS 14.12.08 Jan Alarm Management: Design and
2017 Implementation Requirement
2. PTS 16.51.02 May Safeguarding Memorandum (SM)

2017 and Process Safeguarding Flow
Diagram (PSFD)
3. PTS 16.52.04 Jan Design of Pressure Relief, Flare and
2017 Vent Systems
4. PTS 16.53.01 Oct Overpressure and Underpressure –
2017 Prevention and Protection
5. PTS 16.74.02 Apr Human Factors Engineering – Valve
2019 Criticality Analysis
D. International Codes and Standards
N/A
4. DOCUMENTS ORDER OF PRECEDENCE

All Work shall be performed in accordance with the following order of precedence of
the following codes and standards:
1. Indonesian Act and Regulations.
2. Project Specification and Datasheet.
3. PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) and Construction Standard Procedures
(CSP).
4. International Recognized Codes and Standards.
5. Good Engineering Practice.
In case of conflict between the requirements of this specification with its attachments
and the referenced specifications or codes and standards, CONTRACTOR/VENDOR
shall bring the matter to the COMPANY’s attention for resolution and Approval.
It is the CONTRACTOR responsibility to present the issues and/or differences among

the codes and standards above to the COMPANY for resolution. The more stringent
requirement shall prevail unless otherwise approved by the COMPANY.
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Any latest amendments/new additions to the standard and regulation shall be

incorporated.
If the CONTRACTOR proposes to employ an alternative standard this shall be

approved by the COMPANY before Work can proceed.
5. TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

5.1 Terms
The following terms as used in this document, assume the meanings given
below:
COMPANY PC Ketapang II Ltd, as the Project developer and ultimate
owner of the facility/platform.
CONTRACTOR The party that carries out all or part of the detailed
engineering, procurement, construction, installation and
commissioning (EPCIC) contract of the project and the one
who places the order signs the contract as or on behalf of
the COMPANY. In this Project, PT. Meindo Elang Indah
(MEI).
VENDOR The company that manufactures or supplies equipment and

services to perform duties specified by COMPANY.
“VENDOR” covers Manufacturer/Supplier/Sub-vendor.

5.2 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are commonly used in this document:
barg bar gauge

blpd barrels of liquid per day
bopd barrels of oil per day
BT-FPSO Bukit Tua Floating Production Storage and Offloading
BTJT-A Bukit Tua Wellhead Platform A
BTJT-B Bukit Tua Wellhead Platform B
bwpd barrels of water per day
CCR Central Control Room
CITHP Closed-In Tubing Head Pressure
CSP Construction Standard Procedures
DP Design Pressure
DT Design Temperature
E&I Electrical and Instrument
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
EDP Emergency Depressurizing System
ESD Emergency Shutdown System
FPSO Floating Production Storage and Offloading
FWS Full Well Stream
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FTHP Flowing Tube Head Pressure

GPA General Platform Alarm
GTG Gas Turbine Generator
HC Hydrocarbon
HP/LP High Pressure/Low Pressure
IPF Instrumented Protective Functions
IPS Instrumented Protective System
IRCD Injection Rate Control Device
KO Knock Out
LO Locked-Open
CSO Car-Sealed Open
MAWP Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
MMscfd Million Metric Standard Cubic Feet per Day
MOV Motorized Operated Valve
MW Molecular Weight
N/A Not Available
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
PMCS Process Monitoring and Control System
PSC Production Sharing Contract
PSD Process Shutdown
PSFS Process Safeguarding Flow Scheme
PST Process Safety Time
PSV Pressure Safety Valve
PTS Petronas Technical Standards
PZAHH/LL Pressure Transmitter High-high/Low-low
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
ROV Remote Operated Valves
SCSSV Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve
SDV Shutdown Valve
SIL Safety Integrated Level
SIPROD Simultaneous Production and Drilling
SIS Safety Instrumented System
SP Set Pressure
SSV Surface Safety Valve
TSO Tight Shut-Off
UCP Unit Control Panel
USD Unit Shutdown
WAT Wax Appearance Temperature
WHP Wellhead Platform
WV Wing Valve
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6. PROCESS DESIGN, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

6.1 Process Unit Description
The BTJT-B Wellhead Platform is required to accommodate five (5) single

completion wells comprising oil and associated gas and four (4) future wells.
The Bukit Tua crude oil has been classified as waxy crude with a Wax
Appearance Temperature (WAT) of 65 °C and a high pour point of 35 °C (dead
crude). The WHP facility shall include the use of heat tracing and/or associated
insulation as well as chemical injection facilities to mitigate the
formation/deposition of wax accordingly. The heat tracing will be applied to
liquid and two-phase lines. The test separator, production separator, closed
drain vessel and open drain tank shall each incorporate an electric heater which
can be used during start up and normal operation if the liquid temperature drop
significantly below WAT.
All production fluid is routed to the production manifold before entering

Production Separator (V-1040). The separated gas from Production Separator
(V-1040) will be routed to the compression system which consists of
Compression Suction Scrubber (V-2410/2440) and Gas Compressor (K-
2420/2450). The gas compression system is 2x100% operation, where one (1)
train is in operation and the other train is standby. Meanwhile, the separated
liquid (mix oil/condensate and water) from Production Separator (V-1040) will
be routed to the Liquid Transfer Pump (P-1340A/B) and then heated in the
Liquid Heater (E-1330).
The compressed gas and heated liquid will be combined into one stream and
routed to a 16” FWS pipeline and delivered to BTJT-A Wellhead Platform. The
production fluid from BTJT-B will be commingled with production fluid from
BTJT-A production manifold and routed to Production Separator (V-1020) at
BTJT-A. The separated gas from Production Separator (V-1020) will be
delivered to FPSO via wet gas pipeline, while the separated liquid will be
delivered to FPSO via liquid pipeline.
During early production (November 2021 to April 2023), the production fluid
from wells will be directly routed to BTJT-A without gas compression and liquid
transfer pump system through bypass line due to high availability of FTHP from
the wells. However, Liquid Heater (E-1330) is required to increase the well fluid
temperature before entering the Full Well Stream (FWS) pipeline. Therefore,
during early production, the Liquid Heater (E-1330) will be used as Full Well
Stream (FWS) heater.
The following Figure 6-1 shows the process schematic of Bukit Tua WHP B
(BTJT-B).
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PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM, INFIELD PIPELINES AND

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HOST TIE IN MODIFICATION FOR BUKIT TUA PHASE 2B DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Figure 6-1 BTJT-B Facility

PC
To Vent Header
V-1030
LC
Test Manifold
LC E-2430/
H
2460
M
Production Manifold
PC
K-2420/
2450
M
V-1040 LC V-2410/
H 2440
Production Fluid
Gas Lift Manifold
to BTJT-A
Production Wellheads BTM L-1320
(Crude Oil + Gas) - Typ. 3
P-1340A/B
E-1330 TC TC
PC
E-6020
Export Gas
Production Wellheads BTS from BTJT-A
Gas Turbine
(Crude Oil + Gas) - Typ. 2 S-6060A/B R-2940
Generator Gas Sweeping
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6.2 Process Unit Design Basis
Pressure relief devices and other process safeguarding elements are designed
to accommodate two (2) operation modes at BTJT-B. The two (2) operation
modes at BTJT-B are classified based on production life which are early
production (November 2021 to April 2023) and late production. In early
production, the production fluid from wells will be directly routed to BTJT-A
without gas and liquid separation in Production Separator (V-1040), gas
compression and liquid transfer pump system through bypass line due to high
availability of FTHP from the wells. While in late production, the production fluid
from wells is directed to Production Separator (V-1040) to be separated as gas
and liquid stream prior to be compressed (gas) and pumped (liquid) to increase
the operating pressure and transferred to BTJT-A. As a result, the pressure
relief devices and other process safeguarding elements installed on Production
Separator (V-1040), gas compression and liquid transfer pump system will not
be operated in the early production. The BTJT-B production facility is designed
to handle fluid at the rate of 40 MMscfd and 14700 blpd (12500 bopd) and
assuming BTJT-A arrival pressure at 160 psia.
As per API 521, in evaluating relieving requirements due to any cause, any
automatic control valves that are not under consideration as causing a relieving
requirement and which would tend to relieve the system should be assumed to
remain in the position required for normal processing flow. In other words, no
credit should be taken for any favorable instrument response. However, in
designing pressure relief devices (PSV) at BTJT-B, the most conservative
approach is taken where no reduced relief flowrate considered through the
installed control valve.
6.3 Operator Intervention
Operator intervention can be considered if all the following conditions are

fulfilled:
a. An alarm for operator alert: The alarm shall be independent of the
overpressure scenario, i.e. the cause of the overpressure shall not also
disable the alarm instrumentation.
b. There is adequate time for the operator to react and to stop the
overpressure. The adequacy of this time shall include the time to diagnose
the alarm, to take an action, and for the action to take effect. There shall
be clear, unambiguous and effective operator actions specified for
responding to this alarm. The amount of time that is considered adequate
for operator intervention shall be established by the Technical Authority.
The recommendation of sufficiency will typically be between 15 to 30
minutes. A range is provided based on the following:
- The type of facilities.
- The ability of operators to diagnose an alarm and take corrective action
may vary.
- The distance to and the ability to physically access the
equipment/instrumentation will also have an impact on intervention
time.
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c. The consequences of ineffective, or no, operator intervention shall be

evaluated.
d. If credit for operator intervention is being considered in the relief device
sizing, then the allowable accumulation for ineffective, or no, operator
intervention is evaluated as that for a remote contingency. This
accumulation shall be determined by calculating for the vessel and emptying
pressure required to pass this relief load via the relief area, defined by the
governing relief scenario.
e. Vessels shall be designed for overfill case with no operator intervention
credit. The duration of overfill will be temporary and is determined by the
filling time of the vessel and emptying based on the pumping rate. The
overpressure scenario due to insufficient time for operator intervention for
such case is evaluated as a basis of design.
6.4 Control Valve Bypass

Control valve bypass is only required to be operated when the control valve is
undergoing maintenance or when there is requirement to increase flow during
operation when control valve is already 100% in open position. It is required to
state the maximum allowable flowrate across the control valve bypass to ensure
that the overpressure protection is not jeopardized.
6.5 Maintenance Strategy for Relief Valve
Requirement for maintenance shall be addressed to pressure relief devices

(PSV) at BTJT-B in a regular basis. Some pressure relief devices which are
provided with spare provision are allowed for online maintenance, while others
do not have will require shutdown or turnaround to perform maintenance. The
isolation requirement for single relief valve maintenance is described in Valve
and Isolation Philosophy, BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0009 [B.8].
6.6 Administrative Controls
The use of engineering controls is preferred to administrative controls when it

comes to prevention of overpressure, under-pressure and equipment damage.
Administrative controls may be applied where other over/under-pressure
protection cannot be used. Where applied, administrative controls shall consist
of:
a. Mechanical elements (locks, interlocks, etc).
b. Clear and effective operational and maintenance procedures.
c. Training and relevant personnel on these procedures.
d. Management systems to assess overall effectiveness.
The use of administrative controls is often relied upon for commissioning and
maintenance activities. For normal operation, administrative controls shall not
be used (except where this would otherwise be impractical, as described below).
Subject to approval by the Technical Authority, fire exposure of equipment

which are removed/isolated from operation is not considered a credible
overpressure scenario, if both of the following conditions are met:
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- Fire relief load can be relieved elsewhere in the system during normal
operation (when the equipment is lined up again).
- Procedures are in place for promptly draining and depressurizing equipment
that is isolated for maintenance. This credit is typically taken only for spared
equipment that are intended to be put into operation at a pre-determined
frequency (examples: filters, driers, etc).
Valve operation control applications are defined as controls that limit and clarify
the use of the valve in a pre-defined position: open or closed. Valve for
operation controls are valves with a chained and locked, or key/mechanical
locked, or a car-seal based system, instrumented interlock or 3-way valve.
The criteria set for valve operation controls are:

a. Valve locks are not permitted if closure of the valve will result in an
immediate overpressure. Note that ASME allows the use of valve operation
controls to prevent overpressure in upstream equipment. However, for new
designs, valve operation controls shall not be used to avoid overpressure.
Refer to [C.2] for valve operation controls of relief device isolation valves.
b. All valves in the flow path of a relief header shall be key locked or car-sealed
open.
c. For heat exchangers, there is no requirement for car seals or locks for valves
in the fire relief path (no valves before the thermal relief valves).
d. The Technical Authority may specify other applications of car seals/valve
locks as an acceptable safeguard on a case-by-case.
For assurance on the effectiveness of administrative controls consisting of

procedures, training, management systems, and valve locks, the following shall
be implemented:
a. The importance of valve locks shall be communicated to personnel via
training and procedures. In order to prevent any slackening awareness of
the importance of valve locking, the considerations of using valve lock
applications should be done sensibly.
b. Locked valves shall be identified on the P&ID and the PSFS with the required
valve position specified as key locked-open (LO) or car-sealed open (CSO),
etc.
c. Document list of valve location, intended valve position (open or closed) and
purpose (safety, environmental, or operability, etc.) of each locked valve
shall be made available and maintained up to date.
d. Field verification of locked safety-related valves shall be conducted on a
regular basis.
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TUA PHASE 2B DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
7. SAFEGUARDING ELEMENTS
7.1 Ultimate Safeguard – Summary of Relief Devices and Instrumented Protective Functions
7.1.1 Safety/Relief Valves Summary Datasheet

The ultimate safeguard consists of pressure relief devices as summarized in the following table.
Table 7-1 BTJT-B WHP PSV Summary Data
Relief
Design Design
Device Set
Tag No. Service Location P&ID No. Pressure Relief Path Temperature
Pressure
(barg) (oC)
(barg)
Test Separator
PSV-1030 BTJT-B-B-PID-1511 35 35 Vent Header 86
(V-1030)
Production Separator
PSV-1040A/B BTJT-B-B-PID-1512 35 35 Vent Header 86
(V-1040)
Liquid Heater
(E-1330)
Compressor Suction Scrubber

PSV-2410/2440 BTJT-B-B-PID-1514/1516 35 35 Vent Header 150
(V-2410/2440)
Discharge Line of Gas Compressor

PSV-2420/2450 BTJT-B-B-PID-1515-1/1517-1 35 35 Vent Header 150
A/B (K-2420/2450)
BTJT-B to BTJT-A FWS Pig

Launcher (L-1320)
Temporary BTJT-A to BTJT-B

Gas Lift Pig Receiver (R-2940)
Fuel Gas Heater

(E-6020)
Discharge Line of Closed Drain

PSV-6420A/B BTJT-B-B-PID-1524 35 35 Closed Drain Vessel 81
Transfer Pump (P-6420A/B)
Fuel Gas Filter

(S-6060A/B)
Discharge Line of Diesel Injection

PSV-6770 BTJT-B-B-PID-1539-1 120 120 Suction Pump 65
Pump (P-6770)
PSV-5930 Nitrogen Rack Skid (A-5930) BTJT-B-B-PID-1540 250 17.2 Atmosphere 93
Discharge Line of 1st Stage Air

PSV-5410A/B BTJT-B-B-PID-1541 12 12 Atmosphere 70
Compressor (K-5410A/B-1)
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Relief
Design Design
Device Set
Tag No. Service Location P&ID No. Pressure Relief Path Temperature
Pressure
(barg) (oC)
(barg)
PSV-5411A/B Aftercooler (E-5410A/B-2) BTJT-B-B-PID-1541 12 12 Atmosphere 70
Air Dryer
PSV-5412A/B/C/D BTJT-B-B-PID-1542 12 12 Atmosphere 70
(S-5412A/B/C/D)
Instrument Air Receiver

PSV-5413 BTJT-B-B-PID-1543-1 12 12 Atmosphere 70
(V-5410)
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7.1.2 Ultimate Safeguards – Description of Individual Relief Cases

a. PSV-1030
PSV-1030 is installed to protect Test Separator (V-1030) from
overpressure during emergency fire scenario. Overpressure due to
blocked outlet is not considered during operation since the Test Separator
is protected by PZAHH-1031 that will initiate USD and close upstream
SDV.
1. Electrical Failure
 General - Test Separator heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief
takes place.
 Single - Test Separator heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief
takes place.
 Partial - Test Separator heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief
takes place.
2. Total Cooling Failure
Not applicable.
3. Total Instrument Air Failure
Instrument air supply failure will initiate PSD by PZALL-5425A/B/C
detection and no relief takes place.
4. Inadvertent Valve Opening
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable. Process Safety Time (PST) from PZAHH to PSV set
pressure is more than required SDV closing time.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
8. Thermal Expansion
Not applicable.
b. PSV-1040A/B
PSV-1040A/B are installed to protect Production Separator (V-1040) from
blocked outlet is not considered during operation since the Production
Separator is protected by PZAHH-1041 that will initiate PSD and close
upstream SDV.
 General - Production Separator heater will be tripped by SIS and
no relief takes place.
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 Single - Production Separator heater will be tripped by SIS and no

relief takes place.
 Partial - Production Separator heater will be tripped by SIS and
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
c. PSV-2410/2440
PSV-2410/2440 are installed to protect Compressor Suction Scrubber
Train A/B (V-2410/2440) from overpressure during emergency fire
scenario.
 General – Not applicable.
 Single – Not applicable.
 Partial – Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
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7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
d. PSV-2420/2450
PSV-2420/2450 are installed to protect Gas Compressor Train A/B (K-
2420/2450) from overpressure during blocked discharge scenario.
 General – Gas Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief
takes place.
 Single – Gas Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Partial – Gas Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Governing case.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Identified but not considered as governing case.
Not applicable.
e. PSV-1330A/B
PSV-1330A/B are installed to protect Liquid Heater (E-1330) from
overpressure during emergency fire scenario.
 General – Liquid Heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Single – Liquid Heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Partial – Liquid Heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
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Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
f. PSV-1320
PSV-1320 is installed to protect FWS Pig Launcher (L-1320) from
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
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g. PSV-6020A/B
PSV-6020A/B are installed to protect Fuel Gas Heater (E-6020) from
blocked outlet is not considered during operation since the maximum
source pressure is lower than PSV set pressure.
 General – Fuel Gas Heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief
takes place.
 Single – Fuel Gas Heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Partial – Fuel Gas Heater will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
Not applicable.
Instrument air supply failure will initiate PSD by-PZALL 5425A/B/C
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
h. PSV-6060A/B
PSV-6060A/B are installed to protect Fuel Gas Filter (S-6060A/B) from
overpressure due to inadvertent valve opening scenario. The
overpressure occurs if the PCV-6060A/B is stuck open during gas
operational flow from BTJT-A.
Not applicable.
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Governing case.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Not applicable.
i. PSV-2940
PSV-2940 is installed to protect Temporary BTJT-A to BTJT-B Gas Lift Pig
Receiver from overpressure during emergency fire scenario.
Overpressure due to blocked outlet is not considered during operation
since the maximum source pressure is lower than PSV set pressure.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
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j. PSV-6770
PSV-6770 is installed to protect Diesel Injection Pump (P-6770) from
overpressure due to blocked discharge scenario. The overpressure occurs
if any manual valve at the pump discharge is closed. The relief rate at
this condition based on the pump rated flow.
 General – Diesel Injection Pump will be tripped by SIS and no
relief takes place.
 Single – Diesel Injection Pump will be tripped by SIS and no relief
takes place.
 Partial – Diesel Injection Pump will be tripped by SIS and no relief
takes place.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Governing case.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Not applicable.
k. PSV-5413
PSV-5413 is installed to protect Instrument Air Receiver (V-5410) from
Not applicable.
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Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
l. PSV-5930
PSV-5930 is installed to protect downstream equipment of Nitrogen Rack
Skid (A-5930) from overpressure due to inadvertent valve opening
scenario. The overpressure occurs if the PCV-5931/5932 is stuck open
during operational flow of nitrogen for compressor back-up seal.
Not applicable.
Governing case.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
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m. PSV-5410A/B
PSV-5410A/B are installed to protect downstream equipment of 1st Stage
Air Compressor (K-5410A/B-1) from overpressure due to blocked
discharge scenario.
 General – Air Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Single – Air Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Partial – Air Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Governing case.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
n. PSV-5411A/B
PSV-5411A/B are installed to protect downstream equipment of 2 nd Stage
Air Compressor (K-5410A/B-2) from overpressure due to blocked
discharge scenario.
 General – Air Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Single – Air Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
 Partial – Air Compressor will be tripped by SIS and no relief takes
place.
Not applicable.
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Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Governing case.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
o. PSV-5412A/B/C/D
PSV-5412A/B/C/D are installed to protect Air Dryer (S-5412A/B/C/D)
from overpressure due to emergency fire scenario.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Governing case.
Not applicable.
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p. PSV-6420A/B
PSV-6420A/B is installed to protect Closed Drain Transfer Pump (P-
6420A/B) from overpressure due to blocked discharge scenario. The
overpressure occurs if any manual valve at the pump discharge is closed.
The relief rate at this condition based on the pump rated flow.
 General – Closed Drain Transfer Pump will be tripped by SIS and
 Single – Closed Drain Transfer Pump will be tripped by SIS and no
relief takes place.
 Partial – Closed Drain Transfer Pump will be tripped by SIS and
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
5. Blocked Outlet
Governing case.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Not applicable.
q. PSV-6070
PSV-6070 is installed to protect FWS pipeline from overpressure due to
control valve failure via gas sweeping line. The overpressure occurs if the
control valve at downstream of Fuel Gas Heater (E-6020) is inadvertently
full open.
Not applicable.
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Governing case.
5. Blocked Outlet
Not applicable.
6. Other Failure
Not detected.
7. Fire
Not applicable.
7.2 Mitigation System
Mitigation system is system or barrier included in the design to limit the

consequence of uncontrolled loss of containment. Mitigation system for use in
emergency situations such as a large release of flammable and/or toxic substance
as a result of catastrophic failure of equipment includes description of remote
operated valves, emergency shutdown and emergency depressurizing system, class
1 check valves and liquid blowdown system.
7.2.1 Remote Operated Valves (ROV)

Remote Operated Valves (ROV) are used as isolation valve that can be
operated manually by operator in the control room. Table below shows the
ROV summary list which are installed at BTJT-B.
Table 7-2 BTJT-B WHP ROV Summary Data

ROV Tag ROV Equipment
P&ID No. Location/Function
No. Type Protected/Action
Isolate W-0210
Ball W-0210 flowline to
MOV-0411 B-B-PID-1510 route to production
valve production manifold
manifold
Isolate W-0220
manifold
Isolate W-0230
manifold
Isolate W-0240
manifold
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ROV Tag ROV Equipment

Isolate W-0250
manifold
Isolate W-0210
MOV-0421 B-B-PID-1510 route to test
valve test manifold
manifold
Isolate W-0220
valve test manifold
manifold
Isolate W-0230
valve test manifold
manifold
Isolate W-0240
valve test manifold
manifold
Isolate W-0250
valve test manifold
manifold
Isolate FWS Pig
Ball Outlet FWS Pig
MOV-1311 B-B-PID-1518 Launcher (L-1320)
valve Launcher (L-1320)
from FWS pipeline
Isolate FWS Pig
Ball Outlet FWS Pig
MOV-1312 B-B-PID-1518 Launcher (L-1320)
valve Launcher (L-1320)
from FWS pipeline
Ball Process line to FWS Isolate process line
MOV-1322 B-B-PID-1518
valve pipeline to FWS pipeline
7.2.2 Emergency Depressurizing System

a. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-0411
BDV-0411 is a spring to open valve located at Production Manifold. This
system is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during normal operation and
ESD-2 during SIPROD with time delay. During ESD, it is capable to
depressurize the Production Manifold section under fire condition to 7
barg (100 psig) in 15 minutes.
b. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-0412
BDV-0412 is a spring to open valve located at Test Manifold. This system
is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during normal operation and ESD-2
during SIPROD with time delay. During ESD, it is capable to depressurize
the Test Manifold section under fire condition to 7 barg (100 psig) in 15
minutes.
c. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-1030
BDV-1030 is a spring to open valve located at Test Separator. This
system is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during normal operation and
ESD-2 during SIPROD with time delay. During ESD, it is capable to
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depressurize the Test Separator section under fire condition to 7 barg

(100 psig) in 15 minutes.
d. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-1040
BDV-1040 is a spring open valve located at Production Separator. This
system is initiated automatically during ESD-1 during normal operation
and ESD-2 during SIPROD with time delay. During ESD, it is capable to
depressurize the Production Separator section under fire condition to 7
barg (100 psig) in 15 minutes.
e. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-2420/2450
BDV-2420/2450 is a spring open valve located at Gas Compressor Train
A/B discharge line. This system is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during
normal operation and ESD-2 during SIPROD with time delay. During ESD,
it is capable to depressurize the Compression System (Compressor
Suction Scrubber, Gas Compressor, Compressor Recycle Cooler and
related piping) under fire condition to 7 barg (100 psig) in 15 minutes.
f. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-1320
BDV-1320 is a spring open valve located at FWS export line to FWS
pipeline. This system is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during normal
operation and ESD-2 during SIPROD with time delay. During ESD, it is
capable to depressurize the bypass line of Production Separator and
Compression System, Liquid Heater and related piping to inlet of FWS
pipeline section during early production and also suction of Liquid
Transfer Pump, Liquid Heater and related piping to inlet of FWS pipeline
section during operating of Production Separator under fire condition to
7 barg (100 psig) in 15 minutes.
g. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-2940
BDV-2940 is a spring to open valve located at Gas Lift Receiver topside
piping. This system is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during normal
capable to depressurize the BTJT-B gas lift receiver piping section under
fire condition to 7 barg (100 psig) in 15 minutes.
h. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-6060
BDV-6060 is a spring to open valve located at Fuel Gas Filter discharge
line. This system is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during normal
capable to depressurize the Fuel Gas System (Fuel Gas Heater, Fuel Gas
Filter and related piping) section under fire condition to 7 barg (100 psig)
in 15 minutes.
i. High Rate Depressurizing Valve – BDV-7510/7520
BDV-7510/7520 is a spring to open valve located at inlet of Fuel Gas line.
This system is initiated automatically by ESD-1 during normal operation
and ESD-2 during SIPROD with time delay. During ESD, it is capable to
depressurize fuel gas inlet line of GTG A/B package up to upstream of
SDV at fuel gas line inside GTG A/B package and related piping section
under fire condition to 7 barg (100 psig) in 15 minutes.
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7.2.3 Emergency Shutdown System

In the event of emergency, shutdown valves (SDVs) are used as isolation
valve which are automatically triggered to limit the consequences of
uncontrolled loss of containment. Table below shows the SDVs summary data
which are installed at BTJT-B.
Table 7-3 BTJT-B WHP SDV Summary Data
SDV Tag SDV Equipment

Ball
SDV-0621 B-B-PID-1501 Gas lift line to W-0210 W-0210
valve
Ball
valve
Ball
valve
Ball
valve
Ball
valve
Ball Inlet Test Separator Test Separator
SDV-1030 B-B-PID-1511
valve (V-1030) (V-1030)
Ball Gas outlet Test Separator Test Separator
SDV-1031 B-B-PID-1511
valve (V-1030) (V-1030)
Ball Oil outlet Test Separator Test Separator
SDV-1032 B-B-PID-1511
valve (V-1030) (V-1030)
Ball Water outlet Test Test Separator
SDV-1033 B-B-PID-1511
valve Separator (V-1030) (V-1030)
Ball Inlet Production Separator Production Separator
SDV-1040 B-B-PID-1512
valve (V-1040) (V-1040)
Ball Liquid outlet Production Production Separator
SDV-1041 B-B-PID-1512
valve Separator (V-1040) (V-1040)
Inlet Compressor Suction Compressor Suction
Ball
SDV-2410 B-B-PID-1514 Scrubber Train A Scrubber Train A
valve
(V-2410) (V-2410)
Ball
SDV-2411 B-B-PID-1514 Scrubber Train A Scrubber Train A
valve
(V-2410) (V-2410)
Liquid outlet Compressor Compressor Suction
Ball
SDV-2412 B-B-PID-1514 Suction Scrubber Train A Scrubber Train A
valve
(V-2410) (V-2410)
Discharge line Gas
Ball Gas Compressor Train
SDV-2420 B-B-PID-1515-1 Compressor Train A
valve A (K-2420)
(K-2420)
Ball
SDV-2440 B-B-PID-1516 Scrubber Train B Scrubber Train B
valve
(V-2440) (V-2440)
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SDV Tag SDV Equipment

Ball
SDV-2441 B-B-PID-1516 Scrubber Train B Scrubber Train B
valve
(V-2440) (V-2440)
Liquid outlet Compressor Compressor Suction
Ball
SDV-2442 B-B-PID-1516 Suction Scrubber Train B Scrubber Train B
valve
(V-2440) (V-2440)
Discharge line Gas
Ball Gas Compressor Train
SDV-2450 B-B-PID-1517-1 Compressor Train B
valve B (K-2450)
(K-2450)
Ball Inlet FWS pipeline from
SDV-1320 B-B-PID-1518 FWS pipeline
valve process system
Ball Outlet gas export pipeline
SDV-2940 B-B-PID-1519 Gas export pipeline
valve from BTJT-A
Ball Outlet Fuel Gas Heater Fuel Gas Heater
SDV-6060 B-B-PID-1520
valve (E-6020) (E-6020)
Utility air line of Open Open Drain Pump
Ball
SDV-6530 B-B-PID-1526 Drain Pump (P-6530) and (P-6530) and Caisson
valve
Caisson Pump (P-6540) Pump (P-6540)
Utility air header to
Corrosion Inhibitor
Ball Corrosion Inhibitor
SDV-6860 B-B-PID-1534 Injection Pumps
valve Injection Pumps
(P-6860A~F)
(P-6860A~F)
Utility air header to Scale Scale Inhibitor
Ball
SDV-6870 B-B-PID-1535 Inhibitor Injection Pumps Injection Pumps
valve
(P-6870A~F) (P-6870A~F)
Ball Outlet Diesel Storage Diesel Storage Tank
SDV-6720 B-B-PID-1539-1
valve Tank (T-6720) (T-6720)
Ball Inlet Gas Turbine Gas Turbine Generator
SDV-7510 B-B-PID-1544-1
valve Generator A (GT-7510) A (GT-7510)
Ball Inlet Gas Turbine Gas Turbine Generator
SDV-7520 B-B-PID-1544-2
valve Generator B (GT-7520) B (GT-7520)
7.2.4 Class 1 Check Valves

Class 1 check valves are valves which are inspected periodically to assure
reliable operation. Following table shows the Class 1 check valves summary
data which are installed at BTJT-B.
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Table 7-4 BTJT-B WHP Class 1 Check Valves Summary Data
Class 1
Check Valve Location P&ID No. Purpose
Tag Number
Gas lift line to To prevent backflow from

VX-06101 B-B-PID-1501
W-0210 W-0210

VX-06102 B-B-PID-1502
W-0220 W-0220

VX-06103 B-B-PID-1503
W-0230 W-0230
VX-06104 B-B-PID-1504
W-0240 W-0240

VX-06105 B-B-PID-1505
W-0250 W-0250
Discharge of
To prevent backflow from
VX- Liquid Transfer
B-B-PID-1513 the active Liquid Transfer
13192/13200 Pump
Pump
(P-1340A/B)
Inlet Compressor
gas compression system
VX-24120 Suction Scrubber B-B-PID-1514
train A to Production
Train A (V-2410)
Separator (V-1040)
Gas Compressor
VX-24108 Train A (K-2420) B-B-PID-1515-1 Non slam check valve
discharge line

Inlet Compressor
gas compression system
VX-24118 Suction Scrubber B-B-PID-1516
train B to Production
Train B (V-2440)
Separator (V-1040)
Gas Compressor
VX-24117 Train B (K-2450) B-B-PID-1517-1 Non slam check valve
discharge line
Gas Compressor To prevent backflow of
Train A/B liquid from liquid transfer
VX-13235 B-B-PID-1518
discharge line to system to gas compression
FWS pipeline system
Liquid Heater To prevent backflow of gas
(E-1330) outlet from gas compression
VX-13207 B-B-PID-1518
line to FWS system to liquid transfer
pipeline system
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7.2.5 Liquid Blowdown System

No liquid blowdown system is provided in Bukit Tua BTJT-B platform.
7.2.6 Water/Spray/Deluge System

No water, spray or deluge system are provided in Bukit Tua BTJT-B platform.
7.3 Penultimate Safeguards – Description of Instrumented Protective

Functions (IPF)
The penultimate safeguards consist of the Instrumented Protective Functions (IPF)

to protect the system against overpressure event and summarized in the following
table.
Table 7-5 Penultimate Safeguards for Overpressure Protection
Tag No. Location Purpose
To prevent overpressure on the

Production Manifold, Test Manifold, Test
PZAHH–04213 Downstream of FCV-0410 Separator (V-1030) and Production
Separator (V-1040) if the PZAHH–1031
and PZAHH-1041 are failed to detect.




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Tag No. Location Purpose
To prevent overpressure on Test

PZAHH–1031 Test Separator (V-1030)
Separator (V-1030).
Production Separator To prevent overpressure on Production

PZAHH-1041
(V-1040) Separator (V-1040).
Liquid Transfer Pump To prevent overpressure on Liquid

PZAHH–1341A/B (P-1340A/B) Discharge Transfer Pump (P-1340A/B) discharge
Line line.
To prevent overpressure on Liquid

Heater (E-1330) and piping at the
upstream of Liquid Heater (E-1330) up
Upstream of Liquid
PZAHH-1334 to Production Separator bypass line due
Heater (E-1330)
to block valve inadvertently closed at
upstream of Liquid Heater (E-1330)
during early production.
Compressor Suction To prevent overpressure on Compressor

PZAHH-2424 Scrubber Train A (V- Suction Scrubber Train A (V-2410) and
2410) Gas Outlet Gas Compressor Train A suction line.
To prevent overpressure on Gas

Gas Compressor Train A
PZAHH-2422 Compressor Train A (K-2420) discharge
(K-2420) Discharge Line
line.
Compressor Suction To prevent overpressure on Compressor

PZAHH-2454 Scrubber Train B (V- Suction Scrubber Train B (V-2440) and
2440) Gas Outlet Gas Compressor Train B suction line.
To prevent overpressure on Gas

Gas Compressor Train B
PZAHH-2452 Compressor Train B (K-2450) discharge
(K-2450) Discharge Line
line.

Upstream of Fuel Gas upstream of Fuel Gas Filter (S-6060A/B)
PZAHH-6062
Filter (S-6060A/B) due to pressure control valve (PCV-
6060A/B) failure.
Closed Drain Transfer To prevent overpressure on the

PZAHH–6422A/B Pump (P-6420A/B) discharge line of Closed Drain Transfer
Discharge Line Pump (P-6420A/B).
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
8. INTERFACES BETWEEN SYSTEMS AND UNITS

This section specifically describes the interfaces between system and units and other
utilities interface to ensure the system has been appropriately protected. It is also
intended to ensure that the system is examined. Each interface will be discussed in the
following section.
8.1 Unit Isolation
Regarding to section 7.2.2, the BTJT-B wellhead platform is equipped with mitigating
system that is blowdown valves installed at each isolatable section. This isolatable
section will be limited by shutdown valves (SDV) which will be air actuated or
motorized valve (MOV) which will be electric driven. The isolatable sections are
summarized in the following table.
Table 8-1 Isolatable Sections
Section Equipment Tag Name SDV BDV Remarks
200-P0401-9C607-E50 WV-0210
200-P0402-9C607-E50 WV-0220
200-P0403-9C607-E50 WV-0230
200-P0404-9C607-E50 WV-0240
200-P0405-9C607-E50 WV-0250
Production
200-P0406-9C607-E50 MOV-0421 BDV-0411 -
Manifold
100-P0407-9C607-E50 MOV-0422
100-P0408-9C607-E50 MOV-0423
100-P0409-9C607-E50 MOV-0424
100-P0410-9C607-E50 MOV-0425
400-P0429-9C607-E50 SDV-1040
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Affected WV
(WV-
0210/0220/
200-P0413-9C607-E50 0230/0240/
200-P0414-9C607-E50 0250)
200-P0415-9C607-E50 MOV-0411 Only affected WV
Test Manifold BDV-0412
100-P0416-9C607-E50 will be closed.
MOV-0412
100-P0417-9C607-E50 MOV-0413
200-P0430-9C607-E50 MOV-0414
MOV-0415
SDV-1030
SDV-1030
SDV-1031
Test Separator V-1030 BDV-1030 -
SDV-1032
SDV-1033
SDV-1040
Production SDV-1041
V-1040 BDV-1040 -
Separator SDV-2410
SDV-2440
V-2410
Gas Compression SDV-2410
K-2420 BDV-2420 -
System Train A SDV-2420
E-2430
V-2440
Gas Compression SDV-2440
K-2450 BDV-2450 -
System Train B SDV-2450
E-2460
SDV-1040 will
SDV-1040 become a
SDV-1041 boundary limit
Liquid Transfer during early
Pump, Liquid SDV-2420 production whilst
P-1340A/B
Heater, Topside MOV-1311 BDV-1320 SDV-1041 will
Piping and Inlet of E-1330 become a
MOV-1312
FWS Pipeline boundary limit
MOV-1321 during operating of
SDV-1320 Production
Separator.
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
E-6020
150-PG0613-9C318B-N
100-PG0626-9C607-N
100-PG0620-9C607-N
100-PG0625-9C607-N
SDV-2940
50-PG6004-9C607-H40
SDV-6060
Gas Lift Pig 50-PG0601-9C607-N
Receiver, Topside SDV-0621
50-PG0602-9C607-N
Piping, Fuel Gas SDV-0622 BDV-2940 -
Heater and Gas Lift 50-PG0603-9C607-N
SDV-0623
Manifold 50-PG0604-9C607-N
SDV-0624
50-PG0605-9C607-N SDV-0625
50-PG0606-9C607-N
50-PG0607-9C607-N
50-PG0608-9C607-N
50-PG0609-9C607-N
50-PG0610-9C607-N
S-6060A/B
50-FG6005-9C607-H40
80-FG6006-3C607-H40
Fuel Gas Filter and SDV-6060
50-FG6007-3C607-H40
Inlet to GTG SDV-7510 BDV-6060 -
Package 50-FG6008-3C607-H40
SDV-7520
50-FG6010-3S600-H40
50-FG6050-3S600-H40
50-FG6019-3S600-H40
S-7510 SDV-7510
Fuel Gas Line to 50-FG6050-3S600-H40 SDV Fuel Gas BDV-7510 -
GTG A Package 50-FG6022-3S600-N Line Inside
50-FG6020-3S600-N GTG A Package
S-7520 SDV-7520
Fuel Gas Line to 50-FG6019-3S600-H40 SDV Fuel Gas BDV-7520 -
GTG B Package 50-FG6023-3S600-N Line Inside
50-FG6021-3S600-N GTG B Package
Revision : 0
PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM, INFIELD PIPELINES

AND HOST TIE IN MODIFICATION FOR BUKIT TUA PHASE 2B DEVELOPMENT Page : 40 of 49
PROJECT
8.2 Interfaces between High and Low Pressure Sections

The Bukit Tua wellhead christmas tree shall be rated to API 5000 including wing valves that are automated via the SIS.
Downstream line of wing valves shall be rated to ASME 900# and whilst the choke valves shall be rated to API 5000.
The flowlines, production manifold and test manifold downstream of the choke valves shall be rated to ASME 900# up
to the inlet of Test Separator and Production Separator respectively. Shutdown valves shall be installed to break piping
class to 300# for the Test Separator and Production Separator.
The gas lift system shall be fully rated to 900# up to the wellhead christmas tree.
For pumping system that requires a higher flange rating on the discharge, the discharge flange rating will be maintained
up to the pump suction isolation valve.
The review of the interface between systems and units has been evaluated in the following table.
Table 8-2 Pump Backflow Protection Summary Data
Backflow
Suction Discharge Differential What
Equipment Protection Safeguards
Description PID No. Pressure Pressure Pressure Mechanism
Tag Number Tag Employed/Rationale
(barg) (barg) (bar) Can Sustain
Number
High pressure
Closed Drain VX-13165 on inlet of Check valve at pump
B-B-PID- 0.2 – 0.3 13.6 – 13.9 13.4 – 13.6
P-6420A/B Transfer discharge
VX-13172 1524 Production
Pump
Separator
Backflow during
delivering liquid
to Closed Drain Check valve at pump
Open Drain VX-64146 B-B-PID- 0 1.1 1.1
P-6530 discharge
Pump 1526 Vessel (V-6420)
by Caisson
Pump (P-6540)
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PROJECT
Backflow
Number
Backflow during
delivering liquid
to Closed Drain Check valve at pump
VX-64272 B-B-PID- (-)0.6 – (-)0.53 1.2 – 1.3 1.8 – 1.9
P-6540 Caisson Pump discharge
1526 Vessel (V-6420)
by Open Drain
Pump (P-6530)
Corrosion
Inhibitor
CITHP of Check valve at pump
Injection N/A B-B-PID- 0 103.4 103.4
P-6860A-E discharge
Pump 1534 wellheads
(Wellhead
Injection)
Corrosion
Inhibitor
High pressure Check valve at pump
Injection N/A B-B-PID- 0 11.3 11.3
P-6860F discharge
Pump (FWS 1534 on FWS pipeline
Pipeline
Injection)
Scale Inhibitor
Injection CITHP of Check valve at pump
N/A B-B-PID- 0 103.4 103.4
P-6870A~E Pump discharge
1535 wellheads
(Wellhead
Injection)
Scale Inhibitor
Injection High pressure Check valve at pump
N/A B-B-PID- 0 10.9 10.9
P-6870F Pump (FWS discharge
1535 on FWS pipeline
Pipeline
Injection)
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PROJECT
Backflow
Number
Pour Point
CITHP of Check valve at pump
Depressant N/A B-B-PID- 0 103.5 103.5
P-6890A/B discharge
Injection 1536 wellheads
Pump
Backflow during
water filling to
Safety Service/Potable Check valve at pump
VX-52104 B-B-PID- 0 2.3 2.3
P-5220 Shower/Eye discharge
1538 /Wash Water
Washer Pump
Tote Tank (T-
5220)
Backflow during
Diesel diesel filling to Check valve at pump
VX-67125 B-B-PID- 0.7 1.7 1
P-6730 Transfer discharge
1539 Diesel Storage
Pump
Tank (T-6720)
Diesel CITHP of Check valve at pump

VX-67120 B-B-PID- 0 103.8 103.8
P-6770 Injection discharge
1539 wellheads
Pump
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
8.3 Interfaces with Utility System
This section specifically describes detail impact and consequences of the failure of
utility system at Bukit Tua BTJT-B platform. It also describes the management
strategy to mitigate any failure of utility system at Bukit Tua BTJT-B platform. The
detail impact and consequences of the failure are described as follow.
8.3.1 Electrical Power System
Electrical power generation at Bukit Tua BTJT-B platform shall be as 2x100%
configuration which consists of two (2) Gas Turbine Generator A/B (GT-
7510/7520) unit and one (1) Emergency Diesel Generator (GD-7730) unit.
The GTG unit is the primary electrical power generation to the platform. The
EDG shall be back-up power for the platform during emergency condition
and black start-up. No external power supply to be provided during SIPROD,
the GTG to be used as main power generation and EDG to be used for GTG
auxiliaries start up.
The GT-7510/7520 and GD-7730 will feed into a 400 VAC switchboard SB-
77100 for distribution to the various platforms loads. During normal
operation, GTG will be energized with 1x100% configuration to provide
power to the platform.
During synchronizing between GTG and EDG, the offload generator shall
regulate its voltage, frequency and phase angle to match with the onload
generator. Thus, EDG shall regulate itself to match with GTG’s voltage,
frequency and phase angle in order to synchronize with GTG, prior to load
transfer from GTG to EDG, and in the other hand GTG shall regulate itself to
match with EDG’s voltage, frequency and phase angle in order to synchronize
with EDG prior to load transfer from EDG to GTG.
8.3.2 Fuel Gas System
Gas lift and fuel gas source is taken from FPSO export line via BTJT-A
Wellhead Platform via 6” gas lift pipeline. Gas is received at BTJT-B and then
is routed to Fuel Gas Heater (E-6020). This heater is used to increase the
gas temperature.
The outlet of Fuel Gas Heater (E-6020) is then routed to Fuel Gas Filter (S-
6060A/B). The fuel gas pressure shall be reduced via a split range pressure
control valves approximately to 25 barg prior to be routed to 2x100% Fuel
Gas Filter (S-6060A/B). The fuel gas from Fuel Gas Filter (S-6060A/B) is then
routed to the Gas Turbine Generator A/B (GT-7510/7520) as fuel, to Gas
Compressor Train A/B (K-2420/2450) as primary seal gas and to vent header
as purge gas.
The Fuel Gas Filter (S-6060A/B) are equipped with Pressure Safety Valve
(PSV-6060A/B) to protect against overpressure due to control valve failure
when control valve is inadvertently open. The low temperature protection
(TALL) is also provided to protect the Gas Turbine Generator A/B (GT-
7510/7520) from any liquid condensation.
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
8.3.3 Instrument and Utility Air System

The Instrument Air Package (A-5410) system is designed to supply
instrument and utility air and consists of the following:
 1st Stage Air Compressors (K-5410A/B-1) and 2 nd Stage Air Compressors
(K-5410A/B-2).
 Intercooler (E-5410A/B-1) and Aftercooler (E-5410A/B-2).
 Inter Stage Moisture Separator (S-5410A/B-1) and Discharge Moisture
Separator (S-5410A/B-2).
 Air Pre-Filter (S-5411A/B).
 Air Dryer (S-5412A/B/C/D).
 Air After Filter (S-5413A/B).
 Instrument Air Receiver (V-5410).
 Utility Air Distribution Header.
 Instrument Air Distribution Header.
The control system for the Instrument Air Package (A-5410) is designed for
continuous operation without requiring operator attention. Air compressors
and air dryers are provided with a common Unit Control Panel (UCP). The air
compressors are controlled via VENDOR’s supplied UCP in a lead/lag mode
to start and stop the compressors based on the air demand to users.
The instrument air supply pressure to instrument air distribution header is
controlled by 2x100% pressure regulators, operating in parallel. These
pressure regulators are configured in an active-monitor configuration with
staggered set point. The flow of utility air from the discharge of Instrument
Air Receiver (V-5410) to utility air distribution header is controlled by two
(2) regulators. The upstream pressure regulator is set at 8 barg. If the
upstream air pressure is above 8 barg, the upstream pressure regulator will
be fully open, supplying utility air to the users. If the upstream pressure falls
below 8 barg, this valve will be closed and the utility air flow will be stopped,
prioritizing air supply to the instrumentations. The downstream pressure
regulator will regulate the utility air supply pressure at 7 barg.
Low-low pressure protection (PZALL) is also installed at instrument air
distribution header. Two (2) out of three (3) (2oo3) voting will be
implemented on PZALL-5425A/B/C that is set at 4.2 barg. When two (2) of
PZALL-5425 A/B/C are triggered, the Process Shutdown (PSD) will be
initiated.
8.3.4 Interfaces with Drain System
The Closed Drain Vessel (V-6420) shall act as a knock-out drum for the vent
and designed to accommodate draining of the production and test manifold,
Test Separator (V-1030), Production Separator (V-1040) and other process
vessels installed at BTJT-B.
The Closed Drain Vessel (V-6420) has been provided with liquid level control
that starts the Closed Drain Transfer Pump (P-6420A/B). The pumps operate
in a lead/lag basis during SIPROD (well unloading). During normal operation,
the pumps are 2x100% operation. A high-high liquid level at the Closed Drain
Vessel (V-6420) shall initiate Process Shutdown (PSD). A low-low liquid level
shall shutdown the transfer pumps via the SIS (USD trip).
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
The open drain system will be directed to an Open Drain Tank (T-6530) with
overflow to an Open Drain Caisson (T-6540) on the platform. Pneumatically
driven Open Drain Pump (P-6530) and Caisson Pump (P-6540) will transfer
any oil separated in the Open Drain Tank (T-6530) and the Open Drain
Caisson (T-6540) respectively to the Closed Drain Vessel (V-6420) or to the
bucket at sub cellar deck. All the operations regarding the open drain system
shall be performed manually.
Both Closed Drain Vessel (V-6420) and Open Drain Tank (T-6530) will be
equipped by electric heaters to ensure liquid is in a fluidic state for ease of
pumping during maintenance.
9. MISCELLANEOUS
This section describes the aspect of the process safeguarding procedure that are not
addressed in the previous section of the safeguarding memorandum to be understood by
the operation personnel.
9.1 Operation of Interlocking System for PSV
In normal operation, the interlocking system provided for the block valves of the
relief valve is arranged so that the inlet block valve of the open dummy on the spare
position is closed and the block valve on the outlet is open. This configuration is
used because the pressure rating of the outlet PSV is lower than the inlet PSV.
Changeover is accomplished in the following sequence:
1. The inlet block valve of the spare relief valve is opened and locked.
2. The inlet of the relief valve to be removed is closed.
3. The outlet of the relief valve to be removed is closed.
4. The removed relief valve is replaced by a spool piece (dummy).
5. The outlet block valve of the dummy is opened and locked.
9.2 Operation of Locking System for Pig Launcher/Pig Receiver
In pipeline pigging operation, locking device is provided for block valve at kicker
line, inlet pig launcher/pig receiver block valve, block valves at drain lines and block
valves at vent lines. At BTJT-B, drain and vent for pig launcher/pig receiver are
connected to a closed system (closed drain header and vent header). The basic
functionality of locking device for pig launcher/pig receiver is as follow:
 All main and kicker line block valves to the launcher/receiver are locked closed
before the closure door is opened;
 The vent and drain block valves are opened and closed again. This activity may
have to be repeated several times before the closure door is opened;
 After launching or receiving pig, the launcher/receiver is guaranteed to be
vented and drained (when block valves at vent and drain line are opened, the
block valves at main and kicker line to the launcher/receiver are closed).
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
9.3 Operating Procedures
Specific operating procedures are required for some of the processes in this facility
whereby the system and equipment are not designed with engineering safeguards
but merely depend on the valve operation control to achieve the required level of
protection.
Generally, the Process Monitoring and Control System (PMCS) shall provide the
process control and monitoring for the facilities and be the primary operator
interface to the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and other equipment package
control panels. The control hardware and marshalling cabinets shall be in the E&I
room, which shall be pressurized and air-conditioned.
PMCS has an overall availability of 99.99%. PMCS shall also be based on redundant
hot/standby controllers, redundant networks and simplex I/O structure. PMCS is
also utilized for regulatory set-point control, sequential control, on/off control, non-
safety related interlocks, process monitoring and alarm purposes. PMCS shall be
fully pre-programmed with extensive capabilities and options for control and data
acquisition including but not limited to:
 Computational function.
 Any combination of continuous/discrete/sequential and advanced (cascade)
control algorithms.
BTJT-B Wellhead Platform shall be remotely monitored and controlled from the
FPSO. Field instrumentation in general shall meet the requirement for
environmental, service conditions and area classification of the installed location.
9.4 Equipment Isolation, Start Up, and Shut Down Procedures
The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) shall include separate elements for
Emergency Shutdown (ESD), Process Shutdown (PSD) and Unit Shutdown (USD).
The Emergency Shutdown is further sub-divided to ESD-1 and ESD-2. The Fire and
Gas system shall also be configured onto the SIS system.
Emergency depressurizing (automatic blowdown) is considered the highest level of
shutdown for the platform and only be activated during confirmed fire detection,
SIPROD on the platform or via specific pushbutton or break glass initiators at the
operator’s discretion. During SIPROD mode, ESD-2 at normal mode shall be
upgraded to ESD-1 with automatic blowdown with provision of time delay. Operation
team shall determine the time delay prior to SIPROD. While PSD and some of USDs
at normal mode will be upgraded to ESD-2 during SIPROD.
During normal operation (no drilling activity) when confirmed fire is detected, ESD-
1 shall be triggered and automatic blowdown will be activated.
The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) shall be PLC based and shall carry out the
required process safety and protection functions on the remote platform. The
primary objective of the SIS is to safeguard personnel, equipment and prevent
pollution to the environment.
This system is expected to achieve the following functions:
 Monitor the process shutdown due to fire and gas initiators.
 Provide first-up indication of the shutdown causes.
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
 Perform shutdown logic as per the Process Cause and Effect Matrix.
 Provide local shutdown (ESD/PSD/USD) and shutdown reset (ESD/PSD/USD)
facility.
 Provide remote shutdown (ESD/PSD/USD).
 Provide maintenance and start-up override.
 Remote reset and start-up will be allowed upon remote initiation of USD and
PSD from the FPSO via BTJT-B with maximum of 3 hours in the plan shutdown
condition.
 Provide remote shutdown from the FPSO.
Another objective of the SIS is to prevent uncontrollable sequence of events
following process upsets or abnormal plant conditions. In such events, the shutdown
system will initiate necessary shutdowns in a controlled manner to bring the facility
to a safe state.
9.5 Flame and Detonation Arrestors
An unignited or ‘cold’ vent will be provided at BTJT-B for venting, SIPROD

depressurizing and maintenance activities. The vent will be equipped with CO2
snuffing system.
The vent system shall comprise of headers from the closed drains and vent
collections, a Closed Drains Vessel (V-6420) that serves as a knock-out drum, vent
header, a vent flowmeter, vent boom and a vent tip. The Closed Drain Vessel (V-
6420), vent header and the piping supports shall be designed to withstand the
overpressure from an internal explosion.
In BTJT-B platform, the vent gas from Wellhead Control Panel and pneumatic driven
pump engines will be individually local venting. The requirement of either to safe
location will depend on the sources.
9.6 Other Safeguarding Issues
Relief devices shall be located above the header into which they discharge. The
upstream piping shall slope down towards the protected equipment and the
downstream piping shall slope down towards to the vent header.
In the event of a general instrument air failure, control valves action shall be
established to prevent any unsafe conditions. The sequences applied for the
selection of the control valve sparing action are as follow:
 Shut-off supply.
 Open off-gas line to vent system.
 Close all product lines.
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
10. PROCESS SAFEGUARDING FLOW SCHEME (PSFS)

This “Safeguarding Memorandum” report should be read in conjunction with Process
Safeguarding Flow Scheme (PSFS) to show the more detail of ultimate safeguards,
mitigating system and penultimate safeguards. The PSFS for BTJT-B are generated based
on Process Flow Diagram (PFD), Utility Flow Diagram (UFD) and safeguard elements
present on the P&IDs.
The PSFS lists are as follows:
Table 10-1 Process Safeguarding Flow Scheme (PSFS) List
No. Drawing No. Drawing Title
1 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8001 PSFS Production System

2 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8002 PSFS Separation System
3 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8003 PSFS Gas Lift Pipeline
PSFS Vent, Blowdown, Closed Drain and
4 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8004
Open Drain Collection
5 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8005 PSFS Fuel Gas System
6 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8006 PSFS Chemical Injection System
7 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8007 PSFS Diesel System
8 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8008 PSFS Vent, Open and Closed Drain System
9 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8009 PSFS Instrument Air and Utility Air
10 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8010 PSFS Gas Turbine Generator
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
APPENDIX A
PROCESS SAFEGUARDING FLOW SCHEME (PSFS)
M EI N DO
ELANG INDAH
PETRONAS

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BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD

PROJECT : PROVISION OF ENGINEERING, PROCUREMENT,

CLIENT : PC KETAPANG II LTD

CONTRACT NO. : 4850000373

DOCUMENT TITLE : SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM

0 06-Mar-20 Approved for Construction SBG RAW/TDT/RSD AS EDS SAE/IG

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD

SECTION REV DATE DESCRIPTION

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD

COMMENT RESPONSE SHEET

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD

6. PROCESS DESIGN, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ..................................11

7. SAFEGUARDING ELEMENTS ........................................................................16

8. INTERFACES BETWEEN SYSTEMS AND UNITS ............................................37

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD

8.2 INTERFACES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE SECTIONS ...........40

10. PROCESS SAFEGUARDING FLOW SCHEME (PSFS) ......................................48

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

NO. DOC NO. REV. DOCUMENT TITLE

A. Indonesian Act and Regulations

B. Project Specifications and Datasheet

4. 11-BTJT-B-B-SCM-8001~8010 B1 Process Safeguarding Flow Scheme

5. BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0005 0 Operation and Maintenance

7. BTP2B-EPCIC-BTJTB-B-DES-0007 0 Process Control and Safeguarding

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

NO. DOC NO. REV. DOCUMENT TITLE

9. 11-BTJT-B-B-PID-1501~1545 B1 Piping and Instrumentation

11. As required - Equipment Vendor Documents

12. As required - Equipment Datasheets

C. Petronas Technical Standards (PTS) and Construction Standard Procedures (CSP)

2. PTS 16.51.02 May Safeguarding Memorandum (SM)

D. International Codes and Standards

4. DOCUMENTS ORDER OF PRECEDENCE

It is the CONTRACTOR responsibility to present the issues and/or differences among

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

Any latest amendments/new additions to the standard and regulation shall be

If the CONTRACTOR proposes to employ an alternative standard this shall be

5. TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

VENDOR The company that manufactures or supplies equipment and

“VENDOR” covers Manufacturer/Supplier/Sub-vendor.

The following abbreviations are commonly used in this document:

barg bar gauge

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

FTHP Flowing Tube Head Pressure

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

6. PROCESS DESIGN, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

The BTJT-B Wellhead Platform is required to accommodate five (5) single

All production fluid is routed to the production manifold before entering

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM, INFIELD PIPELINES AND

Figure 6-1 BTJT-B Facility

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

6.2 Process Unit Design Basis

6.3 Operator Intervention

Operator intervention can be considered if all the following conditions are

PROVISION OF EPCIC OF BTJT-B WELLHEAD PLATFORM,

c. The consequences of ineffective, or no, operator intervention shall be

6.4 Control Valve Bypass

6.5 Maintenance Strategy for Relief Valve

Requirement for maintenance shall be addressed to pressure relief devices

6.6 Administrative Controls

The use of engineering controls is preferred to administrative controls when it